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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
197. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, September 9, 1965, 0620Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 INDIA. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 4:13 a.m., and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USIA at 4:40 a.m. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, London, USUN, Karachi, and Madras. 531. Embtel 330./2/ We are now reviewing our ongoing programs in light of effect of current hostilities. Over course of next week we shall be sending Dept series of separate messages covering economic aid, military aid, Peace Corps and USIS programs. /2/In telegram 330 from New Delhi, August 19, the Embassy questioned the wisdom of using food assistance as a lever to promote agricultural policy decisions promoted by the United States. The telegram discussed the issues still in question with respect to negotiating a new P.L. 480 agreement. (Ibid.) It is our belief that most new loan action as well as fourth plan dialogue should be suspended at least for duration of fighting although monitoring of past loans and existing and developing technical assistance projects should continue normally as possible. Cable reviewing this subject is now in preparation. Most urgent decision we require is on PL 480. GOI estimates that supplies wheat available under current PL 480 agreement (including July 26 60 day amendment) would be completely shipped by about Oct 25. If break in supply line is to be avoided, we would have to conclude new agreement within next two weeks to allow sufficient time for Indian supply mission Washington to begin purchases and arrange shipping for additional supplies after shipments under current agreement are completed. Even if fighting should peter out, food shortage in India is likely to be serious to desperate in next 12 months, though too early to make firm estimates, prospects are that delay in monsoon will result in harvests significantly below level of last year. Pressure on foodstocks, already great, will be accentuated by current hostilities which bound to stimulate increased speculation and hoarding. If in addition there should be a gap in arrivals of wheat and other commodities from US, it would be impossible to make it up by accelerating subsequent shipments since current GOI import requirements are already very near capacity of ports and internal transport system when scheduled on regular basis. Continued flow imports is necessary to enable GOI prevent breakdown existing distribution arrangements and to plan efficient utilization wheat and rice on yearly basis, and to avoid disastrous consequence for Indian people. I wish to emphasize that if we should fail maintain shipments, effects on India and our position here would be drastic. Though Indians could get by for little while on indigenous supplies, existing stocks and some new cash purchases, they would quickly run into major catastrophe affecting tens of millions of people. Present stocks are meager and Indians lack foreign exchange for substantial cash purchases abroad. Indians would thus soon be running out of food and inability meet rationing commitments would result severe repercussions in major metropolitan area. Moreover our unique ability assist in easing food shortages will do much improve our political position here which has been severely damaged by use of US planes and tanks by Paks. Equally important, when hostilities terminated hopefully in near future, adequate food will be primary requisite for economic stability and continuance development. I assume there may be objectives under present circumstances to negotiating new agreement along lines recommended Embtel 330. If this is case I urge, for reasons indicated above, immediate authorization to conclude further amendment of Sept 30, 1964, agreement for additional million tons of wheat plus available rice and non-fat dry milk with assurances to GOI that we intend continue to help feed people. Bowles
198. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, September 9, 1965, 1245Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Received at 8:41 p.m., and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA at 9 p.m. Repeated to London, New Delhi, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 428. Subject: Kashmir. Deptel 290./2/ I met for 45 minutes today with FonMin Bhutto to present US response GOP request for invocation defense agreement. I paraphrased reftel and later sent FonMin minute. I added US concerting all our resources behind Security Council and SecGen. We cannot say what next step would be if current initiative should not work. We do not even want to envisage possibility of it not working, and assume FonMin would agree on this. Bhutto replied if UN were only means of securing justice and meeting armed aggression, there would be no need for bilateral alliances. /2/Document 188. If only reason for bilateral agreement with US were to refer to UN then Pakistan might as well not have that agreement. US/Pak agreement is special arrangement and obligation US with respect Pakistan. To refer GOP now to UN is to say US not willing fulfill its obligations. Situation all the more complicated than heretofore since UN has done nothing effective over 18 years re Kashmir. This was Indian intention and if [it?] is base your reply, we might as well [have?] listened to Indians. Fear GOP must make special note of that. US/Pak bilateral agreement not dependent upon UN blessing. If that, however, US approach, must say it causes disappointment GOP. I pointed out I had not said current UN approach the full extent our reaction. It first step and hopefully enough lay basis for settlement acceptable GOP but obviously must get cease fire and withdrawal forces both sides. We have said that "depends upon responses both sides." We recognize our responsibility to go beyond first step if that does not work. If you cooperate in good faith and clarity, US has responsibility. Bhutto said time is of essence. We cannot go by stages when fate of nation hangs in balance. India has violated pledges and promises to people of Kashmir and violated UN resolution. India has embarked on aggression, in East Pakistan by economic aggression, expelling Muslims, infiltrating Jammu. India has perhaps over-reacted. India has committed aggression against Kashmir. Pakistan cannot commit aggression there, they are our own people. India reoccupied Kargil posts August 30, and on August 24 undertook Poonch offensive. GOP had to react but only did so in disputed territory. At every stage India has escalated; by crossing CFL, by launching Uri-Poonch offensive. But nobody, even our allies, came to us and acknowledged those actions as provocative. As self-respecting people we had react. India then determined to react anew and invade Pak territory. I asked about GOP position of implementation cease fire and withdrawal as first step. Bhutto replied this happened in past with very same language, cease fire, UN resolution and promises to bring full weight to bear. Now people have made sacrifices and India has committed aggression. With all that should we repeat mistakes of past and accept cease fire? What is different element to assure India would take different position? Eighteen years ago it was easier accept cease fire, now it much more complicated. We want cease fire but are not going to permit surrender our vital interest. India has no vital interest in Kashmir. Pakistan has vital moral, ethnic, religious interest. Am afraid matter not being looked at objectively. Cease fire must form part of final Kashmir settlement along lines: a) India and Pakistan vacate territory, b) UN administration of law and order for period approximately six months, c) plebiscite within precisely stipulated time. Without that there can be no solution. I said India not able to agree to that now and Bhutto responded, "Then let them destroy Pakistan!" I observed FonMin must be aware there new sense of urgency concerning Kashmir problem compared that past 18 years. Not possible now treat issue passively. Impossible with new situation fail seek acceptable solution. Bhutto said, "People of Kashmir alone must decide, and no solution is complete without people of Kashmir expressing right of self determination. This is battle of survival for Pakistan. We must be either degraded as nation or prevail. We prepared fight to finish. Pakistan is small country but morality is on our side and Pak people united. You cannot destroy a people and their spirit by one battle in Lahore." I interjected that force no ultimate answer. Bhutto retorted, "What has happened over past 18 years?" I pointed out to FonMin his position amounted to saying GOP not willing abandon use of force even if other side withdrew. He replied Pakistan has been invaded. I asked if invader withdraws, would that not be better than throwing him out? Bhutto replied, "Yes, if he also withdrew from Jammu and Kashmir." I said it new position that Jammu and Kashmir part of Pakistan. Bhutto said no, it goes back at least a year. I asked does not plebiscite come first, and Bhutto responded with, "Why has there not been a plebiscite last 18 years?" I said Amb Bowles making urgent representation New Delhi today, and I hoped India would agree to cease fire and withdraw, albeit, I did not expect that would include Jammu and Kashmir. I pointed out that all our persuasiveness has been brought to bear beyond any other thought possible before. Bhutto observed US position India of special character but with Pakistan US has special moral and contractual obligations. Commented surely US can do more than direct GOP to UN. I asked FonMin about GOP position concerning visit UN SecGen. Bhutto said GOP did not object to welcoming him so he might see for himself. He expressed facetious hope Article 19 question sufficiently resolved to permit UN pay SecGen air fare. Noting that question and other UN problems, Bhutto said please take such indications (of weakness) into account before putting all US might behind UN. Said valuable time has been lost with possibly far-reaching consequences. Stressed bilateral obligations not superseded by UN. I acknowledged US bilateral responsibilities go beyond appeal to UN if that should not work. However, as our treaties usually indicate, we seek work within UN if possible. Bhutto said late Secretary Dulles had promised immediate US action event Indian aggression. Said Under Secretary Ball became irritated when Bhutto pointed out US would not intervene promptly enough. Cited late President Kennedy's saying US would break relations with India in event aggression. Amb Harriman had asserted US simply would not permit Indian attack. Bhutto commented now GOP fears being realized. I pointed out to FonMin US using its might right now, and I was not saying if present efforts do not work that we will not try other ways. I said that if GOP could only cooperate, likelihood was more serious effort than ever before seek acceptable solution. Bhutto retorted that people of Kashmir most concerned, suffering as they do from genocide, expulsion and violation from India. I observed India must be brought to accept any agreement of her own free will. To be [garble--viable?] all three parties must be willing to accept, i.e., Pakistan, India, and Kashmir. Bhutto responded, "We not bartering over piece of territory but are concerned with fate five million people. If they want Indian, okay. If they wish to be part of Pakistan, that's fine. If they wish something else, that's all right too. Whatever they want." I told FonMin US hoped GOP can see way clear accept UN initiative as outlined by me if Indians accept. Said such acceptance would buy time. Valuable time in which to work toward agreement. Observed that in unfortunate case India should not accept, GOP would be in strong diplomatic position and thus could not lose either way. Bhutto said GOP had tried UN and been humiliated, been treated there as naive and stupid, subjected to cynical discussion and told to be realistic. Said he had told UN representatives sub-continent could take fire in absence settlement, but they said that impossible. Bhutto claimed GOP had tried very hard obtain peaceful settlement. GOP had accepted all 14 proposals made, as well as UN resolution, Commonwealth initiative, GOP had refrained from taking advantage in Sino-Indian crisis, listened to intermediaries, participated in discussions in Geneva, FonMin maintained GOP had always taken initiatives in seeking peaceful solution. Reiterated it necessary study totality of problem. I suggested GOP receptivity possible visit SecGen signified to me that GOP not prepared abandon peaceful solution and is keeping mind open. Bhutto replied, "Open mind, yes! But a positive cease fire, cease fire which means settlement, plebiscite." Bhutto pointed to Pak locale on crossroads of Asia, asking how can Paks as Oriental people prevent visit their country SecGen who also Asian. Said GOP of course has no objection but if SecGen thinks he not going to address self to heart of matter but simply put forth Indian position, his visit can serve no useful purpose. I observed SecGen certainly not going present GOI position, and I reiterated necessity both sides stop shooting and seek agreement. Bhutto replied that matter of formality. Said cease fire without larger agreement not possible. I asked FonMin if any further intelligence available concerning Indian movements last few hours. He replied no, he then referred Peenion Vielt, calling him old friend of Pakistan, and saying such visit would also be welcome but in same way and manner as the UN SecGen. Reiterated that to be meaningful any discussion must [be] addressed to main problem. Said this matter for US more than any other country. McConaughy
199. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 10, 1965, 6:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IV, Memos and Miscellaneous, 8/65-9/65. Secret. Pak/Indian Roundup. Still no clear picture of the situation on the only really active front in the Punjab below Kashmir. Pak counter-attacks in the Lahore area have taken them well into India, and Delhi seems quite worried. The SYG doesn't seem to have gotten very far in his talks with the Paks, who are still insisting on a Kashmir settlement as part of any cease-fire agreement. Nor does McConaughy's latest talk with Bhutto (Karachi 428/2/ attached) show much give. /2/Document 198. The much more guarded tone of Indian statements suggests that Delhi is getting worried over Pak counterattacks. Chavan's denial India was attacking East Pakistan is the first bright move they've made so far. But Delhi's 564/3/ from an excellent source shows little give as yet either. /3/In telegram 564 from New Delhi, September 10, the Embassy reported on a conversation with Sarvepalli Gopal, Director of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs and son of President Radhakrishnan. According to Gopal, India had no territorial ambitions in Pakistan, but had established the objective in the war of destroying the Pakistani military capability, thereby also finally settling the Kashmir issue. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) The consensus here is that neither side will begin to negotiate seriously until more blood has been let. Many of us feel that the Paks will do quite well militarily in the next week or so in the key Punjab sector. But this would only humiliate the Indians and probably make them less likely to stop shooting. The Paks are already beginning to worry about running out of ammo, etc. at which time Indian weight would begin to tell. Our Muslim friends (Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia especially) are eager to show their sympathy to the Paks./4/ We don't think we ought to growl at them too much because they won't provide significant support and it helps for the Paks to think they have at least a few anchors left to Westward. /4/The Embassy in Tehran reported on September 9 that the Shah had received a telephone call from Ayub with an urgent request for help. Ayub reportedly said that the ally capable of providing the most effective assistance was the United States, which was failing to respond probably because of a desire to see Pakistan destroyed and one Indian nation emerge on the subcontinent. (Telegram 313 from Tehran; ibid.) On September 10 Iran and Turkey issued a joint communiqué, which fixed responsibility for the war on the subcontinent on India, and expressed their readiness to support Pakistan. They also endorsed the appeal of the UN Secretary-General for a cease-fire, and indicated that they were prepared to put contingents of their armed forces at the disposal of the United Nations as peacekeeping forces. (Telegram 274 from Ankara, September 10; ibid.) PM Wilson told the Paks he saw a solution emerging in four stages: (a) cease fire; (b) return to status quo; (c) neutralize and quiet Kashmir; and (d) a Kashmir settlement. U Thant too says the UN would probably have to take on the Kashmir issue again. The Brits apparently envisage some Commonwealth initiative if U Thant fails, and are probing Moscow's view. Nothing from the Chicoms so far except more noise. But Delhi fears the Paks may try to incite India to attack East Pakistan, because this would trigger the Chicoms. R. W. Komer/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
200. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 10, 1965, 1005Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Karachi, London, New Delhi, USUN, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, and passed to the White House, USIA, DOD, and CIA. 52. Deptel 312 to Karachi./2/ Suspension military aid shipments to Pakistan and India. /2/See footnote 2, Document 194. I saw FornMin Bhutto in Rawalpindi 5:30 p.m. Sept 9 to deliver text Mahon Congressional statement (Deptel 310 to Karachi)./3/ Transmittal this report on meeting delayed by difficulties of night work and movement owing to blackout and curfew with added handicaps incident to removal of 500-lb. Indian dud bomb from environs Embassy residence last night. /3/See footnote 3, Document 190. Bhutto read full text which I delivered to him and listened attentively to my exposition of what the action did and did not signify./4/ After long pause he described our action in tone of foreboding as a fateful one which adhered to, would mean that Pak-U.S. relations could not be the same again. He termed the decision an act not of an ally and not even that of a neutral. Rather, it was an act which would be of net benefit to the Indian side. He argued that India with its varied sources of foreign supply, its larger domestic armaments industry and its greater industrial capacity and reserves could stand the loss of U.S. supply flow far better than could Pakistan, which had placed all of its reliance on the U.S. and was almost totally dependent on this one source. Attrition was already becoming a problem for the Pak forces and attrition would soon have a ruinous effect on Pakistan's ability to defend itself if U.S. decision not reversed. Said Paks would fight on to finish with sticks and stones and with bare hands if necessary, but their ability to hold back Indian attack would be vitally undermined by this U.S. blow. He asked to convey the earnest plea of the GOP for reconsideration. /4/On September 10 the Department also sent notice to Karachi and New Delhi that effective September 10 no further commercial licenses for the export of munitions to India and Pakistan were to be issued. In addition, all shipments of munitions to the two countries for which valid licenses had been issued but which had not left the United States were stopped. (Telegram 350 to Karachi, also sent as telegram 427 to New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Bhutto said that if U.S. intent by this action was to put pressure on Pakistan to compel it to accept UNSYG's proposals, we would be disappointed, for pressure effort would have exact oppsite effect. GOP would now be even less inclined than before to accept proposals which would not contain assured provision for withdrawal of Indian armed forces from Kashmir and exercise of self-determination right by Kashmiris. Pakistan would not respond to the kind of pressure inherent in the U.S. action. Bhutto gave an impassioned account of history of Kashmir troubles with India over last four months beginning with May 15 Indian occupation of posts on Pak territory near Kargil and ending with outright Indian invasion of territory of Pakistan proper across international border on Sept 6, which had introduced an entirely new dimension into the conflict. This was a deliberate act of aggressive war which had to be treated apart from the Kashmir fighting. Pakistan stood at a historic crossroads and was fighting for its very existence against a total Indian challenge. It was crucial for allies and friends of Pakistan, among which the U.S. came first, to understand this and to respond. Pakistan could not fathom U.S. refusal to see the case of her ally in the hour of that ally's trial and victimization by Indian aggressor, an aggressor that had never had any regard for the U.S. and had never assumed any commitments to or done anything for the U.S. He pled with us to stop the Indian aggression by cutting off economic assistance to India, including PL-480 food, until India terminated the aggression against Pakistan. Argued that action just announced by U.S. would be of only minor consequence to Indians, but a disastrous reverse to Pakistan. It would reward the aggressor and brand the U.S. as unwilling even to follow a neutral course toward a beleaguered ally. No one could deny that Pakistan had been attacked on her own undisputed territory on Sept 6 and was engaged in a fight for her national existence. Was this not an exercise of legitimate self-defense? Bhutto bitterly recounted Indian cruelties and repressions against Kashmiris on both sides of CFL, stating that Shastri govt far more vicious than Nehru govt in exterminating and deporting Muslims, facilitating influx of Hindu migrants, trying to rub out distinctive indigenous character Kashmir state and people, and re-introducing worst aspects of old Dogra regime. I sought to stem Bhutto tirade by pointing out that we were convinced that action was for preservation of Pakistan as well as subcontinent as a whole; that unconditional acceptance now by Pakistan of Security Council's and SYG's proposals would in any event protect Pakistan from victimization by superior military power of India; that our action was not punitive or threatening, but an unwillingness (demanded by U.S. public opinion and feelings of humanitarianism) to fuel a destructive conflict totally irreconcilable with the principles of peaceful negotiation and settlement which we believed were the only ones which would work. I told Bhutto it seemed to us that GOP was refusing to abandon the resort to force unless it attained in advance full agreement to its basic objectives as to Kashmir. It was not sensible to assume that this most intractable of world issues that has defied all solution efforts for 18 years could be settled now by the attachment of a Pakistani-prescribed rider to a cease-fire agreement. It would not be politically conceivable for any Indian government to concede the whole basic issue in relation to cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire and withdrawal by both sides would have to come first and Pakistan would need to take it on faith that a most resolute and concentrated multilateral effort to achieve a negotiated peaceful settlement would be mounted immediately thereafter. Bhutto said with conviction that it would not be possible to ask the brave Pakistani soldiers or the Kashmir freedom fighters who had sacrificed so much to accept a capitulation by the GOP to the old status quo which would certainly mean a repetition of the intolerable delays, defiances, and deceptions of the Indians over the last 18 years, with even greater ruthlessness and intransigence to be expected from the Indians after their success. The Indians were demanding cease-fire terms which would fully consolidate their strangle hold on Kashmir. Pakistan could never accede to such terms, or accept a formula which would render meaningless all the sacrifices of those patriots standing fast against India oppression. I said the GOP must be aware of the fact that our decision not to fuel the conflagration on either side was not only the decision of the Executive branch but of the Legislative branch and the U.S. people as well, a decision which the GOP should not expect to be changed in present situation. If unhappy contingency arose where India would be in position of defying UN after Pakistan accepted SC and UNSYG proposals, an entirely new situation would be created which would have to be examined on its merits. Bhutto put in a plea for permission for Pakistan to buy for cash the necessary military supplies from the U.S. to keep its defense machine going, if the U.S. adhered to its position that it could not continue the flow on the usual grant basis. He said the Pakistanis would sell all their possessions, even their family heirlooms in order to get the means to continue the struggle until the Indian invasion repulsed and Kashmiri rights established. Pakistan would somehow obtain the necessary means of continuing the struggle by one means or another. I told him he knew the matter with us was not one of dollars and cents in this hour of trial but of doing the best we could to stop the holocaust and start the search for a peaceful settlement which could endure. The difficult meeting ended on a somber note with an oppressive feeling on my part that more ominous developments may be in the air./5/ /5/McConaughy sent a more detailed account of the conversation to the Department on September 11 in telegram 444. (Ibid.) McConaughy
201. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, September 11, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to USUN, Karachi, London, and the White House. The telegram does not indicate the time of transmission; it was received at 2:55 p.m. 576. In response to what he described as urgent request I called on Pres Radhakrishnan Saturday afternoon at 5. He said he had great deal on his mind and covered wide variety of subjects. Following are highlights: 1. At session with U Thant tomorrow India is prepared to say at outset that it fully accepts Security Council resolution to pull back its troops all along line providing Pakistan pulls back theirs including infiltrators they have introduced into Kashmir. Since infiltrators have been returning in large numbers to Azad Kashmir during last few days latter question seemed more manageable than it might have been week ago. President added that there might be some continuing negotiations in regard to few sections of Azad Kashmir including Kargil and Haji Pir Pass which controls strategic transportation routes into Kashmir Valley, or within Valley. However he did not think this needed to be sticking point. Solution might lie in adjustments along ceasefire line where India could compensate Pakistan for strategic areas they have in mind. Or if this were not acceptable to Pakistan he thought India would agree to accept guarantee of more adequate controls by UN. President added that U Thant was staying with him, and that he looked forward to some good talks. In response I stated that we welcomed willingness of Indians to accept Security Council resolution, and I understood India's conviction that military question be detached at this stage from Kashmir political problem. However I wondered if India could not offer Pakistan some concession in political field such as proposal for two year cooling off period during which each country would seek to improve atmosphere on subcontinent through cultural exchanges, elimination of propaganda and radio attacks, etc. At end of this cooling off period it could be agreed that outstanding economic and political questions would be discussed by series of committees and commissions. Radhakrishnan replied that he personally could see no objection to this suggestion although he did not think that it was possible to agree to the Kashmir adjustments that Pakistan has in mind. Best solution would be changes in present ceasefire line, but even this could not be tackled in present heated atmosphere; no Indian govt could survive that agreed to give up any Kashmir soil under these conditions. 2. Against background of Swaran Singh's statement last night that India was trying to keep fighting at minimum during U Thant visit, I asked about reports seeping into Delhi of heavy casualties and losses on both sides. Radhakrishnan stated that Swaran Singh was correct in that India was not attempting to advance but rather was fighting from strong defensive positions. Paks had attacked persistently with heavy commitment of their armored strength and except for one small area had been repulsed. He added that morale in Pak army seemed to be deteriorating rapidly. Twelve Patton tanks had been captured today when their crews deserted; two others had surrendered. I asked the President if any casualty figures were available and he said confidentially that Indians had lost 8,000 killed. When I expressed surprise at this high figure, he said the Pak losses had been significantly heavier. When I pressed to get count of prisoners, wounded, etc., he retreated from his original estimate, saying that he might have been wrong. (Note: This is much higher than any other figure we have had thus far.) 3. President stated he was worried about what seemed to him clearly provocative action Pak Air Force was now taking in East Pakistan. It was to India's obvious interest to neutralize East Pakistan and confine fighting to western front. However hotheads in Pak Air Force were doing their best to stir up Indian military on grounds that major fighting in East Pakistan would help to bring Chinese into war. I made strong plea for India to exercise moderation, pointing out that most important thing right now is to be sure politicians control military and that India is not led into blunders by military men who were oblivious to political realities. At this point Radhakrishnan rang bell by his chair and when one of his military aides entered room, he said, "Please ask the Air Marshal (meaning Arjan Singh) to call on me at 6 pm." I remarked that President seemed to be exercising his prerogatives as CIC. President replied that although he was not directly involved in military questions he was in position to play moderating role and he knew that Arjan Singh would listen to him. 4. Conversation turned to question of China. Radhakrishnan said Indian Govt is deeply worried about possibility of Chinese attack, particularly because language of recent Chinese note was reminiscent of threats India had received in early fall of 1962. If attack should come, what could India expect from US? I responded that our actions would no doubt depend on conditions existing at that time. In view of our long efforts to contain ComChina over last twenty years we obviously had no desire to see them overrun Assam or any part of India. At same time we had no desire to underwrite total war on subcontinent. Therefore much would depend on genuineness of India's efforts to reach agreement with Pakistan so that bulk of her resources could be used against China. I stressed that I could not speak for President, that I was only giving him my offhand personal view. Radhakrishnan stated that he fully understood and thought that my analysis was fair. 5. President stated India was also worried about Indonesia, Turkey and Iran. In case of Indonesia Indians had made official request to Soviet Union to cut off spare parts, ammunition and other supplies as we had done in case of India and Pakistan. So far GOI had not received reply. In regard to Turkey and Iran, India hoped that we would not permit shipment of arms obtained under CENTO./2/ He understood that Iran was also intending to supply Pakistan with petroleum products. /2/ Ambassador Nehru called on Secretary Rusk on September 11 with an urgent request for a U.S. public statement opposing outside intervention in the conflict. Nehru cited reports that Turkey and Iran might supply Pakistan with military equipment obtained from the United States. (Telegram 429 to New Delhi, September 11; ibid.) He then repeated Swaran Singh's request of last evening that we publicly urge all nations not to send equipment to either Pakistan or India on grounds that by supplying belligerents war would be more likely to spread. 6. Pres Radhakrishnan then brought up submarine which we have loaned to Pakistan. What could we do to stop Paks from using our submarine to blow up Indian shipping? I explained that we were in dilemma because Pakistan could just as easily argue that we should withdraw radar equipment which we had previously loaned to Indians. Under circumstances we thought best thing to do was to steer clear of whole subject since we are unable to enforce original agreements with either govt. 7. President asked whether I thought Paks could be persuaded to accept Security Council resolution as India intended to do. I replied that from all indications Paks intended to push hard for Kashmir political agreement as condition for ceasefire. Radhakrishnan said GOI had unverified reports that Ayub Khan was being pushed out or at least into background and that Bhutto and Musa might seize power with purpose of continuing war to bitter end. He earnestly hoped that this rumor was false. Comment: I gather that President's general purpose was to inform me that India was prepared to accept U Thant's proposals and he was hoping that I might have something to tell him about intentions Pakistan. Bowles
202. Editorial Note On September 12, 1965, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara again discussed developments on the subcontinent during a telephone conversation. Johnson: "What do you think about the India-Pakistan thing?" McNamara: "I'm pleased that it hasn't erupted to a higher level of military action than it has. I really don't know how it's getting along. Our intelligence is--I don't mean CIA necessarily--I mean information we get through our military sources and diplomatic. That's really not very good. I don't know exactly how the battle is going. What little information I do have on it indicates to me that the Paks are ahead at this point." Johnson: "Yes, that's the way it appears." McNamara: "And my own impression of the relative military strengths of the two countries is that the Paks could continue to achieve military advantage for a period of, I'd just guess off-hand 4 weeks. And then at the end of that period I would think that the total strength of the Indians in terms of men and equipment, which is roughly four times that of the Paks, would begin to be felt. And then by the end of say 12 weeks, if the conflict continues that long, I would expect the Indians to reverse the trend and then be in a militarily advantageous position." Johnson: "What about the Chinese? That's the 64 dollar . . . ." McNamara: "We don't have any real evidence, and I think we would have if there had been substantial moves. We don't have any real evidence that they're building up strength on that Northeast Frontier Agency border. And we've been very anxious to get more intelligence, we've worked out a plan to do it with some U-2s. I think this will give us advance notice of any movement of men or equipment up there. And there has to be some movement before they can effectively intervene. They can intervene with a few advance days of preparation on their part, and I think they would just clean up that area--push the Indians out if they chose to do so. I rather doubt they'll choose to do it. It's very dangerous for them to do so. My own view is that it almost certainly would involve Western support to India, which China would like to avoid. The great danger here, it seems to me, is the weakening, if not destruction of the Indian political institutions as a result of this." Johnson and McNamara then briefly discussed the threat to Indian political institutions. Johnson: "What about our continuing to send in economic help, food to both of them while they're fighting?" McNamara: "I'd put it off a little while, Mr. President. I think you're going to have to send the food a week from now, or two weeks from now, but you don't have to do it today. I just don't see how you can avoid sending food to really starving people." Johnson: "Well, you know damn well as Napoleon says, an army runs on its belly. And you know that they're going to go right to the army." McNamara: "No. No, I don't think so. The food's going to the army anyhow. There's not going to be any food shortage in the army, whether you send food or not. But on the food, as I said, you don't have to decide today. You probably don't even have to decide it a week from today." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, September 12, 1965, 9:26 a.m., Tape F65.02, Side B, PNO 1)
203. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, September 13, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. Mac-- Pak/India Food. You wanted a reminder before meeting with President. I'm solid with State/AID and embassies in believing that if Pak and Indian public came to believe we were using food as an instrument of pressure, it would be a real setback to our influence. We can tell roughly when an actual pinch might occur--but the real problem is psychological. At what point, in their current emotional state, will the Paks and Indians start accusing us of using food as a weapon? Bowles thinks this could "blow sky high in another week or so," and I'd stick with the judgment of the man in the field in this case./2/ /2/When Bowles saw Subramaniam on September 12 the latter warned that if a disastrous situation affecting the welfare of millions of people in India was to be avoided the Indian Government had to know what to expect from the United States in the way of P.L. 480 grain shipments. (Telegram 580 from New Delhi, September 12; ibid.) Bowles underlined Subramaniam's warning in a personal cable to Komer the same day, in which he cautioned: "We must know soon where we stand on PL 480 as this situation can blow sky high in another week or so." (Telegram 121340Z from New Delhi; ibid., Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles) The trick is to keep on using food as leverage by only dribbling it out slowly, but to do so in time to forestall public reactions. Thus we keep the GOI and GOP worried (as they already are by our stalling), yet don't give them or anyone else a handle to accuse us of using starvation as a weapon. It could also help trigger communal riots. State/AID recommend a million ton (two month) extension for India and 350,000 tons (under existing agreement) for Paks, which would carry them till about December--mostly for East Pakistan. I'd favor just cutting both in half--but doing it now! RWK
204. Editorial Note On September 15, 1965, President Ayub sent a letter to President Johnson explaining Pakistan's response to the cease-fire proposal made to India and Pakistan by UN Secretary-General U Thant on September 12. Thant's proposal called for a UN-supervised cease-fire to take effect on September 14. Thant asserted that the Security Council would then explore, as a matter of urgency, means and methods of achieving an enduring peace between India and Pakistan. Ayub explained in his letter to Johnson that Pakistan did not oppose a cease-fire. But he argued that a cease-fire that did not provide for a self-executing arrangement for a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute would merely re-establish an unacceptable status quo, and would have the effect of rewarding Indian aggression. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Accordingly, Pakistan rejected the cease-fire proposal on September 15. (Telegram 72 from Rawalpindi, September 15; ibid.) In a press conference for foreign correspondents on September 15, Ayub called on President Johnson to bring the influence of the United States to bear on the conflict to bring it to a halt. (Telegram 69 from Rawalpindi, September 15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Agenda Points, September 17, 1965) India responded to the Secretary-General's cease-fire proposal on September 14. The Indian response, in the form of a letter from Shastri to Thant, constituted a qualified acceptance of the cease-fire proposal. India was prepared to accept the proposal as put forward by U Thant, but only if it was amended to deal with the problem of armed infiltrators into Kashmir. India alleged that Pakistan had triggered the crisis by training and introducing infiltrators into Kashmir, and Shastri's letter stated that any cease-fire that did not mandate the removal of all such infiltrators and provide for India to deal with any subsequent infiltrators, would not settle the crisis and would not be acceptable. (Telegram 643 from New Delhi, September 15; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK)
205. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 13-10-65 Washington, September 16, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem; Sensitive. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on September 16 except the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject matter was outside of their jurisdiction. PROSPECTS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN
THE Conclusion We believe that China will avoid direct, large-scale, military involvement in the Indo-Pakistan war. An impending Pakistani defeat would, however, substantially increase the pressures for Chinese entry. Even in this circumstance we believe the chances are better than even that the logistic problems involved and the primacy of Vietnam in China's interests would keep China from undertaking a major military venture against India. In addition to propaganda, political support, and military gestures, China will probably offer material aid, but it probably cannot deliver more than token amounts. It will make threats and there is an even chance it will make small-scale military probes across the Indian frontier; the odds that it might launch a limited-objective attack similar to that of 1962 are somewhat lower. In either case it would expect to produce political and psychological effects far greater than the military importance would justify. [Here follows the 11-page Discussion portion of the Estimate.]
206. Letter From Prime Minister Shastri to President Johnson/1/ New Delhi, September 16, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Shastri Correspondence. No classification marking. The letter was sent to the White House on September 17 under cover of a note from Ambassador Nehru. Dear Mr. President: Ambassador Nehru has reported to me the sympathetic hearing which you gave him when he delivered my last message to you regarding the present conflict between India and Pakistan./2/ I am sending this further communication to you to keep you informed of subsequent developments and to share with you, on a personal level, my thoughts and concerns about the trend of events. /2/See footnote 2, Document 195. 2. As you doubtless know by now, I indicated to the Secretary-General the willingness of my Government to agree to an immediate cease-fire without any pre-conditions, while acquainting him with our stand on certain issues. One of the features of the Pakistani invasion is that it includes large numbers of armed personnel who are not in uniform for whom Pakistan disowns responsibility, although there is unquestionable evidence to show that they have, in fact, been equipped, organised and directed by Pakistan. This is a new technique of aggression to deal with which no effective weapons have yet been designed by the international community. Even so, as I have said, I was agreeable to a cease-fire if Pakistan also agreed to it. While I do not know the precise nature of President Ayub's reply to U Thant, the fact remains that there has been no cease-fire and the fighting continues. 3. I notice from President Ayub's press conference that he regards Pakistan to be engaged in a life and death struggle with India. All I can say is that so far as we are concerned, we consider it to be in our interests to see the people of Pakistan prosper and to live in friendship with India. We are not out to destroy Pakistan, but to protect our own territory from repeated attacks. 4. President Ayub, in his press conference, also stated that what he really wants the U.N. Security Council to do is not to deal with the issues raised by Pakistani invasion, overt and covert, but to lend support to Pakistan's fantastic claim over the State of Jammu & Kashmir. This claim is based on Pakistan's assertion that since the majority of the inhabitants of the State of Jammu & Kashmir are Muslims, the State should have acceded to Pakistan and not to India. 5. The Indian nation consists of people who subscribe to different religious beliefs--Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsees, as well as tribal peoples living in this country from prehistoric times, who speak different languages, almost as many as are spoken on the continent of Europe. We have, in fact, as many Muslims in India as there are in West Pakistan. In India, as in the United States of America, people of different origins, different races, different colours and different religions, live together as citizens of a state in which, despite the stresses and strains which do develop in a mixed society, the Constitution and the laws guarantee equal rights to all citizens. You yourself, Mr President, have made, in recent months, a tremendous contribution in your own country to the task of giving adequate legal protection to a racial minority. It is through national solidarity, rather than through the mischievous doctrine of self-determination, the minorities can find their fulfilment. 6. The reason why, when in 1947, we first went to the Security Council with a complaint of aggression against Pakistan, we made a unilateral promise of having a plebiscite in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, was that, at that time, the State had no democracy, having been under the rule of a prince in the British days, and we were anxious ourselves to be satisfied that the people, as distinct from the ruler, genuinely favoured accession to India. Ever since the accession of the State, we have been building up democratic institutions. There have been three general elections in conditions of freedom. The results of these elections have demonstrated clearly that the people of Jammu & Kashmir have accepted their place in the Indian Union. I should like to state quite categorically that there can be no further question of any plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. Furthermore, I would assert that the relationship between a federal government and its constituent states is no matter for any other country or for the Security Council. If President Ayub feels that by launching an invasion on the State of Jammu & Kashmir, he will pressurize us into ceding any part of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, all I can say is that he is grievously mistaken. Much though we love peace, we shall not buy it by selling our territory. 7. The real question before the U.N., the Security Council and the international community, as a whole, is not of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, but that of restoring peace which was broken once again by Pakistan, and of ensuring that the boundary line between India and Pakistan is not repeatedly violated either by regular troops or by those in disguise. 8. President Ayub has made an appeal to the United States to use its influence for the restoration of peace. I very much hope, Mr President, that the United States will do so. I think the first essential for this is to prevent the conflict from spreading. Pakistan, as you know, has appealed to many nations for help: to western powers in the name of its alliances, to middle-east and Arab countries in the name of religion, as well as to Indonesia and China on the basis of the philosophy of which these two countries are the main exponents. I hope, Mr President, you will find it possible to make it clear to Pakistan that the neutrality which you have, for understandable reasons, maintained in this conflict so far, will have to be modified if other powers begin to join it directly or indirectly. That Pakistan is anxious to spread the conflict is evident from the fact that despite further declaration that we do not want to see any fighting start in East Pakistan, it is making repeated air attacks from East Bengal on Indian air bases, particularly those which are vital for our defence against China. 9. Before leaving India, the Secretary-General left with me a letter throwing out various suggestions for the restoration of peace, his efforts to bring about a cease-fire having failed. One of them is a meeting between President Ayub and me. I do not see how, while the armies of the two countries are locked in combat, the heads of two governments could start a dialogue across the table. You can imagine the effect it would have on the morale of our troops and our people who are solidly behind them. Quite apart from that, I cannot quite see what such a meeting might possibly lead to. As you know, in 1962 there was a meeting between President Ayub Khan and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru when it was agreed that there should be meetings between ministers followed by a summit. We did have a number of meetings between the foreign ministers of two countries, but their positions were so far apart that it became pointless to think of a meeting at the level of heads of government. 10. The Secretary-General has also put forward the idea of mediation by the Secretary-General himself, or by any power friendly to both countries. The difficulty about this too is that what Pakistan wants is not a mediation to bring about an end to fighting and to restore peace without losing face, but mediation in respect of Pakistan's claim to the State of Jammu & Kashmir which we cannot possibly accept. 11. I do not question that even after the present fighting has come to an end, there will remain many issues between the two countries which will continue to create ill-feeling and give rise to friction. We have always felt that this is an unfortunate state of affairs and with better relationship and greater cooperation between the two countries, their economic progress, which is the prime task before them, and in which your great country has been helping so much, will be accelerated. Such an improvement in the relationship between the two countries is eminently desirable, but it would need at least a couple of years of real peace on the borders and a willingness on the part of Pakistan not to align itself in any way with the main threat against India, namely China, before any efforts to improve overall relations between two countries can really become fruitful. Yours sincerely, Lal Bahadur/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and an indication that the original was signed.
207. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the White House/1/ New Delhi, September 16, 1965, 1027Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Cables, 6/65-9/65. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the Department of State, with the request that it be passed to the Department of Agriculture for Freeman. 655. For President Johnson. In view of many difficult problems that are crowding your plate I hesitate to communicate with you directly except under most urgent circumstances. However we have thus far had no reply to numerous messages on future PL 480 shipments and since we have now reached crisis point I believe such communication is justified. PL 480 shipments to India have been coming in under sixty-day agreement signed July 26. Under this authorization the last shipments of foodgrains is scheduled to stop by end of October. Even if we should sign renewal agreement today, there would already be a gap between this date and arrival of shipments under new authorization. In spite of massive increase in India's foodgrain production of nearly 11 percent last year, situation in regard to food supplies and food prices has been serious. Increases in purchasing power, burdens on transportation system plus whisperings of hold-up in US supplied grains are starting to lead to scare buying, hoarding and rise in prices. If under these circumstances PL 480 shipments were to stop, be curtailed or delayed, situation could quickly get out of hand. Food riots in major cities managed by Communists would be inevitable. As they put out word that growing shortages were caused by sudden stoppage of food shipments from USA to low income Indian families public antagonism would become dangerously inflamed. Although agitation against US would not affect abilities of Indian Army in Punjab it would profoundly affect USG in Delhi and all that we have been working for here since India became independent. Ever since fighting started on August 5 I and members of US Mission in Delhi have been bringing to bear every argument and every pressure to influence India toward course of moderation in regard to a Pakistan settlement while at same time seeking to buttress their faith in USA. Yesterday Indian Govt in spite of its growing military advantage agreed unconditionally to an immediate ceasefire. If following the all-out effort our Mission has been making here and GOIs affirmative response to U Thant request, USG should hold up urgently needed food shipments, our influence in India will [be] grievously eroded and Soviet influence increased. With Soviet SAMs protecting Delhi and other cities from attack by Pak MAP-procured B-57s, Soviet tanks fighting US tanks in Punjab and additional MIGs apparently on their way, Soviets have already made deep inroads. In my previous messages I had strongly recommended a 15 month extension, since this would enable Indians to make major advances in their agricultural policies which we have been supporting. In view of importance of helping India become self-sufficient in food I still believe this is proper decision. However, if USG feels that now is not the appropriate time to conclude such a long-term and substantial agreement I strongly urge you to authorize me to sign sixty-day contract. This would assure flow of food ships until latter part of December. I have already been pressed hard for our decision by able, dedicated, highly pro-American officials who are responsible for Indian agricultural policy and who recently sent communication to Secy Freeman expressing determination to make India self-supporting in regard to foodgrains by 1971. Following GOI action yesterday in unconditionally accepting U Thant's proposal for ceasefire these pressures will now be redoubled. Because I did not know whether you were familiar with the problem I have gone into some detail. I assure you, however, that I am not crying wolf. Bowles [Continue with the next documents]
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