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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, September 17, 1965, 6:13 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Lakeland, cleared by Laise, and approved by Handley. Repeated to Karachi, London, Hong Kong, Moscow, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DOD, CIA, and the White House. 498. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation and is FYI, Noforn and subject to revision upon review. Indian Ambassador Nehru called on Secretary September 17 to deliver letter from Shastri to President/2/ regarding Indo-Pak fighting. In addition, based on phone call he had had from Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, Nehru requested: /2/Document 206. 1) That USG make formal statement warning Chicoms that US will intervene if Chicoms attack India; said formal warning desired to supplement helpful informal statement already made by Secretary./3/ Nehru said GOI hopes such formal warning by US would prevent Chicom intervention. /3/On September 15 Rusk made a statement at a press conference warning China to stay out of the conflict between India and Pakistan. See The Washington Post, September 16, 1965. 2) That US come to India's assistance if Chicoms attack; said nature of such assistance would be for US to decide. Secretary said request for formal US statement warning Chicoms re intervention involves major US decision and said that decision make formal warning statement would subsume decision provide assistance in event of Chicom attack, since warning would have no credible deterrent effect if not backed by decision to act. Secretary said only President can make this decision, and told Nehru he would discuss matter with President as soon as possible. Secretary said that, in context Indian request for US warning statement and decision intervene in event of Chicom attack, in our view it of greatest importance that fighting between India and Pakistan be stopped somehow. 3) That as requested in Shastri letter US "neutrality" re Indo-Pak fighting will be modified if other outside powers intervene. Nehru said that India's unconditional acceptance of U Thant's appeal for unconditional ceasefire puts India in the clear and GOI feels it has now gone along with Security Council resolution. Nehru added that Foreign Minister Singh told him to request that US posture in Security Council take into account threat posed to India in latest Chicom note,/4/ and that US modify "neutral" position it thus far has adopted re Indo-Pak fighting. /4/Reference is to a September 16 note from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Indian Embassy in Peking. The note reiterated China's support for "the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination" and China's support for Pakistan in its fight against the "unbridled aggression" of India. The note reviewed the boundary dispute along the border between China and Sikkim and closed with a demand that India dismantle all of its military works along that border within 3 days of the delivery of the note. The text of the note is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 752-754. Secretary asked whether it was GOI position that Kashmir not even discussible, and to what extent settlement of Kashmir problem is war aim of both India and Pakistan. Nehru replied that settlement of Kashmir issue not an Indian war aim. He said, however, GOI cannot discuss anything with Pakistan at this time and GOI cannot agree as condition to any settlement ending fighting that it will discuss status of Kashmir; said situation must go back to status quo ante bellum and Paks must get their forces out of Kashmir. Nehru said there no man in India today who can agree to discuss Kashmir. In response to question whether in requesting US assistance in event of Chicom attack India invoking Air Defense Agreement, Nehru replied he had no specific instructions as to nature of assistance US might provide. In reply to question whether GOI thinks Chicoms would violate demarcated international boundary in Sikkim, Nehru replied that Chicom ultimatum "raised everything--the whole border." Referring to request for formal statement warning Chicoms against intervention, Secretary told Nehru we had used occasion of last Cabot- Wang talks in Warsaw to warn Peking about interfering in Indo-Pak fighting./5/ /5/The meeting between U.S. Ambassador to Poland John M. Cabot and Chinese Ambassador to Poland Wang Kuo-chuan took place on September 15. For a report of the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXX, Document 101. In closing Secretary said he would discuss Shastri letter and Indian requests for formal warning statement, and for US agreement provide assistance in event of Chicom attack, with President and get in touch with Nehru as soon as possible. Nehru reminded Secretary that time limit on Chicom ultimatum runs out on Sunday./6/ /6/September 19. Comment: It apparent Shastri letter written before receipt Chicom note; Nehru request for US support vis-à-vis Chicoms made orally, based on his conversation with Foreign Minister this morning. Rusk
209. Record of Meeting/1/ Washington, September 17, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Sensitive; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco in IO. UNCLEARED SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE MEETING PARTICIPANTS The President decided the following on the Indian-Pakistan situation: 1) We would continue to give the strongest support to the Secretary General and the Security Council. He approved the current draft of the resolution./2/ In general we are to emphasize publicly the efforts that we are making through the UN here at the Department and in New York. /2/Apparent reference to a draft of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on September 20 which demanded that a cease-fire between India and Pakistan take effect on September 22. (UN doc. S/RES/211) 2) No messages would go from the President to Ayub and Shastri for the time being. This might be reviewed in light of whatever Security Council action is taken. 3) Both Defense and State should develop contingency plans on possible next steps for the President's review. 4) No preparatory military moves should now be made in the area. 5) George Ball is to prepare a memorandum giving the pros and cons on whether we should cut off food supplies. 6) [8 lines of source text not declassified] With respect to the three questions the Indians have put to us/3/ and which have now become public knowledge, George Ball will brief Greenfield on the following line: That the Indians have discussed with us their concern over the Chicom development; we have discussed with them our concern in this regard; and that we will take note of these as we pursue our policy within the Security Council. /3/See Document 208.
210. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, September 17, 1965, 5:22 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sidney Sober, cleared by Mann's staff assistant James D. Johnston and Macomber, and approved by Handley. Sent to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo, and repeated to Canberra, Karachi, New Delhi, and Rawalpindi. 420. Joint State/AID Message. Pakistan Consortium./2/ /2/In telegram 530 from Karachi, September 17, the Embassy emphasized the importance of the scheduled consortium meeting. Because of the Kashmir crisis and the growing sense of isolation from Western support felt in Pakistan, the Embassy warned that the decisions taken with respect to the consortium meeting would be magnified in importance in terms of U.S. relations with Pakistan and Pakistan's foreign policy orientation. (Ibid.) 1. World Bank Position. Bank has been querying Consortium members this week on their views and plans concerning pledging session scheduled September 23. The Bank leadership had previously informed the Department on most confidential basis that it did not see how the Bank/IDA could make a pledge until the situation in the subcontinent is clarified. 2. UK Position. British Embassy informs us that London considers atmosphere for September 23 meeting basically affected by the hostilities; basis on which Pakistan aid requirements previously discussed has been altered; therefore it believes it would not be advisable hold Consortium meeting next week; hopes Bank will agree and so inform GOP. 3. US Position. Our most critical concern at this time is to obtain ceasefire. To that end we giving all support to efforts of UNSYG under UNSC resolutions September 4 and September 6. On September 8 we suspended military aid shipments to both India and Pakistan and informed both Governments accordingly. Subsequently, we have suspended all licenses for commercial shipments of military items to both countries. However, shipments are continuing in accordance existing agreements under economic aid program, including PL 480. Pending enactment FY 66 aid appropriation, the Administration has in general not been making any new economic aid loans or grants since beginning FY 66, and both India and Pakistan have been affected. Current hostilities raise important new issues. Secretary has assured Congress that Administration would consult with appropriate members of Congress on situation in subcontinent in connection with making new economic loans or grants to either India or Pakistan. (Representative Mahon, Appropriation Committee Chairman, read out the Secretary's assurances during House debate aid bill September 8.) We have come to conclusion that under present circumstances we not yet in position make pledge on current year's aid level for Pakistan. Present US position does not in any way indicate lessening our interest in economic development of Pakistan. We hope for an early return to situation in which we could again pledge our support for its economic development program. 4. Subsequent to British approach to us, AID Regional Assistant Administrator Macomber on September 16 informally indicated to representatives major Consortium member countries our concurrence with British position and explained US thinking as outlined 3. above. 5. Believe Macomber's discussions have met our general requirements for consultation with Consortium members. However, in addition, if you deem desirable in light queries addressed to you, you may inform host government that US has given very serious consideration to question of pledge and draw on above to describe situation as we see it. Any approach you make should be in low key so as avoid impression we applying pressure other Consortium members. 6. Will inform you further developments soonest./3/ /3/On September 22 the Department sent a circular telegram to the same posts indicating that the World Bank had decided to postpone the Pakistan consortium meeting scheduled for September 23. (Circular telegram 459; ibid.) 7. Separate instruction will follow for Karachi/Rawalpindi. Rusk
211. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, September 18, 1965, 1255Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-1 INDIA-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to USUN, DOD, Karachi, London, Hong Kong, CINCMEAFSA, and the White House and passed to DOD, CIA, and USIA. 698. L.K. Jha reports that Chinese movements in battalion strength on Eastern border of Ladakh and in Chumbi Valley indicate that Peking is getting ready for military action. GOI therefore asks if we would be willing on strictly covert basis to authorize US personnel to consult with Indian military planners on contingency basis. Jha stressed that this action need not imply favorable US response to India's request for help if Chinese attack. However, if an attack should come it could speed up effective assistance by several days. We have personnel here who are qualified to open such discussions. I recommend that we be authorized to proceed with strict understanding that no US commitment is involved./2/ /2/The Department responded that the United States was not prepared to initiate contingency planning. A decision taken at the "highest level" was to avoid commitment of any sort pending the unfolding of the situation. In discussions with the Indian Government, the Embassy was instructed to indicate that the U.S. commitment in Vietnam was heavy and increasing. Effective defense of the subcontinent, from the U.S. perspective, depended on the internal strength of India and Pakistan, and the conflict between the two countries undermined that strength. It was essential that India move toward a rational solution to the problems, including Kashmir, that divided and weakened the subcontinent so that it could face the major threat from China. (Telegram 513 to New Delhi, September 18; ibid., POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Bowles
212. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 18, 1965, 1128Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to Karachi, and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy to the President at 10:30 a.m. under cover of a note that reads: "This is the despatch I mentioned on the phone." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. V, Cables, 9/65-1/66) 82. For immediate personal attention of the Secretary. I flew back Rawalpindi this morning on urgent intimation from Shoaib he needed see me. With new Pak restrictions on activities of all diplomats, he was not supposed to receive me without official being present to record conversation. To evade this he had to telescope private and sensitive part of conversation into about four minutes when we were alone while note-taking officer was being summoned. His message was to effect that Ayub wants to reject Chinese overtures and come down on U.S. side in confrontation now shaping up. But Ayub must have some high-level U.S. statement which he can use as basis for his decision. Recurring theme voiced by President last night was "Why do U.S. actions seem designed to push me toward the Chinese? I don't want to sit in Chinese lap, and I won't do so if it can be avoided. But if U.S. can't give me any help, I'll have no choice." Shoaib said a "gesture" from the U.S. would be sufficient to turn the tide at this moment. When I pressed him to identify the kind of "gesture" that he had in mind, he indicated that an authoritative U.S. statement attaching responsibility to India for original violation international border on September 6 would suffice. In a vaguer vein he indicated that some U.S. public statement of intention to use its influence to bring about an actual implementation of Kashmir position traditionally taken by U.S., as that position was outlined by Secretary Rusk September 14, would also give President Ayub the basis he feels he needs. Shoaib said he felt that action was required in about next 24 hours, which would point to a relationship between Pak decision and expiry of ChiCom ultimatum to GOI. With fateful consequences depending on U.S. and Pak decisions next 36 hours, this hasty, incomplete and second-level statement of far-reaching request is not adequate. I urge that I be given instructions by return Flash message from the President to have it out with Ayub as to precisely what he seeks from us and where he stands. It will be crucially important for me to be instructed as to what if anything I can say by way of private assurances to Ayub that India will be required to show some flexibility in considering a political solution of the Kashmir question, as a condition of any prospective U.S. assistance against Communist China. It is doubtful that Pakistan can be held in line without some assurance to this effect. McConaughy
213. Editorial Note During the course of a conversation on September 18, 1965, with Ambassador Goldberg concerning efforts being made by the UN Security Council to bring an end to the conflict in South Asia, President Johnson outlined the U.S. position he wanted emphasized at the United Nations. Johnson: "We think the Pakistani people ought to have a cease-fire ‘til we can pull this thing--we think India ought to do it. What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Hold the two of them, be equal to both, strictly neutral, pull them together, no threats. But they just can't afford to have this World War III. . . . They can't have that kind of crime around their necks." Johnson indicated that he wanted Goldberg to make it very clear that the United States was fully behind the United Nations in its efforts to deal with the crisis. Later in the conversation, Johnson ruminated about the Kashmir crisis and its bearing on the decision he had to make concerning the provision of grain supplies to offset drought on the subcontinent. Johnson: "I've got to make up my mind whether I'm going to send about 35 million a month in giveaway food to India. And if I do, I've got to continue to Pakistan. It runs about 475 million people, it involves about a million tons for every two months. I think that we oughtn't to be shipping munitions or food or anything else to them while they are in this difficulty. Furthermore, I think until they come here, and we sit down and have an agreement, India's got 470 million worth of reserves, and there's no reason why they can't pay for their wheat if they can pay for munitions. Napoleon said an army fights on its belly, and I don't see any reason for doing it, although State Department and all the people want us to continue to give away. They say there'll be a bunch of riots if we don't. But I think it might be--I don't know if we got an obligation the rest of our lives just to ship them 10% of what they eat. And not without even having agreement or discussions, or tying in any alliance, or to be sure of serving our national interests. They say if you don't, they'll go to Russia. Well, I think it might be a good thing if Russia did a little of it for a while. . . . But they're pressing me a good deal, and I've got to make a decision in the next few hours." Goldberg, in response to the President's question, advised against cutting off the flow of food to the subcontinent. Instead, he proposed an oil embargo to bring an end to the fighting. Johnson did not respond to Goldberg's suggestion. He reverted to the decision he had on his desk concerning food for India. Johnson: "I'm humane, but I don't have to feed the world. I'll sell them anything they want to buy. I haven't got any inherent or constitutional requirement that I know of to furnish it to them ad infinitum. On July 27, I said now I'll give you a million tons extra, which will give you two months. And you come here and we'll talk about our national interests and your national interests. That two months is up September 27. This is September 19. [sic] And of that million tons that I gave them on July 27, 630,000 have been shipped to India. The balance will be shipped next month. But additional wheat must be authorized or purchased now if the flow of the pipeline is not to be interrupted, since it takes at least 10 days or two weeks to contract for the wheat. An additional month for ocean transport. We are therefore in a position where delay beyond four or five more days in author- izing an extension of P.L. 480 shipments would mean a break in the supply line and a shortfall of supplies later this fall." Near the end of the conversation, Goldberg speculated that, in light of the Indian acceptance of the cease-fire proposal, there was the possibility that a cease-fire could be achieved within the next 48 hours. Johnson therefore concluded that his decision concerning food for India could wait for 2 or 3 days. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg, September 18, 1965, 1:27 p.m., Tape F65.04, Side A, PNO 1)
214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Pakistan/1/ Washington, September 18, 1965, 6:21 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Ball, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London, New Delhi, USUN, DOD, CIA, and the White House. 83. For Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: Your 82./2/ You should not seek an interview with Ayub, but you should convey clearly to Bhutto, Shoaib and to any others whom you think useful, and who would communicate accurately to Ayub the following: /2/Document 212. 1. The Chinese ultimatum and the rumors of Chinese troop movements puts Ayub squarely against a critical problem of choice. If he should encourage, or even--by failing to agree to a cease-fire--create the situation that produces Chicom intervention, he will have alienated himself from the West. This is not a threat but a reality. If the Chicoms do intervene,/3/ the world will place the blame for that action on Ayub's failure to agree to the cease-fire. /3/Komer told Ball in a telephone conversation on September 19 that the President was pleased to learn that the Chinese had extended the deadline in their ultimatum to September 22. Johnson intimated that the Chinese extension was due to U.S. pressure, an apparent reference to warnings against Chinese involvement in the conflict on the subcontinent passed by Cabot to Wang and by Rusk in his September 15 statement to the press. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Pakistan, 4/1/64-8/16/66) 2. At the same time, the threat of Chinese intervention provides Ayub the opportunity to move off his present position of rejecting a cease-fire. He can take the position that the dangers of escalation involved in these Chinese moves make it imperative that the Indo-Pak conflict be stopped. Such a declaration should not result in any loss of face on the part of Pakistan since Pakistan is not threatened directly by the Chicoms. The world would tend to view such action as statesmanlike. 3. At the same time we recognize that the basic causes of the conflict cannot be disregarded. For that reason we are helping to obtain Security Council action calling for India and Pakistan to utilize all peaceful means including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter to bring about a permanent solution of the political problems underlying the conflict and supporting the proposal made by the Secretary General calling for a meeting of the two heads of government including the possibility of using the good offices of the Secretary General and other third parties under the auspices of the UN. 4. While this matter is under consideration in the Security Council, it is of utmost importance that Pakistan put itself in as favorable position as possible in world opinion. India so far has the political advantage because it has unconditionally agreed to the cease-fire. The threat of Chicom escalation affords Ayub the opportunity to move toward the same position without sacrifice of dignity. If he does so, the possibility for serious Security Council action toward a permanent solution of the problem will be greatly enhanced. 5. The Pakistanis will undoubtedly raise with you their wish for U.S. assistance in pushing Indians toward negotiations on Kashmir, and their "need" for some form of U.S. reassurances on continuation of aid. You should say on both of these points that you are without official instructions and that you are concerned/4/ that Washington cannot make any useful comment on these matters until it has some clear indication that Ayub is not casting his lot with Communist Chinese at a moment of decisive importance for the future of the free subcontinent. You should add as your personal opinion that it is your judgment and the judgment of men close to the President, with whom you have been in touch, that once the firing is stopped and President Johnson is convinced that renewed U.S. assistance will be used to help the people of Pakistan and not to support military adventures, you believe that close and mutually helpful relations between the U.S. and Pakistan can quickly be restored. But you should express your absolute conviction that President Johnson is not the sort of man who will ever give his approval to one thin dime for a country which supports or encourages the aggressive pressures of Red China./5/ /4/The Embassy was instructed, in telegram 84 to Rawalpindi, September 19, to change "concerned" to "convinced." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) /5/Since Ambassador Ahmed was in New York, Ball and Komer called Pakistani Minister of Embassy Iftikhar Ali off the golf course on September 19 to convey the message outlined in telegram 83. (Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, September 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II; Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Komer, September 19; ibid., Ball Papers, Pakistan, 4/1/64-8/16/66) For USUN: We would like to have the same position conveyed privately and in confidence by Ambassador Goldberg to Amjad Ali. Rusk
215. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 19, 1965, 1400Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 12:17 p.m., and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USIA at 1:10 p.m. Repeated to London, New Delhi, USUN, Karachi, and CINCMEAFSA. 84. Indo-Pak crisis--SC Kashmir. I have just come from private meeting this afternoon with Shoaib, which we arranged at home of mutual Pakistani friend, where we were able to talk freely, escaping restrictions on calls at government offices where in Shoaib's words, "semi-police state atmosphere now prevails." Shoaib told me he had a long private session with President last night and he is greatly encouraged by increasing moderation of President's attitude. He described President as disenchanted with Bhutto's reckless adventurism, grieved at Pak losses, strongly averse to entering any Chicom association and open to a sensible compromise way out. Shoaib said President growingly aware of Bhutto's extremism though Bhutto's job not now in jeopardy. Shoaib said President vetoed Bhutto's projected trip to New York for current SC session because he felt Bhutto would not show sufficient balance. Shoaib said much as President wants to compromise issue with India quickly, he cannot give an accounting to the people of Pakistan with nothing to show for the sacrifices entailed. President believes he would fall if he had to admit to failure, and Shoaib agrees with him. Shoaib said GOP recognized that problem was to find a fair median position on the operative paragraph in SC resolution on Kashmir/2/--a compromise which both Pakistan and India could live with. He recognized that India could not live with unqualified provision now for plebiscite and withdrawal of all forces from occupied Kashmir. Pakistan could not live with simple cease-fire and freeze in status quo ante. /2/Reference is to Resolution 211 adopted by the Security Council on September 20. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 805-806. Shoaib recommendation as minimum alternative which he believes President could buy and then sell to Pak people, is as follows: a provision in operative paragraph of the Security Council resolution which would call for settlement of all principal outstanding issues India and Pakistan, "including Kashmir" or "such as Kashmir."/3/ He said Pakistan could accept provision along this line with a mere illustrative reference to Kashmir. He felt confident India could also accept this, since Kashmir had been mentioned before by agreement in joint documents, announcements, and resolutions. /3/Resolution 211 included the following language: "Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters." (Ibid.) I told Shoaib of my earlier conversation with Bhutto and how far out and unrealistic his proposals were./4/ I was greatly encouraged to hear of Shoaib's far more sensible approach, which gives us something to work on which is inside the park at least. I told him I would send off an urgent message on this and would hope the suggestion would provide a new take-off point. I believe this really modest proposal by Shoaib which undoubtedly has President's tacit approval, gives us new hope for saving the situation here. It offers the modicum of nourishment which Paks must have to enable them to back off from the brink. I urge its most careful, sympathetic and (for all believers) prayerful consideration. /4/McConaughy reported on his conversation with Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed on the morning of September 19 in telegram 85 from Rawalpindi, September 19. McConaughy stated U.S. views as instructed (see Document 214). According to McConaughy, Bhutto's response was "hard-nosed and disquieting." He indicated that Pakistan would not agree to a simple cease-fire without some undertaking on the merits of the dispute or some action to liquidate Indian aggression. Bhutto stated categorically that Pakistan had no secret understanding with China, and he denied that the Chinese ultimatum imposed any obligation on Pakistan to accept a cease-fire agreement. He offered Pakistani acceptance of an immediate cease-fire on the basis of an agreement by India and Pakistan to withdraw all their armed forces from Kashmir, an agreement underwritten by the United States. McConaughy said that it was not realistic to put such a proposal forward seriously, and Bhutto responded that it was meant seriously. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INDIA-PAK) McConaughy
216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, September 19, 1965, 7:19 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Schneider and approved by Handley. Repeated to Karachi, London, USUN, CINCMEAFSA, Hong Kong, Rawalpindi, the White House, DOD, and CIA. 518. Deptel 513 to New Delhi./2/ Following based upon uncleared memcon. It is FYI, Noforn and subject to amendment upon review. /2/See footnote 2, Document 211. Under Secretary Ball called in Amb B.K. Nehru Sept 19 to respond to GOI requests which Ambassador had put to Secretary Sept 17 (Deptel 498)/3/ and which L.K. Jha had made to Amb. Bowles Sept 18. /3/Document 208. After discussion state of play in New York, Amb. Nehru asked if USG had decided upon course following SC action. Under Secretary replied US placing great emphasis upon giving UNSC every chance work out subcontinent crisis. Said this was case in which bilateral diplomacy has great limitations particularly since US has friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. Said he would not wish predict future US course. Under Secretary commented that Indians had replied to Chicom note in statesmanlike manner. Chicom response now gives more time. Remarked that there may be some benefit in Indian admission of exist- ence "structures". Amb Nehru admitted there were such "structures" and claimed they had been unoccupied for 3 years. Said there seemed be difference between Indian estimate of Chicom forces deployed along Indian border (his figure was 150,000) and considerably lower US estimate. We replied our estimate was about 67,000 in Tibet including 5-6,000 in Ladakh plus about 20,000 in Sinkiang. Nehru said India not particularly concerned about Chicom attacks through Chumbi Valley, but was worried about possible Chicom move through Karakoram Pass into Pak held Kashmir. From this side Chicoms could attack in vicinity Kargil and cut off India division in Ladakh by cutting Srinagar-Leh road. Amb Nehru said GOI convinced there was Pak-Chicom collusion. Under Secretary read from Tass story reporting that Kosygin had invited Shastri and Ayub meet on Soviet soil to discuss conflict./4/ Nehru explained this offer, which was for meeting at Tashkent, had been made some time ago. Did not indicate nature Indian reply. /4/Kosygin sent letters on September 17 to Shastri and Ayub, which were published in Pravda, inviting them to meet on Soviet territory to resolve the conflict, with the participation of Kosygin if desired. (Telegram 948 from Moscow, September 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Under Secretary then referred to GOI request USG give warning against Chicom attacks. Stated we believe there would be grave dangers in such action since Chicoms might consider this challenge they would have to take up. We had raised matter at Warsaw talks and Chicoms have undoubtedly taken our probable reaction into consideration. Under Secretary mentioned heavy US commitments in Southeast Asia. Said defense of subcontinent had been weakened by Indo-Pak conflict. Consequently we were concentrating on ending fighting so Indo-Pak differences can be sorted out. Sorting out will depend upon GOI's willingness talk about outstanding problems. Nehru interjected this hard for GOI to do. When Paks "hold gun" to India, it can't agree such proposal. Under Secretary replied Paks asking for plebiscite; we recognize this would be difficult. But world would recognize statesmanship of Indian agreement to some kind of talks on range of differences with Pakistan. Amb Nehru then referred to last set of scheduled Indo-Pak talks which he said Paks had cancelled. Said GOI had been hopeful Rann of Kutch agreement forecast favorable turn Indo-Pak relations but then infiltrations began in Kashmir. Said India not seeking military solution India-Pak problems; but Pakistan was. Current fighting meant it would take long time arrange rational settlement. India wants to get unconditional cease fire and consider talks about many disputes with Pakistan afterwards. Under Secretary then addressed himself to L.K. Jha's proposal for secret contingency discussions with GOI (New Delhi's 698)./5/ (Amb Nehru unfamiliar with this matter. We explained it was confidential proposal put directly to Amb Bowles by L. K. Jha.) Under Secretary said we were not prepared undertake joint contingency planning at this time. Such discussions of what would be militarily effective against Chicoms would involve USG on side Indians and create ambiguity about US position in Indo-Pak conflict. If Chicoms attack, we would wish take another look at situation under consultation provision of Air Defense Agreement. In meantime we wanted Indians' best appraisal of situation through normal continuing discussions between US and Indian military in India. /5/Document 211. Amb. Nehru inquired re Indian request for end US suspension MAP and sales shipments. Under Secretary replied he saw no possibility of US lifting suspension to India and not Pakistan, as Indians asked. Noted that this would destroy whatever influence US had with Pakistan and push Paks further toward Chicoms. Toward end conversation, Amb Nehru changed subject and asked, "why are you trying to starve us out?" Under Secretary replied this was matter we were currently looking into and we hoped have decision in one way or the other in day or two. Pointing to "extreme urgency" of food shipments, Ambassador said India needed resumption by Sept 25./6/ /6/On September 19 Ball sent a memorandum to President Johnson recommending an extension of the existing P.L. 480 agreement with India for 1 month. He also recommended permitting purchase authorizations for Pakistan for 1 month. "This would hold them on a short tether and keep them worried." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II) Telegram Aidto 392 to New Delhi, September 22, authorized the Embassy to negotiate an interim agreement with the Indian Government for 500,000 tons of wheat to meet urgent needs. It was anticipated that the agreement would cover 1 month of India's import requirements. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-8 INDIA) At close conversation Amb Nehru said Education Min Chagla would be returning to Delhi Sept 19 and would probably come back to New York later. Said he had received no word that Swaran Singh planning special trip here but that presumably he would be coming for UNGA. Rusk
217. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 20, 1965, 1200Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi, USUN, London, New Delhi, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Tehran, Ankara, the White House, DOD, and CIA. Also passed to USIA. 91. Indo-Pak crisis. I saw President alone at his request for 35 minutes beginning 1230 hours today. President showed strain from pressure of issues now bearing down on him. But he was calm, affable and outgoing although distressed. Following covers essence with secondary points to follow in septel. He reaffirmed his deep conviction U.S. must play decisive role in surmounting present crisis and thereafter. Said Russians have been trying to seize settlement initiative, which should and still can belong to U.S. Thought U.S. actions recently have weighed heavily against Pakistan, although he knew it was not always intended that way. U.S. silence and inaction at various critical moments had also hurt. Chinese Communists expressing sympathetic sentiments in crisis which Paks do not want from ChiComs, and which had been expected from U.S. after events of Sept 6. Pak people bound to be somewhat influenced by contrasting ChiCom and Pak [U.S.?] records last two weeks despite their instinctive aversion for Communists. He said "Hindus" with their usual clever trickery and self-righteousness had given ChiComs opportunity to exploit tragic hostilities--opportunity which would never have arisen if Indians had not opened up international aggression for first time two weeks ago. Indians had again put Paks, rather than themselves, on spot with U.S. He regretted it had not been made clear to all before Sept 6 that international aggression was entirely different and more serious thing from clashes in disputed territory of Kashmir resulting from Kashmiri resistance to Indian oppression. If U.S. had warned early that any crossing of international boundary into territory proper of other by either India or Pakistan would not be tolerated, present dangerous opportunity opened up for Chinese Communists would never been created. I focused conversation on implications of ChiCom ultimatum and on inescapable and imperative requirement for unconditional cease-fire under UNSC resolutions. I said without arguing background, position at this moment is that ChiComs have it within their power to put Paks in impossible situation unless GOP moves before expiration of ChiCom ultimatum to reject threatened Chinese intervention and implement unconditional cease-fire with India. Anything short of this would put Paks in position of seemingly abetting or at least passively benefiting from ChiCom aggression against India. This would be posture which USG and people could not accept. It would be impossible for Paks or anyone else to prove ChiComs had not been influenced in their decision by Pak failure to disassociate themselves. Such Pak position could not be defended before American Government and people, and I did not know how we could get back on our traditional basis after such a disaster. I asked President if he had been fully informed by Bhutto and Shoaib of my talks with them preceding day (based on Deptel 83 to Rawalpindi)./2/ President said he had been fully posted and he understood the message. /2/Document 214. President said he had just received partial report of UNSC action of last night. I said Sept 22 was shaping up as critical day, both as to acceptance UNSC resolution and as to ChiCom ultimatum. Pak action to disassociate itself from ChiCom designs needed to be taken before that time. I did not see how President Ayub and his govt could live down a failure to take this action. Even a semblance of Pak association with ChiComs in exertion of Communists military pressures on any free country would put Pakistan beyond reach of U.S. help. President said with deep feeling that there was no Pak collusion or even consultation with ChiComs. There was no understanding between them and he had no knowledge of ChiCom intentions. All he knew of their moves was what he read in the world press. President then informed me that he had "recently" sent a message to Peiping telling ChiComs, "For God's sake, do not come in. Do not aggravate the situation." I told him this information was significant, and I wanted to cite it in my report of the conversation. I asked him if he could expressly assure me that we had quite recently transmitted such a message to the Chinese Communists, and did he authorize me to quote him directly to this effect? President replied, "Yes, I do, except leave out `for God's sake'." I said way seemed open for President to follow through in the sense of his message to ChiComs and I urged him to do forthwith. He answered that he would give the most earnest thought to cease-fire decision to take effect next day or so. Great obstacle was Pak public opinion. He asked, "How can I survive an action which will look to the people as if we are giving up on Kashmir, just to help the Indians, with justice for the Kashmiris within our grasp?" "After all the sacrifices that have been made, how can I explain a decision to throw it all away with nothing but another UN resolution to show them?" He expressed grave concern that he and his government could not stand in the face of the expected violent public reaction. "The people would not understand." I told the President that if I knew anything about the people of Pakistan--their ideals, beliefs and convictions--after 3 1/2years here, I knew that they understood the inherent evil of Communism and its antipathy to every principle of Islam. I believed that even the rank and file Pakistani people without educational opportunities had learned from their mullahs that nothing good could come out of Communism. I believed the people would understand and reject the evil Communist motivation, which aimed at eventual disaster for Pakistan and Kashmir, as much as for India. I believed he could carry the people with him in a decision for national integrity and peace, and for the well being and continued development progress of the people of Pakistan in association with her true friends. President said he agrees with my estimate of the inherent distrust of Communism on the part of the people and their understanding of its complete incompatibility with Islam. Still the people considered China to be less of a threat to Pakistan than were India and the USSR. He could not be sure that he could survive what would seem almost universally to be a decision to sacrifice the first national objective for the apparent purpose of helping an India which had not righted its wrongs. I said the reality was far different and the people could be brought to sense this. I expressed a profound conviction that with his unrivaled place in the hearts and the confidence of the people of the country, he could carry them with him. I assured the President that the U.S. would do everything at its command to support him in any difficulties which might grow out of an affirmative decision by him on the UNSC cease-fire call and on the repudiation of ChiCom intervention. I told him that if it had ever seemed that the Kashmir settlement question was treated with a measure of resignation by the friends of Pakistan and India, it could never be so treated again after the fires through which we were now passing. President Ayub could count on a new sense of urgency in the international approach to this issue, if the GOP played its part in this hour. In bidding me an affecting good-bye, President put his hand on my shoulder and said "God bless you," words which I repeated to him./3/ /3/In the assessment of this conversation, sent to the Department in telegram 94 from Rawalpindi, September 20, McConaughy expressed concern that although Ayub seemed to be leaning in the direction of accepting a cease-fire "in a Hamlet mood he might find himself unable to make the decision." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) McConaughy
218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Pakistan/1/ Washington, September 21, 1965, 12:19 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Top Secret; Exdis; Flash. Drafted in the White House on September 20, and cleared by Ball, Handley, Deputy Assistant Secretary David H. Popper (IO), Komer, and McGeorge Bundy. Approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to New Delhi and USUN. 92. For Ambassador from Secretary. 1. You should seek an urgent appointment with Ayub on the grounds that you have reported your last conversation and have received further instructions. 2. You should say to Ayub that his assurances with respect to his personal attitude toward Chinese Communist intervention have been received with great satisfaction in Washington. Unfortunately, the international political requirements cannot be met only by a private assurance alone. The U.S. public and world opinion too will inevitably assume Pak/Chicom collusion if the Chicoms move at a time when the Paks have not accepted the Security Council cease-fire demand. 3. The Security Council resolution is the product of intensive efforts by the U.S. delegate in which Indian and Soviet pressures were resisted sufficiently so that Kashmir is specifically mentioned in the preamble and SC consideration of how to reach a settlement is foreshadowed in operating Paragraph 4./2/ These two important changes are seen among best friends of Pakistan in Washington as providing the necessary footing for the Pak decision to accept the resolution. We regard Pak acceptance of this resolution as absolutely fundamental to restoration of peace in the area and do not see how Paks can get more until hostilities stopped. /2/Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 211 of September 20 indicated that as soon as a cease-fire agreement was in effect the Council would consider the steps that could be taken to assist toward a settlement of the political problem underlying the conflict. (UN doc. S/RES/211) 4. The US supports every part of this resolution; so the GOP can be certain that, if the cease-fire is accepted, the US will not neglect its responsibilities under operative Paragraph 4. Indeed the US will expect to conduct its relations with the two parties with a careful eye to their own readiness to move forward with the efforts foreshadowed in that Article. However, you should avoid giving any impression that we are committing ourselves to support any particular form of negotiated settlement, or that we will cut off the Indians if they do not accept one. If necessary, you should make this very clear. What we are talking about is the readiness of the US to sustain the position that settlement of the underlying problem is needed, and that both parties should address themselves to that problem in good faith. 5. Without engaging the President directly, you should make it very clear that men closest to him here are convinced that Pak acceptance of SC resolution will clear the way for early man-to-man discussion between Ayub and President Johnson which could have most constructive effect on Pak/US relations. In fact, should President Ayub choose to couple visit to Washington with personal appearance at UN, we would warmly welcome this. 6. We do not fully understand significance of Bhutto visit to UN, but if Ayub should speak of Bhutto's mission in terms suggesting a last minute effort to change sentiment in the Security Council, you should leave him in no doubt that Bhutto is on a fool's errand. Ayub is his own best counsellor at this moment of decision. Rusk
219. Telegram From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ New Delhi, September 21, 1965, 1130Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles. Secret; Eyes Only. [text not declassified] Appreciate your cable/2/ and also what I believe to be skillful Washington handling of extraordinarily complex situation which, although full of dangers, may offer certain opportunities for USG to promote its long-term interests in this area. /2/Not further identified. In regard to food situation I believe it is difficult for anyone not actually on ground fully to comprehend risks involved in further delay in authorizing shipments. Right now 40 million Indians, most of them low income people living in large cities, are wholly dependent upon US foodgrains. In Calcutta in order to spread dwindling supplies daily rations have already been cut from twelve ounces to ten ounces. Inevitably story is spreading that this has been due to US decision to put squeeze on Indian people to force them to give in to Paks. GOI and ourselves are doing everything possible to keep situation under wraps. However foreign and US press as well as Indian press are becoming aware that USG is stalling and serious gap in foodgrain supplies will soon result. Question has become not "Will this situation blow up?" but "How soon?" When it does, impact here would constitute extremely serious blow to US influence at moment of great opportunity. Image in world press as well as in India of USG loaded with wheat putting squeeze on 40 million Indian slum dwellers in order to bring pressure to bear on Indian Govt which is faced with potential two-front war (while shipments continue to Pakistan) would be profoundly harmful; Communists will have a field day. Very least we should do is to tell Indian Govt, hopefully within next 24-48 hours, that we are providing one million tons of grain and that we will do everything in our power to see that there is no break in arrival of food ships which now are scheduled to run out in late Oct. This arrangement does not have to be highly publicized. GOI would see advantage in treating it as routine matter. Many thanks for all you have done and are doing. Bowles
220. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 21, 1965, 1450Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to USUN, London, Karachi, New Delhi, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Tehran, Ankara, the White House, DOD, and CIA. Also passed to USIA. 98. Indo-Pak crisis. Following is advance summary several major points raised by President Ayub during our 40 minute meeting beginning at 5:30 p.m. September 21./2/ /2/A more detailed report of this conversation was sent in telegram 100 from Rawalpindi, September 21. In this report McConaughy noted that Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed was present during the conversation, which prevented the type of intimate, personal exchange that McConaughy had with Ayub the previous day. (Ibid.) Ayub's apology for mob action against U.S. nationals and facilities,/3/ offer of restitution and assurances of future protection was earnest and categorical. /3/Telegram 573 from Karachi, September 21, reported that the Embassy and the USIS Library were attacked by stone-throwing mobs on September 21. Glass was broken in the Embassy and the library was set afire and seriously damaged before police were able to disperse the mobs. (Ibid., POL 23-8 PAK) The Consulate General in Lahore also reported on September 21 that it had been attacked by a mob on the same day. The Consulate General and a nearby USIS building were damaged. (Telegram 24 from Lahore; ibid.) On cease fire he early made statement, "We don't know what decision we will take tomorrow. We must see what major powers really intend doing. That is why we have sent Foreign Minister Bhutto to New York to find out." Ayub said Bhutto was instructed on arrival during Tuesday night immediately to get in touch with Ambassador Goldberg and Soviet and other representatives of permanent members of the Security Council. Bhutto was to find out what steps will be taken to move forward with the negotiation for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. "What are permanent members thinking of doing?", Ayub repeated. After presentation my message,/4/ Ayub expressed gratification. He assured me that he would consider things most carefully and would not do anything irresponsible. He said that while U.S. had direct interest in the outcome, Pakistan's very existence was involved. /4/Reference is to the message McConaughy was instructed to convey to Ayub in telegram 92 from Rawalpindi, Document 218. However, Ayub again stressed the need to have clarification on how U.S. and other permanent members "intended to proceed and how serious they are to assure a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute." I could not shake him from the idea that he needed a special report from New York by Bhutto on these points before he could make his decision. Ayub said Bhutto would report to him by radio-phone before Security Council deadline for cease fire (3:00 a.m. Wednesday/5/ EDT). /5/September 22. McConaughy
221. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, September 21, 1965, 1800Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to USUN, Karachi, London, Moscow, Hong Kong, and CINCMEAFSA, and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USIA. 734. L.K. Jha called tonight (1) to describe Indian position in regard to cease fire resolution and (2) to inquire urgently how US would react to an Indian acceptance in principle of Soviet proposal for mediation. In regard to Security Council resolution Jha described Indian attitude in following terms: 1. India is worried about Chinese, wants nothing from Paks and is anxious to stop present fighting. Therefore it will agree to an immediate cease fire if the Paks will stop shooting at same time. 2. Although India has no desire to hold Pak territory, return to Aug 5 cease fire line without some safeguards creates serious problems. For one thing there should be an agreement in regard to infiltrators, two thousand of whom are still on Indian side of the line. Moreover India is reluctant to give up positions it has won on Pak side of C.F.L. that cut off infiltration routes and prevent Paks from dominating key roads that are essential to supply Indian troops facing Chinese in Ladakh until some assurances can be provided that further Pak aggression will be prevented. Jha believes these questions could be negotiated out either directly through Security Council or through General Nimmo working with reps of the two nations on the ground. Jha did not take an inflexible position. The GOI he said felt that while the issues involved were manageable, in view of recent developments they could not be ignored. On the second point, i.e. Soviet proposal for direct negotiations in Tashkent between Ayub Khan and Shastri with Kosygin acting as mediator, Jha requested at earliest possible moment reactions of USG since it was necessary to give Soviets answer on Wednesday/2/ well before Chinese deadline expires. /2/September 22. What, he asked, would we think of such a meeting? Would we consider it helpful, or would it seem to bring Soviets into a role that would not be in US interests? Shastri would appreciate getting our views on highly confidential basis soonest. Jha added that Kosygin was pushing India hard for a favorable answer. There was a strong view within GOI that it would be advantageous to accept proposal on Wednesday in order to draw the USSR into a more favorable position vis-à-vis threatened Chinese attack. However Shastri was hesitant to go the whole way. Just as we have shunned summit meetings for which there has been inadequate preparation so he feels confrontation with Ayub Khan in his present mood could not be expected to produce much. Nonetheless Shastri would like to say to the Soviets tomorrow (a) that he accepts in principle but that (b) he would like to carry discussions with Security Council in regard to a settlement somewhat further (c) reserving Kosygin's proposal for a later stage if needed. I told Jha that although we could not take responsibility for his government's decisions on such a crucial question, we appreciated the Prime Minister's sensitivity for our views and interests, and I would ask my government to provide its informal and confidential evaluation as soon as possible, hopefully by the opening of business Wednesday morning in New Delhi. If you can give me your reactions by then I will be grateful./3/ /3/The Department authorized Bowles to respond to Jha's questions concerning the Soviet offer to mediate by expressing appreciation for being consulted, and by indicating that the U.S. Government still considered that the best hope for solution to the conflict lay in action through the United Nations. (Telegram 535 to New Delhi, September 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Comment: Although difficult assess Soviet objectives, this gambit has advantage of bringing USSR into a constructive position vis-à-vis ChiComs. Since Paks likely to refuse, I judge proposal to be dead-end street. Nevertheless exercise demonstrates Indian willingness to negotiate. Bowles [Continue with the next documents]
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