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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
222. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 22, 1965, 7 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/65-9/65. No classification marking. Prepared by Briefing Officer Arthur McCafferty. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. India-Pakistan Pakistan announced acceptance of the UN cease-fire proposal at a dramatic last-minute Security Council meeting last night./2/ Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto announced Pakistani acceptance as the 3:00 AM UN deadline was reached. India had already accepted the UN proposal, but the Indian delegate to the UN asked that a new time be set for the cease-fire to become effective in the light of Pakistan's delay in announcing its position. The Security Council later announced that the deadline was extended 15 hours until 6:00 PM today. /2/USUN reported on this meeting in telegram 861, September 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Bhutto said Pakistan was giving the UN a "last chance" to settle the Kashmir question and stated that Pakistan would withdraw from the organization if it does not do so. Prior to Bhutto's announcement, the US Embassy in Karachi reported that Ayub would have trouble with Pakistani public opinion if a cease-fire was announced. The Embassy noted that to some extent Ayub is a prisoner of the propaganda carried in the controlled Pakistani press in the past several days, but added that public opinion in Pakistan is subject to rapid shifts in sentiment. President Ayub will address his nation sometime this morning. Replying to Peking's broadcast last night claiming that the Indians had attempted to destroy their old military works along the Sikkim border, the Indians have stated that none of their forces have crossed the Sikkim-Tibet border and that if the installations were destroyed, the demolition must have been done by the Chinese themselves. Peking has as yet made no comment on the Pakistani acceptance of the UN cease-fire proposal. Arthur McCafferty
223. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 23, 1965, 7:10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Cables, 6/65-9/65. Secret. Prepared by McCafferty. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. India-Pakistan The India-Pakistan cease-fire was honored without incident at 6:00 PM last evening and there have been no reported violations since it went it into effect. Even in "peace" however, Indian and Pakistani statements continue to be diametrically opposed. Indian charges that Pakistan bombed Amritsar--killing 50 civilians a few hours after agreeing to a cease-fire--are refuted by Pakistani statements that the claims are baseless and in fact the Pak Air Force hit only military targets along the road to Amritsar. Embassy New Delhi estimates that Pakistan has probably had 2,500-3,000 killed and 12,000-15,000 wounded during the fighting while India lost some 2,000 killed and 10,000 wounded. UN Secretary Thant is wasting no time in gathering a 100-man team of military observers to send to the disputed area. So far Denmark and Canada have each agreed to send ten officers. The new observer group is to be known as UNIPOM, or United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission. The Chinese Communists have allowed their deadline to pass without taking any action against the Indian frontier. Instead, an authoritative People's Daily observer article on 22 September claims that Peking's ultimatum has forced the Indians to comply with its demand that they destroy their "military works" on the Chinese side of the border. The article attempts to keep open the threat of action by claiming that other demands--for a return of livestock and allegedly kidnapped border inhabitants--are still outstanding, and therefore, the "matter is far from closed and accounts must be settled." This language, however, is similar to claims made by Peking for years and does not carry with it the immediacy contained in the recent ultimatum. The first signs of a relaxation in Chinese Communist military alert status in Western Sinkiang and Tibet may now be in evidence, according to field analysis of Chinese military communications. [Here follows a brief report about developments in South Vietnam.] Arthur McCafferty
224. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, September 23, 1965, 1525Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:05 p.m. Also sent to the White House, and repeated to USUN, London, Tehran, New Delhi, DOD, and CIA. 607. Indo-Pak crisis: UNSC ceasefire resolution. 1. President Ayub telephoned me evening September 22 in Rawalpindi for post-ceasefire conversation. He informed me of his phone conversation earlier in the evening with President Johnson./2/ He said it was a fair connection and he clearly felt good about the way the conversation went. He expressed his gratitude for the kind sentiments the President had expressed in regard to the ceasefire decision and prospects for peaceful settlement. Ayub said President had very kindly mentioned possibility of his visiting US a few weeks hence when respective schedules might make it possible. Ayub said he had replied that he very much wanted to accept. He would be preoccupied for next two weeks or so with the aftermath of hostilities. But after that, he would need to confer with UNSYG U Thant in New York and he would like to combine that trip with a visit to the President in Washington. Indicated his hope to work such a visit out, although he made no attempt to be specific. /2/The telephone call from Ayub in Rawalpindi was taken by Johnson in Washington at 10:55 a.m. Ayub placed the call to inform Johnson that Pakistan had accepted the cease-fire agreement. Ayub added: "We believe that you are a man of honor and a gentleman and will see that an honorable settlement is reached to prevent such unfortunate happenings occurring again." Johnson replied: "You may be sure of the readiness of the United States to support and sustain the position that settlement of the underlying problems is needed and is essential." He added, however, "I cannot give you any assurance of any particular form of settlement." Johnson concluded the conversation by inviting Ayub to visit the United States, and Ayub said that he would as soon as he could arrange it. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and President Ayub, September 22, 1965, 10:55 a.m., Tape F65.05, Side A, PNO 2) Three slightly variant transcripts of this conversation are in the Alpha series, ibid. An additional transcript prepared in the White House by Juanita Roberts is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. V, Memos, 9/65-1/66. 2. Ayub appeared grateful for US efforts to bring about ceasefire, but went out of his way to recall assurances I had conveyed that US would strongly support UN efforts for resolution of Kashmir problem. He said GOP would look seriously to US for significant action to encourage peaceful negotiation. He was confident US influence could be decisive. He said he would expect me as US representative here, who had played active part and knew situation well, to do full share in pursuing implementation of US assurances. 3. I told Ayub he knew we would stand by our assurances, but he also knew the limitations which we had stated. I jokingly upbraided him for keeping me in suspense until last moment as to whether he would agree to ceasefire. Ayub said he was sorry about this but he in truth could not be certain himself until almost the deadline because of his distrust of the Indians and his need for Bhutto's assessment from New York. McConaughy
225. Editorial Note On September 26, 1965, Pravda published a report on replies from Shastri and Ayub to Kosygin's September 17 good offices offer. Shastri expressed appreciation for the offer, but replied that the meeting proposed by Kosygin could only take place after the termination of military actions and the creation of a calmer situation. Ayub also expressed appreciation for Kosygin's initiative, but took the position that the necessary foundation for the meeting should be prepared through actions taken by the UN Security Council. (Telegram 1032 from Moscow, September 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK)
226. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 29, 1965, 1520Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Moscow, USUN, New Delhi, London, Hong Kong, Tehran, Ankara, Karachi, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Paris, the White House, CIA, DOD, and USIA. 121. Indo-Pak crisis: Sept 29 meeting with Pres Ayub. A. Cease Fire and Withdrawal. I met today with Pres Ayub for 55-minute discussion. Also present were FonSec and notetaker. Stull accompanied me. Ayub opened saying didn't know what Indians up to in current half dozen or more major cease fire violations. He said one instance Indians gave Pak frontline commander notice that if he didn't pull out would attack. Paks remained, Indians attacked and were driven back. Maintained GOP knows such Indian actions based on instructions from superior commanders. Said GOP has good info of continuing orders from superiors including Chavan and Chaudhury to Indian forces in Kashmir to press attack wherever possible. Cited one recent instance where Indian unit commander threatened with dismissal if he failed take Pak-held bridge. Asked what is GOI after? Pres said, however unfortunate war has been, it inconceivable either side can retain international territory of other. Commented, "We are dealing with a diseased people and don't know how much control exists at highest level. Chavan wishes to make history now but should have done so during serious fighting." Observed Indians nibbling here and there at cease fire. Referring Indian use air power yesterday in Rajasthan, said PAF desired retaliate soonest but he had responded, "Let's see what they are doing tomorrow." Said GOP dealing with very irresponsible people GOI. His expressed hope that early positioning UN cease fire observers would dampen current violations. Ayub responded GOP can't tolerate Indian actions if they continue too long. I urged Pak forebearance noting restraint would not be lost on world opinion. Ayub noted two-company size Indian attacks at Rajasthan and another Indian attack in southern sector in area where no fighting had occurred previously. Characterized Indians as cowardly enemy observing no rules of decency or of war. I told Pres we had relayed all info and cease fire violations passed US by GOP to Emb New Delhi. Said not surprisingly Indians had alleged violations initiated by GOP. Ayub cited Rajasthan violation, saying Pak forces had held area for two weeks. Stated military withdrawal is matter for mutual governmental agmt and is not local commanders' responsibility. Reiterated top Indian leadership irresponsible and castigated "little man Shastri." I interjected that UNSecGen fully apprised of seriousness cease fire violations, and his public reports should have some deterrent effect. Ayub argued GOP wishes observe cease fire but there must be some understanding between India and Pakistan about disengagement, some understanding as to how it must be regulated, controlled and supervised. Said given such understanding, carrying out those functions little more than routine military exercise. I asked Pres Ayub whether he favored separate UNMOGIP and UNIPOM operations. Ayub indicated approval, saying Gen Nimmo too old, any event one man can't handle everything, and good idea that observer organizations separate but still interrelated. I observed effectiveness UN observers would depend importantly on caliber personnel and expressed passing hope Latin Americans would have good command English language. Ayub seized on this to suggest gratuitously that Alliance for Progress may have succeeded bringing Latin Americans well under U.S. influence. I demurred re influence and noted had referred only English-language capability. I asked Pres Ayub how he envisaged actual arrangements for mutual withdrawal. Ayub responded GOP has told SecGen and "among us" he has agreed that along with arrangements for military disengagement a body should be set up to arrange also for political solution. Ayub pointed to "good example for fruitful negotiations in Rann of Kutch precedent." Said some such sort of arrangement has to be laid on. However, "This thing bedeviled by four powers wanting to go together, and we do not know how that could work." Said small team of people necessary and pointed to British, "who know us" and to Americans, "who also know us a little." Commented French and Sovs appear more or less to agree and perhaps there could be understanding on inclusion a Frenchman. Added while latter would be ignorant of specific circumstances here, that would be all right. Said, "We want some such arrangement like that." I asked if suggested body would not always be under UN auspices? Ayub replied affirmatively (but without enthusiasm). Said UNSecGen should authorize such a team to go and negotiate. Commented skeptically he does not know how much relevant experience SecGen has. Noted "UK has more experience," and "Americans have some experience." Said some initiative necessary to break ice and get things moving gradually. Observed had not spelled out this concept in last week's telephone conversation with President Johnson, but had done so to PriMin Wilson. Reiterated Rann of Kutch good precedent and some such approach could create common ground and understanding for possible later Indo-Pak mtg. He referred Pres Johnson observation that Paks wish U.S. become directly involved, but UN must take that on. Commented, "That's all right with GOP." I asked Ayub if he had in mind something comparable to Dixon, Graham or contemplated Admiral Nimitz' mediatory roles but with broader mandate. Ayub replied, "That's it, that's it!" I asked if any mediation or good office effort would not have to take place after withdrawal. Ayub said, "No, now," adding, "if Indians can't agree, Paks can't either. Looking at future events, one can see that. What we want is withdrawal alongside cooling of tempers." I observed GOI could be expected disagree this Pak position. FonSec interjected if necessary go along with Indian position, there can be no agmt. Ayub said it's in SC resolution and SecGen is to arrange implementation that resolution. FonSec said resolution provides that after cease fire effective withdrawal will be considered and parties at same time will attempt find solution, and resolution calls on SecGen assist this process. Quoted Ayub, that "Military disengagement and political disengagement must go hand in hand. Withdrawal without a settlement will enable Indians procrastinate and preclude settlement." Pres Ayub commented didn't think Indians for their part would actually withdraw, rather, intended stay in positions in Kashmir. Repeated present need is for cooling off arrangement alongside withdrawal. I asked Pres if he meant Indians would refuse withdraw from wrong side cease fire line. He replied, "Not in a hurry. They are diseased people, and I wouldn't put anything past them." I asked Ayub if he considered withdrawal from occupied national territory and from disputed territory (Kashmir) were separate questions. He replied, "Undoubtedly." I asked if he could envisage a phased withdrawal, and he replied, "That might well be so." I suggested Indians might well insist on single continuous procedure. Ayub replied, "That is why I said political and military must be side by side so both parties will know what is intended. After all, political and military aspects are combined and not separate watertight compartments. Without political arrangement India will not give up its military vantage points, and we will not give up our vantage points either." I remarked this could be interpreted by Indians as holding threat of force over any negotiations. Ayub replied GOP should be using that argument. Said, "I wouldn't be a bit surprised if meaning of these Indian cease fire violations is that GOI seeking to preclude political arrangements. Both we and they have to be reasonable." I interjected there must be concessions each side and Ayub agreed. I pointed out this always had been U.S. position and cited 1963 Ministerial discussions this regard. Ayub agreed and observed that with negotiated settlement one can't have all one wants. "That's why one negotiates." I stressed U.S. has no favorite solution Kashmir problem and Ayub replied, "We do hope you will stick to that position. We also hope you realize your objectives cannot be realized on the subcontinent without a settlement, and we hope you will help bring that about." B. U.S.-Pak Relations. President Ayub said, "It great misfortune that what we had been trying to do on your behalf to moderate ChiComs has not elicited word of appreciation from you. We may not have achieved, but we have tried and shall continue to try. These efforts may not be so fundamental, but they must also be considered. We got no credit, rather, I won't say bullying, but something akin to it. On top of that, solemn pledges were almost revoked." I commented US need make no apology concerning fulfillment its pledges to Pakistan. On contrary, US thinks it has fullfilled its pledges. Perhaps not in way evisaged by GOP but effectively and through UN. I told President Ayub what he had said was hard. I pointed out US had maintained many beneficial programs for Pakistan. Ayub continued, "We cannot become Communist, and we don't want to become Indians. The last thing we will accept is Indian dictation. We are prepared to be reasonable and to cooperate with India, but not to be subjected by her. Any policy which aims at the subjection of Pakistan by India we shall fight." I said of course that was fundamental, and we understood and respected this. Pres Ayub referred to "rubbish of this scheme and that scheme," for example, published in British press (i.e., Victor Anante Daily Telegraph article). Asked what good can come for U.S. from saving ineffective weak governments? Said governments must be able to carry populace with them. Referred to unfortunate experiences as, for example, Vietnam escalation. States U.S. can never be driven out of Vietnam, but said question whether viable govt can be established there is bedeviling everybody and this despite military successes. Noted improvement military situation but questioned if also psychological improvement. Questioned if viable govt possible Vietnam and answered saying only possible if U.S. remains there for years. Concluded, "There are these lessons to be drawn about danger of rushing in." I said Viet Cong pressures must first be relieved before favorable psychological climate and stable govt can be assured. Ayub commented that entire structure Vietnam must be rebuilt which means U.S. must occupy country 15 to 20 years. I said "occupation" not accurate word to describe our assist- ance to Vietnam. Ayub stated it was evident that weak govt always heavily beset by extremist opposition. In civil conflict, he thought that side which has to enlist outside military support always loses. To bolster up govts with outside direct military intervention "always fails." They can be supported with material by outsiders, but they must fight their own battles on their own feet. He conceded my notation that South Vietnamese Army making a pretty good battle record now, and that govts weakened by military insurrections over period of years must have unusual help or be overwhelmed, as was GRC on mainland of China in 1949. Comment follows in separate tel./2/ /2/McConaughy provided his assessment of the conversation in telegram 123 from Rawalpindi, September 29. He noted that the stiff atmosphere of the discussion was a marked contrast to his meetings with Ayub the previous week. Ayub "seemed to be going out of his way to upbraid the US" for revocation of prior pledges of military support, for failure to appreciate Pakistani efforts to moderate the Chinese, and for something akin to "bullying" of Pakistan. McConaughy speculated on the reasons for Ayub's apparent change of attitude, but admitted that he was at a loss to do so with confidence. He concluded that the Kashmir dispute was the touchstone of U.S.-Pakistan relations. If the Kashmir dispute were resolved satisfactorily, U.S. relations with Pakistan would thrive. (Ibid.) McConaughy
227. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 29, 1965, 1455Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the White House, London, New Delhi, and Karachi. 122. U.S.-Pak summit meeting. During meeting today with Pres Ayub (reported separately),/2/ I referred to my instructions follow up on Sept 23 telephone conversation Presidents Ayub and Johnson with regard possible Ayub visit to U.S. I said should Ayub go to UN we would hope and expect he would also visit Washington for talks with President Johnson along lines their telephone conversation. I invited him to indicate what precise moves might be possible. /2/See Document 226. Ayub replied had discussed this matter previous night (presumably in Cabinet). Had decided would like ask UK agree to postponement long scheduled State visit owing to grave emergency situation facing GOP. Said UK must surely understand reasons for postponement, and he believed President would understand need for postponement of trip to U.S. for same reason. Asked, "Please tell President Johnson on my behalf my first duty is to my country. With popular feelings as they are, and you know them, would be most difficult. We have attempted to damp down these feelings. We have kept U.S. reaction our request for implementation defense agreement secret between myself and FonMinistry. But, nonetheless, things could possibly get out of hand. If President Johnson gives me six or eight weeks, I would be flattered to come. This also what we telling UK. That visit has been postponed so many times, but I just cannot go. I am not reluctant to go. It is a question of my inability. President Johnson will understand; he must understand this. As I told President Johnson during our telephone conversation, this war is long distance from Washington but nonetheless he cannot leave U.S. My war is much closer to my country, and I also cannot leave now." I interjected that of course his visit to U.S. would not be extended State visit, but important short negotiating discussion. Ayub said true and he certainly would not be going to discuss economic affairs but only political matters. "The former are for you to decide, not for me. They are your decision. Please explain to President Johnson there is no reluctance toward visit on my part. You must understand my problem. For example, only yesterday Indian Air Force attacked, and our boys were eager to retaliate. Only I could make decision not to retaliate. I must be here all the time and on top of everything. The people in Pakistan must also understand." I conceded that it would be difficult for Ayub leave country before cease fire fully effective. He said any day something can happen until real disengagement has taken place. Compared situation to a U.S.-Mexican war. I returned to his comment about visit possibility in six or eight weeks. He replied, "Yes, as soon as possible, but there are great difficulties and I must be on tap all the time." I told President Ayub my great concern to get things off dead center in U.S.-Pak relations and observed in important respects meeting of two Presidents necessary to get things moving again. Ayub replied, "Of course, President Johnson can say what he likes in our discussions, and I shall speak frankly to him. But too I shall be reasonable. All we want is that you do not add to our problems." Later in conversation when Ayub complained about lack U.S. appreciation his efforts, I underlined that all those matters argue for face-to-face meeting between two Presidents. (Ayub was referring to his efforts to exert moderating influence on ChiComs.) At conclusion of discussion, I promised report President Ayub's views on U.S. visit and expressed hope that in next few weeks it would be possible work out arrangements. McConaughy
228. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15, Sept. 23-Oct. 14 1965. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. Pressure on Peshawar. Several days ago the Paks closed a small [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] installation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. On 22 September they forcibly closed a minor [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] acoustic installation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. [1 line of source text not declassified] This morning they closed two more small installations near Karachi. Later today Pak guards barred our people from the airfield in Peshawar [1 line of source text not declassified]. No notice or explanation was given in any of these cases. McConaughy raised the earlier incidents with Ayub this morning. Ayub professed total ignorance (cables on meeting attached)/2/ but the Foreign Secretary knew all about it and indicated these installations were being used against Pak security. Since the installations closed have nothing to do with Pak/Indian matters, however, the pattern seems rather to point to a deliberate Pak effort to show us they have cards too, and as pressure to get us to resume aid. /2/Attached were copies of telegram 122 from Rawalpindi (Document 227) and a telegram sent through special channels on September 29 in which McConaughy reported on the conclusion of his conversation with Ayub that morning. McConaughy protested against the actions described in Komer's memorandum to the President. If we can't get Kashmir for Ayub, our only lever to keep Ayub on the reservation is aid. If so, then we must keep convincing Ayub that unless he plays ball with us (e.g. on our installations), there won't be any. This suggests that we should quietly respond to the Pak squeeze on our installations by suspending at least some of the aid now in the pipeline. We have the following options: A. Of the $264 million odd in FY'65 and prior aid now in the pipeline, about half is not yet covered by letters of commitment authorizing disbursements. AID could simply hold these up. It would take about a week for the Paks to catch on. B. Once letters of commitment are issued, about six big US banks then issue letters of credit. A simple AID query as to how much credit remained to be drawn under these letters would get back to the Paks very quickly, and worry them. C. We could go further and ask the banks not to issue any new letters of credit, and even to suspend any remaining disbursements under existing ones. This would get Pak wind up immediately. D. This would leave only the aid goods already bought and perhaps in transit. Repossessing and/or diverting this entails many complications. E. We could also hold up administratively the 175,000 tons of grain on which PA's were just issued. Since the Paks are in a highly agitated frame of mind, it seems best we move carefully. Steps A and B above would put us in a good position, would worry the Paks, yet wouldn't entail early publicity. We also wouldn't want to trigger Pak closing of Peshawar before they had had a chance to digest the likely cost. State probably will not have a recommendation before tomorrow. Among other things, we are worried over the possibility that Ayub is not fully master in his own house. Thus this memo is only to bring you up to date on the state of play. R.W. Komer Mr. President: My guess is that the State Department will come out recommending A. and B./3/ In this rather edgy situation, this seems enough to me. Any preliminary indication of your feelings would be helpful: /3/Komer sent a memorandum to Bundy later on September 29 in which he reported that "instead of quietly cutting off aid, NEA is recommending to Ball that we make one more try with Ayub, and ask him what he is trying to accomplish." Komer noted that he had "registered in spades our view that it was futile to try to talk with Ayub, and that I doubted he was out of control but was rather fully conversant with the squeeze play and for McConaughy, of all people, to go back and ask again what's up would simply invite Ayub retorting `Restore MAP or we'll close Peshawar.'" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II) I am ready to do A. and B. /4/No response by the President appears on the memorandum. McG. B.
229. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, September 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. Mac-- When I called BK Nehru to invite him for lunch with us Friday, he raised the question of a visit by the PM. Did we have in mind the same kind of quick visit to Washington as had been under discussion before the fighting or were we now proposing that if the PM went to the UN the President would be delighted to see him in Washington? I told BK that (1) we had no fixed view; (2) I couldn't speak for the President, but assumed that with the aid bill now by us, the President would be happy to see the PM under either circumstance--it was a matter of working things out to their mutual convenience; (3) I had personally rather thought that with the issue before the UN, the PM would want to appear if he came to the US. BK asked whether our feelers constituted a formal invitation. I replied that the situation was rather one of trying to work things out informally to the mutual convenience of the two leaders but that once this was done I was sure a formal re-invite was no problem. However, I recalled that BK himself had suggested the PM would like to make any formal visit to the US at a time when he could spend several days seeing the country, which of course was not possible during the present interregnum between Lok Sabha sessions. BK said he understood. Mac, my understanding (particularly from the latest note from the President)/2/ is that he'd be happy to see Shastri here in any way and any time that can be mutually worked out. Correct? /2/Reference is to a September 24 note, attached to a memorandum from Komer inquiring about proposed visits by Shastri and Ayub. President Johnson agreed to a visit by Shastri and preferred that the visit take place before October 15. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15, 9/23/65-12/23/65) RWK
230. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 1, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. Pak/Indian Affairs. The situation is still confused. The cease-fire is still tenuously holding as more UN observers appear on the scene. But the latest Indian attack in the Chhamb sector is thoroughly arousing the Paks, and could lead to resumption of full-scale hostilities. We're pressing the SYG to act. In any event withdrawal to the 5 August positions will be a tricky matter. The UK believes the UN must press for it immediately, lest the war erupt again. The British feel the SC must take a tough stance, including sanctions if needed. But the Paks are insisting that withdrawal go hand in hand with the creation of machinery for Kashmir settlement. India's counterploy is to hint that the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire line is no longer valid. Meanwhile Goldberg is conferring about an SC Commission of the four big powers (US, USSR, UK, France) to help the SYG work out a Kashmir settlement. The USSR is reluctant, and the Indians too. Pak Attitudes. Ayub's attitude toward us seems to have hardened; we're not quite sure why. But he's now made clear he can't come here for 6-8 weeks at least; perhaps he wants to soften us up first through such devices as the squeeze on our installations. Meanwhile, the Paks are allowing the almost wholly government-controlled media to feed the growing anti-US and pro-Chicom sentiment in Pakistan. Our Embassy and USIA reports US prestige is at an all-time low. The risk here is that Ayub may paint himself into a corner, and lose his ability to move back toward us even if he decides to do so. There is also a distinct risk that the frustrated die-hards may yet force Pakistan to go the Chicom route, even at the cost of US support. We are simply not in effective communication with Ayub at this critical moment, so if he's unable to come here it may now be important to send someone there. Pressure on US Installations. The Paks have now closed up practically everything but Peshawar itself. There's evidence that we did use walkie-talkies illicitly from the Lahore sites in the early days of the war. But this was three weeks ago, so the consensus still is that the Paks are pulling a pressure play on us. Ball is still considering what retaliatory action, if any, to recommend; some argue that this is no time to goad the Paks further lest we help push them off the deep end, while others feel that a prompt, quiet reaction would cool the Paks off rather than the reverse. Indian Attitudes. Embassy Delhi emphasizes that Indian success has united the nation and produced a new surge of nationalist fervor. Bowles and his UK colleague flatly assert that in this mood the Indians are highly unlikely to compromise on Kashmir. Instead continued hold-up of US aid is rapidly being interpreted as political pressure on India to give up Kashmir. Embassy Delhi contends that if we hold up everything much longer it will dangerously stimulate the growing sentiment to go-it-alone in Delhi, which will only benefit the Soviets. According to Bowles, we face a critical opportunity either to maximize US influence in a newly self-reliant India or to face a rapid decline in this influence and an accelerating shift towards the USSR. We here feel that Bowles' fears are probably premature, but that we do face a growing dilemma. There is little doubt that our decisions at this moment of truth in both India and Pakistan can have basic implications for our further influence for many years to come. We are trying to get the basic issues formulated to put before you, because we inevitably face some decisions shortly, whether or not Shastri or Ayub come here./2/ /2/A handwritten note by Johnson at the end of the memorandum reads: "Bob--Please see that Arthur Dean is kept fully informed and have him come here for consultation as often as advisable." R. W. Komer/3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, October 1, 1965, 9:19 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Sober in SOA, cleared by Handley, and approved by Mann. Repeated to Karachi and Rawalpindi. 613. Aidto 407, info Karachi Aidto 555, Rawalpindi 118./2/ At meeting October 1 with Under Secretary Mann, Bhoothalingam said he understood "pause" in making good on pledge, but continued stoppage on new aid following ceasefire has come as shock. He emphasized need for very early non-project aid, including fertilizer. Said recent fighting had stimulated feeling of national unity and confidence in India which in midst very hopeful venture in economic development. Bhoothalingam wondered what would be result of irritation and frustration if Indian people felt let down by friends on whom they had counted. Said India's basic problem remains China and Indian defense needs must be considered that context. /2/Telegram Aidto 407 to New Delhi, September 30, summarized the meeting that day between Indian Finance Secretary S. Bhoothalingam and Acting AID Administrator William Gaud. Gaud told Bhoothalingam that the existing ban on new economic assistance loans to India and Pakistan would not be lifted automatically upon passage of the foreign assistance bill. Bhoothalingam protested that this action would cause serious problems in India, and that it was severe and out of proportion to the situation on the subcontinent. (Ibid.) Bhoothalingam was in Washington for meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Mann referred to strong feeling in US that economic development incompatible with war. Said we have real problem in seeing that economic aid is not wasted in fighting. Referred to our own balance payments problems and strong Congressional concern over efficacy foreign aid programs. In concern over current appropriation bill, he noted Secretary had told Congress that Administration would consult with it before making new loans to India or Pakistan. Mann expressed hope we could find some way to get back to normal relationship on aid. Said our problem would be greatly eased if there were prospect of political solution satisfactory both India and Pakistan. In response query how soon and under what conditions new loans would be resumed, Mann expressed hope we could see somewhat more clearly ahead in short time. Stated aid could only be effective in an otherwise favorable situation and emphasize we not intending put pressure on GOI. Said we need some more time and look forward to more talks with Indians on this issue. Throughout conversation, Bhoothalingam and Ambassador B.K. Nehru (who also present) defended India's position vis-à-vis Pakistan re commencement of fighting and emphasized virtual insolubility political problem under existing conditions. They offered no positive response on hope expressed by Under Secretary that some progress toward political settlement might be in cards./3/ /3/On October 6 Komer also attempted to explain to Bhoothalingam the problems involved in continuing a business-as-usual approach to economic assistance in the midst of a military confrontation over Kashmir. Komer emphasized the difficulties created by the conflict for foreign assistance legislation in Congress. He also noted, however, that during the past several months there had been some "deep soul searching as to what our aid program in the subcontinent had really been accomplishing." (Memorandum for the Record by Komer; Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II) Ball
232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, October 2, 1965, 5:19 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret. Drafted by Schneider, cleared by Laise and Popper, and approved by Raymond A. Hare. Repeated to Karachi, London, and USUN. 619. Your recent tels such as 829/2/ have given us most perceptive and useful view of atmosphere in India. Your recommendations touch fundamentals of US policy and are under study. In meantime, stance we are adopting with regard India takes into account this atmosphere and its implications for Indian policy. This stance is based on recognition that India has emerged from recent ordeal with strengthened unity, sense of national purpose, and status as the dominant power on subcontinent. This is distinct plus. At same time, however, believe we are justified in reminding India of its responsibility to help solve problems peacefully in troubled times ahead; this means that India must recognize that Pakistan has major problems in its relations with India which are being exploited by Chicoms. Therefore it is reasonable to ask India, in its own interest as well as ours, to engage in creative efforts to help lessen Pakistan's problems as a way of reducing Indo-Pak tensions and frustrating Chinese designs. It will be difficult for us to resume assistance until we are assured conditions exist on subcontinent which make development feasible. /2/Among the points made by Bowles in telegram 829 from New Delhi, September 29, in sketching the political environment created in India by the war was the "hard political fact that no Indian Govt. could agree to yield to Paks by negotiation what Paks have attempted and failed to gain by military force." He also noted that the Indian military would never yield the strategic Kashmir Valley to Pakistan, since that would cut their lines of communication with Indian-held Ladakh. Bowles emphasized that "no international pressure short of direct application of military force will induce India to yield on this particular question." (Ibid.) With these thoughts in mind we have prepared following talking points for use by officials meeting Indians here in immediate future. Hope you will reinforce our efforts here in similar talks in Delhi. India-Pakistan Dispute 1. We recognized that India is the larger power on subcontinent, with considerable force at its disposal. 2. Force, however, constitutes no solution in this day and age. As the larger power India in its own interest and in interest of world peace must take account of aspirations of people of Pakistan, quite apart from question of rights and wrongs. Recent conflict settles nothing and indicates Kashmir will not fade away. The longer it is allowed to fester, the more India runs danger of encouraging destructive Pakistan policies which can be exploited by Communist China. 3. We hope India will recognize desirability of availing itself of all the instruments of diplomacy to achieve better Indo-Pak relations and to give evidence of a willingness to do so. 4. We wish to assure India we recognize that a solution can only evolve from political compromise and accommodation of positions of both parties. It cannot be imposed from outside. However, we do consider that as fellow member of UN we have right to urge that process of unconditional talks within an agreed framework should be started in order to work toward peaceful settlement of outstanding differences. We all have stake in outcome. Economic Assistance 1. Although we have been continuing shipments food and other commodities under our existing economic aid agreements, even with passage aid appropriation we are committed to consulting with Congress on situation in subcontinent in connection with making new economic aid loans or grants to either India or Pakistan. As we prepare for these considerations we will wish consider number of matters. 2. We will need to have idea of the effect of fighting on Indian economy. 3. Prospects for development will also be affected by future allocation of Indian resources between development and defense. We will also therefore need to know effect of GOI's proposed military expenditure on prospects for economic development. 4. More broadly, we will need to be assured that economic development in subcontinent, in which we have invested so heavily, is not again to be disrupted by fighting between India and Pakistan. It would appear to us therefore that there is a need for military disengagement and establishment of a process of negotiation which will provide a basis for peace in subcontinent. 5. Aside from new problems arising out of fighting, we are aware of the basic economic problems India faces in its development effort. We attach critical importance to policy measures India will take to make maximum use of its own resources and foreign assistance. Military Assistance We are committed to consulting fully with appropriate members of Congress regarding situation on subcontinent on conditions under which military aid might be resumed. We do not see how we can resume military aid or sales at the present time, particularly since fighting is still going on./3/ /3/The Department sent a similar set of talking points to Karachi on October 5, urging a withdrawal from military confrontation and unconditional negotiations with India in search of a political settlement. The telegram also explained that resumption of economic and military assistance was contingent upon assurances that the assistance would not contribute to or be wasted in a military conflict on the subcontinent. (Telegram 595 to Karachi; ibid., POL PAK-US) Ball
233. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, October 5, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-8 INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Carleton S. Coon, Jr. SUBJECT Since the cease-fire there has been a steady obbligato of criticism of the United States in the Indian press, based largely on variations on the theme that we are showing partiality to Pakistan (the most recent was Defense Minister Chavan's Bombay speech yesterday). Not all comments on the U.S. have been critical, however, and on the whole we are being let off much lighter than, say, our British colleagues. The main exception to this generalization is the recent uproar over alleged U.S. intention to use PL 480 wheat as a lever to extract concessions on Kashmir. It began with a public statement by the Prime Minister on September 26, in which he reportedly warned the great powers not to pressure India for concessions on Kashmir. He said "India may even have to face food shortages in case some countries stop food exports to India." Mrs. Gandhi on the 27th told a Jammu audience that India must be prepared to get along without aid rather than give in to pressure. These sentiments were fanned by reports from Washington correspondents of Indian newspapers following our September 29 signing of a one month PL 480 extension. The rest of the press picked up the theme rapidly and vigorously. The latest statement by an Indian official is Planning Chief Ashoke Mehta's on October 1 in which he warned against the use of aid, including food supplies, to exert pressure on India. He said that India has "alternate plans ready to go ahead without such aid." During the last couple of days the issue has died down somewhat, perhaps the delayed effect of a statement on September 30 by an official GOI spokesman denying that short-term food agreements were meant as political pressure. In effect, India's leaders have declared that India will tighten its belt and go it alone rather than trade concessions on Kashmir for American wheat. The Indian press has vigorously supported this position./2/ /2/In telegram 636 to New Delhi, October 6, the Department expressed concern over statements by Indian leaders implying that the United States was using P.L. 480 wheat as a lever to extract concessions on Kashmir. The Embassy was instructed to make clear that the United States was not using food for political leverage. (Ibid., AID (US) 15 INDIA) [Continue with the next documents]
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