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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
279. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 12, 1966, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. 2. Secret. What now on India? South Asia is so important to our larger interests vis-à-vis the USSR, and even more Red China, that I'd like to develop where I think we stand at the moment and where we might go from here. Though our strategy has been upset by unexpected tragedy, any reappraisal ought to start with recognition that this strategy has worked remarkably well to date. As an early convert (though an initial sceptic), I'll argue this with anybody. But I'm more impressed with the conversion of the key people in State and AID, along with John Lewis and even Bowles in Delhi. The apparent pulling back which you began last April did force both Paks and Indians to start coming toward us. It also put us in a good position to capitalize on another tragic circumstance, the Pak/Indian war, by making both countries realize that they'd better stop such nonsense if they wanted massive US help. Then yet another circumstance, the approaching Indian famine, gave us even greater leverage. In Pakistan's case, the "short-rein" policy of holding up economic and then military aid helped stop Ayub's drift toward China. It forced Ayub, when faced with the ultimate choice between Washington and Peiping in the final hours of the Pak/Indian war, to reject the Chinese tie lest it mean a break with us. This process culminated in Ayub's visit, which halted the downward slide in US/Pak relations. Though no aid commitments were asked or given, Ayub made clear that he regarded us as his ally and would not tie up with China, in return for your promise that we would not let India gobble up Pakistan. The game is by no means over, and could be upset if Bhutto got rid of Ayub rather than vice versa, or if the Paks saw in Shastri's death (as they did in Nehru's) another chance to gamble on Indian disunity. But the odds are favorable if we resume aid just fast enough to convince the Paks that full resumption is in the cards if they behave, yet do so slowly enough to force Ayub to match it with performance. In India's case, our handling of PL 480 (plus the imperative of approaching famine) have produced the opening stgaes of an agricultural revolution. In the last two months India has taken more far-reaching steps toward self-reliance in food than in the preceding 18 years. If India is important, and it is, we must skillfully maintain this momentum by continued use of carrot and stick. Yet the agricultural revolution is only part of the larger need to revolutionize India's approach to development--on the sound principle that a democratic, self-sustaining India serves our purposes in Asia (whether formally allied to us or not). There were abundant signs of a likely breakthrough here too, and that Shastri planned to say the right things when he saw you. Our getting off the hook of hinging our whole South Asia policy to the impossible goal of early Kashmir settlement powerfully stimulated this process (and was in effect accepted by Ayub in his talks with you). Where now? We planned our Pak/Indian strategy around a series of benchmarks, most of them now passed. The September cease-fire was followed by Ayub's pilgrimage here and now the Tashkent agreements, which will hopefully begin an extended process of Pak/Indian reconciliation. But the culminating visit we envisaged before making the hard decisions on aid resumption has now been cast in doubt by Shastri's death. The nine months of education we invested in Shastri may have to be repeated with a less pragmatic and more nationalistic successor. Thus Shastri's death may turn out to be a major setback, though it is too early to tell. So it is essential to start thinking about how to sustain the momentum of the enterprise. I'd prescribe a combination of generosity toward a nation in travail with continued emphasis on the imperatives of self-help and reconciliation with Pakistan, as most likely to keep the Indians coming toward us. They must do so for food at least--and no interim steps you authorize will really deprive us of much leverage here, since India's emergency need will grow faster than we can meet it. The first requirement is to establish sympathetic contact with the new Indian Prime Minister once we know who he is (last time Nehru's successor was picked in 6 days). So I'd urge renewing the Shastri invite (perhaps for slightly later if it suited Indian convenience). The new Prime Minister might either be unable to come (his first priority must be to establish his own political base) or unable to make commitments if he did. Nonetheless, the gesture would be deeply appreciated. If Shastri's successor cannot come soon, then you might consider sending Art Dean (and perhaps myself) quietly to Delhi as well as Karachi around mid-February to get some feel for how firmly the new leadership is prepared to follow the Shastri line. Depending on Dean's report, we could then decide on what interim steps, e.g. aid resumption, to take pending a later visit by the new Indian prime minister. In sum, I urge that we not let our Pak/Indian enterprise falter--despite our preoccupation with other pressing matters. South Asia is so important to us--especially at a time of growing confrontation with Red China--that we can't afford to do so unless there is no other alternative. If the general thrust of this paper makes sense to you, I will draw up (with State) a more detailed scenario./2/ /2/Bundy wrote a marginal notation on the last page of the memorandum that reads: "RWK This memo is an unusually good one. McGB" R.W. Komer I generally approve--go ahead /3/Johnson did not respond specifically to either of the options listed by Komer, but he added a handwritten note that reads: "Mc & K--See me as soon as P.M. is selected in India and we will formulate our plans. L"
280. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, January 13, 1966, 1837Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok for the Secretary. Secto 12. Vice President and Secretary met with Prime Minister Nanda for half hour morning January 13./2/ Ambassador Bowles and Nehru present, also on Indian side Foreign Secretary C.S. Jha, Secretary to Prime Minister L.K. Jha and Surendra Sinh, and on American side DCM Greene. Following is uncleared memorandum of conversation, much of which dealt with Tashkent meeting and communiqué, and which was supplemented by further half hour with L.K. Jha. /2/The meeting took place during Vice President Humphrey's and Secretary Rusk's trip to India for the funeral of Prime Minister Shastri. Also in the party were Senator John Sherman Cooper and former Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith. In reply Secretary's question whether Shastri's death would affect Tashkent agreement, Nanda said he has tried to make clear that as far as he is concerned Shastri's word is the word of the nation. Vice President said this encouraging note will be welcomed in Washington. Nanda continued that he felt spirit on both sides is that Tashkent agreement will be fulfilled and that this is a moral commitment. He said India will need the help, wisdom and understanding of all concerned to see it through. Following brief recapitulation of communiqué, Indians emphasized that its major obligation is that henceforth negotiation not force will be relied on to deal with questions between India and Pakistan. Foreign Secretary observed that Pakistan High Commissioner is already back in New Delhi and said that Indian High Commissioner would proceed to Karachi on Monday. Following elaboration of chain of events leading to communiqué (see below), Prime Minister noted that Socialists and perhaps others in India will oppose agreement but this is to be expected. Secretary Rusk called Prime Minister's attention to President's State of Union message as reflecting powerful feeling of President's preoccupation to be able to devote our resources to economic and social development at home and abroad, certainly in India. But U.S. needs peace in the world to be able to do this; hence the most recent diplomatic efforts to find a basis for peace. Secretary noted he had told Gromyko that since 1947 the United States has spent $800 billion on defense, and the Soviets proportionately more; he had said that the Governments of both the United States and Soviet Union owe it to their people to lift this burden. Nanda said Vietnam struggle is in the way of achieving these goals and eludes solution in the terms suggested. Vice President emphasized U.S. capacity to help people at home and abroad is limited by amount we have to spend on resisting aggression in Southeast Asia. President Johnson has made clear that he wants to get on with development in Southeast Asia, including North Vietnam. In response to Prime Minister's general agreement on need to start talking, Vice President agreed and pointed out that U.S. sets no conditions on talks; we want to get disputes out of the area of violence and into the area of reason. When this is done, then we will be able to do the things we want to do for the people in all countries. Nanda said India also wants peace and equally wants democracy; latter requires defeating poverty and providing food and better life and equal society for all. Vice President responded that we are committed to same goals and wish people of all Southeast Asia would understand that we would rather use our resources for pursuing these goals than for war. Nanda noted India had made progress despite problems and tensions confronting it; Vice President agreed and said U.S. supported effort at Tashkent and that he had told Kosygin of President Johnson's gratification at the outcome of the Tashkent meeting./3/ If we could get the same kind of assistance from Kosygin on the Vietnam issue as he had given at Tashkent, it would be helpful. Certainly the U.S. is ready. /3/A record of the meeting that Humphrey and Rusk had on January 13 with Kosygin was prepared by Rusk and transmitted to Washington in telegram Secto 10, January 13. The meeting was largely devoted to Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY) L.K. Jha recalled that Shastri's major impression from talk with Kosygin at Tashkent about Vietnam had been the difference from the hostility and suspicion toward U.S. which he had encountered in May. This time Harriman mission seems to have had a favorable effect, and Kosygin had specifically commented favorably on Harriman having first seen the Poles who had been in touch with Hanoi. Kosygin had also said that the big problem is China. The conversation with the Prime Minister concluded with his good wishes that the present American efforts for peace would be successful. Following account of Tashkent meeting emerged from Foreign Secretary's remarks during meeting with Nanda and L.K. Jha's subsequent more detailed account. Talks began well. Ayub in each of personal meetings he had with Shastri, took position that he wanted to live in peace and earnestly implored Shastri to make it possible. Indicated willingness agree to almost anything but said he could not return to Pakistan without something he could show as a gain. On central issue of Kashmir Ayub seemed to be looking for an opening toward a settlement acceptable in Pakistan. Shastri had told him he could not move from well known position. Thereafter Ayub suggested deferring the Kashmir issue and it did not again come up in their conversations; from this Shastri concluded Ayub was prepared not to let Kashmir issue stand in way of restoring good relations between India and Pakistan. According to L.K. Jha major problem for Shastri was that he could not agree to withdrawal along Kashmir cease-fire line without adequate assurances that infiltration would not recur; accordingly he pressed for either or both of "no war" pact and clear affirmation of respect for cease-fire line. On all other points there seemed to be no substantial controversy. Next phase, which Foreign Secretary described as "low point", started with Indians giving Paks draft of a "no war" treaty of friendship. Ayub countered with a one sentence statement to effect both sides agree to seek peaceful solutions of their differences; at Shastri's suggestion he readily added phrase "without recourse to force." Then, on January 8, Indians took hand at draft communiqué calling for respect for cease-fire line and no resort to force. Ayub sent High Commissioner Hussain to Jha with message rejecting both Indian treaty draft and communiqué as entirely unacceptable. This looked like complete breakdown. Until this point Kosygin had confined his activities to exploring the ground privately and separately with Shastri and Ayub but had made no proposal of his own. After Ayub's rejection of both formulations, Kosygin asked Shastri whether he should take a hand and Shastri had encouraged him to try as long as it was clear that the effort was entirely Kosygin's. Starting at 9:00 in the morning on January 9 and continuing until 12:30 next morning, Kosygin went back and forth, working from his own draft of communiqué, which was close to Indian first draft. Ayub apparently felt he could defend the language that resulted regarding non use of force as a reaffirmation of an obligation already entered into, not as a new obligation. From Indian point of view language was acceptable as reiteration of well known position. On cease-fire, Paks first tried to confine language to commitment to observe cease-fire along cease-fire line; Shastri said this did not go far enough in covering problem of infiltrators, and result was obligation to observe terms of cease-fire on cease-fire line. Hardest decision of all for Shastri was to accept this as adequate assurance on which to base agreement to withdraw from Haji Pir Pass. Jha considers that Paks found their anxieties to establish machinery for settling all questions, including Kashmir, met by provision for continuing dialogue. He sensed it was an unspoken assumption on both sides that Kashmir will figure again at a summit meeting after the dust settles. He also believes that when Kosygin sounded Ayub on a Kashmir settlement based on partition along cease-fire line with adjustments, he got a strong negative reaction and dropped the matter. Nevertheless, Shastri continued to feel Paks do not wish resume fighting. Jha commented that follow through could stumble over several matters, including definitions, e.g. what constitute "internal affairs." Nevertheless, he was hopeful agreement will be regarded by both sides as charting course for the future, even though both will have some domestic problems. He expressed disappointment that only thing Paks would not agree on explicitly was restoration of property seized during the conflict, but would only agree to talk about it. Indians had felt there could not be a break over this issue. Vice President and Secretary urged that GOI maintain momentum established by agreement at Tashkent. L.K. Jha in second meeting also gave further account of Shastri talk with Kosygin about Vietnam. This is being reported in septel. At conclusion, Jha referred to Shastri's planned visit to U.S. and said he doubts very much new Prime Minister will be able to leave India on the planned dates. The budget session of Parliament and the budget itself will necessarily occupy his full attention. He went on to make case that India's economic and particularly foreign exchange difficulties are reaching such a critical stage that further delay in alleviating them could be dangerous. He said he realized that new American commitments to assist in India's fourth 5-year plan may have to wait, but urged that dangers of further factory closings and unemployment, especially from mid-February onward, be averted by lifting freeze on new U.S. commitments already pledged. The Secretary said he hoped it would be possible to work this out by consulting together and strongly urged that new Prime Minister not himself freeze on position he could not get to Washington. Secretary said he and Vice President would consult President Johnson. He recalled major political problem, indeed crisis, which had arisen in Congress over further aid to the sub-continent and said that the two countries which received roughly one-third of all U.S. aid have a political constituency in U.S. they have to nourish. He noted the new Prime Minister and President Johnson will have to get in touch to work out the answer to the question Jha had raised. Meeting concluded with Vice President and Secretary again congratulating GOI on encouraging success at Tashkent, which Vice President noted President Johnson had found very constructive. Rusk
281. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, January 14, 1966, 0830Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Copenhagen, Karachi, London, Moscow, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Stockholm, The Hague, Tokyo, Vienna, Wellington, USUN, and Rome. 1795. 1. Vice President, Secretary and Ambassador met January 13 with Subramaniam. Vice President and Ambassador joined meeting after it had started due prior engagement with Kamaraj./2/ /2/Kumaraswamy Kamaraj Nadar, Chief Minister of Madras, 1955-1964, elected President of the Congress Party in January 1964. 2. Others present on Indian side were Asoka Mehta, B.K. Nehru, Bhoothalingham, Dias and Surendra Sing; on American side, Senator Cooper, Reuter, Handley and Weiss. 3. Following is summary principal points. 4. In response Secretary's question, Subramaniam indicated that crop figure still somewhat in question due uncertainty of rains. He hoped to have clearer idea by end of month. 5. Subramaniam stated major new element of uncertainty has entered picture due presumption that as result Shastri's death scheduled Washington talk with President Johnson was now unsure. GOI had been counting on these discussions to clear up outstanding questions and to provide urgently needed decisions on food and other assistance. 6. Secretary cautioned GOI not to make decision on cancellation Washington talks until President and new PM had opportunity to consult. 7. Subramaniam agreed but expressed doubts would be possible proceed with talks as originally scheduled. He noted new PM will have to organize the government and take hard decisions on budget for upcoming budget session of Parliament. This will take time. 8. He stressed that GOI could not afford additional time for decisions on assistance. Its need for immediate commitments of additional food supplies was most urgent. GOI wished to test to the full, as U.S. had urged, its capacity to unload and distribute food supplies and thus was essential avoid any gap in supply line. 9. He also noted that in anticipation additional supplies would be made available, GOI had chartered 300,000 tons shipping in February over and above existing million and a half tons of grains committed by the U.S. He expected 125,000 tons to be provided by Canadians under their recent commitment, leaving 175,000 tons of shipping yet uncovered by any supply commitments. 10. Subramaniam stressed GOI would need new commitments of PL 480 supplies by beginning February if gap in supply were to be avoided. 11. He and Dias also noted GOI taking risks in running down its stocks on assumption additional supplies would be forthcoming. They emphasized difficulty of planning stock utilization and distribution supplies without some immediate, additional and longer run commitments. They also urged immediate commitments in order take full advantage of most favorable shipping season prior onset of monsoon around next June. 12. Subramaniam also emphasized urgency of additional assistance to provide non-food aid, alluding to unfulfilled 1965 U.S. consortium pledge. 13. Subramaniam noted constructive results achieved at Tashkent in reducing tensions between India and Pakistan and helping bring about rapprochement between them. Alluding to our understandable desire avoid dissipation of U.S. aid in wasteful conflict between the two countries, he believed Tashkent agreement answered one of our major concerns against providing economic aid to India. 14. In view Tashkent and India's pressing needs which could no longer be postponed, Subramaniam strongly urged U.S. proceed promptly even in absence Presidential-PM talks (a) to release substantial additional PL 480 supplies of food and (b) to make available other U.S. aid already "committed" (that is, U.S. 1965 consortium pledge). 15. After extended discussion, reported below, of steps taken by GOI to mobilize assistance from other countries, Secretary noted that Tashkent and tragedy of Shastri's death were two new developments which we would have to take into account. He stated that while he could not make any specific commitments at this time, there was general disposition on part of his government to take current Indian crisis seriously and to be helpful. He indicated that when Vice President and he returned to Washington, they would discuss the matter with President and try reach decision on the two requests put forward by Subramaniam. 16. In response query by Vice President and Secretary, Subramaniam summarized major efforts GOI making to obtain assistance from other countries, he presented memorandum/3/ describing in detail these efforts and results to date. (Handley carrying memorandum.) He also reaffirmed his intention to convene shortly meeting of Ambassadors in Delhi to highlight Indian situation and solicit aid. (Calling of meeting is subject approval interim Prime Minister.) /3/Not found. 17. Vice President and Secretary expressed gratification at efforts GOI making and urged GOI keep pressure up. Vice President stated that best we could do to help may not be enough. For this as well as other reasons everyone should pitch in. 18. Vice President particularly stressed approach to Japan. He stated there had been some helpful indications recently of Japanese interest and willingness to assist other countries in Asia. He felt this was thus propitious time to contact Japanese for aid, especially shipping and fertilizer. Vice President also urged Indians to press West Germany for assistance. 19. Vice President and Secretary also urged FAO be prompted to help. Secretary specifically suggested that Sen, Director-General FAO, be approached. 20. Subramaniam had no objection but noted views expressed by U Thant that FAO not proper forum. He repeated what he had previously told Embassy that U Thant had indicated his intention take advantage of January 18 meeting world food program to urge assistance to meet India's urgent food requirements. 21. Secretary suggested that FAO could at least send note to member governments calling attention to India's food needs. Subramaniam agreed and said he would try to get this done. 22. In regard to questions about Russian participation, Reuter noted he had informed Dias in earlier conversation that U.S. had no objection to GOI's approaching Russians for assistance. Secretary agreed, and noted that if Russians could send food to Cuba, why not to India? 23. Vice President and Secretary inquired about reports of great losses food grains due rodents and other wastage and asked what was being done about this. While acknowledging there some wastage, Subramaniam and Dias stated these stories greatly exaggerated. They described some of steps GOI taking to reduce what losses there were, including construction modern storage facilities and campaign to reduce rodent population. Dias noted GOI now has 2.7 million tons of modern storage capacity and has program underway for construction another 2.5 million tons. 24. Vice President and Secretary were pleased to hear of measures being taken. In order to counter alarmist statements and adverse U.S. publicity, they urged GOI get information to the press on true magnitude problem and steps it was taking. 25. Subramaniam and B.K. Nehru noted GOI had gotten such information out but unfortunately it wasn't as newsworthy as alarmist reports. They agreed make further efforts to make the facts known. 26. Dias noted that in shipments in the last three months some 90 percent of Indian imports of PL 480 wheat was weevil infested. Previously weevil infestation had been around 21-22 percent. 27. Vice President expressed surprise at high rate and indicated U.S. should do something about it. 28. Secretary asked whether there would be any difficulty on part of new Indian Government in continuing present GOI agricultural program and priority to food. Subramaniam replied he anticipated no difficulty. He stressed that program he had announced was Cabinet decision and was made to the Parliament, which would thus expect program to continue. In support of Subramaniam Asoka Mehta noted GOI had already made allocations of funds giving highest priority to agriculture. 29. In response Vice President's inquiry, Subramaniam indicated GOI had requested for current calendar year 10 million tons of wheat and 1 million milo. Of this amount GOI hoped 4 million could be obtained under Title II and 7 million under Title I. 30. Vice President suggested that when new Prime Minister comes into office, he should make new official request of India's needs from U.S. Subramaniam agreed to have this done./4/ /4/In telegram 1796 from New Delhi, January 14, Bowles referred to Subramaniam's conversation with Humphrey and Rusk and appealed to Rusk, Humphrey, and President Johnson for a decision within the week on a new P.L. 480 agreement to ensure the continuous flow of grain to India. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-8 INDIA) Bowles
282. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 18, 1966, 5:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. I. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "Rec'd 5:50 p." Here are Freeman's new recommendations on India famine relief./2/ He proposes (1) announcing a new 1.5 million ton allotment in your foreign aid/food message, or alternatively as a gesture of confidence as soon as the new Indian PM is elected; (2) making 1/5th of such allotments feedgrains, as a means of pressing India to do more on agriculture; (3) hitting other countries harder to share the burden; and (4) authorizing him to reimburse India out of later allocations for dollars it spends now to keep the pipeline full (this last gives us a lot more maneuverability). /2/Reference is to a January 18 memorandum from Freeman to the President. (Ibid.) The above seems sensible. I'd favor holding any allotment till your food message, rather than acting now, because it will probably lead the new PM to write you. We ourselves should also prod other countries harder now to contribute, especially since the Delhi government will be temporarily disorganized. This point is worth covering in your food message. But no matter how hard we and the Indians push, I frankly doubt that we can get others to contribute as much as 1/5th of India's needs (as Freeman suggests). Let's exhort like hell, but any such arbitrary formula would only tie our own hands. RW Komer/3/ /3/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature. Approve Freeman package /4/Johnson checked this option. He also sent a note to Komer on January 18 in which he wrote: "Please try to get Freeman to quit giving stuff away." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. I)
283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, January 18, 1966, 8:55 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Komer and Officer in Charge of India, Ceylon and Nepal Affairs Carleton S. Coon, Jr.; cleared by Handley, Public Affairs Adviser Daniel Brown (NEA), and Special Assistant Joseph W. Reap (P); and approved by Hare. A note attached to the telegram indicates that it was erroneously assigned a White House message number in the White House Situation Room, and consequently was not given a Department of State telegram series number. The same note indicates that McGeorge Bundy cleared the message with the President. CAP 66028. For Ambassador. Deliver following message soonest to new Prime Minister/2/ from President Johnson. "Dear Madam Prime Minister: Let me offer my warm congratulations on your appointment and wish you every success as you assume leadership of the world's largest democracy. The relations between our two countries are firmly grounded in our common dedication to the principles of human dignity, human welfare, democratic institutions, and peace. Under your leadership I look forward to a broadening and deepening of this community of interests, and pledge our friendship and cooperation to this end. /2/Indira Gandhi, Minister of Information in the Shastri government, was elected Prime Minister at a meeting of the members of Parliament of the Congress Party on January 18. The final vote was 355 for Gandhi and 169 for Morarji Desai. Prime Minister Gandhi and the members of her Ministry were sworn in on January 24. The new government included Gulzarilal L. Nanda as Minister of Home Affairs, Sachindra Chaudhuri as Minister of Finance, and Asoka Mehta as Minsiter of Planning. Swaran Singh, Y.B. Chavan, and Chidambara Subramaniam retained their portfolios as Ministers of External Affairs, Defense, and Food and Agriculture, respectively. You know how much I had been looking forward to seeing Prime Minister Shastri, under whom your government made such great efforts to bring a better life to India's millions. I will be delighted if you can come on February 1, but realize that your new burdens of office may make this difficult. If you cannot come then, I hope that we can reschedule your visit for an early date, so that we can discuss the many momentous problems we both face. Mrs. Johnson and I remember with much pleasure our earlier meetings with you, and look forward to seeing you again soon."/3/ /3/Printed from an unsigned copy. Gandhi returned a letter to Johnson on January 24, expressing her appreciation for the message of congratulations. She accepted the invitation to visit the United States but noted that it would be a few weeks before she felt free to go abroad. There were, she noted, decisions pending with regard to problems facing India which required urgent attention, and she asked Johnson to receive Ambassador Nehru to discuss them. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 4/15/65-2/28/66)
284. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, January 19, 1966, 0615Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN, New Delhi, London, Karachi, Moscow, Tehran, Ankara, and Kabul. 286. President Ayub on Tashkent. 1. During Jan 18 call on Pres Ayub I told him Pres Johnson and Secretary Rusk had instructed me to convey their great appreciation for Ayub's high statesmanship in reaching Tashkent agreement and undertaking to follow promising but not easy course in relations with India. I further told Ayub I was instructed to say US will follow developments stemming from Tashkent with interest and sympathy and with a disposition to do everything possible to support and help in conciliatory course he is following. 2. Pres Ayub said Prime Minister Shastri had realized necessity of peace for both India and Pakistan, and Ayub thought Shastri had also realized need for some resolution of Kashmir dispute. According Ayub, at Tashkent Shastri initially suggested freezing the Sept 23 cease-fire line but Ayub has opposed this as lacking in principle and had emphasized that this and other aspects Indo-Pak relations must be based on recognized principle. Here Ayub said Russians were helpful in moving Indians along in reasonable direction. Ayub stressed US also can play important role of helping bring India along. This not question of forcing Indian decision, which he agreed with Pres Johnson not feasible. Nonetheless, he said, US has role to play, and its influence on India could promote consolidation of Tashkent spirit. Any event, GOP will keep us informed about Tashkent follow-on negotiations with India. I said hoped new Indian Prime Minister could go promptly to Washington and believed this important to Pakistan as well as India and US. Ayub agreed reiterating importance of US influence on India. If that influence used, US policy objectives will be advanced, according Ayub. Ayub said Kosygin worked night and day at Tashkent and had expressed hope Paks would not feel USSR favoring India. To this Ayub said he replied that he hoped Kosygin would thoroughly understand position of Pakistan as well as India. According Ayub, Russians played big role in Tashkent agreement. For example, he said, right at the end India had pressed for no-war declaration but in this as other matters Kosygin had been able to exert constructive influence. Ayub then remarked "I think US can now play much bigger role." Ayub impression was that Kosygin a big man, reasonable and open to argument. 3. I remarked that statement on non-use of force in Tashkent declaration was in line with UN Charter and predicted that Pak people will surely come to understand reason behind it. Ayub agreed they would understand and observed that, in any event, he couldn't act contrary to Pak national interests. He added, "If they want someone else, I am willing." I probed with observation Ayub apparently being supported on Tashkent by east wing and civil servants, business and bulk of rural populace, but he did not take the bait. 4. I observed it tragic irony that every time Pakistan appears to be making progress with Indian leader he passes on, as in case Gandhi, Nehru and now Shastri. I inquired if there any private understandings with Shastri at Tashkent to which his successor might not be privy. Ayub said had feeling Shastri relieved after signature Tashkent declaration. At following private luncheon Shastri had suggested to him both sides should take visible actions that would have impact on their peoples, e.g., meetings of Indo-Pak military leaders on withdrawal, prompt exchange of high commissioners, perhaps revival of air transit rights. Ayub said they also discussed such problems as shootings along East Pak-Indian border. Ayub said he noted all East Pakistan under one administration while West Bengal under several, and had proposed all border control West Bengal be put under single military commander. 4. [sic] After Shastri's death Ayub said he promptly convened Shastri's advisors and passed on to them what Shastri had indicated to him privately. These advisors included Defense Minister Chavan, Fon Min Swaran Singh, Fon Secretary Jha, High Commissioner to Pakistan Kewal Singh and two or three others. I expressed hope nothing in way of specific understandings had been lost in process, and Ayub said he hoped same. 5. Ayub said Defense Minister Faruque, who attended Shastri funeral, had reported from Delhi that population there seemed relieved to see him, although, Ayub added, one doesn't know how Indian Government feels. I said there appeared be good general reception of Tashkent declaration in India, although no doubt some dissatisfaction bound be present on both sides. 6. During brief exchange on Indian succession, Ayub indicated considerable reservations about leading candidate Indira Gandhi. He seemed to think she an extremist who, being a woman, might embark on adventures. While believing she perhaps better than Morarji Desai, Ayub said he apprehensive lest she be dominated by Krishna Menon. McConaughy
285. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, January 20, 1966, 1345Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDIA. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London, Karachi, Moscow, and USUN and passed to the White House at 1:45 p.m. McGeorge Bundy passed a copy of the telegram to the President on January 20. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 19, 1/3-2/23/66) 1865. 1. Although I was invited to visit Mrs. Indira Gandhi at her home early last evening following her election, I thought it wiser to postpone my presentation of the Pres's invitation/2/ until this morning when she might have more of an opportunity to talk. I called on her at 11:30 (local) Thursday and talked with her for 35 mins on a wide range of subjects. /2/See Document 283. A. Mrs. Gandhi expressed her appreciation for my congratulations and for Mrs. Bowles personal call on her last evening and admitted deep personal satisfaction over her election. If she had taken over following her father's death, she said, it would have been properly written off as an emotional carry-over of the Nehru name. Although the present circumstances were tragic she was now accepted by the party in her own right and this meant a great deal to her. B. Mrs. Gandhi spoke in a friendly manner of Morarji Desai; while deploring his rigidity she said he had great courage and she particularly appreciated his generous remarks following her election. (Note: There are many rumors and counter-rumors here regarding Desai becoming a member of Cabinet in either Home or Finance Ministries. Many people in and around the govt favor this move because of his demonstrated ability to carry one-third of the parliamentary group along with him while others argue that he is too disruptive a personality or that he would not accept if asked.) C. Mrs. Gandhi was much pleased with the Pres's letter and invitation; also with the letter from the Vice Pres./3/ In view of all the fence mending and political decisions that lay ahead she did not see how she could get away during the first week in Feb before the budget session of Parliament started. She was hopeful however that after the budget message is delivered (Feb 28) there might be a lull which would permit her to accept the Pres's invitation at that time. She stressed her desire to visit US as soon as it was humanly possible. /3/Not found. D. Mrs. Gandhi expressed concern over stories which she said had appeared in the US press stating that she leaned towards the USSR and was a close friend of Krishna Menon. She asked for my personal cooperation in clearing up what she described as a gross misunderstanding. E. Mrs. Gandhi stated that she had deep respect and affection for the US and was a great personal admirer of Pres Johnson. She understood the importance of US assistance, and was profoundly grateful for what we had done. While India was also helped by the USSR she was under no illusions about the totalitarian nature of Soviet society nor was she unaware of Soviet long-term objectives in regard to India. F. In regard to Krishna Menon the stories of his alleged political connection with her were simply not true. Indeed he had done more to harm her during the past difficult week than any other single individual. He had worked relentlessly for Nanda and had done so in a manner designed to discredit her personally. While Krishna Menon still had followers among the younger people because of his speaking ability and personal charm, he would have no part in her administration; she had come to look on him as an adversary and not as a friend. 2. In response, I urged her to relax in regard to her relationship with the US. She had many good friends and admirers there and Pres and Mrs. Johnson were eagerly looking forward to her visit. Most thoughtful Americans understood India's desire to build a bridge between the US and USSR and were hopeful that the new govt under her direction would be increasingly successful along these lines. 3. I added that there was however some feeling in America that GOI neutrality in recent years had been bent towards the Soviet Union and I was hopeful that this impression could be corrected during coming months. As I saw it the formula for good relations with us involved three basic points: A. Continue fully to support the Tashkent settlement and do everything in India's power to implement not only withdrawal portion but also proposals for dealing with outstanding disputes. B. Maintain a genuine and positive neutrality in regard to US and USSR assisting us wherever possible in our efforts to move the Soviet Union towards a more constructive world position which would enable us to go forward on such questions as disarmament, stabilization of trouble areas, etc. C. Key India's requests for US aid to pragmatic economic policies which take into account the recent successful experience of such countries as Japan, Italy, Mexico, etc. giving high priority to agriculture, education, and population planning and assigning a major developmental role to the private sector. 4. Mrs. Gandhi expressed her appreciation of my personal assurances and stated she could not take exception to any of my comments in regard to Indian policy in the context of the India-US relationship. If this was in fact the essential formula for a good working relationship between India and the US it would be an easy matter for her to follow it. 5. In an obvious further effort to reassure us in regard to her general economic and political posture, Mrs. Gandhi spoke in the highest terms of Subramaniam whom she described as ablest man in the Cabinet and also went out of her way to praise Asoka Mehta and Chavan for whom she knows we have a high regard. 6. She also expressed her appreciation of Pres Johnson's effort to find a basis for peace in Viet Nam and stated that her govt would do everything in its power to assist us to that end. 7. Mrs. Gandhi added that in economic matters she thought her new govt would be significantly more action-minded than the previous one. Although she had the greatest admiration for Mr. Shastri, she would insist on more young people in the govt and would press hard on such programs as family planning. 8. Comment: Throughout this informal and relaxed exchange Mrs. Gandhi was calm, articulate and assured. Indeed I sensed a significant change in her personality which was reflected in a new appearance of personal security and a willingness to comment freely on controversial matters. 9. We still have no hard info in regard to the new Cabinet except for the assurance that Subramaniam will probably stick with Agriculture but that if he should move to Finance someone in whom he personally has total confidence will take his place. Bowles
286. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 28, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 19, Jan. 19-Feb. 4, 1966. Confidential. McGeorge Bundy sent the memorandum to the President on February 1 under cover of a note in which he wrote that he was sending Rusk's memorandum without comment "because I know you will not need any further advice on the opinions of our local Indians." (Ibid., Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. I) SUBJECT I strongly support Orville Freeman's recommendation to you for a new allocation of 1.5 million tons of PL 480 foodgrain for India. My recent visit in New Delhi and what I have learned since my return convince me that we should make the new allocation of grain as soon as possible. There is no lessening of the Indian need. On the contrary, Minister of Food and Agriculture Subramaniam states that the crisis is now developing rapidly and that there is considerable suffering in some areas./2/ /2/On January 23 Bowles reported on a conversation with Subramaniam in which Subramaniam stated that acute shortages were developing in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, and that in Kerala the Communists were taking advantage of the shortages to attack the government and Subramaniam personally. (Telegram 1883 from New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA) Mrs. Gandhi, in her new role as Prime Minister, has already emphasized how important the food issue looms among her Government's problems. The new Government needs the nation's confidence in its ability to avert widespread famine. Meanwhile, the Indians have been moving ahead on the self-help requirements we have had in mind for both the long run and short run: --In reappointing Subramaniam as Food and Agriculture Minister, Mrs. Gandhi has assured him of her firm support for what he is trying to do to place Indian agriculture on a more solid basis for the years ahead. She has specifically expressed her support for the detailed understanding which he and Orville Freeman have worked out. The Indians have already taken first steps on this front by liberalizing the terms under which new private foreign investment in fertilizer can operate, and by increasing their own allotment for fertilizer imports for this year. --The Indians are also doing what we asked them to do to help themselves to meet the immediate crisis. They have stepped up sharply the rate of shipment of the 1.5 million tons of grain which you authorized on December 9. The last shipment under that allocation should leave the United States within a month. At the same time, the Indians have responded to our urging that they recognize the true dimensions of their problem and plan ahead to meet it. They have booked an additional 200,000 tons of ocean freight for use in February and are planning to go into the market within the very near future to begin booking 900,000 tons of shipping for the month of March. This is being done on faith in our intentions to make additional food available in time. A further allocation of grain is needed very shortly so that the Indians will be able to use the additional shipping and keep up the maximum rate of movement in the period while the weather remains favorable. --The Indians have also moved with unusual vigor to enlist international support in their current crisis. Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria, Greece and The Netherlands have already promised aid, and various other countries are now considering how to help. More countries need to come on board, but the returns to date (see attachment)/3/ indicate the chances are good for a reasonably broad international program of emergency food aid. /3/A 3-page attachment, undated, entitled "International Responses to Indian Appeal," is not printed. There thus seem to be urgent economic and political reasons why we should move ahead promptly with another 1.5 million tons of grain. This would be a limited and interim action, keeping our aid on a fairly short rein and leaving us with ample options on how to react to the Indian crisis as time goes on. Dean Rusk
287. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 1, 1966, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 19, Jan. 19-Feb. 4, 1966. Secret. Pak/Indian Interim Steps. Here is the list you requested today of the interim steps I'd suggest taking now with both countries. I'll also work up the best formula on food sharing that I can. These proposals may be more forthcoming than your own thinking as of this moment, but I feel that the momentum we've achieved in moving Paks and Indians our way (Tashkent, troop withdrawal, new Indian agriculture program) is so promising that we ought to show just enough responsiveness to keep the process going. A. Steps to help Ayub. We ought to do enough for Ayub to avoid undermining his position that his visit here was successful, especially when his Tashkent reconciliation policy is under fire. So I'd favor the following steps parallel to whatever we do for India: 1. An interim PL 480 agreement. Pakistan is much better off than India, but is pressing for food too as it sees India getting so much. We could move pronto with an $18 million extension of the old agreement, or make a new 3 month deal for $26 million (300,000 tons wheat and 25,000 tons of oils). 2. $50 million program loan for fertilizer and raw materials to speed up Pak economy would be a major gesture and good economics too. We'd tie stiff economic conditions (same as for India below). 3. Ease up on military sales. Ayub himself just raised this issue. The Pak military are hurting and disgruntled; we want to ease their pressure on Ayub and guard against the Paks buying a lot from the Chicoms. It's hard to justify restoring MAP yet (this would also be ticklish with Congress). But we could lift our ban on non-lethal military commercial sales, plus telling Ayub we'll entertain requests for MAP credit sales once the 25 February troop withdrawal takes place (the Paks want to buy two civilian C-130s, have about $3 million in orders for commo equipment stacked up, and need a lot of spare parts). 4. Hornig Medical Mission you promised Ayub will leave soon, and be a good gesture hopefully costing mostly surplus rupees. This package should hold Ayub for at least two months (till after a Gandhi visit), but still leave at least $30 million in FY '66 aid, $85 million from EXIM for the Karachi steel mill, and more PL 480 to be doled out later. I'd dress it up via a letter to Ayub. Later you could send out Arthur Dean to discuss terms and conditions prior to further help. B. Package for India. The following is carefully graduated to give Mrs. Gandhi a clear sense now that we want to help, but again save the bulk of our AID money and PL 480 for later bargaining. So when BK Nehru comes in tomorrow with an urgent plea for famine relief and emergency economic aid to keep India's faltering economy going, you could respond with: 1. Another interim PL 480 Allocation. Mrs. Gandhi will doubtless have told BK to plead for a pledge covering the whole emergency period./2/ Our problem is to be responsive enough so that no one can say we're being niggardly, but not let India off the hook. So I'd tell him you'll allocate 1.5 to 2 million tons to keep the pipeline full, and may seek a Joint Resolution endorsing a major US anti-famine effort if others will join in appropriately. But you could emphasize that any further major US contributions will depend on what others do. We can't carry the whole load. So India better get humping. /2/The magnitude of the emergency was underscored by the report of the food grain survey team that was submitted by C. R. Eskildsen to Freeman on January 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 INDIA) Freeman summarized the report in a memorandum to President Johnson on February 1 and noted that India's request for 11 million tons of food grains to meet the emergency was accepted by the team as a "bare bones minimum." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. I) 2. $100 million Program Loan. India's industry is running down badly owing to lack of raw materials. So a loan now would reap dividends, while still reserving the bulk of our aid ($85 million from FY '65 and earlier, at least $70 million from FY '66 and massive PL 480) for later parleying with Indira. As a means of bringing home what we expect, we'd tie on stiff conditions: (a) India must match our $100 million; (b) the money must be used for revving up existing capacity, not to start new projects; (c) reassurance that India won't siphon off too much for defense; and (d) reopening of India's dialogue with the World Bank, which is our ally in getting better Indian performance. 3. Ease up on military commercial and MAP credit sales. This will help Pakistan more than India, but ought to be symmetrical. 4. [5 lines of source text not declassified] 5. Last, I'd authorize Freeman to tell the Indians that we'd reimburse them out of any future PL 480 if they go ahead now and buy wheat with their own foreign exchange. This involves no commitment or added cost, since we're going to give them some future PL 480, but has the great virtue of getting them off their duffs instead of sitting around waiting for a handout. This isn't a gimmick to get more food for India--in fact it lets us play a tougher game. The above steps are in accord with current State,/3/ DOD, and AID thinking. We've had remarkable success to date in Pak/Indian policy and made both countries sing our tune. I'm convinced, as your guy who watches South Asia closely, that the time has come to ease up enough to keep Paks and Indians moving the right way, while retaining plenty of chips to play yet another hand when Indira comes. And we'd tie everything to performance./4/ /3/Department of State proposals for policy initiatives relating to India and Pakistan were outlined in two February 1 memoranda sent to the White House entitled "Scenario for Pakistan: Next Steps in Our Relations" and "Scenario for India: Next Steps in Our Relations." The tenor of the proposals in the memoranda accords with Komer's recommendations. (Ibid., Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Memos, 1/66-9/66 and Country File, India, Vol. VII, Cables, 1/66-8/66, respectively) /4/McGeorge Bundy added a handwritten note under Komer's signature that reads: "This is quite a package, but I am strongly for it--sooner or later we'll have to show a carrot to match our stick, and compared to the size of our whole strategy and our planned commitments, these are small decisions." Johnson responded with a handwritten marginal note that reads: "I don't agree--Don't make any promises to anyone until we can talk further." R. W. Komer [Continue with the next documents]
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