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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
288. Editorial Note President Johnson had a long telephone conversation with Secretary of Agriculture Freeman on February 2, 1966, in anticipation of Johnson's meeting later that day with Indian Ambassador Nehru. In the course of that conversation, Johnson touched on the problems he found in managing the direction of policy toward India, as well as the course he wanted that policy to take. "I'm getting awfully skittish on the India thing because I get any contact--a burnt child dreads the fire--and any contact I have on it I'm misunderstood. I'm by implication committed to underwrite the famine, by implication committed to give them 10 million tons, by implication committed to do it all between now and the first of May. Then I get 14 memos from everybody in the government. It starts with Bowles, and then it goes to State, and then it goes to every Indian lover in town, and then it goes to all the do-good columnists, and then to Agriculture, and then Bob Komer, and then Bundy, and so on and so forth. Now I don't want to do it that way. And that makes me just immediately, just to save myself, feel like they're getting ready to rob my bank. I have to put up the bars and close the doors, and wait til it dies down, or until I can get it started. Now what I want to tell Nehru today is very simple. I'm not going to make any big commitments, I'm not going underwrite anything. I'm going to say to him today just what I said a long time ago. I'm waiting to see what kind of a foreign policy we can have with your people. It's not going to be a one-way deal. I'm not going to just underwrite the perpetuation of the government of India and the people of India to have them spend all their goddamn time dedicating themselves to the destruction of the people of the United States and the government of the United States." Johnson sketched the kind of discussion he intended to have with Ambassador Nehru. "Now we're going to sit down and have a good free discussion. I'm ready to do it for Shastri. I'm pretty sensitive about your trying to bludgeon me on account of the visit. You were wrong on that and I don't like it. And you didn't help yourself a damn bit with it. And if you want to go to Russia, there's nothing I'd welcome more. I'd just give you a certified check and publicly applaud it. Just like I did the Tashkent agreement. I'm not in the slightest concerned about your getting help from Russia. Get every damn dime of it you can. This business of `the Communists might help you a little therefore I've got to give you everything I've got' doesn't appeal to me. Now maybe I'm wrong. But if I am I'm going to be wrong for three more years, and that's that." Johnson went on outlining the hypothetical conversation. "I do think you got a problem. I do think you need help. I do want to help. But it's not going to be a unilateral thing when I do it. When I do it I'm going to say to Congress that I think they have a food situation here, and I think these people need help." But Johnson resisted the notion of massive assistance to India without any tangible return on the investment. "All we're going to do, as far as I'm concerned, we're not going to make all these economic grants that we've been making, we're not going to make these loans. We're just going to sit here until they find it to their interest to come and discuss and negotiate, to outline what it is they want us to do. And if all they got to propose to me is a way for me to deliver some money to them, then I'm not going to be interested in it. I'm interested in their helping us too. How can they help us? What can they do to help us?" The theme runs throughout the conversation. "But I want to see how this balances out on the scale. When I put my wheat down here, and it costs me a few hundred million, I want to see what you're putting on the other side. And if it's just a bunch of bullshit and a lot of criticism of the President that's a different thing." Johnson was particularly sensitive to Indian criticism of his policies in Vietnam. "I would think they could help us if they could understand our objectives in the world and our viewpoint, and try to be a little more sympathetic in recognizing them. I don't say just rubber-stamp anything we do, but I don't think they need to denounce us every day on what we're doing in Vietnam." Johnson nonetheless was willing to address the food crisis in India. "I'd like to have a message written to the Congress and a bill introduced and passed, which will be known as the Indian food bill, Indian relief bill, for the relief of the Indian nation, or something of that kind." But Johnson was not prepared to go forward with a food bill for India until after he had met with Prime Minister Gandhi. "I asked her to come. I thought she'd come in the last part of January. There's some indication she's coming in the early part of February. I'd like to add it today. But I don't want to set it up until I get some kind of agreement out of them. What are they going to do for the United States?" (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, February 2, 1966, 10:01 a.m., Tape F66.03, Side B, PNO 1)
289. Memorandum for Record/1/ Washington, February 2, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Cables, 1/66-8/66. Secret. The meeting took place at the White House on February 2 but the memorandum is dated February 3. SUBJECT The President greeted Ambassador Nehru warmly, saying that he thought the new cabinet was off to a good start. He well understood India's succession problem, having gone through the same tragic situation himself. Nehru replied that Mrs. Gandhi was touched by the President's message/2/ and sent warm greetings to him. The President commented jocularly that with a woman Prime Minister in India, the pressure was now on us. We would have to do something more for our women. Nehru riposted that the women of India were "impossible" now. /2/See Document 283. Commenting that talks were long overdue, the President was anxious to see Mrs. Gandhi as soon as possible. He was troubled because he had an incipient revolt on his hands in Congress. He did not want to go to Congress on future aid to India till he had talked things over further with Mrs. Gandhi. In the meantime he had asked our best people to get up a program; then he would ask the Congress to join in it. The President wanted to go this route because he was getting tired of the charges that he was running everything, even though he kept asking for Congress' views (as on Vietnam). The President then discussed multilateralizing our aid, including food. He didn't wholly agree with Senator Fulbright on doing everything via multilateral rather than bilateral means. The best argument against multilateralism, as the AID people kept claiming, was that we didn't get credit for the aid we gave. Yet given the UN's success in dealing with the Pak/Indian cease fire, he wondered if it might not be best to use the multilateral route in meeting Indian food needs. We might make a substantial contribution to the World Food Program or the UN itself and ask every other country to come in appropriately. We put in 50% of the World Food Program now. We could even say that we would increase this proportion if others would do the same, not necessarily in wheat alone but in its equivalent. The Ambassador commented that the US was the only country which had food to spare, and it didn't cost the US anything to send it abroad. The President bridled at this, retorting that we did have to pay for every nickel's worth of wheat or other commodities. He had just seen figures from the Budget Bureau indicating that we had to pay $60-80 per ton for wheat. The President wanted to sit down with the new Prime Minister and discuss what he could do for India as well as vice versa. Then he would tell the Congress what he wanted to do in bushels and dollars. This had not been budgeted yet. He noted that he was being severely criticized right this minute for feeding Vietnam refugees, while cutting out $600 million in military construction here. We could get results from the Congress if we consulted it. Congressman kept claiming that they were not consulted enough. Senator Fulbright kept saying that when the President acted without the Congress he was being ostentatious and dictatorial. The President then raised the question of promises vs. performance. He described how in 1961 we had committed $300 million to Brazil for social projects. The Brazilians were to do several things in return. They passed a number of resolutions, but didn't perform on a single one. Then he, President Johnson, had doubled aid to $550-600 million, but Senator Morse claimed that we were less liked in Latin America now than ever. The President suspected that a good deal of this problem was our "image", created by Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. So we had to figure out--the quicker the better--what to do for India and then put it up to the Congress. He was trying to get a five-year authorization for aid, but doubted that he would get it in an election year. The President told Nehru to evolve--with Komer and others--a sensible program. Then we would send our people--including Secretaries Rusk, Freeman and Gardner--up to testify. The first program we would undertake under the new AID/Food Message was the Indian emergency. At the moment the President thought we should act through the UN, perhaps after an interim allocation to keep things going. Senator Fulbright was right that we got no credit for what we did bilaterally. Ambassador Nehru interjected that handling food this way was difficult. But economic aid had to be given with conditions, which were more acceptable if exacted through multilateral agencies. Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to say that she would like to come in the second half of March. The Indian Parliament would still be in session then, but she thought she could get away. The President asked the Ambassador to tell her that there was no one in the world who understood her problem in taking over better or with more sympathy. Mrs. Johnson and he would see her on no notice at all, at any time she could come. It was essential that they meet as early as possible so he could get ahead with what he wanted to do. Nehru should tell Mrs. Gandhi just to wire when she was coming. The Ambassador mentioned that Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to tell the President how much she appreciated the peace moves on Vietnam. She was greatly disappointed at the lack of response. Nehru commented on India's contribution through talking with Kosygin at Tashkent. He added, "I don't know if you know yet, but we also made some approaches through our Consul General in Hanoi." However, the North Vietnamese were not responsible [responsive?]. We also sent our ICC Chairman to Hanoi. He reported that there were two parties in the NVN Government. The moderates were gaining ground but were still in the minority. Nehru repeated that Mrs. Gandhi was "very distressed" at the lack of response to these approaches. The President then explained at length our decisions on the pause and the many efforts we had made to establish contact and generate a response. He explained how the Soviets and others had said something would come of a pause if we stopped ten days or so, but it didn't work. He "appreciated very much" what Shastri said at Tashkent with Kosygin. However, the net of the whole exercise was that the President was worse off than a month ago. His basic problem was not with the peace lovers but with those who argued for a yet tougher line. The President indicated that he was "terribly proud" of what India did at Tashkent in moving toward reconciliation with the Paks. "Shastri died the right way in the cause of peace, not at the end of a gun barrel." Ambassador Nehru replied that Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to tell the President that "India was going all-out to make Tashkent work." The Indians hoped to withdraw well before 25 February. They were also proposing resumption of ministerial meetings and of transit overflights. Meanwhile, anti-Pak propaganda had been stopped. The President discussed Ayub's problems, remarked that one of these was that he had ended up almost an "advocate of India". But Ayub had many difficulties with his own people. When he came to the US he was a chastened man, but also a proud one. He didn't rebel or even argue, when the President told him he had to settle with India. Nehru remarked that what the President had done with Ayub had had considerable effect on Tashkent. The President hoped that Ayub wouldn't lose his job as a result; Bhutto and others seemed to be a serious threat. Nehru said that the Indians realized they had to help Ayub, but India had a few problems of its own at home with hard- liners. The Ambassador then made "two specific emergency requests." The first was food. The US had given India 1.5 million tons in December, and the last would be shipped this week. Could the US give a firm public commitment on more, to cover at least till the end of June? If the US were unable to make a public commitment, it would promote hoarding and riots--as in Kerala. Of course, the Kerala crisis was partly food and partly politics. He explained that if the Indian people lacked confidence that sufficient wheat was coming, they would not give up their own stocks of rice and wheat for distribution. If India could have 5 million tons of wheat now, "it would take us up through June." Second, the Ambassador claimed that there had been a freeze on all US aid, including what was pledged last year--about $500 million was outstanding. The Indian economy was running out of raw material. Factories were operating way below capacity and unemployment was up. Since it took eight months between the signing of a loan agreement and the actual arrival of the goods involved, India's economic problems were bleak unless aid was started up again. These two problems were so urgent that the Prime Minister had asked Nehru to take them up right away. India also intended to talk with the World Bank shortly about its broader economic problems. The President replied that he understood the urgency of these matters. His problem was whether he could borrow on his own prestige by going ahead without the Congress on these matters. He didn't know how soon this bank would run out. So his judgment was that he should make no commitments till there was an understanding between our two countries, and till he got the approval of the American people via the Congress. Otherwise, he was just asking for more problems. So on food in particular, he desired to send a message and legislation to the Congress on what we could do and what we thought others should do. To act in any other way would jeopardize the future relations between our two countries--and the President's own relations with the Congress. Nehru asked how India's short term emergency needs could be met in the meantime. The President replied that he might take some action before the Congress moved, but could only afford the utter minimum. He did not want to make new agreements until he could both touch his Congressional base and talk with Mrs. Gandhi. Nehru pointed out that if Shastri hadn't died, he would have been in Washington this very day. Circumstance had prevented a US/Indian meeting of minds. The President reminded him that we had planned on the 1.5 million tons carrying us till Shastri came, and pointed out that it had lasted till this time. However, he thought that we might be able to make another interim allotment to carry us past the time when the Prime Minister came, because he didn't want her to be under pressure to come here. He would get the appropriate Congressional leaders together before the week was out, and then announce an interim allotment./3/ The President thought that the American people would come through, but the Indian people had to understand that we Americans had our problems too. If the President sent a message to Congress/4/ and there was full public discussion Indians must realize that they were going to be criticized during this discussion. Nehru thought that Indians would understand. /3/On February 4 the White House announced authorization for an extension of the P.L. 480 agreement with India to provide an additional 2 million tons of wheat and 1 million tons of sorghum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. I) An amendment to that effect to the existing P.L. 480 agreement was signed on February 5 in New Delhi. (Telegram 2009 from New Delhi, February 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-4 INDIA) /4/On February 10 President Johnson sent a message to Congress "On Food for Freedom." The message addressed the problem of hunger worldwide and the things the United States could do to help meet the problem and to help the hungry nations of the world become self-sufficient. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 28, 1966, pp. 336-341. The President then re-emphasized that the Prime Minister should come--the sooner the better. The two of them could work out an understanding. The President would get a food message up to Congress right after, and we would get it through in thirty days. Nehru again made a plea for economic aid; "defreezing" economic assistance was as important as food. The President said he would talk with Nehru again on this. He had made up his mind that there would be no new aid till we had agreed on a new course with both India and Pakistan. He thought he had such an agreement with Ayub, but had been holding up any new initiatives with Pakistan till the Indians could visit. Indeed, he believed that his talk with Ayub had more to do with the success of Tashkent than almost anything else. Ayub knew from his talks here that war with India or ties with China were "inimical to US interests". Ayub had said that he would not do anything inimical to the interests of the US. The President then said that he would deal with the Kerala problem (another interim food allotment) without Mrs. Gandhi asking him. He was going to treat Mrs. Gandhi as he would want her to treat him. He knew her problem better than she might think he knew it, since he had gone through a similar succession crisis. The President then walked Ambassador Nehru out through the Lobby. R. W. Komer
290. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 4, 1966, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 19, Jan. 19-Feb. 4, 1966. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "Rec'd 4:30 p." Pakistan too. If we announce another India PL 480 allotment, State and AID urge that we at least make a private gesture toward Pakistan too. Pak needs are far less than those of India, but Ayub is under fire and has to show that we aren't neglecting Pakistan after he came here./2/ The minimum sensible (which would require no publicity) would be to tell the Paks we will shortly begin talks for a new interim PL 480 deal to cover their needs through spring (perhaps 200,000 tons of grain and 25,000 tons of oil). We could also invite the Pak Agriculture Minister (a friend) to come here next month, to match the Subramaniam visit. /2/In a February 5 telephone conversation with Vice President Humphrey, President Johnson noted that Ayub had run a political risk in taking the stand he did at Tashkent. Johnson felt that Ayub had reached an accommodation with India in good part in order to maintain his credibility with the United States. Johnson consequently felt that the United States should do what it could to help Ayub weather the political storm. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey, February 5, 1966, 10:15 a.m., Tape F66.04, Side B, PNO 1 40) This step commits us to little, while covering our Pak flank. We could spin out negotiations and terms as much as needed. Here is yet another "gimme", but I can't avoid making these pleas. I'm unfortunately the staffer responsible to you for half the beggars in the world. Approve/3/ /3/President Johnson checked this option. R.W. Komer
291. Letter From Prime Minister Gandhi to President Johnson/1/ New Delhi, February 8, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 4/15/65-2/28/66. No classification marking. Another copy of this letter is attached to a covering transmittal note from Ambassador Nehru indicating that the letter was transmitted to the White House on February 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 262, President--India 1966) Dear Mr. President, Ambassador B.K. Nehru has reported to me the talk he had with you on the 2nd February. I am grateful to you for receiving him immediately after his return to Washington and for the patient and sympathetic hearing you gave him. Even more, I thank you for your immediate response in making available another three million tons of foodgrains under your P.L.-480 Programme. This sets at rest our immediate anxieties on the food front. We are intensifying our efforts to make other countries join more meaningfully in the international effort which you have initiated to help us. There is one matter which is still causing me concern. It is so urgent that I feel I must write about it straightaway as it cannot wait until I am in a position to visit you in Washington which would be some time in the later half of March. Following the unfortunate conflict with Pakistan, there had been a pause in the flow of U.S. aid to India. You have been good enough to release some of this aid recently to help us to meet our fertilizer needs. The cause of our present deep anxiety is that the suspension of non-project aid has left most of our industries desperately short of essential raw materials, components and spare parts for which they have been relying on U.S. sources of supply. Production and employment in many units have already been affected. In another few weeks, we apprehend large-scale unemployment and closure of factories all over the country. I do hope, Mr. President, that this matter will receive your attention in the immediate future as to keep it pending till I am able to come to Washington would only prolong the period for which men and machinery will be kept idle./2/ /2/In a February 9 memorandum to the President, transmitting the letter from Prime Minister Gandhi, Komer wrote with regard to her request for economic assistance: "The $100 million program loan should prove a more than adequate answer when the Vice President reaches Delhi." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 20, 1/3/66-2/23/66) With warm regards, Yours sincerely, Indira Gandhi
292. Letter From President Johnson to President Ayub/1/ Washington, February 10, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pakistan, Vol. 2, Pres. Ayub Correspondence, 1/1/66-12/25/67. Confidential. Dear Mr. President: Thank your for your letter of January 22,/2/ which was delivered to me on February 4 shortly before I left for Honolulu. I have greatly admired what you and Prime Minister Shastri did at Tashkent in the cause of peace. It was a remarkable demonstration for all the world to see of how good will and good sense can overcome the dictates of fear and the passion of war. /2/Ayub wrote to Johnson on January 22 to make the point that the popular reaction to the Tashkent agreement in Pakistan bore out Ayub's contention that the Kashmir issue lay at the heart of the troubled relations between Pakistan and India. Ayub reiterated his opinion that early steps to settle the Kashmir dispute were essential to the establishment of good relations between the two countries. (Ibid.) Neither side lost at Tashkent. Both Pakistan and India have surely gained in the hard work of securing peace on the subcontinent. I well realize that there are those in Pakistan who think Tashkent did not go far enough. But I share your hope that Tashkent will enable both India and Pakistan to turn a new leaf so that there can now be real progress toward removing the differences that have for so long troubled relations between two great friends of the United States. What has happened since Tashkent leads me to see real basis for this hope. I have been deeply impressed with the way you are seeking to convince your people of this. I am also greatly encouraged by what Mrs. Gandhi has said both publicly and privately about her determination to see that the Tashkent Declaration is carried out. What you and India can do to keep the spirit of Tashkent alive will greatly affect what we as friends of both countries can do to help. You know how much we cherish the goal of a real peace in South Asia. We will not shirk doing what we can to help bring that about. As a result of our own discussions and the auspicious developments at Tashkent, I have asked Vice President Humphrey to take up with you certain reciprocal steps which we feel able to take at this juncture./3/ I am delighted that he will have the opportunity to visit with you, primarily on events in Southeast Asia. I was greatly heartened by our talks in Honolulu with the leaders of South Viet Nam, and he will want to tell you about what was accomplished there and what more can be done to find a way to bring peace to the people of Viet Nam. In this our determination is undiminished, despite the hostile response from Hanoi. /3/Vice President Humphrey was scheduled to arrive in Karachi on February 15, following stops in Saigon and Bangkok. Humphrey visited Pakistan February 15-16; he visited India February 16-17. Mrs. Johnson and I send our warm personal regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, February 10, 1966, 10:07 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Exdis/VP. Drafted by Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs in AID C. Herbert Rees; cleared by Macomber, AID Administrator David Bell, Stoddard (DOD/ISA), Komer, and Handley; and approved and initialed by Rusk. A handwritten marginal notation, in an unknown hand, reads: "OK/L" indicating that the telegram was also cleared by the President. Also sent to New Delhi, Karachi, and Rawalpindi. 2342. For the Vice President. Subject: Interim Aid for India and Pakistan. 1. President has authorized negotiations for economic commodity loans of $100 million for India and $50 million for Pakistan subject to agreement on economic policy conditions. President would like Vice President initiate discussion these matters Karachi and Delhi including application necessary economic conditions. Memorandum/2/ which President approved in substance given to Mr. Bundy for VP. New Delhi Aidto 1109 and Karachi Aidto 1306/3/ provided additional details re contemplated conditions which in summary call for: /2/Not found. /3/Neither found. a. priority to development and its corollary avoidance of diversion of resources to arms race b. emphasis on using aid and at least matching amount own resources for imports for full utilization of existing capacity, as opposed to use for building new capacity or increasing reserves, and c. In case India, resumption discussions with IBRD on economic policy changes. 2. President also authorized greater flexibility to permit some commercial sales and MAP credit sales of non-lethal military equipment, subject to continued satisfactory moves toward peace (e.g. actual troop withdrawal). VP asked advise governments of this new policy, indicating it to be administered on selective limited case by case basis with decisions clearly related to events on subcontinent. 3. We here concerned that public announcement loans at time VP in South Asia might appear as bribe related Vietnam, therefore contemplate that appropriate announcements concerning economic loan negotiations be made after completion South Asia visits. No public announcement on military sales policy contemplated. 4. Suggest that VP, in telling Mrs. Gandhi and President Ayub of above decisions mention following: a. President well impressed with new movement toward establishment peace on subcontinent symbolized by Tashkent troop withdrawal, and other moves toward Pak/Indian reconciliation; b. This frees U.S. to take interim steps, i.e., the loans, to help prevent undue run-down of Indian and Pak economies; c. Undertakings sought in return are part of increasing emphasis on self-help essential to justify such aid resumption to the Congress. In Delhi suggest VP add that President looks forward to seeing Mrs. Gandhi as soon as convenient for her, to reach meeting of minds at summit which will facilitate resumption of mutually beneficial relation. In both capitals would also be most valuable to underline basic view that President eager to help those who help themselves and who respond in kind. He determined that our relations must be a two way street. 5. In this connection, the President suggests that you develop with Mrs. Gandhi the theme that he must balance in the scales what each people can do for the other. More and more, public sentiment in both countries must be taken into account in our relations. The President intends to lead the American people into carefully weighing all the ways in which we can contribute to furthering our friendship with almost 500 million Indians. We believe we can help in many ways--in food, economic aid, education, health, and in maintaining peace in the world. In return, the President hopes that Mrs. Gandhi, before she comes here, will explore ways in which her 500 million people can be helpful to 200 million Americans. This doesn't mean that we want India to ally itself with us, much less adopt our economic system or philosophy. Nor do we insist on total Indian support of our foreign policies. But when the US is under attack in the UN or other forums it would be immensely helpful if the Indians could occasionally at least stand up and say "stop, look and listen--let's try to understand what the US is doing before we criticize it." Last but not least, one immediate thing the Indians could do would be to find ways of helping to promote peace through the ICC (septel will follow on ICC matter). 6. Septels will also be prepared on administrative details economic loan documentation and on military sales matter./4/ /4/Telegram 2374 to Saigon, February 12, conveyed additional points that the President suggested Humphrey might take up, including informing Gandhi of the prompt decision to authorize a $100 million program loan to India as his response to her urgent request. He encouraged Humphrey to get an up-to-date feel for India's food problems but warned that he could offer no further help until he had consulted with Congress. Johnson was inclined to favor announcement of the program loans in Karachi and New Delhi, and telegram 2374 recommended that Humphrey issue a statement at the end of each visit setting forth the decision to negotiate the loans. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) INDIA) Rusk
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, February 12, 1966, 12:38 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by William L. Simmons and Schneider (SOA), and Stoddard (DOD/ISA); cleared by Komer, Hoopes, Warren, Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs (NEA/NR) Lieutenant Colonel Billy W. Byrd, and Dwight M. Cramer (G/PM-MC); and approved by Handley. Also sent to Rawalpindi, New Delhi, and Saigon and Bangkok for the Vice President. Repeated to CINCMEAFSA, CHUSMSMI, and CHMAAG Pakistan. 1225. Joint State/Defense. [Refs] (a) Deptel 1417 to Delhi, 1184 to Karachi, 331 to Rawalpindi; (b) Deptel 1410 to Delhi, 1120 to Karachi, 328 to Rawalpindi;/2/ (c) Deptel 1467 to Delhi, 1213 to Karachi, 340 to Rawalpindi, 2342 to Saigon./3/ Notal. /2/Telegrams 1410 and 1417 to New Delhi deal with unrelated matters. The references are in error and have not been further identified. /3/Document 293. Subject: U.S. Military Sales Policy re India/Pakistan. 1. In light of prompt and effective movement by India and Pakistan to implement withdrawal provisions of pertinent SC Resolutions and Tashkent Declaration, USG has concluded that our objective in imposing total ban on military shipments to India and Pakistan has been largely accomplished and that retention of this policy would not serve U.S. interests or objectives in either country. At same time, there have been fundamental changes in our relationship with subcontinent and phasing and substance of future military shipments to India and Pakistan must take this into account. 2. President has therefore authorized more flexible policy to permit some commercial sales and MAP credit sales of nonlethal military equipment. Policy will be administered on selective, limited, case-by-case basis with decisions clearly related to events on subcontinent and subject to continued satisfactory moves toward peace, e.g. actual troop withdrawal. 3. New policy, which Vice President will convey both Governments, designed to (a) relieve some of the pressures on both leaders, but particularly Ayub; (b) ease pressures on India and Pakistan to turn to Soviet and Chicom sources of supply respectively and give us stronger basis for action designed prevent such dependence; (c) indicate U.S. understanding of security problems facing both countries; (d) enable us to retain military relationship with both, and most important (e) indicate U.S. approval of India's and Pakistan's movement toward reconciliation their differences at conference table. Specific sales under this policy will be concluded only upon satisfactory completion of withdrawals; i.e., presumably February 25. 4. We plan to approve export military items gradually, at least at outset, and with special attention to political and military effects of each approval given circumstances on subcontinent. At outset we will look with greater favor on straight sales than credit sales, getting into latter as and when situation on subcontinent continues improve. (We anticipate GOP will wish to take advantage of opportunity to place their purchases on a credit sales basis. If this matter is raised GOP should be advised that we are prepared discuss further steps in implementing a credit arrangement.) 5. Definition of Nonlethal: Includes transport, observation, trainer aircraft, and unarmed helicopters and support equipment and spares; Trucks, trailers, and miscellaneous wheeled vehicles and spares; Communications, radar and signal equipment (includes Star Sapphire, but not grant aid at this time); Engineer equipment (including Border Roads Organization support), medical and Quartermaster equipment; Training; Excluded from the foregoing are armed or armored vehicles such as tanks and APC's, infantry weapons, artillery, ammunition, armed helicopters, and combat aircraft. Spare parts in support these items also excluded. Machine tools for defense production not on Munitions List and non-lethal but there likely be problem availability since in any event surplus U.S. tools being diverted to U.S. munitions industry for priority Vietnam needs. 6. Execution: USG prepared to accept cash and credit sales requests (i.e. either new orders or requests for revalidation orders presently suspended) through medium of USMSMI and MAAG Pak for items and services identified as non-lethal in para 5 above. It should be emphasized, however, that each such request will be treated on case-by-case basis and willingness of U.S. to acquiesce in sale must necessarily be weighed against conditions prevailing at time on subcontinent. Further relaxation of U.S. policy to permit resumption of some grant aid and possible sale of lethal items not predictable at this time. 7. We consider that opening up of our sales policy to both India and Pakistan gives us opportunity to re-establish measure of cooperation and rapport between MAAG Pakistan and USMSMI and their host country's military colleagues. Accordingly, we consider it of utmost importance that items requested by India and Pakistan be submitted through MAAG Pakistan, USMSMI and CINCMEAFSA channel for validation. 8. Most appropriate initial items (in addition to exceptions already made ref b) seem to us to be in field communication equipment; e.g. Pakistan, Electro-Craft radios of value $3 million; India, AN/PRC-25 radios from RCA (we willing offer credit for these since delivery unlikely until mid-year in accordance our request to Indians to give up early delivery in favor our needs Vietnam). 9. Request Country Team comments on initial military items falling under non-lethal definition para 5 to be released soonest. For time being you should not discuss this with third country missions, i.e., British, Canadian, Australian. 10. New policy should not be conveyed to Governments until visit of Vice President. At that time each Government should be informed policy applies equally to other. No public announcement should be made and we would expect GOI and GOP follow similar course. We will inform U.K., Canada and Australia of new policy after it has been conveyed to both Governments. 11. For Karachi/Rawalpindi: We are informing Pak Embassy here that Department has Electro-Craft problem under active review, and that we assume GOP will take this into consideration before pressing further to break contract./4/ /4/Telegram 1485 to New Delhi, also sent to Karachi as telegram 1229, February 12, expanded upon a primary concern conditioning policy considerations in Washington: "As we begin to move back selectively toward new economic aid and supply of military items to India and Pakistan, their level of military expenditure is high among the issues of concern to us. In brief, our concern stems from belief that overspending on defense endangers progress by both toward accommodation and causes them unduly divert their resources and energies from task of internal economic development." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 INDIA) Rusk
295. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, February 16, 1966, 1420Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Secret; Immediate; Exdis/VP. Repeated to New Delhi and passed to the White House at 11:10 a.m. 1626. Following is brief of uncleared memorandum of conversation between VP Humphrey and President Ayub in Karachi Feb 15/66 (full text being pouched/2/): /2/The memorandum of conversation was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to airgram A-511 from Karachi, February 25. (Ibid.) A transcript of this conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 6A. The transcript indicates that the meeting began at 5:35 p.m. and ended at 7:25 p.m. It also lists the participants in the meeting as Humphrey, Harriman, Valenti, McConaughy, Ayub, Bhutto, and Shoaib. Summary. Vice President Humphrey met for nearly two hours February 15 with President Ayub to discuss United States Vietnam policy with particular attention to Honolulu Conference results, and to inform Ayub of United States decisions: (1) to negotiate economic commodity loan of $50,000,000; (2) to negotiate shortly interim PL-480 agreement; (3) to relax ban on military shipments to permit some commercial and MAP credit sales of non-lethal military equipment. Ayub expressed hope for success of efforts launched at Honolulu to promote social and political progress in Vietnam, but stressed formidable obstacles which Indo-Pak confrontation imposes upon Pak capability offer assistance other than continuing attempts counsel moderation on Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders, which Ayub indicated readiness to do as opportunities arose. Ayub was appreciative of United States aid decisions noted above, pointed to critical Pak requirements for replacements for range of United States origin military equipment, and underlined felt threat to Pakistan of growing Indian military capability. Throughout, Ayub stressed desire for peace and Pak intention carry out Tashkent declaration provisions in "letter and spirit." End of summary. Vietnam After conveying President Johnson's good wishes to Ayub, and with reference President Johnson's letters of Feb 10/3/ and 11/4/ to Ayub, Vice President Humphrey gave long and detailed account of American diplomatic and military effort with respect Vietnam and related events of recent Honolulu Conference. VP described root problem of moving local govt towards social progress and recognition of South Vietnamese leaders of this problem and its magnitude. VP noted South Vietnam Govt had developed program which intended meet military needs and reconstruction goals and coordinate them at provincial level, emphasizing self-help aspect. Program not perfect and hour late, but in US view program can be effective and deserves support. Military situation manageable and improving. It is political-social problems which loom large. Other countries can help with non-combatant support in this struggle for development and social progress which in Pak of particular concern. Moreover, whole struggle in Southeast Asia in US view is vital for all. VP described total program of Communist attack on Southeast Asia, noting that in President Johnson's view this large-scale challenge must be faced now: otherwise it will be necessary meet it elsewhere at other time. US must show determination and strength, and believes its actions this regard tie directly into Pak security. While recognizing each nation's sovereignty, US feels strongly factual case is as stated. /3/Document 292. /4/Johnson's letter to Ayub of February 11, transmitted to Karachi in circular telegram 1531 of that date, conveyed Johnson's impressions of the recent Honolulu conference on South Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) Governor Harriman gave strong support VP's presentation elaborating on reasons which impelled resumption of bombing. He adverted to possibility Ayub might impress upon Communist China, Moscow, Hanoi desirability of moderation; stress particularly to Soviets sincerity with which US seeking peace; consider contribution of medical team or other contribution to Vietnam struggle. Ayub expressed thanks for explanations, and appreciation to President Johnson for keeping him informed. He said, "I know you face great difficulties, are doing your best, and I hope you succeed." He noted 35 years of terrible continuing war in area had resulted in tremendous problem. Good deal depends upon how much local people prepared to sacrifice. Problem also of growing nationalism in area. But key is willingness undertake social reform, then outside forces can assist. In response to remarks by Governor Harriman, Ayub noted that Indian pressure of 1.2 million men under arms fantastically reduces Pak abilities enlarge its military and political commitments. Pak very security at stake. Pak greatly interested in Vietnam situation. In Peiping and Moscow, Ayub pointed out US had interests in Asia as world power. Pak will continue at least plead for moderation. Anytime ChiCom or Sov leaders pass through "we shall certainly continue these efforts." Regarding matter of contribution Ayub noted that if Pak to do so it would incur enmity of Sov Union and Chinese and put itself in impossible situation with India as avowed enemy while US unable really underwrite Pak liabilities. (FonMin Bhutto noted parenthetically that following resumption of bombing GOP had not issued any adverse statement although India, member of ICC, had.) Elsewhere Ayub noted Pak has accepted commitments and risks far beyond its military and economic power, vide instance U-2 incident. For sake US friendship Pak incurred wrath of USSR despite latter's capacity destroy Pak. Pak was asked in 1961 contribute battalion for Laos and replied with offer of brigade. Unfortunately owing present problem with India, Pak ability do anything like that greatly reduced. Ayub went on delineate difficulty Pak situation geographically split with 1400 miles of "not very friendly India" between wings. India constant open threat. If any of Pak's big neighbors move, Paks in difficulty. Then too Pak is ideological state bordered by Communist neighbors USSR and China. Security important, but also a country must have good social and economic programs. Pakistan has been cited by many as outstanding example of effective economic development. US has been major contributor and Pak deeply grateful. Tashkent, Indo-Pak Relations and Arms Pak bedeviled by problem of how to find peace with India. Tashkent declaration (TD) good start which requires diplomatic followup. Pak has every intention follow through. Tashkent in interest whole region. Pak wants live in peace and only hopes India does too. But what is sense of fabulous Indian expenditures for armaments? Before 1962 India had ten divisions. Now has 21 plus three recently organized and talking about additional seven. Indians spending $2.6 million [billion?] for military purposes. Much of military equipment not suitable for use in Himalaya against Chinese. Some reduction in armed forces indicated in interests of all. In another connection Ayub enjoined VP tell Indians Paks "want peace" and indicated great achievement for all would ensue if US could persuade India be reasonable. VP reminded Ayub of US gratitude concerning statesmanlike Tashkent. He pledged US would do everything possible to insure implementation of UNSC Sept 20 resolution and TD provisions. US does understand Pak problem and President Johnson greatly disturbed at possibility of arms race on sub-continent. [garble--He feels] India committed to TD and that India concerned over possibility ChiCom attack. Economic Aid VP noted President Johnson told him he wished contribute to Pak progress and TD implementation. US prepared negotiate $50 million dollar economic commodity assistance at this time and to open up discussion further economic assistance that may be needed. VP indicated stipulation concerning priority for economic development and application of loan to imports for existing plant capacity. PL 480 VP indicated US readiness negotiate shortly interim PL 480 agreement and discuss longer-term food requirements. Doubtful that US able fill all Pak requirements although would like to in view drought and Pak achievements in agricultural development field. Military Supplies VP informed Ayub of US decision to relax ban on military shipments to permit some purchases non-lethal equipment. Ayub wondered what Pak to do with its fighters when US had given only three months supply of spare parts. "We can't leave Pak defenseless; no country can allow that. If we can't get what we must have from you then we must go elsewhere." VP noted US taking look at whole picture and that as Tashkent proceeds it can take new look. US not trading but working with reality. We can take further look this spring or early summer and spring is just around corner. Purposes in India VP noted for Ayub's info he intended in India: (1) emphasize importance Indo-Pak relations along TD lines; (2) inform PM Gandhi of US and Pak views this regard; (3) discuss 100 million dollar commodity loan to India in similar terms as $50 million dollar loan to Pak./5/ /5/Humphrey issued a statement to the press on February 15 following his conversation with Ayub in which he announced the $50 million loan and the offer to negotiate an interim P.L. 480 agreement. (Telegram 1614 from Karachi, February 15; ibid., POL 7 HUMPHREY) The Embassy reported on February 16 that the Pakistani press had headlined the announcements concerning the loan and the P.L. 480 agreement. The Embassy noted that it was the best press the United States had received in Pakistan in months. (Telegram 1625 from Karachi; ibid.) McConaughy
296. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, February 17, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, which was received at 3:31 p.m. and passed to the White House at 4:35 p.m. 2136. Dept pass priority AmEmbassy Canberra for Vice President. For the President from the Vice President. I have had a useful and full schedule in India. We stopped first in the Punjab and spent half a day touring their agricultural university and experiment station, an accelerated agricultural production project, a health center and family planning clinic and a Peace Corps project. I was impressed by the way the Indians are adapting the knowhow learned from US in agricultural research, education and production. In New Delhi I saw President Radhakrishnan and Vice President Husain last evening and today saw Ministers concerned with economic affairs and agriculture, Foreign and Defense Ministers, and the Prime Minister. In all these meetings I stressed our concern that Tashkent Declaration be followed up effectively. The President, the Prime Minister, and the Ministers all said this is their firm intention. I also went into detail about the Honolulu meetings and their significance for the future of both the military and social-economic efforts in Vietnam. I made clear we asked only for peace and freedom of choice for the people of Vietnam. We urged the Indians to recognize our common interest in the success of these efforts and to give us any views of theirs in private but not in public. We also urged that GOI use its influence with the Soviets directly and in ICC to encourage them to be helpful in bringing the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. I asked them to consider medical or other humanitarian assistance to SVN. The response was generally affirmative about working on the Russians, which they say they will continue to do even though they do not anticipate much give there in the immediate future. The President in particular expressed his willingness and desire to work on the Russians. Response on public postures was qualified by their concern to retain influence in Moscow and to acquire influence in Hanoi, both of which they feel require that they not be seen to be leaning too far towards US. They appear to feel this approach will serve our mutual interest in the objective of containing and frustrating the Chinese. I explored in detail their food needs and economic prospects and I am satisfied that their planning for the budget which is to be presented on February 18 gives top priority to agriculture measures agreed to with Secretary Freeman. This confirmed by Prime Minister. Also GOI will confine defense expenditures to the limits previously agreed to with Secretary McNamara. Indian Ministers detailed efforts being made by GOI to mobilize assistance from other countries to meet their present food emergency. I am satisfied that the Indians are making a major effort in seeking other country assistance. They also reviewed in detail the disastrous effect which foreign exchange shortage is having on the economy. They were grateful for our interim assistance and recognized that further talks would be necessary between you and Mrs. Gandhi before an understanding on a longer term program could be reached. I told Mrs. Gandhi how much you were looking forward to seeing her to continue discussions on all these matters and it appears that she is thinking of coming shortly after the 15th of March. Additional information on my conversation with Prime Minister will be sent from Canberra. All items in my instructions from Rusk covered in these talks. Feel progress made. Bowles [Continue with the next documents]
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