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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
307. Summary Record of Conversation Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi/1/ Washington, March 28, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1-8/66. Secret. No drafting information appears on the record, but an April 5 note from Saunders to Bromley Smith indicates that Handley and Laise prepared it. (Ibid.) Prime Minister Gandhi visited the United States March 27-April 1; she was in Washington March 28-29. At approximately 12:35 p.m., the President and Mrs. Gandhi returned to the assembled group of advisers/2/ in the Cabinet Room and reported briefly on their talks as follows: /2/The group included Rusk, Hare, Bowles, Valenti, Komer, Handley, Ambassador Nehru, L.K. Jha, C.S. Jha, and Minister of Embassy P.K. Banerjee. A memorandum of their conversation before Johnson and Gandhi joined them, which was devoted almost entirely to Vietnam, is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. The President said they had had a pleasant and most helpful exchange of views and they discovered they had many things in common. In fact, he hadn't realized how numerous these were. Prime Minister Gandhi faced some of the same problems which he had after the death of President Kennedy--demanding internal problems, difficult international issues, and elections. He said that they had been talking about her needs and our needs. She had told him of the agricultural agreements that had been reached between Minister Subramaniam and Secretary Freeman, and mentioned the fact that they had to go before her Parliament. He had told her that we had a similar requirement and were taking a message to Congress. We wanted to be able to say to the IBRD as soon as it gets other countries pulled together that we will do what we can. He said he wanted to ask Congress to support this and also the food program. He hoped a message would go up this week, then the Prime Minister can have her economists meet with George Woods to work out the details. He and the Prime Minister had not gone into detail. The President said they also talked of the need for peace in that part of the world and said they understood each other and agreed to do everything possible to be helpful to each other. He then asked Mrs. Gandhi if she had anything to add. Prime Minister Gandhi said the President had summed up things very well. They had indeed found they had much in common. The President had said how worried he is about the problem of getting support from people who are opposed to paying out large sums of aid to India. She had replied that India can be a great force for peace and that India is, of course, grateful for the material help of the United States, but it needs even more the understanding of the United States. She said she told the President he is admired in India because India sees him as someone trying to translate the ideals of the United States' Constitution into reality; he was someone who believed in it sincerely. Asia is in an explosive state; now that independence has been gained, people have come to expect something more than the past has offered; new horizons have opened up which are still beyond their reach. They are impatient for change to take place. Mrs. Gandhi said she told the President India is in a position to use its aid much better; it is making an effort to be better organized and more efficient, drawing in younger, more energetic groups. She said India had a record of achievement, but mistakes had also been made. One of the significant facts was that among the educated group of people--and although this was still small, it was an increasing group in India--they had achieved a fair amount of excellence. These people are now being called upon to get greater efficiency and more movement. She believed that between the United States and India there could be a good working partnership. The President said he had also asked the Prime Minister to give us from time to time recommendations for procedures to get peace in Vietnam and the rest of the world. He said he had made no request; he had expressed appreciation for their ICC service and hoped somehow we could find the answer to peace. He had told Mrs. Gandhi that we are generally agreed that we want to do what we can and what the Congress will let us do to support George Woods' efforts in India's economic development. He thought that arrangements could best be made between technicians. The President then said that they had gone on to discuss generally the question of family planning, agriculture and peace planning, but no details. He said he thought it had been a very enjoyable talk./3/ /3/In a telephone conversation later in the afternoon with Rusk, Johnson observed that he had not gotten much out of his conversation with Gandhi. "I just sat there and listened to what I consider to be a rather limited and superficial discussion of problems." He could discern no sense of urgency in Gandhi's description of the problems facing her nation. Rusk said that he had had a similar experience during a luncheon conversation with the Prime Minister. Both Johnson and Rusk noted that Gandhi had taken no initiative in the discussions. Johnson said that when he suggested that famine in India might lead to widespread starvation and death Gandhi had responded that no one would die from the famine. She indicated that malnutrition was the worst specter faced by the Indian people. In Johnson's view, Gandhi had not made a strong case for U.S. assistance. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, March 28, 1966, 4:44 p.m., Tape F66.13, Side A, PNO 232) The Secretary reported briefly on the exchange of views that had taken place among the advisers during the course of the Presidential talks. He noted that he thought the discussion had been beneficial and that it had been possible to go into detail on our attitudes toward peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia and how this might be brought about. The Indian delegation had also reported on the worsening of the Tashkent atmosphere. The Secretary thought we had laid groundwork for further useful discussions and we had, therefore, employed our time very usefully. Prime Minister Gandhi intervened with one further thought which she termed her pet idea: she mentioned that on the subject of achieving better Indo-Pak relations she had been wondering if there could be some major economic project, like the Mekong, which might help to improve relations. She thought common involvement in a constructive effort might contribute to lessening of fears and tensions. The Secretary observed in a sense this is the way the Saar problem was solved. Ambassador Bowles noted that harnessing the Brahmaputra was just such a project. The Secretary said we would be happy to hear more about how this might be brought about. The President closed the conversation by saying we would leave it to our imaginative Ambassador Bowles to come up with ideas.
308. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 29, 1966, 10 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-US. Secret. Drafted by Laise on March 31, and approved in S on April 4. The meeting took place at the Blair House guest residence. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS India United States The Secretary opened the discussions by asking what would be the principal questions Prime Minister Gandhi would face in Parliament about her visit here. Mrs. Gandhi said it would be, "have I sold the country?" The Secretary noted the dilemma concerning the public presentation on food. It shouldn't be such as to frighten people in India, but on the other hand the need must be seen to be real in the United States. Mrs. Gandhi observed that the need is real. The Secretary said things may be said here that will be uncomfortable for India. Mrs. Gandhi suggested that the subject might be treated as a localized matter. Mr. L.K. Jha observed that this won't help either of us. He said that the disturbance on the Indian side arose out of the Pope's public appeal, which led to the belief that there were dead bodies in the streets. He thought the case should be presented as this being the year in which famine was averted; it was a natural calamity and we are all doing our best to meet it. Ambassador Nehru commented that this was too much an understatement; if we don't get the wheat, there will be a famine. The situation in the United States is that to get a response, the need must be somewhat overplayed. Mr. C.S. Jha said "let's emphasize the positive." The Secretary replied that maybe emphasis should be on prevention rather than cure. He thought it would be helpful to publicize information on the caloric content of the diet, i.e. there is a need for more food because people are eating more. The Secretary said there are three central questions in Congress: (a) the character of the need; (b) what is India doing for itself? and (c) what are other countries doing? He noted, for example, that although Canada had increased its contribution to India, it had also announced another million and one-half ton wheat sale to China. This somewhat negated the effect of their gift to India. However, he recognizes that there was nothing India could really do about this. Prime Minister Gandhi observed that surely if China is being helped this is all the more reason to give wheat to India. The Secretary acknowledged this was a good answer, but the question in Congress will be why isn't Canada, a fellow member of the Commonwealth, as good a friend of India as the United States. The Secretary then asked if food came up in Paris. The Prime Minister replied that it was mentioned. The French had said that they would look into it. They had noted that it is a long time since the last harvest and the stocks have already been committed to sales; August is the harvest month. The Secretary changed the subject to the Geneva Conference and disarmament. He said that following the test ban treaty we had been in frequent contact with the U.S.S.R. in an effort to go forward. It was heavy weather but we had been beginning to turn down military budgets by mutual example; Vietnam led this to be put aside. Nevertheless, there should be a chance to move ahead on nonproliferation. As a matter of policy, we and the U.S.S.R. agreed on limitation, but things are snagged at the moment on what they say about nuclear cooperation in NATO. If they would concentrate on nonproliferation, we could satisfy them. Nothing contemplated in NATO is as potentially dangerous as the existing arrangements. The Soviets have understandable nervousness as long as they don't know what the West intends to do with its nuclear forces. They don't like NATO or anything that ties the U.S. to Europe. They don't like any arrangements to share in NATO or to enhance Germany. On this we can't help them. Maybe the importance of this would wither away in time. If we think solely of proliferation, we can help meet that problem. As regards the non-nuclear powers, we are interested in the Indian views. Prime Minister Gandhi said that India is interested in nonproliferation; "we are sure we don't want to go into the manufacture of nuclear devices or bombs." Mr. L.K. Jha asked whether part of the Russian anxiety wasn't the fear of the German finger on the trigger. The Secretary replied that if there were any reality underlying this fear, we would be on the Russian side. We are utterly opposed to sharing nuclear weapons. The prime example of this is France. We paid a price for our policy; we can't let anyone help fire U.S. nuclear weapons. From the point of view of the U.S.S.R., that should be satisfactory. It isn't because they don't know the details of any arrangements we might reach, but it is simply because we haven't worked out the details ourselves. The Secretary noted that conventional forces could set off the chain of nuclear war, so the problem of a German finger on the trigger is not a real argument. We need Russian help if we are to avoid development of the wrong kind of a nationalist Germany. The Secretary said that he felt the Russians believed our statements were made in good faith but they think we are wrong about the steps that will follow. He hasn't abandoned hope. Mr. Krishna Rao asked about the recent amendments which we had submitted in Geneva and wondered if this would help solve the problem. The Secretary said the amendments would help close the gap, although the Russians had rejected them. Nevertheless, Gromyko had indicated interest, which would perhaps be picked up after the Moscow meeting of the Communist Party. The Secretary went on to note that we are also concerned about lesser countries. These countries seem to show great concern about disarmament of the major powers, but show little concern about it as it affects themselves. When the UN was debating disarmament, 70 countries were lining up to buy arms from us. This extends to Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. We hope to have movement on the nuclear free zone in Africa and Latin America and have talked to Russia about it in the Near East. We feel strongly that the Geneva efforts should continue and we should gnaw away at the problem. Ambassador Nehru asked the Secretary to develop his ideas about security of the non-nuclear states. The Secretary said this is a complex question for all of us. It is not inconceivable that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. might act jointly, but there is no disposition on the part of the U.S.S.R. to talk. This raises the question as to whether the U.S. and U.K. should take on the obligation and, if so, wouldn't this require some sort of an alliance, and does India want an alliance? Mr. C.S. Jha replied, "No"; Prime Minister Shastri had gone into all this and the Indian Government had concluded that the U.S.-U.K. guarantee would not work. The Soviet position is that the guarantee should involve all powers and it doesn't want to indicate willingness to use nuclear weapons against nuclear powers. A general prohibition is what they want. The difficulties with the treaty as Mr. Jha saw it are (1) differences among the nuclear powers, and (2) the attitude of the non-nuclear powers. India goes along with the position of the Eight. The two main points here are (a) the question of balance of obligations. What this would be is a matter for negotiation; India doesn't know. Cutting down stockpiles raises a question of inspection and the U.S.S.R. is not prepared for this; (b) some kind of assurances to the non-nuclear powers. As far as India is concerned, it is China that looms large. Some solution should be found. The Soviets have come out with the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons and the proposal that no nuclear power will use the nuclear weapons first. He understood that this gives the U.S. problems. The Secretary observed that if we could get balanced reduction of armaments, we could compromise on the first strike problem. Mr. Jha asked what was the significance of the latest U.S.S.R. statement that they are prepared to consider IAEA safeguards? The Secretary responded that the U.S.S.R. has moved on the question of safeguards and this is possibly of significance, particularly in the Near East. This could reduce fear in the area. Maybe we could move here in lieu of the nonproliferation treaty. We had the impression at the time of the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty that the U.S.S.R. had China very much on its mind. In regard to the issue of fingers on the trigger, we have pointed out to the Russians that on the two key arrangements there are safeguards. The more fingers that are added, the greater will be the inertia and, therefore, the U.S.S.R. has less cause for worry. Mr. Jha observed that when the Indians were in the U.S.S.R., Kosygin had said that Germany is a more serious problem for the U.S.S.R. than Vietnam is for the U.S. Mr. Jha said he had one point to raise on the question of a matter of balance. The Indian Government (i.e., the Ministry of External Affairs) had been giving thought to this; they did not insist on the assumption of too much of an obligation by the nuclear powers; all they sought was a beginning. He asked what the U.S. reaction would be to a nonproliferation treaty that does not spell out the balance but contains a promise by the nuclear powers that they would come to some arrangement to cut back. After two years there would be a review and if the nuclear powers had not been able to make progress toward balanced reduction, the treaty would fall to the ground. The Secretary assured the Indians that the U.S. was interested in nuclear disarmament, reduction in production of fissionable materials, etc. The snag is inspection; the U.S. is very forthcoming on this. One of the difficulties, however, is that inspection asks the Soviets for a unilateral concession. The U.S. is an open society, the U.S.S.R. is not. It is not just a question of trust and faith; if we are to prevent deep fear in this country, we have to be able to say we know whether the Soviets are keeping their word. We need inspection, therefore, from a military and a psychological point of view. A good many things can be done without intrusion on the U.S.S.R. On the comprehensive test ban, we have sought to deal with it as a matter, not of policy, but a technical problem of detectability. If we could conduct joint inspections, progress would be possible, but the U.S.S.R. objects on political grounds. Mr. L.K. Jha said he wished to reinforce what the Prime Minister had said about India not going nuclear. He warned, however, that one factor should be mentioned: over the last three or four years there has been public questioning of this policy. Unless there is greater speed in negotiations, India as a have-not nation may find the situation getting out of hand politically. The possibilities of preserving balance should not get so much weight so long as the direction is right. The Secretary noted it would be sometime yet before there is any significant deployment of Chinese weapons; we have good evidence of this. We would like to move on general disarmament. The U.S. has spent $850 billion in defense since 1947; such sums could be more constructively used for other purposes. The same is also true of the Soviets. Both of us are anxious to disarm. Mr. C.S. Jha referred to the Secretary's mention of the smaller countries acquiring arms. He noted that this worries India when it sees Saudi Arabia buying $300 million worth from Britain, and the U.S. also selling large quantities to Saudi Arabia and to Iran. India has heard and fears some of this may eventually be passed on to Pakistan. They know Pakistan has put out tenders in the world market. Chinese arms are going into Pakistan. All this creates problems and he hoped the arms-selling countries would develop some standards and norms other than profit. Otherwise instability will grow. There was then a brief exchange on controls which the U.S. exercised over transfer of our materiel to third parties, with the Secretary noting that such control exists on military aid but it is more difficult to exercise the same control over sales. Mr. C.S. Jha asked whether we had made any assessment of recent U.S.S.R. statements and whether we saw a trend back to Stalinism developing in the Twenty-third Congress. The Secretary said we had not had a chance to analyze Brezhnev's speech, but he would try to get a preliminary assessment to convey to Mr. Jha that evening at dinner. However, the U.S. impression is that the Soviet policy will continue to move in a moderate direction. The reasons are pressures in Eastern Europe and internal problems of allocation of resources. Mr. Jha again rephrased the question by asking whether we would think this new Soviet pronouncement might result in a shift toward China. The Secretary replied that it was much too soon to say. Undoubtedly there are different elements functioning in the Kremlin; however, most of our Eastern European contacts indicate that the dynamics are such that it would be impossible for the U.S.S.R. to move toward Peiping by acceding to Peiping's views on doctrine. We may be in a rather dangerous period as far as China is concerned. Prime Minister Gandhi asked what we saw as the major external problem of China. The Secretary thought it was their failures in Indonesia, Africa and at Algiers. Mrs. Gandhi wondered whether they looked at them as failures. The Secretary replied that they must be aware of the facts. In addition they see U.S. power committed to Southeast Asia. They must realize their policy is unprofitable, although they keep saying revolution is inevitable. The Secretary raised the question of Peiping's UN membership and said the question is what is to be done about Formosa; beyond the Assembly is the Security Council. Many countries which are supporting the admission of Communist China would not expel Formosa. One of the questions is whether other Asians want Peiping to exercise the Asian veto in the Security Council. Mr. C.S. Jha replied that the CPR wielding the veto is not a comfortable prospect. Nevertheless, he felt that it would be easier to tame the Chinese in the UN than outside. He thought they would not be likely to have things their own way. In addition he said there is a case for the reconstitution of the Security Council and he thought India had a good case for a seat as one of the permanent members. Ambassador Nehru asked the Secretary why in view of the enlargement that is taking place in the Security Council the number of vetoing countries couldn't be enlarged? The Secretary replied that if this were done we would hope that there would be a reduction in the veto power.
309. Summary Record of Conversation Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi/1/ Washington, March 29, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Memos and Miscellaneous, 1-8/66. Secret. No drafting information appears on the record, but according to an April 5 memorandum from Saunders to Bromley Smith, Handley and Laise prepared it. (Ibid.) Following the five o'clock meeting between the President and Prime Minister Gandhi, the President reported to the assembled group of advisers/2/ in the Cabinet Room that he had gone over the food message to Congress with the Prime Minister. He indicated that he would review the message with the Senate leaders at 6:15 p.m. that day and with the House leaders the next day. He hoped to get it approved for submission by noon on the thirtieth. The President reported that the Prime Minister had read the message but had not commented on it. He asked Ambassador Nehru to review it. /2/For a list of the advisers involved, see footnote 2, Document 307. The President, the Prime Minister and the advisers reviewed and approved the draft communiqué,/3/ with the addition of a paragraph in which Mrs. Gandhi formally extended an invitation to President Johnson to visit India. The President thanked Mrs. Gandhi for her invitation and expressed the hope that conditions here and in India would permit acceptance of it./4/ /3/For text of the joint communiqué issued on March 29, see Department of State Bulletin, April 18, 1966, pp. 603-604. /4/On March 31 Johnson sent a personal message to Gandhi in New York expressing his pleasure in their conversations in Washington and adding "how much we value your friendship." (Telegram 2324 to USUN; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA)
310. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 29, 1966, 10:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. I, 4/2-5/26/66. Confidential. George Woods is eager to start working over the Indians on a self-help and aid package as soon as he knows where we stand. Therefore, if you are satisfied as a result of your talks that Mrs. Gandhi intends to adopt the major economic reforms that we and the World Bank have been seeking, the best way to move ahead might be for me to tell Woods on your behalf. State, AID and I suggest we tell him the following, which protects us with plenty of caveats: 1. You have concluded from your talks that she is prepared to liberalize India's import control policies as well as internal price, marketing and other business controls which have been inhibiting economic growth, provided the necessary financial support is forthcoming. Additionally, she is prepared to adjust exchange rates and tax policies to support liberalization. 2. In order to move more rapidly toward self-sufficiency in food production, Mrs. Gandhi has assured you that India will follow through in emphasizing agricultural development, making adequate fertilizer available to the farmers and vigorously seeking to attract foreign private investment in fertilizer production. 3. She has also spoken to you of India's efforts in the family planning field and of her determination to accelerate these programs. 4. In turn you have indicated to Mrs. Gandhi your realization that the liberalization program described above can be implemented only with assurances of substantial financial support. You are prepared to say informally that if India actually takes the necessary steps to the satisfaction of the World Bank and the other consortium donors (including ourselves) we are prepared to help provide needed support for such a program in phase with its execution, subject of course to Congressional appropriations. 5. You currently believe that we will be able to support the Indian economic reform program in FY 1967 with about $385 million of AID loans (if Congress meets your aid request) and $50 million of EX-IM Bank loans--the same levels as pledged in recent years. Of this amount you are prepared to extend an increased proportion in the form of program lending. You also understand that the economic reform program will require a debt rescheduling in which the U.S. will take its share--approximately $30 million for FY 67 (much less than the Europeans). All this is, of course, conditioned not only on India's actually following through with its reform program, but also on the willingness of other consortium members to bear an appropriate portion of the burden. 6. Finally, in view of our continuing wish to provide our support in coordination with the World Bank and the other members of the Indian Consortium, you have suggested that Mrs. Gandhi have her senior financial and planning officials come to Washington as soon as possible in order to work out an agreement with the World Bank and the IMF regarding the details of the economic reform program and the financial backstopping arrangements. We expect the Bank to take the lead in coordinating the necessary consultations between India and the governments of the consortium members. This package is the real McCoy--much more so than emergency food. If George Woods, with our backing can drive the tough bargain which he contemplates, we will have accomplished more in moving India via our aid leverage than in the last six years combined. And we will have done so at little if any greater out-of-pocket cost than in 1963 or 1964. I stress again that this is a self-enforcing bargain--if India doesn't make the reforms we and the Bank want, it doesn't get most of the dough. This puts the choice squarely up to them. I may be over- enthusiastic, but I see this as a major foreign policy stroke, affecting 500 million people in the largest country in the Free World./2/ /2/A handwritten postscript by Komer reads: "We'd keep all of this very quiet for the time being, leaving it to the Indians to make the first move." R.W. Komer Tell Woods /3/Johnson checked this option.
311. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 30, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. I. No classification marking. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. SUBJECT I strongly endorse the amounts and types of food assistance to India listed in your message to the Congress./2/ India has an urgent need for this help. It needs it soon: the next allocation of food grains should be made by April 15 at the latest if the pipeline is to be kept full. /2/President Johnson's March 30 message to Congress addressed the pressing problem of drought and famine in India. Johnson noted that the United States had supplied 6 million tons of food grain to India during the previous fiscal year and 6.5 million tons during the current fiscal year. India needed an estimated 6 or 7 million tons of grain to meet its minimal requirements through December 1966. Johnson proposed that the United States provide 3.5 million tons of that total, with the remainder to be provided by other contributing nations. For text of the message to Congress, see Department of State Bulletin, April 18, 1966, pp. 605-607. While the Indian Government is confident that it can stay on top of a very difficult supply problem if the rate of grain arrivals is maintained, delays will cause an acute crisis for Mrs. Gandhi. Her Government has not yet consolidated its position and is beset by serious internal problems, only one of which is food. Inability of the Indian Government to feed its people (especially in Kerala and the major cities such as Calcutta where rioting has already occurred) would undermine the Government's ability to maintain order during the coming election year. This could deter Mrs. Gandhi from moving ahead to solve her longer-run economic problems. Dean Rusk
312. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Embassies and Legations/1/ Washington, March 30, 1966, 3:52 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary John P. Walsh, cleared by Handley and Schneider, and approved by Rusk. A draft copy of this telegram bears a handwritten marginal notation by President Johnson which reads: "Good--ask for and have assembled replies from all countries for me to see." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. I) 1894. From Secretary to Ambassador. You should expeditiously bring to the attention of host government, at level and in manner you deem most effective, the message by President Johnson on Food for India conveyed on wireless file today. If you judge host government has capacity to provide food or money to buy food, you should urge it to respond generously and quickly to the great humanitarian needs in India resulting from severe drought conditions. Rusk
313. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 3, 1966, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. I. Confidential. We now have first-round reactions to your food message, which our ambassadors have delivered in almost every foreign capital. A spate of local holidays has prevented a number of governments from responding yet, but we have enough answers to form a clear pattern. The sampling you asked to see is attached./2/ /2/Not printed. The most striking aspect of these answers is how many countries are themselves on the emergency list. They draw a graphic picture of the world's food problem! Nevertheless your message has been well received. Even some of the marginally poor nations want at least to send India token help. A number of the wealthier ones are cranking up more substantial responses, and some that have already given are considering more./3/ /3/Rostow added a handwritten marginal notation at the end of the memorandum that reads: "5 considering, 12 giving, 8 token." To capitalize on this momentum, I have asked State to organize our follow-up. We don't want any potential donors to slip off the hook. We also need to get the Indians involved in this follow-up. The big danger is that they will sit back and relax, figuring that we have now assumed leadership--something we had insisted they do. It will still be an uphill job to get others to match our 3.5 million tons of grain, though we may well get more than equivalent dollar value (about $210 million) in other commodities and services. I will report again later when results are firmer./4/ /4/President Johnson's handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "Walt see me and get Nehru in at once." At an April 5 meeting at the White House, at which the President, the Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and General Taylor were the principal participants, the issue of food for India was discussed. President Johnson instructed Rusk to meet with Ambassador Nehru and "put the heat on" for help from other countries. (Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Valenti, Jack, Meeting Notes (Typed) 12/21/65-4/6/66) Johnson put pressure on Nehru personally in a telephone conversation on April 5. He ran through the U.S. survey of potential contributors and suggested that Nehru work with Rusk in a joint effort to solicit additional support. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ambassador Nehru, April 5, 1966, 4:59 p.m., Tape F66.14, Side A, PNO 1) Walt
314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, April 6, 1966, 5:13 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Handley. Cleared by Staff Assistant Peter T. Higgins in AF. Repeated to Lagos. 1895. Following summary of conversation April 5, 1966 between Secretary and Indian Ambassador B.K. Nehru FYI and Noforn. Handley also present. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review. 1. Following successful Senate Agriculture Committee Hearing on President's program for food to India at which Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman testified,/2/ Secretary called in Indian Ambassador B.K. Nehru. Secretary gave him run-down on Agriculture Committee Hearing and told him that Committee had unanimously reported out House Resolution and that Senator Ellender expected that final Senate action will be taken April 6. Secretary then went on to say that at request of President, he wanted to mention one matter of some urgency. Secretary said that at the public hearing before the Senate Agriculture Committee and privately he had been pressed hard by a number of Senators as to what other countries were doing to contribute to India. He expressed his and the President's particular interest in learning from India exactly what it had done to contact other countries and what results had been obtained. /2/A transcript of the hearing before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on April 5 is ibid., AID (US) 15 INDIA. 2. The Secretary said that on our part, we had contacted 113 countries and of these 23 had offered contributions, 13 were considering offers, 33 had given no firm response, and 44 were unable to contribute. The Secretary said that total contributions from other countries up to now could be valued at about $150 million. 3. Among the countries contacted was Nigeria which had expressed interest in providing some aid although not very much. Moreover, the Nigerians did not want to appear to be intruding in other people's business and would also have some practical problems regarding transportation. But, the Secretary added, our report from Nigeria indicated that the GON had not taken any initiative because they had received no request from the GOI. 4. The Secretary went on to emphasize that even though token contributions might not be important to the GOI they were of the utmost importance to us since it was essential to the American Congress and American people that our contribution, although large, be part of a large scale international effort. The Secretary pointed out that since India was suffering from the results of an extraordinary drought, he did not think that Indian initiatives to secure contributions from other countries would be a derogation of Indian prestige. Some of the countries contributing might feel that in another year under similar conditions they too could turn to India and other countries for help without loss of prestige. 5. He urged on the Ambassador the importance of the closest possible contact between India and the US in sharing information and a "box-score" as to which countries might be able to help and on follow-up. He said we would furnish the Indian Embassy a list of all countries we had contacted and the reactions we had received. He urged on the Ambassador the need to reciprocate. 6. Amb. Nehru expressed appreciation for the role played by the USG, particularly the President's, in this effort and indicated gratification over the action of the House and Senate Agriculture Committee. He said that his Embassy would furnish the Dept. all available information on GOI's contacts with other countries and agreed on the importance of keeping closely in touch with each other. 7. Amb. Nehru went on to say that there was a recent report from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture indicating that overall wastage of grains produced in India was now estimated at between 14-16% instead of an alleged 50% as had been given wide publicity. This included losses in the field, from threshing, from rodents, etc. He added that losses in government facilities were less than 1%. 8. The Secretary gave Amb. Nehru the text of the Resolution approved by the Senate Agriculture Committee which included the two amendments adopted by the House. One of these amendments the Secretary pointed out, dealt with the need to make sure that food was being given to the destitute. The Secretary suggested that it would be very important for the Embassy and the GOI to give publicity to measures being taken to make sure that food was being made available not only to those who could afford to buy it but also to the very poor. Ambassador Nehru agreed and said he would follow through on this point. Rusk
315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, April 6, 1966, 6:29 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Handley and Farr in AID/NESA, cleared by Rostow and Saunders, and approved by Handley. A note by Saunders on a draft of this telegram indicates that it was based on a conversation between President Johnson and Rostow on April 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. II) 1897. As results Gandhi visit begin stand out in clearer perspective, following points worth passing for your guidance: 1. While atmosphere very cordial, no concrete agreements reached. This not unexpected. However, difficult to get any sure sense exactly what Indians intend to do. While Gandhi party appeared understand nature economic deal we and IBRD have in mind, we still not sure they intend to go through with it. Decisions left to be made in Delhi. 2. In this connection, we see danger euphoria of visit, President's strong message to Congress and resumption consortium activity will lull Indians back into secure feeling US ready to shoulder Indian burdens. Crucial this not happen because, while we do not intend to abandon Indians, we mean what we say about self-help. We want to bring Indians back to earth gently but quickly. 3. Indian performance will be main criterion for our next moves. For instance, we expect Indians move quickly to accept Woods' invitation begin discussions with IBRD. We expect Indians begin hot pursuit fertilizer investors with propositions carefully prepared to be responsive to reasonable investor needs. 4. In short, next move up to Indians. Since it essential they realize this, suggest you make clear appropriate levels we consider ball now in Indian court. We have promised understanding help when they move. They should expect little more from us until they do. Rusk
316. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 14, 1966, 12:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Aides File, Vol. I, April 1-30, 1966. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "Rec'd Ranch 4-16-66, 5:00 p." With the Gandhi visit behind us, it is time to begin shoring up the Pakistan side of our affairs in the subcontinent. A first step is to tell Ayub what you said to Mrs. Gandhi about Indo-Pak relations and Kashmir, since we promised to keep him informed. Kashmir is still his chief concern, and he will be watching sharply for signs that we are favoring India. The attached letter/2/ assures him that you pressed Mrs. Gandhi on this subject as hard as you pressed him. While we cannot report any specific progress, it will reassure Ayub to know that you have not forgotten your promise to him to say the same hard things to the Indians that you said to him. It is also a chance to let him know gently that we are watching the Chicom visit. /2/Document 317. I recommend you take an especially close look at the State Department text. Because most of your talk with Mrs. Gandhi was private, they were drafting partly in the dark. Knowing what you told both her and Ayub, you may want to put your personal stamp on this one. The only caution is that we do not want to say anything the Paks could leak to our disadvantage in India. Secretary Rusk will soon be sending you recommendations for possible next steps with Pakistan on the economic side. Ayub's finance minister will be here next week for informal talks with the World Bank and AID. Ayub is still pressing for resumption of military aid, and we will have recommendations on that in a few weeks. But we are ignoring both the economic and military questions in this letter in order to preserve your flexibility, while still maintaining a little movement. WR
317. Letter From President Johnson to President Ayub/1/ Washington, April 17, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pakistan, Vol. 2, Pres. Ayub Correspondence, 1/1/66-12/25/67. No classification marking. The letter was transmitted to Pakistan in telegram 1475, April 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of March first/2/ and for the understanding it conveys of our effort in Vietnam. Vice President Humphrey has reportedly fully on his discussions with you. /2/A copy of this letter, which deals with Vietnam, is ibid. I would like in this letter to share with you some of my views on the good talks I had with Prime Minister Gandhi. You may already have seen some of the public statements that Mrs. Gandhi and I made, but in the event you have not, I am asking Ambassador McConaughy to make a set available to you. These statements I think provide a good summary of our talks, but I want to assure you personally that we discussed frankly the subjects which concern you most. I stressed to Mrs. Gandhi the importance we attach to the restoration of peace on the subcontinent and the continuation of the process of reconciliation begun at Tashkent. I explained to her the difficulty my government will have in providing sustained assistance unless we can be reasonably sure that India and Pakistan are now able to concentrate on peaceful development. I urged her to keep up the effort to resolve the underlying issues which divide India and Pakistan, including Kashmir. I can report to you that I found Mrs. Gandhi to be firm in her commitment to carry out fully the Tashkent Declaration. At the same time, her views on relations with your country were moderate and constructive. She explained to me in complete candor the domestic political and economic problems she faces as her Government prepares for next year's elections. Both you and I have submitted ourselves and our Governments to the electorate in the recent past and I believe that you can appreciate, as I do, her very real problem in this regard. I have read with concern of recent charges by both Pakistan and India that the other side is violating the Tashkent accord. I have also been troubled about the effect the visit of the Chinese Communist leaders might have on relations between the two great nations of the subcontinent. But I was heartened to read of the exchange of messages between you and Mrs. Gandhi as she returned to New Delhi from abroad. I earnestly hope that the moderation and keen sense of realism you both possess will keep alive the spirit of reconciliation so encouragingly begun at Tashkent. Sincerely,
318. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 18, 1966, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Cables, 1/66-8/66. Confidential. State of play in India and Pakistan. As soon as she returned to New Delhi, Mrs. Gandhi scheduled her Planning Minister (Asoka Mehta) to fly to Washington today to begin talks with the World Bank this week./2/ By coincidence, Ayub's Finance Minister (Shoaib) arrives today for similar talks./3/ /2/Mehta visited Washington April 18-May 6. /3/Shoaib visited Washington April 18-29. The difference between these two missions is that the Indians are working from your assurance to Mrs. Gandhi that if they meet the Bank's terms, we will help. The Pakistanis are still waiting to find out where they stand. Secretary Rusk will have recommendations on next aid steps for Pakistan in the next day or two, and we may suggest that you see Shoaib for a few moments to pass your current feelings direct to Ayub. The stumbling block with Pakistan is more political than economic. Pakistan made its deal with the Bank two years ago. The problem is that, since Ayub's visit here, he has feted Liu Shao-chi, paraded Chicom military hardware, blocked any progress on non-Kashmir issues at the India-Pak ministerial meeting, failed to reopen our closed facilities and permitted some use of the US as a whipping boy in connection with the Chicom visit. On the other hand, Ayub himself has been quite restrained during the Chicom tour and is carefully sending Bhutto to both the CENTO and SEATO ministerial meetings (he missed last year). The question Secretary Rusk will be putting to you is whether you are willing anyway at least to spell out the economic and political terms of an aid deal or whether you feel Ayub's performance requires us to hold off on any offer now. We are still a couple of weeks from having a recommendation for you on next steps on military aid. However, State and Defense are working on details, and we are already tying it in with the economic talks by trying to establish ceilings on defense expenditures. Worldwide responses to your Indian food message are still coming in, and we will give you a more detailed report as soon as B.K. Nehru gives us a late reading on India's own approaches. In short, we now figure that other donors have come up with about $165 million in a variety of contributions--or within about 20% of matching the value of your 3.5 million ton offer ($210 million at world prices). Walt
319. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and the Pakistani Finance Minister (Shoaib)/1/ Washington, April 19, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Cables, 1/66-9/66. Confidential. After I explained broadly our concerns about Tashkent and military expenditures, Shoaib made the following points. 1. He will take up with George Woods two multinational projects on which Pakistan is prepared to move now with India: the export of natural gas to India from the fields of West Pakistan; and the joint development and exploitation of the waters of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Teesta rivers. Shoaib says that, in the past, the Indians were unwilling to become "dependent" on Pakistan gas. And they have also been unwilling to discuss the joint development of the river waters. He hopes George Woods can interest the Indians in proceeding on these two fronts quietly but promptly./2/ /2/Rostow sent a copy of this memorandum of conversation to the President on April 19 with a covering note in which he stated that Shoaib's message was important if true. He noted that in the past Pakistan had insisted upon movement on the Kashmir problem before considering economic collaboration. Rostow suggested that George Woods of the World Bank be encouraged to follow up on the constructive moves Shoaib had indicated Pakistan was prepared to make and lean on the Indians to cooperate. (Ibid.) 2. He will also take up with George Woods a possible World Bank role as third party in India-Pak negotiations to limit over-all military expenditures between the two countries. He says Ayub is prepared to settle for Pakistan military expenditures between one-fourth and one-third of Indian military expenditures./3/ In any case, Shoaib has been financing the increase in Pak military expenditures by increased taxation and is determined to preserve the level of development expenditure in Pakistan, earning the additional foreign exchange necessary for additional military expenditures by a special export drive. But this assumes that the old economic aid level to Pakistan will be restored. /3/Shoaib discussed Pakistan's military budget with Secretary McNamara on April 22. In the course of the discussion, Shoaib pointed to Pakistan's pressing need for spare parts for U.S.-supplied aircraft and tanks. (Memorandum of conversation; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0075, Memos of Conversations Between Sec McNamara and Heads of State (other than NATO)) 3. Shoaib says the biggest single thing that we could do to restore U.S.-Pak relations would be to finance the steel mill./4/ He will be seeing Harold Linder as well as Dave Bell on this. The management will be done by the National Steel Company of the U.S. The energy will come from natural gas. The raw material will be mainly U.S. scrap metal. National Steel, as well as Shoaib, believes it will be an efficient operation, making a profit. /4/Shoaib also discussed financing for the Karachi steel mill with Under Secretary of State Mann on April 25 in the course of a wide-ranging discussion. (Telegram 1522 to Karachi, April 25; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK) WR
320. Editorial Note On April 19, 1966, President Johnson signed into law House Joint Resolution 997, "To support United States participation in relieving victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people." Johnson noted that the legislation supported and endorsed his recent offer to enlarge food shipments to India to help offset the worst drought of the century. He called upon the governments of other countries to join in the effort to meet the disaster. For text of P.L. 89-406, issued as 80 Stat. 131, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, page 688. [Continue with the next documents]
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