NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
334. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to President Johnson/1/ New Delhi, May 5, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles (cont.). Secret. Dear Mr. President: It occurred to me that you might like a first-hand report of the impact here in India of your discussions with Mrs. Gandhi. Here in brief is the way the situation has been shaping up: 1. Mrs. Gandhi and her close associates were enormously pleased with the visit. They returned with glowing accounts of your courtesy and understanding and the warm response of the American press, and people. 2. As a result the already significant group of U.S. supporters within the Government has been materially strengthened. With the exception of the Communists and Congress Party left-wingers there has also been a very warm response from the press, Parliamentarians and the public in general. 3. However, the Soviet Union, the Moscow branch of the Communist Party and the fellow travelers in the left wing of the Congress Party, recognizing the enormous political significance of the closer Indo-U.S. relationship, have launched a well organized and, I must admit, rather effective counter attack. Led by Krishna Menon and K.D. Malavia in Parliament and strongly backed by such Soviet-financed publications as Blitz, Link and the Patriot, this group has been taking shrewd advantage of recent dope stories from Indian correspondents in the United States which have provided the Indian public with a dismally pessimistic view of the economic discussions now under way in Washington. The extreme left has also picked on the Indo-American Foundation as evidence of a new U.S. drive to "take over India" and warned that Mrs. Gandhi and her Government are prepared to sell India out to the United States. 4. However, Mrs. Gandhi, instead of ducking this political challenge as many feared she might do, has met the left wing attacks head on with a vigorous defense of India's relationship to the United States. In so doing, she has boldly staked her political future on a closer understanding with the United States and the Western powers and on the increased flow of foreign exchange which India requires to become economically self-sufficient within a ten or twelve year time span. 5. Mrs. Gandhi, recognizing that she has a hard political fight on her hands, is right now placing her highest priority on strengthening her own position with the Indian people. Thus she is launched on a series of speaking appearances (which include as many as four appearances a day) plus regular radio talks over a nationwide network. Some observers feel that she is paying too little attention to Parliament and the Congress Party political leadership. However, I believe that she has deliberately chosen to build her strength first of all with the people, so that she may have a solid public base for the political struggle with the leftist groups (supported on some issues by the extreme right) that lies ahead. 6. If Mrs. Gandhi and her associates stick with their present vigorous economic pragmatism and if, with the help of the World Bank, we are able to provide the support required to insure the necessary increase in India's economic growth, I believe that the positive economic and political results by the end of this year will be clearly evident. For instance if the current negotiations with Asoka Mehta are successful and if the foreign exchange needed to increase India's imports of maintenance items is made available the rise of factory production and employment will be significant. At the same time as you know vigorous steps are being taken to provide more fertilizer, water, improved seeds, etc. With a fair break in the monsoon this is expected to provide a 20% to 25% increase in food grain production in this fiscal year. 7. If this economic breakthrough does in fact occur it will I believe open the doors to a political revolution in India which may have historic consequences for the entire free world. Since Independence 19 years ago the old guard who lived and worked under Gandhi and Nehru has dominated the Congress Party. These men for the most part are conservative, unimaginative, uncreative and in many ways doctrinaire. If Mrs. Gandhi's effort to create a new economic and political climate succeeds the door will be opened wide to men and women in their 30's, 40's and early 50's who have thus far largely been shut out of active participation in Indian public life. 8. In response to Mrs. Gandhi's "new look" and in anticipation of this political awakening younger people are already beginning to speak out with renewed vigor and confidence. Indeed some observers sense a growing feeling in the air which is reminiscent of the early days of the New Deal. 9. If this political and economic evolution does in fact take shape a new generation of Indians will be taking over following elections next February, a generation which is more pragmatic, flexible, imaginative and increasingly aware of India's potential role as a stabilizing force in Asia. The Cabinet which Mrs. Gandhi will select next February will reflect this political switch. Thus, the decisions which we face in regard to India take on an important new dimension; i.e., it is not simply a matter of assuring a solvent Indian Government but of assuring the political success of the most promising government that India has had since Independence. 10. However, a note of caution is in order. There are at least three developments which could stand in the way of the development of which we have such high hopes: A. A second drought comparable to the one last year. (As last year's was the worst in 65 years, it is unlikely to repeat itself this year.) B. A failure on our part to understand the acute sensitivity of the Indian political situation in an election year. (The pressures we have brought to bear on the Indians up to now have been dramatically effective and we have largely won our objectives. Now as the political temp rises we must be careful not to expose Mrs. Gandhi to the leftist charge that her policies are directed by the U.S. Government in Washington and administered by the U.S. Embassy in Delhi.) C. A direct Pak-Chinese attack on India or a major stirring up of the Himalayan border areas through "national liberation" techniques. (This is worrisome but not likely.) We have come a very long way in our relationship with India since you and I reviewed the situation in your office in May of 1965. At that time I suggested that the U.S. may be forced within the next few years to choose between three possible courses of action in Asia: a. We can get out of Asia leaving it to the tender mercies of the Chinese and/or Russians (which would be unthinkable); b. We can continue to increase our military inputs in an effort to bolster our severely limited political power base (the Asian nations which are now directly associated with us total no more than 6% or 7% of the Asian people); c. We can work tactfully and pragmatically for the development of an indigenous Asian counterweight to China (since India has more than half the non-communist population of Asia it must inevitably play a key role) which we can effectively support with a much smaller investment of American resources. In the last year we have, I believe, made far greater progress towards this third choice than is generally recognized. The tactics which you chose to clarify the political-economic issues here in India have been dramatically successful. India has responded and accepted in large measure the suggestions and conditions which we have advanced. Most important of all Mrs. Gandhi has emerged as a politically competent, liberal-minded democratic leader who appears to recognize the communist-left as her primary domestic enemy and who understands the crucial importance of the U.S. in providing the support required to make India economically self-sufficient and politically viable. If the situation develops as we hope it may, there is reason to expect that by Christmas a new economic and political dynamism will begin to be evident here in India that will be clearly recognizable at home. If this occurs we will have the beginning of a new power balance in Asia which well be greatly to our advantage and for which you can take great personal credit./2/ /2/Johnson added the following handwritten marginal notation to the letter: "Bill M--Give substance to Phil Potter." Reference is to Bill Moyers and Phillip Potter, the Washington bureau chief for the Baltimore Sun. With my warm regards, Sincerely, Chet Bowles
335. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 7, 1966, 9 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt M. Rostow, Vol. 2, May 1-15, 1966. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "Sent by wire to President." Ambassador Ahmed of Pakistan gave me verbally the following message: 1. President Ayub had not understood in his conversations with you that he had undertaken a personal commitment to reopen the closed facilities. 2. Since this is your understanding, he will now give the matter his urgent personal attention./2/ /2/McConaughy met with Ayub on May 5 to discuss Shoaib's visit to Washington and the Ayub government's response to the conditions involved in reestablishing U.S. assistance to Pakistan. During the course of the conversation, Ayub took up the issue of the closed installations. He could not recall discussing the issue with Johnson in Washington, and he noted that newspaper leaks in U.S. papers concerning the stations complicated the issue in that the Soviet Union and China were more likely to react to the reopening of the stations. Nonetheless, Ayub said, a Foreign Office draft proposal for reopening would be given to McConaughy for comment within the week. (Telegram 2032 from Karachi, May 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PAK) Walt
336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, May 8, 1966, 12:20 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Coon, cleared by Macomber and Rostow, and approved by Handley. Repeated to Karachi and Rawalpindi. 2170. Joint State/AID message. Subject: Indian Planning Minister Mehta's Visit to Washington. 1. Mehta left Washington May 6 after two and a half weeks of discussions with IBRD and USG. In addition to talks with Bank and senior USG officials he met with President twice (May 4 and 5). Mehta expects be back in New Delhi by May 10. 2. Mehta's Discussion with Bank. We maintained stance throughout visit that Mehta was here to work out understanding with Bank and USG was not party these negotiations. Discussions were in fact Bank operation in which we did not participate. Following conclusion Mehta's talks with IBRD, he informed us that there had been general policy agreement between him and Bank. IBRD has confirmed this to us. We also understand that Mehta told Bank his position represented that of GOI. Bank informs us that extensive details remain to be worked out. We understand procedure will be for GOI to submit series of memoranda to Bank indicating Indian line of action with regard each of reforms. 3. While in Washington Mehta also had discussions with a variety of high-level USG officials. During these discussions Mehta generally stressed new GOI emphasis on agriculture and family planning, and good prospects for general economic breakthrough given adequate external support. (See Deptel 2041/2/ for example of Mehta's general line.) For our part we attempted in these talks to clarify for Mehta the considerations we held of particular importance for establishing the general framework within which our aid relationship could develop along mutually beneficial lines given a satisfactory GOI understanding with the IBRD. /2/Document 325. a. We made it clear to Mehta how we felt about the problem of peace on the subcontinent. We told him we wanted concrete evidence that India and Pakistan were gradually settling their differences, and in this connection asked whether a new round of ministerial talks might not produce enough agreement to improve climate. We told Mehta Shoaib felt the ball was in India's court. Mehta responded noncomittally. b. We also told Mehta we wanted some sort of ceiling on domestic and foreign military spending and asked that accounting of Soviet aid be on delivery basis. As in conversation reported Deptel 2041, Mehta's response was generally to effect GOI was in fact holding line on defense budget, GOI loath to divert funds from development to military, etc. Indian reps claimed that only arms coming from Soviet Bloc are naval equipment and assistance in building aircraft factory. 4. Following conclusion discussion with Bank, Mehta raised subject of amounts of nonproject and project aid with USG officials. Stated Indians accepted Bank's analysis of $900 million requirement of nonproject aid for first year and required assurance that adequate support will be available throughout Fourth Five-Year Plan. Mehta also attached great importance to continuation project aid, noting that progress on projects had been virtually nil for past year. Apparently adding what he understood had been available from US for projects in FY 66 ($110 million) to amount he believed necessary from FY 67 ($150 million), he indicated need for coming year for $260 million in project aid from US. Bank indicated optimism about raising $900 million non-project aid (including debt adjustment and including $100 million US non-project loan now under negotiation.) USG indicated imminent release of four loans already authorized. Also said that $260 million was substantially more than would be available for DL projects because 1) we are not recognizing the $110 million carryover and 2) we wished to give a sharp priority to program lending. We did mention the possibility of announcing the availability of a fixed amount of extended risk guarantees in support of private US project financing. 5. In concluding session with Mehta,/3/ USG informed him that we aware of problems facing India, felt deeply about them, and wanted to do our part to support India's economic program. We said that the way GOI was approaching its problems meets our complete approval. We reminded Mehta of our inability commit our Congress and that what we could do depended on funds Congress made available. But we assured Mehta we recognized consequences of proposed Indian action and would do our part to best of our ability. We reemphasized importance we attach to peace on subcontinent and problem of military expenditures. /3/On May 5, Mehta met with Rusk, Bell, Handley, and Laise. A memorandum of this conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/INC Files: Lot 70 D 314, India 1966, Visits--Asoka Mehta. Comment: IBRD tells us informally that Indians have proposed economic policy changes to be accomplished over two year period which Bank finds acceptable. IBRD/GOI agreement is contingent on GOI working out suitable arrangements with IMF which are also acceptable to IBRD. This presumably to be done during coming week by Mehta associates remaining here. IBRD plans to communicate promptly with major creditors to transmit proposals and to seek assurances of support. We are sending by separate telegram statement which we worked out with Mehta and which we agreed that he could make to Parliament on Friday May 13, if agreement with IMF consummated by that time. Our understanding that no public statement of this kind be made prior May 13. In intervening period Indian comment is expected to be to effect that Mehta had useful talks here and is now reporting to GOI. Essential that no substantial comment be made prior to May 13 as we will be consulting with Key members of Congress. We hope Mehta statement will meet Prime Minister Gandhi's political requirements for the present. You should clearly understand that IBRD/GOI agreement is contingent on subsequent agreement with IMF and on success of consultations with creditors. Rusk
337. Letter From Prime Minister Gandhi to President Johnson/1/ New Delhi, May 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 3, 5/6-26, 1966. No classification marking. Dear Mr. President: More than a month has gone by since I had the pleasure of visiting your great country and enjoying the warm hospitality with which you received me. I am writing to you today not because I have any specific problem to put to you but because I feel that an occasional letter at a personal level might be a useful way of sharing thoughts about matters of common concern. One of the things which had impressed me most was your complete understanding of what I would call the political side of aid as distinct from its economic aspects. The reluctance with which aid-giving countries view the prospect of finding large sums of money to help developing countries on the road to progress is understood by everyone. What is not so easily or widely appreciated is the reluctance and sometimes even resentment with which aid is accepted by the recipient. Ever since my return, I have been asked searching questions in Parliament and by the Press to discover whether I have been pressurised by you or the World Bank to do things against our better judgement. I do not mind this. Indeed, I welcome it because in part the questioning reflects the spirit of self-respect and dignity which survives in our people inspite of the many problems of poverty. This is a source of strength to me. However in part these questions are prompted by political factors of a different nature. With elections not many months ahead, every political party is anxious to take up positions which are critical of the party in power, and even within my party, there is the usual struggle for nomination which is a phenomenon which you understand far more than I do. My critics have specially chosen the Indo-U.S. Foundation as the spring-board for a personal attack on me, even though the basic idea had been agreed long before I came to office. Such criticism, inspired on personal or party motivation, does not worry me. What has distressed me a little is that many people in academic life with no political motives have also expressed some apprehensions. I am hoping to meet them personally with my Education Minister in the next few days. I should like to give the fullest consideration to their viewpoint and to allay their anxieties as far as possible. It is only after this meeting has taken place that detailed discussions on the draft will start with your Embassy here. I hope that in these talks, there will be fullest understanding of our problems. You will doubtless want to hear a little about the food situation in India in which you have taken a personal interest. The reporting in the press, both in India and abroad, tends to be exaggerated one way or the other. On the one hand, an impression is given in some sections of the foreign press that there is no great shortage and we are giving an exaggerated picture. On the other hand, constant allegations are made in Parliament and elsewhere of starvation deaths. The actual position is somewhere in between the two extreme views. There is an acute shortage of foodgrains, because of the complete failure of the monsoon last year. There are also certain areas, mostly in the States of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Mysore and Orissa, which have always been scarcity pockets. Their plight this year is undoubtedly precarious. The timely movement of imports under PL-480 as well as from other sources has averted a calamity. We have begun relief works to give employment to the people in the scarcity areas. I recently returned from a tour of a district in the State of Maharashtra where conditions were distressing. I was heartened to see the energetic measures, both short-term and long-term, taken by the State Government and local farmers. Tomorrow, I am visiting some areas in the State of Orissa to see for myself what more can be done to provide relief. One of the most difficult things to combat is the shortage of drinking water in areas which have poor communications. In our Fourth Five-Year Plan we have to pay special attention to the problem of water supply in the remote rural areas. The reports which we have from Pakistan are far from encouraging. The entire trend of publicity through the press and radio, the part which Pakistan is playing in fomenting trouble in the hill tracts on our Eastern borders, the kind of rapport that it has established with China--all these indicate a complete negation of the spirit underlying the Tashkent Declaration. But perhaps you know much more about the true state of affairs in Pakistan than we do, since our diplomats have limited opportunity to acquire information about what goes on in Pakistan for obvious reasons. The latest explosion in China of a nuclear device is a matter of deep concern for us. There has been a growing demand in this country for developing a nuclear device of our own. We have stood firmly against this. But each fresh report of China's activity in this regard strengthens this demand and attracts new adherents to it. Mr. Asoka Mehta, our Minister for Planning, returned from the United States on Sunday, the 8th morning, and the same evening, he gave me an account of the talks he had with the World Bank and Members of your Administration, as well as of the two meetings he had with you. He told me of your kind words about me and also of the deep human sympathy with which you viewed the problems of this subcontinent and the efforts we are making to lift nearly 500 million people out of poverty, ignorance and disease. I came away from the United States convinced of your friendly support and cooperation in our endeavor. I am glad you could find time to see Mr. Mehta and that you gave him an indication of your support for our Plan. I have little doubt that Mr. Mehta is also going to be criticized and attacked for what he has done or what he is supposed to have done. Controversy is the spice of democratic life. I hope that American journalists who may not be used to our hot food and hot climate will not use too many hot words in their despatches to the U.S. Press! What a thoughtful gesture it was to send me the pen with which you signed one of the many documents which reflect your friendship for my country. With kind personal regards to you and Mrs. Johnson, Yours sincerely, Indira Gandhi
338. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, May 18, 1966, 1520Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, and Taipei and passed to the White House at 2:35 p.m. 639. Joint State/AID message. 1. I met this morning with Fin Min Shoaib and Fin Sec M.M. Ahmad for discussion of aide-memoire delivered by MFA May 17 (Embtel 636)./2/ Acting AID Director Bee accompanied. Shoaib introduced subject himself by saying he wanted provide Bee with copy of aide-mémoire which he knew had been given to Embassy by MFA. /2/The text of the aide-mémoire was transmitted in telegram 636 from Rawalpindi, May 17. (Ibid.) The aide-mémoire is summarized in paragraph 11 of the telegram printed here. 2. I said that I was disappointed by tone and content of aide-mémoire. Shoaib countered with view that aide-mémoire should meet requirements of US Government and pave way for early decisions on aid. While phraseology might not be ideal in all respects, he considered note contained several distinct achievements in substance. He thought statement regarding GOP willingness to participate with GOI in a ministerial meeting was positive and forthcoming. He also thought that mention of reducing military forces of both countries as topic for bilateral discussion along with Kashmir was also a significant gain. Finally, he considered statement welcoming a World Bank initiative for discussion of eastern rivers problem to be a major step forward. 3. When I stated that we found the indicated two to one ratio of military forces to be troublesome, Shoaib countered that this was a military judgement which he was unable to question; that is, if India attacks Pakistan, Pakistan would need to have force at least half the size of Indian force in order to defend itself successfully. Shoaib went on to stress, however, that aide-mémoire did not bless this military judgement which he said Pakistan could not financially support. Limitations of Pakistan's resources and need for development were such as to permit expenditure allocation to defense of only rs. 225 crores, or less than one-fourth of current Indian budget. Thus, he said, key word to stress in this paragraph is "nevertheless." 4. Shoaib pointed out it had been by no means easy to get agreement within GOP on defense budget figures in aide-memoire, and he clearly considered it an achievement to have these figures recorded in government document. As regards level of defense spending for current fiscal year, Shoaib stated he simply could not at this juncture give a figure, but that he still feared it might reach as high as rs. 268 crores. He stressed that costs of war plus major equipment replacements had to be borne in the current year. He also stated that it was not possible to segregate foreign exchange expenditures for defense as between fiscal years 1965/66 and 1966/67. 5. I pointed out, in accordance Deptel 543,/3/ that US was deeply troubled by level of Pak defense expenditures currently envisaged, and expressed hope it would be possible to bring them down to levels cited during Washington discussions. Shoaib protested that, while he knew US would like lower figures, figures used in aide-mémoire were within framework of discussions he had had with Bell in Washington. Moreover, he stressed, GOP would be willing to move down from these levels if the Indians were to reduce their budget. /3/Dated May 13. (Ibid., POL 15-1 PAK) 6. I then referred Shoaib to article in this morning's Pak Times by Z.A. Suleri (see separate telegram)/4/ and asked whether this forecast public discussion of range of important issues two governments were dealing with. Shoaib, after reading article, stated that GOP definitely did not wish to get involved in public debate. In fact, he thought public ventilation would be embarrassing and undesirable from standpoint of GOP. He feared that there would be some further leaks on both sides and he urged utmost be done to avoid them. In this connection, he said there were some fairly embarrassing articles (for GOP) which appeared in Washington Post and other US papers at the time of his visit to Washington. Shoaib added that destructiveness of public debate on this issue clearly shown by difficulties Mehta and GOI now having with Indian Parliament. /4/Not found. 7. As illustrative of continuing press problems, I called to Shoaib's attention PPA article which appeared in most Pakistan papers May 16 regarding alleged downing of Chinese plane over ChiCom territory. He indicated that he had not seen this article, but agreed that tone was nasty. (See para 3 Karachi's 2087/5/ to Dept.) /5/Dated May 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 CHICOM-US) 8. As regards Pakistan's relations with China, Shoaib said that wording of final paragraph (consideration 5) was meant only to reaffirm GOP policy toward China as outlined by Ayub to Pres Johnson in December and in Ayub's recent statements to Ambassador McConaughy (Karachi's 2032)./6/ /6/In his conversation with McConaughy on May 5, reported in telegram 2032 from Karachi, Ayub stated that there had been and would be no deviation from the understandings concerning Pakistan's relationship with China that had been reached during his talks with Johnson in Washington on December 14 and 15. (Ibid., POL 15-1 PAK) 9. Shoaib stressed that he would need to have US answer soon. Budget speech is scheduled for June 11 and budget must go to printer around end of May. He earnestly hoped it would be possible to conclude deal before end of month and thereby achieve major step forward toward normalization US-Pak relations. 10. Following meeting, I spoke to Shoaib privately and reminded him there was key item to which aide-mémoire was not addressed, namely, reopening of closed AEDS installations, and that this matter clearly must be resolved and emphasized that we were awaiting MFA response. Shoaib said he understood this, adding that he had sent Ayub memo emphasizing need for GOP to move ahead on this issue. 11. Comment: In essence, GOP aide-mémoire: (a) has accepted upper budgetary limitation on defense expenditures conditional upon similar Indian restraint; (b) has reiterated Pak willingness to discuss with India Kashmir settlement and arms reduction; (c) has indicated would welcome World Bank initiative for discussions of eastern waters; and (d) has reasserted Pak-ChiCom relationship is not inimical to other countries. 12. In our judgement GOP aide-mémoire can barely be considered minimal response to US proposals and this only provided GOP comes through on AEDS issue. Question is whether US should reject GOP aide-mémoire as inadequate and seek to negotiate more favorable language or proceed with aid package. We recommend against rejection unless, of course, GOP should itself reject by failure to agree to reopening of AED Stations. Outright US rejection would at this juncture be serious blow to positive elements and windfall for destructive forces in Pakistan, possibly tip delicate East-West policy balance here, and probably invite wave of charged anti-American public reaction. While it may be possible to obtain more forthcoming language by negotiation, we very much doubt if substantive result would be net improvement and justify delay and risk of giving opposition another opportunity to sabotage this effort to rebuild relations. 13. Accordingly, we recommend US, upon GOP agreement to reopen AED Stations, promptly advise GOP of willingness proceed with aid program as discussed with Shoaib. Cargo
339. Letter From President Johnson to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)/1/ Washington, May 20, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 2 INDIA. Confidential. Dear Chet: I am grateful for your firsthand report of May 5th/2/ on the situation in India. I am pleased that Mrs. Gandhi seems to have enjoyed her visit here and sensed our authentic interest and understanding of her problems. /2/Document 334. It is good that she has shown the courage to carry forward her economic program in the face of pressures from the Left and Right. We shall be doing all we can to back the IBRD plan, within the limits of the resources Congress finally grants. As you know, we shall not have an easy time with AID legislation this year. I'm impressed with what Mehta said--and with what you say--about the potentialities for an economic upsurge in India in the years ahead. I would underline for you two problems with which your letter did not deal. If the question of military expenditures. George Woods will undertake to assess the military expenditures of India and Pakistan and try to get them moving downward. Neither country can afford to go on spending so much either of its own resources or its foreign exchange for defense. In both countries the issue is politically sensitive; and we cannot expect radical reductions immediately. But if we are to generate the resources they need to accelerate economic and social development, we cannot be complacent about this issue. Whether Indian and Pakistani political leaders can afford to reduce military expenditures depends, in turn, on progress in the normalization of their relations. In this connection, I pointed out to Mehta the responsibility borne by the larger country in this kind of tense bilateral problem. I told him how hard we have had to work to make it possible for Mexico to live with us in an atmosphere of inner confidence and self-respect. India has a parallel responsibility. I do not believe that India can become "an indigenous Asian counterweight to China" unless India regards it as part of its own responsibility to work actively towards the normalization of its relations with Pakistan. Far too much of India's diplomatic energies and military resources will be focussed on the Pak problem for it to emerge as a major constructive force unless the subcontinent as a whole is peaceful. I understand that this transformation cannot be brought about in days or months. I also understand Mrs. Gandhi's election problems. Nevertheless, India cannot safely be passive with respect to its commitments at Tashkent. Only those on the spot can work out what the next steps might be; but you should understand that nothing would ease our problems more in getting the resources necessary for Indian development than a forthcoming Indian position with respect to normalization of relations with Pakistan. Among the next steps, I would urge you to take up with the Indian Government the possibility of their assuming the initiative in mounting a second Ministerial meeting. Our next Ambassador to Pakistan, the distinguished lawyer and businessman Eugene Locke, will be working under similar instructions in Rawalpindi. Again, Chet, let me thank you for your report and for the great work you are doing in a critical region. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
340. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 27, 1966, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 348, Alternatives to U.S. Facilities in Pakistan. Top Secret; Sensitive. Another copy is ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 5, May 27-June 10, 1966. In November you tentatively approved a recommendation from Sect. Rusk, McNamara and Raborn for establishing contingency alternatives for our intelligence facilities in Pakistan. But you felt we ought to hold final decision until after you talked with Ayub. Then we held further until after Tashkent and the Indian visit. Now State, Defense and CIA have reviewed their October recommendations and (with minor updating) feel we should go ahead. They emphasize that this is not a proposal to relocate most of the present activities from Pakistan or to duplicate them. They propose to develop minimum space and install basic equipment so we can diversify some of these activities and be in a position to move them all on short notice with little intelligence loss if need be. To refresh your memory, they recommended we: (a) increase existing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] facilities in Embassies Tehran and New Delhi; (b) add one floor to a planned warehouse in the embassy compound in Tehran; (c) acquire land outside Tehran for eventually developing a more satisfactory permanent installation (including dependent quarters) if needed; and (d) explore the possibility of developing facilities in India. Costs of (a) and (b) would be about $1.5 million; time about 9 months. Cost of (c) is approximately $5 million with eventual cost depending on how extensively we develop that site; time about 18 months. Cost of (d) is uncertain until we have a concrete plan but less than the $8-36 million they projected last fall when they suggested shipborne coverage in the Bay of Bengal (which did not prove out in a later test). As general guidelines, they recommend (a) no further investment in Pakistan; (b) as new facilities come into being, we transfer some of those now in Pakistan to reduce the leverage any one country holds over us; but (c) unless you decide otherwise or the Paks kick us out, we retain a substantial portion of our present Pak activities. They also recommended certain sweeteners for Iran to develop the favorable political climate essential to expansion. Your recent approval of the new military sales package has brought those up to date. The balance of payments impact would be minimal; all equipment would be US-built. One-time real estate and construction costs would be about $6 million, and annual recurring costs about $750,000 (much of which would be offset by reduction of Pak facilities). I believe it makes sense to go ahead with this program now. Since we no longer have the kind of close relationship with Pakistan we had prior to the Chinese attack on India, we would be well to reinsure. If you still approve, I recommend you sign the attached./2/ /2/Johnson wrote "OK" on the memorandum and signed the attachment, which was issued on May 30 as National Security Action Memorandum 348. NSAM No. 348, addressed to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, was entitled "Alternatives to US Facilities in Pakistan," and reads as follows: "I have reviewed your 22 October 1965 Memorandum to me in response to NSAM 337 as updated by the Department of State's 17 May 1966 Memorandum to Mr. Rostow and by my approval on May 23 of the new military sales package for Iran. "I approve your recommendations as updated subject to the usual review by the Bureau of the Budget before expenditures are authorized." (Ibid.) For text of NSAM No. 337, see Document 168. Rusk's October 22, 1965, memorandum to Johnson, and Benjamin Read's May 17, 1966, memorandum to Rostow, both of which contained recommendations for the implementation of NSAM No. 337, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 348, Alternatives to U.S. Facilities in Pakistan. For Johnson's approval of a sales package for Iran, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Vol. XXII, Document 144. Walt
341. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, May 27, 1966, 1229Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, Rawalpindi, London, Moscow, USUN, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, and CINCMEAFSA and passed to the White House and DOD at 2:55 p.m. 3261. Pass White House and Dept of Defense. 1. We share concern expressed in Deptel 2311/2/ over recent deterioration in relationship established at Tashkent. We also agree that the next few weeks in Indo-Pak relations will be critical. /2/Dated May 25. (Ibid.) 2. On May 25 and 26, Carol Laise and I spent a total of more than four hours with Mrs. Gandhi, L.K. Jha, C.S. Jha and Swaran Singh during which the question of Pak-Indo relationships was the primary subject. The mood on the Indian side was extremely moderate with a genuine concern over the situation which has been developing since Tashkent combined with an equally genuine uncertainty as to what to do about it. 3. The general theme which we developed in these conversations was (a) that India with its large population, growing industrial strength, and democratic base has a wide open opportunity to become the major force for peace, progress and stability in Asia and (b) that this objective can be reached only if India's economic growth rate can be stepped up sharply and a way found to keep Pakistan from diverting India from its crucially important, overriding national goals. 4. As in previously reported conversations with the two Jhas and with other members of the govt I also stressed: A. Since the last Pak-India meeting was held in Rawalpindi it is India's responsibility to take the initiative in inviting Pakistani reps to India; B. A ministerial level conference at this time will create the same old confrontations between the same old professionals with little hope of progress; the wiser course therefore lies in meeting between Mrs. Gandhi and Ayub Khan. 5. While agreeing with my general thesis, L.K. suggested that in the present context a top-level meeting was risky since a failure at the summit would seem to close the door to further progress. Mrs. Gandhi later remarked that several of her staff associates had advanced this thesis. 6. I disagreed with this conclusion on the grounds that no one could legitimately expect a miracle from the first meeting between Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi; indeed Mrs. Gandhi's invitation could state that the purpose was to exchange views on current difficulties and to establish some system of communication through which future progress might become possible. In his first meeting with Mrs. Gandhi, Ayub Khan would almost certainly be restrained and since Mrs. Gandhi herself would be anxious to create a feeling of goodwill we could expect a minimum of conflict and a maximum of constructive atmospherics. 7. Although neither L.K. Jha nor Mrs. Gandhi responded directly to this proposal both stressed that they are searching for an effective approach and that my suggestion had not been ruled out. (Note: When I next see L.K. Jha I shall suggest that the tangible outcome of a meeting between Mrs. Gandhi and Ayub might be an agreement on a series of regular monthly meetings between personal reps of Mrs. Gandhi and Ayub similar to our Warsaw meetings with the Chinese. Through these meetings the two parties could keep the dialogue open and maintain a regular channel for exploring current problems which in turn could provide the basis for meaningful negotiations.) 8. During our meetings with the two Jhas, Singh and Mrs. Gandhi the Indian view which was presented with varying emphasis was as follows: A. At Tashkent Ayub seemed generally anxious to find a solution to the Pak-India impasse and at no time insisted that Kashmir must be settled before progress could be made on other issues. In his opening remarks at the Rawalpindi meeting, Ayub had continued this friendly and open-minded approach. However, shortly thereafter the mood abruptly changed and at the close Ayub spoke in very different terms. The assumption was that during this interval Bhutto had somehow managed to increase his influence over Pak policy. The GOI seems genuinely to believe that Ayub is a moderate in search of a reasonable settlement. Bhutto is considered a reckless and intensely ambitious man comparable in some ways to Subandrio. B. The Chinese would now like to use the Paks as they are using North Vietnamese as an instrument of Chinese policy and if necessary to do their dying. Pakistan in its turn has eagerly seized on this opportunity to bring pressure to bear on the US and USSR as well as on India. C. Bhutto is promoting thesis that India is about to disintegrate. This reflects the Peking view which in the case of China is explained by the isolated position of its leaders. D. Although they find this situation profoundly disturbing with no ready answers, the Indians assert that they will continue to do their best to break the impasse. 9. In our talks with L.K. Jha and C.S. Jha I brought up the problem of Kashmir by expressing the hope that though problems between India and Pakistan will require persistence and time, India could simultaneously move to straighten out their relationship with the Kashmiris and thereby eliminate basis for Pak charge of oppression. To this suggestion L.K. Jha, as in the past, responded affirmatively again hinting that some answer might be found before or during elections next February. However, C.S. Jha said he saw no hope whatever for progress through Sheik Abdullah whom he loosely described as pro-Chinese and pro-Pak. 10. In our talk with L.K. Jha I also brought up the question of military equipment to Pakistan. I pointed out that without spare parts from the US many of the Pak F-86's were inoperative and that if we fail to provide these parts there will be additional pressure on the Paks to procure MIG 19s from China (which the Indians know is a superior plane). 11. To this and other references to military aid to Pak L.K. Jha expressed profound distress and opposition. He stated that to give arms to Paks at a time when they were openly threatening India, drawing closer to China and pressing US to increase their military capacity for use against India would be not only self defeating but dangerous. Such a move, he said, would enable the Paks to raise their price to the Chinese (which the Chinese would almost surely meet) and would accomplish none of the objectives which we seek. A modest amount of military aid would be wholly ineffective in easing out the Chinese and would only lead to Pak demands for much more aid; if we then raised ante we would increase the likelihood of war. Swaran Singh vigorously reiterated this position the following day; in addition he said such a move would directly and adversely affect India's ability to initiate moves to reduce Indo-Pak tensions and resolve outstanding differences. 12. We believe that India is earnestly seeking some appropriate gesture that might help to ease the current tensions and strengthen hand of Ayub. There is every evidence among Indian leadership of a moderate though worried mood. At the All India Congress Committee meeting in Bombay the subject of Pak-India relations was carefully sidetracked in order to avoid provocative speeches. Although news stories occasionally headline border incidents Indian editorial comments have been consistently sober. 13. L.K. Jha indicated India is searching for a concrete proposal or proposals for economic cooperation which might signal their desire to reduce tensions. In this connection he acknowledged Beru-Bari transfer might provide useful gesture towards reconciliation. (Subsequently David Scott, Acting UK HICOM reported that during his trip to Pakistan Aziz Ahmed had indicated this kind of move would not be acceptable GOP.) This morning's headlines state that GOI is moving unilaterally to permit normal trade relations with Pakistan. 14. We shall continue to work along above lines not only in our conversations with GOI but also with the many friendly and cooperative members of the Indian press. However, in one sense, we are leaning against an open door since the Indians are already persuaded of dangers; the question is how best to deal with them. 15. I suggest this is an important time to bring all appropriate pressure to bear in Karachi and Rawalpindi to meet India at least part way and above all to take advantage of Mrs. Gandhi's genuine good will before pre-election mood takes over here in India and she loses her political flexibility. 16. Although the GOI mood now is affirmative there are three developments which would abruptly destroy whatever hopes there may be for a rational settlement of Pak-India differences. A. An aggressive border action by the Chinese. This could foreclose any conciliatory move by the Indians on ground that such a move would make them appear to be giving ground to Paks in the face of Chinese pressure; B. Intensification of Pak disruptive efforts in Kashmir and in eastern hill areas. C. A decision by USG before Indian elections next February to provide military supplies to Pakistan, particularly in face of ominous internal developments in Pakistan such as increasing influence of Bhutto and input of sizeable amounts of Chinese military equipment. In the politically charged pre-election atmosphere here this resumption of US military supplies would absolutely foreclose any Indian initiative on the Pak question, undermine the political leadership of Mrs. Gandhi and the moderates, greatly strengthen both Krishna Menon and the fellow travelers on the left, and the extremists on the right and destroy current prospect for a significant economic and political breakthrough in this critical and strategically-placed nation. Although it is impossible accurately to foresee the situation that we will face next winter, by that time the answers to some questions at least will be a lot more clear. Bowles
342. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Gandhi/1/ Washington, May 30, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 3/1/66-12/31/66. Secret. Transmitted to New Delhi for delivery to Prime Minister Gandhi in telegram 2357 to New Delhi, May 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDIA) Dear Mrs. Gandhi: Your letter/2/ was a source of strength and satisfaction to me. /2/Document 337. We are both leaders of a democracy and must put our policies to the test of national elections and carry our parties with us in the process. That means we are almost always at work in a sea of troubles. Understanding that, it is good to share our thoughts as we try to solve the problems we face. I have been reading with admiration the reports of your spirited defense of your policies against political attack--most recently at the Congress Party meeting at Bombay. As you may have gathered, I am also meeting my critics at least half way as we enter our congressional campaign. We learned much from Planning Minister Mehta about your plans for moving India ahead to faster economic progress. I was particularly pleased--even moved--by his account of the gathering energy and determination in evidence from the farmers in the villages to the new generation of ingenious and determined young industrialists. It was also good to hear directly from him of his encouraging discussions with the World Bank. As I told him, I wish to be as helpful as possible to you and to your government in the period that lies ahead. I feel the state of relations between our two countries is bright and promising. I know we both are seeking much the same thing: practical ways of achieving an economy of abundance with social justice and freedom from exploitation. Against the background of this generally hopeful picture, I share your concern about one matter of great importance to the future of free Asia--indeed, of the whole world community. That, of course, is the present state of relations between Pakistan and India. I well know how difficult it is for democratic leaders to be conciliatory and moderate in the face of critical public opinion. But it seems to me extremely important that communications be maintained between the two countries, with the objective of creating a firmer basis of peace. The process begun at Tashkent must not wither and die. Quite apart from the overriding need for peace, any thought that last fall's hostilities might recur would provide a ready argument to political leaders in this country who are opposed in principle to any substantial aid program. More important, it would plant doubts among even the strongest supporters of our foreign assistance. This could strengthen efforts to cut back the next aid bill in general and more particularly to block the resumption of economic aid to India and Pakistan on the scale that you and I know is necessary. As a concrete means of reversing a dangerous arms buildup, it seems to me crucial that India and Pakistan find some way of limiting their defense expenditures and starting them on parallel downward paths. This is essential to both peace and development. I know from our own experience with the Soviet Union how difficult this is to do. However, before Viet Nam both we and the Soviets--without ever talking about it--had begun a series of unilateral but seemingly reciprocal cutbacks in our spending. Let me add that I remain as convinced as ever of the genuineness and depth of your own dedication to the cause of peace with your neighbor. The knowledge of your commitment to peace is a source of encouragement and strength to me as I ask the American people to help in India's development. You suggested you might be interested in my view of the current state of affairs in Pakistan. It does seem that Pakistan is going through a difficult period. The government there is under considerable political pressure to demonstrate some achievement on Kashmir. It is hard to predict where these pressures will lead, but I believe we both have an opportunity to influence future events. As I told you when you were here, I have confidence in President Ayub, and I believe that he intends to maintain friendly ties with the Free World. As you know, I am about to send a new Ambassador to Pakistan, a trusted and capable colleague, Mr. Eugene Locke. He has clearly in mind the necessity of peace on the subcontinent and the requirement of responsibility and flexibility on the part of both countries. I shall be most interested in his thoughts as to how the U.S. and Pakistan can go about working out a relationship that is best for all of us. I shall keep in touch with you and will hope for your support during the weeks ahead. I have often thought, late in the night, of the burden of history and political pressure borne by you and my friend Ayub in this matter. I have only two observations: first, as I told your Minister of Planning, we have learned from our experience with Mexico the special responsibility that the larger partner must bear in making it possible for the smaller nation to live in confidence and dignity as a neighbor; second, in working forward from our present difficult position, you may have to take small steps, each then understanding the political problems of the other, each fighting loyally before his own public opinion for whatever limited agreements can be achieved. From this distance it would appear that a forthcoming invitation for high-level talks might now be timely. I was interested in your remarks about the Indo-American Foundation. I know from my own experience that even a project as intrinsically worthy as this one can become a source of political controversy; it is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that a good project has been strongly questioned and vigorously debated as a part of the democratic political process. Working together, however, and with a full understanding of the problems which confront us both, I am sure that we can find a way to launch the Foundation in a form which will preserve its essential character and its ability to stimulate Indian education as we both intend. Your observations on the food situation in India were helpful to me and, on the whole, heartening. As you are aware, I am following this matter personally. Congress reacted favorably to the message I sent it toward the end of your visit here, and we will continue to do our part to help you weather this difficult season. However, our own stocks of wheat have dropped more rapidly than expected, and I have recently had to increase wheat acreage here. That will not increase our anticipated stocks until 1967. My prayers are joined with yours that the coming rains are bountiful. The political disturbances in Viet Nam have been disquieting. But I am convinced, in the phrase I quoted in my African talk the other day, they are "growing pains." They are part of the process by which the Vietnamese people are working out their political future in their own way. We are using our limited influence to persuade them to work these matters out by discussion rather than by violence. The Vietnamese government has made clear its continuing commitment to elections before the middle of September and the work of the committee set up to prepare for these elections is going forward. We support the government's commitment to these elections and we continue to believe that in this way and in other ways the process of building a truly free nation in Viet Nam will go forward. As for the war, we shall apply that minimum of our great military power necessary to convince those responsible in Hanoi that the aggression should cease, while searching every day to bring the matter from the battlefield to the negotiating table. Before closing, let me say that I admire your courage in sticking to a policy of foregoing nuclear weapons. I think this is a wise and a good policy. I cannot believe, knowing the costs and limitations of small national nuclear systems, that they represent the wave of the future in this increasingly interdependent world. With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Lyndon B. [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXV Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |