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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
360. Telegram From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant and Chief of Staff (Moyers)/1/ New Delhi, July 25, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Cables, 1/66-9/66. Secret. No time of transmission is on the telegram. An attachment indicates that the telegram was sent [text not declassified]. 5618. I have just sent an Exdis cable/2/ to the President and Secretary Rusk pointing out the profoundly adverse impact that U.S. Mission in India believes a resumption of U.S. supplies of lethal military equipment to Pakistan will have on our position in India at this critical stage. /2/Telegram 1307 from New Delhi, July 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-INDIA) Bowles was responding to a personal message sent to him by Rusk on July 24 to tell him that a consensus was building in Washington in favor of altering policy on military assistance to allow sales of lethal spare parts to India and Pakistan. Bowles was invited to comment. (Telegram 14123 to New Delhi, July 24; ibid.) In this private message to you I would like to add that I have a deep personal involvement in this issue which I cannot wish out of existence. In 1952 when it was first proposed that we arm Pakistan in the face of clear evidence that Pakistan wanted the equipment for use against India rather than the Russians or Chinese, I was able (in my first assignment as Ambassador here) to persuade President Truman to veto the idea. When Secretary Dulles picked up the plan in the fall of 1953, I wrote him stressing that if arms we gave Pakistan were ever used in combat, it would not be against China or Russia but only against India, and that even if they were never used, their effect would be to upset the power balance in South Asia, to cloud our relations with India which is potentially the most important non-Communist power in Asia, and to open the door to a much closer Soviet relationship with India. Unhappily these concerns have been fully justified by events. In the intervening years, President Eisenhower, Ambassadors Bunker, Galbraith and myself assured India over and over again that this U.S. equipment would never be used against her. Yet when the attack came last August and September, it was clear that there was no way that we would prevent their use. As a result we were faced with a very strong public reaction here in India growing out of deep resentment that young Indians were being killed by the equipment we had given the Paks. In an effort to contain these feelings, I told the Indian government, public and press on several occasions that I could not imagine my government resuming a policy which had proven so costly for everyone concerned unless the Pakistanis could be persuaded to join India and the U.S. in opposing the Chinese. My objective is not to add to the concerns of the President at this difficult time but rather to relieve him of problems wherever I possibly can. However, past events have given me a personal involvement on this issue which I thought you should know about. Warm regards.
361. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Pakistan (Locke) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 26, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Cables, 1/66-9/66. No classification marking. Locke returned to Washington for consultations following his first 10 days as Ambassador. According to a July 25 briefing memorandum prepared for President Johnson by Rostow, Locke was scheduled to meet with Johnson on July 26. (Ibid.) No record of that meeting has been found. Locke probably his memorandum to Johnson at that meeting. Mr. President: 1. My jobs are to: A. Keep India and Pakistan from fighting; 2. From point of view of doing these jobs, Ayub best man U.S. can have as President of Pakistan. He doesn't want to get too close to China, perhaps for reasons of personal survival. But he may be forced toward China if he can't otherwise obtain security against India. Some leading generals do not see dependence on China as threat to Pakistan. 3. Many leading Pakistanis, particularly in Army, feel U.S. would sacrifice Pakistan for India. Ayub does not at this time, primarily because of friendship for President Johnson. He believes Bowles would sacrifice Pakistan and made strong pitch for Bowles' removal, with man "strong enough to stand up to India". I shall meet Bowles next week in Hong Kong or Bangkok. 4. Ayub has shown his good faith by A. Firing Bhutto 5. We need to keep faith with him by helping him feel secure against India without his getting closer to China. This means first furnishing spare parts. 6. We also need to get India-Pakistan talks started on arms limitations and other matters. These talks must include Kashmir. Real progress on Kashmir can only be achieved, however, by secret meetings. Many believe Kashmir insolvable. I believe we must try to find solution, as otherwise no chance of lasting peace on subcontinent. Talks must be bilateral secret talks between the two countries at first; but, if at some later time settlement can be achieved by heavy handed U.S. approach, we should not hesitate. Eugene M. Locke/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, July 26, 1966, 2:06 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-INDIA. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Hare. 15058. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I much appreciated your thoughtful 1307./2/ I have no doubt that Indian reaction would be sharp but there are certain factors in my mind which were not discussed in your telegram on which I would appreciate your further comments. /2/See footnote 2, Document 360. 1. In present circumstances, India is moving toward a complete military domination of the subcontinent. Her own military production capability plus very substantial increments of Soviet equipment puts her in the position of saying that it is all right for India to build up its armed forces from the Soviet Union but not all right for Pakistan to acquire even spare parts from the United States. 2. India should be concerned about any Chinese military influence south of the Himalayas. If the United States does not supply spare parts to Pakistan, Pakistan will be impelled to take more and more from Peking. Is this in India's interest? This is the other side of the coin of the Indian view that spare parts from us to Pakistan would constitute joint action by Peking and Washington to build up Pakistan at India's expense. 3. India's conduct over the past twenty years with regard to Kashmir is difficult to accept. Her view that this is not a dispute but a closed question runs counter to repeated actions by the United Nations and bumps into the long standing and instinctive American policy that the wishes of the people concerned should have a paramount influence on such political questions. 4. Do you really think that there is one chance in a thousand that India would take any action to be a counter-weight to Communist China in Asia unless India itself were attacked? I find it hard to believe that India would lift a finger against mainland China in any other circumstance. Relevant to this point is the outrageous departure from non-alignment which Mrs. Gandhi accepted in Moscow. 5. Although I accept that Pakistan stimulated the events of last year by sending infiltrators into Kashmir, it is nevertheless true that India, without consultation, escalated the conflict immediately by sending her own armed forces across the cease-fire line. She has been very critical of the United States over more or less drastic steps that we have taken in the face of North Vietnamese escalation. Had we reacted as forcefully as India did to Kashmir infiltrators, India would have been horrified. Accepting Pakistani responsibility for the infiltration, India must accept its share of responsibility for the scale and pace of escalation. 6. I am personally troubled by the point that the United States, having furnished ninety percent of the equipment of the Pakistan armed forces, has an obligation not to deny spare parts so long as India and Pakistan are prepared to live at peace with each other. 7. Finally, I doubt that we should move toward reliance upon India as our sole partner in the subcontinent because I do not believe that India would accept or play that role. 8. Did Mrs. Gandhi get a commitment from the Russians not to supply arms to Pakistan? Was that the price she received for the deep compromise of her non-alignment? If not, what would be Indian reaction to Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan? My guess is that they would accept it in relative good grace but still be deeply offended if we were to do the same. Is there not basic inequity in the Indians' expectation that we would refrain from a policy now being followed by the British? Of course, the British policy favors India many times over in terms of arms purchases by India and Pakistan. 9. My conclusion is that when all of the pretence is cast aside, the general Indian attitude is that "what India wants India gets." The same India which preaches to others has no problem about throwing an armored division into Hyderabad, seizing Goa and calling Kashmir a closed question. 10. I fully recognize the cogency of the views put forward in your 1307 but I am concerned about the prospect that India, with all of its other problems, would find itself facing a Chinese-Pakistan combination with all of the possibilities for trouble through wars-of-liberation techniques around the frontiers of India. I would feel better about the situation if India seemed to be willing to make any substantial moves on its side to make peace with Pakistan. I have fully noted your point about the Indian elections and the impact upon pro-American ministers such as Mehta and Subramanian. But if you have additional observations on the points above, I would appreciate it./3/ /3/Bowles responded with a personal telegram to Rusk on July 28. He answered Rusk point-by-point, arguing that India by virtue of its size and military strength would inevitably dominate the subcontinent, and that the United States was compelled to recognize that fact and shape its policies accordingly. On the sensitive issue of the sale of spare parts, Bowles wrote: "experience has led GOI to conclude that if the finger on trigger is Pakistani US military equipment is just as threatening to Indian security as Chinese equipment." (Telegram 1479 from New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US INDIA) Personal regards. Rusk
363. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 1, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 355, Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, further to NSAM 351. Secret. SUBJECT Secretary Rusk has sent the paper/2/ you requested at the NSC meeting of June 9 on the Indian nuclear problem. He sees no dramatic steps to discourage the Indians from starting down the nuclear route that would not cost us more than any likely gain would be worth. However, his paper, agreed around town, does recommend a number of steps which together provide some hope of discouraging or delaying an Indian decision. /2/Reference is to the enclosure to the July 25 memorandum from Rusk to Johnson; see footnote 3, Document 359. In the economic field, it recommends a number of steps to impress on the Indians the costs--in development, manpower and Indo-Pakistan relations--of going nuclear. It also suggests we keep an eye on ways to link possible larger economic assistance in the future to a firm Indian commitment not to go nuclear. To meet legitimate Indian security worries, it proposes sharing more systematically our intelligence analyses of the Chinese nuclear threat and the difficulties the Chinese face in making it effective. It also recommends seeking Soviet cooperation in a UN assurance to non-nuclear countries and suggests we continue efforts to achieve arms control agreements which might delay an Indian decision to go nuclear. It asks for a number of studies, including how best to deal with Chicom "blackmail" of India or an overt Chicom nuclear threat to India, how to bolster the credibility of private security assurances to India and how to react if India does go nuclear. The report also recommends a number of steps to bolster the technological and political prestige of those states which could go nuclear but refrain from doing so. It requests that a high priority be assigned to gathering and analyzing relevant intelligence, and recommends a long-term contingency study of what we should do in the event that India decides to undertake a national nuclear program. You will find these recommendations spelled out in the attached/3/ (pp. 1-4). They do not solve the Indian nuclear problem, but they do represent a good blueprint for making the most of the assets we have. If you approve continuing along these lines, I will sign the attached NSAM to keep the departments moving down this path. /3/The attachment is a copy of the July 25 memorandum from Rusk to Johnson and the attached report. Walt Approve/4/ /4/Johnson checked the approval line.
364. National Security Action Memorandum No. 355/1/ Washington, August 1, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 355, Indian Nuclear Weapons Program, further to NSAM 351. Secret. Copies were sent to McNamara and the Directors of ACDA, CIA, and USIA. TO SUBJECT /2/Document 347. The President has approved the recommendations contained in the Secretary of State's memorandum to the President of July 25, 1966,/3/ concerning the Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, as requested in NSAM 351. These recommendations are attached. /3/Document 359. He asks that the Secretary of State assume responsibility for implementing these recommendations. Where appropriate, the Secretary may, in consultation with other agencies, delegate to these agencies responsibility for implementing specific recommendations. Within one month, I would appreciate it if the Department of State could report to this office the assignment of operational responsibility for the specific tasks called for by these recommendations. By November 1 we would hope for the first progress report on implementation./4/ /4/A progress report was sent to Rostow on October 31 by Benjamin Read. The report dealt largely with the establishment of an interdepartmental working group, the gathering of data, and ongoing studies of the problem. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 355, further to NSAM 351) There was nothing in the report judged important enough by Wriggins to pass on to the President. (Memorandum from Wriggins to Rostow, November 4; ibid.) WW Rostow
365. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 8, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1/8/66. Secret. SUBJECT After lengthy discussions, State and Defense have finally agreed on how to approach the problem of military supplies to Pakistan and India. Since providing lethal spares to Pakistan will promote difficulties in India for us and for Mrs. Gandhi, and not providing them will create difficulties for us and Ayub in Pakistan, the paper/2/ does not make a specific recommendation today on whether or not to sell spares for Pakistan now. /2/Reference is to a joint State/Defense memorandum to the President, August 1, entitled "Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan." (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 9, July 16-31, 1966) Rather, it seeks to put the narrow problem of spares for Pakistan within the much larger and more important issue of getting both India and Pakistan together (or separately) to agree on limiting their defense outlays. It proposes that Gene Locke explore with Ayub how he will limit his relationship with China and enter serious talks to reach agreed arms limitations with India, while we study with him the problem of spares and possible free world, third country sources of indispensable military equipment. Simultaneously, Chet Bowles would make clear we are above all seeking to get the two countries to agree on an arms limitation and to restrain the Pak-Chicom relationship. But to do this we have to explore with Pakistan their need for spares. This step should help to allay their growing fear of India and give India, Pakistan, and the U.S. time to promote a more active dialogue on agreed arms limitations. You are, in short, being asked to authorize parallel explorations in both capitals. A final decision on actions to be taken will depend on the results of these explorations. If they are conducted with finesse and luck is with us, we could make substantial progress. If our political opponents in either country wish to, they could use the mere fact of our explorations to raise some dust. Even starting the explorations will net us sharp criticism in India, as Sig Harrison's premature story in the Washington Post/3/ demonstrates. /3/On July 29 Selig Harrison reported that the United States had taken a "guarded first step" toward resuming the supply of spare parts to Pakistan's armed forces. (Washington Post, July 29, 1966, p. 1) This approach will keep our hand in the game in Pakistan and may provide one handle for tackling the arms limitation problem. The Indians should not take so desperately seriously a possible U.S. program of roughly $8 million. If their reaction is profound and sustained, we can still decide what to do later on. Both Secretaries recommend you proceed with this exploratory step, and I concur. W.W.R./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. Agree to explore in both Pakistan and India/5/ /5/Neither option is checked.
366. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, August 9, 1966, 1930Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon for Bowles and to Karachi. Passed to the White House at 7:04 p.m. 435. 1. Amb Bowles and I had fine meeting for 2-1/2 hours in Bangkok. We agree such meetings are highly desirable. 2. On Kashmir Amb Bowles and I agree it would be desirable to have secret meetings between trusted emissaries of Mrs. Gandhi and Pres Ayub who might be named at exploratory meeting between these Chiefs of State. Amb Bowles doubts however that actual results will flow from such meetings until India sorts out relations with Kashmiris. 3. Amb Bowles and I agree problem of Indo-Pak relations is broader than Kashmir and discussions should involve other subjects. Perhaps Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi, or their emissaries, could settle on framework for discussing together subjects. We agree I should discuss with Ayub whether and where he will meet with Mrs. Gandhi and his version of modalities of future discussions between the two countries. 4. Amb Bowles and I agree on importance of preventing arms race on subcontinent. To this end it is my belief we should seek to bring about secret discussions on arms limitation between representatives of both countries chosen by their respective Chief of State. I desire to discuss with Ayub his willingness to authorize such discussions. 5. Amb Bowles does not believe GOI will hold meaningful discussions if U.S. provides lethal spare parts for Pakistan and unless (A) Pakistan renounces use of force in regard to Kashmir and (B) U.S. offers some tangible assurance of assistance to GOI in event of ChiCom and/or Pak attack. He believes if we do not furnish spares to Pakistan India might be persuaded as first step to agree to assessment of size of its own and Pak military establishments by World Bank. I believe bilateral discussions between representatives of the two countries probably will be more fruitful. If such discussions cannot now be brought about, I believe we should seek to promote same objective of stable military force relationship through separate discussions between U.S. and each country. 6. Amb Bowles and I do not reach any broad agreement on complex of issues relating to U.S. military policy toward subcontinent. We agree Pak military dependence on ChiComs would be disastrous for India, and one of our prime objectives with respect to India is to prevent Pakistan from growing closer to ChiComs. Amb Bowles believes Indian leaders would agree with this and would also agree China is main threat to India. He indicates that principal fear of Indian leaders is possibility of ChiCom-Pak military combination. However, Amb Bowles considers that (A) Pakistan will not move closer to China even if Pakistan fails to secure lethal spare parts because Ayub and landowners supporting him will not tolerate further closeness to Communism; (B) we can in any event prevent such a development by threatening to shut off economic aid to Pakistan; and (C) ChiComs would not increase military aid to Pakistan to any extent because of their own requirements. 7. On sale of equipment to Pakistan by friendly third countries, Amb Bowles says he will do everything he can, using argument U.S. not responsible for what other sovereign nations do, to manage what he expects will be serious problem to Indian reaction. 8. Ambassador Bowles may have further comments. 9. For my part, with respect to these critical questions of U.S. military policy in this part of world, I remain convinced for reasons I set forth in Washington that course outlined in draft memorandum for President entitled "Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan" is right./2/ I believe it most important I be able to talk to Ayub along lines of this memorandum shortly after his return from Dacca August 12. The security of India will not be advanced if Pakistan is continually pressed toward China by Indian military weight. In my judgement this vicious circle must be broken./3/ /2/See Document 365. Locke sent his comments on the memorandum to the President in a memorandum dated July 25. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Memos, 1/66-9/66) /3/Bowles transmitted his comments on his meeting with Locke in Bangkok in telegram 3200 from Saigon, August 11. Bowles stated that Locke's account accurately reflected the meeting. His only qualification was to note that he had been pressing the Indian Government for a heads of state meeting not, as Locke reported, to settle Indo-Pak differences, but to create a positive atmosphere in which to discuss differences and find solutions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-PAK) Rostow sent copies of both Ambassadors' accounts of the meeting in Bangkok to President Johnson on August 11. Rostow's advice was that "we ought to move very cautiously about spare parts for Pakistan; but move very strongly via our two Ambassadors and George Woods towards getting India-Pak agreement on the level of their military budgets." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Memos, 1/66-9/66) Locke
367. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 17, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Laise on August 18 and approved by Wriggins on August 24. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 12:35 p.m. at the White House. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS At his request, Ambassador Nehru called on President Johnson at 12:30 p.m., August 17. The Ambassador delivered a letter which he had brought back from Prime Minister Gandhi./2/ The President accepted it without opening it and asked if this was the message which had been mentioned in the newspapers. He then inquired about the monsoons, to which the Ambassador replied that things were all right so far but it was too early to be sure. The President then commented that he understood India has political problems (based on Ambassador Nehru's conversation with Walt Rostow/3/) and noted that we did also. /2/See Document 368. /3/Rostow's memorandum of his conversation with Nehru on August 12 recorded Nehru's "well-known gloom about the Indian scene." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Memos and Misc, 1/8/66) The Ambassador said that he was depressed by what he had observed during his trip to India. There was a prevailing "ugly mood" growing out of frustration, anger and annoyance both inside and outside the Congress Party. It was alleged that Mrs. Gandhi was submitting to foreign pressure, especially on the devaluation issue, in order to get aid. The attitude seemed to be that, if getting aid meant surrender of sovereignty, this was unacceptable. He noted that this was what people say whether or not they mean it. But the way in which they were saying it was very virulent. This was particularly true in the context of devaluation because the rupee was regarded as a strong currency, not like a lot of the Latin American currencies. The Ambassador observed that the brunt of the criticism is falling on Food Minister Subramaniam, Finance Minister Chaudhuri, Planning Minister Mehta and the Ambassador himself. The President replied that it is the best people who always get attacked. Citing the U.S. situation, he noted that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara are two of the most peaceful men in town, yet they are the ones here who are under the gun. He also recalled the extreme criticism of Lincoln. This made it possible, the President said, for us to understand what the Indians are enduring. Ambassador Nehru noted, however, that our two systems are different. The Indian Prime Minister can be thrown out "at the drop of a hat" whereas the President was in office for an elected term. Reassuringly the President observed that he does not believe the worst will happen. He noted we had the same type of problems and hoped Mrs. Gandhi would come through. He understood that the Indians don't want to be dictated to and in this context he mentioned the Indo-American Foundation. He told Ambassador Nehru that we would be flexible, but we couldn't disown the parentage. Going on to other matters, the President stressed the need to face the population and fertilizer problems and said he admired what the Indians had done. He was sure it would pay off in the end. But on Pakistan, India should do better. India is the larger country and with that went responsibility. There is no use in telling the Paks to go to hell, they won't go. The President said he appreciated Tashkent. The need now is to get back to talking and in this context he recognized the difficulties created by the Indian elections. He again drew the parallel to the Vietnam situation, saying we want to talk but the others won't react. Indicating that he understood that peaceful gestures sometimes are misunderstood domestically, he noted that his own poll of popularity had gone down after the pause in bombing in Vietnam. People just didn't understand it and regarded it as weakness. Ambassador Nehru said that India is "desperately anxious" to come to terms with Pakistan but couldn't yield on Kashmir. The idea of Tashkent was to put Kashmir in "cold storage." Reading at random from a message he had just received discussing the Pak conditions for talks, he presented a picture of the Pak position as being that no meaningful talks could take place without concrete steps on Kashmir; all other issues were peripheral and these other things could not be settled until Kashmir was settled. The Ambassador stressed that India is ready to get together on everything, including arms, but the Pakistanis keep saying "after Kashmir." The Ambassador went on to say that India was hoping for a reduction in the relations between Pakistan and the Chinese. The presence of Chinese advisers, hints of nuclear cooperation following Ghulam Faruque's visit to China and other such developments give no indication at all of Pakistan moving away from the Chinese. The result is that India is left under double pressure, from both China and Pakistan. At this point Mr. Wriggins injected the observation that conditions prior to conversations are often exaggerated for bargaining purposes and this in itself need not inhibit talking. The Ambassador noted India was ready to talk without conditions, but reiterated that the Paks won't talk until after Kashmir. The President undertook to see what we could do and said he would welcome suggestions. After some hesitation, the Ambassador ventured the opinion that he didn't really know what we could do since he didn't know about our relations with Pakistan. He went on to add that there were two things that the U.S. could do for India: (1) "Don't crowd us," let matters take their own course since democracies are not rational before elections; and (2) give all the wheat possible so people can be fed. Frankly, the importance of wheat is essentially political and short term. In the long term, as he had previously observed to Ambassador Hare, India has to face up to the realization of starvation or the solution of its own problems. In closing the President said let's talk things over and see what we can do. The Ambassador promised to follow up with Ambassador Hare.
368. Memorandum From Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 19, 1966, 9:20 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, India, Vol. 1, PM Gandhi Correspondence, 1/11/66-9/12/67. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "Rec'd 9:45." A handwritten "L" indicates it was seen by the President. SUBJECT /2/Prime Minister Gandhi's 5-page letter to President Johnson was dated August 7. (Ibid.) 1. This rather long letter covers a lot of ground. 2. It is a dignified, poised effort to resume the dialogue which she must feel was impeded by her slip in the Moscow communiqué./3/ (B.K. Nehru has reported it was a staff snafu; even the Foreign Minister didn't see it before it was published.) /3/In the communiqué signed on July 16 at Moscow at the conclusion of her visit to the Soviet Union, Gandhi agreed to language calling for an end to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 689-693) 3. On economic matters, she underlines the high priority on food production, the trickiness of the rains this year, the desire of her government to be economically independent in ten years. She makes no complaint about devaluation but stresses that hard economic decisions are difficult enough before an election--doubly so if "there is the slightest suspicion of external pressure, whether from foreign countries or international institutions. It is very largely for this reason that the decision to devalue was met with such violent opposition, even within my own party." 4. Her visits to Cairo, Brioni and Moscow were "very useful." In October she will receive Tito and Nasser; (and we can expect strong neutralist noises from her guests. But she must receive them well to prove her loyalty to "non-alignment" before the election). New countries require strongly nationalist regimes if they are to have enough popular support to make the necessary economic decisions. 5. She regrets any misunderstanding there may have been over the Moscow communiqué and hopes her subsequent statements clarified our doubts. 6. On Vietnam, their policy is to find a way to get from the battlefield to the conference table "where the parties concerned can find a solution in peace." She believes you and she were agreed on these fundamentals--and she says that Nasser, Tito and Kosygin also agree on this objective. "China, of course, thinks differently." 7. India is also in touch with Hanoi. Ho won't meet on any terms which "could be construed as a sign of weakness." She believes if we stopped bombing the north, her peace efforts would be strengthened. 8. She passes on to you Kosygin's view that if U.S. forces cross the 17th parallel, "it would not be possible to avoid escalation of the conflict into a larger war." 9. On Indo-Pak relations, she alleges closer Chicom relations with the Paks, and a possible second Pakistani try at infiltration and disruption with Chicom connivance. (Intelligence is checking this again at our request. Previous similar reports have proved highly exaggerated.) Talks with Pakistan are stalled because the Paks "seem still to insist that the question of Kashmir must be settled" first. 10. Talks on defense expenditures will be on the agenda if talks are begun. 11. She concludes with a reference to Luci's "glittering" wedding and how much you will miss Luci. "What a lovely girl she is. Seeing her reminded me how incomplete a family is without a daughter." 12. (State is preparing a draft reply which we will have this weekend.) Howard Bromley Smith
369. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, August 20, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Privacy Channel. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, which was received in the Department at 10:03 a.m. Passed to the White House. Howard Wriggins summarized Ayub's letter in an August 23 memorandum to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pakistan, Vol. 2, President Ayub Correspondence, 1/1/66-12/25/67) 599. For the President. 1. Following is text of letter dated August 20 for President Johnson from President Ayub. MFA passed letter to Embassy at 1715 hours August 20 stating Ayub desired letter be sent by Embassy communications to ensure rapid receipt by President Johnson. Begin Text. 20th August 1966 Dear Mr. President, Ambassador Locke has seen me. We understand from him that your government will be taking a decision shortly on the question of resumption of supply of defence equipment and spare parts to Pakistan. In this connection I would like to share with you some of our fears at the situation developing in this region which has serious implications for Pakistan. As you are no doubt aware, India has mounted a steadily growing propaganda campaign against Pakistan accusing it of all kinds of nefarious intentions including collusion with a foreign power in order to obtain atomic weapons for military purposes and preparing for, what the Indians call, a second round of fighting. The Indian Government has, we understand, gone to the extent of issuing a warning to the United States Government that a resumption of arms supplies to Pakistan would be a "very serious threat to the security of India," and that it would be regarded as an unfriendly act by the Government of India which would put a severe strain on US-Indian relations. This wholly unwarranted Indian propaganda campaign is directed at thwarting the establishment of greater rapport between the US and Pakistan. Furthermore, it provides a cover for India's own large scale military preparations including the development of nuclear capability for military purposes. In this connection I take the liberty of recalling what you, Mr. President, said in our meeting last December that United States would not allow India to dictate US policy towards Pakistan, nor would they allow Pakistan to dictate US policy towards India. I wish to make it clear that Pakistan remains willing to enter into purposeful negotiations with India for the settlement of all outstanding disputes and differences between the two countries. We have kept United States Government informed of our discussions with the Government of India on this subject. India while ostensibly expressing its willingness to discuss all outstanding issues between the two countries has made it very clear that it will not alter its stand on Jammu and Kashmir which it claims to be an integral part of India and for whose complete integration it is taking one measure after another. The Government of India is now deliberately building up an atmosphere of tension along the cease-fire line and elsewhere and uttering threats of renewed hostilities. I am sure you will appreciate that in the circumstances it is not possible for my government to accept at face value the Government of India's professed desire to improve the climate of relations and foster good-neighbourly ties between our two countries. We understand from Ambassador Locke that the US Government wishes to follow an "even handed" policy towards Pakistan and India. This is perfectly understandable. At the same time I would be less than frank if I did not draw your attention to the fact that the denial of arms replacements and spares to Pakistan would seriously impair her ability to defend herself which surely could not be your intention. Denial of these facilities means complete write off of the American equipment which we hold in large proportion. Its replacement from other sources would put a fearful burden on our resources. Thus our need for spares etc. stands on a different footing to that of India which is not dependent on American equipment to the same extent. We earnestly hope that in reaching the decision which your administration is to take shortly in this vital matter, our fears and the problems will get the considerations they deserve. Please accept, Mr. President, my warmest regards and best wishes for your continuing good health./2/ /2/Ambassador Locke commented on Ayub's letter in telegram 601 from Rawalpindi, sent marked for the President on August 22. Locke stated that Ayub's letter underscored his conviction that affirmative action on Pakistan's request for spare parts, tied to Pakistan's willingness to limit its arms purchases from China and discuss arms limitations with India, was of critical importance in preventing a closer relationship between Pakistan and China. India, he argued, "should not be permitted to bluff US from action which is in her own vital interest and which is essential to put US-Pakistan relations on proper basis for foreseeable future." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-PAK) Bowles transmitted a contrasting view of the issue in telegram 2673 from New Delhi, August 19. He argued that to provide the spare parts necessary to reactivate Pakistan's F-104s, B-52s, and Patton tanks "would have a devastating long-term effect" on relations between the United States and India and between India and Pakistan. He stated that the Indian Government was convinced that any military equipment the United States provided to Pakistan would be used against India, and that the reactivation of U.S. supplied planes would tip the military balance against India. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Cables, 1/66-9/66) Yours sincerely, Mohammad Ayub Khan End Text. Locke
370. Memorandum From Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 23, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos, 1966. Secret. SUBJECT We are coming down to the wire on military supply policy toward Pakistan and India. The Bunker/Dean report/2/ is now in, and the meeting with Secretary Rusk and McNamara will be for the purpose of reviewing their findings. /2/Reference is to an assessment done by Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and Arthur Dean of the joint memorandum on military supply policy for India and Pakistan produced by the Departments of State and Defense on August 1; see footnote 2, Document 365. Their assessment, which has not been found, was summarized in greater detail in an August 24 memorandum from Wriggins to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos, 1966) In sum, they recommend that we undertake a limited and carefully phased program of sale of spares to Pakistan, on rather clear conditions, with carefully phased interpretative initiatives in India. They propose that in Pakistan Gene Locke enter into very private and exploratory talks with Ayub to see how far he will be willing to go in (a) limiting his relationship with China, and (b) undertaking serious and forthcoming discussions with India on outstanding issues, particularly arms limitation. As we become reassured on these points, we would assist him in finding sources of spares in western markets for his aircraft and other U.S. supplied equipment. Those parts he could not find there we would sell to him directly. The extent and duration of such a policy would depend upon his continued reasonable approach to India, his determination in seeking arms limitation and willingness to limit his supply and political relations with China. In India, we would make clear that we were examining with Ayub ways to explore arms limitation, his relations with China, and other matters of interest to India. We would also, however, indicate that a small program of the sale of spares was in question. We would reassure the Indians that this did not mean a return to our earlier policy of massive assistance to Pakistan, but represented an effort to retain some influence in Pakistan to improve the chances of a reasonable Pakistan policy towards India and limit China's penetration into the subcontinent. If the proposed policy works, in six months we should find that pressures in Pakistan toward a closer Chinese relationship will have been reduced; with considerable luck and a good deal of careful but inconspicuous management, direct and private talks between India and Pakistan will have led to a halt in the arms race and perhaps even a down turn in defense expenditures. The chances that this will be possible are perhaps less than even; but if they succeed, it will be very much to our interest. On the other hand, we will have become the object of considerable political antagonism in India as Mrs. Gandhi's opponents on the Left and the Hindu Right both attack her for allowing their Muslim neighbor to receive military supplies from the United States. And we can expect Mrs. Gandhi herself to have to criticize us directly if she is to hold her own in the political scramble. This will adversely affect Congressional attitudes toward aid to India and will make Ambassador Bowles' position more difficult, but we cannot tell for how long. There are risks in this policy. The Pakistanis could accept our spares and then resume their earlier adventurist policies toward India--though this is generally conceded to be highly unlikely; our enemies in either India or Pakistan can surface confidential conversations before they have come to fruition, precipitating greater hostility of both against us. Both sides may enter talks and emerge more bitter than ever. The Indian political opposition can so distort our intentions and our actions as to make Mrs. Gandhi's position more difficult. But no action also has its obvious costs: Postponing this approach to Ayub until after the Indian election would avoid difficulties for us--and for Mrs. Gandhi--in India. But it would lead Pakistanis to believe we had succumbed to India efforts to veto our policy toward them, would weaken Ayub, strengthen the hand of the more extreme Generals and Airforce Colonels, and generally encourage a more instransigent policy toward India and closer ties with China. It will also make Gene Locke's problems as a new Ambassador more difficult. Your Ambassadors differ sharply on what should be done. Ambassador Locke believes he can gain substantial advantages from a policy which is more forthcoming toward Pakistan's desires than the Dean/Bunker approach; but this will provoke even more difficulties in India than the course proposed. Personal messages to you from your Ambassador and Ayub are attached./3/ Most of the Pakistani specialists in town feel Ambassador Locke overstates the advantages to be gained if we follow this course and he somewhat overstates the costs if we do not. /3/See Document 369 and footnote 2 thereto. In New Delhi, Mr. Bowles argues that any such course will be bound to create the most profound difficulties for us in India. He believes the political backlash will be virtually impossible to contain. In a number of personal communications, he has strongly expressed his dire fears. India specialists in Washington believe he substantially overstates the liabilities of the proposed course--and also the advantages of choosing India instead of attempting to work with both India and Pakistan, as this proposal seeks to do. Thus, the policy being recommended by the Department has built-in contention. No one is enthusiastic, except perhaps Ambassador Locke, but it appears to be the least costly policy we can design. I therefore recommend that you accept the Department's proposals as set forth in the attached memorandum./4/ I would urge the following caveats: /4/Not found attached. An apparent reference to the State-Defense memorandum cited in footnote 2 above. (1) the talks in Pindi should not be started until after the present session of the Indian legislature closes in early September; (2) Secretary Rusk should be charged with a particular responsibility to monitor these negotiations with especial care to ensure that both Ambassadors follow their delicate instructions with precision. Howard Wriggins/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
371. Memorandum From Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 24, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Memos, 1/66-9/66. Confidential. SUBJECT State, Agriculture and AID recommend you approve now the next PL 480 agreements for India and Pakistan./2/ Although the monsoon leaves a big question mark, we expect these agreements to carry us through January or February, leaving one more agreement to sign before India's February elections. /2/Reference is to a joint August 22 memorandum to the President from Rusk, Freeman, and Gaud. (Ibid., NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. III) A copy is also in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) INDIA. The departments recommend for India 1.2 million tons of wheat and up to 800,000 tons of coarse grains; for Pakistan, 200,000 tons of wheat and 200,000 tons of corn or milo. The wheat picture is pretty bleak. The departments have carefully reviewed Indian and Pak requests against the background of our own very tight wheat supply--4 million tons less for PL 480 than last year, a 25% drop. The painful fact is that we just will not have enough wheat to send all the two governments feel they need, even though half of our total PL 480 wheat this fiscal year is earmarked for those two countries. We will be answering India's request for 7.8 million tons of wheat in FY 1967 with only 5 million and Pakistan's request for 2.2 million tons with only 830,000. But after thorough study, the departments have done the best they can by these two--and better than by most other PL 480 recipients this year. We can offer coarse grains to help fill the gap. The departments propose 2.3 million tons in FY 1967 for India (the Indians asked only for 1.5 million) and 330,000 for the Paks (they are expecting much less, if any). However, the Indians after a major effort to increase consumption have said they couldn't handle much more--even if we can't make up the difference in wheat. The Paks are willing to try a small quantity for the first time, but we don't know how that will work out. Despite short supply, we will be able to complete our 1966 emergency program and see India through her harvest, though she will still be hard pressed to meet ration levels with the wheat we can send. The serious pinch could come next spring, especially if this fall's crop is below average. That is when stocks must be built against the shortage period before next fall's crop. So we have to hold back now to save as much wheat as possible for that potentially critical time and to make our pre-election agreement as large as possible. If you approve this agreement, we will have committed 3.6 million tons of wheat so far for FY 1967, leaving only 1.4 million tons more to send through June. While the Indian agreement could be signed any time in September, we ought to move immediately in Pakistan. Hoarding has become a problem, and promise of new shipments should turn loose stocks already in the country. So we want to ship as much as we can now without losing flexibility next spring. Approving the departments' recommendation would bring our FY 1967 total to 580,000 tons of wheat, leaving only 250,000 tons for the rest of the year. I recommend you approve the departments' recommendation. We will continue diplomatic efforts to explain fully the facts of our own wheat situation. Howard Approve India /3/Johnson checked this option. On the August 24 covering memorandum from Bromley Smith to the President, which Smith used to transmit the Rusk-Freeman-Gaud memorandum and the Wriggins memorandum to the President, Johnson wrote: "We must hold onto all the wheat we can--send nothing unless we break an iron bound agreement by not sending. See me." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Memos, 1/66-9/66) [Continue with the next documents]
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