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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
372. Letter From President Johnson to President Ayub/1/ Washington, August 30, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pakistan, Vol. 2, President Ayub Correspondence, 1/1/66-12/25/67. No classification marking. Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of August 20/2/ which arrived at a time when my closest colleagues and I have been reviewing the manner in which our own policies and actions in South Asia can best contribute to our common goal of peace and security. One of the elements of this review is, of course, our military supply policy. Your letter underscores the complexities of this problem, and you may be sure we have the concerns you express very much in mind. /2/See Document 369. We ourselves are troubled over what appears to be a growing atmosphere of mistrust and apprehension between Pakistan and India. I am especially concerned that this will make it harder for India and Pakistan to avoid an arms race which could threaten the development of your nations and compound our problems in helping. I am glad to know from you that Pakistan remains committed to negotiations with India as the way of solving the many troublesome issues that cause this situation. I believe that is Prime Minister Gandhi's intention as well. I can only encourage you to persist in seeking to establish the kind of trusted communication between you and Mrs. Gandhi that will build confidence between your governments and make possible a more rational approach to the issues that now set you at odds. Ambassador Locke has told me of the good talks he has had with you. I deeply appreciate the warm welcome you have given him. With warm regards, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
373. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Gandhi/1/ Washington, August 31, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 3/1/66-12/31/66. No classification marking. Dear Mrs. Gandhi: After I talked with Ambassador Nehru about his visit to India, I read with deep interest your letter/2/ which he delivered to me personally. /2/See Document 368. I understand the serious domestic problems which you are facing in your pre-election period. You know you have my friendship and sympathy as you confront them. Secretary Freeman has also given me a firsthand report of his recent trip to India. I was encouraged by what he had to say about your resolute efforts to increase agricultural production and reduce the rate of population increase. The problems you face in these areas are formidable, but I am confident that you and your nation are on the right track and that you will overcome them. I join those who are praying that the next harvest in India will be bountiful. As you know, we have also had a drought and our harvest is not expected to be good. We will do what we can to help you through the difficult food situation you face in the months ahead, although the help we may be able to give may not be as much as we both would want. I admire the courage you showed in devaluing the rupee and embarking on a program of import liberalization. I share your hope that this program will be successful. Few problems in this troubled world have given me more cause for concern during the past year than your country's relations with Pakistan. You know how highly I value my personal relationship of confidence and trust with you and President Ayub. You also know that I want to contribute constructively to the material progress, dignity, and security of both India and Pakistan. As I told you when you were here, it is painful for all of us when two friends are forced by history into a relationship with each other such as that which now exists between India and Pakistan. I am particularly concerned at what appears to be growing mistrust within each country regarding the intentions of the other. I fear that the result will be that both you and President Ayub will face increasing problems with your own citizens in maintaining a public atmosphere which would make possible a process leading to reconciliation. I very much hope that both you and President Ayub will try to avoid or deflate public charges and countercharges which further dissipate the political climate achieved at Tashkent. Public statements about military force levels increase the difficulties you both face in avoiding the arms race that neither of you wants. Some Pakistanis may still cling to the false notion that their objectives in Kashmir can be obtained by force. I believe that President Ayub does not subscribe to such a view and his signing of the Tashkent agreement gives you this assurance. I have always found him to be a man of honor. Our information does not support the statement that Pakistan is preparing for radical action against India. Nor do I have the impression that relations between Pakistan and Communist China have altered significantly toward closer cooperation during the last few weeks. This is, of course, a matter about which I share your concern. But strained relations between India and Pakistan increase Pakistani receptivity to improving its relations with China. On the other hand, improved India-Pakistan relations could become a guarantee that Pakistan would not move further in a direction we both deplore. Therefore, I would urge both you and President Ayub to bend every effort to reestablish trusted communications between your representatives which will lessen the present spiral of apprehension and make possible a more rational approach to many specific issues that now set you at odds. In this connection I greatly welcomed your expression of willingness to see arms levels discussed. If you believe we could be helpful in bringing about the opening of such a dialogue, we would, of course, welcome any suggestion you might have. I note that your talks with President Nasser, President Tito, and Chairman Kosygin led you to conclude that they, like our two governments, are in basic agreement on moving the Viet Nam problem to the conference table. The crucial question, of course, remains how this objective can be brought about. India is in a position to be of help in resolving this issue, which thus far has stubbornly resisted our most intensive and searching efforts and those of our friends in many countries. You mention that you are in touch with Hanoi. We will give the closest attention to whatever concrete indications that channel may produce that Hanoi has come to a genuine and realistic interest in finding a mutually acceptable basis for talks. A reduction of hostilities, including a cessation of bombing, is possible if matched by reciprocal action by the other side. This action need not be of a formal or declared nature. It could take any of a number of possible verifiable forms which, as you put it, need not necessarily be construed as a "sign of weakness" on Hanoi's part. We are not looking for signs of weakness from Hanoi, but rather for a genuine desire on its part to end this conflict. Thank you for your gracious words about my daughter. The problems and feelings of parents the world over are, indeed, much the same. With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
374. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 2, 1966, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. 1. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates it was seen by the President. SUBJECT After our talk yesterday morning about the relation between our domestic bread prices and our India-Pak PL 480 programs, I asked the Budget Bureau informally for an opinion. The Bureau has headed the interagency operation of which I spoke. The attached/2/ strikes me as a good updated analysis based on the facts developed during the July inter-agency review of our wheat situation. It is not a formal memo checked with Agriculture. I believe you will wish to read it. /2/Reference is to a September 1 memorandum from Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget Charles J. Zwick to Rostow, entitled "Effect of P.L. 480 sales on domestic wheat prices." The argument is that we set the FY 1967 PL 480 planning figure only after reviewing domestic projections of consumption, exports and the carryover necessary to keep prices in line. Speculation in the market has kept prices unexpectedly high. But this is a largely irrational element on which cutting PL 480 shipments would have almost no significant effect. It might even have the contrary effect by indicating panic about the domestic position. Therefore, though the reaction of speculators is impossible to predict, it looks to me as if these Indian and Pak agreements would have no effect on domestic prices. I would hate to hold the small Pak agreement up much longer; and I believe the pared down proposal for India is about as far as we should go, given their pre-harvest and pre-election requirements and our commitments. That proposal--only running through February--gives us the chance to make a fresh assessment after the Indian November harvest is in. But if you still feel uncomfortable, we might hold back on the larger Indian deal--I propose delaying signing until late September anyway--and ask for a formal Agriculture-Budget answer to your question. Walt I'm satisfied; go ahead with your approach on both India and
Pakistan /3/Johnson checked this option.
375. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 2, 1966, 1450Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 835. Ref: State 38151./2/ Meeting with Pres Ayub. /2/Telegram 38151 to Karachi and Rawalpindi, August 30, transmitted the text of President Johnson's August 30 letter to President Ayub. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 476, Lebanon thru Pakistan) For text of the letter, see Document 372. 1. I met with Pres Ayub for 45 minutes Sept 2 with FonMin Additional Sec Agha Shahi and notetaker Piracha also present. After reading letters from Mrs. Johnson and Sec Freeman,/3/ Ayub carefully studied reftel communication from Pres Johnson. /3/Neither found. 2. I elaborated on: (a) need for peace on subcontinent, for conditions favoring economic development and for downward trend defense spending; (b) importance Pres Johnson attaches to Indo-Pak moderation and efforts deal peacefully with problems including Kashmir; (c) improvement in US-Pak bilateral relations and mutual recognition respective national interests; (d) US understanding of Pak security concerns expressed in Ayub's Aug 20 letter to Pres Johnson;/4/ (e) US concern at harmful effects of Indo-Pak propaganda escalation including military tension; (f) US confidence in Pak and Indian top leadership; and (g) possibilities for secret Indo-Pak discussions. /4/See Document 369. 3. Ayub indicated: (a) readiness to establish "trusted communications" with Mrs. Gandhi preferably covering full range Indo-Pak issues; (b) scepticism about utility Indo-Pak arms limitation discussions separate from consideration of political differences; (c) conviction India already has acquired excessive arms while Pakistan does not plan, and cannot afford, further arms acquisition. 4. Ayub interrupted my comments on propaganda escalation to read report from Pak HICOM New Delhi stating current Indian purpose in generating tension is to justify possible postponement of Indian elections desired and discussed in Congress Party circles. Pak HICOM recommended GOP not reply to Indian propaganda. Ayub asked me what GOP should do in such cases since Pak public exposed to Indian propaganda does not know what to think, and internal situation requires some reply. 5. I referred to Sept 6 Defense of Pakistan Day which I hoped would not be occasion for new round of Indo-Pak charges and counter-charges. This regard, I cited anti-Indian press release for Sept 6 (Rawalpindi 813)/5/ which I hoped would not set tone for celebration. (Press release subsequently withdrawn per Rawalpindi 828)./6/ Ayub stressed Defense of Pakistan Day intended commemorate achievements of armed forces and left impression he wishes avoid strong anti-Indian orientation. /5/Telegram 813 from Rawalpindi, September 1, transmitted the text of a press release prepared by the Press Information Department entitled "India's Wanton Aggression." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) /6/Dated September 2. (Ibid.) 6. I suggested establishment trusted communication between Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi might best be through personally known confidants, not anti-Indian or anti-Pak, preferably without political ambition but with negotiating experience and, on arms problems, perhaps with military experience. Ayub volunteered perhaps somebody like Jai Prokash Narain or Raja Gopalacharian on Indian side. 7. Ayub balked when I said hoped could report to Washington that he willing undertake secret Indo-Pak military discussions with or without concurrent consideration other differences. Ayub professed see no purpose in separate military discussion but left open possibility GOP might nonetheless go along if pressed. Ayub asked if US would participate any such talks? I said had not contemplated this and I didn't know. I added that discussions concerning level of forces might be more relevant to mutual security than less precise approaches through defense budgets and gross national products percentages. 8. When I pointed to possible utility of trusted military officers as confidants on both sides, Ayub appeared have no objection but said generals would have to turn to political leaders to ascertain conditions determining military requirements. For example, he said, defense requirements would vary with Kashmir solution. I attempted to counter Ayub's scepticism about working separately towards arms limitation with suggestion India and Pakistan begin from current force levels and through discussion seek to establish some understanding of mutually tolerable military relationship. 10. Comment: (A) My impression is Ayub might go along if we insisted on separate arms discussion with India, but he does not think such an approach can accomplish anything under present political conditions. Accordingly, I believe we should promptly sound out Mrs. Gandhi on willingness to establish "trusted communications" channel, i.e., secret talks between confidants of Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi on all topics, including Kashmir and arms limitations. (B) I believe we need to know more specifically what would contribute to subcontinental security. This regard, it would be useful if Washington could proceed with military studies concerning reasonable defense establishments in India and Pakistan. These could serve as basis for separate US supporting discussions with GOI and GOP. (C) I suspect Ayub may interpret Pres Johnson's letter and my presentation to signify likely postponement of US decision on lethal spare part sales to Pakistan until after Indian elections. While a little doubt may be healthy, I do not believe we should permit Ayub to draw too pessimistic a conclusion in this regard. In my judgement, best interests of US would be served by informing Ayub promptly after adjournment later this month of present session of Indian Parliament, and certainly well before Indian elections, of US willingness to discuss lethal spares with him in connection with Indo-Pak arms limitation and Sino-Pak military supply relationship./7/ /7/In a follow up conversation on September 3 with Additional Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi, Locke pointed out that the emphasis during his conversation with Ayub on the difficulties faced by the United States with regard to military supply policy was not intended to foreshadow a negative decision. He reported that his purpose was to prevent Ayub from making decisions based on the mistaken notion that the United States had decided against him in the critical national security field. (Telegram 847 from Rawalpindi, September 3; ibid., POL INDIA-PAK) Locke
376. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 15, 1966, 7:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, April-Dec. 1966. Confidential. SUBJECT I now have from Agriculture, the Council of Economic Advisers and the Budget Bureau the formal analysis you requested of the relation between the proposed next PL 480 agreement for India and our own wheat and bread prices./2/ /2/The analysis was in a September 12 Bureau of the Budget memorandum from Zwick to Rostow. (Ibid.) No one can predict with absolute certainty that US wheat prices have leveled off for good after their June rise (though August held steady) or that speculators will not jostle the market again. However, these studies do conclude that: --Stopping this India agreement for 1.2 million tons of wheat through February would have a negligible effect on wheat prices here. --Even cutting off the whole PL 480 program probably would not reduce bread prices, because wheat accounts for only 14-15% of the retail price of bread. If bread prices rose, it would be largely for other reasons which slightly lower wheat prices (if they were possible) could only partly offset. --Our own wheat crop will come in 1.8 million tons (56 million bushels) higher than we estimated when, back in July, we allocated 11.3 million tons (413 million bushels) to PL 480 worldwide in FY 1967. So we will have more of a buffer than we decided then would be adequate to keep prices stable. --In general, there is no logical reason for wheat prices to move significantly higher, although there is always some risk that the speculators will read the signs otherwise. Agriculture will continue to tailor PL 480 programs carefully to the classes of wheat in better supply and to spread out purchase authorizations to minimize market effects. World wheat output is expected to be higher this year than last; the Soviet crop is better, lessening the pressure on Free World supplies; and the prospective crop from our own increased acreage allotments should begin to influence prices toward the end of the year. Because of our clear commitment to India and the negligible influence of this program on our own market, I recommend we go ahead now with the Freeeman-Rusk-Gaud program of 1.2 million tons of wheat and 800,000 tons of sorghum (their memo attached)./3/ An agreement signed in the next two weeks will just barely keep the pipeline flowing. If you approve, I will ask Secretary Freeman to try to stretch this as far into January and February as feasible unless unexpected Indian developments cause us to take another look. /3/See footnote 2, Document 371. Walt Approve/4/ /4/Neither option is checked. Rostow raised the issue again in a September 20 briefing memorandum for a Tuesday luncheon meeting. He noted that the Departments of State and Agriculture were pressing for a decision on P.L. 480 for the subcontinent. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, April-Dec. 1966) On September 23 Vice President Humphrey sent a memorandum to the President in which he added his weight to the judgment that the proposed P.L. 480 agreements with India and Pakistan could go forward without any predictable impact on the price of bread in the United States. (Ibid., Name File, Vice President, Vol. I)
377. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 26, 1966, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. 2. Secret. SUBJECT The last shipment of wheat under the current agreement is now scheduled to leave the US by 31 October. It should arrive in India about 1 December, give or take a few days. These October shipments will include 327,000 tons of wheat and 150,000 tons of milo. Milo shipments will continue with 150,000 tons each in November and December. It takes about 9 weeks between Washington decision and arrival in India for negotiation, procurement, movement of grain to port and transit (30-40 days). Counting back 9 weeks from the beginning of December indicates there will be a gap in December arrivals if we don't go ahead with the new agreement in the next week. A 1-2 week gap probably wouldn't cause difficulty. The Indian government would begin to get nervous but could chalk the slippage off to bureaucratic delay. But somewhere between 2 and 4 weeks from now, it will become obvious to the Indian grain dealers and politicians that there will be a gap in December. With arrivals of US wheat running about 345,000 tons in October and 202,500 in November, little or no wheat arriving in December would raise questions. No one argues that Indians would starve. Not even the Indian government knows how much food may be tucked away in that vast nation. But the one clear indicator we have shows that government grain stocks have been drawn down from 1 million tons on 1 June to 738,000 on 1 September. This is a little more than one month's average off-take (600,000 tons). This indicator operates in the Indian market much like our carryover here. When it drops, speculation increases and prices rise. The government, with short stocks, has no large quantities to release to force prices down. Even harder to measure is the effect of unexplained delay on the high-level Indian's view of our dependability. Mrs. Gandhi's reliance on US and World Bank advice has become a major political issue. We don't want to give her opposition an opening to argue that we don't back our promises with performance, especially since the World Bank consortium is already falling $20 million short of its $900 million target. The ideal on pure foreign policy grounds would be to go ahead now. But if you are still uneasy about U.S. prices, I'd suggest this course: --Wait 1-2 weeks to confirm what now looks like a break in U.S. price levels. The price in the Kansas City wheat market fell 12 per bushel in the week of 16-23 September. The price had hung around $1.97 since mid-June (a jump from the $1.79 of 10 June) until last week's drop to $1.85. --Then if we have to delay longer we ought to give the Indians confidentially some hint of why we're delaying (though we wouldn't want this to get back to our farmers). We might also let the Indians begin purchasing against the new agreement and promise to reimburse them later (Agriculture has a procedure for this). This may come up at lunch tomorrow. However, if not, we will need your decision on whether (a) to go ahead now with the original Freeman-Rusk-Gaud proposal of 1.2 million tons of wheat and 800,000 tons of coarse grain, or (b) to hold off for another couple of weeks. Walt Go ahead now with Freeman-Rusk-Gaud proposal /2/Johnson checked this option, and added the following handwritten comment: "Freeman recommends holding."
378. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 28, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Memos, 10/66-7/67. Confidential. Mr. President: The attached note from Marvin asked for my analysis of Eugene Locke's letter to you. (Tab A)/2/ /2/Attached was an undated letter to President Johnson from Ambassador Locke, with a September 27 covering note to Rostow from Special Assistant Marvin Watson. 1. Locke argues that if we do not provide Ayub with military equipment he will turn to China. 2. This would have the following effects: --Give China a base south of the Himalayas; 3. He meets the argument that military dependence does not necessarily mean alliance by citing the fact that Pakistan is more vulnerable to becoming an ally of China than, say, Indonesia, because of Pakistan's fear of India. 4. With respect to India, Gene argues that the bad effects would only be temporary. India badly needs our aid and our role as a balance to Russian influence, on the one hand, and the Chinese threat, on the other. In general, he regards the spare parts issue as critical to our relationship with Pakistan and urges that he be permitted to inform Ayub that we will proceed. Only in the last paragraph does he say, "Of course what I have said about Pakistan's military needs is said in the context of reaching understandings at the same time about limitations on arms from China and about an attempt to reach some arms limitation understanding with India." Comment: In some ways Gene Locke's view is the mirror image of Chet Bowles' who argues that if we supply spare parts to Pakistan, we will throw India still deeper into the arms of the Soviet Union. Chet will also recall the following facts: --India is 5 times as large as Pakistan and our major interest
on the subcontinent; We must urge Chet to use maximum influence on India to negotiate an arms limitation deal with Pakistan and be prepared to listen to the Paks on Kashmir. It is not good enough to threaten Washington with a deepened India-Soviet arms relation. There is no future unless India-Pak relations improve and we keep for India a moderate Pakistan. This is basically an Indian responsibility. Therefore, Chet should concentrate on bringing it about. Walt
379. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 28, 1966, 9:15 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Cables, 10/66-7/67. Secret. SUBJECT Gene Locke cables you and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara asking that he be authorized to explore with Ayub the returns we might gain, however limited, if we sold him military spares for equipment originally procured from the United States. In this cable, the text of which is attached,/2/ Gene says we are losing our chips in Pakistan by our indecision. He reports that the sale of spares is the number one issue with the Pakistan government and he believes it could be used to promote Indo-Pakistan arms limitation discussions and limited Pakistan arms purchases from China. Further waiting (a) encourages Ayub's domestic opponents, (b) promotes the belief that the US does not care about Pakistan's security and (c) permits both the Government of Pakistan and India to conclude that India can dictate our policy toward Pakistan. He reminds us that further waiting is in itself a decision. /2/Telegram 1148 from Rawalpindi, September 27. A copy is also in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-PAK. As background, you will recall that before Gene left for Pakistan in July, staff papers were prepared on this subject. They would have authorized him to explore with Ayub how the sale of spares might be used to define more precisely Ayub's relations with China and encourage him to enter serious discussions with the Indians on arms limitation. Ambassador Bowles' reaction was so strong that Secretary Rusk held the recommendation for further thought. Newspaper leaks led Indian officials to protest publicly in the Indian Parliament. You requested Ellsworth Bunker and Arthur Dean to look into the matter. They reported to you in mid-August, recommending we go ahead, but with somewhat more caution than the earlier proposal. Since then, no decision has been reached. Secretary Rusk has been reluctant to proceed until he talked with Ambassador Bowles. Secretary McNamara has not yet focused on the problem but his Deputy for International Security Affairs, opposes the idea. I agree that further delay in a decision is eroding our position, and we should face this one shortly, perhaps toward the end of Chet Bowles' visit. Walt I agree, ask Secretary Rusk to review the bidding and give me DOD/State recommendation--agreed or split--by October 5/3/ Meet Gene Locke's difficulty and approve the Dean/Bunker recommendation Tell Gene now we can't sell spares to Pakistan See me /3/Johnson checked this option and amended it with a notation indicating that he wanted recommendations on the issue from Bunker, Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, and Arthur Dean. He added a further handwritten notation that reads: "Let's discuss this weekend--Take to David." Reference is to Camp David, the Presidential retreat in Maryland where, according to the President's Diary, President Johnson spent the weekend of October 1-2 with Rusk, McNamara, Katzenbach, Walt Rostow, and Eugene Rostow. (Johnson Library) A list of decisions taken by the President during the weekend, apparently drafted by Walt Rostow, indicates that Johnson authorized Rusk to draft instructions to the two Ambassadors to try to get India and Pakistan to agree on arms limitations. A decision on the spare parts issue was postponed. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, April-Dec 1966)
380. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 15, 1966, 10:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. II. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "Rec'd 10-15-66, 1:30 p." SUBJECT The attached from John Schnittker/2/ explains release yesterday of another 250,000 tons of wheat for India. This is just an administrative device for completing shipments you promised in your March message to Congress. /2/The attachment was an October 14 memorandum from Acting Secretary of Agriculture Schnittker to the President. The reason for a special action is that, while your approvals are written in tons, PL 480 agreements are written in dollars. When US prices rose, the dollar totals in the 27 May agreement would not cover the total tonnage you authorized. The shortfall became evident when Agriculture and the Indian Supply Mission totaled all the purchases under the May agreement. This means there will be 200-250,000 tons more in the pipeline than we thought earlier this week. While this will carry Indian shipments into November, delaying our decision on the new agreement until you get back/3/ will still cause shipments in November and December to dip. /3/Reference is to the trip the President was scheduled to make to meet in Manila October 24-25 with the heads of the other six governments with military forces in South Vietnam. I think the most important element to weigh against domestic concerns is how delay will affect Mrs. Gandhi's feelings about our promises of support. We made milestone economic and food deals with her, saying we'd stand behind her as long as she did her share. There have been some gaps in the Indians' performance, but overall they've made the right decisions. These deals have become a major issue in India's election campaign. The question is whether Mrs. Gandhi can show that US aid pays off or whether her opposition makes stick its charge that she's sold India's dignity for a mess of pottage. I don't predict disaster if we hold off. This is a political judgment which you are best suited to make. I'd be more comfortable about the Indian end if we went ahead now. Walt I still think we ought to hold off/4/ /4/Johnson checked this option.
381. Telegram From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ New Delhi, October 19, 1966, 1256Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. III. Confidential. The message was sent [text not declassified]. 6752. On my return to India I find that the food situation has worsened seriously in comparison to a month ago. In several key areas the vitally important rains of early October have not come and consequently estimates of output for this crop year are down by at least four or five million tons. In Bihar, parts of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madya Pradesh the late rains had been largely lacking and a desperate situation is in the making. Several of our people who have recently visited Bihar and Uttar Pradesh report that if anything the GOI is underestimating the danger. Asoka Mehta, Subramaniam and others are now visiting the area and it is my guess that we will be faced shortly with a request for an additional shipment of milo to meet this new situation. In the meantime I am being pressed very hard since my return in regard to recommendation to President for two million tons--1.2 of wheat and 800,000 of milo--which are now pending in Washington. When I left the US the President was waiting for a report on India's agricultural performance under the terms of our general understanding. I have just read the report/2/ put together by the Department of Agriculture, AID, and the Department of State; it seems to me to be completely factual, balanced and accurate. Under the circumstances I will be grateful to you personally if you can give me your private estimate of where the situation stands and how soon we may expect a decision on the pending requests3 /2/Not found. /3/On October 31 the Country Team in India expressed its increasing concern "at adverse impact in an explosive political period of further delay in signing new agreement." (Telegram 6340 from New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA) Regards,
382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, October 21, 1966, 6:33 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Laingen and Coon on October 6; cleared by Hare, Spain, Heck, Handley, Warren, Macomber, Hoopes, and Walt Rostow; approved by Secretary Rusk. A handwritten notation on the telegram reads: "OK/L" suggesting that the telegram was also cleared by the President. Also sent to New Delhi and London and repeated to CINCMEAFSA. 71125. Joint State/Defense message. Subject: Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan. For Ambassadors Locke and Bowles. 1. This message contains instructions relating to continuing review being conducted here of our military supply policy for India and Pakistan. 2. Our premise is that it is vitally important for US interests not to be forced to choose between these two countries, as their current tactics are designed to get us to do. Our continuing objective is to build both sound US-Indian and sound US-Pakistan relations; we do not intend to permit either to veto what serves our policy interests in the other. 3. Our problem, however, is that both India and Pakistan are now pursuing policies that divert their own limited resources from development, dilute the massive economic aid we are providing each of them, and cause a dangerous drift toward greater dependence in the military field on Communist China and Soviet Union. Neither GOI nor GOP appears sufficiently to recognize serious consequences this situation has had and will continue to have for their own interests in relations with us and our ability in practical terms to help them meet their problems. Neither seems aware that public and Congressional reaction to last fall's tragic Indo-Pak war, diminished resources for foreign aid overall, and our bed-rock commitment in Viet-Nam could make it impossible for us to do what we believe needs to be done even in area economic aid (not to mention security field) unless some more constructive element than now exists is introduced into Indian- Pakistan relations. 4. We believe this situation requires bilateral discussion with leadership both countries, on frankest possible terms, to consider what we can do toward curtailing arms race between them and at same time serve other US interests, including prevention Communist influence (particularly Chicom) from eroding our own position further. In first instance this requires that we begin exploratory conversations with GOP and subsequently with GOI, in order better ascertain whether and how a change in our current military supply policy might better serve US interests in subcontinent. 5. Against this background, action addressees authorized undertake action along following lines: (a) For Rawalpindi: You should arrange fully private session with Ayub for frank and exhaustive review of where we stand in our relationship. You should reaffirm our strengthened confidence we on right track in rebuilding sound US/Pak bilateral relationship. You should then go on to review our growing concern over difficulties India and Pakistan having in coming to grips in meaningful way with their problems, new evidence arms buildup, and risk this poses for peaceful and steady growth stronger economies and better life people both countries. (b) You should say that you have therefore been instructed to talk frankly with Ayub in order consider together what might be done to build basis for more durable peace in subcontinent. (If asked by Ayub you may indicate that Ambassador Bowles is being instructed do the same in New Delhi.) (c) You should go on to describe what we believe is our common interest with Ayub in the peaceful resolution of Indo-Pak issues and in curbing the arms race potential in subcontinent now, before new and even more costly round of arms procurement ensues. We would like to know from Ayub what he is prepared to do to further these objectives. You should say that present trend in both countries strikes us as strongly counter-productive and that we see heavy responsibility on leadership both sides to act now to curb this trend before it too late. You should explore with Ayub his arms supply relationship and intentions with Chicoms, noting that while asking us for decision on spares he has never taken us into confidence to any degree on his intentions arms procurement generally, including possible deal with Soviets. (FYI--This designed elicit expression Ayub's intentions re Soviet supply. Even though it would not raise same problems for us as does Chicom source, it has bearing on prospects for further arms spiral. End FYI.) (d) You should also explore with Ayub on what basis he prepared support efforts achieve understanding on force levels, materiel procurement, and defense spending, that would head off arms spiral in subcontinent while protecting legitimate security requirements of each country. (FYI--Important thing is to get something going, preferably with India, but at least with us. End FYI.) What specifically would Ayub be prepared to do in this area? You may wish reinject idea of secret Indo-Pak talks in this context, suggesting to Ayub that for our part we see merit in idea that he and Mrs. Gandhi designate individuals who have their confidence and trust and who could explore in non-public discussion, preferably outside South Asia, what might be possible in arms limitation and other problems, including Kashmir. (Further elaboration this point was contained State 16670.)/2/ /2/Dated July 27. (Ibid., POL INDIA-PAK) (e) You should tell Ayub we can appreciate his security concerns, as spelled out in his letter to President August 20./3/ But Ayub should recognize that we have our problems too and that what we can do to help him meet these concerns depends on what he can do to help us. Specifically it depends heavily on genuine, determined efforts on Pakistan's part to lower tension and to demonstrate its intentions on arms limitation and resolution other Indo-Pak problems. Ayub must also realistically recognize that any modification our present arms policy would assume acceptable limits on his arms supply and political relations with Chicoms. Moreover Ayub should know that we frankly see real problems in any modification our current arms sales policy because of disruptive risks for Indo-Pak reconciliation process and he should fully understand our belief this consequence can only be avoided if there is in fact forward movement Pak-Indian relations. /3/See Document 369. (f) In sum, we want Ayub to know that we appreciate fact that his past dependence on US equipment puts him in present circumstances in difficult position, that we are not oblivious to his security problem, that we currently reviewing possible modification our military sales policy, but that in view misuse our equipment in 1965 we can assist in reactivating US supplied equipment only if he will help create conditions which give promise of peace in subcontinent and no recurrence of events 1965 and help head off arms race. Until we have some better idea of what he is prepared to give on his side of the bargain we have little basis on which to act. He should also be fully aware that any leak of this exploratory conversation would obviously increase the obstacles to a modification of US arms policy. (g) FYI--Above is as far as you should go with Ayub in first round in suggesting possibility some give in our present arms sales policy. Our thinking however is that if Ayub's response is considered satisfactory after assessment in Washington, we would subsequently indicate to Ayub that we are ready discuss with him GOP's legitimate military requirements and how they might be met, it being understood any US supply role would be limited to cash sales lethal spares for previously supplied US equipment not readily available from other Western sources and sales of non-lethal equipment. To extent lethal spares are available from non-US Western sources, we would prefer that Pakistan rely on such sources in future and we would be prepared help facilitate this in ways open to us. To extent such spares not available these sources, we would discuss with Paks what supplementary amounts might be available from us. We have in mind limited, transitional level of spares from US. (We presently envisage $8 million as ceiling figure for all spares, lethal and non-lethal.) Finally, although we do not intend resume supply lethal end items, we would indicate readiness over longer term to help GOP in arranging for procurement justifiable new equipment of this nature from other Western sources. End FYI. (h) For Delhi: We recognize that because of risk of leaks, there should be minimum delay between time our first démarche to Ayub and corresponding representations Delhi. But we believe we cannot authorize those representations until Washington has assessed Ayub's response. Precise nature our instructions to you for representations with Mrs. Gandhi will depend on nature Ayub response. Tentatively, however, we see your initial representations along following lines: (1) Refrain from discussing precise nature our initial approach to Ayub on arms limitation and possibility some degree relaxation arms policy. (2) Instead, stake out general contours of the way we see our strategic interests in Asia and how US and Indian interests coincide. (3) Within this context discuss what we both can do to minimize Chicom presence and influence in Pakistan, when issue of Pak security is paramount factor. (4) Explore options available to us. As we see it these boil down to actions on India's part involving willingness to talk, to compromise, and to make concessions on basic problem such as arms control and Kashmir; and/or US actions to maintain moderating influence in Pakistan. Extent to which India can or cannot move on former has bearing on what US will need to do on latter. (5) Urge GOI that now is time to move decisively on arms balance and limitation. This is process which larger power must effectively initiate, failure do so serves only interest of Chicoms. This means India as well as Pakistan must unilaterally exercise restraint now in arms acquisition and it also means that start must be made toward eventual bilateral understanding that will encompass materiel acquisitions and force structure as well as defense expenditure levels. (6) Underscore for GOI that our economic and military supply policies are related to this objective. We do not intend under foreseeable circumstances return to military supply relationship we had with Pakistan (or India) prior September 1965. However, some flexibility on our sales policy should be maintained. Regardless of our policy Pakistan as sovereign state is going to insist on meeting what it considers its minimum security requirements. Indeed, Indian recognition of this will reduce GOP fears that India desires to undo partition. (7) Discuss with GOI how to maximize India's public understanding and minimize India's public misinterpretation of US actions. In context present realities Indians should understand that India is central to our interests in Asia; security of subcontinent is essential element of this interest; and our future policies, including those relating to military supply, will reflect this. (i) For both Rawalpindi and Delhi: Both approaches when made should take note of representations we have already made during economic aid discussions on risk of arms race and urgency downward trend defense spending. They should note that same basic concern is fundamental in approaches you now making on broader issue of arms limitation and imply without specifically saying so that magnitude and kind of future US economic aid will be related to efforts each makes in arms limitation. (j) For London: You should inform HMG in closest confidence of kind of explorations we undertaking first with GOP and then with GOI. Rawalpindi and Delhi should similarly inform High Commissioners, bearing in mind that any leaks would jeopardize whole operation. 6. It is important that all concerned recognize that our efforts at this stage purely exploratory in nature and that we making no commitment as to specific policy decisions. We see steps outlined above as first in series exploratory steps with both leaders, aimed at achieving progress toward understanding on arms balance and limitation which could encompass wide variety of approaches. We are aware any progress will be slow and that there are clear limitations in degree influence we can hope to have through limited military supply policy we envisage. Essentially our purpose at this stage is to learn more than we now know how our policies as a whole can effectively help contain arms race, reduce dependence either country on Communist sources supply and at same time promote fundamental need for continuing patient Indo-Pak dialogue. Where we go from here, including role British might play, will depend heavily on nature your first approaches to GOI and GOP and your own recommendations. Katzenbach [Continue with the next documents]
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