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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
383. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, November 1, 1966, 1254Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi. 1667. Dept pls pass Harriman. Discussion with President Ayub: Military Supply Relationships. 1. During meeting of Governor Harriman/2/ and myself today with President Ayub I conveyed in brief discussion of about fifteen minutes military supply relationship approach as set forth SecState 71125./3/ /2/Harriman was in Rawalpindi to brief Ayub on the results of the Manila Conference. He sent his report of the discussion with Ayub on November 1 to President Johnson and Secretary Rusk in telegram 1958 from Tehran, November 1. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Harriman's account of the discussion with Ayub focused on Vietnam. He also sent an account of the meeting he and Bowles had with Gandhi on October 31. That conversation also focused on Vietnam, and Harriman reported that the Prime Minister was assertive, insisting that the United States stop the bombing of North Vietnam without prior conditions. (Telegram 1959 from Tehran, November 1; ibid.) /3/Document 382. 2. Ayub's response was moderately encouraging although still in general terms. Ayub indicated Pakistan already had received nearly all military equipment contracted under current arms deals with China. He added Pakistan is also seeking obtain some materiel from USSR but indicated he is not "pushing" Russia as he hopes hear from US first. 3. Ayub implied both arms limitations and arms sources are appropriate subjects for discussion and indicated Pakistan continues deeply desire limit armaments. This regard, Ayub charged India had built up military much more than Pakistan and had obtained massive quantities of equipment which unsuitable for deployment in mountainous terrain fronting China and therefore aimed only at Pakistan. He added Pakistan has no intention of attacking India and simply wants to survive as integrated and stable country. Ayub authorized Foreign Minister Pirzada and Foreign Secretary Yusuf who also were present to explore general subject further with me. 4. Given primary purpose of meeting to discuss Manila Conference, and Governor Harriman's tight schedule, it proved impossible to discuss subject in greater detail this occasion. I intend take matter up further with Pirzada and Yusuf as suggested by Ayub. Presumably Embassy Delhi may wish to defer action pending further soundings here. Locke
384. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, November 6, 1966, 1545Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi. 1751. Ref: State 71125./2/ Subject: Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan. /2/Document 382. 1. In meeting with Foreign Secretary Yusuf at 1700 hours November 6, called at his request on military supply policy, he stated he had talked with President Ayub following my meeting with Yusuf in Karachi on November 3 (Pindi tel 1716)./3/ The following is statement of Government of Pakistan. (Yusuf had hand-written statement, quite possibly prepared by Ayub, which he read to me and from which I took notes): /3/Locke's November 3 meeting with Yusuf was a follow up to the discussion of military supply policy with Ayub on November 1. Locke asked for a commitment by Pakistan to engage in secret arms limitation discussions with India, expressed concern over the level of defense expenditures in India and Pakistan, and asked for assurances that military supply agreements with China would be limited. (Telegram 1716 from Rawalpindi, November 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 PAK) A. Pakistan does not want arms race with India. It wants only minimum deterrent force consistent with safety and security of country. Since minimum force depends on nature of threat, Pakistan would welcome agreement with India on arms limitation. To that end Pakistan would be willing to enter into secret talks with Government of India at place and level to be fixed by mutual consent. B. Pakistan believes best place for talks is Delhi. The reasons are (1) that in its view this would cause less speculation than meeting by high level representatives of two countries in a third country and (2) that this would remove usual Indian ploy of delaying months to await non-existent instructions from Delhi. C. Pakistan believes talk should be held within the framework of a political settlement and that it is therefore essential that talks on political issues (which I interpret to mean Kashmir) should proceed simultaneously with arms limitation talks. However the talks need not be by the same representatives or in the same location. D. The Government of Pakistan has stated in the past and reiterates that it has no offensive or defensive alliance with China. The present arms agreement with China has a fixed financial limit and will be allowed to run its course. The bulk of Chinese equipment has already arrived, only a small portion is yet to come. The arrival of the remainder will be spread over a period of time. E. To the extent Pakistan obtains military equipment from the United States in the future, her need to tap other sources will be correspondingly reduced. Pakistan would prefer equipment of U.S. origin as its people are conversant with it. They are seeking military equipment from Russia, but have not pushed this, preferring to wait to determine what may be available from United States. In view of the limitation on Pakistan's resources, terms on which arms are supplied will be an important consideration. F. There is now a major deficiency in Pakistan's military equipment. This consists of (1) losses in the last war not yet filled and (2) additions to equip increased force raised since war and necessitated by Indian expansion. Pakistan does not desire equipment for expansion above its present armed force level, but only adequately to fill out equipment for Pak forces that exist today. G. Pakistan will be willing to talk in terms of exact figures and numbers when she discusses her requirements in the event the United States determines to help her meet those requirements. H. The President cautions that while Pakistan will enter into talks with India in good faith, these talks by their very nature can be protracted and the outcome uncertain, and she cannot delay her procurement until such time as agreement is actually reached. I. The President again wished to raise the question of the tanks to be purchased from Germany. (Pindi tel 1615)./4/ These tanks are not additive to the tank force but are for replacement purposes. Most of Pakistan's tanks are Sherman tanks which are no longer being made and spare parts for which are difficult to obtain. It is Pakistan's desire to phase out these tanks, replacing them with tanks of the kind requested. Because they are excess with Germany and she has no place for them, they can be obtained for a reasonable price. Yusuf does not have numbers available but they will depend on how many Sherman tanks are to be phased and when. Yusuf can get us estimates of numbers if we desire. /4/In telegram 1615 from Rawalpindi, October 28, the Embassy reported that Pakistan was seeking U.S. approval of the purchase of M-41 and M-47 tanks and 155 mm. cannon from West Germany. The Germans were reported willing to sell but only through a third party and with U.S. acquiescence. The Foreign Ministry noted that India had obtained Seahawk aircraft from Germany through Italy in a similar fashion. (Ibid.) 2. President Ayub leaving for London morning of November 13. I am prepared return from Dacca to Karachi to talk with him about any message received from Department before that time. (Importance attached by President Ayub this subject indicated by fact Secy. Yusuf telephoned me yesterday and asked me to postpone my trip to Dacca one day in order to hold above reported meeting with him.) Locke
385. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 7, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. II. Confidential. Rostow forwarded Freeman's memorandum to the President on November 9 under cover of a memorandum in which he noted that Rusk endorsed Freeman's recommendation. Rostow added his own endorsement of the recommendation. (Ibid.) SUBJECT I. Current Crop Prospects The more recent reports from New Delhi, estimating the coming foodgrain harvest at 80-85 million tons, indicate a much smaller foodgrain harvest than was anticipated by Indian government officials a few months ago. It now seems quite likely that India's food situation will continue to be precarious throughout the coming year and that grain import needs will continue to be high. This is due in part to a very poor monsoon and in part to shortcomings in this year's agricultural development effort. II. An Evaluation of this Year's Agricultural Effort The nature of the monsoon continues to be the overwhelming factor determining the level of food production on the Indian subcontinent. The second most important factor is the use of fertilizer. In this area, the Indians have performed well on some counts but poorly on others. They have willingly allocated scarce foreign exchange for the import of fertilizer in order to meet the agreed upon targets for fertilizer availability. However, last year because of delays in financing much of the fertilizer was not ordered on time. Efforts to increase foreign private investment in the production of chemical fertilizer in India have been quite successful compared with any previous efforts but not adequate when related to the scale of India's needs. A similar shortfall exists for investment in pesticides and the multiplication and distribution of improved seed varieties. Minister Subramaniam seems to be doing his utmost to achieve the objectives for Indian agriculture which he and I mutually agreed upon several months ago. But private foreign investment in fertilizer is moving slowly. The reason is, at least in part, that both sides (the Indian Government and the foreign investors) are trying to get the best deal possible for themselves and are willing to delay in order to get it. The follow-through necessary to complete complicated negotiations is lacking on the Indian side. We believe that the solution to this problem of ensuring the necessary action for foreign private investment can only be accomplished by the Prime Minister herself. Somehow she must be made to realize this. Reaching agreement with Minister Subramaniam, however competent and influential he may be, is not enough. The Prime Minister, however, is deeply pre-occupied with the campaign for the General Election to be held in February. The key figures in politics are jockeying for position in anticipation of the formation of a new cabinet in February. We are also concerned about the reluctance of the Indian Government to ease controls and regulations in the agricultural sector. Two years ago I went to India and helped them to set up a Foodgrains Corporation, comparable to our Commodity Credit Corporation, which would have the responsibility for supporting farm prices at a level which would make the use of modern inputs profitable. It now appears that the Government of India is using the Foodgrains Corporation to procure foodgrains at below market prices, thus discouraging food production rather than stimulating it with proper pricing as was originally intended. However, procurement prices have recently been raised in four states. We are planning to send to India, within the next week or two, a member of the team who originally helped establish this corporation to evaluate its performance. III. Proposed Action on PL 480 Interim Agreement These matters and some others that we are checking out need to be taken into consideration before allocating any substantial quantities of food assistance. We will be prepared to review with the Indians a progress check list in detail when negotiations take place in December for the balance of fiscal 1967. In the meantime I would urge that we go slowly and make only the minimum necessary allocation to avoid breaking the pipe line. We can expect no substantial policy changes before the Indian elections in late February and our negotiations in December should be kept quiet so as to avoid providing ammunition to those who attack the present government for being too subservient to U.S. wishes. But in the December negotiations we can and will explore a number of self-help measures which could improve India's agricultural performance and impress upon Indian leaders how gravely we view performance shortfalls. We recommend therefore that we go ahead at this time with 1.2 million tons of wheat and 800,000 tons of grain sorghum on an interim basis, meanwhile preparing for detailed top level negotiations in December. By early December we should have more detailed information on the nature of shortcomings of this year's agricultural effort as well as the first report on our own wheat acreage. State and AID concur in this analysis and recommendation.
386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, November 7, 1966, 1:37 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Rusk on November 6, cleared by Hare and Katzenbach, and approved by Rusk. 80047. Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. Re your 6660,/2/ I believe I should let you know very privately that we have some major problems back here about reproducing in 1967 anything like the food shipments we made to India during 1966 and that we should not let the Indian Government take it for granted that we can be a source for such food in advance of any decisions actually made. /2/Telegram 6660 from New Delhi, November 4, was sent by Bowles to the President and Secretaries Rusk and Freeman to put the "critical Indian food situation" in clear perspective. In the 10-page cable, Bowles described the crisis facing India and the need for U.S. help to avert a tragedy. He credited the Indian Government for its strenuous efforts to improve agricultural output and concluded that only repeated failure of the monsoon rains prevented a significantly expanded harvest. Bowles argued that the "short-tether" policy governing U.S. food shipments was self-defeating in that it created the impression of political pressure and gave leverage to an opposition seeking to unseat the Gandhi government with which the United States had worked closely in attempting to modernize Indian agricultural methods and open up the Indian economy. (Ibid., SOC 10 INDIA) It comes as a deep disappointment that "imports from abroad must at least equal those of calendar year 1966." The following questions are going to be highly relevant back here: 1. How good is Indian performance on their own commitments? Your 6660 is most helpful but indications of any failure to make the maximum effort could be very damaging here. 2. Our own prospective supply situation is not encouraging in terms of repeating next year what we did this year. Quite apart from actual production and wheat stocks, it was necessary for us to be much more restrictive on a number of other countries this past year because of Indian requirements. It will not be easy for us to continue this policy without deep injury in other places. 3. What are the prospects for India's obtaining substantial amounts of food from other sources? In this case, it will not be very agreeable here for the Indians to use their available foreign exchange to buy in other markets and leave it to us to come forward with major concessional food shipments. They at least ought to offer to buy in our market. If, for example, they purchase large quantities of grain from the Soviet Union on relatively hard terms, it would create serious questions as to why they should not buy in our market on similar terms. Similarly, it will be important for them to get concessional help of substantial amounts from others. What do you know about Indian plans in this regard? 4. While we must avoid the overt impression of political conditions, the truth is that India has a political constituency in the US which it must nourish if it expects substantial concessional help. This is simply a political fact of life since the President has no resources except those made available by Congress and this in turn is affected by the general political atmosphere. I am sure you realize that the gratuitous departure of India from a position of non-alignment in Viet-Nam does not help at all. I cannot understand why the Indians cannot simply support the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 and the idea of a peaceful settlement. The Moscow communiqué and the demand for a unilateral cessation of bombing are complicating factors which should not be underestimated. I mention these factors because they bear upon paragraph eleven of your 6232./3/ It would be most unfortunate if the government leadership should proceed on the basis that they can somehow rely upon us at the end of the day to come through with whatever is required. If they face a repeat of their 1966 situation, they have some formidable problems to solve and should not be in the mood to take us for granted. Anything that you can send us on the above or other related points will be greatly appreciated. /3/Dated October 27. (Ibid., AID (US) 15-8 INDIA) Warm regards. Rusk
387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, November 8, 1966, 7:16 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Spain, Coon, Wriggins, Handley, Kitchen, Hoopes, and Deputy Assistant Administrator in AID/NESA Walter G. Farr, Jr.; and approved by Hare. Repeated to Rawalpindi, Dacca for Locke, and London. 81259. Ref: Rawalpindi's 1751/2/ and 1759;/3/ Delhi's 6698./4/ Subject: Military Supply Policy. /2/Document 384. /3/In telegram 1759 from Rawalpindi, November 7, Locke reported that Foreign Secretary Yusuf had indicated that his government had received a feeler from Indian Foreign Minister Singh concerning the possibility of secret talks. Yusuf noted that the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi had been instructed to follow up on the opening. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 PAK) /4/Telegram 6698 from New Delhi, November 5, reported on a conversation between Bowles and C.S. Jha. In the course of discussing relations between India and Pakistan, Bowles noted that the current political environment in each country effectively precluded a public dialogue. Jha agreed and was receptive to Bowles' suggestion that secret talks without an agenda offered the only good prospect of improving relations. (Ibid., POL INDIA-PAK) 1. We believe discussions with Ayub and Foreign Secretary Yusuf have now reached point where corresponding representations should begin with GOI. We are encouraged by nature Ayub's response and believe it both tactically and psychologically desirable we move promptly exploit that response. 2. Accordingly you should seek earliest possible opportunity open discussions with Mrs. Gandhi along lines Para 5(h) State 71125./5/ These could be natural follow-up to highly opportune exchange you had with C.S. Jha reported Embtel 6698. We continue feel it best for present not spell out precise nature talks with Ayub. However you authorized describe our démarche in general terms and to say we are encouraged by both his stance on future Chicom procurement and readiness find way to begin exploratory talks with GOI, urging Mrs. Gandhi as you did Jha to "try it out" with Ayub. (As indicated Pindi's 1759, Pak Hicom Delhi reportedly instructed take up idea of secret talks with GOI.) /5/Document 382. 3. For both Delhi and Rawalpindi: Given Ayub's upcoming visit UK appreciate knowing reaction your British colleagues to our current efforts. Rusk
388. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, November 8, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 INDIA. Secret; Nodis: Eyes Only. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. 6826. For the Secretary from Ambassador Bowles. Reference: New 6660;/2/ State 80047./3/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 386. /3/Document 386. 1. I appreciate your strictly eyes only cable on the Indian food situation. As you point out, we are facing heavy demands from many directions and something has to give. Against this background I shall take up your points one by one. A. Our cable 6660 on India's current agricultural performance is the result of a thorough study by all elements of our mission here plus lengthy discussions with everyone we could find in India who might have an enlightened opinion or reliable knowledge of Indian agriculture. Our analysis was specifically checked against the broad knowledge of Bernie Bell, who has been in India for the last sixty days heading the World Bank Study Group which has been exhaustively studying the Indian economic and agricultural situations since September 1964 and which will soon report to the consortium. Bell himself fully supports our findings as does Sir John Crawford, the eminent Australian agricultural economist now in Delhi as a member of the World Bank team. Both Bell and Crawford will underscore these views when they reach Washington in the next two or three weeks following the consortium meeting in Paris. I suggest you talk to them and judge for yourself. B. Frankly and confidentially what particularly worries me is the fact that the most sober and balanced analysis we can develop here has on several occasions been undercut by hearsay reports by people who had not been here or whose information is fragmentary. For instance when I was in Washington the President told me he understood that India is falling down badly on its fertilizer program. When I ran this down I discovered that this story grew out of someone's interpretation of India's reluctance to extend its March 1, 1967 deadline for the special incentives to new private sector plants, a reluctance which I explained in our 6660 as reflecting India's judgement that by holding to this date for the time being it might induce quicker decisions by the fertilizer companies. C. May I repeat that our report on the unprecedented revolution now occurring in Indian agriculture is an accurate, balanced and considered one, fully supported by the findings of every foreign agricultural expert whom we know in India. India's recent performance, while not perfect, is substantially ahead of anything we anticipated. In the language of Bill Gaud's memorandum to Walt Rostow of October 7, 1966,/4/ it is "incomparably better than in any previous year." /4/Reference is to an October 8 memorandum from Gaud to Rostow assessing Indian agricultural performance. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. III) 2. I am aware of and concerned by the shortages in our own available stocks of wheat and other claims on our resources. A. The needs here are desperate and are so recognized by everyone concerned. As far as priorities are concerned we must take into account the possibility of India disintegrating under the economic and political pressures set in motion by the adverse monsoon throughout most of India last year and compounded by a monsoon this year which has failed even more dismally in an area inhabited by 100 million people. B. It should be stressed that India is prepared to take large amounts of milo, which I understand we have in substantial supply as well as any other edible grains. I hope that with our existing supplies we will be able to meet India's minimum requirements during the first half of 1967, and that by the latter half increased supplies as result 30 per cent expansion US wheat acreage will be sufficient to satisfy remaining needs until the harvest a year from now. While I fully appreciate our desire to avoid any further reduction in our foodgrain stockpile, we may have to weigh the adverse implications of such temporary reduction against the importance of keeping people alive and avoiding the disintegration of the largest and most strategically placed non-Communist nation in Asia. 3. Last night the Canadian High Commissioner told me that Canada had been asked to provide 2 million tons of wheat and that it was his impression that his government would agree. He thought that one million tons would be on an outright grant basis as in the case of Canadian shipments this year and the second million would be on long term credit. The Australians and French also tell me they have been asked for wheat. The French Ambassador said he thought his government would react favorably. I hope that the Australians can also be persuaded to provide assistance in view of their favorable crop. A. I recognize the political problems that would be created by India purchasing large amounts of grain for hard currency from others while receiving grain on a concessional basis from US. I have no knowledge of what the Soviet Union will do. However, since they have had a good crop, I would not be surprised to see them come up with some well-timed gesture. B. India will obviously have to secure whatever she needs by whatever means. We must remember that we have a crucial stake in seeing that the foreign exchange required to keep India's economy moving is not completely diverted into famine relief; Soviet political interests, as they see them, may lie in precisely the opposite direction. In any case, we have never allowed the greed and short-sightedness of other nations to set a ceiling on our performance, and this is no time to start. 4. I know you will agree that no nation, however enlightened its leadership, can change its foreign policy overnight. Thirty years after our own isolationist policies had become irrelevant, Congress voted to deny France and Britain the military equipment necessary to defend themselves against the Nazis. Similarly, India is still clinging doggedly to the sterile premises of the Bandung Conference. The so-called Non-Aligned Summit Meeting here in Delhi was a ridiculous performance: there will probably be more silly gestures in the future. A. However we should not underestimate the progress we have made in India on foreign policy matters. The biggest circulation dailies [garble--invariably?] criticized the Moscow communiqué: criticism of the recent Yugoslav-UAR-India communiqué was even more devastating. In the last year, partly due to our own efforts here, a large number of key Indian journalists have visited East Asia including Viet-Nam. As far as I know their reports in every instance have been strongly sympathetic with our interests in Asia. Under separate cover I shall send you recent articles which reflect this profound shift in thinking. B. There is no doubt in my mind that if we get into a war with China, India will, reluctantly to be sure, be dragged in on our side much as we were dragged into two world wars in support of the French and the British. In the meantime India will continue to be frustrating, difficult and inconsistent reflecting the inner conflicts of a new nation facing staggering problems and possessing, not unnaturally, a vast sense of insecurity and a realization of its own relative weakness. C. While the Indians look to us hopefully for support, they are by no means taking us for granted. They are keenly aware of the inadequacy of our supplies and of our emphasis on performance as a precondition for assistance. They have experienced the suspension of our aid and our short-tether policy of doling out PL480 a few months at a time, a policy which whatever its advantages has made rational long-term planning in India impossible. As we reported, the GOI has come under extremely heavy attack for its so-called dependence on the US for PL480 and other assistance. As a consequence, the government has been extremely hesitant to approach us for additional assistance; if anything, it has recently underestimated its needs in dealings with us. 5. Tomorrow I shall send a cable to you and the President outlining my deep anxiety about the political and economic situation here./5/ I do not exaggerate when I say the future of India, with its democratic promise and economic potential, is hanging in the balance. What is at stake is not only India's stability but its future relationships with US and other Western nations; these will be profoundly affected by developments in the next six months. /5/Telegram 6843 from New Delhi, November 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA) 6. The 2 million tons of wheat and milo which I recommended in late August is still being held in abeyance. Even if the President approves it today a significant slowdown in the arrival of food ships here will be inevitable by mid-January, which is the very time when the food shortage will be most critical and with the election only one month away political tensions most acute. 7. It is absolutely essential, Dean, that we keep these food grains flowing and that we take a fresh long term look at the importance of a stable friendly India to American security interests in Asia. If India lapses into chaos or antipathy, and in my opinion these are very real possibilities, the massive sacrifice we are making in Vietnam will lose much of its meaning. I know that we can count on you to do everything possible at what I really believe to be a crucial moment. With warm personal regards./6/ /6/In a November 9 memorandum to the President, Rostow characterized this cable from Bowles as a "vivid, somewhat overstated, but essentially accurate account of the nature and seriousness of the situation created by the crop failure in the state of Bihar and neighboring areas." He added that Ambassador Nehru had called him to warn that starvation was expected in India by February unless the flow of U.S. grain was resumed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. II) Bowles
389. Editorial Note On November 10, 1966, President Johnson told Secretary of Agriculture Freeman that he was disappointed with the memorandum Freeman had sent to him on November 7 (Document 385). In the course of a telephone conversation, Johnson said: "You must've had two men write this memo. You gave the best damn arguments I ever saw for not giving it to them. You said they hadn't kept their agreement on investment and fertilizer. That it's moving slowly. That they're jockeying to try to get a deal that's better for themselves. That they're delaying. That they don't have the follow-through necessary to do what they agreed to do. . . . That they're easing regulations and controls in the agricultural sector, which we're concerned about. That the government is using the Foodgrains Corporation to procure them at below market price, discouraging food production rather than stimulating it as agreed to. . . . Therefore, I recommend we give them 1.2." Johnson drew a different conclusion: "That's going to get me in trouble. I can't take a recommendation like yours, and Rusk who just says `me too' on any goddamn thing you can dream up. I can't do that and feed India another year. I'm not going to unless Congress does." He told Freeman to send his study group to India. "In the meantime, I'd urge we go slowly. . . . Tell them we can't act 'til the Congress comes back. And send your man over, and take each thing they agreed to do, and study damn carefully, because these give-away days, they voted them out of office last Tuesday." He told Freeman to tell Bowles "that we have completed our commitments. That we've given them $1 billion. That these billions come hard these days. . . . And that these matters need checking out." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, November 10, 1966, 3:36 p.m., Tape F66.31, Side A, PNO 1) Johnson did not feel that he could get a balanced appreciation of the situation from Bowles. He described Bowles to Vice President Humphrey as "the Ambassador from India not to India." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey, November 24, 1966, 9:40 a.m., Tape F66.31, Side B, PNO 336) Johnson was seriously concerned about "give-aways" at a time when the grain surplus in the United States was depleted and he was facing the prospect of a $135 billion budget. In a follow-up conversation with Freeman on November 11, Johnson said that in future food allotments he wanted to know what the United States was going to get in return for its food. "Usually we just get kicked in the pants. That's what she [Gandhi] does to us. She'll call old Tito or somebody else and just give us hell. I don't want to write her foreign policy, but it looks to me the least they could do, right before our election, is quit kicking us." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, November 11, 1966, 8:59 a.m., Tape F66.31, Side A, PNO 158)
390. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, November 11, 1966, 7:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Lester Brown in Agriculture; cleared by Farr (AID), Wriggins, and Secretary Freeman; and approved by Handley. 83625. For Ambassador from Secretary Freeman. Ref: State 83624./2/ Please pass following message from me to Subramaniam: /2/Telegram 83624 to New Delhi, November 11, also for Bowles from Freeman, provided more background detail on the mission Freeman proposed to send to India to assess the food crisis. Freeman noted that the utmost urgency was attached to the assessment. (Ibid.) Begin Text. 1. We are much disheartened here by the reports of another poor crop in India. Coming after last year's near disastrous crop, it poses exceedingly difficult problems. We also face difficult supply, domestic food price and political problems here. 2. This Administration is deeply concerned over the failure of major food producing countries other than Canada to contribute foodgrains to India on a meaningful scale. 3. The new food aid legislation requires that we carefully assess agricultural performance in countries requesting food aid. At the direction of the President I am therefore sending immediately two of my top economists to India to undertake a quick on-the-spot assessment of the agricultural production effort, particularly the functioning of the Foodgrains Corporation, private investment in the production of fertilizer, the extent to which the 6.5 million tons target of additional foodgrain production is being achieved under the High-yielding Varieties Program, and other jointly agreed targets which help to determine whether the self-help requirement of our new legislation is met. 4. This team of economists, consisting of Martin Abel and Art Thompson, have worked with you and your staff previously. They will be joined by Assistant Secretary Dorothy Jacobson the week of November 20. 5. Since our short supply situation has resulted in increased Congressional concern, we would like to have several members of Congress from both houses and both parties join us in order to confirm to their elected colleagues India's need and the seriousness of the effort being made. We realize this may be a delicate matter particularly at this time in your political timetable. But you can be sure that the President would not propose it unless he felt it essential here. We would welcome your suggestions as to how this could be kept as low key as possible as they join the team the week of November 20./3/ End Text. /3/In a personal cable to Rusk, Bowles described this message as "extraordinarily insensitive" and complained that sending economists from Washington to assess the situation in India constituted an indictment of the Embassy's competence and judgment, which he felt to be "unjustified and unacceptable." Bowles argued that Freeman's message suggested a totally unfounded relationship between a second poor crop year and Indian efforts in agriculture. He stated that he did not intend to deliver Freeman's message to Subramaniam unless directed to do so by Rusk or the President. (Telegram 6998 from New Delhi, November 12; ibid., AID (US) 15 INDIA) Rusk responded in telegram 83747 to New Delhi, November 12, that the dispatch of a special mission to India was not intended as a vote of no-confidence in the Embassy's judgment. Rusk noted that the larger objective of the experts from Agriculture and the later Congressional delegation was to enlist the cooperation of Subramaniam and the Indian Government in redoubled efforts to meet the crisis and to persuade them not to take for granted action by the United States. (Ibid.) In telegram 83787 to New Delhi, November 13, Rusk instructed Bowles to make an oral presentation to Subramaniam along the lines of Freeman's message, but softened somewhat to take account of Indian sensibilities. (Ibid., SOC 10 INDIA) Rusk
391. Letter From Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)/1/ Washington, November 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. III. Confidential; Eyes Only. Dear Chet: By now you will have received cables indicating that two agricultural economists from the USDA will be on their way to Delhi Monday/2/ evening. Several Congressmen and Senators will be coming later, early in December, since it has not been possible to alter the schedules of the key Members of Congress at this short notice. /2/November 14. This mission should be seen as an earnest of the President's deep concern for India's plight. The past several mornings he has come in with a new angle, so you can be assured he is deeply concerned. From the urgency of your messages, he suspects that we are in for another really tough year in India and that the Congress will have to be asked to come through handsomely again, even though we argued this year that such high requirements were quite exceptional. He therefore feels it absolutely necessary to build a base in Congress which can only be done by (a) a really cool review, sponsored by Washington, of Indian agricultural performance and (b) adequate Congressional participation so that the members can reassure their elected colleagues. The President knows Mrs. Gandhi's political difficulties, particularly the last distressing weeks, but he has his problems, too. Without such a quick look now, he does not believe he can get Congress cranked up sufficiently. He is even unable to move on the interim 2 million tons until this team of experts reports. The Department of State, with Freeman's concurrence, is also asking Doug Heck to plug into the agricultural team's immediate investigations. It is important that he go along insofar as he can in order to get a rather precise view of the political implications of pressing the agricultural changes Subramaniam has agreed to and we have been urging. And on his return, he will be able to interpret to us all verbally, as our discussions proceed, the broader context and experience of the specialized economic mission. The attached is a rough outline/3/ of the kinds of information we think we will need. It may not all come out in the report of Secretary Freeman's experts, but it suggests the total picture we think we will eventually have to provide and send it to you as the best indication of our thinking here now. I am sending a copy to John Lewis to impress on him the need for a broad view in this exercise. /3/Not printed. This is in haste. You can imagine how distressed we are that the Government is having its present difficulties. It is particularly discouraging for those of us who have been plugging India's bright future for so long. But I personally think it will come through this time of troubles, though it may be a close thing. All the best--and be of good cheer. Don't the British say, "Keep your pecker up"? Sincerely, Howard Wriggins/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
392. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, November 14, 1966, 1322Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA. Confidential; Priority. 7055. Ref: State 83787./2/ /2/See footnote 3, Document 390. 1. At 10 am Nov 14 AID Director John Lewis and I called on Subramaniam to outline our plan for urgent review of Indian food situation first by experts from USDA, second by Congressmen. Dias, Secretary, Dept of Food, also attended meeting. We are forwarding by separate cable/3/ aide-mémoire which outlines conversation in detail and which we have conveyed to Subramaniam. /3/Telegram 7056 from New Delhi, November 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA) 2. After hearing our presentation Subramaniam stated he would welcome any action that would create a better understanding of India's food problem and effort India is making to meet its needs as a basis for continued assistance. 3. As noted in aide-mémoire, Subramaniam promptly brought up question of India's urgent and immediate needs. In November 1,200,000 tons of foodgrains would be landed. In December he expected roughly one million tons. Unless additional shipments can be arranged very soon, arrivals in January will drop to 500,000 tons. This will mean reduced rations in all major cities just one month before national elections. 4. Under these extreme circumstances he expressed hope that we would agree to release, on interim basis the additional 500,000 tons required to keep pipeline full until first of February. If an agreement were not signed in near future, India would undertake to pay for this emergency grain with its own foreign exchange./4/ /4/Rostow passed on this request in a November 14 memorandum to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. 2) The Embassy was informed, in telegram 86882 to New Delhi, November 17, that urgent Indian cash purchases of grain would be shipped expeditiously so that deliveries would continue. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA) 5. I told Subramaniam we would convey his request to Washington and inform him as soon as we receive reply. As Dept knows from our previous cables, we do not feel that Subramaniam overstates extent of the emergency. We are therefore hopeful that it will be possible allow India obtain an additional 500,000 tons of food grain immediately either through prompt amendment to present PL480 agreement or under reimbursable procedure which was used earlier this year (Deptel 2119, May 2)./5/ /5/Telegram 2119 was sent to New Delhi on May 3. (Ibid., AID (IBRD) 9 INDIA) Bowles
393. Editorial Note On November 27, 1966, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman called President Johnson to discuss the report of the experts Freeman had sent to India to assess agricultural developments. Freeman said he was preparing a memorandum for the President summarizing the report. Johnson observed that such a memorandum would be politically sensitive, and he was concerned about leaks to the press in the Department of Agriculture. He told Freeman to give him an oral summary of the report and not to submit the memorandum. Freeman noted that his experts had gone to India with instructions to determine how well India was living up to the agreement Freeman and Subramaniam had signed in Rome. The experts concluded that "their batting average was about 80 per cent. That on the things they said they'd do, they pretty well delivered on." On balance, the experts gave the Indian Government an "A" for effort. Freeman went on to assess the new food crisis that was complicating the Indian Government's efforts to live up to the agreement. "This monsoon failure took place in central India. It came on very quickly with an almost complete failure of rainfall in the last six weeks." In some ways, he noted, the new crisis posed a more difficult problem than the subcontinent-wide crisis of the previous year: "this time the shortfall is concentrated in a very limited area that involves about 150 million people which is a long way from the seacoast and which, unfortunately, is in an area in India which has the worst government in terms of the state government. And they seem to be having just a hell of a time getting the local leadership in that area--the chief ministers, as they call them--to move." Freeman observed that without food supplies from abroad there was a serious danger of starvation. In response to a question from Johnson, Freeman stated that the anticipated grain harvest in India would produce some 85 million tons, approximately 10 million tons less than expected before the failure of the monsoons. Johnson asked how the projected 85 million ton total compared with the amount of grain produced in India the previous year. Freeman responded that India had produced 74 million tons during the previous famine year. Johnson asked how much grain had been supplied to India from abroad during the previous year, and Freeman indicated that India had received approximately 11 million tons, of which the United States had supplied 8.5 million. Johnson found it difficult to understand why India needed grain from abroad if it was going to produce as much as it had gotten by on during the previous year: "I just don't see why they ought to call Uncle Sam. They got eleven million more tons of production this year than they had last year when we gave them ten. Themselves. Now, they haven't had a goddamn big failure. They've just produced eleven million more than they had last year. But they're just on that tit and they want ten million free tons, and we want it for our farmers and so nobody here is stopping." Freeman explained that the problem in India was one of uneven distribution. Some of the Indian states would enjoy grain surpluses, but in the wake of the famine it was difficult to persuade people to part with that surplus. One of the options being considered by the Gandhi government, if grain from abroad could not be found to meet the new crisis, was to use the army to compel a redistribution of grain. Freeman noted that with a general election pending in India, the experts in the Department of Agriculture felt that such a move would probably lead to the fall of the government. Another option would be to use the limited foreign exchange reserves India had to buy grain on the international market. To do so, however, would impact heavily on the economic development program the United States was supporting in India. Johnson was skeptical about how India was spending its foreign exchange reserves: "I'd bear in mind that they got two hundred million of currency that they can buy all the damn wheat they need, instead of airplanes." He also had difficulty sympathizing with the distribution problem Freeman had described: "It's just a hell of a note for me to say to India that I've got a big surplus in Texas but I haven't in Maine so you got to ship it up to us for Maine, India, because I won't take it from Texas. That don't make sense. The only reason I got to ship it is because they won't use their own." Johnson was also dubious about the advice he was getting on India: "I've got more damn people that are working for the Indians and fewer working for the Americans than anybody I ever saw." With that reservation, he asked Freeman to outline the immediate problem. Freeman noted that significant quantities of wheat were scheduled to be shipped from the United States to India in December and January. Between 800,000 and 900,000 tons were to be shipped in December and some 200,000 more in January. From the middle of January until the beginning of April, however, Freeman stated "they are going to be naked." Except for the United States, Canada was the only other country contemplating emergency grain supplies for India, and Canada was hampered by frozen ports. In light of the serious nature of the crisis, Freeman suggested that Johnson authorize an additional 2 million tons of grain to bridge the shortfall until the new crop was harvested in India in April. Johnson was not prepared to make the kind of commitment proposed by Freeman without authorization from Congress. He was concerned over the prospect of a $20 billion budget deficit, and he felt he had to give priority to financing the war in Vietnam. "Now, goddamn it, I've just got to stop something. And I don't know anything easier to stop than the Indian wheat." He was prepared to contemplate an additional 500,000 tons, at a cost of approximately $35 million, to supplement the more than 1 million tons already scheduled for shipment, but beyond that he wanted Congress to be consulted. His concluding instruction to Freeman was to arrange for a draft resolution bearing on the food crisis for Congress to consider when it came back into session in January: "I think if you just tell Rusk on this, or Nick, or whoever you are dealing with in the morning that we want to get a resolution ready and, as soon as they do, why, Congress gets back, we'll have one of the first meetings, like we did last time. We'll follow the same procedures. Unless there is something that I'm not aware of, I don't want to go up into the dozens of millions of dollars on commitments unless I got these Congressmen and other folks behind me." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, November 27, 1966, 7:30 p.m., Tape F66.32, Sides A and B (entire tape)) [Continue with the next documents]
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