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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
394. Telegram From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant and Chief of Staff (Moyers)/1/ New Delhi, November 28, 1966, 1106Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles. Secret; Eyes Only. The message was [text not declassified] addressed to the White House, Eyes Only Bill Moyers. 7126. 1. Because I felt that we have done all that we can do through regular channels to communicate the importance to U.S. interests in India of keeping the grain pipe line full and because USDA team is now making its report, we have been sending in only routine reporting cables. 2. However as this emergency grows I am taking the liberty of cabling you directly and privately because I want to be absolutely sure that those close to the President and the President himself understand the agonizing political-economic situation which is building up here in India. In view of the turmoil of Manila, the US elections, the continuing Viet-Nam crisis and some unpleasant surgery, it would not be surprising if the full implications of our messages have failed to filter through. 3. Here is the situation as briefly and soberly as I can state it: by next Wednesday or Thursday the Indian Cabinet will have to decide whether or not to cut the already meager rations on which some 120 million people largely in the urban areas are living in order to spread the available supplies over a longer period. Under the very best of circumstances the moderate pro-democracy Congress Party is bound to face severe losses in the elections in February. If the already inadequate daily foodgrain ration to these 120 million people is cut these losses will be significantly greater and the prospect of a government emerging which is closer to the U.S. will diminish sharply. 4. I have been making a vigorous and continuing effort through background talks with the Indian press and key Indian officials to temper the current fears, insecurity and distrust. Thus far the Indian press and GOI spokesmen, including Mrs. Gandhi,/2/ have been remarkably moderate. However as starvation deaths grow significantly and the electioneering climate takes over, such restraints will be cast aside and moderation will go by the board. /2/The Associated Press reported from New Delhi on November 26 that Prime Minister Gandhi told the Press Club of India that India had been forced to seek food from other parts of the world because of a delay by the United States in signing a new P.L. 480 agreement. She said the delay was purportedly because India was not making sufficient efforts to increase its food production, but she denied that this was the case. As a result of the reduced flow of grain from abroad, she said that the government was considering a cut in grain rations to the Indian people in order to provide more food for the drought-affected areas of the country. (Ibid., NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. III) 5. Although I do not know the real reasons for the delay I surmise from newspaper dope stories out of Washington and from various visitors that several factors are involved. Following are some of them with my comments: A. India is not doing enough to help herself. Although India after 200 years of stagnation is not doing everything it should in agriculture, it is doing far more than we dreamed it could do two years ago. This is the consensus of every qualified observer who has had a first hand look (including experts for the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the World Bank and our own mission). India's water development still lags and adequate credit facilities are lacking in many areas but even here the prospects for progress are encouraging. Unless I am profoundly mistaken India will be close to foodgrain self-sufficiency by 1971 and in a balanced food position by 1975. Although it may properly be charged that the Indians should have given agriculture a much higher priority several years ago we ourselves carry a certain responsibility for the delay. In the 1950's the economic assistance policies of the USG in India were not designed to make India self-sustaining in foods but consciously or unconsciously to preserve India as a dumping ground for PL 480 food surpluses which at that time seemed limitless. It has only been during the last three years that the USG has itself faced the Indian food situation realistically and attempted to deal with it vigorously. B. India should ask others besides Uncle Sam. India has been pressing all nations in a position to help vigorously in the last few weeks, and some of these nations will probably come through (Canada, Australia, perhaps even Soviets). However, no nation other than U.S. is in a position to keep the food grain pipe lines full during the next crucial 90 days. C. The necessary food is available in India, if only the surplus states would give it up to the needy areas. This story, which seems to have originated with a Warren Unna article, is based on gross misinformation. The Indian Government has been vigorously procuring in the few surplus states in desperate effort to maintain rations in large urban areas throughout India and at the same time boost deliveries to famine-torn Bihar and up. D. Mrs. Gandhi is unfairly critical of U.S. policies in Viet-Nam. I more than almost anyone else can sympathize with the President's frustration over the vagaries and contradictions of India's foreign policies; the Moscow communiqué was particularly irritating as I told Mrs. Gandhi in a blunt personal letter the day after the communiqué was signed. However, this situation is not new. India's non-alignment evolved out of the independence movement and has been in full bloom now for nineteen years. (Note: It took us Americans forty years and two world wars to learn the folly of isolationism.) Moreover if we can avoid undue strain on our relations with India now I believe that there is a better than even chance that the new government which will be formed after the elections will adopt a posture more favorable to us in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Many key Indian political leaders, some of whom may emerge with greatly enhanced influence following the election, already have a keen appreciation for what U.S. is trying to do there. Last week Blitz and the Communist press were in an uproar because the Indian Government told the North Viet-Nam representative here in India not to release a statement critical of the U.S. which had been prepared for the press. In any event, the appearance that U.S. is delaying food shipments because of displeasure with India's Viet-Nam policy which has been created by leaked news stories out of Washington simply sets off a strong chauvinistic reaction here which plays into the hands of those who most strenuously oppose our policy. 6. Nevertheless, even if one were to concede these arguments and, I must emphasize that all but the last run wholly counter to the evidence available to us and the qualified analysts and observers who have recently gone over the ground, one absolutely fundamental question remains: is the United States with its traditional commitment to human welfare going to stand by idly in the face of a major and increasingly apparent human disaster in India and permit that disaster to occur? This question will necessarily be answered by our action, or inaction, in the next ten days. Whatever we decide to do thereafter, no matter on what scale or priority, will come only after starvation has become inevitable to an unknown number of people barely living today in the Bihar area. It will not be long before our TV screens and front pages will be overflowing with grim pictures and stories of this tragic situation. 7. As far as India is concerned our failure to act will provide a bonanza political opportunity for the Communists and lose us the respect and confidence of even the moderate groups in one of the few remaining democratic nations in Asia and Africa, confidence which hae been painstakingly built up over the past two decades. With all our power and wealth we simply cannot permit our moral leadership, to which the President has personally contributed so much, to be gravely and perhaps irreparably damaged by allowing Indians to starve while we wait for still more facts. 8. By now Martin Abel of the Department of Agriculture, who knows India well and who, as you know, has been making an intensive study of the food situation here during the last ten days, has reported to Orville Freeman who I assume will then report directly to the President. Unless I am mistaken, Abel's analysis and also Dorothy Jacobson's will coincide in most respects with our own. 9. I earnestly hope that based on this additional information the President will release the emergency grain necessary to maintain the pipeline flow at least well into March. This will see us beyond the election and through a dangerous crisis period in which both we and they can be grievously hurt, and leave time for a sober consideration of our 1967 Indian food plan. If we are forced to cut down this coming year on our shipments to India let's do it next fall and not now. 10. One possible approach that might allow us to meet the current emergency while protecting our Congressional rear is as follows: A. Announce soonest that we are releasing 500,000 tons of wheat and milo on an emergency basis with the understanding that the Indians will pay for it with their own money if we should decide to discontinue the food aid program. B. Ask the Congressional delegation headed by Bob Pogue and Walter Mondale which is coming out here in two weeks to give the President their judgment immediately following their visit of the importance of extending this emergency program by an additional million and a half tons of foodgrains. This would cover period until President can consult in early January with Congressional leaders or secure a new joint resolution if this is indicated. C. Postpone decision on the 1967 food aid program for India until after Congress has had an opportunity to take suitable action in January. The 2 million tons will alleviate need for further decisions until late January. 11. If this personal message adds nothing new to what the President already knows please file and forget it. However if you feel it can be helpful in further clarifying the situation please use it as you think best. 12. Believe me, Bill, I would not send this personal plea for action if I were not very deeply concerned by what may be ahead.
395. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 28, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. III. No classification marking. SUBJECT ENCLOSURE /2/Attached was a November 27 report from Martin E. Abel and Arthur T. Thompson to Freeman entitled "Evaluation of Agricultural Self-Help Efforts and Review of Food Situation in India." 1. The enclosed is self-explanatory. The team sought to make it objective and quantitative with a minimum of subjective evaluations. Particular attention was given to measuring whether India had met the commitments made by Minister Subramaniam at Rome. In certain cases commitments as to action were implicit rather than explicit. In these cases the effort applied was evaluated accordingly. The sections on the Food Situation include both objective evaluation and some judgments. The political situation is more in the area of State than Agriculture. Nonetheless, I felt you would welcome opinions from the last credible source "on the ground." 2. My evaluation of the Report is as follows: A. The Indians have met their clear cut commitments. The record is not a complete 100 percent where results are concerned but they have come close and have, I believe, sincerely tried to deliver. B. The food situation is grave. Two million tons of grain must come from somewhere between mid-January when the pipeline runs out and April, when the spring crop comes in. (How much relief the spring crop will give remains to be seen.) Otherwise there will be starvation in India during that period. The balance of the year will have to be considered separately. 3. Alternatives--There are four possible ways to get the 2 million tons of grain: A. It is possible, but unlikely, that the Indians could get it by the use of military force internally to procure in the surplus states. But this would postpone, not lessen, the total requirement for imported grain in 1967. The President can best judge the politics of such a course of action. Subramaniam's analysis is carried in the Report. B. It is possible that Canada could ship some in time to help. Australia is another possibility. So far neither France nor Russia have given encouragement. It is not likely that any combination of these could get the 2 million tons needed in the next few months. C. India might buy commercially. One hundred million dollars would buy about 1.5 million tons of wheat and a third more grain sorghum. India's free foreign exchange reserves are estimated at 150 to 200 million dollars. The President can best judge the practicality of India using these reserves in light of the economic development program. D. The United States. However, the logistics of moving grain from the U.S. are such (6 weeks at a minimum) that there is a real threat of famine if we wait to see what other countries do, and whether India will take the necessary steps to procure internally or buy outside commercially. The Team reported to me that Minister Subramaniam outlined his three alternative courses of action: A. A contribution from the United States at the level of recent months. B. A reduced contribution from the United States supplemented by a commercial purchase. C. Use military force for internal procurement and supplement by commercial purchase. He stated that he knew exactly what he would have to do under each alternative. He asked that the U.S. make up its mind so he would know what alternative to follow. 4. Political I do not feel competent to pass judgment on the political situation not having been exposed directly for 6 months. Mrs. Jacobson who is an experienced political observer reports that it is most sensitive and that the current government will likely stand or fall on the food question and whether the U.S. acts promptly. The Team reported to me that Subramaniam said that the present government would be defeated if the Army was used for compulsory procurement. He predicts that under such circumstances he would not be re-elected. 5. Recommendations A. I would recommend that an interim allocation be made promptly. On the record the Indians have met their commitment made to the U.S. at Rome. They are trying hard. Agriculture today is clearly the number 1 item (perhaps as much as defense) in their planning and budgeting. In 1965 the U.S. allotted 6 million tons of food grain to India. The Indian "self-help" effort in 1966 merits, in my judgment, a continuation of shipments at least at that level. We have shipped 3.2 million tons so far in this fiscal year. The 2 million tons I recommend be allotted between now and mid-February would fall within the 6 million ton level of 1965. Such an allocation could be made at once or in two segments--1 million tons immediately and the second million could be made subject to the confirmation of the Congressional team that India is making an adequate agricultural effort and couldn't get the grain from any other source in time to prevent disaster. B. Any allocation should be made under strict conditions. It should be clear that the continuation and strengthening of self-help efforts is a condition. Negotiations on self-help should begin soon to be completed following the Indian election. Any further allocation should depend on clear and definite Indian commitments to take further specific steps to strengthen their agriculture.
396. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, November 28, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. III. Secret. Drafted by Francis M. Bator, the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. SUBJECT In summary, the President instructed that: 1. We provide him with a December-January-February schedule of absolute "minimum" requirements. 2. Irrespective of the above, we will not provide any wheat unilaterally, without substantial contributions from Canada, Australia, and France. Goldberg should have a hard go at them to see what they are prepared to do. 3. If we can get substantial contributions from the other producing countries, the President would be willing to provide a few hundred thousand tons prior to any Congressional action--if they do 1/2 million tons we might do 1/2 million tons. ("Get me a program which involves other donors, and for a U.S. amount of not over 1/2 million tons.") 4. For anything more than that, we must get a Congressional resolution. The President is prepared to make this the first order of Congressional business in January. FMB
397.Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, November 28, 1966, 2338Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. II. Confidential. CAP 661088. To the President from Walt Rostow. State wants your clearance on the following deal. 1. The Canadians would put up 21 million dollars in special food assistance to India as a pure grant. They may be announcing this in any case this afternoon or tomorrow morning. It consists of 150 thousand tons of wheat plus $9 million worth of flour, milk concentrates, etc. 2. We would put up 500 thousand tons of grain valued at $35 million on concessional terms (PL 480 Title I). 3. The Indians would agree to buy either from us alone (or from us and the Canadians) an additional 500 thousand tons of grain. (The Canadians may take the view that it is inappropriate, given the Indian foreign exchange position, to buy grain now. Besides, they may think that it would fudge up their normal commercial marketing arrangements. In that case, the 500,000 ton order would come to us.) 4. This would be the nut of the deal. Are we empowered to put this deal to the Indians, once we have confirmed the Canadian $21 million grant offer? 5. In addition, we would go out promptly to the Australians and ask them to put up 200,000 tons of grain on concessional terms. Our people think we might end up getting 100,000 tons, but it will take time for two reasons. First, the Australians are only now gathering in their harvest and don't quite know where they stand. Second, they haven't yet moved over like the Canadians to the idea of concessional grain. State does not think the deal should be held up until the Australians come round. 6. We would also go out to the French with a request that they put up some grain on concessional terms. We are not optimistic. 7. For your information, the last grain ship carrying wheat under present agreements from the U.S. to India will leave on December 7 and arrive by mid January. Grain arrivals from all sources now look as follows: October 918,000 tons; November 820,000 tons; December 320,000 tons; January 564,000 tons; February zero. In short, no grain arrivals are yet firmed up between mid January and the end of February. 8. The best estimate we have for the current harvest is 78.5 million tons, not 84 million tons. The Indians are projecting higher figures in order to avoid panic and to get through their elections.
398. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 29, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Memos, 10/66-7/67, Vol. VII. Secret. A handwritten note reads, "Rec'd at Ranch 11-30-66, 9:20 a.m." A handwritten "L" indicates the memorandum was seen by the President. SUBJECT When you sent Gene Locke out for his initial meeting with Ayub last spring, you authorized him to say we would resume our AID lending in six-month slices provided the Paks would do certain things. We wanted them to limit their defense expenditures, to make an honest effort to maintain the "spirit of Tashkent," to demonstrate a satisfactory appreciation of our interests in Asia, to cooperate on arrangements for our facilities and to live up to the economic conditions laid down by the World Bank Consortium. Locke feels that Ayub has done an honest job of living up to his share of this bargain. I recommend you read the attached excellent memo from Secretary Rusk detailing our conditions and Pak performance./2/ Of course, there is room for improvement in relations with India, but we at least have both capitals thinking about quite substantive talks, though probably not until after Indian elections. On all the economic and bilateral issues, Pak performance looks pretty good. /2/The memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President is dated November 21. Now is the time to go ahead with the next six-month slice--a second $70-million commodity loan through the Consortium--if you are satisfied that Ayub has lived up to your understanding with him last December and the conditions you laid down in April. Secretary Rusk recommends that you approve. Charlie Schultze finds that their economic performance has been good, their need clear, and that our share of total assistance is declining./3/ This loan fits within the reduced Development Loan authorized by Congress for FY 67 and leaves room for a U.S. loan to help finance U.S. equipment sales on the Karachi Steel Mill, for which your authorization will be sought later. /3/Schultze recommended approval of the loan in a November 28 memorandum to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Memos, 10/66-7/67, Vol. VII) This $70-million loan will be for purchases in the U.S. Secretary Fowler concurs. My own feeling is that we are back on an even enough keel to warrant taking this second step. Ayub has responded well to your sending a personal friend as Ambassador, and his removal of Foreign Minister Bhutto was a major step in rooting out the anti-American tone which characterized Pak policy in 1964 and 1965. Our policy on military spares may be the next big test in our relationship. Going ahead with this economic step now shows that we consider our relations still to be on the upgrade and gives us a firmer base for working toward the tough resolution of the military aid problem. I recommend you authorize the proposed loan. Walt Approve /4/Johnson checked this option. Rostow noted in a December 13 memorandum to the President that he did not receive word of the President's response until December 12. He asked if Johnson wanted to make a decision at that point. There is no indication on the memorandum of the President's response to Rostow's question. (Ibid., Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, April-December 1966)
399. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, December 9, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. III. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. The President last night authorized Walt Rostow to convey the following points to B.K. Nehru:/2/ /2/In a December 8 conversation with Katzenbach, Johnson complained about a number of news stories he had read suggesting that the U.S. supply of grain to India was dwindling. "This whole mess that the pipeline is going to dry up in January is just a damn lie." Johnson noted that the pipeline was currently full, and that 1 million tons of grain would be delivered to India in January. He felt that Nehru was contributing to a false impression through his contacts with a number of major papers. He said he was "damn tired of them treating me this way." He also enjoined Katzenbach to "get out your damn baseball bat" and do something about the people in the State Department who he thought were attempting to put pressure on him on India policy by leaking information to the press. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, December 8, 1966, 10:26 a.m., Tape F6612.01, Side B, PNO 34) 1. It is counter-productive to leak stories to the press and to pressure the President on the food problem. The President is the best friend the Indians have. By working through the press, they make it harder for him to do what he did during their emergency last year and what he may have to do again this year. 2. The Indians should give equal priority to buying wheat commercially in the U.S. It does not set well for us to read of larger purchases elsewhere when we are carrying the bulk of the concessional burden. (I asked WWR whether the President knew that the Indians intended to buy 50,000 tons and whether we should read his comment to imply that they should buy more. WWR said yes.) 3. The President can not move until his Congressional group comes back on 23 or 24 December. (However, the President has USDA lining up fast ships to move as quickly as they can after he makes a decision.) 4. The President is assured that India will be covered for January. He will be in a position to help in February if he gets a favorable report from his Congressional delegation. He can make no commitment now but the Indians should keep quiet and have some faith. Rostow planned to see Nehru in New York this afternoon. H.S.
400. Message From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)/1/ Washington, December 10, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles (cont.). Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note indicates that the message was sent as [text not declassified]. Chet: Assure you President is deeply concerned regarding Indian food needs, but he is determined to establish a sound political position to support our share of the massive needs you report for next year. January arrivals are now covered in part from Canada and Australia, as a result of our unwillingness to rush in. Decisions regarding February and beyond can't be taken until after Congressional delegation/2/ returns and after considering their recommendation and other problems here. Friday, December 9, I discussed this with Bijou,/3/ on President's instructions, sketched the above, and reiterated the four key points in our policy that (a) there must be evidence of effective high priority on agriculture; (b) there must be equitable burden-sharing internationally--others must contribute substantially grant foodstuffs or cash for food purchases; (c) there must be a Congressional base for food aid; (d) commercial purchases should be made on an equitable basis--we, too, are an important market for cash sales of grain and we hope the GOI Treasury officials will come to consider grain purchases here as high a priority as purchases in Australia and Canada. /2/The Congressional delegation scheduled to arrive in India on December 14 to assess the food situation was composed of Senator Jack Miller, Congressman W.R. Poage, and Congressman Robert Dole. /3/Ambassador Nehru. Bijou understands these points. I also stressed the counter-productivity of his Embassy or any other US or Indian governmental official attempting to use the press in an effort to stampede us. Sect. Rusk will have more of the flavor for you when you meet shortly./4/ /4/On his return from a trip to Vietnam, Rusk made a refueling stop in New Delhi on December 12 and met at Palam airport with Bowles and Foreign Minister Chagla. Rusk and Chagla discussed the situation in Vietnam and the food crisis in India. Chagla stated that the unwillingness or inability of the United States to help India meet the food crisis would cause resentment among the Indian people who would be unable to understand the U.S. rationale no matter how valid it might be. Rusk responded that Chagla's comment was unfair. He noted that the United States had sent food to India on a massive scale while help from other countries had been minimal. (Memorandum of conversation by Bowles, December 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-US) On December 14 Bowles sent to Rusk the answers to a number of questions raised by Rusk in his December 12 conversation with Bowles concerning the food crisis. (Telegram 8634 from New Delhi; ibid., SOC 10 INDIA) Walt/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
401. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, December 13, 1966, 1:23 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Heck on December 12; cleared by Handley, Macomber, Wriggins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations H.G. Torbert, Jr., and Brown (USDA), and in substance by Fried; and approved and initialed by Acting Secretary Katzenbach. Sent to Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, Helsinki, London, Madrid, Mexico City, Oslo, Paris, Rangoon, Rome, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, and Wellington and repeated to Karachi, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, USUN, and Paris for the Secretary. 101529. For Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Indian Food Crisis 1. U.S. Government is seriously concerned over food situation in India which for second year in row is faced with drought and substantial short-falls in food production. Situation is aggravated this year by near-famine conditions in northeastern India involving approximately 75 million people. While India has made considerable progress in its agriculture development program, this effort has been undermined by unfavorable weather. Until next major crop is harvested in October 1967 India's need will be great. 2. To meet last year's crop failure, we supplied eight million tons of foodgrains (about $500 million). Our response to India's needs last year was facilitated and endorsed by a Congressional resolution which authorized President to provide these PL-480 foodgrain shipments to India. The last shipments under that authorization are expected to arrive in India in January. 3. To cope with its pressing needs, Indian Government has approached us and several other major food-producing countries for further assistance. Canadian Government has already responded generously with $21 million food grant. It plans seek appropriation of another $75 million for food assistance, involving total grant of a million tons of wheat. We have hopes Australia will also supply wheat on grant or generous concessional terms. 4. We wish to do what we can but supplying India's needs this year will strain our diminishing foodgrain resources. Our wheat carry-over is lowest in years. We have had to expand acreage under cultivation to meet additional demands at considerable budgetary cost. It is apparent another long-term foodgrain assistance program will require Congressional support. Accordingly we consider it important that all industrial countries, especially members of India Consortium, as well as food-exporting countries generally share in this responsibility. 5. Actions such as India's self-help efforts, Canada's, and hopefully Australia's, are steps in this direction. Foodgrain-exporting nations however cannot be expected carry entire load. Industrial countries generally should be expected assist, not merely by token shipments of food, etc., but also by contributing funds to buy wheat or other grains in world market or by providing shipping, fertilizer, etc. 6. You should consult with your Indian colleague and support his efforts to obtain assistance from host government. FYI: GOI is being urged to issue such instructions./2/ End FYI. If your Indian colleague seeks your support you should urge host government to respond generously and quickly with food, money to buy food or equipment and supplies. Capability of USG to continue to extend substantial food assistance to India will depend to considerable degree on India's self-help efforts to buy foodgrains and solicit assistance from others and on response of latter to humanitarian crisis which India faces./3/ /2/The Embassy in India reported on December 15 that Food Secretary Dias had offered assurances that India would explore every genuine source of assistance. (Telegram 8648 from New Delhi; ibid.) /3/On December 19 Benjamin Read sent to Rostow a summary report on the replies received in response to circular telegram 101529. Read's covering memorandum characterized the responses as disappointing. (Ibid.) Katzenbach
402. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 16, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Memos, 10/66-7/67, Vol. VII. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "rec'd 12-16-66, 3:15 p." SUBJECT The time has come to decide whether to take the next step with Ayub. When you sent Gene Locke out in June, he took with him your promise to resume economic and food aid for six months and to consider another six months in December or January provided Ayub met certain conditions. You now have before you (a) Secretary Rusk's recommendation/2/ for a $70 million non-project loan for the last half of FY 1967, and (b) the attached Schnittker-Gaud recommendation/3/ for meeting urgent Pak requests for further food aid. /2/See footnote 2, Document 398. /3/Attached; dated December 12. The main decision is how you want to deal with Ayub. Secretary Rusk feels that he has come far enough in meeting our conditions to warrant our going ahead for another six months. Locke feels Ayub has kept faith, though performance has not been perfect. If you want to keep the heat on, the AID loan is the better vehicle for discussing progress on our political conditions. Holding off our PL 480 decision would generate greater political pressure on Ayub than delaying the AID loan because sharply rising food prices (20% in November alone) are fast becoming his top political problem. However, I don't believe you want to use food that way. There are good reasons for treating the Pak food program separately from India's. First, while the Paks suffered from drought this year too, their needs are smaller--about 700,000 tons for the rest of FY 1967. Second, they have already rounded up almost 500,000 tons--about 25% of this year's total import needs--through purchases here and elsewhere and from other donors. They have spent 10% of their scarce foreign exchange to do this. Third, they are already performing well in agriculture. Charlie Schultze's memo (attached)/4/ details what the Paks need and have done. /4/Attached; dated December 16. John Schnittker and Bill Gaud recommend (attached) that you give a go-ahead in the next week on 250,000 tons of wheat and 250,000 tons of coarse grains ($36 million) in time to negotiate an amendment to the current agreement before 1 January. Ships would have to begin leaving around 15 January to get our wheat in during the critical March-April pre-harvest period. By waiting until 1 January we would lose valuable time negotiating a totally new agreement under the unfamiliar procedures required by the new law. If you prefer to hold off until next week when you get US harvest figures, that would cause no harm. But if they're satisfactory, I would recommend letting the Pak negotiations proceed unless you wish to convey a completely negative political signal. Walt Go ahead now /5/Johnson checked this option. A handwritten note reads: "Jake Jacobsen telephoned Mr. Rostow, 9:25 am 12/20/66 and said Pres. wants to hold PL 480 and program loan until makes India announcement."
403. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 16, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. II. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "Rec'd 12-16-66, 7:25 p." SUBJECT Bill Gaud with Agriculture agreement is prepared to go ahead with a $25 million special nutrition program for 5-7 million children under 12 and expectant and nursing mothers in the worst drought areas of India. The program would be run by CARE and other relief organizations would participate to the limits of their ability. It would be under Title II (emergency programs) of PL 480. The Indian government initially requested a program which would cost about $60 million. The $25 million would give them a start on a revised program for mixing in India a composite food including Indian ingredients and those from other donors that would provide an alternative source of high protein which is much cheaper than milk powder. Gaud has the authority to approve this kind of program but thought you ought to see it first because it is relevant to the whole Indian problem. It seems to me there's little question of our giving CARE a go-ahead on this. However, I wonder whether there wouldn't be considerable advantage for you in announcing it. To be sure it isn't the main grain sale they're awaiting, but reaching 5-7 million children and mothers is no small program. If you could release it tomorrow, it would hit the Sunday papers (draft release attached/2/). If you do, it would be a good idea if I could call B.K. Nehru in advance. /2/Not printed. Walt Approve White House release /3/Neither option is checked. A telephone message from the LBJ Ranch concerning the memorandum, relayed to Rostow on December 17 by Jake Jacobsen reads: "I would not do a thing on that now. I want to personally approve every item for India. Tell Gaud I want to approve and do all." The message is summarized in an attached handwritten note.
404. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 20, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. II. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "sent to Ranch via wire CAP 661271. Poage, Miller and Dole, whom I warned not to talk about recommendations in India, have sent via CIA channel the following message asking Freeman to be informed. "Replying to Freeman telegram/2/ detailed letter will be hand delivered to Freeman Thursday morning which recommends 1.8 million tons of grain be furnished Government of India with maximum amount donated under Title II of PL 480 before December 31 or under Title II of new act/3/ immediately after January 1." /2/On December 19 Freeman sent a cable to New Delhi for Poage that reads: "Please cable to the President from India your preliminary report on India's food needs and agricultural performance and your recommendations to the President regarding the need for an interim allocation of grain." (Telegram 105400 to New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, LEG 7 POAG) /3/Reference is to the Food for Peace Act, adopted by Congress on November 11. (80 Stat. 1526)
405. Letter From Representatives Poage and Dole and Senator Miller to Secretary of Agriculture Freeman/1/ New Delhi, December 20, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. III. No classification marking. Dear Mr. Secretary: Pursuant to your request, we, the undersigned, have travelled throughout India and have made on-the-spot visits to drought-stricken farming areas and, appropriate storage and transportation facilities. We discussed food problems with Indian officials at all levels and U.S. Government and voluntary agency people. We were impressed by the magnitude of economic progress, especially in agriculture, by the severity of the drought in northern India, and by the awesome prospect of human suffering which is certain to follow if no help is forthcoming. We wish to emphasize that we were impressed by programs and progress toward Indian self-sufficiency. A most urgent decision is required if food aid from the United States is to arrive in an orderly manner during February, March, and April. More deliberate planning for follow-up assistance should be firmed up by March. Based on figures available to us at this time and considering our declining U.S. reserves, we recommend that 1.8 million tons of grain (at least 30% sorghum) be furnished the Government of India, with maximum amount donated under Title II of P.L. 480 before December 31, or in the alternative if legally more expeditious under Title II of the new Act immediately after January 1, with announcement of such action at once. The donation should be: (1) based on emergency drought relief for the people of India from the people of the United States; (2) require that to the maximum extent possible the United States donated grain be distributed free to needy persons or proceeds be used for their relief; and (3) the announcement should express the hope of the United States that the USSR and other countries will join the United States, Canada, and Australia in helping India meet her food and fertilizer shortages. A portion of the 1.8 million tons should be considered for Title III distribution through voluntary agencies. Donations to GOI appear more advantageous than concessional sales (1) because of excessive United States holdings of rupees in India; (2) in order to enable GOI to more effectively negotiate help from the USSR and other countries; (3) to follow examples of Canada and Australia; and (4) to help persuade GOI officials and the Indian press to move more quickly toward the United States position regarding Vietnam and to change open criticism of U.S. military strategy to one of condemnation of communist aggression. We expressed to some GOI officials our belief that the American people feel that some Indian spokesmen have been unfair to both the United States Government and to a majority of the Indian people by their undue criticism of the United States policy in Vietnam. Yet, we have never been welcomed more enthusiastically or hospitably than we were during this visit. We draw your attention to Section 103(i) of the new PL 480 Act which requires the President to promote progress toward assurance of an adequate food supply by encouraging countries with which agreements are made to give higher emphasis to the production of food crops (such as grain) than to the production of non-food crops (such as cotton) as are in world surplus. In view of large U.S. holdings of rupees, we suggest that in negotiating long-term agreements concessional sales for local currency be replaced by sales on credit eventually repayable in dollars as early as economic conditions in India permit. In view of rapid population growth in India, we urge that any new agreement further emphasize and support efforts to expand agricultural production and technology while implementing effective family planning programs. We suggest that no new long-term agreements with India under Titles I and IV be concluded until the matters we have discussed herein have been resolved. However, a long-term agreement should be concluded by March 1967./2/ /2/Freeman summarized the Congressional delegation's recommendations in a telephone conversation with President Johnson on December 22. Johnson indicated that he was not prepared to accept the 1.8 million ton recommendation. He interpreted the delegation's recommendations as covering India's needs through February and March and agreed to cover India's needs through February because Congress was not in session and could not act in time to get food to India to meet the requirements for February. He authorized Freeman to make a low-level announcement that the United States would send 450,000 tons of wheat and 450,000 tons of feed grains to cover February. Johnson indicated that he would leave the March requirements for Congress to address once it came back into session. He stated that what the United States would do to meet the continuing need would depend on Congress, and on what other countries would do to contribute proportionate amounts to match the U.S. contribution. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, December 22, 1966, 11:07 a.m., Tape F6612.03, Side A, PNO 90) Sincerely yours, WR Poage
406. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, December 21, 1966, 2053Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. II. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 3:51 p.m. CAP 661283. If and when you are ready to make your Indian food decision, you may wish to check this rundown of the related decisions on India and Pakistan you also have to work with. 1. At the top of the list is the $25 million CARE special nutrition program in India for expectant mothers and children in the worst drought areas. This is a significant effort which could reach 5-7 million of the most vulnerable people, and you could well couple it with whatever announcement you make on the major feeding program. ( I sent you a memo/2/ and draft press release Friday.) /2/Document 403. 2. PL 480 for Pakistan is the next priority since we ought to sign a new agreement next week to keep their pipeline going. I don't recommend specifically linking this to the Indian program. Ayub resents our linking his programs with India's and there's no need to rub in the fact that we have to think of them together. The Paks have already done a good job buying here and elsewhere to cover their own gaps and their agricultural performance has been good. But if we delay a substantial decision too long, they will feel impelled to use so much of their scarce foreign exchange that import liberalization and other desirable development policies will have to be sacrificed. Simply going ahead with the Pak program as soon after the Indian decision as you are ready ought to make your point that these are all parts of the worldwide food problem you are trying to dramatize. 3. The Pak $70 million loan is the most flexible, though we don't want to wait too much longer. This is the other important part of Gene Locke's second round steps to keep your relationship with Ayub developing./3/ /3/Telegram 108416 to Rawalpindi, December 24, informed the Embassy that the commodity aid loan for Pakistan had been approved. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 9 PAK)
407. Telegram From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, December 22, 1966, 1837Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. II. Unclassified. WH 60790. I have conferred with Rostow and Katzenbach pursuant to your instructions that the India announcement be made on a low key basis. The following statement has their concurrence. "It was announced today that an allocation of 900,000 tons of grain, 50 percent wheat and 50 percent sorghum, has been made to India. Immediate shipment will be made with arrivals during the month of February and early March. Combined with earlier U.S. authorizations, purchases by India and grants by Australia and Canada, grain arrivals in India will continue to be around the record million ton per month level. Substantial stocks of privately owned and CCC wheat and grain sorghum are positioned in Atlantic, Gulf and West Coast ports to speed shipments." As directed, I plan to hold a press backgrounder prior to releasing the statement./2/ That backgrounder will emphasize the following points. /2/Rostow cabled the President on December 23 that Freeman had made the state- ment and held the backgrounder for the press as planned on December 22. (Telegram WH 60792 to the LBJ Ranch; ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 17, 12/14-31/66) 1. That grain arrivals in India in February will maintain the million ton record level. 2. That other countries are joining with us in meeting India's needs. I will repeat what I said in Austin that a 50-50 proportion with other countries around the world is not unreasonable. 3. That progress has been made by India in strengthening her agriculture. The self-help criteria are being met. 4. That the President does not want to go any further in connection with grain allocations to India than is absolutely necessary until Congress has had the opportunity to consider the matter. 5. That purchases have been made by India on a commercial basis in the U.S. and that the proportion between the commercial and the concessional is improving. Each of these points will be developed as effectively as possible during the course of the backgrounder. [Continue with the next documents]
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