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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
408. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 2, 1967, 4:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. III. No classification marking. SUBJECT 1. We have made progress in giving shape to your idea of (a) internationalizing food aid to India and (b) other countries matching in food and additional agricultural inputs what we provide in food. A consensus has developed with Agriculture, AID, and State that the World Bank India consortium is the best place to do the job. 2. I have explored the idea at length with George Woods. He is now strongly for it; and his senior staff has been exploring the implications with our people. 3. Amb. Nehru is for it as the most efficient multilateral forum. He also thinks it will be a more dignified way to deal with food aid than rushing about the world with a "begging bowl." We don't yet know how the Indian government will react. They would probably like to keep things as separate as possible; but I'm confident they'll go along once they know that you have decided food and agricultural aid should be treated as hard and multilateral. 4. The next consortium meeting is scheduled for about mid-March. This is a good time to come to grips with the new policy: --it is this session which, in any case, must make a fresh start on India's next five-year plan, with its new high priority for agriculture; --we will have by that time a clearer fix on India's 1967 food requirements; --the Indian elections will be over and blunt talk by donors will be less politically explosive. 5. The critical problem we face is to reconcile two policy requirements: --the need to make by about January 15 at the latest a decision on a further Indian grain allotment, in order to keep the pipeline full in March and April; and --the need to bring Japan, Germany, Italy, Britain, etc. along on the new method for handling Indian agricultural aid. (Canada wants to move this way; and we shall also wish to bring Australia formally into the India consortium.) 6. Ideally we would wish to announce the new policy at the time of the next Indian grain allotment. And this remains one option. But those dealing with the India consortium feel that we have a better chance to bring the industrial countries along if, before we firmly announce our position, we send abroad a first-class team to explain: --food aid is now hard and we are going to treat it that way from now forward; --the U.S. and Canada, in the consortium, Australia and the USSR, outside the consortium, have, in effect, been giving extra hard aid to India to meet the emergency; --since the common goal is Indian food self-sufficiency at the earliest possible time, it is possible and right for the other industrialized countries of the world to contribute more in chemical fertilizers, pesticides, etc.; --we are prepared to work on a 50-50 matching basis to keep Indians from starving and to hasten Indian self-sufficiency in food if Indian self-help efforts are adequate; --we believe the World Bank consortium is the proper place to negotiate out such a policy--along with other aspects of India aid--and propose that it be taken up at the mid-March consortium meeting. 7. The background for this feeling that prior consultation is wise is that some of the other donors feel we have acted somewhat unilaterally in the past with respect to the Indian and Pak consortium arrangements; and they are inclined to use that as an excuse for contributing less, rather than more, to the development of the subcontinent. A further step which they regard as unilateral might make a hard job harder. 8. On this view, the idea would be to send abroad, say, E.V. Rostow (or Ellsworth Bunker) and Bill Macomber to prepare the ground for the new approach in mid-March. 9. This would mean, however, that we would have to make another Indian grain decision under the new legislation before the new policy was fully and publicly announced, debated and supported by Congress. 10. There are, therefore, three options as follows: Option one. You could let go with both barrels in an early detailed message at the time the next India food allotment was made. It would describe the need to share the burden; to increase aid in fertilizers, etc.; and set forth in some detail how you think this could be done. It would contain specific figures of what we would offer; define targets for what other countries must do to match us; and authorize 1.5 million tons interim to carry through far enough to permit serious and tough negotiations with the new government to be formed in April. This message would be issued after prompt consultations with the returned Congressional mission and Congressional leaders. If we are to expect some cooperation from other members of the consortium, at a minimum we must give them the gist of your general approach before your message and commit ourselves to send a negotiator to discuss these matters in detail with them after your message, but before the consortium meets in March. Such a message is being drafted.
--before you make another interim allocation for India, this approach formally defines for Congress and our people how you would like to proceed, including international matching, the Bank's role and what you expect others to do; --it dramatizes your concern for Indian agriculture, and your determination to have the burden shared more equitably.
--our agriculture specialists and those knowledgeable on the consortium are doubtful others will match us unless we make a substantial advance diplomatic effort (or are prepared to fudge the figures). This approach does not leave time enough ahead of your message to make a maximum advance effort. If there are not full discussions in advance, the Europeans and Japan are likely to resent our effort and be even less helpful. Option two. You could make a low-key interim allocation now and present a major message to Congress only in February, after careful advance consultations with consortium members. (Joe Califano prefers this date for other reasons.) After consultation with the returned Congressional mission and with Congressional leaders, you could authorize a second interim allocation of, say, 1.5 million tons, under the new Food for Freedom legislation, by January 15. This would carry the pipeline far enough so that the real negotiations could be with the new government which takes office in April. It could count as part of your proposed bargain for the balance of 1967. You could indicate to Congressional leaders in low-key private talk how you were proceeding; and that you were determined to have our food aid treated as "hard" and matched in the consortium. Secretary Rusk could then push urgent high-level exploratory talks with prospective European and Japanese donors. After these conversations, we could sense more accurately what we might expect of the others, before you deliver a detailed message to the Congress.
--it would protect you in Congress from getting too far committed to specific matching formulae which may be unrealistic; --it would give our consortium specialists and George Woods time to soften up other members.
--you would be making a new allocation for India without formally consulting Congress and getting a resolution; --you would be some way down the road before officially notifying Congress of your intentions; --most aspects of the deal would become publicly known before your detailed message went to the Congress. Option three. After consultations with the returned Congressional delegation and Congressional leaders, you could perhaps combine the advantages of both options by sending a short message to Congress on January 15, sketching in general terms your intent about internationalizing and finding ways to augment agricultural assistance while sharing the burden more equitably. You could then indicate you were authorizing negotiations under the new legislation for a 1.5 million ton interim shipment. You could promise a more detailed message later in the session. After careful negotiations with prospective donors, a more accurate detailed message could be submitted.
--such a two-stage approach would permit you to lay out your general strategy without having to specify so early in the calendar year figures or matching formulae; --it would put the world on notice of your general approach without publicly putting the finger on any specific countries before your staffs had had a shot at winning them over privately.
--if Congress insists on extensive discussion before it gives you a resolution, Bill Gaud, Gene Rostow and Orville Freeman will have to tip most of your hand before the consortium meeting in any event. 11. I myself feel Option two is best at the present time, if you feel informal Congressional consultations would meet your criteria of what is right and necessary before making an additional interim allocation. Option three sounds good and statesmanlike; but we're liable to fall between two stools: the message would be too thin to be impressive; too substantive to avoid appearing to force the Japanese and European hands unilaterally and without consultations. My impression is that the way you have handled the Indian food situation in the past several months--and especially your success in smoking out Canada, Australia, and the USSR--have proved popular at home as well as educational abroad. I suspect quiet Congressional consultations could cover you on the next interim India allocation, if you were to indicate the direction of your policy; but only you can assess the matter properly. 12. I recommend, therefore, that you have an early session with Orville Freeman; Sec. Rusk and Gene Rostow; Bill Gaud and Bill Macomber to go over the track; directly hear the argument; and choose your option. 13. A final issue arises out of the work we have done, which you will also wish to consider; namely, the likely size of the Indian food deficit and our proper share in meeting it. There are various estimates about as to what India will require by way of food imports for calendar 1967. They run from a high of 11 million tons to a low (Indian Embassy, Washington) of 8 million tons. About 2.3 million tons have already been granted, loaned, or bought for 1967. That leaves somewhere between 5.7 and 8.7 million tons to be covered. Subtract from that the 3 million tons you are willing to put up and have matched by others. That leaves between 2.7 and 5.7 milllion tons to be found elsewhere. Here are the best figures we can now estimate--or guess--for what others might contribute on a concessional basis, over and above grants already made in 1967: Canada--900,000 tons This will be a million tons short of the minimum deficit and might be 4 million tons short of the maximum which your experts are now inclined to think is the more realistic figure. More chemical fertilizers will not cover it; although they would help in 1968. The books then could be balanced by: --properly prorated commercial purchases of grain; The trouble with commercial food purchases is that they run down Indian foreign exchange and endanger the whole program of liberalizing their domestic economy and getting the bureaucrats off the neck of the private sector, slowing up their domestic development. The World Bank, the IMF, and the whole consortium pushed India hard in this direction last year. Also, I am told, Agriculture is worried again about piling up surpluses and lowering domestic prices--with the new wheat acreage--if we only move an additional 3 million tons to India this year. 14. The best way to balance the books, of course, would be for the other industrialized countries to put up extra money for India and have India use some of it to purchase U.S. and other grain, without cutting foreign exchange available for other aspects of development. In effect, our negotiators and George Woods will, in one way or another, be pushing for some such over-all increase in non-food-producers aid to India. 15. I have the strong feeling that I am telling you nothing you don't already know; and that you discounted all this when you laid down the 3 million tons as a guideline. I have no recommendation to make; but I did wish you to know the bureaucracy will probably be pressing you for a figure higher than 3 million tons when the time comes to negotiate for matching in the consortium. Walt
409. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 9, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. II. Secret. Drafted by Novak. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Rostow opened the meeting, stating that the Administration was seeking advice on the Indian food problem from members of Congress who had been to India and who were members of the Agriculture Committees. There were a number of questions: When should a Presidential Message be sent to the Congress? Should a resolution accompany the Message? When should there be hearings? When should there be action by the Congress? When should an interim allocation be made to keep the pipeline full? How large should this interim allocation be? Senator Miller thought that it would be better not to send a resolution to the Congress at the time of the Message. He proposed that the President say in his Message that a draft resolution would shortly follow, or perhaps even better, leave it to the Congress to draft an appropriate resolution. Senator Miller said it was important that we avoid specifics in the Message such as the actual figures on a final allocation since this would serve to attract Congressional attention and criticism, which might affect the outcome of the upcoming Indian elections. He recommended that there be no hearings or other Congressional action until after the elections. Secretary Freeman raised the question of timing of the interim allocation. He pointed out that the pipeline will run out in the middle of March and that ideally an interim allocation should be made by next week. He also raised the question of how big the interim allocation should be. Congressman Poage suggested that the real question was what the President wanted to do. Secretary Freeman agreed and said he thought the President was inclined to try for the minimum interim amount. Senator Miller said he thought an interim allocation of less than 1.8 million tons, assuming 200,000 tons more was contributed by the Soviet Union, would keep the pipeline full until the end of May. Secretary Freeman pointed out that there was an additional problem. The monsoon season would make it impossible to ship in as much grain in June as in earlier months and that the interim allocation might therefore have to be slightly larger to take this into account. He also pointed out that the interim allocation should be large enough to hold us until the Consortium had time to act. Secretary Rostow agreed, pointing out that the Consortium was unlikely to act immediately, since these countries, like ourselves, also had legislatures to deal with. Congressman Poage addressed himself to the principle of matching in the Consortium. He said it was his understanding, on the basis of last Friday's/2/ meeting at the White House, that the President wanted matching on a 50-50 basis over the next two fiscal years. Senator Miller agreed. Senator Miller and Congressman Poage both agreed that such matching did not have to start until the second half of calendar 1967 and if we divided the calendar year in half, assuming India needed ten million tons for the year, five million in the second half would have to be matched--2.5 million by the U.S. and 2.5 million from elsewhere. They agreed that in the first six months of 1967 something less than 50-50 would do. But Congressman Poage stressed that he felt that the President was very serious about the principle of 50-50 matching and that if others stopped contributing, we should stop contributing. Secretary Freeman agreed that the President would want to go as far as possible to achieve this goal. /2/January 6. Congressman Poage then asked why we should be optimistic about this Consortium approach and wanted to know what would be its appeal. Mr. Farr stated that we had two objectives here: one was to make food shipments like any other kind of aid--like dollars--and the other was to gain acceptance for this principle in order to get additional burden-sharing from the other members of the Consortium. Congressman Poage then asked why we should do the begging. Mr. Rostow replied by pointing out that, in the last analysis, if we don't support India's diplomatic efforts in what will be a difficult negotiating situation at best, we will find ourselves at the end of the year in the same position that we were at the end of this year, and we will not have achieved our objective. Senator Miller agreed we must help solicit but he stressed his feeling that the Indians should do still more than they have been doing. Secretary Freeman, in summarizing the discussion, said there was agreement that the principle of matching should go into effect in the second half of calendar 1968 and that the Indians must be pressed to work hard at getting additional contributions. It was left that the Congressmen would talk with Congressman Dole, discuss the matter with the leadership of both Houses, and then make recommendations to the President within the next day or two on the basis of the understandings reached at this meeting. In discussions the following day between Senator Miller and Mr. Eskildsen, it became clear that the Congressional group wanted particularly to keep the interim program amount to a bare minimum. They apparently agreed that there was little likelihood of Congressional and Consortium action and a new agreement by the end of March (which would get foodgrain in volume to India only by very late May). However, they relied upon a document they saw in India to make an estimate of 800,000 tons as the minimum monthly requirement, and as their memorandum/3/ indicated, they felt matching could begin before July 1. This accounted for a smaller estimate of the interim allocation than that formulated by the Executive Branch. /3/Document 405.
410. Memorandum for the Files/1/ Washington, January 10, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. V. No classification marking. Drafted by John Schnittker. SUBJECT On Friday, December 2, the President called me by telephone to discuss the India situation in regard to grain exports. Marvin Watson or Jake Jacobson also called on or near the same day. The President suggested the possibility of exporting half-million tons of wheat and half a million tons of grain sorghum in late December and wanted to know how this could be handled. On December 3, Saturday, I met for most of the morning with Eskildsen, Jaenke, and Moseley to put together a memorandum detailing the amount of wheat and sorghum that were in position to be exported and also the estimated India arrivals in January, February, and March based upon a possible million-ton authorization from the U.S., plus old authorizations not yet fully shipped. I was instructed, on Sunday morning by telephone from Texas, to send this memorandum to the President as fast as possible. I did this by wire/2/ thru the situation room and found later some impatience on the part of the President's staff that "some eyes in the situation room might have seen the memorandum". About mid-afternoon on Sunday, December 4, I was called by the President who again reviewed the situation including a lot of the material that was in the memorandum which he apparently had not seen although I had delivered it personally to the White House about 12:00 noon. It was in this conversation that I pointed out to him the great difficulty of locating ships that could be loaded quickly with cargos for India when decisions to authorize additional grain to India are made at a very late date. I explained the problem of the U.S.S. Manhattan which was known to be leaving India about December 4, and which was available to be booked but might within a few days head for the Middle East to pick up a cargo of oil. The President by telephone authorized me to take an option on the U.S.S. Manhattan which I did by calling Eskildsen who by late evening of the same day told me that the Manhattan was in the Bay of Bengal and it had been arranged that she would arrive on the West Coast about Christmas Day. /2/Reference is to telegram CAP 661170 from the White House to the LBJ Ranch, December 4. (Ibid., Vol. III) Also in this telephone conversation with the President, we reviewed January arrivals which were represented to be 964,000-tons including 714,000-tons from the United States and some grain from Canada and Australia. (Looking back, it's now clear that this should have been 564,000-tons, not 714,000-tons. We did some double counting, thus bringing the January arrival figure to about 150,000-tons higher than could be realized.) The President also asked about the crop conditions in the Southwest and spoke of the drought in Texas. He instructed me to call a message to Miss Fehmer later that day recapping the January arrivals expected in India and telling him what the highest rates of unloading ever achieved in India were in the past. By the time I called Miss Fehmer she had some additional questions from the President which I responded to but made no record of. On December 6, I recapped all this material in a confidential memorandum to the President./3/ Either On December 5 or 6 in telephone conversations with the President and with Marvin Watson, and Jake Jacobson, I indicated in response to their questions that I preferred December 15 as the date for a final decision on additional allocation to India. I pointed out that with a Congressional team arriving back in the United States on the 21st or 22nd, I understood it would be rather difficult to make a decision on the 15th while the Congressional team was in India. /3/Not printed. (Ibid.) Also on December 5, I talked with Watson and Jacobson about using Sen. McGee as a substitute for Sen. Mondale who could not make the trip to India with Mr. Poage, Dole, and Sen. Miller of Iowa. The White House staff specifically concurred with the appointment of McGee even though he was in a different time table. I cabled McGee in Delhi/4/ asking him to look at the agricultural situation to the extent possible while he was in India. /4/Telegram 47019 to New Delhi, December 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, LEG 7 MCGEE) His cable/5/ came back on December 6, indicating that he had already done this. /5/Telegram 8204 from New Delhi, December 6. (Ibid.) On December 14, we briefed the Poage mission before they headed for India. On December 16, in a telephone conversation with the President I again reaffirmed the need for a one-million ton decision at the earliest possible date, and again reviewed the difficult shipping situation with him. It was at this time that the President agreed that we should proceed to option some ships even though this was a matter which India usually handled. The next day, December 17, which was a Saturday, Ray Ioanes reported to the Secretary and me at noon that they had optioned about 100,000-tons of shipping on a 72-hour basis and that it could be "rolled over" for several days, although some ships might be lost in the process. On December 20 we learned that the Poage report/6/ would recommend that the President go ahead with an interim allocation to India. We also made tentative arrangements with Watson and Jim Jones for a personal report to the President on the 22nd. These later collapsed when we learned that they had issued a brief press statement in Delhi before departure and that Dole would be bringing back a written report/7/ from the team. /6/See Document 404. /7/Document 405. About December 20, after staff meeting, I authorized Ioanes and Jaenke to load the Manhattan completely, even though this would delay her departure by several days. Originally it had been planned to load only 77,000-tons on this ship which carried 102,000-tons. Actually we felt very good about the fact that the Manhattan had slipped only about a week from the original plan for arrival in India--from about January 30 to February 6. January 6, I met with Minister Kaul at the request of Ioanes and Eskildsen to review the arrivals of grain to India and the departures from the United States. By this time it had become clear that arrivals in January were slipping to approximately 750,000-tons and that arrivals in February could not quite reach the 1-million ton mark. The Secretary directed that everything possible be done to make arrivals February reach the million ton mark (I have dictated a separate memo/8/ on that.) /8/Not found. Also on late Friday, January 6, the President met with the Secretary, Poage, Dole, and Sen. Miller to review the India situation, following a week of discussions within the Executive Branch on the kind of message that ought to be sent to the Congress on India.
411. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 12, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966-February 1967, Vol. IV. Secret. SUBJECT We now have a Rusk-Freeman-Gaud proposal for internationalizing the Indian food problem (Tab A)/2/ and a recommendation from Congressman Poage's group (Tab B)/3/ on the size of an interim allocation pending Congress' response. I am also attaching State's draft message to Congress (Tab C)/4/ describing your Indian program as the next important step in your War on Hunger. We'll edit the message and adjust the numbers further once we have your guidance. Here are the main points in this complex set of recommendations: /2/Reference is to a joint memorandum sent to the President on January 11; not printed. /3/Reference is to a letter sent by Senator Miller and Congressmen Poage and Dole to Freeman on January 11. Poage sent a copy to Rostow on the same day; not printed. /4/Undated; not printed. 1. The Secretaries propose to throw Indian food aid into the World Bank's India consortium, and the Congressmen generally agree. If you approve, I'll have to get final and formal agreement from George Woods and we'll have to get the Indians and other consortium members aboard. 2. The Secretaries underscore the importance of careful consultations with India and other consortium members before we publicly announce this approach. They have two reasons: a. Other consortium members resent unilateral action. The chances of persuading them to take on food in the consortium will be greater if we tackle them privately first. b. Quite frankly, Bill Gaud feels chances of getting as much as we're asking from other donors are slim. We all feel you should have a realistic picture of the odds before you take a strong public stand. The Congressmen naturally do not address this operational point, but it is crucial in launching your program the right way. The big sticking point will be the consortium members who have avoided food aid so far. We may be able to move Germany, if it counts against the offset, to which State and Defense are agreeable. But the others will be tough. With the Bank doing the accounting, we would try to persuade other aid donors to match our special emergency food contribution in the second half of CY 1967 by giving food, fertilizer or cash. We would expect their contributions to be over and above: (a) their already planned pledge in the Indian consortium and (b) their contribution to IDA replenishment. The special contribution in new aid for food would be at least $120 million in this calendar year. It will take some pretty tough high-level arm-twisting to persuade these already strapped governments to do that much more. Therefore, the Secretaries recommend you send scouts to sound out the consortium capitals before you send your message to Congress. Since this will require the highest-level emissary we can field, I'd suggest trying to get Doug Dillon. If he's not available, Gene Rostow's responsibilities and intensive work on this problem in recent days would make him a natural. Whoever goes will have to get going this week. 3. The Secretaries believe we should plan on 4.4 million tons more for the rest of CY 1967. The Congressmen do not specifically address the total CY 1967 need since they'll address this later when they have your message. However, they have figured their interim allocation from the same 10 million ton estimate of Indian need that the Secretaries use. The Secretaries looked hard at 3 million and seriously doubt it would do the job: --They believe the higher figure is necessary to give us a workable negotiating posture with our consortium partners. They feel that asking other donors to increase their total aid to India while we stay at the same level in economic aid and cut our food aid in half (8.3 million in 1966 to 4.6 this year--1.6 already approved plus 3) is an untenable negotiating position. They know it will be an uphill fight to get any more aid at all, so we need to put ourselves in the best negotiating position possible. --If we gave 3 million tons and others matched us, the total of 8.3 million (including 2.3 million already on the way) would still fall short of India's estimated need of 10 million. A low figure now could have adverse political effects in India before the election and could discourage US farmers from planting. --With 4.4 million tons, we'd still be reducing our proportion of food aid from 90% in 1966 to 60% in 1967; and, with luck, we would be laying the foundation for moving to 50-50. --The higher figure of 4.4 looks reasonable, yet is still pretty tough to match. If you wish to stick to an overall US figure of 3 million tons now, you could buy some flexibility by promising a mid-summer review after our crop is in; although that would weaken our negotiating posture and worry the Indians as they go to the polls. 4. The Secretaries agree with Poage and his colleagues that an interim allocation is urgent. The Secretaries propose 2 million tons to cover the pipeline while we're swinging the World Bank into action and waiting for the new Indian government to be formed. To do this we would have to cover Indian needs at least through the end of May, because we won't be able to negotiate an agreement with the new Indian government until mid-April. The Congressmen urge 1.7 million. The Secretaries could live with 1.7 million provided we recognize that the Congressmen's figure will not carry through to the end of May unless there is more grain available from the spring crop than we anticipate or unless India receives unexpected contributions from other nations. (The Congressmen are figuring that India needs 800,000 tons a month--a figure from a public Indian document--while Subramaniam privately fixes the need at 900,000.) 5. Whichever figure you approve, timing will be important. Here are the main alternatives: --Postpone your message until the end of January, well before the Indian elections, but late enough so we can complete consultations and so the Congress won't have to let it be unanswered too long. (We won't want Congressional debate before the election.) To delay this way, we would have to announce an interim allocation immediately. The main advantage of this approach would be to settle the pipeline problem for awhile and give us ample time to complete high-level talks and still avert a new round of press speculation about the pipeline. The Congress would like it too because it does not want to hold off acting on your message too long. --Send your message as soon as we can warn other capitals and announce the interim allocation in the message. We could probably get a preliminary reaction from other consortium members by about 23 January, but we couldn't expect anything firm. Chance of press leaks increases once we start talking in other capitals. In either case, the Secretaries favor a message before the Indian election, though we would want to avoid Congressional debate in the first two weeks of February right before the Indians vote. Here, then, are the decisions to be made:/5/ /5/Johnson approved recommendations 1 and 2. 1. Get George Woods' final and formal agreement to take on Indian food aid. 2. If Woods agrees, get the Indians aboard and then start talking with other consortium members. 3. For this mission: Try to get Dillon /6/Johnson checked this option. 4. Set a planning level for the rest of CY 1967. --As Freeman-Rusk-Gaud recommend: 4.4 total, 2 million interim
and 2.4 later /7/Johnson circled "1.7 interim" among the choices at this option. --Your initial thought: 3 million in the message with promise of a summer review 5. Timing. --Interim allocation immediately, rest in the message 23
January or later /8/Johnson checked this option. Walt
412. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, January 14, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, The President. Secret. Sent under cover of a January 13 memorandum from Rostow to Katzenbach, Freeman, Eugene Rostow, and Gaud, which stated that it represented Rostow's understanding of what had been agreed the previous evening regarding Indian food. He asked them to notify Wriggins promptly whether it also reflected their understanding, and welcomed any suggestions. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 7:30 p.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House and included, in addition to the President, Freeman, Katzenbach, Walt Rostow, Eugene Rostow, Gaud, Macomber, and Wriggins. (Johnson Library) MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary Orville L. Freeman Under Secretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Mr. William S. Gaud SUBJECT It is my understanding that at last evening's meeting with the President, it was agreed: 1. to firm up our understanding with George Woods that the India consortium will assume responsibility for food aid; 2. to develop plans on the assumption of a 10-million ton Indian import requirement for CY 67, of which the U.S. might provide 6 million tons (including amounts already allocated); but no commitment could be made to such a U.S. contribution until Congressional review; 3. to go hard for 50-50 sharing by May or June, although it was recognized we might not be able to do it on a regular basis; 4. to send scouts to India to win Indian acceptance of this general approach and then to Western Europe immediately to see how near we could come to 50-50 shares; 5. to prepare a message to go to Congress by January 23rd, after we receive a preliminary report from our scouts. It would announce an interim allocation of 1 million tons (1/2 wheat and 1/2 sorghum) and the $25 million CARE Title II request. It was recognized that a positive message would help in the Indian elections, but a disappointing proposal could adversely affect the outcome; 6. that hearings on the message would not start until after the Indian election; 7. that a second interim allocation of 1 million tons more before a long term agreement, was not entirely out of the question, but could not be made without a recommendation from relevant Members of Congress; 8. that Under Secretary Katzenbach and Secretary Freeman will renew soundings with Congressional leaders and members of the Appropriations Committees, including Members Ford, Mahon, Rooney, Russell, Ellender. W. W. Rostow/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
413. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, January 13, 1967, 6:17 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, SOC 10 INDIA. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Heck on January 12; cleared by Handley, Farr, Wriggins, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Resources Edward R. Fried (E), Country Director for Germany Alfred Puhan, Country Director for Canada Rufus Z. Smith, Country Director for France and Benelux Robert Anderson, Country Director for Italy, Austria, and Switzerland Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Country Director for Japan Richard L. Sneider, Country Director for the United Kingdom J. Harold Shullaw, and Eskildsen; and approved by Eugene Rostow. A handwritten notation on the telegram reads "OK/L," suggesting that it was cleared with the President. Sent to Bonn, London, The Hague, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, 1 Brussels and repeated to New Delhi, Ottawa, and Vienna. 118255. For Ambassador from Secretary. Subject: Indian Food Crisis. Ref: Cirtel 101529./2/ /2/Document 401. 1. Dept cirtel 101529 outlined our concerns over food situation in India and our interest in wider sharing of responsibility for meeting India's food aid requirements. Response to this effort has been encouraging and as a result of our efforts and those of GOI several countries have increased their contributions. So far, in this current drive India has received grants of 150,000 tons of wheat from Australia, 150,000 tons from Canada, 200,000 tons from USSR, and 35,000 tons from World Food Program (FAO). Sweden and Norway are also considering significant grants of fertilizer and France is considering grants of dried milk. In addition, India has purchased 150,000 tons of wheat from Australia, 50,000 tons from US, and plans to buy another 50,000 tons from US. GOI also buying rice from Burma and Thailand. On December 23 we supplemented these contributions and purchases with 900,000 tons of PL 480 foodgrains for immediate delivery. 2. This effort and shipments already in pipeline provide India with its required food imports of over 800,000 tons monthly through March. Much more needs to be done to tide India over until summer crop is harvested about October/November. 3. We are urgently reviewing additional steps to close this gap while encouraging GOI down road to greater food sufficiency. To this end President is planning another message to Congress before end of January on Indian food crisis which would make following points: (a) The burden sharing should be further internationalized on a much larger and more comprehensive and systematic scale than any yet attempted in order to achieve a genuinely multilateral program to handle India's food problem; (b) To enlist the participation of others on more organized basis, food assistance should be placed along with economic aid, under World Bank Consortium. We feel time has come to add food as another responsibility of the Consortium. This is sound economics, fair burden sharing, and provides a proper channel for incremental food and food-related aid of donors who have not previously been involved in this effort; (c) As incentive, we are considering pledging substantial amount of foodgrain to the Consortium to be matched by other nations either in food, fertilizer, pesticides, shipping, etc. or by additional program assistance. These contributions would of course be additional to regular Consortium pledges; (d) To keep food flowing while these arrangements being worked out, another allotment of undetermined amount for immediate delivery to India would be authorized; (e) We remain vitally interested in Indian performance and in GOI efforts to improve its agricultural production. 4. To indicate priority President places on this effort, to highlight importance we attach to this multilateral program and to enlist support of those in best position to increase their contribution, the President is sending Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs as his representative to discuss our proposals with appropriate officials of host government. He will acquaint them with President's thinking and dimensions of our plans and seek indications of their position and extent to which we can count on their participation. President will want to review their soundings before message goes to Congress. 5. In undertaking this campaign we are fully conscious of demands being placed on our partners, all of whom have their Indian problems. As members of Consortium they are already confronted by substantially higher level of regular requirements. In addition IDA is seeking substantially increased contribution much of it to be earmarked for India. We estimate their share of emergency matching food program based on prorated share of Consortium pledges will total another $95 million divided roughly as follows: UK $26 million, Germany $27 million, Japan $20 million, Italy $12 million, France $6.5 million, Netherlands $3.5 million, Austria $1.25 million, Belgium $.75 million.6. In meantime Rostow and State/AID USDA team plans depart for New Delhi January 15 stopping in Tokyo enroute and proceed immediately thereafter to other posts. Exact schedule follows. Request you inform host government of Rostow's impending arrival, begin set up meetings with appropriate key officials at highest levels and prepare background papers on host government AID programs to India, financial situation and other relevant facts useful to negotiations. Pass info to Rostow in New Delhi. 7. In separate message/3/ we are asking New Delhi to inform GOI of foregoing and to have latter instruct appropriate Indian representatives accordingly so that they will remain in step with us. In view of delicate consultations now necessary it is important that no leaks occur on detail or substance of these proposals. Press guidance follows. /3/Telegram 118378 to New Delhi, January 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, SOC 10 INDIA) Rusk
414. Memorandum From President Johnson to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow)/1/ Washington, January 14, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/ROSTOW. Secret. The draft instructions were sent to the President on January 14 by Walt Rostow under cover of a memorandum in which he stated that the instructions were moderately detailed to give Eugene Rostow a clear sense of how far he could go in revealing the administration's plans. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Eugene Rostow Trip, Jan 1967) The instructions, as sent to Rostow, were revised slightly in Johnson's hand. The instructions were transmitted to Rostow in telegram 118911 to Tokyo, January 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/ROSTOW) The purpose of your mission to Asia and Europe as my special emissary is to explain the United States position on future food aid to India and to win agreement of the Indian government and the members of the World Bank's India consortium for a systematic international program to help India achieve its goal of self-sufficiency in food grains at the earliest possible date and to cover ad interim India's food deficits. In India, you should stress the importance of India's taking the lead in making its own case in other capitals. I. The U.S. Position I regard our approach to the problem of India as a major component of the policy on food and population stated on January 10, 1967 in my State of the Union Message./2/ You should make clear my grave concern that the world's food production is falling sharply behind population growth--that vast areas have for the past 20 years been losing the capacity to feed themselves. You should emphasize that the United States has brought its own domestic food surpluses under control and can no longer be counted on to provide an inexhaustible reservoir of food grains for the hungry as a by-product of domestic policy. Grain stocks elsewhere have also tended to fall in recent years. You should explain the significance of the new Food for Freedom Program whereby the United States decided to use appropriated funds to encourage farmers to produce extra food for food aid programs in countries determined to master their own agricultural problems. You should state that the United States now expects all the other nations of the world--rich and poor alike--to shoulder their share of the world's fight against hunger and malnutrition. You may cite my view that failure of other nations to join this effort now will leave the world on the road to intolerable suffering. /2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 2-14. II. Our Proposal You should outline my proposal that future food and agricultural aid for India be planned and allocated insofar as possible through the India consortium of the World Bank. With the permission of Mr. George Woods, you may say that the Bank has agreed to accept this responsibility. You should explain our reason for this choice: (a) the interconnection between agricultural and industrial development; and (b) the desirability of assuring that food and agricultural aid complement and, if possible, not undercut aid supporting India's overall economic development. You may reassure your listeners that this proposal is in no way meant to pre-empt important efforts in other world organizations to find solutions to the world's agricultural problems. III. Your First Objective You should obtain the agreement of the governments of India and the major members of the India consortium to this course. If they cannot give you their final assent, you should take away with you the best sense you can of their probable decision and emphasize the importance of a firm decision within two weeks. IV. Interim Arrangements/3/ /3/Johnson deleted an initial proposed sentence in this paragraph that read: "You are authorized to say that the U.S. is willing to keep food flowing to India by continuing emergency food deliveries through May-June until the consortium can organize its effort." After marking that deletion, Johnson noted that the remainder of the paragraph was "OK." You may inform those governments in strictest confidence that I plan to announce by the end of January an interim additional allocation of 1 million tons of food grain. Thereafter, I will be guided by the sense of Congress and the response of our associates in determining further emergency allocations. We will expect other governments to help as they can with emergency measures to keep India's pipeline full during this interim period. V. Burden-sharing Our goal for the second half of calendar 1967 and thereafter is to establish a system whereby the U.S. provides no more than half of India's concessional food aid requirement. This will require other donors--in the consortium and out--to match the U.S. contribution with an equivalent value in food, fertilizer, cash or other materials essential to agricultural production on concessional terms. This aid must be additional (a) to economic aid required to meet consortium goals this year, and (b) to donors' contributions to IDA replenishment. Your second objective, therefore, is to secure promises of as much additional aid as possible, to estimate how much added aid we can expect and to report to me your impression of how quickly we can move to a full 50-50 split of the food aid burden. You may make clear that this proposal for sharing the food aid burden is not intended to alter already established patterns of assessing proportionate shares of other economic aid within the consortium. VI. Indian Requirements and U.S. Share For planning and talking purposes only, you are authorized to say that they (Indians) now estimate India's import requirements for CY 1967 at about 10 million tons. Without implying any commitment, you may, if you feel it will improve your bargaining position, indicate that the United States might/4/ be willing--with the approval of the Congress--to provide as much as 5 or 6 million tons under concessional terms total in CY 1967 (including 1.6 million already approved) provided other donors do their fair share. You must make clear that these are planning figures which will necessarily be refined as we gain a more accurate picture of India's spring crop and our own crop later in the summer. /4/Johnson underscored the word "might" and changed the text to read "to provide as much as 5 or 6 million tons" from the original reference to 6 million tons. VII. Report You should report your findings in each capital as you go. I will expect a final recommendation from you on the program to be outlined in my message to Congress about 23 January, or as soon thereafter as possible. VIII. German Offset Before your arrival in Bonn, you will receive separate instructions on the extent to which you are authorized to offer to count additional German contributions of agricultural aid against U.S.-German offset arrangements. IX. Publicity You should caution the governments with which you talk against premature public or press disclosure of the substance or details of your discussions. You should, however, inform them that the U.S. government tentatively plans to state its position publicly soon after your return. LBJ
415. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, January 16, 1967, 4:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17-4 US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Coon; cleared by Macomber, Wriggins, and Mary S. Olmstead (NEA/INC); and approved by Handley. Repeated to Tokyo for Rostow. 119084. Please deliver following message from the President to Prime Minister Gandhi as soon as possible: "Dear Mrs. Gandhi: Your message to me conveying New Year's greetings was most welcome./2/ We certainly face grave problems in the months ahead. But I fully share your hope and expectation that we shall overcome them, and that cooperation between our two governments and peoples will grow still closer. /2/In her New Year's message to President Johnson, December 31, Prime Minister Gandhi expressed her thanks for the assistance rendered by the United States in helping India to deal with the critical situation caused by a second successive year of drought. The message was conveyed to the White House under cover of a note from Ambassador Nehru on December 31. (Ibid.) We continue to give serious thought to your government's problems in providing enough food for your people. We see your difficulty this year as reflecting a larger fact: quite apart from your particular problems of drought, the developing regions of the world are losing the ability to feed themselves. We foresee a somber future if the world fails to reverse this trend by concerted and determined action. I profoundly hope that India will take the lead in inspiring and urging all nations--rich and poor alike--to join a truly world wide effort to bring population and food production back into balance. We believe you realize the day is past when the United States can bear this burden alone. We count on the Government of India to become an example of what a determined people can do for themselves. We count on your government also to dramatize to all nations of the world the depth of this problem. It is my earnest hope that your own representatives in other capitals will press your case with their host governments--an effort we will support but for which your government will, of course, wish to take responsibility. At the same time I realize with the utmost understanding that the problems you face in the months ahead cannot be solved entirely by your own efforts. Joint effort of all nations able to help will be required to avert what you rightly describe as a human tragedy; and they will be needed equally to hasten the day when Indian agriculture can meet India's requirements. I wish you to know that I am deeply concerned that this aid be forthcoming in as sufficient and timely a fashion as we can justify to our people. However, as I said in my recent State of the Union message, I am convinced that this problem is a responsibility of the international community, and will have to be met by a truly international effort. To explain my thoughts more fully, I am sending Mr. Eugene V. Rostow our Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs as my personal representative to discuss this problem with you and with the leaders of other friendly and interested countries. He will be arriving in New Delhi shortly after you receive this letter. In closing, may I again express my hopes that 1967 will see progress on this and the many other grave problems we face. With warm personal regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson" We do not intend to release this letter, and we assume GOI will not./3/ /3/Gandhi responded on January 23 in a letter to Johnson that she regretted not being able to meet with Rostow during his visit to India because of her campaign schedule. She applauded the effort he was making to help enlist additional assistance for India, and stated that India would do all it could to second that effort. She reiterated the commitment of her government to increase food production and to control population growth. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 1/1/67-4/30/67) Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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