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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, March 31, 1967, 5:28 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IX, Cables, 3/67-7/67. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Handley on March 14, cleared by Katzenbach and Rostow at White House, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Rawalpindi. 166539. For Ambassador from the Secretary. 1. After full consideration of alternatives, we have concluded that the US should follow a policy toward India and Pakistan designed to limit arms acquisition, to restrain military expenditures, to reduce the possibility of military confrontation, and to encourage highest priority allocation of resources to agricultural and economic development. The United States should use all useful leverage at its disposal to further this policy, including its bilateral economic assistance, its participation in the World Bank and in aid consortia, and end-use controls over US military equipment supplied directly or indirectly to third countries. 2. The supply of military equipment by the United States should be governed by this policy. The United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the Soviet Union should be urged to follow similar restraints in their military supply policies toward India and Pakistan. 3. Initial implementation of this policy should include: A. Withdrawal of MAAG (Pakistan) and USMSMI, making alternative, limited arrangements for providing such military representation, inspection and supervision of sales and training as may be required; the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be a party to such arrangements. B. Steps to prevent the sales by third countries to India and Pakistan of military equipment which (a) includes US technology and components; (b) is produced in the US or (c) is co-produced with the US, except when the US has determined that such sales contribute to arms limitation or reduced defense expenditures. C. Indicating to India and Pakistan that, although the US remains unwilling to contribute to the augmentation of the military establishment of either country through the sale of lethal military equipment, it is willing to consider on a case by case basis the sale of spare parts for previously supplied lethal equipment when there is a clearly established critical need and when such sales contribute to arms limitation or reduced military expenditures and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance between the two nations. The question is not now before us as to replacing an end item of US origin should that item be totally destroyed through accidental loss. That contingency will be considered when it arises. D. Indicating to India and Pakistan our willingness to reinstitute training in the US for a limited number of key Indian and Pakistani military personnel under MAP. E. Disbursement of remaining obligated FY-67 credit sales funds only where such expenditures will contribute to US security interests (e.g. Star Sapphire) or to support of the general policy of arms limitation. Credit sales shall be for non-lethal items only. 4. FY-68 credit sales planning for India and Pakistan should be predicated on the preceding paragraphs. The relevant figure in the 1968 budget should be $75 million with the following provisions: A. The figure is to be classified. B. It is to be an absolute ceiling, not a target. C. It should under no circumstances be communicated to the Governments of India and Pakistan without specific approval of the Secretary of State. D. Proposed credits will be reviewed case by case for their contribution to arms limitations. 5. After we have consulted with Congress you will be receiving instructions on implementation of this policy, and timing and manner of presentation. We recognize that situation will differ between New Delhi and Rawalpindi and that certain current problems including NPT may have bearing on timing of presentation in New Delhi. Rusk
432. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 2, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Memos, 10/66-7/67. Confidential. SUBJECT Here is the wheat agreement Gene Locke probably mentioned to you. He is paying his farewell calls/2/ on Pakistan's senior economic ministers early tomorrow morning and would like to give them an answer then. This would necessitate getting a cable out to him early this evening. If that's cutting it too close, we can get it to him easily--if you approve--for his final call on Ayub Friday./3/ /2/Locke resigned his post as Ambassador to Pakistan effective April 16. He was replaced by Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr., who was appointed on July 27 and presented his credentials on August 16. /3/April 7. Charlie Schultze's memo (attached)/4/ lays out the figures. In a nutshell, Pakistan has asked us for an added 250,000 tons of wheat now to help break a rapid rise in prices stemming from drought shortages. Freeman and Hall propose 200,000--half to be charged against any FY 1968 US allocation for Pakistan. /4/Dated April 3, Schultze's memorandum to the President dealt with the proposed P.L. 480 agreement with Pakistan. I recommend approval. Pakistan has done a sound job in agriculture. Approving this program now would help Ayub with a tough economic-political problem. Even doing this wouldn't take us beyond average past levels (1.5 million tons) for this year./5/ /5/Johnson's marginal handwritten response reads: "OK, for either 200 or 250--I'd give him 250 but notify Locke at once." Walt
433. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, April 5, 1967, 9:14 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 INDIA. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Spain, Laingen, and Heck on March 27; cleared by Handley, Macomber, Captain Asbury Coward (G/PM), Katzenbach, Townsend Hoopes, AID Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia Alfred D. White, and Wriggins; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to New Delhi and repeated to London, Tehran, and CINCMEAFSA. 168709. Ref: State 166539./2/ Subject: Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan. Following are your instructions covering military supply policy conveyed by reftel: /2/Document 431. 1. We desire implement decision as soon as Congressional consultations, now underway, are complete; telegram will inform you of completion. While we recognize Ambassador Bowles will need some elbow room on timing of approaches to GOI, there is some urgency for Ambassador Locke to inform GOP. We understand meeting with Ayub now set for April 7; we believe GOI should be informed as soon after that as possible to assure shortest gap possible between presentations. Basic elements of new policy should be communicated as stated reftel, omitting references to internal USG operations. 2. Both posts should emphasize that new policy reflects intensive review over long period time and with involvement highest levels USG. Both should also insure it clearly understood we do not under foreseeable circumstances intend return to supply relationship we had prior September 1965. 3. Our new policy recognizes that fundamental historical changes have taken place. Our purpose is to establish a new relationship that takes into account legitimate defense requirements both countries but rests primarily on conviction that basic security and economic well being of both countries depends on their finding way to lessen tensions between them and thus to reduce share of their resources going to military expenditures. For Rawalpindi: 4. In conveying policy package to Ayub you should say we were encouraged by his response to our representations on arms limitation in November (Rawalpindi's 1751)./3/ On assumption that that response remains basis for GOP arms policy, we now prepared do following within context of stated policy (i.e., only when such actions will contribute to arms limitation or reduced defense expenditures): /3/Document 384. (a) entertain specific requests for cash purchase in US of lethal spares on case-by-case basis; (b) continue to consider requests for credit purchase of non-lethal end items; (c) discuss his other problems of military supply, including requests for purchase from third countries of US-controlled equipment, but only within policy context stated reftel; (d) resume limited grant training program, if GOP so desires. 5. Before we able to address Pak request for our concurrence in M-47 tank deal with Germans (Rawalpindi's 3489),/4/ we need know: (a) effect of prospective purchases of US tank spares on level operational tanks of US origins; (b) how proposed German deal would further affect tank strength levels; (c) number Pak tanks of Chicom origin; and, (d) effects of foregoing tank strengths on overall armed forces structure. /4/In telegram 3489 from Rawalpindi, March 17, Locke reported that Ayub reiterated Pakistan's need for M-47 tanks and interest in obtaining them from the Federal Republic of Germany. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PAK) 6. In conveying policy package to Ayub we hope you can get across that we are prepared to help him meet his legitimate security requirements but that manner in which GOP deals in coming weeks and months with recent GOI offer begin talks on arms limitation (State 158121)/5/ could have decisive impact on way we able to respond to GOP requests. /5/In telegram 158121 to New Delhi and Rawalpindi, March 18, the Department expressed mild encouragement over recent developments in Indian-Pakistani relations. The Department cited, as grounds for this encouragement, Chagla's offer on March 14 of talks with Pakistan without preconditions, and Ayub's expressed willingness to consider secret talks concerning arms limitations. The Embassies were instructed to encourage both governments to build on these openings. (Ibid., POL INDIA-PAK) For New Delhi: 7. We recognize difficult task you face in getting Indians to see that their own interests served by our new policy. There are a number of elements in package designed help meet your problem (i.e., permanent MAAG withdrawal, credit sales, training). We believe it would be useful highlight following points: (a) This decision terminates grant military assistance to Pakistan and substantially results in the end of a military relationship we have had with Pakistan since 1954; (b) the withdrawal of MAAG from Pakistan (and USMSMI from India) symbolizes this new policy; (c) need for some degree of flexibility in our sales policy if we are to have any influence on Pak position regarding arms limitation; (d) fact that military supply is only one element of larger USG policy designed contribute to security, integrity, and economic well being of South Asia as a whole; the record speaks for itself as to what we have done and are ready to do for India, a country that is central to our interests in area; (e) specific benefits for India include (1) $17 million on 3 per cent and ten year repayment basis for completion of Star Sapphire project. This is a special concessional rate, no longer available elsewhere and is provided in recognition of importance of completing this project; (2) authority to continue our credit sales program on case-by-case basis (currently on 5 1/2 per cent and 7 year terms); (3) limited grant training program. 8. We believe it would also be useful for you to reiterate in this context our strong satisfaction over recent Chagla letter to Pirzada/6/ on arms limitation talks, adding that we continue believe special burden responsibility rests on India as larger power if progress to be made in such talks. /6/See footnote 2, Document 423. For both posts: 9. Para 3 C reftel states policy on replacement items, i.e., the question is not now before us as to replacing an end item of US origin should that item be totally destroyed through accidental loss. That contingency will be considered when it arises. 10. Both GOI and GOP should understand what while we are prepared to discuss arrangements for carrying out our new policy, including handling of any public announcements, decisions of timing and tactics will have to be our own, influenced particularly by Congressional requirements. You should stress most strongly that we intend handle this matter in as low key as possible and will look to both Governments for their cooperation. We would prefer for present to avoid any kind of public announcement or comment on new policy but recognize difficulty doing so for very long. FYI: We believe it preferable to make low key announcement which focuses on MAAG and USMSMI withdrawal instead of reacting to leaks. This announcement would be made as soon as possible after Ambassador Bowles talks to GOI and might be followed up with backgrounder in Washington with selected journalists, possibly including Indians and Paks who resident here. Will keep you informed. End FYI. Contingency press guidance being prepared. 11. If asked about timing MAAG/USMSMI withdrawal, you should say this still being worked out. FYI: We envisage July 1 as target date. End FYI. 12. FYI: We recognize that conflicting approaches GOI (willingness talk with GOP on all subjects but without recognizing existence dispute on Kashmir) and GOP (willingness talk GOI all subjects but only if Kashmir dispute also discussed) will continue complicate our efforts achieve arms limitation. We believe you should continue take every opportunity urge both sides to moderate their preconditions. Meanwhile, we are prepared for time being to see what we can accomplish bilaterally. End FYI. 13. We intend brief Ambassador Hilaly and Chargé Bannerjee as soon as we know approaches made to Governments. For London: 14. As soon as scenario for presentations in Rawalpindi and New Delhi has been worked out, we expect to authorize you to convey new policy to HMG at appropriate level and in closest confidence. In doing so you should say that we will wish consult further on what we might be able to do together to achieve progress toward arms limitation subcontinent. Rusk
434. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 8, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IX, Memos & Miscellaneous, 3-7/67. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "Rec'd 4/8/67, 12:30 p." A handwritten "L" indicates it was seen by the President. SUBJECT /2/Eugene Rostow, who headed the U.S. delegation to the meetings of the India consortium in Paris, April 5-6, reported on the results of the meetings in telegrams 15622 and 15623 from Paris, both April 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, SOC 10 INDIA) The meetings appear to have been highly successful. The Consortium has agreed to include food aid in its planning and pledging; it sustained the non-food requirement of $900 million foreign exchange aid; and it has already made additional commitments virtually matching our 3 million tons of food. There are three types of additional assistance: (a) direct food equivalents, now totalling approximately $70 million; (b) accelerating European pipelines to release real resources this year which normally would not have come forward for a number of years, amounting to roughly $50 to $70 million additional; and (c) debt relief, over and above what donors agreed to do to meet the $900 million foreign exchange requirement. We won't know the exact debt relief figure until April 25th when representatives come to Washington for a wrap-up meeting to make final commitments. This may total some $139-141 million more. The Paris delegation recommends that we now release 1.5 million of the 3 million additional tons of food approved by the Congressional resolution. They want to hold the second 1.5 million as leverage until after the April meeting firms up debt relief arrangements. We'll report in greater detail when we've talked to the people who were there, but the preliminary report looks good./3/ /3/Rostow added a handwritten postscript that reads: "in short, it looks as if Gene may have got more than the extra $190 million." Walt
435. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, April 8, 1967, 1000Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi, London, Tehran, and CINCMEAFSA. 3788. Ref: State 166539/2/ and 168709./3/ /2/Document 431. /3/Document 433. 1. Conveyed contents reftels (omitting USG internal and New Delhi instructions) orally to President Ayub in forty-five minute conversation April 7. 2. President Ayub reaffirmed statements passed to me by Foreign Secretary Yousuf November 6 (Rawalpindi 1751)./4/ Particularly he said tanks and other equipment are to "fill gaps" and replace worn out obsolete equipment, not to increase force levels. /4/Document 384. 3. President stated GOP has replied to Chagla note about arms limitation meeting, and Foreign Office instructed to furnish us copy. Ayub said meetings should be secret and at diplomatic level at present, since any Ministerial meetings which got in press would only increase Indo-Pak tensions. 4. Ayub was optimistic about meetings. He said senior Pak officer (most probably G. Mueenuddin) recently went to India for wedding and saw B.K. Nehru, an old friend of his, and subsequently Indira Gandhi. Nehru said politically impossible seriously discuss Kashmir. Mrs. Gandhi said she prepared to listen to Pak officer but would make no comment. Ayub said conciliatory public statements by Indians on arms limitation and other subjects are purely for US consumption. Ayub noted that while Pak military budget reduced this year, India budget increased to about 969 crore. He said much hidden in EA budget because of India's ordnance production. Pakistan estimates real Indian defense expenditures 15 to 20 per cent greater than above figure. Ayub reiterated that way to obtain arms limitation is for US to talk independently to each country as British did in Rann of Kutch dispute. He reiterated Pakistan wants arms limitation, Pakistan can never have anywhere near as large army as India, which is sapping India's economic strength; Pakistan merely wants to be able to defend itself adequately. 5. I noted our need for list of Pak spare part requirements and requirements for purchases from third countries, including information prerequisite for consideration German tank purchase. My impression is Ayub prepared to make requested information available, at least against specific possibility obtain desired tanks. 6. We discussed possibility of Defense Minister Khan travelling to US soon to talk with Defense and State Departments. 7. Comment: Review of public and private statements by Ayub and senior responsible officials over past several months demonstrates consistency in GOP position reflected anew in Ayub's remarks today. Principal elements are GOP: (a) willingness in principle to reduce defense expenditures and limit arms; (b) requirement for some degree of motion on political issues; (c) scepticism about Indian sincerity and concern at possible GOI press leaks and public exploitation of talks; (d) preference for secrecy exploratory talks via diplomatic channels and for US bilateral approaches with each side. Emphasis varies but all elements remain central to Pak position. 8. It now most important to develop GOP confidence in political and military feasibility of new US policy. Immediate requirement this regard is expeditious US response to Pak lethel spare parts request. 9. Absolute discretion all parties essential with respect to existence and content Indo-Pak talks and regarding any military strength figures supplied to US. Would appreciate opportunity review any proposed press release re US military support policy. 10. Please advise your reactions to Khan visit. We recommend he come and that opportunity be used to begin rebuilding relationship between US and Pak armed forces./5/ /5/Locke reported on April 11 that he had followed up his discussion with Ayub on April 7 by covering the same ground with Defense Minister Admiral Khan, Foreign Minister Pirzada, Foreign Secretary Yusuf, and Air Marshal Nur Khan. (Telegram 3788 from Rawalpindi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 INDIA) At Admiral Khan's request, the Embassy prepared and sent to him on April 12 a memorandum outlining the new military supply policy for India and Pakistan. (Telegram 3862 from Rawalpindi, April 12; ibid.) Locke's judgment was that the Ayub government found the new U.S. military supply policy to be moderately satisfactory and, under the circumstances, an understandable modification of U.S. policy. (Telegram 5007 from Karachi, April 14; ibid., DEF 12-5 PAK) Locke
436. Letter From Prime Minister Gandhi to President Johnson New Delhi, April 10, 1967. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 1/1/67-4/30/67. No classification marking. 3 pages of source text not declassified by the Indian Government.]
437. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, April 10, 1967, 1430Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 14747. Dept pass CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, AmEmbassy London, AmEmbassy Rawalpindi, AmEmbassy Tehran. Ref: State 166539/2/ and 168709./3/ /2/Document 431. /3/Document 433. 1. I decided it best convey contents reftels to Foreign Minister Chagla rather than Prime Minister Gandhi since once she took position it would be government policy, whereas we retain some flexibility by making approach to Chagla. I also decided to convey our position in writing and accordingly handed him aide-mémoire at beginning our meeting. Full text aide-mémoire transmitted next following telegram./4/ While meeting was conducted in polite terms, there was no doubt that Chagla and Bajpai, who was also present, were deeply concerned over effects of our decision. /4/Telegram 14748 from New Delhi, April 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-INDIA) 2. After reading aide-mémoire Chagla stressed that GOI policy is to attempt to prevent arms race which is harmful to both India and Pakistan. GOI is prepared for serious talks. I asked if he had yet had reply to his letter to Foreign Minister Pirzada. He replied in the negative but stated he understood reply was about to be received and Indian HICOM in Pindi was returning tomorrow to Delhi and he expected he would be carrying reply with him. 3. Chagla said the question was how far U.S. policy would contribute to achieving our shared objective of preventing an arms race. He pointed out GOI was worried not merely about arms that the Paks obtained from all over the world but about the arms that were going to Pakistan through Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. in this connection he cited unusual circumstance of Iranian planes recently taking part in Pakistani National Day celebrations. He said he would be going to Tehran in a few days and wanted to have a frank talk with the Shah. 4. Chagla said deep concern would be aroused by resumption of provision of spare parts for lethal equipment in hands of Paks even on sales basis since this would understandably strengthen Pak military capacity. I pointed out that we were simply readjusting our policy so that it would now be consistent with that of other Western countries. He believed new policy strongly favored Paks and reminded me that they had previously told us Paks would use our weapons against India. We had been unable to prevent Paks from using such equipment against India. 5. Chagla was concerned that effect of resumption spare parts supply for Pakistan lethal equipment would inevitably lead to a step up in arms race. It was felt that the timing of our move was "singularly unfortunate" coming immediately before anticipated reply of Paks to Chagla letter. Our new policy it was feared would encourage Pak intransigence. He pointed out that criteria of limitation of military expenditures means that Paks will be able to obtain more equipment within the same expenditure ceiling. 6. Chagla asked if we agreed that the Indians should discuss arms limitations irrespective of Kashmir, and I told him we understood that the Kashmir problem could not be solved first. 7. Bajpai expressed grave concern which Chagla shared that proposed announcement April 12 would have extremely damaging effect not only on Indian public attitudes but also on L.K. Jha's visit to Washington. They strongly urged that announcement be held up at least a few days. 8. In closing Chagla agreed with my suggestion that the value of this policy would be determined by the manner in which we implemented it and added that if it helped the Indo-Pak dialogue it was all well and good, if not, all India's efforts to establish a dialogue would be for naught. We agreed that we would again be in touch in a few days after they had had an opportunity to give a thorough study to our aide-mémoire. 9. During meeting I also handed Foreign Minister on separate paper text of proposed press statement. I did not give him text of contingency questions and answers. Bajpai pointed out that the press statement as presently drafted draws major attention to our provision spare parts for previously supplied equipment to Paks and fact India also included as Chagla put it was "SOP with no real meaning", since we have not in past provided lethal items to Indians on anywhere near scale provided Paks. 10. Effect of proposed press statement he said will be highly damaging our interests in India. (Note: I am sending separate message April 11 containing suggested redraft of press statement which is attempt to place our policy in perspective that would help diminish difficulties here.) 11. Action requested: As Chagla will undoubtedly be calling me back in day or two for further discussion, I would like to be able to assure him catagorically that if Paks give a negative response to Chagla letter/5/ calling for arms limitation, and by negative response I include a reply indicating prior necessity to settle Kashmir, that I be authorized assure GOI in such circumstances we would not proceed authorize sale spare parts for previously supplied lethal military equipment. Anything further I could say to effect Paks agree not go to ChiComs for additional equipment would be helpful. /5/C.S. Jha told Bowles on April 11 that Pakistan had just rejected the proposal in Chagla's letter. Jha stated that the Pakistani response would amplify the negative reaction in India to the decision taken by the United States on military supply policy. (Telegram 14899 from New Delhi, April 12; ibid.) Bowles
438. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, April 15, 1967, 2326Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, India, Vol. I, Prime Minister Gandhi Correspondence, 1/11/66-9/12/67. Confidential. CAP 67295. For the President from Walt Rostow. Subject: L.K. Jha and the NPT. Against the background of the following letter from Mrs. Gandhi, I had a talk this morning with L.K. Jha,/2/ one of her closest and most responsible advisors and B.K. Nehru./3/ You will see from her letter that she hopes Jha will be able to see you--he leaves town on Wednesday./4/ There are three issues: /2/Jha visited Washington April 12-19. /3/A memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Rostow, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. 9, 3/67-7/67. /4/April 19. Firstly, Soviet and U.S. assurances to India and others who sign the NPT: He has just come from Moscow where he appears to have made substantial progress in getting out of the Russians the beginnings of an assurance. According to him, the Russians are prepared to make a declaration when the NPT is signed to the effect that the nuclear powers have a responsibility to act quickly through the Security Council if a non-nuclear signatory of the NPT is subject to unprovoked nuclear threat or attack. There would also be language permitting a nuclear power to act in fulfillment of that assurance without waiting for Security Council action, freeing it from a possible delay as a result of a Security Council veto. According to him, they are ready to do it simultaneously with us, even though our respective assurances would not necessarily be identical. We do not yet have the formal Soviet text. But Jha has a reputation for care and accuracy. If he is nearly accurate, this could represent a real breakthrough. We will be studying a paper/5/ he has drafted combining our views and Russia's, as he understands them. He recognizes that we can't give him anything definitive until we see the Russian text, but he hopes for some sign from us of a serious interest in privately exploring with the Russians an assurance paralleling what he thinks they are ready to declare. /5/A copy of this undated paper is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, India, Vol. I, Prime Minister Gandhi Correspondence, 1/11/66-9/12/67. Secondly, we discussed briefly our new arms policy toward the subcontinent. They fear that our selling spares to Ayub will make him less willing to reach agreement with them, and make it more difficult for them to hold the line on defense expenditures. I stressed our intention to look at military supply on a case by case basis in the light of particular transactions' effect upon the level of expenditures. Third, we discussed the problem of at least holding the line, and preferably, reducing arms expenditures. They argued we should force the Paks to reach an arms agreement with them by not selling spares until they agreed (for his part, Ayub wants us to act as middle man, so that we can pressure the Indians on Pakistan's behalf). I urged them to press forward in all possible ways their effort toward secret talks, preferably between military and financial specialists in both countries in an effort to find a way to prevent a further arms race, which we did not intend to finance. They shouldn't be discouraged if the Paks didn't respond quickly--after all, India was by far the larger, stronger country. Pakistan has no arms production and no source of supply like India's from Russia. Prime Minister Gandhi leans heavily on L.K. Jha's judgment. It is important that he go home with a clear knowledge of our interest in his brokerage effort between us and Moscow. He saw Kosygin when there, and before he came here, his government asked if you could receive him. In view of the possibility that we may be on the verge of a breakthrough on the NPT, and the importance of strengthening his hand in New Delhi against the Hawks who want to go nuclear, I recommend you try to see him on Tuesday or Wednesday. Have Marv set up an appointment/6/ /6/Neither option is checked on the telegram. Johnson did, however, meet with Jha on April 19; see Document 440. [Here follows the text of Prime Minister Gandhi's April 10 letter to President Johnson; see Document 436.]
439. Letter From the Deputy Ambassador-designate to Vietnam (Locke) to President Johnson/1/ Djakarta, April 18, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Memos, 10/66-7/67. Confidential. Ambassador Locke left his post as Ambassador to Pakistan on April 16, and was passing through Indonesia en route to his new post as Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam. Dear Mr. President: Enclosed is an "Aide-mémoire on the U.S. Government's Arms Policy For Pakistan and India"/2/ which President Ayub handed me when I lunched at his house April 15. He asked me to send it to you. /2/The enclosed aide-mémoire, prepared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and dated April 15, laid out a variety of reasons for concluding that "the new U.S. arms supply policy affects Pakistan adversely." The aide-mémoire also argued that "U.S. policy towards Pakistan in the economic field gives rise to concern." The Aide-mémoire discusses not only the military supply policy, but economic aid as well. With respect to our military supply policy, all government officials with whom I have talked recognize that it is an improvement over the current situation. They do not believe, however, that it adequately recognizes their defense needs. I believe that it does, if properly interpreted and implemented. They agree, but have no confidence in our interpretation or implementation. For this reason it is extremely important that: 1. We handle spare parts requests expeditiously and do not debate for long periods whether they are in "critical need" or contribute to "reduced defense expenditures." Obviously all spare parts not on hand are "critically needed" and to buy them from us is cheaper than to buy them from gun runners, thus reducing defense expenditures. We should only assure ourselves that the supply of parts requested is of reasonable quality. 2. We handle requests for permission to buy end items from third countries promptly and with understanding. If these items are actually for replacements and to fill in gaps, as claimed, and not for expanded forces, they should be allowed. Requests in this category should be considered as reducing defense expenditures, because these tanks are less expensive than new ones from other countries which would otherwise be bought. The key question should be whether or not the requested tanks are necessary to an adequate defense within existing force levels. 3. We use economic pressure to prevent the Indians from fueling an arms race. Some of the reasons Pakistan is suspicious of our proper implementation of the new policy are: 1. We appear to them to have bought the Indian "status quo" on Kashmir and to be trying by our policy to force them to accept it. This they will never do. 2. We said when I first came to Pakistan that we were requiring India, like Pakistan, to keep her defense expenditures in line and avoid an arms race; yet the Indian defense budget has gone up, where Pakistan's has gone down somewhat; and the balance of forces has increased considerably in favor of the Indians since the 1965 War. 3. In November, pursuant to State Department message, I asked President Ayub certain questions with respect to his intentions about arms limitations, talks on all subjects (including Kashmir), and arms sources (especially Chinese and Russian), and left the thought that our degree of responsiveness to his defense needs would depend on our assessment of his answers. His answers, I believe, were satisfactory from our point of view, yet our action was delayed five months, and then given in the form of a policy which on its face does not appear to recognize his needs, although it can be interpreted to do so. (As above stated, our declared policy--properly interpreted and implemented--will properly recognize his needs, and it is this prompt and proper interpretation and implementation that is important.) The paper's comments with respect to economic matters are not completely balanced. We cannot be more forthcoming on Tarbela at this time than we have been, and they understand the reason. We have been reasonably forthcoming both as to amount and timing on consortium aid and food, at least as compared with India. It is difficult for Pakistan to understand, however, although I have tried to explain why it takes so long to get a commitment issued on the $70 million loan, after you authorized it some time ago. Also they still feel we should have been more responsive in meeting their request to send 250,000 tons of wheat before the end of the year in response to President Ayub's personal letter to Secretary Freeman;/3/ the wheat was eventually committed and sent, but not in time to avoid Pakistan buying more with its own foreign exchange and being forced to suspend the free list. And it is true--as they charge--that they have spent many times per capita more of their foreign exchange on food than India, and India's greater famine may be principally due to India's failure to use the same self-help measures as Pakistan. In other words, we have been very responsive to many of their requests, but they have been frustrated and their economic progress has been slowed and liberalization prevented by a combination of slowness in consortium aid and their necessity to spend so much foreign exchange on food grain--whatever the cause. /3/Not found. It is true that if we could be more responsive from a timing point of view on all kinds of aid, we could build more good will without giving more in the total. But of course we have our own problems, and Pakistan has not always been quick in solving some of our minor troubles in Pakistan. There will be a tendency in reading the enclosed report to be a little aggravated by what appears to be Pakistan's failure to see our problems and appreciate our help. But we should resist this tendency. We should seek to understand and be sympathetic to their frustrations--whatever the cause. Pakistan's orientation toward the West is extremely important to us (and to India as well) and we should not be diverted from our major foreign policy goals by emotional reaction./4/ /4/Locke expanded his analysis of the Pakistani aide-mémoire in another letter to the President, sent from Bangkok on May 1. He noted that his first reaction to the aide-mémoire was one of anger, for it did not show any appreciation for U.S. actions with respect to Pakistan's security and food problems. Upon reflection, he decided that the aide-mémoire did not accurately reflect the attitudes of Ayub and his principal advisers. As he saw it, the Pakistani leadership viewed the new U.S. military supply policy as a step forward and recognized the importance of U.S. economic assistance. Locke felt that the Pakistanis did not question the fact that they received their fair share of economic assistance, but had problems with the timing of the assistance. Locke attributed the aide-memoire to pressure from the "China lobby" in the government and in the press. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Memos, 10/66-7/67) Faithfully yours, Eugene M. Locke/5/ /5/Signed for Locke by Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green.
440. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 19, 1967, 11-11:50 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 INDIA. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it apparently was drafted by Wriggins. A typewritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was uncleared. The time of the meeting, held in the Oval Office at the White House, is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) THOSE PRESENT After welcome by the President and exchange of pleasantries, L. K. Jha indicated that he had come at the request of the Prime Minister on a visit to the Soviet Union and Washington, to explore the question of security assurances connected with the NPT. The Soviet reply had been positive and he hoped the U.S. too would be able to move ahead. The President said that he had just received the text/2/ this morning, that it looked very interesting. From earlier statements, the Indians could know generally how interested we were in this problem; we will have to look at it with care; but we will get right at it. (He asked Mr. Rostow to be sure the staff work was ready for tomorrow's meeting.) /2/The undated text of a draft Soviet declaration concerning assurances to non-nuclear nations in the event of aggression by a nuclear power, as conveyed to Washington by Jha, is attached to an April 20 memorandum from Kohler to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 INDIA; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchive), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, "India and Pakistan--On the Nuclear Threshold," Document 14) Secretary Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed the Soviet draft on June 23. The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 198; it is also available on the Internet, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, Document 16. L.K. Jha said that the Prime Minister also wanted him to thank the President for all his help on so many fronts, including food and economic aid. If he should find it possible to come to New Delhi, the President would receive a very warm welcome. The President replied that he had enjoyed his earlier visit and learned a great deal, particularly in the countryside, where he saw so much progress being made. Perhaps it would be possible to think about a trip for sometime next year, but he couldn't make a commitment now for so far ahead. He pointed out that Ambassadors Cooper, Galbraith, and Bunker had all been so well received they had been made converts to India's cause; perhaps if he went, he would be converted too. L.K. Jha said he hoped that would be so. The President indicated that he had appointed Ambassador Bunker, whom the Indians had trained, to Vietnam in the hope that some way could be found to end that conflict satisfactorily. Perhaps the Indians, who knew Ambassador Bunker, would now be able to help a bit more. Despite numerous efforts to reach agreement with North Vietnam, none of our many initiatives had elicited Ho's willingness to talk. No Administration had done more to ease relations with the Soviet Union: Space Treaty, East/West trade; Consular Agreement, etc. We were not rigid on anything except running out on our contracts. What a disordered world it would be if others came to assume the U.S. word was worthless! The President wanted the Prime Minister to know how much he had enjoyed having her here; he had worried about the painful political steps she had had to go through. But after all both of them were better off than such former leaders as Erhard, Macmillan and Khrushchev. Her country had many friends in the U.S.; he had had trouble getting the support she needed; but in the end, as a result of the Congressional resolution and other steps, things were likely to come out all right. Everyone who has been out there feels that India is part of our future, and that we are part of theirs. "And so do I," he said. In conclusion, the President reiterated his interest in having the Russian text examined with great care and indicated we would be back to them shortly with our reactions./3/ /3/Jha also met with Secretary of Defense McNamara on April 18. They discussed the need for assurances to India against nuclear threats, U.S. resumption of the sale of "lethal spares" to the subcontinent, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The memorandum of conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, "India and Pakistan--On the Nuclear Threshold," Document 15.
441. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Gandhi/1/ Washington, May 9, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, India, Vol. I, Prime Minister Gandhi Correspondence, 1/11/66-9/12/67. No classification marking. Transmitted to New Delhi in telegram 192874, May 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL INDIA-US) Dear Madame Prime Minister: The frankness and informality of your letter/2/ and of my recent meeting with Mr. L.K. Jha recall the warmth of our talks during your visit here a year ago. I agree wholeheartedly that there is no substitute for these personal exchanges. /2/Document 436. This is why I am especially tempted by your gracious invitation to visit India again. No journey could give me greater pleasure, for Mrs. Johnson and I treasure memories of our last visit. Regrettably, I think it unlikely that we shall be able to make this trip in the months immediately ahead. As we look a bit further into the future, however, I hope it may be possible. The year since your visit has been exceedingly busy for us both. We have each had our share of satisfactions and disappointments. These are inevitable given the problems we face. Your letter suggests that perhaps your greatest satisfaction these past twelve months has been the mature, responsible way in which so many million Indians demonstrated the strength and vitality of Indian democracy by participating in India's fourth general election. You have a right to be proud, especially in view of the natural calamity which has afflicted many regions of India. I know the drought has added greatly to your burdens and caused you great personal sorrow. All friends of India share both your pride and your grief. I continue to follow closely your food situation. The Consortium meeting in Paris was an important step in meeting both the short range and longer term aspects of this problem. While you still have much to do in encouraging other governments to participate fully in both the food and the economic aid programs, I believe you have started down a new path which offers hope. We will continue to work at your side and expect soon to release additional wheat now that others have taken substantial steps toward matching our effort. You must also find satisfaction in the measures your government has taken during the past year to give greater emphasis to agriculture, to carry out massive countrywide family planning programs, to liberalize imports and to relax controls over industrial investment and production. I am confident that pressing along the course set by these new policies can bring India to its goal of a self-reliant economy and a rising standard of living. My government will continue to do its share in the international effort to support India. But I am sure you know that our ability to help will depend in considerable measure on whether both India and Pakistan can contain--and even reduce--military spending. Further increases in defense spending by your government and Pakistan's would make it far more difficult for me to mobilize support for economic development in either country. I know you want to hold down defense spending, and I believe President Ayub is motivated by a similar resolve. On my side, I think that my greatest satisfaction recently has come from those signs which hold out the possibility of a relaxation of world tensions--even a slight relaxation. We have concluded the Outer Space Treaty/3/ and made some progress in negotiating a non-proliferation treaty. In this great effort--which will help determine the kind of world in which our children and grandchildren will live--we welcome the constructive support of India. /3/Reference is to the treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space signed in Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27. The treaty entered into force on October 10. (18 UST 2410) That is why we were especially glad to see Mr. Jha at this time. As you know, I have long been aware of India's security problems vis-à-vis hostile China. Obviously, your country's concern has increased since October 1964, when the Chinese exploded their first atomic device. I stated publicly then that the United States is willing to extend its strong support to any country which has chosen not to use its nuclear technology to build weapons if that country should be threatened with nuclear weapons. I can understand why you have raised the question with the major nuclear weapons states of making clear their concern and intentions in this connection. As I told Mr. Jha, I am deeply interested in the trend of his discussions in Moscow, including the illustrative text of a possible Soviet declaration on nuclear assurances. My advisers and I are carefully exploring the possibilities in this approach, and we will be in touch with you. Our great and continuing disappointment in this past year is that the relentless efforts we have made to find a peaceful and honorable resolution of the Vietnam conflict have thus far failed to evoke a corresponding response from the other side. The United States stands for peace and justice with honor, and I shall continue to pursue peace. A just solution, of course, cannot be one which denies the right of our Vietnamese friends to independence and self-determination, without external coercion. I would hope that those nations which share a stake in these precious principles would support my country's efforts to find an honorable peace. With warmest good wishes. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson [Continue with the next documents]
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