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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
462. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, October 10, 1967, 0058Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Handley on October 6. Cleared by Spain and Hamilton (White House) and approved by Handley. Repeated to New Delhi, London, USUN, and Moscow. 51282. Following were main elements meeting between President and Pakistan Foreign Minister Pirzada,/2/ October 5. Ambassador Hilaly, Mr. Walt Rostow, and Handley were present. /2/Pirzada visited the United States October 5-6. A summary of his meeting with Rusk on October 6 was transmitted to Rawalpindi in telegram 49679, October 6. (Ibid.) Pirzada began meeting by saying that President Ayub had asked him to convey warm greetings to the President. The President replied that he hoped Pirzada would remember him to President Ayub for whom he had great admiration. In response to President's question about the situation in UN, Pirzada said on the Near East question he had found things settling down and that situation was far less "agitated" than it was at summer session ESSGA. He thought that a solution was now possible. He said that Ayub had done his best to persuade the Arabs to make a settlement and he believed that most of the Arab countries were now willing to accept the resolution worked out between the U.S. and the Soviets. Everyone was now looking to U.S. He thought that a solution would be entirely possible if something could be done about the refugees and Jerusalem. He said that Pakistan, as a Moslem nation, had very special interest in Jerusalem question. When pressed as to what kind of status he envisaged, he replied that it should be the same as it was on June 4, even though this meant the city would be split. He thought that arrangements could be worked out for access to Jewish holy places. They had found in Moscow that the Soviets were prepared to continue to support the resolution they had discussed with the USG if this were satisfactory to the Arabs. The President noted that he had heard about the good economic progress being made in Pakistan and wondered if this were continuing. Pirzada replied that they were proud of their economic development and very grateful for assistance given by the U.S. which had made this progress possible. He said that construction of Tarbela, which is now insured by U.S. support, will go a long way to making Pakistan prosperous. He thanked President for his decision to send a team to study Pakistan's watershed problems. The President said that we were pleased to help Pakistan since we were very fond of their people. Pirzada said that the dedication of the Mangla Dam would take place on November 23 and he hoped the USG would accept the GOP's invitation to send a high level delegation to it. He said that GOP was very pleased with the performance of the American contractor, the Guy F. Atkinson Company, and noted that this company was now bidding for construction of Tarbela. In response to question on Indo/Pak relations, Pirzada said there can be no relief from tension until the Kashmir hurdle is removed. Kashmir, he said, was considered non-negotiable by the Indians. Meanwhile, the situation in Kashmir had become very serious, with riots taking place and with repression and cruelty being inflicted on people of Kashmir. Every effort should be made to try to bring India to the conference table on Kashmir. The President noted that it would be indeed wonderful if the Kashmir question could be solved. In commenting on post-Tashkent contacts with India, Pirzada did not attribute much importance to the reported upcoming telecommunications meeting. He said there had been a lot of foot dragging on the part of the Indians and that the meeting would be simply to ratify points that had been earlier agreed to by experts on each side. He noted that up to now there had been no firm decision on the delegations since the Indians had delayed for three months in working out the details, but nevertheless he felt sure that the meeting would take place. The President said that we were very pleased with the reductions in the Pakistan defense budget. Pirzada said that has not been easy since India has increased its budget and is buying submarines, tanks, and sophisticated weapons. That is why, he said, Ayub had gone to Moscow. He had told the Soviets that if they wanted peace in the subcontinent they must stop shipment of sophisticated weapons. The President and Pirzada briefly discussed the fighting between India and Communist China on the Sikkim border and agreed that at this stage it seemed "inconsequential". In discussing other aspects of Ayub's visit to Moscow, Pirzada said that Kosygin had been greatly impressed with his visit to the U.S. and his talks with the President. In answer to a question from the President about what the Soviets had said on Viet Nam, Pirzada replied that the Soviets had the impression that if the bombing were stopped, negotiations might take place. The President commented that this was just an impression. In discussing the food situation Rostow mentioned that he had had a talk with Finance Minister Uquaili the day before regarding commercial purchases of U.S. grain. Hilaly said that Pakistan was in a tight foreign exchange position and would be very reluctant to make additional commercial purchases. Rostow then said that, in all candor, he had to explain the difficult budget and fiscal situation facing the President. He understood their difficulties but the President's problem is also very serious and that at a time when he might be considering the possibility of cutting down on school lunch programs in the U.S., it would be difficult for the American public to understand why additional commercial purchases by Pakistan were not possible. As the meeting ended, Pirzada said that Ayub had asked him to thank the President for the sale of spare parts for the Pakistan Air Force. Ayub had also asked him to remind the President that Pakistan had made an official request to purchase replacements for aircraft and tanks. The President said that this request was under study, that we were anxious to help but that he had grave difficulties with the Congress on the question of military supplies. He pointed out that even today the Senate and House conferees on MAP had not been able to reach a decision and he was very uncertain as to what the outcome would be. Pirzada then added that Pakistan's request for purchase of spares for the Army had not yet moved. Handley expressed some surprise at this and agreed to look into it. Rusk
463. Summary Notes of the 576th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, October 11, 1967, 12:10-12:40 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, 10/11/67. Confidential/Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. An attached list of those attending indicates that, in addition to the President, Rusk, McNamara, Helms, Fowler, Freeman, Schultze, Gaud, Rostow, and Hamilton participated in the discussion. (Ibid.) U.S. Food Aid The President: The PL-480 program was initiated as a surplus food program in an attempt to raise the price paid U.S. farmers for their products, principally wheat. It has become an AID problem because we must now substitute bushels of wheat for those dollars which the Congress is not giving us to use in assisting foreign countries economically. AID Director Gaud: The PL-480 program has gone through three stages. The first stage involved disposal of surplus commodities. Our agreements provided for very easy terms. In the second stage, we made our conditions tougher. In the third stage during which surpluses became shortages, we were unable to do what we wanted to. The present stage involves the usage of the surpluses we have while retaining specific self-help actions we require of countries receiving assistance. There are four identifiable issues: 1. Do we insist on specific clauses covering marketing requirements or should we be flexible on this point, deciding on a case-by-case basis? It is recommended that we stretch the marketing requirements and keep the clauses covering this issue flexible. 2. Without jeopardizing our long-term objectives, we must decide whether we can increase food aid to fill the gap left because of the reduced AID funds appropriated by Congress. Specific countries involved are Ceylon, Colombia, and Chile. 3. Should we use food aid to build up buffer stocks in the recipient countries? 4. Should we soften the terms and the amount of down payment now being required in existing agreements? Two countries particularly involved are Brazil and Colombia. The President: Why doesn't Brazil want our wheat? AID Director Gaud and Secretary Freeman: Our terms are too high in their opinion. They believe our wheat will cost them too much. Secretary Freeman: The wheat situation in the U.S. has turned around. Availabilities may well be down if current crop estimates are correct. Food agreements have been tightened up with a view to forcing recipient countries to carry out self-help measures. Our wheat exports dropped because the worldwide harvest is good. The wheat market overreacted. We now have checked the downward price trend. The bushel price may be $1.50. Our policy should be to move out PL-480 wheat rather than to force commercial wheat sales. The present estimate is that we will have to move 400 million bushels to get a domestic price of $1.40 to $1.50 a bushel. Current sales are estimated at 300 million bushels. The only place to sell additional quantities is in India. The President: If India goes out in the open market to buy wheat, it should buy from us. Secretary Fowler: The question boils down to the Indian problem. Given the domestic supply situation, if we push wheat sales, we face the prospect of eroding the self-help provisions in our agreements and affecting the commercial market. Among the options listed in the Freeman-Gaud paper (copy attached),/2/ an option not listed would provide that the condition of our sale would depend upon agreement of India to purchase 500,000 tons of U.S. wheat. We would insist on other countries matching what we did. In general, we should insist that food aid be included in the total aid picture insofar as matching is concerned. Our present domestic supply problem should be handled in such a way as not to weaken the matching principle in future years. /2/Reference is to an October 10 memorandum from Freeman and Gaud to the President entitled "Food Aid for India in 1968." (Ibid.) Walt Rostow: We have a chance to break down zonal restrictions involving the movement of food in India. To do so would be a real plus and is worth a try. When the Indian Consortium is negotiated in November, we should try to get our food aid counted as part of our contribution. Secretary Rusk: We should ask the Senior Inter-Departmental Group to look at our various food and AID policies. The President: Recommendations should be sent to me. If food recipient countries must buy wheat in addition to the amounts they are receiving from donors, they should buy from the United States. Bromley Smith
464. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, October 13, 1967, 0720Z /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PAK-US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi. 1269. Ref. Rawalpindi 1197/2/ and 1241./3/ Subj: Military Supply. Please pass White House. /2/In telegram 1197 from Rawalpindi, October 9, the Embassy asked for a rundown on the talks in Washington with Foreign Minister Pirzada. (Ibid., POL 7 PAK) /3/Telegram 1241 from Rawalpindi, October 11, reported that Oehlert's tentative appointment to meet with Ayub that evening had been postponed until Ayub returned from France. (Ibid., POL 12-5 PAK) 1. At social function October 6, Defense Minister Admiral Khan requested I call on him following morning on urgent matter. 2. Next morning he had with him Defense Secretary Ghias Uddin Ahmed. After pleasantries, they made following statements, with the Minister doing most of the talking. A. Next to President Ayub, they and the military establishment are the best friends USG has in Pakistan; B. They offer their assistance in connection with any problem our Embassy here might have, even if not within sphere of their Ministry; C. They do not know what USG desires might be with respect to continuation of Peshawar, but are anxious to help fulfill whatever they might be; and D. They badly need 200 tanks, reciting usual statistics about originally agreed force levels requirements, battle losses, and obsolescence, emphasizing "mad arms build up of GOI" and Pakistan's need to be equipped for 30-day holding action in the event of GOI attack to allow time for U.N. and friendly countries to halt hostilities. They explained increase in GOP request from 100 to 200 tanks by saying Pakistan really needs 600 to 700 and previous fiscal limitations of 50 for FY 68 and 50 for FY 69, have now been relaxed to 100 each year. They added, Ayub, despite dedication to security, continues to give economic development first priority. 3. In response, I mentioned U.S. overall and subcontinental arms policy as well as current Congressional situations. When I referred to gratifying though small reduction in percentages in GOP and GOI budgets devoted to arms, they alleged GOI budget is meaningless, since it [garble] being adhered to and GOI is arming feverishly and has purchasing missions scouting in many countries including Czechoslovakia. They claimed all this was directed against Pakistan, since GOI well aware ChiComs have no intention attack or conquer India where they would encounter almost unsurmountable logistical and terrain problems. 4. I said Minister and Defense Secretary seem to have more information about arms buildup in India than I, and they volunteered to furnish me "documented statistics". 5. I pointed out that: A. We have no solid information from GOP regarding number of ChiCom tanks Pakistan has received or which might still be committed and B. We have no assurance that if US-manufactured tanks became available GOP would not seek more elsewhere. 6. Defense Minister and Secretary responded that: A. They would be glad to welcome a technical group and show what material Pakistan has and needs and why; and B. Firm assurances would be given that if Pakistan acquired 200 tanks requested no more would be sought or acquired elsewhere. 7. Defense Minister and Secretary said while they will prepare report for me on alleged GOI arms build up, it would be better for me to discuss with Ayub the points in paras 5 and 6 above, adding it would be a good idea to do it "in cool of evening over couple of scotch-and-sodas". They would set up date for me at 1930 hours October 11, and I should confirm with Ayub's Military Secretary, General Rafi. 8. Rafi was in Lahore and did not return until evening of Oct. 9. I was subsequently informed Ayub had previous commitment for evening October 11 and would see me to discuss these matters after his return from France, Romania, and Turkey October 31. 9. This approach by Defense Minister and Secretary suggests several pregnant speculations including that: A. It is opening ploy in campaign to relate US military supply to Peshawar continuance. Although only tanks were mentioned it seems probable ante will be raised to encompass at least all pending requests for military supplies (including aircraft, artillery, rifles) and will be related to Pakistan's continuing requirements for lethal end items replacement and modernization to maintain desired military posture vis-à-vis India; B. Ayub returned empty handed from Russia with respect to USSR military equipment for GOP and reduced assistance for GOI, although possibility exists he obtained some assurances of help insufficient to Pak needs, and he wishes to see can be done with USG; and C. Postponement of suggested discussion until Ayub's return from France indicates he wishes defer our conversation until he explores possibility of obtaining military equipment from France. 10. Range of above speculations could be extended almost indefinitely, but I believe we shall be on firmer ground in this regard after my next meeting with Ayub, during which I hope mostly to find out what he may have in mind. Meanwhile, Washington may wish to consider implications from its perspective, of apparent Pak inclination to link military supply and Peshawar. 11. I would appreciate benefit Washington's preliminary views for my background prior to seeing Ayub./4/ /4/In assessing the Pakistani request for tanks, the Department stressed that the vital factor in deciding how to respond to the request would be the number of tanks supplied or committed to Pakistan by China. (Telegram 55550 to Rawalpindi, October 18; ibid., POL 12-5 PAK) Oehlert
465. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 18, 1967, 2:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. IV. Confidential. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates it was seen by the President. SUBJECT As you instructed at last week's NSC meeting, Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Schultze have put into writing their joint proposal on wheat for India. Their memorandum is at Tab A./2/ It argues for: /2/October 17 memorandum from Freeman, Gaud, and Schultze to the President entitled "Food Aid for India." (Ibid.) --a six-month agreement providing for 3 1/2 million tons of wheat (plus minor amounts of other commodities as appropriate); --very tough self-help conditions; --acceptance of the International Grains Agreement formula as sufficient guaranty of matching by other donors; --an informal but tough line on commercial purchases, making it clear that it is important to us that the Indians buy American if they buy any wheat abroad; --no new approach to the Congress; --immediate commencement of negotiations. (Our negotiating leverage declines as the Indians move closer to a bumper harvest.) Nick Katzenbach has reviewed and approved this proposal. Joe Fowler has decided to write a separate memorandum (Tab B)./3/ He argues that: /3/October 17 memorandum from Fowler to the President entitled "Food Aid for India." (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 46, Oct. 16-20, 1967) --we should condition our PL 480 wheat on Indian agreement to buy at least 500,000 tons from us for cash; --we should not accept the Grains Agreement formula as fulfilling the matching requirement for the first half of 1968, since the Grains Agreement does not come into effect until July 1 of next year. In the meantime, if we can't get any more matching resources, we ought to insist that our food be counted as dollar aid in the Indian Consortium. The rest of us have been over Fowler's points very carefully. He may well be right on his second count, but we don't need to decide that issue here. If Passman & Company gut the AID appropriation bill, it is very unlikely that we will have to insist that at least part of our food be counted as dollar aid. (There are some costs to this--e.g., the Canadians and the Australians will take a similar stand and cut down their dollar aid accordingly--and there is a serious risk that the Consortium might dissolve under such pressure.) But we don't need to face this question directly until we know how much AID money we will have. We will come back to you when that decision needs to be made, and Fowler will have a full voice in the recommendation. Making this decision now does not mean that you are overruling him on this point. Joe's first point is tougher. Everybody wants to sell as much grain as possible. Freeman would be delighted to back any tactic he thought was likely to extract more commercial sales. But the truth is that the Indians are very unlikely to buy any wheat abroad in a year of record domestic harvests and severe foreign exchange shortage. They certainly aren't going to buy anything like 500,000 tons, and the leverage of this PL 480 offer is not nearly sufficient to get them to do so. They didn't buy quite that much from us last year in the second consecutive year of the worst drought in recent history. This year's Indian grain crop will be nearly 20 million tons more than last year's. The prospect of another 3 1/2 million tons in imports just isn't attractive enough to make them spend scarce foreign exchange on wheat. Joe's proposal has other drawbacks: --a flat condition such as he proposes would be a clear violation of our pledge in the International Grains Agreement not to tie any PL 480 sales to cash sales. (The language in the Freeman/Gaud/Schultze memo is already right on the borderline in this respect; some State lawyers are concerned that even this may be too strong.) --if such a condition became widely known in the diplomatic community--and it would become widely known--the Canadians and Australians, from whom we now expect upwards of a million tons of food aid to India, would either scrap those plans or insist upon the same conditions we impose. The result might well be no wheat sales for anybody, and the others, particularly Australia, would be very bitter; --such a condition would rob us of all our leverage to get the internal policy reforms we want from the Indians. They would see it as a straight commercial proposition which they would almost certainly refuse. But even if they bought it, they certainly wouldn't feel they owed us anything on the policy front. Thus, although everybody agrees with Fowler's objectives, the rest of us would argue that his condition would: (i) keep us from moving the wheat we have to move if we are to meet our FY 1968 PL 480 targets and support domestic prices, (ii) weaken our influence on Indian internal agricultural policy, (iii) sour the other donors on helping India, and (iv) get us into international legal trouble which could sink the Grains Agreement before it is even ratified. My vote is with the Freeman/Gaud/Schultze recommendation at Tab A. Special Note: In considering this decision, you should know that we have considerable evidence that the Indians are going back on their promise not to buy Soviet fighter-bombers. They told us last June that they would not buy Soviet planes if we let the British sell them 24 Hawker-Hunters. We gave the British the go ahead. It is now becoming clear that the Indians have some sort of bargain with the Soviets to buy a substantial number--perhaps 100--SU-7 fighter-bombers at about $1.7 million per copy. Secretary Rusk has already called in B. K. Nehru and sent Bowles in to Morarji Desai to demand an explanation. We haven't yet got any straight answers. If these reports are true, we will want to rethink our whole posture on aid to India--and the Congress may want to as well. But our position in the food negotiation gets less advantageous with each day we wait. Thus, I would suggest we: --start the food negotiation with the specific caveat that all bets are subject to change if the aircraft problem turns out as rumored; --hold off on the dollar side of our aid to India until we get satisfaction on the aircraft. Walt Start negotiations on basis Freeman/Gaud/Schultze memo (Tab A)/4/ /4/The President approved this option after adding the first four words by hand.
466. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, October 22, 1967, 2001Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, SOC 10 INDIA. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Heck on October 20. Cleared by Handley, Spain, Wolf, AID's Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia Maurice J. Williams, and Walt Rostow, in substance by Reid (OSD/ISA) and Freeman. Approved and initialed by Rusk. 58064. For Ambassador from Secretary. 1. President has asked me convey following to you: A. A message/2/ going forward to you outlines elements of a food package we are asking you discuss with GOI. This is a large program involving three and one-half million tons of foodgrains and some $250 million of U.S. resources. Its dimensions are yet another indication of our determination to work with the Indians to meet their food shortages and help them on road to self-sufficiency in foodgrains. This effort on our part is particularly significant as it occurs at a time when aid resources we can offer India and other countries are declining. /2/Not found. B. In putting this proposal to Indians you should also make crystal clear to them that our ability to continue to be forthcoming on the whole range of our assistance relations with the GOI is closely related to India's performance in reducing diversion of resources from economic to defense expenditures. C. Our decisions on aid will be closely related to a satisfactory resolution SU-7 matter (State 56877)./3/ /3/Dated October 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-6 USSR-INDIA) D. We do not propose at this time to make our food package contingent on reduction in defense budget but Indian actions in this field will weigh heavily in decisions we will be making shortly on division of aid appropriations, future PL-480 agreements, Consortium meeting and other forums which contribute to India's growth. Indians should realize their performance will have important bearing on these decisions, on Congressional attitudes, and on efforts we are making to get Pakistanis to cut back their defense spending. Rusk
467. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, October 27, 1967, 0017Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, SOC 10 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Mary S. Olmsted (NEA/INC) on October 25, cleared by Heck and Hamilton at the White House, and approved by Handley. 60510. New Delhi 4882./2/ Subject: Memcon with B.K. Nehru on Food. /2/In telegram 4882 from New Delhi, October 23, Bowles asked for a report on the President's conversation with Ambassador Nehru. (Ibid.) 1. Following is uncleared summary of memcon prepared by Secretary Freeman of October 21 talk between President, Ambassador Nehru and Secretary Freeman. Full memcon/3/ being pouched. /3/A copy of the memorandum of conversation was sent by Freeman to Rusk on October 24. (Ibid.) 2. Nehru thought commercial grain question could be worked out although he expressed concern about relations with Australia and Canada. 3. Nehru said Chief Ministers recently concluded they could not liberalize food zones at this time and certainly could not abolish them. Assuming a crop of 95 million tons (which by no means assured) and imports of 7.5 million tons, Nehru said per capita intake would be somewhat less this year than in 1964, allowing for seed, feed, private stocks, and general attrition. Therefore, Nehru said, India not in strong enough position to abolish zones. (USDA estimates indicate per capita availability in 1967/68 virtually identical to that of 1964/65, with same assumptions re imports, private stocks, etc.) 4. Freeman acknowledged political problem in abolishing zones but pointed out danger in not abolishing them. Argued that bold step at this time would tend to counteract downward pressure on prices from big crop in the most productive states. Producers increasingly adopting new techniques and methods. Sharp drop in prices to producers could disillusion Indian farmer and set back entire agricultural effort seriously. Continuation of zones would have that effect and now is time to abolish them. With two million tons of GOI reserves clearly attainable, plus at least an increase of 2.5 million tons in private hands, this is time to move. 5. Nehru discussed necessity to listen to local decision-makers and democratic process which would reflect itself in demands of people to abolish food zones should the above contingencies take place. 6. Freeman replied sometimes people in democracy must lead rather than count noses and issue of zones or no zones was not, and was not likely to become, political question on which Indian people could express themselves. 7. Nehru replied that should move in direction of abolishing zones be made, there ought to be more than six months' assurance of grain from U.S. 8. Conversation ended with directive by President that Secretary Freeman review his analysis of India situation and confirm his strong position that food zones in India should be completely abolished now and a maximum amount of pressure brought to bear to accomplish that goal or explain any adjustments that might be called for. 9. Nehru was asked to communicate with GOI and see what could and would be done by them to abolish food zones. Rusk
468. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, October 27, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. X, Memos & Miscellaneous, 8/67-2/68. Secret. SUBJECT We talked briefly on Tuesday about the fighter-bomber dispute in India. The following is a summary of where we stand now and what directions I would like to see us take in the future: Facts: 1. In June, we gave the British permission to sell the Indians 24 Hawker-Hunter fighters. We insisted upon two conditions: --that they be replacements, not additions to Indian air power, and --that India assure us she would not follow through on the purchase of 200 Russian SU-7 fighter-bombers which was rumored to be under negotiation. 2. Over the last month it has become increasingly clear that: --the Indians are in the process of buying 150-200 SU-7's from the Soviets at $1-1.7 million apiece; --they knew of this purchase at the time they assured us they wouldn't (most of the planes were apparently contracted for by October 1966); and --they are going ahead with the deal regardless of our views. 3. We have already used some of our big diplomatic guns to nail down the facts and to urge the Indians against going through with the deal: --Bowles has called on Morarji Desai, pursuant to a very strong cable from Rusk pointing out that this Indian action would be the worst combination of bad faith, bad resource allocation, bad strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan, and bad U.S. politics upon which continued massive U.S. aid to India depends; --Rusk has called in B.K. Nehru and made the same points; --Jerry Greene, our DCM in Delhi, has had several conversations with the No. 2 man in the Indian Defense Ministry, who gave us the original assurance and who is now the source of most of our information about what they are actually doing; --Bowles was instructed to make it clear that the atmosphere created by the handling of the SU-7 problem would affect the full range of our aid relations with India, including the wheat deal. (We did not threaten to revoke the wheat deal if we didn't get satisfaction on the SU-7's.) 5. Bowles, obviously upset, is urging that we not allow the SU-7 problem to poison our overall relations with India. He argues that India is now at a crossroads ("watershed" is his term), and that a tough démarche from us on the SU-7's could well turn her away from the West and away from concentration on economic progress. He agrees the incident is regrettable and that it will probably cause some trouble in the Congress. But he argues strongly against doing much, if anything, about it. 6. Senator Symington--along with an unknown number of other members of Congress--knows the history of the problem up to but not including the details we have picked up in the past month. Luke Battle has mentioned to him a couple of times that we have a problem and that he wants to give him a full briefing soon. Symington has always been very strongly anti-India (and pro-Pak); he is sure to point to this as yet another shameful example of Indian untrustworthiness (and the facts will lend considerable support to his case). 7. The Indians argue that: --the assurance applied only to new procurement, not to old orders; --British footdragging on the Hawker-Hunters made it clear that India could not depend on this aircraft as its workhorse for the period between the phasing out of their older planes and the phasing in during the 70's of Indian-manufactured MIG 21's; --the five-year defense plan worked out in 1964 and agreed to in principle by the U.S. provided for an air requirement which the SU-7's will help to meet. There is no desire to exceed the 1964 plan, but India can't afford any shortfalls, particularly since the Paks are not getting Mirage fighter-bombers. The first proposition is transparently false. The assurance was clear. The second and third are now the objects of a study being carried out by DIA and INR. (Of course, even if the study shows that the Indians are not doing anything more than the 1964 plan prescribed, we will have to decide whether the 1964 plan--which was followed by the Indo-Pak war--still represents our concept of what Indian security demands.) 8. We are now engaged or about to be engaged in five separate negotiations with the Indians, most of which are for their benefit: --a PL 480 wheat package totalling 3.5 million tons ($250 million); --a mid-November meeting of the Indian Consortium at which under normal circumstances we would pledge upwards of $380 million; --a $17 million Star Sapphire project providing for an early warning radar system against the Chinese; --a $25 million private deal under which the Bendix Corporation would join with an Indian corporation to build an airplane factory; --Negotiation of parallel U.S.-Soviet security assurances for non-nuclear signers of the NPT, particularly India. Implications 1. If it leaked that India is buying 150-200 Soviet fighter-bombers after we received specific assurance that she would not do so, I think there is an excellent chance that the Congress would pass an amendment to the AID appropriation bill cutting off dollar aid to India unless and until the deal were revoked. 2. If we let the Indians get away with this reneging without penalty, it would be very hard for us to convince them we mean what we say in future arms policy negotiations. This would be a real credibility gap. 3. We have clandestine information that the Paks already know about the SU-7 deal. They are so short of foreign exchange that they have not yet done anything about it. But publicity will put them in a very different political situation, and we can expect heavy pressure to help them regain "parity." 4. However, it is the combined judgment of our Mission in Delhi and NEA/Washington that no amount of U.S. pressure is likely to get Mrs. Gandhi to call off the SU-7 deal entirely. Any direct threat to cut off aid to India would probably have the reverse result--she would do a Sukarno rather than bend under pressure. (In fact, she probably doesn't have the political weight to carry the Cabinet in any other direction.) The result would be dissolution of the Consortium, failure to make use of the economic recovery promised by the good harvest, and a heavy blow to any hope of rapid economic growth in India for some time to come. Action Program In summary, the Indians have been lousy. It makes sense for us to try to get them to undo the damage, but the chances aren't really very good. It is very hard on our interests--both short and long-term--to cut off the help we are giving them, particularly grain. Yet it is terribly important that we have very soon a palatable story to tell Symington and other interested parties if we are to head off the problem in the Congress before it guts the Aid Bill. Any direct tying of aid to the SU-7's alone would probably drive India into going through with the bargain and scuttle their development programs as well. I have suggested that our policy be built along the following lines: 1. The SU-7 problem is directly tied to the Hawker-Hunters. We should immediately suspend our approval of the Hawker-Hunter deal until we get satisfaction on the SU-7's. (It is particularly important to have done this by the time we talk to the Congress.) 2. We should agree with the Indians that the SU-7 problem cannot be looked at alone--that the real problem is what amount of resources should be allocated to defense, measured against an agreed concept of Indian security needs. We are willing to join India in a hard look at that whole question, starting as soon as they like. 3. In the meantime, however, the defense budget problem is so important to the overall development outlook in India that we do not feel we can move ahead with our Consortium pledge until there is substantial agreement on the broad question of the proper size of the defense effort. Tactics The current plan--which has not gone yet beyond the sixth floor/2/--is to put this line into a letter from Rusk to Mrs. Gandhi. (This is entirely because Mrs. Gandhi is Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister at the moment.) We would try to do it diplomatically, and we have some basis for the joint study line in that the Indians themselves proposed general defense talks a few months ago. The cancellation of the Hawker-Hunter approval is not really likely to bother her much, although it probably will force her to make an explicit review and decision on whether to go ahead with the SU-7 proposition. The Consortium pledge threat may also be less powerful leverage than we would normally expect because she knows that we are now in a freeze on all new commitments and that the Congress is thinking seriously about cutting off the water. But it should be serious enough to get her to agree to the talks and perhaps to some modification of the SU-7 arrangement. (Obviously, we would push hard to get the SU-7 deal turned around completely if the discussions give us a substantive case against it.) /2/Reference is to the sixth floor of the Department of State; the Secretary of State and his deputies have their offices on the seventh floor. Perhaps most important, this letter would be a basic document we could show the Congress as evidence that we take this perfidy seriously and that we are doing something about it. When we have sent it, I would argue that Battle should have quiet talks with Symington and other interested parties on the Hill. I think it is much better to go to them than to let them be surprised by a headline. They may insist that we aren't being nearly tough enough--that we ought to cut the Indians off entirely until they make good on their promise. But I think early consultation is the tactic best calculated to head this off if it can be headed off. These are my thoughts. The letter is now in preparation in NEA, but I have no assurance that the Secretary will agree to go along. I will keep you informed. EH
469. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, October 30, 1967, 0032Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Spain and Prescott. Cleared by Battle, Handley, Heck, Wolf, Schwartz (DOD), Williams (AID/NESA), and Hamilton at the White House and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to New Delhi and CINCSTRIKE. 61581. For Ambassador. Ref: Rawalpindi 1269./2/ Subject: Military Supply. /2/Document 464. 1. FYI: The temptation to try to "buy" an assured future for the Peshawar facility with one or two hundred tanks is very real. However, we concur with para 9 reftel that to recognize linkage military supply policy with Peshawar would probably result in intolerable pressures from GOP for more and more hardware. Furthermore, we convinced such recognition would destroy the foundation of that policy which has its justification in its own separate objectives. Therefore, we believe it best during your October 31 conversation with Ayub for you to make no mention of Peshawar. From standpoint our interests we feel it still too early begin negotiations on this question. When we are ready these will have to be played out against background of totality US-Pak relations, of which our military supply policy is only part--although we hope in Pakistan's eyes a valuable part which it will wish preserve. End FYI. 2. We believe it would be useful, therefore, for you in your meeting with Ayub to review our whole military supply policy in order (A) prevent any misunderstanding by GOP on this important aspect our relationship, and (B) to impress on him value to Pakistan of this policy. 3. You should point out that since new policy began in April, 1967, we have approved for purchase $23 million in ammunition and spare parts. Air Force and Navy spare parts already being received in Pakistan. Despite Pirzada complaint to President, GOP has only within present month begun to submit specific purchase requests for Army spares, which we assume will also begin reach Pakistan soon. During same period, we have also approved $5 million jeep sale on very favorable three per cent-ten year credit terms and sales of assorted other non-lethal items. Military training program, for which we paying cost, has already been reestablished with 17 officers expected to take courses in US this year. 4. You may add that, while there will inevitably be delays resulting from our Vietnam priorities and manufacturers' lead times, as long as spare parts and other materiel requirements remain within framework our policy, we as interested as GOP in working out speedy and effective handling, including possible arrangements for filling all spares needs on yearly basis. This high priority business for General Geary. 5. On tank question, you should say that original request for 100 tanks has been actively considered. GOP had first indicated West Germany would be source and we understand from ForMin Pirzada this possibility still remains despite public FRG denials. For Ayub's information only, we also believe it possible some excess M-47s may be generated in Italy or France. However, we have never received formal request from any of these countries for sale to Pakistan. You may tell Ayub that we will understand it if the GOP decides to consult discreetly with possible sources of tanks to determine whether or not and what kind of a deal it can make with one of them. 6. You should remind Ayub again that Congressional and public concern makes the whole subject of military supply an extremely sensitive one. You can tell him that we would be prepared examine carefully any request for approval of 100 tank sale we might receive from Germans, French, or Italians. However, you should make clear that we would have to consult at the appropriate time with the Senate and House Committees concerned and that we cannot guarantee either concurrence or that a leak which might cause difficulties would not take place. Even for such consultation we would have to make sure that any request served the objectives of our military supply policy. To do this, we would have to have a clear understanding that: (a) number of tanks received or on order from Red China has not resulted in net increase Pak armour and that no further deliveries from this source expected; (b) GOP not planning purchases of tanks from other sources (e.g., France or Soviet Union); (c) for each US-controlled tank acquired one obsolete tank would be scrapped from Pak tank inventory; and, (d) Pakistan advise us of what, if any, major arms acquisitions of other kinds it foresees in reasonable future and justification therefor./3/ /3/Oehlert and Ayub discussed the tank issue when they met in Karachi on November 1. Oehlert asked for the assurances concerning alternate sources of supply outlined in telegram 61581. Ayub, "after some sparring," agreed that if his minimal requirements could be met with U.S.-originated equipment, he would undertake to scrap one obsolete tank for each new one acquired, and he would not seek or accept additional equipment from other sources. (Telegram 807 from Karachi, November 1; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) 7. FYI: We believe frank understanding on above conditions essential as we cannot afford be caught in another equivocation as with India on the Hawker Hunter/SU-7 deal and because, as we see it, main justification for tank sale, should it be approved, would be prevention excessive defense spending and/or introduction new weapons system which would follow from Pak acquisition expensive French AMX tanks or greater numbers Chinese or Soviet tanks. If possible therefore you should obtain from Ayub (1) total number of Chinese tanks held or expected; (2) which other major items military material Pakistan has acquired or is seeking from non-US sources; and, (3) some indication whether or not he prepared accept above conditions. End FYI. 8. We believe action should be completed on original request for 100 tanks before moving on to decisions on other lethal end items. However, should subject come up, you may tell Ayub we remain prepared consider on case-by-case basis any third country requests for sale to Pakistan of US-controlled equipment provided such sale meets objectives our military supply policy. Request for second hundred tanks is in this category and we willing to discuss it when question of first hundred has been satisfactorily disposed of. Direct US sales of artillery or any other lethal end-item are out of question at this time. 9. On replacement aircraft (Rawalpindi 332,/4/ 968/5/) you may indicate our understanding that most of aircraft requested (four F-57Bs and two F-104As) were lost during 1965 war. We cannot consider replacement for these aircraft. Only real accidental loss would appear to be one RB-57A which reportedly lost in landing washout at Risalpir in May, 1967. You may tell Ayub that while we have not yet investigated availabilities we willing in principle give consideration to request for purchase replacement this aircraft. /4/Telegram 332 from Rawalpindi, August 5, reported on a request from Defense Minister Khan for "replacement" of 4 F-57B, 1 RB-57A, and 2 F-104A aircraft. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 PAK) /5/In telegram 968 from Rawalpindi, September 23, the Embassy reported on a letter from Defense Minister Khan in which he reiterated Pakistan's desire for 200 M-47 tanks, 4 F-57B, 1 RB-57A, and 2 F-104A aircraft. (Ibid.) 10. You should indicate to Ayub our gratification at relatively moderate approach he has taken thus far in seeking acquire military hardware. Without this approach, including modest reduction this year's Defense Budget, we doubt that we would have been able sustain our current military supply policy even this far. We consider it of the greatest importance that he maintain this moderation and that Pakistan and the US have completely frank understanding on military supply problems. Should he be interested, we would be prepared at appropriate time have some of our experts discuss with his officers our own "cost effectiveness" approach to problem of getting maximum capability from minimum expenditure. Rusk
470. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, November 25, 1967, 0710Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 2019. Govto 12. 1. By appointment at 1100 hours Friday morning November 24, our delegation/2/ with Ambassador Oehlert presented to Ayub the map case as the President's gift. He received it with appreciation. /2/The telegram was from Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman, who was head of a Presidential delegation that attended the dedication ceremonies at the Mangla Dam on November 23. The delegation included Senator E. L. Bartlett of Alaska, Representative Delwin M. Clawson of California, Governor Kenneth M. Curtis of Maine, and Governor Calvin L. Rampton of Utah. 2. Immediately thereafter the Ambassador and I met with Ayub alone for well over an hour. Foreign Secretary Yusuf was also present and took voluminous notes. 3. I presented Ayub with the original of President Johnson's letter/3/ which I had read at the dedication services the previous day. He expressed warm appreciation of the President's message and referred to his long friendship beginning with the visit as Vice President. The letter had scooped in the press the messages from all other countries and the handwritten postscript was featured. /3/Reference is to a November 20 letter from Johnson to Ayub in which Johnson lauded the Ayub government and the people of Pakistan for the signal accomplishment represented by the construction of the Mangla Dam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of Correspondence File, Pakistan, Vol. 2, President Ayub Correspondence, 1/1/66-12/25/67) 4. We first discussed Vietnam, which I will report in septel./4/ /4/In telegram 2016 from Rawalpindi, November 25, Harriman reported that he had explained to Ayub President Johnson's urgent desire that pressure be exerted on North Vietnam to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Ayub agreed to do what he could in his contacts with Communist countries to promote a settlement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Harriman Files: Lot 71 D 461, Pakistan Trip) 5. Raising the Middle East problem, I expressed our encouragement by the unanimous approval [of] the British resolution by the Security Council, including Soviet support. Although Ayub said he had received the British draft from New York, he read carefully paragraph by paragraph a copy I handed him. I suggested that it would be useful for him now to encourage King Hussein who had made a good impression in the US. Unfortunately, Nasser had repudiated Hussein's position. Ayub agreed to support the efforts of the UN representative Gunnar Jensen, although he suggested that we not press the Arabs too hard. He pointed to the wide interpretation that could be given the phrasing of the resolution. I replied that all we wanted was the basis for peace along the lines of the President's five points. He agreed that a basis for a permanent peace was essential and recognized that the resolution was an important step forward, underlining the value of Soviet support. He made no bones about Soviet long-term intentions in the area, but thought that they did not want renewed hostilities. Jerusalem came up later in my talk with him at luncheon. He stated that his people would demand independent status for the Moslem holy places, which were revered second only to Mecca. He agreed, however, the subject should be kept apart from the other Arab-Israel problems. 6. As Ayub had mentioned the need for cooperation by the advanced countries to the developing countries, I gave him a copy of the President's Science Advisory Committee's report on hunger, which included detailed analyses of Pakistan's problems. I said I thought that approach of increased food production within an over-all expanding economy as proposed by this report was receiving increased attention in the US and elsewhere. 7. Ayub then brought up the question of tanks in the following manner: (A) he propounded the view that India had lost its ideology; since the death of Gandhi India had abandoned its principle of non-violence; since the death of Nehru, it had abandoned its policy of non-alignment; bigotry was now becoming more and more rampant in India; the elections were showing this type of candidate was winning; the present government was weak and could not last. Yet, India was developing vast military strength as a result of our past help and present Soviet assistance. This was obviously directed at Pakistan. He genuinely feared the possibility of another attack from India, and Pakistan must be prepared to meet it. (B) He said Pakistan badly needed 500 tanks to replace obsolete Shermans, but was presently requesting only 200. This is in line with prior statements made by him and the Minister of Defense to Ambassador Oehlert. (C) He reaffirmed previous statements made to Amb. Oehlert that he would scrap obsolete tanks on a one-for-one basis if he could receive tanks from or through US. (D) He expressed an understanding of our inability to make direct sales of tanks but expressed the hope that our government would take the initiative with countries where M-47 tanks under our control were known to exist in surplus and obtain offer of sale to Pakistan on appropriate terms. At this point I asked Amb. Oehlert to restate our present position with respect to tanks. He reminded Ayub that in previous conversations it had been pointed out: first, that we could not undertake direct sale; second, that we could not consider approving transfers through any intermediate government; third, that we could not take any initiative in undertaking to be purchasing agent for GOP; fourth, that we had under consideration only 100 tanks although we did not foreclose the possibility of considering a second 100 after the first 100 was disposed of one way or another and if justification could be established adequate to make it possible to undertake such consideration; and that if GOP established the availability of 100 tanks in some other country for purchase on acceptable terms USG would give earnest consideration to their request to approve sale of such tanks directly to Pakistan. Ayub stated he must have reconstructed tanks, as he could not afford new ones. Although I admitted we were unhappy at size of India's military budget, we didn't believe Indian aggressive intentions toward Pakistan. I admitted weakness Indian Government and many internal problems, but asked whether this wasn't what had been expected as inevitable after Nehru's death, and expressed the opinion it was too early to predict political future. I underlined our respect for Pakistan's economic development and considered use of resources for further economic expansion as wiser investment for Pakistan security than extravagant military outlays. However, I agreed to report his concern. 8. Conversation broke off in order to prepare for luncheon at which Ayub entertained all visiting delegations. He asked me to express his high respects to the President. Oehlert [Continue with the next documents]
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