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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
508. Telegram From the Ambassador to Pakistan (Oehlert) to President Johnson/1/ Rawalpindi, August 5, 1968, 1051Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Memos, 5/68-11/68. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only for the President. An interim acknowledgment of this telegram on August 6 by Bromley Smith at the White House [text not declassified]. (Ibid.) 5602. 1. When you posted me here you told me to feel free to communicate directly with you when I believed the circumstances justified it. 2. It is fair to say that I have not abused that privilege. 3. The circumstances do now justify it. 4. Our national interests in this country--indeed in this part of the world--have reached a crisis. 5. Having, unsuccessfully, used every other means at my command to resolve this crisis, I have no other resource except to place the problem on your overburdened but broad shoulders. 6. Whatever its troubles may be with some of its East European satellites, the USSR has made and is making great progress in this part of the world: A. It has attained its century-old ambition to reach warm waters; B. The strength of its Mediterranean fleet grows apace; C. It has made a captive of the more belligerent Arab states, especially the UAR, Syria, Algeria and Iraq; D. It has obtained a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf; E. It has made India largely dependent upon it because of military supply; F. It has largely outflanked the friendly Arab states of Jordan and Saudi Arabia; G. It has at least partially outflanked Iran and Turkey. 7. It is clearly contrary to our national interests for Pakistan to move into the Russian orbit--not only because of Pakistan itself but also because of the effect upon Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. 8. The following has happened with respect to Pakistan: A. Our liberalized military supply policy of April 1967 has not obtained Pakistan any end items: I. Efforts through Germany, Italy and now Belgium have all failed; II. The failures have been due in large measure to Indian pressure. B. We have seen the first visit in history of a Russian head of state to Pakistan. C. We have seen the first visit of a Russian naval vessel (a squadron) to Pakistan; D. We have received the termination notice on Peshawar; E. The USSR has indicated a willingness to sell lethal end items to Pakistan despite strong Indian protests. 9. If Pakistan is forced to rely on Russia for arms, Peshawar is lost and all of our other vital interests in this part of the world, including Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are jeopardized. 10. Time is of the essence. 11. Pakistan prefers U.S. made arms for logistical and ideological reasons but has been unable to come by them. 12. Our commitment to third party sales dates back to April 1967. 13. Our commitment of "one hundred tanks now and one hundred later" dates back to March 1, 1968. 14. All of the heat we might expect from the Congress, the press, or India has already been taken by our declared willingness to see Pakistan get tanks from Italy etc. 15. Our commitment of those tanks was conditioned on: A. No further acquisition of tanks or other lethal end items by Pakistan from anyone without consultation with us; B. Scrapping the present tank inventory on one for one basis; C. Purchase price and terms acceptable to us. 16. Our commitment of those tanks was not conditioned upon any Peshawar extension. In fact, my positive instructions were not to link the two. 17. During my June 1968 Washington consultations all responsible officials to whom I talked in State, Defense, Joint Chiefs and the intelligence community agreed that if the Belgian tank deal fell through we should sell the tanks directly if need be. 18. The only reservation to the above was one of timing because of a concern for Congressional reaction. 19. During my consultations I met with the Georgia delegation, the Florida delegation, the Zablocki Subcommittee in executive session, and an informal group of members of Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees at the invitation of Dick Russell. 20. All, and especially Russell and Senator Symington, were strongly in favor of a change in military supply policy for the subcontinent to allow direct sales of lethal end items on a case by case basis. Such a policy modification, or at least a special exception to the present policy, for the two hundred tanks committed would not be an embarrassment to the next administration. 21. On the contrary, it is the only way to keep the next administration's options open. With all the other problems facing it, it will be at least a year from now before the next administration can fix on a subcontinent arms policy. It will then be too late. Peshawar will be gone and the Paks will be in Russian hands. By moving now we can prevent this from happening without in any way committing or binding the policy of the next administration. 22. I beseech you, Mr. President, to move forcefully and immediately to get Ayub his tanks. 23. It may not even be necessary to make a direct sale. Iran is ready, able and willing to provide the tanks. Ayub knows this. If we do not allow it, he will certainly conclude that we do not want him to have any tanks and never did. 24. An Iranian sale would be 100 percent in accord with our present policy. It would need no modification of or exception to that policy. It would not represent the slightest deviation in principle from our already expressed willingness to approve a sale by Germany, Italy or Belgium. 25. The only reason ever advanced for not approving such a sale when the possibility first arose last December has been that if we do approve it, the Shah will want to buy more M-60's from us than our experts think he should in the interest of his own budgetary considerations. 26. It is the Shah's own money. He is no longer receiving aid. 27. For him to buy more M-60's from us is in our own interests: A. Employment-wise; B. Profit-wise; C. Tax-wise; D. Balance of payments-wise. 28. It can not please the Shah to refuse to allow him to do this. 29. If the Shah wants more modern tanks he will get them--if not from us then from the French or the Russians--which would not be in our interests. 30. If we let the Shah sell Ayub the tanks our balance sheet would look like this: A. Assets: I. The Shah will be pleased; II. Ayub will be pleased; III. The Russians will be slowed down in Pakistan and in all of South Asia and parts of the Middle East; IV. Our financial interests will have been served; V. Peshawar retention will be helped; VI. We will have fulfilled our commitment. B. Liabilities: None. 31. Mr. President, on December 23, 1967, in Karachi, in your presence I told Ayub that Pakistan was not my client but that my only client was the USG. I told him that while I had great respect for him and for his government and for their accomplishments and hoped that I could often be of assistance to his government's interests, I had come here only to serve my own government. You will remember the context in which those remarks were made. 32. I have not changed. 33. I give not one fig for Pakistan except as its interests are ours. 34. My earnest request to you to approve Iran and if for some unforeseen reason that should fail then to make a direct sale, is based exclusively on our own national interests. 35. I know that the greatest American I have ever known will forgive me for plagiarizing him--I am a free man, an American and an Ambassador of the United States of America in that order. 36. It is in those three contexts, Mr. President, and only those three, that I seek your action./2/ /2/Hamilton and Bromley Smith sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson in Texas on August 6. (Memorandum to the President; ibid.) They also sent a copy of telegram 17737 from New Delhi, July 31, in which Bowles pressed for a reversal of the decision to countenance the sale of tanks to Pakistan in light of the purchase of Chinese tanks by Pakistan, the impending purchase of Soviet arms including tanks by Pakistan, and the adverse impact on U.S.-Indian relations of even an indirect sale of U.S.-originated tanks to Pakistan. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90, August 1-10, 1968) On August 9 Battle sent a cable to Oehlert assuring him that every effort was being made to facilitate a third country sale of tanks to Pakistan. He noted, however, that an Iranian sale continued to pose significant policy problems. (Telegram 217963 to Rawalpindi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PAK)
509. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 8, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, County File, India, Vol. XI, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/68-10/68. Secret. SUBJECT /2/Katzenbach headed a team that visited New Delhi for the first in a projected series of annual bilateral consultations between the United States and India. Included in Katzenbach's party were Battle, Heck, Assistant AID Administrator Maurice Williams, and Hamilton of the NSC Staff. The Indian delegation at the talks was headed by Minister of State for External Affairs B.R. Bhagat. While in India, Katzenbach, accompanied by Battle, Heck, and Bowles, met with President Zakir Husain, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Gandhi, and Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Desai. Katzenbach reported on his meeting with Gandhi in telegram 17455 from New Delhi, July 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 313) A memorandum of his conversation with Husain on July 27 is in Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 73 D 24, India 1968, India/US--Informal Talks. A brief report on the talks was transmitted to Washington on July 29 in telegram 18664 from Paris. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL INDIA-US) A more complete summary report on the talks was transmitted to Washington in airgram A-1390 from New Delhi, August 13; ibid., POL 1 INDIA-US. As you know, I have just finished a week in India launching the first in a series of annual planning talks with the Indians. During the week--in addition to three days of talks--I visited the huge Bakhra-Nangal Dam, a family planning center and an agricultural research station. In addition, I had private talks with Mrs. Gandhi, President Husain and Deputy Prime Minister Desai. I came away with the following impressions and conclusions: --India is managing its affairs far better than I had suspected. Vast problems remain, but I was continually struck by the spirit of determination and self-confidence of all. --There has been a very real and exciting break-through in agriculture. The Indians now are giving agricultural production the priority it deserves. Sustained progress will, of course, require sustained Indian effort and both support and policy monitoring by the aid consortium. You can be proud of your personal role in reducing the threat of a massive Indian famine and malnutrition. The talks themselves went well. The atmosphere was good; the discussion informal and relaxed. By agreement, we both stuck to the larger issues and did not push too hard on touchy subjects. South East Asia The most significant outcome of the talks was an Indian indication that they have decided to take on a more active role in Southeast Asia. In the short run this means improving their relations with the countries of the region. For the post-Viet-Nam period they suggested that they--with other SEA countries--promote a regional group which would assume greater responsibility for the problems of the area. The Indians hope the neutrality and security of this grouping would be recognized and supported by the US and others. The idea certainly has not been thought out in detail, but the significant point is India's initiative to involve itself in an area it has long overlooked. We told the Indians to try the idea out on others, including the Russians, with whom they plan similar talks next month. Surprisingly, the Indians did not exclude Pakistan from this regional grouping. I also was interested to hear that the Indians are now surplus in small arms production. One of the roles they might play in promoting their scheme would be to supply modest military assistance (both equipment and training). China I returned with a far better understanding of India's problems with China. The Indians are extremely troubled by Chinese pressures, and have built up a substantial force to cope with any conventional military threat (including Chinese support for insurgents along the northeastern borders). Morale among the Indian armed forces is high and--unlike 1962--they should be able to give a good account of themselves. As we total up our security assets in Asia, I think we can look upon this force as a net plus against China Pakistan Tanks for Pakistan came up at various times, but the Indians did not belabor the subject as they had earlier threatened to do. This is, as you know, an extremely complicated problem, so I will send you a separate memo on it. Aid Not surprisingly, the Indians are troubled about aid cutbacks, but are adjusting to the blow. They were particularly worried about prospects for IDA, since continuation of their import liberalization program is dependent upon IDA funds. Gandhi Trip I learned that Mrs. Gandhi will visit South America in September and October. She expects to stop overnight in New York on October 14 on her way back, and would, I suspect, like to see you informally while she is in the US. You may want to invite her to a private lunch at the White House on October 15. I personally believe it would be a useful move./3/ /3/Another copy of this memorandum included a typed marginal notation indicating that the President's response to this suggestion was "Hold off for now." (Ibid., POL INDIA-US) Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
510. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, August 23, 1968, 1745Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 PAK-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Spain on August 15; cleared by Heck, Handley, Wolfin (G/PM), Curl (INR), Robert H. Neuman (L/NEA), Sheldon (CIA), Hero (OSD/OGC), Wix (DOD/ISA), and Bromley Smith at the White House; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 226368. For Ambassador. Ref: (a) Rawalpindi 6575,/2/ (b) State 214860,/3/ (c) State 202781,/4/ (Nodis). /2/In telegram 6575 from Rawalpindi, August 1, Oehlert reported on a conversation with Foreign Office Director General Piracha in which Piracha pressed for action on the pending tank sale. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 BEL-PAK) /3/Telegram 214860 to Rawalpindi, August 3, informed Ambassador Oehlert that he could expect a proposal regarding the termination of the Peshawar facility shortly. (Ibid., DEF 15 PAK-US) /4/Document 504. 1. You are authorized meet with Akhbar and Yusuf to present proposal for withdrawal Peshawar along lines paras 2-6 below. 2. Personnel: (A) USG proposes begin phase-out technical operational personnel in January 1969. Withdrawal of total of about 800 operational personnel would be completed by December 1969, at which time all USAF operational activities would end. Under planned month-by-month personnel withdrawals, about half of total operational personnel would be out in July 1969. Army Sugar Tree unit (approximately 30 personnel) would remain in operation until final close-out of Peshawar. (B) Approximately 500 support personnel would begin departures before July 1969 with final evacuation to be completed by July 1, 1970. Since many of these personnel would be involved in final clean-up after operations ceased in December 1969, bulk of them would depart in monthly withdrawals between January and July 1970. (C) In sum, we would have about 30% present authorized personnel out by July 1969, another 30% by December 1969, with remaining 40% completely out by July 1, 1970. 3. Technical Equipment: (A) As operational personnel are withdrawn as outlined above, the equipment and associated materiel which they have been using would be crated and readied for shipment. The exact movement schedule from the station would depend on availability of transportation, but, in any event, it would all be out before July 1, 1970. (B) Antenna dismantling would begin in January 1969 with the antenna associated with Placid I (Bankhead), including the 15-foot dish inclosed in the 21-foot radome, two 6-foot dishes inclosed in another radome, the corner reflector and four log periodic-type antenna. Dismantling and removal of these could probably be completed in ninety days. Other UHF and special antenna would be removed from January through June 1970, or earlier. (C) Equipment for the 12 positions presently being used by the Pakistanis would be turned over to them in the event of a favorable Pak response to the USG phase-out plan. The high frequency antenna systems would be left to them in any event. (D) In sum, some of the most visible antenna would be dismantled well in advance of July 17, 1969. Dismantling of the remainder of that which we would remove would span the January 1969-July 1970 period. The Pakistanis would receive title to the equipment for the 12 positions they now have plus the high frequency antenna. 4. Non-technical equipment and facilities: Physical plant, including residential and office buildings and recreational facilities worth approximately $10 million will be left behind for the GOP. Since individual items are not covered in the 1959 agreement, disposition of these would be worked out between USAF and Pak authorities. (FYI: In the event of a favorable Pak response to the USG phase-out plan we would be prepared to be helpful by leaving Peshawar a valuable and readily usable installation to the GOP. Since the 1959 Agreement is silent on residual value, we are in poor negotiating position on this subject. However, believe point that valuable installation will accrue to Pakistanis should subtly be made known. End FYI.) 5. Dependents: Dependents would normally depart with their sponsors according to schedules outlined paras 2(A) and 2(B) above. We would anticipate that about 50% of the approximately 400 dependents would be withdrawn by July 1969 and that all would be out by January 1970. (FYI: If absolutely necessary, we could undertake to remove maximum possible number earlier in 1969 making it possible at that time also to abandon base housing and to reduce and consolidate support facilities such as commissary, school, and hospital. End FYI.) 6. Exclusion Area: As part of proposed phase-out plan, we would be prepared to eliminate the US Exclusive Use Area at once. We would need only time to accomplish necessary physical adjustments which would probably be done in about two weeks. We would still require, of course, a separate small area under special security protection for our communications center. (FYI: 6937th Sp. Commander should be able provide you with description physical implications such change, e.g., number of additional square feet added to joint US/GOP area. End FYI.) 7. FYI: Tactics and Timing: Our objective remains to get as much time as possible beyond July 1969, but it now seems to us here that one-year is most practical target to shoot at. There will remain some flexibility on a variety of specifics, but above proposal incorporates elements package discussed earlier (ref (c)) and is designed to make one year "moving-out" period beyond July 1969 as palatable as possible to Pakistanis. Should it turn out that one year period is unobtainable, we would then prefer total close-out by July 1969, including the withdrawal of US equipment used in the Pakistani exclusion area. Implementation such plan would have to begin soon, and, therefore, it is important that we determine as quickly as possible whether or not above proposal viable. 8. On this question, we still believe basic GOP attitude as reflected in and affected by recent exchange Presidential letters will be more important than specifics of withdrawal plan, but wish do anything possible present most attractive proposal. We hope paras 2-6 above will give you enough to open discussions. Should it become clear proposal is workable, one or more officials from agencies most directly concerned would come to Rawalpindi to help refine specifics. 9. We realize atmosphere for discussions could be improved by affirmative action on tanks and that it may be desirable wait additional week or so to see how current initiatives play out before coming to grips with Yusuf and Ahkbar on Peshawar plan. We will inform you on tanks ASAP. 10. Question of offering additional cash "rent" for period July 1969-July 1970 has been reexamined and para 4 (g) ref (c) is reconfirmed. We are prepared continue but not increase present rent. End FYI. Rusk
511. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, August 24, 1968, 0705Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-6 USSR-PAK. Secret; Exdis. 7085. From Ambassador. Subject: USSR Military Supply for Pakistan. 1. This morning the Defense Minister and Defense Secretary informed me that USSR has agreed in principle to sell GOP any hardware it wants, including tanks. 2. They added that last night President Ayub had asked the Minister to inform me that he is reluctant to act on this agreement because: A. From an economic viewpoint he would prefer to acquire cheaper, second-hand material; B. From a logistical viewpoint he would prefer to acquire U.S.-produced material; C. Most importantly, he wished to avoid, if possible, any increased dependence on USSR. 3. They then stated that despite Ayub's reluctance, he would be forced to move in the Russian direction unless he could be assured early-on that U.S. manufactured sources would be forthcoming. 4. They then alluded to Iran, stating that this was, from their viewpoint, the cheapest, quickest and most certain source. 5. After explaining our Congressional problem vis-à-vis Iran, I informed them, without in any way identifying the countries, that we were having discussions with two other possible sources and hoped to have determined their position within the next several weeks. 6. They reverted to Iran, suggesting that USG, GOP and GOI could have a private, gentlemen's agreement among a very limited number of people in each government, that tanks would be forthcoming from Iran after Congress adjourns--for delivery next calendar year. I depreciated the practicabilities of such an agreement, including the prospects that it could remain secret./2/ /2/The Department confirmed in telegram 231334 to Rawalpindi, August 31, that the proposed "gentlemen's agreement" was not feasible. The Department indicated that negotiations with Turkey concerning the sale of U.S.-originated tanks by Turkey to Pakistan were underway, with the prospect of an agreement in September. Oehlert was instructed to avoid replying to Admiral Khan's approach if possible until the negotiations with Turkey were concluded. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 PAK) Oehlert
512. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 23, 1968, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. XI, Cables, 2/68-10/68. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that it was received on September 24 at 9:10 a.m. Mr. President: The attached memorandum and file (Tab 1)/2/ are, in a sense, a reclama from Secretaries Rusk and Freeman, Bill Gaud, and Charlie Zwick on your decision of August 5 on India. (See Tab 2)/3/ The history is as follows. /2/Zwick pulled together the positions of Rusk, Freeman, and Gaud in a September 12 memorandum to the President dealing with aid to India. (Ibid.) The file cited by Rostow was his tabulation in a September 23 memorandum to the President of the remaining decisions relating to India. (Ibid.) /3/See Document 507. --We reported firmly and clearly to one and all that you wished to make no further decisions on India in your administration. --In examining the political and economic consequences of this judgment, Sec. Rusk, for one set of reasons, Sec. Freeman, for another, Bill Gaud and Charlie Zwick, for a third, all felt that they had a duty to lay the matter once more before you on the following basis: What absolutely minimal decisions on Indian aid were required to keep alive the political and economic assets which you had built up there through your policies. (Sec. Freeman's anxiety has another dimension which is wholly familiar to you.) They concluded by raising for your decision: --A $50 million fertilizer loan (as opposed to $200 million in general AID funds) because, as Zwick's memorandum says: "Failure to order this fertilizer now will mean a serious shortage of fertilizer for India next year which cannot be made up later." --Similarly, this minimal program would cut the proposed 5.5 million tons of wheat to 1.5 million tons: the reason "If there is a break in PL 480 shipments from August through next March, we are all concerned that the buffer stocks will be drawn down to a point where the Indian government will be unable to move ahead in breaking down the food zones that prevent building a national agricultural market." Secretary Rusk, I gather, is prepared to make this case to you on political grounds. Since you know so well the arguments surrounding Indian aid, I forward the attached file unsigned by me: another signature is of no help. I do feel it is my duty, however, to make available to you this proposed minimal package which is, in the judgment of your responsible advisers, the recommended course of action in the light of your well understood reservations./4/ /4/A handwritten note on the memorandum by Jim Jones reads: "Walt--Talk to Pres. about this. Pres. didn't say no more decisions. He said no more gifts." Walt
513. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, September 25, 1968, 2333Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 PAK-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Spain and cleared by Mouser (NEA/INC), Neuman (L/NEA), Wolf (G/PM), Austin and Curl (INR), and Colonel Kravitz (DOD/ISA). Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 245135. Ref: Rawalpindi 7675./2/ Subject: Peshawar Negotiations. For Ambassador. /2/In telegram 7675 from Rawalpindi, September 18, Oehlert noted that Ayub was preoccupied with preparations for a trip to East Pakistan and that the time was not ripe to approach him on the Peshawar issue. Oehlert also noted that it would not be good strategy to make such an approach without a resolution of the Pakistani tank request in hand. He felt that until the opportunity to discuss Peshawar with Ayub was more propitious, it would be wise to rely on the assurance offered by General Akhbar that the Peshawar facility could be operated until the termination date and then dismantled. (Ibid.) 1. We are encouraged by your report of Akhbar's assurance we will be able continue operations through July 17, 1969 with dismantling and withdrawal to take place later. However, legal opinion here unable find any solid base for us to claim such right in agreement itself, and we cannot plan on that basis without written confirmation. 2. We must emphasize that time is running out for decision one way or another. Operating agencies need maximum lead time for orderly phase out of facility. 3. While we agree desirability avoiding visible alteration normal operations and personnel procedures prior to negotiations with GOP, USAF has already had to cease sending dependents not now on orders and we foresee other steps required soon. You should, therefore, initiate negotiations ASAP after your return to Pindi in accordance with State 226368/3/ in order to achieve an early decision. /3/Document 510. 4. Should it become evident that extension to 17 July 1970 is not feasible with proposed package, you should attempt obtain written confirmation of Akhbar's undertaking to permit full operation through July 17, 1969 and dismantling and removal thereafter. Such arrangement would, of course, be preferable to complete evacuation and turnover by July 17, 1969. Rusk
514. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 4, 1968, 12:37-1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. XI, Cables, 2/68-10/68. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Saunders and Handley on October 30. Approved by the White House on November 22. The time of the meeting, which was held at the White House, is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) SUBJECT /2/Desai visited Washington September 28-October 5 to attend meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. While in Washington he met with Freeman, Fowler, and Rusk, in addition to President Johnson. A memorandum of his conversation with Rusk on September 28 is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 INDIA-US. The results of Desai's visit were summarized in telegram 251579 to New Delhi, October 8. (Ibid., POL 7 INDIA) PARTICIPANTS Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai called on the President for a twenty-minute conversation at 12:40 p.m. on Friday, October 4. After a brief exchange of pleasantries, the President and Deputy Prime Minister exchanged remarks on the following subjects: When the Deputy Prime Minister commented that the President had had a difficult time since they last met, the President said that we had had lots of problems but that we had also found lots of answers. We had not found answers for all of our most difficult problems but we had been blessed by progress in a number of fields. For instance, just this week, the President had had occasion, on signing several bills, to review our progress in the field of conservation, and he was very proud of what had been accomplished during his administration. On the other hand, we have still not been able to find an answer to the difficult problems of Vietnam. Continuing on Vietnam, the President said that others had a different view of the problem from his but he felt, after looking at the problem from every possible angle and hearing every possible viewpoint that doing anything other than what we have done would have led to conditions far more difficult than the ones we face now. He said Czechoslovakia had been a disappointment--indeed frightening--and he was quite concerned. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had been just on the verge of sitting down and making progress on limiting offensive and defensive weapons, on Vietnam and on the Middle East. "Then just before we got on the elevator, they invaded Czechoslovakia." The President said the Middle East is quite troublesome. "We can't get either side to cooperate." At home, the economy is in excellent condition. People are expressing discontent, but a lot of this is artificially stirred up. In sum, the President said there are pluses and minuses on our record. Then he asked the Deputy Prime Minister to tell him about conditions in his country. The President particularly inquired about the recent rainfall and the condition of the next Indian crop. The Deputy Prime Minister said that the rain last year had been good and the crop a record one. The rains this year are less and the crop will be smaller, though it will be the end of October before anyone can make a sound estimate of just how big it may be. He noted that the industrial sector of the economy had begun to recover. In response to the President's inquiry whether India's changes in agricultural policy have paid off, the Deputy Prime Minister said that they definitely had. In spite of the possibility of poor rains this year, he tentatively estimated that the crop would not fall below 90 million tons because of the stronger production base that had been established as a result of changes in agricultural policy. There followed a brief discussion of the nature of what the October rains contributed to each of the Indian crops in comparison to the relation of the rains to harvesting and planting in Texas. The President asked about Prime Minister Gandhi, B.K. Nehru, and former Agriculture Minister Subramaniam. The Deputy Prime Minister replied that Mrs. Gandhi was well into her Latin American tour but would have to cancel her scheduled visit to Peru because of the coup. He said that B.K. Nehru was in Assam and that Subramaniam was now head of the Committee on Aeronautics and had been in the United States a few weeks ago. The President said he was sorry he had missed Subramaniam and expressed admiration for the job Subramaniam did as Agriculture Minister. The President said that a lot of problems had come together in the past few months--the war, Congressional difficulties, and the United Nations. The Deputy Prime Minister responded by saying that he doubted the President's successor could change many of these problems and that he would be confronted by pretty much the same pressures. He also said that he had the greatest admiration for the way the President had stood up to his problems. The President said he was concerned over the turn in recent months in the American people's attitude toward other nations. He said this has been a familiar pattern in American history. After World War I we had had the Washington Naval Conference and scrapped a lot of our war material. Then we got into World War II and after that we demobilized and then came the Korean War. Now we are in Vietnam. Throughout this period, we have had other problems such as Greece, Turkey and the India-Pakistan war. A lot of the American people say that we should not try to be the World's policeman. The President did not feel that was the issue. If a child was sick with smallpox next door, he didn't see how anyone could justify not going to its aid on the ground that one shouldn't "mess with other people's business." The President also said that his "enemies" say that we are "messing" too much in other people's affairs. What they mean by this, the President said, is that our policies are costing too much money. He felt that this was unrealistic and he was proud of how we have worked with a number of other countries, especially India. He said that India was doing better and so was Latin America and Africa. He said that some people were talking about bringing our troops back from Europe and he thought this had been an invitation for the Soviets to do what they had done in Czechoslovakia. He could not understand the new mood of isolation in the United States. It is in both parties, but his own party was worse than the other. The Deputy Prime Minister asked whether it would be possible to release the remainder of this year's PL 480 shipments now. The President said he was not going to make many decisions on consequential matters between now and the election, which is just a month off. Then we would have a new President-elect. "Anything you do in your last few days in office, people suspect you of ulterior motives." The President said anything the new President could do, he wanted to let him handle. The Deputy Prime Minister responded by saying that this decision "has already been done earlier by you; it is not a new decision." The Deputy Prime Minister went on to say that the President had already sent 3.5 million tons, and 2.3 million tons of the total approved remained. He said it would "come in handy" right now. India needs to build its buffer stocks, and it now appears that it has to look forward to a crop smaller than last year's. After a noticeable silence, the President asked how long the Prime Minister was going to be in Latin America. After the Deputy Prime Minister's short response, the President asked whether India was any closer to the solution of the Kashmir problem. The Deputy Prime Minister responded that they were "neither closer nor farther" from the solution. The President asked how President Ayub was. He said that Ayub was "very distressed with us." Ambassador Jung said, "Why?" The President said Ayub felt that we haven't treated Pakistan fairly. We have helped India more than we had Pakistan. The President said he felt Ayub was "disillusioned and disheartened." The President said he was "sad about this." When the Deputy Prime Minister said that he couldn't understand Ayub's feelings since we had done much more for Pakistan than for India, the President pointed to a photo of his family and said in essence that the Deputy Prime Minister's remarks make him think that while member of a family loved each other and worked together, there were times that each child thought the other was getting more than its share. The Deputy Prime Minister presented the President with an album of Gandhi commemorative photos and, after a picture-taking session around the gift, the meeting broke up with an exchange of best wishes. The President hoped that Mr. Desai would have a good visit to Washington and said that he had lots of admirers in this country, especially Secretary Rusk who had been "vociferous" in praising him.
515. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, October 9, 1968, 2339Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spain and Prescott (NEA/PAF); cleared by Handley, Macomber, and Country Director for India Christopher Van Hollen (NEA/INC), cleared in substance by Glenn Lee Smith (NEA/P) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Harry H. Schwartz (DOD/ISA); and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to New Delhi and USUN. 252851. Subject: Visit to Washington of Pakistan Foreign Minister./2/ /2/Husain was in the United States for the session of the UN General Assembly. He met with Rusk in New York on September 30 in addition to the meetings in Washington on October 8 chaired by Katzenbach, and a meeting with Rostow on October 9. A record of Husain's meeting with Rusk is ibid., POL PAK-US. Records of the meetings on October 8 are ibid., POL 27 INDIA-PAK, AGR 12 PAK, and DEF 1 PAK. A record of Husain's meeting with Rostow is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Memos, 5/68-11/68. 1. Talks with Pakistan Foreign Minister Arshad Husain went smoothly. 2. In pre-lunch informal private meeting October 8 with Acting Secretary Foreign Minister asked that President Ayub's best wishes and best regards be conveyed to President Johnson. Acting Secretary undertook do so, mentioned Ambassador Hilaly's effective role as Pakistan Ambassador here, and indicated high respect President Johnson and Department have for Ambassador Oehlert. Acting Secretary also took opportunity to mention to Foreign Minister importance which we attach to negotiations on Peshawar which would begin October 11 in Rawalpindi and to express hope these negotiations would be successfully concluded. 3. Acting Secretary gave luncheon in honor of Foreign Minister at 1 pm, after which discussions continued until 6:30 p.m. Participants on Pak side were Foreign Minister, Ambassador Hilaly and Minister Farooqi from Pakistan Embassy. Finance Minister Uquaili and Finance Secretary Ghulam Ishaq Khan joined in for economic assistance topic. In addition to Acting Secretary, US side included Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze, Assistant Secretaries of State Hart and Bundy, Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke, and other State and DOD officers, as well as AID Assistant Administrator Williams for economic topic. 4. Main topics covered were: (a) Economic Aid Level: Pak concern about economic aid cutbacks came up several times. Main argument was that US aid had enabled Pakistan make significant progress in the development field but that a serious reduction in aid levels at this time would jeopardize whole development effort. Paks recognized that some cuts were necessary as a result of Congressional action but expressed hope level would not fall below $100 million. Paks also raised question whether US would approve Pak sale of approximately 500,000 tons rice which would help Paks make up for short fall in economic aid. Acting Secretary recognized superior Pak development performance and said that we would do the best we could with what Congress allocates but that the outlook was definitely not good. On rice question, it was suggested this matter should be raised with Secretary of Agriculture Freeman. (b) Military Supply: Foreign Minister said that Secretary Rusk had promised him that a decision on subject of tanks might be reached before he left the US. Acting Secretary explained Congressional and public opinion problems on arms sales and traumatic effect on US attitudes of 1965 Indo-Pak war. Recognized that present policy unsatisfactory in many respects but problem was to find alternative. Said that he had hoped to be able to give specific answer on tanks but was unable to do so. He expected have an answer soon, however, and would be in touch. FonMin indicated desire GOP continue rely on US as primary source military supply. Brought up problem of aircraft replacement and indicated a Pak decision on future sources of supply would probably have to be taken within next six months. Acting Secretary said US understood GOP problem but that it was difficult to make a decision on this kind of problem at this time. Amb mentioned delays in spare parts shipments. DOD representative indicated this not likely be major problem and undertook be in touch with Embassy. Amb also raised questions regarding procurement Sidewinders in Europe and asked for US "helpful hints" this regard. (c) Kashmir: FonMin reviewed efforts for Kashmir settlement. He recognized disadvantages of continuing hostility and indicated that President Ayub had instructed him do anything possible to seek a settlement. India, however, refused recognize Kashmir as a dispute. FonMin indicated that GOP may have to go back to UN, was not asking for anything now but would seek US advice when this point reached. In reply to question, FonMin said that Soviets had not followed up on Tashkent agreement. (d) Farakka: FonMin said present inclination of GOP was to run out technical and Secretarial level talks in hope some way could be found settle Farakka issue. If no solution found, GOP would have to go to UN, World Court, or elsewhere to try to find way out. He said Soviets had raised question of Farakka with GOI. US side expressed hope talks would be constructive and indicated that from US viewpoint outside intervention might be counterproductive. (e) Mid-East: Foreign Minister stressed importance of Jerusalem to Muslim world and urged compliance with Jerusalem Resolution. Said he believed Arabs willing undertake settlement but had nothing new to offer and did not indicate he was thinking of any initiatives in the UN on this subject. (f) Communist China: FonMin not very forthcoming on this subject and confined his remarks to his personal observations. US side expressed thanks for Secretary Yusuf's efforts in North Korea and China. (g) Soviet Union: FonMin believed that Czech crisis posed a two-fold problem for Soviets: (1) ideological--whether Communist movement should be polycentric or monocentric, and (2) strategic--protection of Soviet spheres of influence. 5. Ambassador Hilaly's small stag dinner for FonMin evening October 8 attended by Acting Secretary, Senator Sparkman, and key Department and DOD officials was warm, relaxed and informal. FonMin made apparent his awareness great US contribution to Pakistan's progress and well-being and his appreciation for it. 6. October 9 lunch hosted by House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Chairman Zablocki was marked success. Speaker McCormack attended and paid personal tribute to President Ayub. Despite fact that House had been in continuous session for 26 hours, many House members, including Committee Chairman Morgan and Congressman Sikes attended "working lunch" and participated in spirited discussion with FonMin on his views Communist China, Indo-Pak problems, and Pakistan's development progress. This followed by session in Senate Foreign Relations Committee room with Acting Committee Chairman Senator Sparkman and Senator Hickenlooper. In both cases FonMin handled himself well and obviously left good impression on key Congressmen and Senators. 7. Throughout visit discussions were easy, friendly, and smooth flowing. FonMin expressed general agreement with US views on world situation, Soviet Union and Communist China. He indicated privately he completely satisfied with Washington visit and that his confidence in US sincerity and good-will of highest. 8. Press Guidance: Department used following guidance for press inquiries: "We are pleased that Pakistan's Foreign Minister has been able to come to Washington. During the Foreign Minister's brief visit he met Acting Secretary Katzenbach and other senior officials for an exchange of views on a wide range of topics including matters of world interests and bilateral concerns. Specific inquiries are to be answered with `I have nothing further to add.'" This guidance adhered to throughout. Press play here so far low key and uncontroversial. Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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