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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
516. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, October 11, 1968, 1400Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 PAK-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 8406. From Ambassador. Ref: State 252292./2/ /2/The Department, in telegram 252292 to Rawalpindi, October 9, welcomed the opening of negotiations on Peshawar scheduled to begin on October 11 and recognized the importance the sale of tanks to Pakistan could have on the negotiations and indicated that vigorous efforts were being made to facilitate such a sale. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 PAK) 1. Following letter from Akhbar to McCloskey, dated 9 October, was received late Wednesday:/3/ /3/October 9. "Thank you for your letter dated 3 October 1968./4/ It is correct that I had given the US authorities assurance that as long as the Peshawar communication unit agreement remains operative, we will afford you all the necessary support stipulated in the agreement. I am glad to know that you found this support satisfactory. /4/Not found. The Government of Pakistan has served notice for the termination of the agreement on 18 July 1969. It therefore follows that all the provisions of the agreement will lapse on that date. You will also recall that apart from the notice given by the Government of Pakistan, I had been giving the US authorities hints and indications on the termination of the agreement many months before hand. You will therefore agree that every opportunity has been given to enable you to plan an orderly and smooth evacuation of the base, as it will cease to operate as a communication unit on 18 July 1969. The agreement and all its provisions will lapse on the above date. You are therefore advised to dismantle and ship out of the country any removable property by 18 July 1969 as the provisions of the agreement exempting such property from inspection, search and seizure would lapse on that date and the US Government will have no further rights in the matter. The evacuation of any movable property left over in the base after 18 July 1969 may be subject to separate negotiations between the two governments." 2. Impossible yet to be certain, even after today's meeting, whether this repudiation of Akhbar's previous assurances, obviously fathered by Yusuf, represents merely a gambit of a tough opening bargaining position or a deep-seated decision of GOP not to yield one inch--at least sans tanks. 3. Today's meeting attended on our side by Oehlert, Rogers, McCloskey and Nastoff. On theirs by Yusuf, Akbar, Piracha and Farooqi. 4. Presented aide-mémoire (copy being pouched along with transcription of meeting notes)/5/ which first addressed itself to exchange of McCloskey/Akhbar letters pointing out that next to last paragraph of letter sounded like a threat to seize any USG property remaining on base after July 17, 1969. /5/Airgram A-607 from Rawalpindi, October 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 PAK-US) 5. Their side flatly and firmly denied any such threat was intended and indicated they considered it subject to negotiations because they do not consider that agreement conveys any such rights. However they did not give categoric assurance in form satisfactory to us that we can operate through termination date and then dismantle and ship in orderly fashion. 6. If further negotiations indicate that GOP will not back down from position Akbar letter then I would regard this as not only unfriendly but actively hostile since it is tantamount to a threat to confiscate USG property unless we accept a close-down substantially in advance of date called for by the agreement. The agreement guarantees USG right to operate base as a communications unit and to use equipment through July 17, 1969, and also specifies that title to removable materials, equipment or property will remain in USG and "may be removed freely by the USG at any time." 7. It is my prayerfully arrived at conclusion that we should refuse to submit to any such threat which contravenes the provisions of the agreement, repeated oral assurances previously given, and the accepted standards of conduct between friendly nations. 8. I therefore recommend that, if GOP remains intransigent on this point, and if necessary to overcome such intransigency on the part of GOP, we be prepared to discontinue both economic aid and the supply of military spare parts. 9. More than Peshawar is at stake. In Friends Not Masters/6/ Ayub states that each bilateral negotiation "would be determined by the limits of tolerance of third parties . . . to illustrate, the United States would not be too eager to provide us with unlimited economic and military assistance if we were to establish bilateral relations with major Communist powers without regard to American interest of strategies in Asia. If we cannot in an unlimited way identify ourselves with American interests, we must learn to do with less than unlimited American assistance." (Pages 118-119.) /6/Reference is to Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). 10. In a conversation last week with Chargé Rogers and Admiral King, Piracha stated and emphasized the doctrine of "limits of tolerance." 11. It seems clear that the GOP is testing the limits of tolerance of the USG. If we show a high threshold of tolerance in this matter then we can never hope again to win GOP support for any policy of ours which is opposed by either USSR or ChiComs unless we are then willing to face a confrontation. To back down would be an almost irreparable show of weakness. To stand firm might win the day. At worst it would clarify the situation and we would know how far GOP has committed its policy toward its Communist neighbors without regard to USG interests, policy or sensibilities. Such a confrontation is bound to come sooner or later unless the USG is content to continue economic aid and military spare parts regardless of GOP preferential treatment of Communist interests without regard to USG interests. 12. Although of course I did not raise such issues at today's meeting, I repeated my recommendation of paragraph above for the longer haul. In addition to the strategic concerns supporting those recommendations, any action by GOP to seize USG property would cause justifiable US political tempest, particularly if aid or sales to GOP continued, and also would raise a serious legal question concerning the applicability to our economic aid program of Section 620 (e) of FAA--the Hickenlooper amendment. While that provision could be read as not covering expropriation of USG property, we believe it would be anomalous to construe it as applicable to cases of seizure of US citizens' property but inapplicable where property of USG is involved. At our meeting today, I brought to the attention of GOP the possible applicability of Section 620 (e) to any expropriatory action. 13. Balance of aide-mémoire, which was discussed at some length, covered: A. Review of antecedent events of termination notice, President Johnson's letter to President Ayub of July 14,/7/ latter's letter to President Johnson dated July 19,/8/ and Piracha's information of appointment of Yusuf/Akbar committee; /7/See Document 503. /8/Document 505. B. A recognition of GOP's previous support of base, the need for the base, its irreplaceability, its importance, the unfavorableness to USG interests of the GOP termination notice and its attendant circumstances; and C. A proposed phase out schedule which tracks that covered by my instructions except that for bargaining purposes I added six months to each time phase. 14. Throughout discussions second portion aide-mémoire GOP side maintained strong stance that base must cease all operations on 18 July 1969, but: A. Indicated it would be helpful to them if we would ostentatiously dismantle some elements prior to July 18, 1969, which we indicated we could and probably would do; and B. Stated that they would need to consider and discuss aide-mémoire proposals before taking a position. 15. Neither our aide-mémoire nor our conversation indicated any equipment we would be willing to give them in return for some extension and they did not raise the question. 16. Next meeting set for October 18 at time to be agreed upon. Would hope at that meeting to obtain acceptable assurances our rights of removal of property. Oehlert
517. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, October 20, 1968, 0900Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 PAK-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The text of this telegram was sent to President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch in telegram CAP 82588, October 20. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Cables, 5/68-11/68) 8628. Subject: Peshawar/Tanks. Please pass White House. From Ambassador. 1. Last evening President Ayub phoned me to say that he had decided to "take a calculated risk" and agree to some extension of base operations along the lines of my previous proposal./2/ He emphasized that he was willing to take such a risk because he was anxious to be helpful to USG in any way he could. /2/When Oehlert met with Foreign Secretary Yusuf on October 18, Yusuf informed him that the U.S. proposal to phase out operations at the Peshawar facility gradually following the termination of the base agreement on July 17, 1969, had been considered, but the Pakistani Government position was that all operational activities at the facility must be terminated on July 17, 1969. (Telegram 8589 from Rawalpindi, October 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 PAK-US) Oehlert expressed his disappointment over the position taken by the Pakistani Government in a conversation with Ayub on October 19. He told Ayub that the decision to force the closure of the facility on July 17, 1969, would be seen by many in Washington as evidence that Pakistan attached greater importance to its relations with China and the Soviet Union than with the United States. (Telegram 8625 from Rawalpindi, October 19; ibid.) 2. He added that he had instructed Secretary Yusuf to get in touch with me and work out the details. 3. Ayub then said that there was another matter he had meant to discuss with me the evening before. He reminded me of his conversation with President Johnson and me in Karachi last December 23/3/ about "horses", said he greatly appreciated all the efforts which had been made in that direction, and that he hopes that those efforts would be carried forward to early fruition because he badly needed the "horses." /3/See Document 475. 4. I assured him that every possible effort was being made. 5. Pursuant to appointment I met with Yusuf at 1000 hours this morning. He handed me an unofficial unsigned aide-mémoire/4/ reading as follows: /4/Not found. A. Dismantling, packing and removal of the facilities, installations and equipment shall commence in January 1969. This will be accompanied by a staggered thinning down of personnel. B. All facilities, installations and equipment not dismantled by the cut-out date (i.e. 17 July 1969) will be dismantled not later then 31st December 1969 in accordance with a fixed monthly programme. C. All dismantled facilities, installations and equipment shall be packed and crated and be removed from Pakistan as early as possible and in no case later than 28th February 1970. All remaining base personnel will be evacuated completely by the same date. 6. Attention is called to the reference to "a fixed monthly program" in paragraph 5 (B) above. Yusuf and I agreed that we would meet again on Monday, October 28. A. For him to receive our formal response to the above proposal (I would hope and urge that it be accepted, since it covers all desired points except for Sugar Tree operation for some months after 31 December 1969); and B. If possible for US to submit a proposed fixed monthly schedule although it was agreed that there could be an exchange of notes along the lines of the aide-mémoire with the fixed monthly schedule to be furnished later. Would hope to be able to submit the schedule on October 28 and would appreciate guidance along those lines ASAP. 7. There was one disturbing element in the Yusuf conversation, but I do not consider it insurmountable. He stated that, in addition to an exchange of letters embodying the point of the aide-mémoire, there should be a verbal understanding that all antenna would be down by July 17, 1969. 8. I told him that, while I was not technically informed, I believe that such a requirement would negate the intention for us to be able to operate selected equipment through 31 December since I did not believe that the equipment was operable without antenna. 9. He responded that what they wanted was continued use in "a discreet manner" with all antenna indoors if possible or at least as unobtrusive as possible. 10. The gist and tone of the conversation was such that I believe they will not insist on the antenna point provided much of the most obtrusive elements are down by July 17 and further progress in that direction is evident thereafter. Oehlert
518. Telegram From the Ambassador to Pakistan (Oehlert) to President Johnson/1/ Rawalpindi, October 25, 1968, 0811Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 101, October 23-28, 1968. Secret. [text not declassified] 500. 1. President Ayub's personal intervention in the Peshawar matter and his instructions to his Foreign Office to work out a time extension along the general lines of our request evidences his desire to accommodate our wishes in such matters to the extent he deems possible and to improve relationships between the two countries. 2. A breakthrough on tanks would greatly strengthen our hand and make it possible to us to continue working in the direction of those objectives. 3. Most respectfully but most urgently I request you to give the deepest consideration to the possibility of either: A. Sweetening the pot to the extent necessary with Turkey, or B. Authorizing a direct sale of tanks either as an exception to the present military supply policy or in connection with a liberalization thereof.
519. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 25, 1968, 3:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Memos, 5/68-11/68. Secret/Sensitive. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates it was received at 4 p.m. SUBJECT At Tab A/2/ Nick Katzenbach advises that we have reached the decision point in the nagging year-old effort to find Patton tanks for Ayub. If you feel strongly about this obligation, he recommends that we pay the cost ($3 million) of arranging an interim sale through Turkey, the only feasible third-country deal we've been able to turn up. Failing a Turkish deal, Katzenbach thinks we should tell Ayub we have honestly done our best and he will have to look elsewhere. With the support of his SIG colleagues, Nick lays out your main options: /2/Reference is to an October 22 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President entitled "Tanks for Pakistan." (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 101, Oct. 23-28, 1968) A copy is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PAK. 1. Turkish sale: The Turks apparently won't sell 100 M-47's to Pakistan unless they can get 100 refurbished M-48's for themselves in the bargain. This will cost us about $3 million; Nitze is prepared to find the money within current budget limits. But this would take care of only half of the 200 tanks Ayub wants. Defense is not ready to chip in another $3 million for another round of the Turk-to-Pak tank switch. Katzenbach and Co. recommend you can and should leave the second 100 tanks for your successor. One hundred now at $3 million and 100 left hanging is the preferred course. 2. Iran: The Shah will sell 100 old M-47's to Ayub if we replace them with new M-60's. This would add $22 million to Iran's planned purchases. Thus it would fly in the face of our budget-cutting advice to the Shah and probably raise a storm on the Hill. No one recommends this alternative. 3. Change policy for one-time exception: You could lift the current ban on direct U.S. weapons sales to the subcontinent just to sell Ayub these tanks. Your advisors think this would be the worst of worlds. It would mock a policy we've all defended up to this moment, be certain to bring an outcry from the Hill, and deeply embitter the Indians, who have always feared that we didn't mean our even-handed policy following the 1965 war. Chet Bowles feels strongly that it's far better to remove the arms ban for good--whatever flak this would bring in India--rather than try to carry off a one-time exception for Pak arms clearly aimed at the Indians. 4. Reverse current policy: You could lift the South Asian arms ban altogether because of (a) the demonstrable argument that third country sales just don't work, and (b) the policy judgment that arms sales are the only way to get the seat we want at Pak and Indian tables to influence--and, hopefully, restrain--their inevitable military spending. As with all military sales, we would be deciding sales to India and Pakistan case-by-case on the grounds of legitimate need and aiming at ultimate limitation of arms spending. Nick would like to see us do everything we can to make the Turkish sale work because removing the ban altogether will surely present us with a sizeable and expensive shopping list from the Paks. And though they would make righteous noises at first about our policy switch, the Indians would also soon be pressing to buy. Certainly we could call the shots on what we even consider selling. But no one can be sure that lifting the ban, arousing expectations, and then turning down numerous requests wouldn't leave us with less leverage on the Indians and Paks than we have now. Whatever its effect abroad, a change in policy would bring sharp reaction from the Hill. Despite these strong arguments against lifting the ban, Nick and his colleagues feel that if the Turkish deal is unworkable--and you personally feel a commitment to Ayub--the next best way to get him the tanks would be to change present policy across the board. We hoped third-country purchases would add enough flexibility to our policy to make it livable. If that door just won't open, then we have to make the hard choice between abandoning the military field in the subcontinent altogether and staying in the game. Nick would argue for staying in the game, but he'd prefer to see that choice left to your successor. That's why he thinks it's worth $3 million to make the Turkish deal work. Indian Reaction It goes without saying that any of the above actions which get Ayub his tanks will make us unpopular in India for awhile. Even though the Indians have made major purchases from the Soviets, even if the tanks got to Ayub via a third country entirely in the context of our current no-favorites arms policy, and even though we approved a British sale of Hawker-Hunters to the Indians under the same policy provision, this deal would be our first involvement in a major Pakistani arms purchase since the 1965 war. Peshawar Negotiations Nick believes--and I tend to agree--that the tanks should be kept separate from Peshawar talks. Ben Oehlert has long felt that the tanks would enable us to make the best of our withdrawal from the base. You should know, however, that it looks as if Ayub has already turned around and largely met our request for an extension of certain facilities several months beyond the July 1969 close-out of the agreement. Ayub will see this as a major concession; Ben points out (Tab B) that Ayub talked about tanks in the same breath./3/ /3/The reference should be to Tab C. Rostow added a handwritten note at this point that reads: "At Tab C is Oehlert's personal message to you--arrived today back channel." For the text of Oehlert's message, see Document 518. Recommendation This is a mixed bag. Following Nick's recommendation and offering $3 million in replacement tanks to the Turks is clearly the easiest way out. But we should consider that we are only prolonging the agony in South Asian arms policy. It could be argued that this is the time to scrap current policy as plainly unworkable, take the public heat and let the new Administration see if open sales can work at all. Your successor would probably find it easier to clamp back on the ban than to take it off. On balance, my own vote goes with Katzenbach to make the Turkish deal work. Walt Try Turkish deal with sweetener as last effort/4/ /4/None of the options is checked. A handwritten note on the memorandum by Jim Jones indicates the President's response: "Jim--Set up meeting soon to discuss this."
520. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, October 26, 1968, 1754Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-10 PAK-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Spain on October 24; cleared by Handley, Wolf, Curl, Van Hollen, Robert H. Neuman (L/NEA), Colonel Kravitz (DOD/ISA), Admiral Showers (DIA), Sheldon, and Saunders; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 262361. Ref: Rawalpindi's 8628./2/ For Ambassador. /2/Document 517. 1. You authorized inform GOP at October 29 meeting that USG agrees generally to Peshawar withdrawal proposal presented in Foreign Secretary Yusuf's October 20 Aide-mémoire as reported para 5 reftel. You should indicate USG would like formalize understanding through exchange of notes. Proposed text of USG note in para 4 below. 2. Believe you should reiterate orally to Yusuf that, while dismantling of most conspicuous antenna will begin well before July 17, 1969, we will wish maintain selected antenna to December 31, 1969. You may wish also to point out that, if GOP should wish, we are prepared to leave some antenna on departure. 3. FYI: If proposed arrangement concluded satisfactorily, we are prepared cease Sugar Tree operations also by December 31, 1969. End FYI. 4. Following is proposed text USG note for presentation October 29 meeting: Begin Text: Excellency: I refer to recent discussions between representatives of our two Governments regarding the forthcoming termination of the Agreement on the Establishment of a Communications Unit in Pakistan, signed at Karachi, July 18, 1959. As a result of these discussions, it is agreed that: A. Dismantling, packing and removal of certain facilities, installations and equipment shall commence in January 1969. This will be accompanied by a staggered thinning down of U.S. personnel. B. All of the facilities, installations and equipment remaining on July 17, 1969 shall be dismantled no later than December 31, 1969, in accordance with a fixed monthly program which shall be separately agreed. C. All dismantled facilities, installations and equipment shall be packed and crated and be removed from Pakistan as early as possible and in no event later than February 28, 1970. All remaining base personnel will be evacuated completely from Pakistan by the same date. D. The rights, privileges, and immunities which the Pakistan Government has previously accorded to U.S. personnel and property at the Peshawar facility will be extended to cover the period from July 18, 1969 until February 28, 1970. Upon the receipt of a note from you indicating that the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Government of Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America will consider that this note and your reply constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply./3/ /3/Oehlert met on October 29 with Foreign Secretary Yusuf and General Akbar and presented the note. Yusuf and Akhbar indicated that the U.S. response appeared to be satisfactory. (Telegram 8845 from Rawalpindi, October 29; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-10 PAK-US) The Foreign Ministry returned a note to the Embassy on November 1 accepting the Embassy's note as the basis for agreement. (The texts of both notes were transmitted to Washington as enclosures to airgram A-641 from Rawalpindi, November 14; ibid. Accept, Excellency, et cetera. End Text. Rusk 521. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, November 4, 1968, 1505Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. IV. Secret. CAP 82673. Secretary Rusk urged me this morning to lay before you the Pak tank and India aid decisions. The following paper presents the two issues. 1. Ayub's Tanks. The issue is whether to: A. Spend $3 million in military aid funds to try to persuade Turkey to sell 100 M-47's to Pakistan. We would replace them with 100 M-48's. Nitze says he can find the money. B. Or remove the ban on arms aid to the subcontinent altogether and sell the tanks directly to Ayub. If the Turkish deal falls through, this would be the only practical alternative to get Ayub even 100 tanks. My earlier memo and Nick Katzenbach's are attached./2/ /2/See Document 519 and footnote 2 thereto. 2. Indian Aid. You asked me to lay out for you alternative aid packages. These facts should be taken into consideration: --There is no pressing food shortage in India. But the Indians need: A. Food imports to keep prices down and to help them continue their promising program of agricultural reform. B. They need fertilizer imports for next spring's harvest. If they cut back here, they will not get the full advantage of the miracle seeds now in place. --The Indians fear a sharp cutback in foreign development aid. They expected a commitment of $200 million from IDA by now. They can no longer count on this. Second, they are completely in the dark about the U.S. program. Normally we would have pledged our aid for fiscal 1969 in a consortium meeting held in late summer or early fall. There has been no meeting because of uncertainty about what the Congress would appropriate. A. The danger is they may over-react by overcautious budgetary decisions--which they are in process of making now--they could in effect put their whole development program in suspense. B. Whether they over-react or not, the sharper the cutback in available foreign exchange, the sharper the cutback they will have to make in development investment. These are the alternatives: A. Food aid only. This could range from one million tons to the 2.3 million tons we originally proposed. One million tons would reopen the pipeline and give the Indians some confidence. The 2.3 million ton figure (which would bring our 1968 shipments up to the 1967 level) would give them the best chance of getting a grip on their agricultural price and supply problems. B. Food aid plus an interim loan commitment. Building from the food aid decision, we would add say $100 million as a loan commitment now. This would be large enough to have a good psychological impact and would still leave roughly half the fiscal 1969 appropriation for decision by your successor. Perhaps half the loan money would be for fertilizer and the rest for industrial imports. Bill Gaud would have to decide on the mix in light of the total program. C. Food aid plus the total FY 69 aid appropriation for India. This would mean food aid plus an estimated $195 million in loan money. (We gave $285 million last year.) The main argument for committing the full amount now is that it would do the most good now. It would have the greatest impact on Indian budgetary decisions and on their fertilizer procurement policy. It would give them some margin to gamble that IDA may still come through by the middle of 1969. Your successor would still have the decision to make on calendar 1969 food aid and time to work out the next India consortium pledge and get it through the Congress./3/ /3/A handwritten note on the memorandum by Jim Jones quotes the President's response: "Give them the 2.3 mill. tons that you proposed plus the $195 mill. loan and announce it this afternoon. Also give Ayub some food or something. LBJ/JRJ"
522. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, November 4, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India's Food Problem, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent to Jim Jones for the President and repeated to Tom Johnson in San Antonio. A handwritten note on the telegram indicates the message was sent as White House telegram CAP 82682. After clearing with Freeman, Gaud and Katzenbach, in response to your request, I propose you make the following announcement this afternoon on India food: "The President today authorized the negotiation of a PL-480 agreement with India to provide for the sale of approximately 2.3 million tons of wheat and wheat flour, 90,000 tons of tallow, and other agricultural commodities, totalling a current export market value of $169 million. This program will help India carry out its new agricultural policies which are moving Indian agriculture toward modernization and a decreasing dependence on food aid." We propose not to include the economic loans in this announcement. Bill Gaud still needs to work out the details over the next few days, and we will instruct him to go ahead at a level of up to $195 million. On the Pak side, we don't believe there will be much reaction to another food deal for India. The tanks--what they most want--do not lend themselves to public announcement because we still have to make our deal with the Turks and even then it will be an arrangement between the Turks and Paks. As for an economic cushion, we think a quiet word in the next few days from Ben Oehlert on outstanding Pak requests should more than satisfy Ayub. Thus we propose the following: 1. An immediate telegram to Ankara trying to wrap up the tank deal with the Turks as outlined in our earlier memo/2/ to you. /2/Reference is to Document 519. 2. Over the next week we will have for Pakistan: a. A development loan package up to $70 million, if you approve./3/ This is this year's aid level. The recommendation will be on your desk this week. /3/In a November 18 memorandum to the President, Rostow endorsed a recommendation from Gaud and Zwick for a $71 million development loan package for Pakistan. Johnson initialed his approval. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Cables, 5/68-11/68) b. Word that we are ready to consider sympathetically their PL-480 request of about $20 million. At the same time, we would tell them that we are ready to make concessions on their usual marketing requirement that would indirectly enable them to increase their earnings from rice exports. The Paks are doing so well agriculturally that they do not need much food aid. We believe these steps will balance adequately on the Pak side. There is one final option to consider. John Schnittker wishes you to know that the Indians have today requested 100,000 tons of rice. They need it, and we have abundant supplies. We have not gone into rice for India for several years because of the implications for our rice acreage allotments. Schnittker himself would recommend against doing this now, but he did not want to foreclose it on his own. If you wished to do this, we would include the following as a new second sentence in the announcement: "In addition, the President noted a recent request from India for a quantity of rice which he said would be given careful consideration." I do not recommend this unless you have reasons for it.
523. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, November 7, 1968, 1210Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Memos, 5/68-11/68. Top Secret; Cherokee. The Cherokee communications channel was established on November 5 for the exchange of literally eyes only messages between the Secretary and an Ambassador. (Circular telegram 267318 to all Embassies, November 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 CHEROKEE) 9165. Literally eyes only for President Johnson from Ambassador. 1. In any change of administration time is required for the identification and analysis of problems and for the decision making process. 2. With a change of parties this process will take longer than usual and will be complicated by the fact that the Executive and the Congress will be of different parties. 3. I seriously doubt that we can stem the tide here of drift toward reliance on the Communist world for the time required without the encouragement of a few tanks. 4. Mr. President, on last December 23 you told Ayub and me that you were sick and tired of the India lovers in the State Department. 5. I am too. 6. In the intervening months they have resorted to every excuse, every delay, every strategem to thwart your wishes with respect to tanks for Pakistan. 7. I pray you not to let them get away with it. 8. In the immortal words of John Nance Garner, Mr. President, "Let's strike a blow for freedom." 9. Alice joins me in thanking you for the opportunity of service to our country and to you personally which you have given us and we extend our affection to you and Lady Bird. We expect to follow you into private life shortly after January 20 and will look forward to the privilege of enjoying your company both in Palm Beach and on the shores of the Pedernales./2/ /2/A typewritten note attached to the telegram, dictated by President Johnson on November 7 reads: "Write Oehlert a good, strong wire and tell him I am really doing what he wants done." Rostow did so on November 7 in an eyes only cable to Oehlert in which he called attention to telegram 268175 to Ankara. (White House telegram CAP 82740 to Rawalpindi; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Memos, 5/68-11/68) Telegram 268175 to Ankara, November 7, instructed the Embassy to reiterate continuing high-level U.S. interest in the sale of M-47 tanks by Turkey to Pakistan, and the urgent need for a response. If necessary the Embassy was authorized to indicate that the United States was prepared to make available to Turkey 100 rehabilitated M-48 tanks to replace 100 M-47 tanks sold to Pakistan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PAK) Oehlert
524. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, November 16, 1968, 1445Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Karachi. 9454. From Ambassador. Ref: State 272942./2/ /2/Telegram 272942 to Rawalpindi, November 16, authorized Oehlert to tell Ayub that the United States and Turkey had agreed in principle on the sale of 100 M-47 tanks by Turkey to Pakistan. Oehlert was instructed to point out that final approval of the sale was dependent upon Pakistan's acceptance of the conditions set forth in Oehlert's May 9 letter to Admiral Khan. (Ibid.) 1. At lunch today I handed President Ayub, Foreign Minister Arshad and Presidential Advisor Fida Hassan a letter/3/ patterned after the appropriate parts of my May 9 letter to Defense Minister, and strongly stating secrecy requirement. Copy being pouched. /3/Not found. 2. Additionally, I stated orally that during past several months there had been reports of Pak acquisition of additional tanks from USSR and/or ChiComs, that reports had been source of concern to us and that both in connection with a Turkish transaction and the Conte-Symington amendments we would need to know the validity of those rumors. 3. Ayub responded that they had no agreement with ChiComs re arms and that the only lethal items being acquired from USSR were "ammunition, spare parts and things like that." 4. Ayub then said that he had understood that there were to be 200 tanks. 5. I responded that in March we had indicated to them that, subject to certain conditions, we were prepared to approve third country sale of "100 tanks now and 100 later"--that the word "later" had not been defined and that there was no longer time to work out the details of the first 100 and tackle the problem of the second 100 before our change of administration so that the question of the second 100 would have to be taken up with the new administration. 6. Ayub then asked what the price of the tanks would be. I told him that, except for our residual value, the matter was between GOP and GOT. 7. He showed a marked reluctance to bargain with Turkey, taking the position that US really owned the tanks, that they had no value over and above our residual, and that, that should be the price. 8. I said that as I saw the procedure his and the GOT military should identify a particular 100 tanks, we would appraise their residual value, and that the price, if any, over and above that would be a matter of negotiation between GOP and GOT. 9. He seemed unhappy about that and the meeting ended with his comment that they would consider my letter and give me a reply. 10. At no point was any question raised about any of the conditions restated from the May 9 letter. 11. Would appreciate ASAP: A. Re our transfer of 48s to GOT do they pay us anything? Previous telegrams make clear only that rehabilitation cost will not be passed on; B. Is GOT expecting to charge a higher price than residual value; C. Under present proposal do we keep residual value or pass it on to GOT? Oehlert
525. Telegram From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to President Johnson/1/ New Delhi, November 19, 1968, 1259Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles. Secret. [text not declassified] 850. 1. I hesitate to introduce any more controversial problems at a moment when your plate is already full. However, I feel impelled in good faith to express to you directly my deep personal concern over what the press states is a pending agreement to encourage the Turks to sell Patton tanks to Pakistan under US license. 2. Although we have reviewed the background on numerous occasions it may be useful briefly to consider the chain of events which brought us to present difficulties: A. Since John Foster Dulles made his so-called "alliance" with Pakistan in 1954 we have provided Pakistan with nearly $800 million in military equipment, most of it on a grant basis. The very nature of this aid indicates that Pakistan never intended it for use in the mountains against the Chinese or Soviet forces but rather on the Punjabi plains against India. B. Between 1954 and 1965 two American Presidents and several Ambassadors (including myself) assured the Indians that we "would never allow this US equipment to be used against India." C. In 1963-64 following the Chinese war, after providing limited assistance to India, we rejected its request to help modernize its defense establishment at a rate of about $75 million annually because of fear of upsetting our relationship with Pakistan. In return for this assistance the Indians had been prepared: (1) to agree not to buy lethal weapons from the Communist nations, (2) to negotiate a military force level agreement with Pakistan, and (3) to work with us on a political basis to establish greater stability in Asia and Southeast Asia. D. Only in August 1964 when it became clear that we were not prepared to give India this assistance, did India turn to the Soviet Union as its major source of military equipment. 3. As the Indo-Pak crisis developed in early August 1965 the Paks sent some 6,000 armed guerrillas into Kashmir on the mistaken assumption that they would receive the support of the Kashmir people. When this effort failed the Paks sent an armored brigade to cut off India's vulnerable supply lines into Kashmir. After this column had penetrated some 12 miles into Indian territory and to relieve the pressure the Indians moved into the Pakistan Punjab. Whatever the fault of India in raising the tension which led to this three-week war, the 3,000 or so Indians who lost their lives were killed by American weapons, which we had repeatedly and officially assured the Indians would never be used against them. 4. Since then I and my associates have felt strongly that we should refuse to give lethal equipment either to Pakistan or India. I have taken this position in recognition of the complexity of our relationship with Pakistan and in spite of the threat to the integrity of the Indian nation by a Chinese movement across north Burma through Nefa or through the Chumbi Valley between Bhutan and Sikkim. 5. It is my conviction that the only realistic way to move the Chinese and Soviet military influence out of the subcontinent is not to provide lethal equipment to the two governments, but to help both to become as self-sufficient as possible in regard to their defense requirements. This will not be accomplished overnight. 6. India's present tank strength is 1,282 and Pakistan's is 965; a ratio of only 4 to 3 in India's favor. This is considered by the Indians a bare minimum considering the two-pronged threat they face. If under these circumstances we provide new tanks to Pakistan we will further escalate and fuel a subcontinental arms race and the Indians will surely increase their inventory to maintain this ratio. At this critical point this will have a profoundly adverse effect on the relationship of India and Pakistan and our relationship with democratic India, which has a major potential role to play in Asia. 7. I am keenly aware of the pressures Pakistan is bringing to bear, and I also share the irritation we often feel when India fails to take constructive positions on international issues. Nevertheless, I must call to your attention the enormous investment we have made in India in the last 15 years, the increasing dynamism which is becoming apparent in the Indian economy and the solid basis for hope that India within a few years may become a major force for stability in Asia. 8. Therefore, I recommend with all the earnestness at my command that no lethal military assistance be given either Pakistan or India under present circumstances. 9. After dictating this cable, I had a difficult talk with Foreign Secretary who is deeply concerned about the sale of tanks. This discussion is reported in New Delhi 22700./2/ /2/Dated November 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 PAK) On November 25 Rusk sent a personal cable to Bowles in which he stated that the message Bowles sent had been carefully reviewed but the decision was to assist Pakistan to buy tanks from a third country. (Ibid., DEF 12 CHEROKEE) Bowles
526. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, November 23, 1968, 0156Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Grant E. Mouser (NEA/INC) on November 22; cleared by Van Hollen, Colonel Kravitz (DOD/ISA), and General Doyle (DOD/Joint Staff/J-5), and in draft by Schmelzer and Spain; and approved by Handley. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA. 276950. Subject: U.S. Military Supply Policy. Ref: New Delhi's 22784./2/ /2/In telegram 22784 from New Delhi, November 20, from Bowles to the Secretary, Bowles reiterated his conviction that the United States should not sell or countenance the sale of lethal weapons to India or Pakistan. If, however, the sale of Patton tanks by Turkey to Pakistan was irreversible, Bowles stated that the impact of the sale in India might be muted somewhat by a concomitant decision to sell or authorize the sale of lethal weapons to India. (Ibid.) 1. We know of your strong views on tanks for Pakistan but for reasons you are aware, decision has been made to proceed if Pakistan and Turkey can work out arrangements. For reasons set forth in previous communications, most recently in report of Hart/Jung conversation (274522),/3/ we do not believe long-pending tank transaction poses problem of major proportion, unless GOI decides to exaggerate its significance. We do not believe tank deal should logically contribute to escalation of arms race, any more than U.K. sale of Hawker-Hunter aircraft to India contributed. /3/Telegram 274522 to New Delhi, November 20, reported on a conversation on November 19 between Assistant Secretary Hart and Indian Ambassador Jung in which Jung registered his country's concern over reports of a sale of U.S.-originated tanks to Pakistan. Hart noted that the sale remained to be consummated, but stated that if it occurred it could serve the purpose of preventing Pakistan from becoming completely dependent upon Communist sources for military equipment. (Ibid.) 2. We appreciate fact GOI is aroused by prospects of sale and they fear that tanks might somehow encourage Pakistanis to some adventure against India. Judging, however, by your conversation with Kaul (New Delhi's 22700)/4/ there may also be element of self-justification for impending Indian arms purchase from Soviet Union, negotiations for which were under way well before tank deal with Pakistan was revived. /4/See footnote 2, Document 525. 3. We have reviewed points made in para 4 of reftel. As you know, our present military supply policy would exclude direct U.S. sale of light tanks, armored personnel carriers and armored reconnaissance airborne assault vehicles to India. Our policy would permit, however, case-by-case examination of third country arrangements for sales these three items, if and when we are approached. Current policy would also exclude licensing arrangement for indigenous production of fighter-interceptor aircraft (though defense production projects such as Varangaon acceptable). In all cases, we would want to examine each purchase request carefully in order to avoid any escalation of subcontinent arms race and unnecessary diversion of resources from economic development. 4. We will keep you posted regarding tank transaction/5/ and meanwhile hope you can use points made to Jung to temper Indian reaction. Our comments on sale of 106 mm ammunition under existing policy (DRI 837 68 of 20 Nov)/6/ will be forwarded separately. /5/On December 26 Oehlert reported that he had learned from the Pakistani Foreign Office that the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Turkey had reached agreement on the sale of Turkish tanks to Pakistan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PAK) /6/Not found. Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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