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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
Afghanistan 527. Letter From President Johnson to King Zaher/1/ Washington, January 2, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Afghanistan, 11/23/63-10/1/66. No classification marking. Your Majesty: I have asked my good friend, Sargent Shriver,/2/ to bring you my warm personal greetings. He will of course be looking into the activities of the Peace Corps, but I particularly wanted him to have the opportunity to meet with you. /2/Peace Corps Director R. Sargent Shriver was in Kabul January 21-22 during a trip to several Middle East and South Asian countries. Documentation on Shriver's trip is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/SHRIVER. All of us have watched with admiration the accelerated pace of Afghan economic and political advance under your wise direction. Your friends were also very pleased when normal relations were restored between your country and your neighbor, Pakistan. I regret that a mission abroad prevented me from seeing you and Her Majesty in Washington. However, President Kennedy told me of the great pleasure your visit gave him and of the candid and fruit- ful discussions he had with you. While you and I share a common loss at his passing, let us build together on the friendly relationship you and he began. Should you have any thoughts you would like me to have, I hope you will speak as freely to Mr. Shriver as you would to me. I have asked Sargent Shriver to convey to you our deep appreciation for your warm welcome to the 33 Peace Corps Volunteers in your country. Since its birth under President Kennedy, I have regarded the Peace Corps as one of the most imaginative instruments ever devised for capturing the idealism of youth and putting it to work in the cause of world peace and understanding. Our Volunteers have benefitted enormously from their experience in your country. The United States will also benefit as they return, with broader horizons and greater understanding of the world, to take their places in our society. They will add a new dimension to American life. I only hope that they have contributed in some small way to the well-being of your people and to their understanding of us. Please accept my thanks for your receiving Sargent Shriver, and rest assured of the continued great interest of the United States in the independence and prosperity of your country./3/ /3/In his reply of April 15, King Zaher assured the President of his "sincere desire to maintain our existing friendship on a basis of mutual understanding and goodwill." (Ibid., POL AFG-US) Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
528. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 37-64 Washington, January 22, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on January 22. A table of contents and map are not printed. AFGHANISTAN Conclusions A. For the last decade, Afghanistan has been undergoing a substantial economic and social modernization. Since the removal from office of Prime Minister Daud in March 1963, modernization has started in the political field as well, under a cabinet which for the first time in 30 years is not headed by a member of the royal family. B. The new cabinet has no political base save in the support of the King and royal family, who remain the source of power. For the moment at least, they favor political reform. The question is how they will react to increasing pressure for change, as and when modernizers within and outside the government wish to move farther and faster than the monarchy deems prudent. We believe there is at least an even chance that the monarchy will stay sufficiently abreast of the times to avoid violent upheaval. C. The Afghans will continue eager to take assistance from both Bloc and West, but will make every effort to see that neither acquires inordinate influence. They have done this successfully for ten years and should be able to continue, despite the fact that virtually all military assistance has come from the Bloc. Under the new government, tolerable relations with Pakistan have been restored, and both sides will try to keep tensions under control, though flareups are always possible and can, as recent experience shows, have damaging consequences for Afghanistan. D. If further large-scale foreign aid is forthcoming, as seems likely, Afghanistan should make increasing economic progress, on the base of a substantial infrastructure created over the past decade. But it is still a very underdeveloped country and will long be hampered by lack of trained people and shortage of domestic revenue. The USSR, which has in recent years become Afghanistan's chief trading partner and its major source of aid, will continue in these roles, but this will probably not be translated into decisive political influence. [Here follows the 9-page Discussion portion of the NIE.]
529. Airgram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ A-238 Kabul, December 26, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 AFG. Confidential. Drafted on December 24 by Ambassador Steeves. Repeated to Karachi. SUBJECT Dr. Abdul Zaher became Deputy Prime Minister during my absence in the United States. I thought it fitting to call on him as a matter of courtesy in connection with his new responsibilities after my return to Kabul. Dr. Zaher's long acquaintance with the United States in connection with his medical training there has always inspired him to retain a very lively and sympathetic interest in the United States. He therefore was interested in talking at some length about the recent U.S. domestic political scene, the outcome of the elections, etc. The conversation then turned to the current scene in Afghanistan. I remarked that, while gratified with many of the signs of progress and current developments in Afghanistan, I could not help but be concerned over the RGA's greatest problem--the financial crisis. We talked at some length as to what was causing the current instability, the dangers of inflation and the measures which I had heard were being taken to solve the current problems. During the period when Dr. Zaher was President of the National Assembly, his very sympathetic ear was one that could be used to express certain opinions that one would hesitate to present to certain others less sympathetically inclined. One of these subjects that I have discussed with Dr. Zaher in the past was Afghanistan's military posture. In connection with their financial straits, this subject arose again. With some apology in talking about a delicate matter, I pointed out to him that a good bit of their budgetary difficulties now were undoubtedly being caused by the heavy commitments the RGA was making both to current and projected military plans and development. I expressed the view that although one could well understand progressive measures to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of forces whose responsibility it was to maintain good internal security, the outside observer could not help but wonder what justification there could be for vast sums being spent for the latest model of fighters, tanks and missiles which were of dubious use. Afghanistan's posture was one of maintaining the protective coloring of neutrality. Their policy was one of the reconciliation and amicability with all of their neighbors. While this posture was understandable, it was difficult to reconcile this stance with continuing high expenditure on arms. The exercise became all the more questionable when it was quite obvious that lack of budget and facilities often meant that this sophisticated equipment deteriorated sitting in place. What therefore was the purpose and how could Afghanistan possibly get itself out of its financial difficulties with these obligations staring them in the face? In response I was treated to a rather unusual performance by Dr. Zaher. His attitude could well be explained that now being Deputy Prime Minister he must hew to the accepted line, but he pointed out with some emotional fervor that Pakistan's unfriendly attitude unwilling to cease and desist in its program of bringing under complete control the tribal areas Afghanistan simply had to be prepared for any eventuality. He felt that if Pakistan went so far as to take punitive action against any of the tribal people within Afghan territory, they simply could not be left impotent. At this point in the conversation I quickly recalled that Colonel Abdul Wali/2/ had used the same argument with me some months previously. Dr. Zaher's argument was largely based upon the political necessity of showing their people so exercised over the Pushtunistan issue/3/ that they were physically ready to retaliate should Pakistan take extreme steps. No amount of persuasion or argument could budge him. I pointed out the ultimate folly which would result from preparing for an unfriendly confrontation with Pakistan rather than devoting themselves to the further advancement of the already begun thawing processes and the dialogue which could bring about understanding. While he agreed to this in theory, he felt that gestures from Pakistan plus the step-up in Pakistan's armed strength left Afghanistan with no alternative but to be in a position to offer at least token resistance. I, of course, discussed with Dr. Zaher at some length where such a program would lead. It would make them more dependent upon the Soviets, who were the suppliers of this hardware. It was hardly a practical view of the future (in view of Afghanistan's neutrality) to look upon this type of alignment with any equanimity. I made some reference to the fact that some of the recent happenings, such as the Cairo Conference/4/ and Afghanistan's activity in the United Nations on the Congo,/5/ looked dangerously like Afghanistan's becoming more unneutral. This latter subject he simply refused to discuss. /2/Colonel Abdul Wali, the King's son-in-law and Chief of Staff of the Afghan Central Forces. /3/The Pushtunistan issue, which had troubled relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the creation of Pakistan, involved a dispute over the future of the Pushtun tribes living along the Pakistan side of the boundary between the two countries. Afghanistan's continued advocacy of self-determination or statehood for these people had been consistently opposed by Pakistan. /4/The Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Counties, held in Cairo on October 5-10 called for the United States to lift its commercial and economic blockade of Cuba and negotiate the evacuation of Guantanamo Naval Base. The text of the Cairo declaration is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 691-698. /5/On December 1 Afghanistan joined 21 other countries in requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo caused by the military rescue operation launched in Stanleyville and in other parts of the Congo by Belgium and the United States. (UN doc. S/6076 and Add. 1-5) At the conclusion of the discussion in which I pointed out to him the grave danger of becoming too beholden to the Soviets, I asked him if this were a price that the Afghans would eventually be willing to pay in order to carry on their stiff posture toward the south. He replied rather gravely, "We wouldn't, but our successors would." He went on to explain that no government in Kabul could possibly exist without giving real substantive support to the Pushtunistan issue. If they were ever overthrown for slipping in their fidelity to the national purpose, radicals would take over from them and might indeed be just that unwise. In summation, he pointed out to me that as I well knew Afghanistan passionately desired U.S. support, sympathy and understanding. He said they had the same attitude towards Germany and were now hopeful of getting more sympathetic treatment from Great Britain. He alluded to past history in pointing out that the United States had not been as forthcoming with Afghanistan as we might have been while we were arming Pakistan to the teeth. They really had no alternative but to look after their selfish interests. While his attitude throughout was extremely cordial and we parted on a very friendly note, I did come away with the impression that I had never had a more serious presentation of this feeling from a person of Dr. Zaher's nature who before has been much more flexible in his viewpoint. He may have been speaking as the new Deputy Prime Minister, he may have been talking to me in the hopes that word of their determined stand would filter back into Pakistan or he may have been speaking again as the frontiersman, which he is, from a province bordering on Pakistan, but whatever the reason, he revealed a firmness and a dedication to the so-called Pushtunistan issue such as I had never received from him before. JM Steeves
530. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ Kabul, March 3, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Confidential. Repeated to Karachi and New Delhi. 481. Governor Harriman accompanied by Ambassador called on PriMin Yusuf March 2 for more than hour's discussion bilateral problems and world issues./2/ PriMin expressed concern at slow rate progress Helmand Valley development and made strong plea for budgetary support assist RGA in its current financial difficulties. PriMin told Harriman he was concerned re continuing inflation and felt perhaps commodity loan assistance to soak up excess currency in circulation would be desirable. Yusuf added he aware USG concerned RGA spending inordinate amount on army and military procurement but noted only neighbor with which Afghanistan had any problem was Pakistan which had received considerable military assistance from USG. /2/Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman visited Kabul March 2-3 en route to the Far East Chiefs of Mission Conference in Baguio, Philippines. His March 16 report to the President is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission II. Harriman also called on the King on March 2. A report of this conversation is in telegram 480 from Kabul, March 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Governor Harriman told PriMin question budgetary support was unpopular subject with Congress who had to derive funds from taxes levied on American people. He told PriMin we are continuing to see if there is any more efficient way of approaching our mutual aid problems, notably in the Helmand Valley. Harriman said he already aware RGA concern at pace HVA development, hoped to carry out aerial inspection of Helmand Valley March 3 prior leaving for New Delhi, and would upon his return Washington personally investigate whether anything more could be done to speed up work on the HVA project. In response Governor's question, PriMin stated Afghan relations very good with Soviet, ChiCom and Iranian neighbors. He added relations with Paks improving, noting this connection March 2 signature new five-year Pak-Afghan transit agreement. PriMin said he was not fully satisfied with agreement but felt it represented acceptable compromise. Governor Harriman conveyed President's greetings to PriMin and outlined President's domestic programs and success President has had in promoting them. PriMin responded Afghans had great respect for what President has been able accomplish domestically and singled out action on civil rights for special approval. In general discussion world problems, Harriman drew on his extensive experience with Soviets, explaining Communism has made industrial progress, but that system has conspicuously failed produce adequate food. Governor speculated this was due character farm work which requires hardworking individuals with personal stake in operation, rather than hourly paid factory hands paced by machine. PriMin commented he impressed by effectiveness cooperatives which he had seen during his recent visit India and remarked he also understood Egyptian cooperatives highly effective. Harriman replied Egyptians would be better off if Nasser spent more time on internal matters and less on foreign adventures such as assistance Congo rebels. PriMin noted Tshombe highly unpopular among non-aligned states. Harriman told PriMin Tshombe was probably in fact second most popular Congolese among his countrymen, most popular being Lumumba who dead. Whether or non-aligned states doubted Tshombe's internal popularity or disliked him personally was no excuse for intervention in Congolese internal affairs. To drive this point home Harriman asked PriMin how he would take it if intruders tried to promote his removal in Afghanistan. PriMin Yusuf got the point and did not have any reply. PriMin opined effort should be made reach political settlement, to which Harriman responded this had been consistent USG objective but fact was OAU had proved ineffective so far. We were hopeful of results from new Nouakchott group. On Vietnam, Harriman stressed as he had in press statement on arrival that problem would be solved if North Vietnamese would stop intervening in SVN affairs. PriMin took standard RGA line expressing concern at possibility widening conflict and hope political settlement could be worked out. Comment: Conversation was frank but cordial throughout. PriMin was unabashed in his presentation for additional USG economic aid which constitutes further indication country's current difficulties. Believe opportunity provided by Governor's visit for extended wide-ranging talks such as foregoing, which continued at dinner residence evening March 2 with PriMin and six members Cabinet, most useful in underlining USG views on world problems to highest levels RGA./3/ /3/In a follow-up telegram to Secretary Rusk from New Delhi, Harriman observed that U.S. relations with Afghanistan were developing satisfactorily, but that the major problem was delay in AID program decisions, which the Afghans interpreted as indicating a lack of genuine U.S. interest, and which they contrasted with "prompt and open handed decisions" by the Soviets. He added, "There is no doubt that the King and other ministers look on us as strong anchor to windward. However, Prime Minister is, I feel, a bit too trustful of Soviets' continuing friendship and goodwill." (Telegram 2485 from New Delhi, March 4; ibid., POL AFG-US) Steeves
531. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 28, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 8 AFG. Confidential. Drafted by Schmelzer on May 6. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Farhang said that the Afghan economy would remain a problem for the next few years because of long-term structural weaknesses. The price of Afghanistan's major export to western markets, karakul, had remained about the same since 1939, whereas the price of manufactured goods imported from the West had increased 300 per cent in this time. The present Afghan aid request/2/ grew out of the short-term financial crisis, but he was glad to report, as he had heard from Kabul the day before, that the deficit for the fiscal year ending March 20, 1965 had been 600 million Afghanis rather than the one billion which it had been feared to be. Farhang said that the attention of the government had been concentrated on political and social reform with the thought that the government could revert to economic problems later. Now, however, the attention of the government is concentrated on the current economic problems, and the government has learned that it must tackle political and economic problems simultaneously. The government hopes that it will not suffer politically during the election period in October as a result of present economic problems. /2/The Embassy reported in telegram 563, April 2, that it had received a letter from Minister of Planning Yaftali requesting U.S. assistance to help solve Afghanistan's financial crisis. (Ibid., FN 1-1 AFG) Mr. Talbot said that the U.S. would await the results of the IMF mission talks in Kabul before deciding what we could do to help Afghanistan. Mr. Handley asked what the Afghans themselves could do to improve their situation. Farhang replied that recently the government had convened successfully a congress of landowners to persuade them to agree to an increase in land taxation. The government hoped to do a number of other things to overcome structural weaknesses: (1) to process karakul in Afghanistan, perhaps with U.S. assistance, which could increase the income from this source by 50 per cent; (2) to set up a wool scouring plant; (3) to sell fruit in the Middle East particularly Kuwait. The fruit presently sold to Pakistan and India is sold on bilateral account and does not earn foreign exchange; (4) eventually, to export cotton goods. Farhang said that the Textile Mill is in better shape now because Abdul Majid Zabuli,/3/ its moving force, had returned to Afghanistan and because the government was giving it additional assistance. Farhang commented that he hoped that the private sector would play a stronger role perhaps after five years. The government planned to help selected enterprises, and the new legal system would facilitate the development of private enterprise as a whole. /3/Abdul Majid Zabuli, President of Bank-i-Milli. Referring to his discussion April 26 with Mr. Macomber of AID, Farhang said that he had reported to his government Mr. Macomber's suggestion that Afghanistan would be best advised to give up one or more projects now contemplated under U.S. assistance in order to better handle the present financial problem. Farhang said that he did not know how his government would react to this suggestion. He himself felt that it would be better to continue with the projects contemplated; otherwise, workers and machinery becoming available as other projects are finished would remain unused, and there would be an imbalance in Afghan development if new American projects were not taken up (Soviet projects would continue). Mr. Talbot said that he hoped Mr. Farhang would take back with him the knowledge that the United States is very much interested in the constitutional and economic development of Afghanistan. Many Americans were interested in these developments, particularly since the visit of Their Majesties to the U.S. in 1963. Mr. Talbot said he was glad to meet Farhang again, this time in Washington. Farhang expressed appreciation of American interest and assistance, and concluded that he hoped that he could also take back with him to Afghanistan American agreement for assistance to meet the current need there.
532. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ Kabul, May 6, 1965, 1200Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 AFG-IRAN/HELMAND. Secret; Exdis. 660. Ref Embtel 659./2/ For Secretary from Ambassador. Reftel reports watershed session I had with PriMin May 5. While I most reluctant add extraordinarily heavy burdens you are carrying feel I would be derelict my duty were I not to call to your personal attention implications PriMin's position for future US-Afghan relations. /2/In telegram 659 from Kabul, May 6, Ambassador Steeves reported on his conversation with Prime Minister Yusuf, who informed him that he and his cabinet had decided to give top priority and assign whatever resources might be required to accelerate the Helmand Valley project. Yusuf asked for a definite answer as to U.S. plans "for the completion of the project." Following a lengthy discussion, they agreed to defer further deliberation until after their joint technical planners could meet to consider what could realistically be achieved in the Valley. (Ibid.) If we are to be prevented by our own regulations or other factors from stepping up assistance on Helmand Valley project, with which we have been so closely associated for fifteen years, Afghans quite likely request us terminate this major US activity here. Since many key Afghan officials, such as MinFin and MinInt, have been personally identified with Helmand Valley in past and it is in a very real sense seen here as heart our economic program, Afghans are likely regard any such development as "abandonment" by USG. This would set in train here developments gradually curtailing our position and influence. We presently undertaking joint US-Afghan technical discussions see whether goals envisioned by PriMin feasible but I am not sanguine outcome unless we able to do more ourselves than so far authorized. Accordingly, before curtailment along lines above suggested takes place, believe policy determination required as to whether maintenance our existing satisfactory position here of sufficient importance USG, and to its CENTO allies Iran and Pakistan, to warrant us making special effort provide forthcoming response to PriMin and thus maintaining major and productive US presence in Helmand Valley development to which Afghans now giving highest priority./3/ /3/In telegram 326 to Kabul, May 11, the Department of State commented: "Ambassador can be sure we will take his warning signal seriously. We do not intend to let US-Afghan relations deteriorate but neither can we ignore our own aid standards and political requirements. We will seek to resolve our problems with Afghanistan in order to enable us to do what is required to maintain an effective U.S. presence there." (Ibid.) Steeves
533. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ Kabul, May 13, 1965, 1215Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FN 10 AFG/IMF. Limited Official Use. 679. Ref Embtel 675./2/ Embassy Econ Counselor saw IMF team for one hour just prior team departure Kabul. After very difficult discussions last forty-eight hours, including lengthy meeting with PM Yusuf, team left with signed letter committing RGA to program fiscal and financial reform, which team feels will be acceptable to Fund directors as basis extension standby facility. Team felt that commitments obtained were well above minimum latitude their instructions and were unanimous in expressing opinion that acceptable commitments would not have been forthcoming without US-FRG "pressure" position linking in tying consideration future extraordinary assistance to favorable outcome IMF consultations. /2/Dated May 13. (Ibid.) Despite tough negotiations and undoubtedly painful concessions made by RGA, Afghan sources report that team earned respect of Afghans and that Ministry of Finance officials are privately saying that IMF visit will result in enactment of reform measures which they have long advocated but never had sufficient political strength to carry out. Team plans to file RGA statement of undertaking and their report immediately upon return Washington this weekend, and estimate that if Fund directorate approves RGA proposals, agreement could be reached within three weeks and drawings commence soon thereafter. CT comments on consultations and recommendations for subsequent U.S. action now under preparation./3/ /3/On May 15 the Country Team in Afghanistan recommended consideration of a commodity assistance loan. They commented that the IMF team had succeeded in establishing fiscal responsibility as a condition for additional aid and that acceptance by the Afghan Government of IMF controls represented a victory for the advocates of a Western presence in the country. (Telegram Toaid 1331 from Kabul, May 15; ibid., AID (US) 9 AFG) Brewer
534. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ Kabul, June 12, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) AFG. Confidential. No time of transmission is on the telegram. 734. Joint Embassy/USAID Message. Ref: Deptel 342;/2/ NESA action memorandum May 25;/3/ Embtel 732./4/ I had two hour session with Prime Minister Yusuf morning June 10 to outline agreement in principle on Afghan aid program reached in Washington during my consultations. MinPlan Yaftali and Farhadi (FonOff) were with PriMin, and HVA head Wakil joined us for discussion HVA. DCM Brewer and AID Director Nucker accompanied me. /2/Telegram 342 to Kabul, May 28, from Ambassador Steeves, who was in Washington for consultations, described the program for aid to Afghanistan that had been tentatively agreed upon and suggested the Embassy request that the Afghan Government withhold any policy decisions on the Helmand Valley until after his return. (Ibid.) /3/Not found. /4/In telegram 732 from Kabul, June 10, Ambassador Steeves reported that the package agreed upon during his Washington consultations had been favorably received by the Prime Minister and his associates. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID US-AFG) Began by explaining to PriMin I had been asked return Washington view completion IMF study, Nucker's presence there and fact I already relatively near in Western Europe. Told Yusuf we had been able reach general agreement in three main areas and fourth miscellaneous category future USG aid RGA and said would like outline entire package prior discussing details. PriMin agreed. Re PL 480 wheat, I reminded PriMin Afghanistan about only country in world still on Title II/5/ basis. We had agreed this would be continued for another year with program up to 150,000 tons if detailed studies supported. I noted questions higher deposit price, storage and transportation were among problems on which technicians would have to reach agreement and suggested this working level study begin promptly. PriMin expressed pleasure at news. /5/Title II of P.L. 480 authorized the transfer of surplus agricultural commodities on a grant basis. Re loan program, I referred request Yaftali letter/6/ and said we favored selective project commodity loan which would make maximum contribution in areas USG already assisting such as agriculture on which MinAg had appealed to me month ago. We also hoped such loan would encourage small industries in private sector. However, both imagination and administrative machinery would be required implement program properly. I suggested we get down to technical studies right away to determine how best use $2 million which being made available as first tranche but noted program capable of increments as need shown. PriMin asked whether as much as $4 million might be available in coming year if RGA could justify. Nucker explained details, adding if $2 million orders from farmers and businessmen right away then more possible. Yusuf expressed gratitude but noted program would not help foreign exchange problem. American prices were higher than elsewhere. I interjected American goods also better. PriMin agreed but added had hoped loan could be used for consumer goods. I told Yusuf frankly this was not possible but of course our suggested help would give RGA greater flexibility in use other funds. Nucker stressed our approach could be used soak up Afghanis from private sector and at same time assist agricultural and industrial development. I added use agricultural or industrial bank might result establishment of some sort revolving fund which might then prompt interest some American bank consider lending additional help. Told Yusuf we had been promised first priority on assignment advisor who could sit with bank manager and show him how make this program work. PriMin asked whether advisor might come soon to which Nucker replied as soon as RGA desired. PriMin indicated expert should come now. /6/See footnote 2, Document 531. Remaining three-quarters our discussion largely devoted HVA, I told PriMin we suggesting four-pronged approach: (a) special case re Arghandab; (b) equipment loan for ACU/7/ which might illustratively work in Shamalan; (c) BuRec team proceed in Darweshan and elsewhere prepare basis for subsequent loan applications; and (d) agreement in principle on Kajakai power. Informed Yusuf that, as rapidly as we could prepare drainage map Arghandab and get data on which contractor could base bid, we were willing get this going on special basis. We would also need examine irrigation gates and sluices so that both supply water and drainage regulated. PriMin asked who might do required survey. Nucker replied we thinking several experts might be added J.G. White contract save time. PriMin asked whether USG funds available for survey and construction. Nucker affirmed re survey but said construction would be on loan basis. /7/Afghan Construction Unit. Re ACU equipment loan, I stressed urgency so ACU could get to work on HVA areas Afghans might choose. PriMin felt ACU work should be supplementary to that of US contractor brought in later. I agreed, assuring him funds would be available for equipment loan. Response Yusuf's query re amount, Nucker said $4-5 million had been discussed. I told PriMin it was in this area that we would look to RGA provide men and money enable ACU start work on semi-classified land such as Shamalan. PriMin remarked he would have two thousand men trained as machine operators by next month, but said ACU could only help in total picture on limited supplemental basis. Re BuRec, I told PriMin we would expect team continue work in other areas such as Darweshan on basis original concept full land classification needed justify subsequent incremental loans. However, we could be working on Arghandab and ACU on Shamalan at same time. Turning Kajakai power, I informed PriMin USG agreement in principle loan this project. Nucker explained following steps: (1) as soon as RGA requested, we prepared make loan approximating $1 million for two 1500 kw diesel generators Kandahar; (2) in August pair experts would arrive work with RGA resolve problems remaining from Beck report and develop loan application for Kajakai power units; and (3) power distribution line, which already funded, going forward with Washington starting work with Harza re contract for project. PriMin said troubled lest whole power development be dependent on agreement particular arrangements re organization and foreign scholarship training. I commented Beck report total set recommendations some of which might not need be immediately implemented. PriMin stressed RGA unprepared spend substantial sums on loan basis on foreign scholarships. I cautioned him total program must incorporate enough of Beck and related suggestions to assure that power system we were helping provide could be operated. PriMin stressed need begin construction immediately rather than waiting five years and opined Beck schedule should be accelerated. With USG agreement in principle now in hand he felt necessary technical details could be worked out. I urged Yusuf not dismiss training aspects project lightly. Yaftali asserted in the past training had always been on grant basis. Re miscellaneous category, told PriMin I had feared foregoing might have required sacrifice something else in program but was happy assure him this not so. HIQ/8/ and AID could go forward on schedule. /8/Herat-Islam Qala road. Additionally, where RGA had development schemes which required equipment for exploitation, such as coal mines, USG prepared under certain conditions consider equipment loans. One condition would be some American management. I mentioned both Dar-e-Suf and Herat locations and said we happy discuss if RGA interested. In subsequent general discussion PriMin sought fix clearly in mind what USG proposal meant in terms HVA. Said he accepted proposals re Arghandab and need for ACU equipment loan application but asked what proposed re other HVA areas including Shamalan, Darweshan, Nadi Ali, Marjeh and Tarnak. I replied additional investment Nadi Ali probably unjustified. Tarnak and Darweshan would require land classification as prelude loan application. Wakil noted quality Arghandab land similar Darweshan-Shamalan. Difference was more settlers Arghandab with greater skill. Would be pity tackle Arghandab now and "forget about" Darweshan and Shamalan. Nucker commented Arghandab had Washington approval in principle, since land being preserved required different technical and legal tests than undeveloped land. Re-equipped ACU could get started on Shamalan with our guidance while elsewhere land classification and project planning would be down. Soon as ten thousand acres or more found meet USG legal requirements development loan application could be submitted. Yaftali asked whether private contractor could not do Darweshan survey. Nucker replied yes on loan basis. PriMin stressed RGA would not apply for loan for survey work. Wakil argued for private contractor do survey work as most efficient. Brewer noted past disappointing rate BuRec progress in large part due failure HVA lend proper support. Nucker felt BuRec could be instructed concentrate its efforts and, with necessary HVA support, would do as well as private contractor. I said would be difficult shift from BuRec entirely without creating confusion and misunderstanding. Wakil replied BuRec could oversee quality contractor's work. PriMin emphasized RGA concerned lest work be delayed as in past. Inquired how long survey Arghandab would take. Nucker replied should not take excessive length of time. Wakil disagreed, noting permeability study and similar work needed in addition to drainage pattern. PriMin again inquired why private contractor could not do work under BuRec supervision. Wakil added could not understand why grant money available for BuRec survey but not for survey by private contractor. Yaftali cited fine RGA experience with private contractors such as MK and AHC. I told PriMin we had great faith in entire package and accordingly hoped RGA would leave to us matter of assuring BuRec moved with appropriate speed and momentum. PriMin wondered whether contract could be drawn up with either BuRec or J.G. White giving timetable within which work to be finished. I remarked might be possible get Arghandab out of way in three years. Nucker added elsewhere might do twenty thousand acres a year. PriMin seemed satisfied and inquired re steps to be taken following this meeting. Nucker said staff would spend considerable time with HVA and would ascertain who should make Arghandab study and how long it would take. In summing up, PriMin expressed hope program would be workable as proposed. While it did not meet all RGA had asked, it showed USG good will and cooperative spirit. He was pleased some work could start promptly to overcome frustrations all sides had experienced. Work would be done certain areas as outlined with remaining land being completed on basis twenty thousand acres a year. PriMin then said Herat-Kandahar road would be open in two months and inquired re status HIQ. Nucker replied detailed specs being prepared Livorno and hoped contractor might mobilize during winter, start construction next spring and finish in one year. PriMin expressed appreciation and again said how pleased he was work could start promptly on HVA. Comment: While obviously not meeting RGA wishes on all points, believe our presentation package did succeed convincing PriMin USG determination move ahead more rapidly than in past, notably re HVA which to him is all important. Afghans still would prefer faster rate development which they think possible through private contract arrangement. They have, however, accepted our proposals as basis for moving forward. We can now get down to detailed work and I would hope will be able demonstrate on continuing basis that any further delays in implementation will be RGA responsibility, not ours. To this end, CT will do all it can see foregoing schedule carried out, and I urge maximum continued support appropriate Washington agencies to achieve this end. Steeves
535. Airgram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ A-249 Kabul, June 2, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 2 AFG. Confidential. Drafted by Eric Neff and William F. Spengler of the Political Section, and approved by Steeves. SUBJECT I was received in audience by His Majesty Mohammad Zahir Shah at the palace this morning at my initiative to discuss with him several subjects of mutual interest on my return to Kabul after leave in the United States. As on the occasion of previous audiences (Emb A-107, October 30, 1965/2/ and A-189, March 10, 1966/3/), I brought along Second Secretary Eric Neff to serve as interpreter in French. The following is a record of the conversation except for one subject which is being reported separately. /2/Airgram 107 from Kabul, October 30, 1965, reported a meeting on October 13 between the Ambassador and the King. (Ibid., POL 2 AFG) /3/Airgram 189 from Kabul, March 10, reported a meeting on March 1 between the Ambassador and the King. (Ibid.) I opened the conversation by saying how pleased I was to see the King again and how much I had enjoyed our association over the years. I added that, as the King perhaps knew, I would be leaving Afghanistan in about six weeks to take up my new assignment and, although the exact date of my departure had not yet been fixed, I thought it would be about July 15. The King replied that he, too, had very much enjoyed our relationship and that he would be sorry to see me go. Briefly recounting my recent leave in the U.S., I commented that I had brought back with me many expressions of goodwill for the King and Her Majesty from all those they had met during their last visit to the U.S. I added that these expressions of esteem and goodwill came not only from the highest echelons of government but also from all those down the line who had the pleasure of meeting them. In this connection I specifically mentioned former Governor Welch of Indiana who had written me that he considered the King's visit to his state as one of the high points of his tenure as governor. I also mentioned how pleased I had been to have been able to attend the University of California's presentation to Ambassador Majid of an Honorary Doctorate--adding how popular and well regarded the Ambassador was in Washington. I then raised the question of Prime Minister Maiwandwal's working visit to Washington (Emb A-248),/4/ adding that the exact date was now in the process of being worked out and wondering if he thought that about November 1 would be convenient. The King replied that he was very pleased about the visit, adding that the Prime Minister would be especially busy during the next few months, but thought that November would probably be the best time. I then commented that the visit not only reflected my government's interest and concern for Afghanistan, but also was an expression of high regard for the Prime Minister himself. The King indicated that he appreciated this, and left me with the impression that he, too, approved of the job the Prime Minister was doing. /4/Dated June 2. (Ibid.) Referring to the forthcoming opening ceremonies for the new Kabul/Kandahar road, constructed with American assistance, I said that I hoped the King would be able to officiate. I added that the exact date would depend on the engineers and the climate, but I thought the project would be completed by July 18. I also mentioned we were exploring the possibility of having Vice President Humphrey attend the opening. The King replied that, of course, he would be delighted to attend the opening ceremony and that he would be most happy if the Vice President could also be present. I discussed our concern about the slow progress of the Helmand Valley development project. I pointed out that the United States had made a major investment in the project and was prepared to do more, but he should know we were unhappy with the way the project was being administered. I mentioned in passing the shortage of local funds allocated for repairing and cleaning the canals, and said that while I did not want to burden him with details, I did want him to be aware that problems exist and of our concern in this regard. The King replied that he was grateful for our assistance and was very much aware that problems existed. In fact, he was aware of them in detail. He added that he would keep in mind what I had told him. I then said that I had discussed the matter last week with the Prime Minister and had subsequently sent a memorandum to him/5/ describing some of the difficulties which had arisen. /5/Not found. I then told the King that, as he well knew, ever since my arrival in Afghanistan I had worked to improve the climate for private investment which I and my government believed could make a major contribution to the development of the country. I referred to the recent visit here of a group of American business leaders and representatives of the Department of Commerce, and specifically mentioned a promising project that had been proposed by Mr. Mariani, a member of the group and president of one of the largest fruit and nut processing companies in the U.S., to establish a canning industry in the Kandahar-Helmand area. I had discussed the project with the Prime Minister who had expressed great interest in it. I also left with the King a copy of the proposal which I had given the Prime Minister. The King responded that he and his government were very much interested in attracting private investment into Afghanistan and would certainly continue to support this effort. I closed the conversation by thanking the King for the trees and bushes he had given for the new chancery grounds and said that I hoped that my new assignment as Director General of the Foreign Service might enable me to attend the dedication ceremonies of the new chancery. I told the King I would be paying a final farewell call on him sometime nearer my actual departure. JM Steeves
536. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ Kabul, July 25, 1966, 1220Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/FREEMAN. Confidential. 379. Subject: Secy Freeman's Discussion with RGA. Ref: State 11304./2/ /2/In telegram 11304, July 20, the Department requested additional details on the Kabul-Kandahar road opening, including Secretary Freeman's talks with Afghan Government officials, and the general impact of his visit on U.S.-Afghan relations. (Ibid.) 1. Details Kabul-Kandahar road openings being submitted by airgram/3/ and general impact Secy Freeman's visit by septel./4/ This message covers Secy's meeting July 13 with PriMin Maiwandwal and key Cabinet members which only official discussion with RGA during short visit. Following account based on oral report by Amb Steeves (only Mission official present). /3/Airgram 19 from Kabul, July 28, described the July 13 ceremonies opening the Kabul-Kandahar highway, built under an AID development grant. Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman attended as special representative of the President. (Ibid., IT 7-16, AFG) /4/In telegram 415 from Kabul, July 27, the Embassy reported that Freeman's visit had dramatized U.S. interest in Afghanistan, and that, although no substantive actions or decisions were taken, the Secretary's discussions with top Afghan officials helped place the U.S. aid prospects in better perspective. (Ibid., POL 7 US/FREEMAN) 2. Secy observed privately before meeting that Afghan performance in tackling basic agric problems appeared shockingly inadequate. RGA spokesmen at meeting did nothing overcome this impression. Meeting related solely to Afghanistan's agric problems and foodgrain situation. Afghans described problems and plans in general but largely failed provide convincing info. 3. In response, Secy avoided being hypercritical but did not conceal awareness of Afghanistan's failure take effective measures alleviate agric problems. When Afghan official estimated 200,000 tons as foodgrain import requirement for coming year, Secy observed pointedly that raising ante progressively from original 50,000 ton program suggested Afghanistan going backward rather than making progress in meeting food problem. (As far as we know, specific quantities not otherwise discussed and Secretary emphasized fact of limited stocks of US foodgrains available for export this year.) 4. Re prospects future US foodgrain assistance, Secy stressed Title II no longer possible. Explaining course of new legislation in Congress, including pressures for cash dollar sales or loans, Secy foresaw more restrictive law probably most closely resembling present Title IV. 5. This context, PriMin admitted that RGA, in urgently requesting further Title II assistance, hoped beat enactment of new legislation. Secy saw little chance success such tactic. (See also Embtel 274.)/5/ /5/Dated July 18. (Ibid., AID (US) 6. In discussion of possible domestic effects of future Afghan foodgrain purchases, Secy asked if RGA had considered direct subsidy in reselling to consumers; Afghans did not object this suggestion. Secy also raised possible substitution of coarse grains for wheat; response inconclusive. 7. Secy emphasized throughout that it squarely up to Afghans to meet own problem by taking effective measures produce more food--e.g. adoption of prices providing adequate incentive to Afghan farmers and importation of more fertilizer. 8. In subsequent conversation with Amb Steeves, PriMin stated he regarded Secy very sympathetic and understanding man. PriMin added he anxious visit US as best means of communicating Afghan sense of "dependence" on USG for substantial and timely aid, though he believed he had conveyed general idea to Secy. 9. Understand staffers Brown and Walsh attended discussion, took notes for records of Secy and White House, respectively. Department might obtain more complete account from them if desired. Blood [Continue with the next documents]
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