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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
537. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ Kabul, November 19, 1966, 1010Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) AFG. Confidential. 2015. Joint Embassy/USAID message. 1. In view present competition for limited US aid funds, Country Team believes it useful recall significance continuing bilateral economic assistance as principal instrument for assuring type of US presence needed to secure our over-all objectives in Afghanistan. 2. Such presence was found imperative when RGA was much less responsive to popular aspirations than it is now. Major political transformation of recent past renders it even more vital to our interests. In CT view, therefore, USG cannot afford lower its sights in Afghanistan re level of presence on grounds that present government is "safely" Western-oriented. CT does not view this simply as problem of giving aid and comfort to a friendly government somewhat frightened by prospects it has opened up through Western-type political liberalization. More important problem is to make sure our total program, at this juncture, does not fail express to growing sector of populace which politically alert that US has creative and dependable interest in their progress. 3. Central role of technical assistance in providing this assurance is obvious. However, benefits are gradual and long-term in nature. Advice alone is not enough to secure popular confidence. To assure continuation of presence adequate to accomplish our objectives, CT convinced US must keep up momentum in certain sensitive sectors where any open invitation to Soviets or ChiComs to take over in areas of past US efforts could tip balance and render our past investment ineffectual. This need not mean abdicating our incentives to self-help and other program criteria. It does mean we must move on an adequate number of projects which combine economic development potential and political benefits for US. 4. In this context, CT has following views on currently pending program issues: A. Food and Agriculture (I) Re Food for Peace, CT believes current US posture is in Afghanistan's own best interests and should be carried through despite emotional shock being experienced by RGA. Essential positive element US posture is, of course, continuing readiness supply fertilizer, equipment and technical assistance to assist RGA's intensified food production program. (II) We must recognize, nevertheless, that in recent years Afghans have regarded PL-480 support (of type now being phased out) as primary form US assistance. Its transformation will inevitably shift public attention more acutely upon Helmand Valley development, where our present image is unsatisfactory, as well as upon economically stagnant area Kandahar which also traditionally associated with US aid effort. B. Helmand Valley For this reason, it fortunate we are now in position move ahead with Kandahar diesel-electric power project, and that we are on point of financing badly-needed new equipment for HACU./2/ This new movement will be all to the good. But we must recognize that Helmand-Kandahar agricultural development as we conceive it can show results only gradually. CT proposes continue restraining RGA ambitions for land development at uneconomic pace. This underscores urgency of proceeding with long-deferred Kajakai hydro project. CT convinced that, among various proposals for US action in Afghanistan, this is one where both economic and political factors clearly show it in our interest to carry out. In view foregoing circumstances, timing of final US commitment to project has become more critical than ever. Thus, CT has received with extreme concern, even dismay, indication (per Aidto 532)/3/ that AID/W considering further deferment Kajakai loan as well as possibility stopgap alternatives. Separate message on specifics reftel will follow soonest. /2/Helmand Authority Construction Unit. /3/Not found. Although Helmand long thought of as US preserve, Soviet or ChiCom offers to build on our foundations are by no means out of question if we allow matters drift too much. We may question their economics, but Soviet-aided Nangarhar project and ChiCom-aided Parwan project show that both powers are prepared enter this type activity in Afghanistan and possibly expand it (viz. new ChiCom survey Farah Rud Valley, west of Helmand). C. Civil Aviation In this sector, takeover our predominant role by another power would be particularly harmful to US reputation, and takeover by Communists a signal defeat. Despite progress, we are not yet near point where Afghans can go it alone in civil aviation. CT believes Boeing jet project justified on economic grounds. If it should prove to be borderline case, however, CT wishes point out that rejection loan would deny US another case where economic and political factors fortuitously combined to constitute a real opportunity for US. Turndown would in fact mean we paid political price: population would eventually draw conclusion that, at critical time, US was unprepared share with Afghanistan its special genius in commercial jet transport. Bush airline idea has potential for increasing national cohesion and encouraging responsiveness by RGA to population in remote areas. If friendly Western power such as Canada should prove willing finance foreign exchange costs such venture from outset, CT would regard this as in harmony US interests. If not, it will be only natural for RGA to look to US. Project is not yet sufficiently developed to pose specific programming issues. Our attitude, however, should be sympathetic if feasibility studies should show that Bush operations of specified scale could be conducted on economic basis or something close thereto (as has been done in some other LDC's). D. Ministry of Justice Proposal CT will need further study before able give outline initial response to CA-1063/4/ re Title IX Foreign Assistance Act. However, should mention that CT has serious doubts about going ahead with project for reorganization Ministry Justice and overhaul legal code. RGA is not pursuing initiative with any enthusiasm. Present leadership Ministry Justice totally inadequate for realization benefits. Even if this changed, doubtful that request, if resumed, would be confined to just the kind of activity we would want to involve ourselves in. Risks are abundant in view intertwining Islamic law with present system. If anything went wrong with project, public much more likely find fault with our role than give US credit for involvement more constructive aspects. /4/Reference is incorrect; CA-1063, December 3, concerned a different subject. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FN 1-1 LAOS) E. Roads For reasons already suggested (particularly section C above), we may want to concern ourselves in future with targets opportunity re road-building in north. There is no doubt about impact on rural populace of highways already built here by US and Soviets, or about increased mobility afforded to urban populations. Activity along roadsides testifies to how such roads can change lives of people and, in their minds, point the way to the future. This longer-run US interest affects issue of increasing aid loan to permit widening roadbed Herat-Islam Qala road. CT believes decision to economize by building 5.5 meter road ([garble] meters including shoulders) was mistake which, if not rectified, will plague us in future. Since Kabul-Kandahar-Herat road is 7 meters wide (10 meters including shoulders) and IBRD-financed road from Nrshed to Afghan border will apparently have roadbed 9 meters wide, it seems inevitable that HIQ link with narrower roadbed will, in words one astute official US observer who recently visited here, turn out to be "monument to niggardliness." Here is prime case where we have ability respond quickly at cost which seems reasonable in light our total stake in Afghanistan. Because cost of widening will increase with every day of construction, CT believes widening HIQ road most urgent of program issues confronting US in Afghanistan and urges immediate approval before AHC gets any further down road. Blood
538. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 25, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal, 3/28/67. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "rec'd 3/25/67 1:50 p." SUBJECT /2/Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal visited the United States March 25-April 9. While in Washington March 28-30, he met with President Johnson and other U.S. officials. For the exchange of greetings, exchange of toasts, and joint statement issued on March 28, see Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1967, pp. 627-632. A summary of Secretary Rusk's conversation with Maiwandwal is in telegram 165557 to Kabul, March 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 AFG) Briefing papers and other material relating to Maiwandwal's visit are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 587, V.26 and V.27. Our main reason for inviting the Afghan Prime Minister is to reassure him that we're still behind him in his delicate balancing act between the West and the USSR. So far Afghanistan has kept the Western door wide open, even though we've put in less than half the Soviet level of aid. The Afghan King, in a private talk with President Kennedy in 1963,/3/ opened his heart on his fear of going completely under Soviet domination. Maiwandwal probably doesn't know this, but it's typical of most Afghan leaders' real sympathies. We want to encourage them. /3/For a record of this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 327. But staying out of Soviet clutches is an uphill fight. Economically, Afghanistan is increasingly linked with the Soviet economy, and the USSR provides all its military equipment. But we have a near-monopoly of assistance to its whole educational system. PanAm has built its airline and is minority co-owner. Most of the Cabinet is clearly pro-Western. Maiwandwal himself is an old friend and knows the U.S. well, but he has to avoid further criticism that he's in our pocket. The main thing he wants from his visit is a sense that we're not backing away. He and his colleagues are leery of our increasingly tight approach to aid. (FY 67 $34 million, FY 68 $18 million.) We can't make a long-term commitment to his new Five Year Plan, though it's a good one worked up with Bob Nathan. But we are ready to go ahead with several projects (described in Secretary Rusk's memo)./4/ We believe these plus your normal warm hospitality will do the job. /4/In a March 24 memorandum Rusk recommended that the President indicate to Maiwandwal U.S. support for Afghanistan's economic development program, and inform him that the $4.6 million loan for equipment for the Helmand Valley was nearly ready for a signature. Rusk suggested that Maiwandwal also be told that a decision was expected in 30 days on his request for a $13 million AID loan for hydroelectric power at the Kajakai Dam site in the Helmand Valley, and that Afghanistan's application for an Export-Import Bank loan of $7.5 million was still under consideration. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal, 3/28/67) I recommend you read Secretary Rusk's memo and the scope paper (General Tabs A and C attached)./5/ The economic charts (background Tab B) prepared especially for you suggest the main contours--low overwhelmingly agricultural GNP, exports growing but going mainly to the USSR, elementary industry growing slowly--the very first steps of development. Above all, you will be interested in the description of Afghanistan's new experiment with parliamentary government which Maiwandwal is trying to make work (background Tab A). Maiwandwal is running into familiar problems of student unrest, party building, how to make an archaic bureaucracy function rapidly. His bio is at Bio Sketches Tab A, and we'll have talking points for you Monday night. /5/Tabs A, B, and C are not printed. Walt
539. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 28, 1967, 12:40-12:54 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 AFG. Confidential. Drafted by Spain, approved in S and by Saunders on June 19. The President and Prime Minister Maiwandwal met privately in the Oval Office from 11:50 a.m. to 12:35 p.m.; the part of the meeting printed was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States /2/The Prime Minister also met with Secretary Rusk on March 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, E 5 AFG/Five Year Plan) Afghanistan After the President and the Prime Minister joined the other members of the party, the Prime Minister thanked the President for the opportunity which his visit to the United States provided to renew old friendships. Secretary Rusk noted that the Secretary General of the United Nations had just made public his proposal on Vietnam and that the USG had commented favorably on it. He added that he understood Hanoi's reaction was negative. The President said he had discussed the announcement with the Prime Minister and told him of our disappointment at Hanoi's negative reaction. He said we had earlier consulted with our allies on the proposal and responded affirmatively. We had done this a dozen or so times in the past on other proposals. However, Hanoi's reaction to the Secretary General was that this was none of his business. War is everybody's business, the President said, and the U.S. is prepared to consider anybody's suggestion for ending it. He said he had asked Mr. Rostow to check the time and manner of our consultations on U-Thant's latest proposal and that he wanted to show this data to the Prime Minister. The President added that he felt more strongly then ever that the people of Vietnam should be allowed to have free elections and that after that, if they wanted us out, we would be happy to leave. The money we are spending for bullets we would be happy to spend instead for bread. We would even be willing to help Ho Chi Minh. He stressed, however, that we were not going to surrender or pull out of Vietnam, saying that if agreements were no good there, they were no good anywhere. He said we are still ready to go toward peace. Our answer is Yes. Hanoi's is still No. The Prime Minister observed that the Secretary General is going abroad again and suggested that perhaps he would be having further consultations on Vietnam during his trip. Secretary Rusk noted that U Thant had seen two North Vietnamese diplomats in Rangoon and thought it possible that those discussions had been taken into account in the Secretary General's present proposal. The Secretary told the Prime Minister that we knew of his interest in the cause of peace in Vietnam. He added he did not know whether or not the Prime Minister had any way to explore privately further moves; he remarked that he thought public approaches were not likely to get very far at the present time. The Prime Minister agreed that public approaches were not apt to be effective and said that the rigid public stands which both sides have taken makes this difficult. He noted that Afghanistan has always stood by the April, 1964 recommendations of the seventeen non-aligned countries. In response to a question from Secretary Rusk as to how much attention the Vietnam problem attracted in Afghanistan, the Prime Minister said that it attracted a good deal of attention and now that there is democracy in the country it was sometimes used by the politicians for their own purposes. He expressed his concern over the problem describing it as an explosive situation which he feared might escalate into a bigger danger.
540. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 29, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63-4/68. Secret. Drafted by Spain. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Before Prime Minister Maiwandwal's departure from Blair House today for his luncheon with the Secretary of State, I had the opportunity to ask him for his understanding of his discussion with the President yesterday./2/ My query was prompted by some remarks the Prime Minister made to me last evening which I thought suggested a possible misunderstanding. This turned out not to be the case. /2/See Document 539. The Prime Minister said that his discussion with the President had been thoroughly enjoyable and constructive. He felt that he and the President had come to grips with some major problems and understood each other very well indeed. He said that the point he had been trying to make in response to the President on Vietnam was that a number of other countries in the world, specifically including Afghanistan, did not see the Vietnam situation in exactly the same way we did. He said that he had tried to point out to the President that the United States had a tendency to be unduly concerned at different times with different problems; some years ago it had been organizing the northern tier into CENTO to defeat Communist aggression; earlier it had been the Marshall Plan and the Korean war; now it was Vietnam. The interests of Afghanistan and of other non-aligned Asian countries did not change as did those of the United States. This was the reason why they were not able to come as far as we would like them to at any given time on Vietnam, CENTO, the Korean war, etc. On more specific subjects, the Prime Minister indicated that he had discussed the Ariana Airline request for a loan from the Export Import Bank and understood the situation as it had been explained to him by Ambassador Neumann in New York and by the President. He was content and he would wait. On Afghanistan's present food needs, he said that the President had told him that the U.S. would do what it could to help on as generous terms as possible, specifically that cost would be repayable in 40 years. On the Kajakai project, he said that the President was sympathetic and had said that the papers were being prepared. He understood that the President had not made a commitment and that the President expected that he (Maiwandwal) would not discuss the matter publicly at this time. He said that the President had also mentioned the upcoming loan for land improvement equipment in the Helmand Valley and that they both understood that action on this was virtually completed. I asked the Prime Minister for his views as to timing of any future steps on the Kajakai project. He said that he would very much like to be able to announce it together with the next food agreement shortly after his return to Kabul, April 15. He said that if the food agreement were to be ready sooner, he would like to withhold announcement until after his return. He added that the Kajakai loan was particularly important to him personally and that he deduced from his conversation with the President that an announcement shortly after his return home would probably be possible.
541. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 17, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-4/68. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that it was received on April 18 at 5:05 p.m. SUBJECT Secretary Freeman is ready to go ahead with the $4.4 million wheat and oil agreement you mentioned to Prime Minister Maiwandwal./2/ Sharply rising food prices have triggered demonstrations in Afghanistan over the past two weeks, and Ambassador Neumann recommends we go ahead as soon as possible. Maiwandwal has just returned and can make good political use of a go-ahead to dampen fears of shortages. /2/In an April 7 memorandum to the President, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and AID Administrator Gaud recommend negotiation of a P.L. 480 agreement with Afghanistan. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 26, April 6-30, 1967) His one comment under pressure at the Press Club/3/ remains an isolated incident. His public statements on the rest of his tour were quite moderate. Now that a couple of weeks have elapsed, we should probably go ahead now unless you are strongly opposed. /3/In response to questions on Vietnam following a speech at the National Press Club on March 30, Maiwandwal stated that peace talks were impossible as long as the United States continued bombing North Vietnam, and he urged an unconditional end to the bombing. (Memorandum from Wriggins to Rostow, March 30; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal 3/28/67) Charles Schultze's economic analysis is attached./4/ /4/The April 15 memorandum to the President from Schultze noted the self-help measures undertaken in Afghanistan in the past year and recommended that the President authorize negotiation of the proposed P.L. 480 agreement due to Afghanistan's urgent need for wheat and oil. Walt Approve/5/ /5/Both options are checked; apparently Johnson checked "See me," and Rostow checked the approval after consulting with him. A notation in Rostow's handwriting reads: "Call Nick," presumably Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. Telegram 185010 to Kabul, April 29, states that 40,000 tons of wheat for Afghanistan was approved that day. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15-8 AFG)
542. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ Kabul, April 28, 1967, 0815Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15-8 AFG. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 4366. Kajakai and Wheat Announcements. 1. In my 4209/2/ and previous messages I urged immediate US announcement next PL-480 wheat tranche. /2/Dated April 18. (Ibid., AID (US) 15 AFG) 2. In ensuing days furor caused by allegations of Afghan student against CIA (Hotaki case)/3/ has increased markedly in intensity as result spate of strident comment in local press (Kabul 4365)./4/ PriMin's belated confrontation with Parliament likely occur Tuesday May 2, at which time PriMin will be hard put to defend his recent trip to US and indeed value US-Afghan ties in light suspicion cast on US motives toward Afghanistan because of Hotaki case (Kabul 4322)./5/ /3/Reference is to an Afghan living in the United States who made charges of CIA activities in Afghanistan that received publicity in the United States, including an article in the April issue of Ramparts magazine. ("Three Tales of the CIA," Ramparts, Vol. 5, No. 10, April 1967, pp. 23-24) Hotaki's charges were summarized in a March 11 memorandum from Read to Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63-4/68) On April 24 the Embassy reported that the Hotaki case had "erupted with a vengeance here creating critical political problem for PriMin Maiwandwal." (Telegram 4293 from Kabul; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG CIA) /4/Telegram 4365 from Kabul, April 28, reported that the "eruption" of the Hotaki case "continues with increasing intensity amid mounting public criticism, now spurred by heavy press play, reflecting adversely on Maiwandwal government and USG." (Ibid.) /5/Telegram 4322 from Kabul, April 25, reported on the postponement of the Prime Minister's confrontation with Parliament. (Ibid.) 3. We are whistling in the dark if we do not face up to fact that Hotaki case has not only seriously jeopardized Maiwandwal govt but also has caused substantial deterioration in US position here. In one week much of profit of Maiwandwal visit has been erased. 3. [sic] We have one action within our power which holds some promise of helping retrieve situation. We can and should announce new PL-480 wheat sale and intention to proceed with Kajakai before PriMin's appearance at Parliament expected May 2./6/ PriMin, through Farhadi, informed DCM today that timely announcements would be immensely helpful. /6/In telegram 4548 from Kabul, May 9, the Embassy reported that the furor over the Hotaki affair appeared to be subsiding following a persuasive speech in Parliament by Maiwandwal, in which he declared the accusations were unsubstantiated rumors. (Ibid., POL 15-1 AFG) 4. I strongly urge immediate announcement of these two evidences US cooperation with Afghanistan not because we wish defend Maiwandwal (he may already be past saving) but because it is essential we offer proof of disinterested US help at moment when US under heavy attack and suspicion for carrying out covert operations of "imperialistic and neo-colonialist" nature. Neumann
543. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, May 2, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Afghanistan, 4/1/66-1/20/69. Secret. SUBJECT Now that we have broken loose the PL 480 for Afghanistan, we ought to look forward to the two remaining aid items on the Afghanistan agenda: 1. The big one, of course, is the Kajakai Dam loan. This has now worked its way almost all the way through the AID loan machinery and will come to us sometime in the next week or two. 2. There is also a $4.6 million loan for earthmoving equipment to be used in the Helmand Valley, largely for irrigation works. This is already to go and would not normally come to the President because it is less than $10 million. However, in view of the President's general freeze on Afghanistan aid, AID is asking whether it can go ahead on its own. I agreed to sound you out since you have talked recently with the President. If the President does not feel strongly about this any longer, you may want me to give AID a go-ahead on the small loan. The Kajakai loan will have to come to the President later anyway. If you feel the President would not like anything to go ahead without his knowing, we can hold the small loan a week or two until we are ready to check the Kajakai project with him and simply make the smaller one a paragraph in that memo. Hal Go ahead with the equipment loan /2/Rostow changed the second option to read: "We'd damned well better check it with the President," and added, "See me, WR."
544. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 7, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 30, June 1-12, 1967. Confidential. SUBJECT Here is the request for your formal approval of a $12 million loan to Afghanistan to finance the installation of additional generating equipment at the Kajakai dam in the Helmand Valley, with which we've been associated for many years. When Ambassador [Prime Minister] Maiwandwal was here in early April, you advised him we would decide on the loan within thirty days, but AID has given it a most thorough going over. After careful review, they concur that it is economically sound. If you approve this loan, actual construction will not be started until satisfactory progress is made toward improving accounting procedures, the rate structure and the collection of payments in their electrical industry. Secretary Fowler agrees the balance of payments effects of the loan are minimal. It would create a political problem if we turned it down now. We have done three feasibility studies and already in 1965 told them we "agreed in principle" to finance it. Charlie Schultze agrees with Bill Gaud we should go ahead./2/ I recommend you approve./3/ /2/Schultze recommended approval in a May 29 memorandum to the President. (Ibid.) /3/In both cases, the last option is checked and 6/8/67 is handwritten in the margin. Telegram 214155 to Kabul, June 22, states that the two loans had been approved. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 9 AFG) Approve Kajakai AID has also been holding off on a $4.5 million equipment loan for earth-moving machinery to be used in building irrigation works in the Helmand Valley. This small a loan would not normally come to you, but AID has held it up ever since you put a freeze on all Afghan aid. They would like to go ahead now. I recommend we proceed. Yes on small loan W.W. Rostow/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
545. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ Kabul, November 27, 1967, 1545Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade and Bucharest for Harriman, and to Rawalpindi and Tehran. Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman made a trip to Pakistan for the dedication of the Mangla Dam November 21-27 and stopped in Kabul on the return journey for talks with the King and Prime Minister Etemadi. A record of Harriman's meeting with the King is in telegram 1577 from Belgrade, November 26. (Ibid.) 1. Interview Harriman with PM Etemadi/2/ Nov. 25, and subsequent dinner for delegation hosted by PM, were conducted in atmosphere unusual warmth. PM and Afghan Ministers present gave impression they felt occasion offered them important opportunity set forth problems faced by new government and express views and hopes. /2/On October 11 Prime Minister Maiwandwal resigned, and on November 1 the King appointed Foreign Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi as Prime Minister. 2. Also present at interview were Yaftali (Deputy PM), Hamed (Min Planning), Farhadi (MFA), Amb Neumann, Spain and McClure. 3. PM opened by saying vote of confidence in new [garble--government] showed democratic experiment proceeding successfully. Key to dealing with Parliament was frankness and sincerity. 4. PM felt by far most serious problems facing him were economic. He anticipated need for austerity, and was concerned about new 5-year plan. Afghanistan needed understanding and cooperation from friends, particularly U.S. Appreciated report of Agricultural Review Team,/3/ but needed assistance, particularly wheat. Achievement self-sufficiency in wheat in 5 or 6 years, he felt, depended both on political stability and continued foreign aid. In passing, PM noted his belief there had been some hoarding of good 1967 wheat harvest because of what he considered to have been lack of political stability in recent past. /3/A U.S. Agricultural Review Team was sent to Afghanistan June 20-July 20 to advise the Afghan Government on measures to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. (Telegram 4725 from Kabul, May 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 AGR) On October 2 President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Maiwandwal enclosing the report and recommendations of the agricultural experts. (Ibid., POL 15-1 AFG) 5. Yaftali stressed financial problems. Said RGA realized it must do more about tax and fiscal reforms, but insisted foreign aid was essential. Expressed concern about debt repayment to USSR. In response Harriman's question about extent to which gas would meet this problem, he said it would really help only after full production rate reached in 2 or 3 years. 6. Both PM and Yaftali emphasized that top priority for RGA efforts was in agriculture. 7. When Yaftali mentioned that fertilizer loan funds had been diverted to HIQ road, PM interjected that completion of road was very important for Afghanistan, particularly for development trade with outside world through Iran. Added that RGA also hoped connect with projected Iranian road to port of Bandar Abbas, but would need foreign technical and financial aid to pave necessary 200 kilometers. 8. Yaftali said RGA was trying encourage more private sector activity (he cited light industries and textiles as export possibilities). Said RGA had already removed some export taxes and planned to do more. When he referred to discussions with IMF, Harriman commented IMF recommendations are usually very sound. 9. Yaftali then turned to plea for indication of general extent prospective US assistance during 5-year plan period. Referred to "shopping list" transmitted some months ago. PM said Parliament was demanding such indication, and parliamentary approval of plan depended considerably upon RGA's ability to furnish meaningful answer. Later in conversation, he said fact that of 180 deputies who spoke in recent debate on government a great number had talked about plan showed intensity of public interest and expectations re planned development. He acknowledged past assistance, and said both RGA and Afghan people recognized depth of American good will for their country. This was why he felt he should be fully frank during visit (a friendly gesture in itself, which he highly appreciated) about what was really needed from US. One thing, he said, was wheat, which RGA needed soon, partly to impart a sense of security throughout country after what happened in local wheat market last winter and spring. 10. Asked about other aid donors, PM said USSR had already committed itself to support plan. Delegation was going to Moscow shortly to firm up specific projects. French were expanding technical assistance, and were considering some industrial projects; he estimated French aid contribution at about $15 million. Germany was helping too. However, Afghanistan counted mainly on US and USSR. 11. Gov Harriman replied that USG certainly wanted to help. Some assistance would undoubtedly be possible, but we could not be sure just how much. Congress was severely reducing the resources available. Long-term commitments were more of a problem than ever. Harriman said he could therefore not answer some of PM's questions, except to say that USG had deep respect for PM and RGA and desired be helpful. He personally appreciated fact that Afghanistan was at a turning point in economic development. Added that USG believes strongly in importance of agriculture for countries like Afghanistan and realizes its development is slow process. 12. On other subjects, exchanges were equally friendly and frank. 13. PM spent what we felt was inordinate amount of time on Pushtunistan issue. Said this was only major problem in way of brotherly relations with Pakistan with which Afghanistan has so much in common. Recalled at length Afghan restraint and support of Pakistan in 1965 war. But he insisted both countries had to face issue, and both would gain immensely if true will of Pushtun people expressed. PM emphasized pressures upon RGA from Parliament. He expressed considerable bitterness about Ayub's recent book,/4/ saying it undid years of careful work to improve relations. /4/Reference is to Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). 14. When asked for specific proposals, PM said it was simple; will of Pushtun people must be expressed. As practical matter, main thing needed was statement of intention by Pakistan willingness to discuss subject. 15. In further discussion, PM mentioned incidentally that UN had been helpful in cause of peace, but Afghanistan had no intention take Pushtunistan issue to UN. Harriman said Pushtunistan was bilateral problem. US regretted its existence, hoped relations among parties would improve, but did not see how we could usefully get involved. USG did, however, have greatest respect for and interest in Afghanistan. PM concluded what Afghanistan needed on this issue was understanding. 16. PM stressed gratitude his government and many Afghans for USG kindness in providing medical care for former PM Maiwandwal. 17. Re Iran, PM said relations were very good and improving daily. Poor relations of past were due mainly to mutual lack of knowledge. Today there was no political problem, only technical one on distribution Helmand waters. 18. Re Communist China, PM said after some prodding that relations remained "correct." Projects under loan proceeding satisfactorily. He added with smile we should really ask our Pak friends about this, since they were very close to Chinese. 19. On Middle East, PM said he shared Harriman's gratification that UN resolution adopted unanimously by SC./5/ PM also characterized King Hussein as "wise and courageous." On Cyprus, Governor and PM agreed situation tragic, Greece and Turkey must eventually get over emotional approach to problem. /5/Reference is to UN Resolution 242 passed by the Security Council on November 22, 1967. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 616-617. 20. On Vietnam, Harriman stressed President Johnson's desire for peace negotiations, shared by almost all countries including USSR. Hanoi misjudging attitude of American people and determination see matter through. PM expressed thanks for this and previous expositions US position. Said Geneva agreements were obvious basis for solution. 21. Governor expressed appreciation for PM's frankness and obvious readiness face realities. PM made clear throughout conversation his appreciation for visit by delegation./6/ /6/On December 9 Ambassador Neumann called on the Prime Minister to expand on Harriman's November 25 conversation. He stressed the importance of self-help meas- ures by Afghanistan and explained the restrictions imposed by Congress on the availability of total resources. (Telegram 4266 from Kabul, December 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 AFG) Neumann
546. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/ Kabul, February 21, 1968, 1130Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15-8 AFG. Confidential; Priority. 3185. Subject: PL-480 Title I: RGA Proposal of 8/30/67. 1. We are concerned about consequences further delay authority negotiate new Title I agreement PL-480. If unable proceed by March 1 at latest, anticipate deterioration prospects solution troublesome economic matters outstanding between USG and RGA, with consequent unfavorable effects RGA self-help efforts. 2. Would remind Dept RGA request has been pending with USG almost six months. Washington approval negotiation appeared imminent last December and again mid-January. Deliveries wheat Kabul can hardly now be made current crop year. This however, is less significant than role of new agreement in total American aid package for Afghanistan and hoped-for impact of latter on Afghan economic policies. In light other developments affecting US assistance Afghanistan, if we appear hesitate further on PL-480, RGA will surely begin wonder whether basic change American policy toward Afghanistan has occurred. 3. RGA has recently completed economic negotiations with Soviets which in Afghan eyes appear have been in many respect less troublesome than negotiations with US--particularly re commodity assistance. However, our main concern lies in other areas. 4. RGA at last appears ready move on long-term solution vexatious trust fund problem. We can hardly imagine RGA going through with this, however, until we have made firm offer on PL-480. 5. Deadlines for RGA budget decisions FY beginning March 22 are rapidly approaching. We understand RGA plans to include trust fund payments in budget from now on. Early assurance on PL-480 will be essential to assure such item included in budget. Moreover, anticipated proceeds proposed PL-480 agreement will play important role in determining magnitude next development budget. Loss of confidence our intentions could lead to serious cutback overall level RGA development spending, at time when economy in doldrums, and could even lead to cuts in RGA's top-priority agricultural production program. 6. We therefore urge prompt authorization negotiate. Blood
547. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Zwick) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 27, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63-4/68. Secret. SUBJECT Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate an $8.2 million P.L. 480 agreement with Afghanistan (Tab A)./2/ The agreement would provide 90,000 tons of wheat and 6,000 tons of vegetable oil on 40-year dollar credit terms, with a 10-year grace period. To help the U.S. balance of payments, it would require that the first $750,000 be paid over 10 months beginning on June 30. /2/Tab A, not printed, is a March 6 memorandum from Freeman and Gaud to the President. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 69, March 25-31, 1968) The amount of wheat proposed for this agreement is quite generous in view of Afghanistan's recent good crop. However, I feel that it is warranted by our desire to move wheat and by the additional self-help leverage which we can get from a larger P.L. 480 program. This agreement would bring to $12.5 million the amount of food aid provided in FY 1968. Our dollar aid is limited to technical assistance and is estimated at $7.5 million this fiscal year. Self-help. Afghanistan has taken a number of important steps to increase agricultural production, with a view to self-sufficiency in wheat and edible oil by the early 1970's. The last P.L. 480 agreement, signed in July, contained general self-help conditions designed to reinforce the Government's commitment to that goal. This agreement would require additional specific and sound measures, in particular (a) the establishment of a wheat price high enough to provide incentives to farmers, and (b) improvement of fertilizer distribution by turning it over to the private sector. Military Expenditures. Afghanistan's military supply situation presents a particularly thorny problem. Although about half of its military hardware was provided under contracts concluded prior to 1961, the country's defense establishment is out of all proportion to its economic situation or any realistic appraisal of the current threat. Almost all of Afghanistan's military equipment has been supplied by the Soviets. The current inventory includes an estimated 335 tanks, 55 or more surface-to-air missiles, 250 anti-tank missiles, and 96 MIG fighters. (A background paper on military expenditures is attached at Tab B.)/3/ /3/The attachment, entitled "Review of Proposed PL 480 Agreement with Afghanistan per Section 620 (S) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as Amended," undated, is not printed. In spite of this situation Gaud feels, and I agree, that a close reading of the Symington amendment/4/ does not require you to make a finding that Afghan resources are being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with economic development. The rationale for this approach is essentially two-fold: /4/The Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, adopted November 14, 1967 (P.L. 90-137; 81 Stat. 445), directed the President to terminate development loans and P.L. 480 assistance to nations that diverted such assistance to military expenditures or diverted their own resources to "unnecessary" military expenditures "to a degree which materially interferes" with their own development. --Since three-fourths of the equipment is provided on a grant basis, actual expenditures amount to only about 20% of the budget and are not out of line with neighboring India and Pakistan. --These expenditures in themselves probably do not unduly interfere with development. Lack of technical skills and workable institutions constitute a more serious bottleneck to Afghan development. There are also two strong practical reasons for not invoking the Symington amendment now: --Our aid program in Afghanistan helps to counterbalance a much larger Soviet presence. In 1963, King Zahir embarked upon an experiment in parliamentary democracy which probably would not have been possible without our influence and support. --In Afghanistan as elsewhere, the Symington and Conte/Long amendments/5/ can be quite useful for purposes of persuasion, but they lose their utility once they are applied. Our relatively small aid program may not enable us to convince the Afghans to reduce their future defense expenditures in any event, but to precipitately cut off all U.S. assistance clearly would not achieve this objective. /5/The Conte-Long Amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968, adopted January 2, 1968 (P.L. 90-249; 81 Stat. 936), directed the President to withhold an equivalent amount of economic assistance from any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea, that used its own resources to purchase sophisticated weaponry. On the other hand, I do not think we can simply conduct business as usual in the face of this problem. There is a reasonable chance that the U.S., by building on the dialogue which Ambassador Neumann has begun, can induce some restraint in the Afghan military budget. Moreover, if we ignore the spirit of the Symington amendment in Afghanistan, we lay ourselves open to charges on the Hill that we are not serious about its application and will not put any teeth into our policy anywhere in the world. On balance, I recommend that we go ahead with this proposed P.L. 480 agreement, but that in negotiating it the State Department be instructed to make a vigorous effort, both here and through Ambassador Neumann in Afghanistan, to get across to the Afghans the following points, agreed to by Bill Gaud and Luke Battle: --While we recognize that it is difficult for one country to pass judgment on the national security problems and military structure of another, it is our best judgment that Afghanistan's present military structure and expenditures need serious reexamination in the light of the present military threat and what we all know to be the country's economic needs. --U.S. law now requires that we take future developments on this front fully into account in thinking about any further P.L. 480 assistance or dollar loans or continuation of our technical assistance program. --We strongly urge Afghanistan to seek ways to reduce the burden of military expenditures upon its economy. The Afghan Government should know that, under present circumstances, increases in the defense budget or new contracts for additional military equipment will make it extremely difficult for us to provide assistance in the future. Charles J. Zwick Approve P.L. 480 sale; instruct Ambassador and State
Department to take strong line with RGA /6/This option is checked and next to it a typewritten note reads: "N.B.: The Disapprove decision was made on March 29, 1968. On April 23, 1968 the President reversed his decision and agreed."
548. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 22, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63-4/68. Secret. Mr. President: We have had a serious failure in communicating your decision on the attached PL 480 package for Afghanistan. As the note indicates, Miss Nivens telephoned, as is usual, your decision to the staff member working the area, Roger Morris, who was acting in Ed Hamilton's absence. He heard her relay of your decision as "approved" rather than "disapproved." He communicated the decision, as is usual, to State which notified our man in Kabul. We discovered the mistake a few days later and flashed Kabul (Tab C)/2/ but it was too late to catch our Ambassador before he had (1) delivered the lecture on military spending (reporting cable at Tab D),/3/ and (2) delivered the news that we were ready to go ahead with the PL 480 deal (Tab E)./4/ /2/Not printed; telegram 148514 to Kabul, April 17. /3/Not printed; telegram 3775 from Kabul, March 30. /4/Not printed; telegram 4072 from Kabul, April 18. Thus, due to our error, I am afraid there will be some broken crockery if we back out now. We have two choices: --The President can withdraw our offer to make this agreement on the grounds that the Symington Amendment is not being complied with: --or we can accept the consequences of our error and let the PL 480 package go through. As you can see from the cable at Tab D, our Ambassador believes that his lecture on military spending has begun a serious rethinking of the Afghan military budget. He would certainly argue that cutting off the food aid now would be self-defeating. It would also cast doubt on our $8.2 million AID program in Afghanistan, since the Symington Amendment leaves the President no leeway once he decides that aid should be terminated because a country is spending too much on defense. To assure that this will not happen again, I have made arrangements that all decisions will be communicated twice: to the relevant member of my staff; and to the Secretariat at the Department of State. Walt Proceed to withdraw offer on Symington Amendment grounds /5/This option is checked; Johnson added a handwritten note, "No choice." [end of document]
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