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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
32. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ I-36036/67 Washington, October 13, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, 381 Malaysia, 1967. Top Secret. Drafted by Nuechterlein on October 12. SUBJECT On 10 October 1967 the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, called on the Secretary of Defense/2/ and presented him with a paper entitled "Memorandum on the Defence of Malaysia" (copy enclosed). This document has also been given to the Secretary of State. Mr. Hasluck stated that Prime Minister Holt wished to make a statement in Parliament during the next four to eight weeks on his government's intentions regarding Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore, following the British withdrawal. Prime Minister Holt desires to know, before making this statement, to what extent the United States would be prepared to support Australia if it decides to retain its military presence in this area after the British depart. /2/See Document 30. In order that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense may be in a position to respond to the Australian Government's request for consultations on this matter, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the Secretary of Defense with their views and recommendations concerning strategic/military implications of the Australian Foreign Minister's memorandum. In formulating these recommendations, it is requested that attention be given to the following additional questions: 1. What is the strategic importance of the Malacca Strait area to the United States? 2. What are the principal advantages and disadvantages, from a military point of view, of the U.S. encouraging Australia and New Zealand to assume primary responsibility for the security of Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdraw? 3. To what extent could the U.S. military services make use of military facilities in Singapore and Malaysia, if these facilities were under Australian/New Zealand control, following the British withdrawal, and if it were determined to be in the U.S. interest to make use of such facilities? In view of the Australian Minister's request to the Secretary that this matter be "closely held", it is requested that special care be taken to restrict dissemination of the enclosed memorandum. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are desired by 6 November 1967. Paul C. Warnke/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Warnke signed the original.
Attachment Memorandum on the Defence of Malaysia by the Australian Minister for External Affairs Washington, October 9, 1967. A Regional security needs to be a total security stretching from Korea to the Indian Ocean. Hitherto the United States' guarantees have formed a line as far as Thailand and the British have guaranteed the security of Malaysia and Singapore. The new situation with which we have to deal has two different timetables: (a) Before and after the total British withdrawal in the mid-seventies. (b) Before and after the end of hostilities in Vietnam. We do not know whether these two timetables will coincide or whether we have to make suppositions about further variations on them. Broadly, we can talk of the "short-term" problem and the "long-term" problem in Malaysia and Singapore but these phrases at present can mean little more than "in the next few years" (say four, five or six) and "afterwards". B In the short-term the military need in Malaysia and Singapore may not be great and no immediate threat from outside (except possibly insurgency from the Communist remnant in southern Thailand) can be seen. But the argument for a continuing Australian presence in Malaysia is strong. (a) Malaysia and Singapore expect something from us. (b) Morale, both in these countries and surrounding countries, needs to be maintained. (c) A continuing presence may assist the effective development of self-defence capacity by Malaysia and Singapore. (d) Once we went out we would probably be out for good and it would certainly be harder to get back in the event of an emergency. C In the long-term the general case for maintaining a presence in Malaysia is the same as the case for maintaining a guaranteed security in other parts of the region and the one cannot be separated from the other. It would be hard for us to stay in Malaysia as the only white-faced troops on the mainland and it would be equally hard for the United States to stay in other parts of Asia, even though the need existed, if we had pulled out of Malaysia. The decisions both our governments make on any phase of regional security are intertwined. At this stage we seek consultation. We need understanding rather than commitments but, without these necessary understandings at this stage, difficulties could arise. D Among the questions we raise for discussion are the following: 1. Australia believes it is important for us to stay in Malaysia, but we certainly are unable to take over British responsibility or to replace Britain. We can only develop our own role (side by side, we hope, with New Zealand) up to the limits of our capacity, having regard to other commitments. What is to be that role? Does the United States agree that we should develop such a role? 2. Australia has already decided and announced a decision to give defence aid of $20 million (Australian) to encourage the development of Malaysian and Singapore defence over the next three years ($16 million to Malaysia and $4 million to Singapore). What else will be available (e.g. from Britain) either for economic assistance or for defence? 3. Australia has not yet made a final decision on its own military presence but the scale of this support will probably be of the same order as the present forces (a battalion, plus an A/A battery, plus some aircraft and a naval presence). New Zealand also has not made a decision but the indications are that their battalion, which has already been drawn upon for the Vietnam contingent, may be further reduced. In the short-term is this sufficient? 4. In the event of the need for any build-up of forces or movement and supply of larger numbers of forces, problems of logistic support may arise. Hitherto there has been some dependence on the British. Will there be a need for other logistic support? 5. In the event of hostilities or (in prospect of an increased threat) in the event of building up and movement of forces to meet such a threat, the question of the ANZUS commitment will arise. It has been our tacit understanding that Australia should not place herself in positions in which the ANZUS commitment might be involved without consulting the United States and that the United States will indicate its own views of how the commitment applies. Do we need to have further understandings about the ANZUS commitment if Australia and New Zealand stay in Malaysia? Both of our countries have political difficulties to face. When the Australian Prime Minister announced an intention to stay in Malaysia he would be likely to meet questions about the position under ANZUS. On the other hand, at the present juncture, there would be difficulties for the United States Administration in Congress if it were to declare another commitment overseas. Can we consult on finding a suitable formula to express our understanding? The Australian Government would want to be able to reassure Parliament that in entering into commitments we had full understanding from the United States Government. 6. The Malaysians and the Singaporeans may seek some assurance or guarantees from us or set conditions on our continued presence in their territory. Our presence there now is only covered by a letter from the Australian Government associating itself with the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. (This will give a legal basis to our presence there until about 1970.) At present, with most of our own forces engaged in Vietnam, it would be hard for Australia to give any assurances or guarantees that relied for performance on our own resources. 7. In any arrangement made with Malaysia and Singapore for retaining our forces there we would certainly hope to be able to commit the same forces to SEATO plans in Thailand without forfeiting the right to return. 8. The matters mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 have been brought under notice at this stage because they may be raised in the five-power (or four-power) talks the Tunku has proposed to the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. The Australian Government is still examining questions that will arise if any proposal is made for a defence agreement with us, but one consideration that weighs with us is that, at this stage, while we want to stay in Malaysia we should keep open our options for the future. Has the United States any comments to make on such a subject? 9. In all matters relating to defence aid to Malaysia we have the current diplomatic problem of handling Indonesia. We want to maintain good relations; we do not want to alarm them or give an impression that we are arming Malaysia against them; and we hope that they would see any decision as a necessary part of the answer to Chinese expansion. We would also wish to build a road towards future co-operation with Indonesia for mutual security, even though the realisation of that hope may at present seem remote. If our hopes that Indonesia will follow peaceful courses are not realised we need to have some defensive or deterrent capacity. In summary we want: (a) As much British defence effort in the East as can be contrived--but we are not optimistic. (b) Effective Malaysian and Singaporean self-defence, as early as possible. This [portion of text missing] Malaysia and Singapore. Our confidence is qualified by many doubts. (c) To maintain the credibility of SEATO (i) to reassure Thailand; (d) To keep ANZUS alive as the principal guarantee of Australia's own security.
(e) The closest possible understanding with U.S.A. on all matters affecting a continued American interest and presence in the region.
(a) More details about British intentions, plans and capacity in respect of (i) the run down in Malaysia and Singapore; (b) More specific information about Malaysian and Singapore proposals in respect of (i) the relationships to each other; (c) Further indications of American thinking both in the period before the ending of hostilities in Vietnam and after the ending of hostilities, recognising of course that what happens after that point of time depends on the way in which hostilities end. Throughout all these discussions there arises the question of the timing of successive moves.
33. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-614-67 Washington, November 8, 1967. 1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467, Malaysia 381, 1967. Top Secret. A stamped note on the source text indicates that McNamara's Special Assistant saw this memorandum. SUBJECT 1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-36036/67, dated 13 October 1967,/2/ which requested the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the strategic/military implications of a memorandum furnished to you by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, dated 10 October 1967./3/ In formulating their recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also gave attention to the additional questions posed in the reference. /2/Document 32. /3/See the enclosure to Document 32. 2. (TS) The strategic importance of the Malacca Strait area derives from its controlling position with respect to passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and its proximity to the western approaches to Southeast Asia through Thailand. Freedom to transit the Malacca and Sunda Straits, both of which can be controlled effectively from the Malaysian/Singapore area, is axiomatic in principle and necessary in practice. Continuation of the present high volume of military and commercial transits would require circumnavigation of the Indonesian Archipelago if control of the Straits areas were denied the United States or its allies. Such a detour of over 2,000 miles would be comparable to placing an additional ocean, the size of the Atlantic, in the path of seaborne traffic. 3. (TS) The US strategic/military interests would be adversely affected if Australia, following the United Kingdom withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore, decided not to maintain a military presence in those countries. The United States should: a. Support a continuing Australian/New Zealand presence in Malaysia and Singapore now and following the announced British withdrawal from the area and encourage Australia to develop a leading role in the area. b. Support Australian and New Zealand participation in a regional security arrangement. c. Reassure Australia that the terms of the ANZUS Treaty apply to Australian/New Zealand Armed Forces, public vessels, and aircraft in Malaysia/Singapore. d. Continue to encourage the United Kingdom to retain some military forces in the Malaysia/Singapore area. e. Not assume any of the current UK treaty commitments to Malaysia and Singapore, and avoid stationing US forces in Malaysia and Singapore. 4. (U) A detailed consideration of questions raised in the memorandum by the Australian Minister for External Affairs is contained in Appendix A./4/ Answers to the additional questions contained in the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) are in Appendix B. /4/Neither appendix is printed. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 34. Notes on Conversation Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Holyoake/1/ Canberra, December 21, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 253. No classification marking. The notes were taken by Rostow. Notes on Conversation with Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand 9:30 a.m., Thursday, December 21, 1967, Canberra, Australia 1. Holyoake suggested (I think) that he would put a New Zealand frigate to work with our naval forces in Viet-nam./2/ /2/When Holyoake's Cabinet learned of the "promise of a frigate" it took exception. Holyoake explained that he "did not 'promise' a frigate, but only mentioned it as the kind of assistance that New Zealand might be able to give, in lieu of more troops." Rostow informed Johnson that he suspected that Holyoake "got out ahead of his Cabinet colleagues" and was now playing the "Cabinet game of 'first among equals.'" Rostow stated "I think we can count on the frigate after Holyoake has taken care of his housekeeping." (Telegram CAP 671217 from Rostow to Johnson, December 28; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5 D (3) Allies: Troop Commitments; Other Aid) 2. His major concern was whether the President intended to widen the war. Specifically, he asked about Haiphong. The President answered that he had no intention to mine Haiphong. He wished to keep the war from getting wider. Equally, he was against our pulling out. The only option was to keep pressure on roughly within recent limits. With respect to Cambodia, President said this was a serious problem; was hopeful ICC could do more if helicopters were accepted. Holyoake expressed himself strongly against hot pursuit, saying there was problem as to how far you go. If you penetrate shallowly, they set up camps further back. You are led on and on. There was a little byplay about New Zealand exports, with Holyoake pointing out that U.S. exports are only 3% of GNP whereas New Zealand's were 25% of GNP. But Holyoake did not press the matter hard.
35. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Canberra, December 21, 1967, 11:13 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Australia and Round the World Trip, December 1967. Secret. Although there is no drafting information on the source text, a letter from William Bundy to Clark, December 30, indicates that this account was prepared by Rostow. (Ibid.) Meeting of the President With the Australian Cabinet 11:13 a.m., December 21, 1967, Cabinet Room, Canberra Prime Minister McEwen opened by saying that he wished that we were meeting under happier circumstances./2/ Nevertheless, he, the rest of the Cabinet, and all the Australian people were profoundly grateful to the President for taking this arduous journey on this occasion. It was an act of true greatness on the part of the President. He was likewise grateful to the British Prime Minister and others who had come. /2/On December 17 Prime Minister Harold Holt disappeared while swimming in the heavy surf at Portsea, Victoria. He was presumed drowned. President Johnson represented the United States at the memorial service in Melbourne on December 22. Prince Charles, accompanied by Prime Minister Wilson and Leader of the Opposition Heath, attended for Queen Elizabeth. Other foreign leaders attending were Presidents Marcos, Thieu, and Park, Prime Ministers Holyoake, Thanom, and Lee, and Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abzul Razak of Malaysia. The presence of the President, the Prime Minister and others was an indication that Harold Holt had made his mark on the world. He wished to note that the President's message to Mrs. Holt and the family had comforted them greatly. Harold Holt was a warmhearted, generous man. He was seen by his own countrymen as a "typical Australian." There was no higher praise. His country had been proud of him. He dealt around the world with other heads of government as his peers and was accepted as such. There was more than mutural regard here. He demonstrated that, although he was a leader of a small country, he and that country were being taken to people's hearts. Moreover, he took firm positions on the great issues of his time. Be in no doubt whatsoever: the new government will carry forward the policies that Harold Holt had initiated. They will stand with the U.S. in Vietnam right through to the end. They do not seek a crushing victory over the North Vietnamese or the VC, but we have set out to frustrate an effort to enslave a nation. We shall make sure that nation can stand on its own feet. That is the Australian attitude and policy from which they shall not be deflected. Australia shall continue to pursue the development of understanding relations with all these Asian countries. We are learning to trust them. They are learning to trust us. Thus Australia will continue to play its part along with the U.S. in the great constructive task of building a new Asia. President Johnson. The President thanked the Prime Minister for the beauty, generosity, and eloquence of his expression. He said it meant a great deal. It was a privilege to sit at this table again. He was here in Australia because he wanted to be here; and he simply could not be anywhere else. A representative of the television network asked him a few days before what drew the President to Harold Holt. He answered: He was drawn to him because he was an Australian--a man of character and tenacity, generosity and toughness, and a man of brotherly love. Out of his whole experience with Australians, he must assume that there are bad Australians, but he had never met one. With Australians you never need develop a crick in your neck to see if they are behind you. They are either beside you or out in front of you. They crease their hat a little differently and have a slightly different accent, but I regard them as my people. Now the Australians are showing courage in taking sacrifice to prevent a little, independent country from being gobbled up. The Australian effort in Vietnam has our admiration and gratitude. The Australians show stability in the face of a great challenge--a great confrontation. Even before be met Harold Holt, an Australian had represented him at Commonwealth meeting--Sir Robert Menzies. Before he went to one of these meetings, Menzies had asked what could I say on your behalf. I outlined our views. In fact, he went even further in defending our position than I had suggested. There really is a special quality to the U.S.-Australian relationship. We do feel instinctively the same way about problems. It is reflected in the attitude of our boys in Vietnam. When they are asked where they wish to go for rest and rehabilitation, Australia emerges universally as their first preference. That was the way it was as the President himself knew during Second World War. Our economic interests occasionally conflict. But we mange to stay reasonably close together in these matters on a live and let live basis. His last memory of Harold Holt was of Holt stretched out in the sun at Camp David, after taking a swim, calling back to his colleagues charged with economic affairs in Canberra to work out amicably some difficult problems. I know where you are this morning. Four years ago we faced this kind of moment when President Kennedy was killed. Permit me to say this: Now is the time for you to live together and work together by the Golden Rule. Don't shoot from the hip. Don't divide up the family firm. I kept the Kennedy cabinet. None has been fired. Many have stayed right down to the present. In adversity a family gets together. That is why I am here. I remember well that I once called at the hospital to see my father who was then under an oxygen tent. He said, get me my britches, I am going home. When we argued against him, he said. "I want to be home where they know when you are sick and care when you die." That is the way it is between us. In these days ahead you will find the U.S. will stretch a little in the face of Australian problems to make it easier for you. I remember when Harold Holt said be would go "all the way with LBJ." I could see that was a slogan which might get him into political trouble--it might be misunderstood or even a disaster for him. Harold simply shrugged. I tried then to interpret it as meaning that the U.S. would go all the way with Australia. Australia is one of the principal reasons that we have committed our power so fully in this part of the world. The U.S. could probably survive even if Southeast Asia were lost to the Communists. Perhaps the others there might not be wholly necessary for U.S security interests. But, if we are going to keep our ANZUS commitments, we must keep our alliances with others. We have taken a hundred thousand casualties in South Vietnam, including the wounded. Hundreds of dead, thousands of wounded every month. But I am convinced in the long run this is the lesser cost. We would face a bigger war. It is better to stop this aggression at the takeoff than at the landing. The purpose of an alliance is to make sure that if dictators start going after small countries, they will face the U.S. That is the kind of commitment we have to New Zealand and Australia, the Middle East and Europe and Latin America. Whether these commitments are right or wrong, we have them. I intend to honor them. With this kind of burden, it is good to find someone to stand up beside you. I want to thank you for your help in Vietnam. I want to thank you for your sturdy position in the face of British devaluation and your assistance in defending the dollar. The protection of our international monetary system, which is based on the dollar, is a serious matter, but somehow we shall cope with it. I shall be recommending measures next week which I almost shudder to mention here. But the speculator shall not prevail. I want to thank you also for what Australia is doing for our boys; taking them into your homes; treating them like your own. This is what you did also when I was here in the Second World War. Whatever you do in sorting out your domestic politics--in whatever manner the people exercise their judgment, don't let it mix with foreign policy. Remember also that we in the U.S. are stretching out our hand in this period, not in a paternalistic way, but to be worthy of your friendship. We know that to have a friend one must be a friend. We have been well served in this respect by Amb. Waller who was good enough to join us. It you have problems, let him know; he has the key to the front door and the back door of the White House. As for Ed and Ann Clark, I have been worried that he was going to run for political office--in Australia. He has been the best Australian Ambassador to the U.S. I have ever known--the most effective man in expressing Australian views and interests. There are sad hours. I know that in being here I am doing what is right. I have come to pay my respects to a fallen friend. And, when the services are over, we will be able to raise our chins a bit higher knowing that no one can come between us. The Prime Minister replied, whatever shake out there may be in the government, the President can be assured that there will be no change in the Australian attitude and policy towards the U.S. or in its foreign policy. The President should know that Australians are proud to be your friend and ally. The President then reviewed the troop situation; the recent accelerated delivery of 10,000 men and 600 tons in 18 days. We shall have 102 of our 106 combat battalions in place by Christmas, others will come in the spring. We look forward to an extra division from Korea; an extra 10,000 from Thailand; the extra 65,000 from South Vietnam which will soon be debated in the Assembly. The enemy is building his forces in the South. We must try very hard to be ready. We may face dark days ahead. The Prime Minister responded that they face a new situation in the light of the U.K. withdrawal and will sustain forces in Malaysia. The President said that we will be responding to their thoughts on the problem of security in that area, but we are counting on their keeping their present forces in place. President went on to thank Australia for providing evidence to the Cambodians of Communist use of Cambodian soil. The pressure on us from that use may be more than we can put up with; although we agree with Hasluck that we must be cautious in this matter. But it is hard to see the troops forming up to re-attack; although we wish to keep the war from widening. We hope that Sihanouk will see the light. He didn't denounce us after we presented the evidence. Perhaps there is some room for diplomacy here. But we must constantly bear in mind that 2 more divisions from the North are coming down into South Vietnam. We must take this into account in our plans and in our thoughts. Foreign Minister Hasluck said that the Australian policy with respect to Sihanouk was to remain quiet. Pay no attention to the unpleasant noises he might make. We were pleased to pass on information on your behalf, but thought it the part of wisdom for Australians not to be associated with it.
36. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Canberra, April 6, 1968, 1200Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUSTL-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Rostow sent this telegram to the President on April 7 and there is an indication on the source text that the President saw the telegram. (Note from Rostow to Johnson, April 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Australia, Vol. III, Cables, 6/67-1/69. Secto 44. Eyes only for the President from the Secretary. Following are the highlights of an extended talk I had with Prime Minister Gorton, a portion of which was attended by his Deputy Prime Minister McEwan, Foreign Minister Hasluck and Defense Minister Fairhall. 1. Gorton sent you his warm regards and expressed deep sympathy for the tragic burden thrown upon you and upon the United States by the assassination of Martin Luther King. 2. He expressed some question in his mind about whether a visit by him to Washington would be an intrusion upon you following your announcement not to be a candidate./2/ I told him that I thought your announcement should not make any difference, that I knew that you were anxious to have a good talk with him and that I would discuss the matter further with you upon my return. He said that the tentative timing (sometime in the latter part of May) has been complicated somewhat by changes in the plans of Prime Minister Ghandi's visit to Australia. /2/In telegram 144251 to Canberra, April 9, Johnson responded that he hoped that Gorton could visit Washington in May 1968 and that Johnson's recent announcement about his personal plans in no way diminished the need for close consultation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL AUSTL-US) 3. I think our talk smoothed out any ruffled feathers he might have had about whether he was consulted in a timely fashion about your speech of last Sunday./3/ I went into some detail about the decisions you faced about additional troops to Viet-Nam, the call-up of reserves and the need to demonstrate that Hanoi was the obstacle to peace rather than Washington. My impression is that his original irritation was due to (a) the fact that this was his first experience with a change in bombing patterns while it was at least your ninth and that the other chiefs of government have gotten used to the idea; (b) he himself was in New Zealand and was not informed until several hours after he might have been had he been in Canberra; (c) because of transmission procedures our Embassy in Canberra did not have a full official text which it could give the Prime Minister before he began hearing excerpts from it through the press, and (d) his opposition leader Whitlam tried to make the most out of the notion that the United States had adopted Whitlam's policy at the expense of the government. /3/Johnson announced on March 31 that he would not be a candidate for reelection and he was limiting the bombing of North Vietnam. The text of the address is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-1969, Book I, pp. 469-476. 4. Gorton made it clear that he knew that the United States was carrying the overwhelming part of the burden and that Australia's contribution did not give him a license "to throw his weight around." I think we can give special attention to bilateral consultation with the Australians that will remove any remaining shadow on that score. 5. I briefed him privately on the state of play in the Crocodile Series/4/ and he expressed satisfaction. /4/The code name for Harriman's direct peace negotiations with North Vietnam. 6. I raised with him the troop issue and told him that as a minimum Australia and New Zealand should put their heads together and round out their forces with additional support troops to take the place of Americans who were serving the ANZAC forces in a supporting role. Having checked with Sharp and Saigon I specifically mentioned artillery reinforcements and a truck company as examples. I pointed out that it is a serious burden for United States forces to have such a high percentage of its total manpower in Viet-Nam engaged in general logistic support to everyone else's forces. He replied "I have heard what you said" but refused to make any commitment. I had already worked on the Foreign and Defense Ministers on the same point as well as on Keith Holyoake in New Zealand. Gorton thinks he has some political problems about increasing his forces but I pointed out that we all do. We will have to follow up on this further. The less said publicly about asking Australia for more troops the better chance we can get them. 7. I ran into strong reservations about the non-proliferation treaty ranging from basic misgivings about giving up the nuclear option to worries about the fear of limitations on development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes./5/ The general line of questioning was very similar to that we have heard from the Germans. I am taking up with the State Department the possibility of sending an expert technical man out to talk with their Atomic Energy Commission people on a good many points on which we ought to be able to satisfy them. I threw the book at them on the prospects in the event proliferation and pointed out that if Australia ever had to live next door to a nuclear armed Indonesia they would curse the day they refused to give up the nuclear option. There are elements in their Atomic Energy Commission and in their military who are raising the principal problems. Hasluck clearly thinks Australia should sign but my guess is that it will take some time before Australia gets around to that point. /5/Reported on more fully in Secto 43 from Canberra, April 6. (Department of State, S/S-Conference Files: Lot 68 D 182, CF 275) 8. The Australians are much preoccupied by the longer range results of the British withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Now that Harold Wilson has achieved his basic purpose of getting his own "little Englanders" to stand still for his far-reaching domestic economic measures, the Australians believe that we ought to press Wilson to back away from his announcement of withdrawal and think hard about further delays and a more significant presence than originally contemplated. I will follow up on this on my return. 9. I found Gorton helpful, friendly and staunch as reflected in Australia's participation in the three conferences we held in New Zealand. But Gorton is a new Prime Minister, with a reputation as a lone wolf in political circles, and apparently inclined to reach snap judgments and personal conclusions before he has considered the full advice of his more experienced colleagues and his departments. He will take a bit of handling but sees the general situation in the Pacific and Australian national interests pretty much as did Holt. I will have available a more detailed account of my talk with Gorton upon my return. Rusk
37. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 25, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Australia, Visit of Prime Minister Gorton, May 27-28, 1968. Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum. SUBJECT Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk and the briefing book on this visit./2/ /2/Rusk's May 24 memorandum to the President is ibid., and the Department of State copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 AUSTL. The briefing book was attached to a May 2 memorandum from Read to Rostow, ibid. I passed on to Ambassador Waller your hope that Gorton would attend the Rusk luncheon, and your intention to find a way to give the visit a tone of particular cordiality. As the schedule has shaped up, it may be rather difficult to do this. Your second meeting with Gorton is taking place at 11:30 a.m. on Tuesday. It cannot be a long visit because Gorton is due at the National Press Club at 12:15. You may have your own plan for giving the visit a public note of unusual cordiality, but if you want suggestions I have three, in ascending order of effectiveness. 1. You could "spontaneously" accompany Gorton to the luncheon at the State Department following your first meeting with him on Monday. This is not a public luncheon but your departure from the schedule would become known and attract some public comment. 2. You could "spontaneously" accompany Gorton to his speech at the National Press Club on Tuesday, introducing him with some warm words. This would, of course, get heavy press coverage. 3. If you go through with your tentative plans to go to the Ranch on Wednesday, you could have Gorton as a weekend guest. As it now stands, Gorton is due to start back to Australia on Friday afternoon after a heavy schedule in New York. He could instead fly to the Ranch, spend the weekend with you, and catch an Australian airline flight from San Francisco on Sunday, June 2, at 8:00 p.m. This, of course, would be by far the most effective way of dramatizing your special regard for Australia. Gorton will have three main concerns: 1. Our political situation and its implications for our Asia policy. I suggest you review the situation fully, stressing that the facts do not warrant a conclusion that the U.S. is about to retreat from Asia. 2. The situation in Vietnam and Paris. He will expect a full exchange and has been very sensitive in the past about the need for full and prior consultation before we take any new departures. He will want to hear your thoughts about what to do if the talks continue to be unproductive, and your plans in regard to the bombing pause under the various contingencies. Gorton has publicly ruled out any increases in Australian forces in Vietnam, barring some major change in the situation. (The Australians have about 8,000 men--three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, one bomber squadron, two helicopter squadrons and a tank squadron.) 3. UK withdrawal from Malaysia-Singapore. Gorton seems to be backing away from the earlier Australian plan to maintain a force in Malaysia after the British withdrawal in 1971. He has talked publicly about the possibility of a "Fortress Australia" approach. He may press hard on the idea that Australia cannot undertake commitments in the Malaysia-Singapore area without a firm guarantee of U.S. support and protection under the ANZUS Treaty. I suggest you adhere to our previous line that: --we think a continued Australian military presence would be a valuable stabilizing factor; --we realize questions about the application of ANZUS might arise in connection with such deployments; --we would like to stay in close consultation about the matter; --but we cannot give a blanket guarantee. You should be aware that this whole problem may come to a head at the Five-Power Commonwealth meeting (UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore) scheduled for Kuala Lumpur in June. All of the above points are covered well and in more detail in Secretary Rusk's memo to you. You might discuss with Gorton your plans for announcing an Ambassador to Australia. A particular point of interest: Mrs. Gorton was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts; grew up in Bangor, Maine; and still retains her American citizenship. She is dual national, also having Australian citizenship. Gorton is a very different kind of fellow from Harold Holt. Rather than ruling by consensus with his Cabinet, Gorton is attempting to dominate his colleagues. He is also attempting to handle foreign and defense affairs directly from the Prime Minister's office, cutting the External Affairs and Defense Ministers out. Thus it is that he is accompanied only by members of his personal staff./3/ /3/The Embassy in Australia prepared an assessment of the Gorton government which concluded that it had internal problems despite its strong public support. Gorton was more likely than the late Prime Minister Holt to view issues narrowly in terms of Australia's self interests. (Telegram 5576 from Canberra, May 13; ibid.; POL 15-1 AUSTL) The Embassy also prepared a list of anticipated topics for the visit. (Telegram 5575, May 13; ibid., POL 7 AUSTL) Walt [Continue with the next documents]
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