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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
80. Memorandum From the Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Far East (Poats) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 22, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, E 11-2 MEKONG. Secret; Exdis. SUBJECT The President made the decision not to participate in financing this project in Cambodia at this time on the basis of a briefing given him in Texas by Walt Rostow, drawing upon State's telegram 72950 of October 25 (copy attached), and Gene Black's message from Djakarta, Embtel 2227 (copy attached)./2/ There was further discussion with Rostow by Bill Gaud and perhaps others with regard to Black's inquiry, but no memo was sent to the White House at that time. State and AID were in process of preparing additional information at the request of Mr. Rostow on behalf of the President on the week-end of November 12-13 when Mr. Rostow cancelled this request and informed us that the President had decided not to go ahead with a U.S. contribution to the project. /2/Both attached, but not printed. A note on the source text indicates that Rusk saw telegram 2227 from Djakarta, November 9. State's message #85330 of November 15 (copy attached)/3/ which recorded this decision was sent to Black on November 15. /3/Attached, but not printed. A note on the source text indicates Rusk saw telegram 85330 to Taipei and Tokyo. The reversal of our earlier consideration of participation in this project resulted from passage of an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act signed October 15, and receipt of information on Cambodian gifts to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese representatives in Phnom Penh. The amendment to the Appropriations Act removed the President's authority to waive, on the basis of his determination of "national interest," the legal prohibition against providing economic assistance to any country which furnishes items of economic assistance to North Vietnam or Cuba. The law now leaves the President no waiver latitude except a finding of "national security" importance to the United States. The two outgoing cables attached explain the rationale for the decision, and, I believe, reflect the considerations presented to the President by Mr. Rostow. Rutherford Poats
81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, November 23, 1966, 8:35 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, E 11-2 MEKONG. Secret. Drafted by Sisco and Barnett; cleared with Poats and Walter M. Kotschnig, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs; and approved by Sisco. 90619. For Ambassador Goldberg from Sisco. I know from your telephone call the other day that you are concerned about the fact that we can not now commit ourselves to financial support of the Prek Thnot Dam in Cambodia. While our AID people have been in regular contact with Goldschmidt, this matter is of such importance that it has undoubtedly come to the attention of the SYG and he will expect the fullest kind of explanation. We believe, therefore, that rather than to wait for his inquiry you should take the initiative at the earliest appropriate moment to explain our position in perspective and in context. For your background you should draw upon Deptel 72950 of October 25 and Deptel 85330 of November 15./2/ We can send you an appropriate officer if you feel you want added details. /2/See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 80. Apart from desirable approach to the SYG, there is also the fact that SYG has called an informal meeting on the Prek Thnot project on November 25 the purpose being to provide governments interested in assisting Cambodia with information concerning the project and to address to these governments an appeal for cooperation and the necessary financing. In view of the fact that we will not be able to make any financial commitment, I would suggest that the Mission be represented at this meeting by Clarence Blau. This is not going to be a pledging session but rather discussion of the status of the Prek Thnot project and the question of financial support. If asked, suggest Blau should confine his comment on US inability to finance Prek Thnot to simple statement that legal and administrative complications exist at present time. Following is pertinent information additional to that which is contained in above reftels for use in your private talk with U Thant. When the President following his Baltimore address designated Eugene Black to be his representative on Southeast Asia social and economic development, he requested Black to invite U Thant to offer views as to how best to proceed with his responsibilities. At that time U Thant advised Black to avoid if possible advocacy of schemes that would have the appearance of American initiatives but rather to build upon the work of ECAFE and in particular progress already made by early 1965 in implementing a Mekong Valley development program and in creating an Asian Development Bank. At the last session of the ECAFE plenary, it was decided that 1966 should be Cambodia Year for the Mekong Coordinating Committee. We consider it important that you impress upon U Thant: (1) continued United States interest in the Mekong Coordinating Committee's activities; (2) our desire to see that Committee succeed in working out projects from which all the riparian countries, including Cambodia, can benefit; (3) the continued readiness of the United States to give sympathetic consideration to making financial contributions to sound projects agreed upon by the Committee. Having made these points clear, U Thant should be taken fully into our confidence as to why we are unable to make a commitment to assist in financing Prek Thnot at this time. U Thant should know that in August 1966 we did, in fact, state confidentially that under certain conditions we would contribute some $5 million to support the Prek Thnot project in Cambodia. We cannot carry out that commitment now because the United States Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act for 1967 with a provision that imposes upon the President the obligation to find that considerations of national security exist as justification for extending assistance to any country which furnishes items of economic or military assistance to North Viet Nam. We must consider that the question of such assistance applies to the Viet-Cong as well as North Viet Nam. Cambodia is a source of supply for the Viet-Cong and has made token gifts to the NLF and to NVN in April and earlier. We do not believe that it would be consistent with the purposes sought by Cambodia, the United Nations, and the United States through the operations of the Mekong Coordinating Committee, to make--and publicly defend making--a United States financial contribution to Prek Thnot on grounds that this project in Cambodia served the national security interests of the United States. We have not regarded support of projects in the Mekong Basin as serving cold war or military purposes. New legislation places the United States in a situation where a commitment to finance Prek Thnot would have to be justified to the Congress and to the world at large as motivated by national security considerations. To do so would be contrary to the basic policies the President supports. To do so would, we believe, present the probability that Prince Sihanouk would reject our assistance and cause him to abandon interest in the project itself. We hope that our decision not to assist in financing Prek Thnot at this time will not deter the Japanese Government, the United Nations and other potential donors from mobilizing the required resources. Rusk
82. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SAT/MC-10 Tokyo, December 6, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, E 11-2 MEKONG. Secret. Drafted by Zurhellen and approved in S on December 22. The meeting took place at the Japanese Prime Minister's official residence. PARTICIPANTS Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister Takeo Miki, Foreign Minister Dean Rusk, Secretary of State SUBJECT The Secretary said that he had talked with Foreign Minister Miki about Cambodia and would welcome any help that the Government of Japan could give in restoring friendly relations between the U.S. and Cambodia. Prime Minister Sato said that a problem concerning Cambodia was the Mekong River aid program, of which Prek Thnot was the immediate problem. He understood that a total of 33 million dollars was required. One-third of this would be paid by Cambodia, leaving a total of 22 million dollars in foreign currency to be raised. He understood that U.S. law had changed and that U.S. help was therefore impossible. Mr. Black had proposed that Japan pay one-half of all of the foreign currency needed. This might seem like a small problem from the point of view of the U.S., but it was a difficult one for Japan. Japan needed U.S. help to get the Mekong Conference on the tracks. The Secretary said we were puzzled as to how to proceed. The congressional action had been against the wishes of the President and the Secretary of State. This problem was definitely linked to Vietnam. The U.S. would like to see it go forward, if the other governments and international institutions concerned could do so. It is possible that there will be developments later on in Vietnam which will open the door again for the U.S., but the Secretary could not hope at this time for Congress to change its mind. We would nevertheless like to see Cambodia kept in the plan. If Japan could find some way to adjust on this matter, we might find some way to adjust somewhere else. Prime Minister Sato said that what he had wanted to say was that the matter might go forward with Japan paying one-half and the United States using its good offices to get contributions for the other half from countries such as France and Australia. The Secretary said that we should keep in close touch on this matter.
83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 9, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, SEA Development Program, Vol. II, 1966. Secret. SUBJECT You have agreed to see Eugene Black on Saturday, December 10, at 11:30 a.m. He wishes to report to you on his second trip to Asia as your representative to discuss social and economic development and regional cooperation./2/ /2/The President saw Black from 11:59 a.m. to 12:55 p.m. on December 10. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of the meeting has been found. Black's written report to the President, December 9, is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, SEA Development Program, Vol. II, 1966. He will also tell you of a long conversation with Nasser. Black went to Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Manila and Japan, where he participated with Henry Fowler in inaugurating the governors of the Asian Development Bank. At each stop Black found continuing high interest in multilateral and regional cooperation, plus active exploration of projects that involve a flow of foreign capital in the area and the institutional framework for increasing their regional contacts. Black confirms the great expectations held for the Asian Development Bank. He also encountered Asian views that our help is most effective when we 1. Assist in stabilizing their raw materials prices. 2. Help them gain easier and expanded access to foreign markets. 3. Help them cope with problems created by fluctuations in foreign exchange earning capacity. Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia continue to be highly sensitive to our actions affecting rubber and tin. All resent arrangements which impede the expansion of their textile industries. In reporting to you Black may stress the following: 1. The real possibility of misunderstanding and disappointment if we make too much of the $1 billion offer for Asian economic development. He may suggest instead that we think of the offer as an order of magnitude of our intentions, rather than a firm promise for which we will in future be held accountable. 2. That we seek from Congress in the spring an appropriation of $200 million for special funds for the Asian Development Bank, to be matched equally by Japan and "all others," for grants and soft long-term lending. This "soft window" might establish special funds for agriculture, Mekong projects, and transportation and communications development. 3. The desirability of exercising restraint in GSA stockpile disposals and in applying various controls on imports of Southeast Asian exports. During his trip Black participated in formalizing the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Secretariat at Manila. Black followed your instructions in presenting our position on a contribution to regional education projects, and found the education ministers generally satisfied. Black also had hoped to commit our assistance to the Prek Thnot dam project in Cambodia. As you know, Congressional constraints made this impractical for now. Black then attempted to persuade the Japanese to take the lead in a multinational consortium, and we are still pursuing this. (The latest report from Sect. Rusk suggests the Japanese will take the lead in this matter; but movement is now held up because the Cambodians called off the meeting scheduled for last Saturday.)/3/ /3/December 2. Black fully understands some of our Congressional problems--which I discussed at lunch with him--and has offered to lobby for your regional development objectives. I recommend that you encourage him to do so. Walt
84. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 12, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, E 11-2 MEKONG. Secret. Drafted by Flowerree. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Canada United States Mr. Bundy opened the discussion by re-capitulating the present status of the funding of the Prek Thnot Project. He said that the Japanese had agreed to contribute fifty per cent of the foreign exchange cost of the project and noted that the remainder would have to come through contributions from countries other than the United States as we were prevented by Congressional action from contributing funds to projects in Cambodia. In answer to a question by Ambassador Ritchie, Mr. Bundy explained that our inability to contribute was based on no other consideration than the aforementioned act which forbade the United States Government from making contributions to countries which trade with North Vietnam. Exceptions would necessitate a Presidential waiver on grounds of overriding National Security interest. Although we are unable to contribute to this project ourselves, we have undertaken to encourage other countries to make pledges. Ambassador Ritchie then asked whether Congress would not recognize a project in Cambodia as being important to United States National Security. Mr. Bundy replied that even if Congress did so, it would be unlikely that Sihanouk would accept funds vouchsafed to him in the name of United States National Security. Ambassador Ritchie next asked whether the Asian Development Bank would be able to participate in the funding of the Prek Thnot Project. Mr. Bundy said that he thought that the ADB was unable to undertake the handling of soft loans of this nature, but he would have the matter examined further. He then went on to say that thus far, in addition to the Japanese pledge, about three and one half million dollars might be expected from Australia, the Netherlands, France, India and Pakistan. The cost of the project could be reduced somewhat if the power plant were deferred; however, there would still be a shortfall of some five to six million dollars. Mr. Bundy then brought up the question of timing, saying that it was imperative to move ahead rapidly as Sihanouk might reject the whole project out of pique, if it appeared doubtful that adequate funds would be forthcoming. The Japanese initiative in this instance was commendable, and we did not wish to see it fail. He also noted that this project has value as an example of a way which is open to other countries in Southeast Asia to help themselves. Returning to the subject of timing, he spoke of the forthcoming trip by UN Under Secretary Narasimhan who will visit several Southeast Asian capitals to discuss the project before going to Phnom Penh. Time is therefore of the essence. Ambassador Ritchie said that he presonally could appreciate the argument which Mr. Bundy had presented. His government, however, had serious doubts about the wisdom of participating in this project. In the first place, Ottawa considered that its technical soundness has not yet been demonstrated. Moreover, Canada was already heavily involved in the Nam Ngum Project. Ambassador Ritchie promised to report the United States views, but said he anticipated some resistance in Ottawa. He again raised the question of the inability of the US to participate. Mr. Bundy restated the legislative problem with this particular project but pointed out that we are ready to contribute to other projects in the area as indicated in the President's State of the Union message. As an example, he noted our willingness to contribute to the Southeast Asian Educational Organization,/2/ and the President's proposal for a 200 million dollar special fund to be administered by the ADB. /2/Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Charles Schultze, recommended that the United States agree to Eugene Black's proposal for a $28 million contribution for regional education institutions in Southeast Asia over the period covering fiscal years 1967-1973, subject to provision of funding by Congress. (Memorandum from Schultze to the President, November 10, 1966; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, W.W. Rostow, Vol. 15, Nov. 1-30, 1966) On November 17, 1966, Rostow reported in a memorandum to the President that the results of an informal poll he took among the Congressional leadership indicated that most leaders supported the idea, but some were generally unwilling to make such a long-term commitment. (Ibid.) Ambassador Ritchie said that he would put the question of a Canadian contribution to the Prek Thnot Project to Ottawa./3/ /3/On January 23 Rusk sent Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin a letter requesting that Canada consider a contribution toward the Mekong Committee's Prek Thnot project. (Department of State, Central Files, E 11-2 MEKONG)
85. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/ Bangkok, January 12, 1967, 1218Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SEATO 3. Secret; Exdis. 8822. For Bundy. Ref: State 116180./2/ /2/In telegram 116180 to Bangkok, January 11, the Department asked for Martin's comment on Rusk's idea as expressed to Foreign Minister Thanat of Thailand of scheduling a meeting of foreign ministers whose countries contributed troops to the fighting in South Vietnam in place of the SEATO Ministerial meeting which could be postponed. (Ibid.) 1. I can understand that the prospect of another SEATO Council meeting in Washington does not offer great appeal. I can also understand that Thanat might well see special advantages to a meeting of troops contributing nations where he could concert with his Korean colleague on the evolution of a "directorate" for the SEA war. Nevertheless, I am firmly of the opinion that a troop contributing conference would not and could not take the place of the SEATO Council meeting which is already scheduled for April. 2. Not only we but the other SEATO countries contributing forces to Vietnam have repeatedly cast our commitments to Vietnam in the context of our SEATO obligations. We will have to do this again and again. The Secretary will have to emphasize this relationship again in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 16th and 23rd. The Thai will shortly be making a public statement regarding the U.S. use of Thai bases, and this statement will be predicated upon Thai and U.S. obligations under the SEATO Treaty./3/ It would be difficult to find a formulation to explain the postponement of an already announced conference of countries participating in the fundamental constitutional structure upon which our position in Vietnam rests. It would be additionally difficult in view of the military advisors' already scheduled meeting to immediately precede SEATO Council meeting. /3/Apparent reference to a statement made by Thailand on March 22 about U.S. Air Force use of the Thai Air Base at U Tapao; see Document 342. 3. We have come through some difficult times in SEATO and the organization has been strained by the French and Pakistani performance. But we have correctly maintained the position that SEATO plays an important fundamental role in the pattern of security in Southeast Asia. This policy, I think, has been fully vindicated by the presence in SVN of forces from all fimy [four?] SEATO Pacific members. There is growing confidence in Asia that, in the face of our joint determination, Chinese Communism will not be allowed to extend further to the south. This is no time in my opinion to risk any signal which might be interpreted as wavering on our part either by our friends or by our enemies. 4. There is perhaps much to be said for a conference of troop contributors, but, I believe, it should be treated as a separate conference from that of SEATO countries and should not be allowed to appear to substitute for it. The date of the SEATO conference is set and it is widely known that it will take place in April. In setting the date we have taken the position that postponement would pose great administrative problems for us. Under the circumstances I think that a postponement of SEATO in favor of a troop contributors conference would suggest that we are already in the process of scuttling SEATO. I would find it most difficult to imagine a formulation which could adequately explain why this step was taken./4/ /4/The Department agreed with "general thrust" of Martin's "observations on holding SEATO meeting in April, but since the date had not been announced, there was an opportunity to discuss with Thanat the relationship of the troop contributors meeting with the SEATO meeting. (Telegram 119654 to Bangkok, January 16; Department of State, Central Files, SEATO 3) Martin
86. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 20, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. SUBJECT /2/This memorandum, prepared by Carl F. Salans and entitled "Legal Basis for United States Actions Against North Vietnam," was sent to all diplomatic posts and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Ibid.) Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff of the Committee, told Senator Wayne Morse that it was "about the sloppiest piece of legal work I have ever seen." Marcy reported that it sounded "like it was put together by a high school student." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 46, Marcy Chron File, Marcy memorandum to Morse, March 17 as quoted in Gibbons, U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part III, p. 79, footnote 97) Ernest Lindley has relayed your request for an indication of reasons why the Viet Nam legal memorandum of March 8, 1965 did not rely upon the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty as a basis for United States actions in the bombing of North Viet Nam. We are now clearing a draft public position on this. Meanwhile, the present memorandum outlines the background of the 1965 memorandum and sets forth the reasons for its non-reliance on SEATO. To summarize, those reasons may be stated briefly as follows: (1) After the start of continuing U.S. air strikes against North Viet Nam in February 1965, the first criticism of these actions was rested on two grounds: (a) the bombing was inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the United Nations Charter; and (b) the bombing violated the Geneva Accords. Thus, in preparing a memorandum in support of U.S. actions, we addressed our arguments to the issues of Charter obligations and the bearing of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Of course, the issue of law involved in a reliance on Article IV, paragraph 1 of the SEATO Treaty is precisely the same as that involved in a consideration of the United Nations Charter provisions: i.e., whether there has been an armed attack by North Viet Nam against the South, Accordingly, reliance on the SEATO Treaty would not have provided an independent legal justification. (2) More to the point, in March 1965 it was the judgment of the Department that reliance on the Southeast Asia Treaty would not strengthen our case. On the contrary, such reliance would have been vulnerable to the criticism that our SEATO partners did not agree with us. There had been no collective action by SEATO under Article IV, paragraph 1. While we could have relied on the individual obligation set forth in Article IV(1), the Department was concerned that we would be alone in asserting that the treaty provision was applicable. Discussion: Our first determination that there had been an "aggression by means of armed attack" against South Viet Nam was made following the Pleiku attacks early in 1965 and in connection with the decision to launch air strikes against the North. This determination laid the basis for asserting that the air strikes were justified in the light of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter ("inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs"). This determination also laid the basis for an invocation of Article IV(1) of the Southeast Asia Treaty. The United States has long taken the view that Article IV(1) sets forth an individual as well as a collective obligation to "act to meet the common danger" in the event of aggression by means of armed attack. There has not at any time been a collective decision by the SEATO Council to act under Article IV(1) in defense of South Viet Nam, which is a protocol state covered by the Treaty./3/ In the absence of such collective action, individual members of SEATO could have relied on Article IV(1) as stating an obligation to assist South Viet Nam in meeting the armed attack from the North. As of March 1965 none of our partners in SEATO had taken this position, and at least some of them seemed likely to disagree. If the United States had asserted a treaty commitment under Article IV(1), we would have been exposed to the argument that our position was very weak since the other SEATO members were unwilling to give a corresponding interpretation. /3/The closest SEATO has come to collective decision was the 1966 Council communiqué which characterized North Viet Nam's aggression against the South as an "armed attack." [Footnote in the source text.] On March 10, 1965 the Office of the Legal Adviser sent a memorandum to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs/4/ pointing out that, since the United States now characterized the aggression in Viet Nam as an armed attack by the North on the South, there was a legal basis for invoking Article IV(1) of the Southeast Asia Treaty. Some days later FE replied that it saw no particular advantage in "bringing SEATO into the Viet Nam picture via the Rusk-Thanat route, since this would simply put a SEATO label on our individual action." The FE memorandum went on to discuss the difficulties of invoking collective action by SEATO. /4/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) At the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 the Administration did not rely on the SEATO Treaty as a basis for U.S. air strikes against vessels and facilities of North Viet Nam. Your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 6 included the following statement: "We do believe that the obligations of the SEATO Treaty are both joint and several, and that the SEATO Treaty is a substantiating basis for our presence there and our effort there, although, however, [we are]/5/ not acting specifically under the SEATO Treaty." /5/Brackets in the source text. On the same day you gave similar testimony before the House Committee: "Our view is that the obligations of the SEATO Treaty are both joint and several. But we are not in Southeast Asia at the present time precisely under the SEATO Treaty." On January 14, 1965 you made a statement as follows at a briefing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee: "There is no formal commitment by the allies at this point to South Viet Nam. We are now considering--and this I hope the Committee will keep very privately--we are considering now whether it would not be a good idea for South Viet Nam formally to request assistance from the members of SEATO under the terms of the SEATO Treaty." In preparing for the tenth SEATO Council meeting scheduled for May 1965 in London, the United States proposed to some of our SEATO allies that the GVN should make a formal request to the members of SEATO that they take action under the Treaty to meet aggression from North Viet Nam. Relying on the Rusk-Thanat interpretation of Article IV, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, we proposed that those SEATO members willing to act should state their readiness to do so at the Council meeting. The United Kingdom and New Zealand both opposed this proposal, and Australia was cool toward it. We therefore did not press the proposal. On April 29, 1965 Australia announced its intention to place ground forces in South Viet Nam. A month later, New Zealand announced that it too would send combat forces. It was in May 1965 that the United States first stated a direct reliance on the Southeast Asia Treaty for our actions in Viet Nam. The President, in a message to Congress requesting additional appropriations to meet military requirements in Viet Nam, stated: ". . . we are directly committed to the defense of South Viet Nam. In 1954 we signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That treaty committed us to act to meet aggression against South Viet Nam. The United States Senate ratified that treaty and that obligation by a vote of 82 to 1." Prior to this time the United States had made clear, in the Tonkin Gulf resolution and various statements, that we would live up to our obligations under the Southeast Asia Treaty, but had not asserted that there existed already a state of facts in which the obligations of Article IV(1) had been brought into operation. We had referred to the Southeast Asia Treaty as a "substantiating basis" for the U.S. presence in Viet Nam and our assistance in preserving the independence of that country, but this reference to the Treaty as a whole, as an expression of the United States interest in Southeast Asia, should not be confused with a reliance on Article IV(1).
87. Action Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 24, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Salans with concurrences from Manhard, Heyward Isham, Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group, and Marshall H. Noble of P. SUBJECT Relationship of SEATO Treaty to Viet Nam: Recommended Public Position My memorandum of January 20, 1967,/2/ outlined for your information the background of the Department's memorandum of March 8, 1965 entitled "Legal Basis for United States Actions Against North Viet Nam"/3/ and set forth the reasons for its non-reliance on SEATO. In order to answer queries from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or elsewhere about the Department's alleged change of emphasis on whether the SEATO Treaty underlines our presence in Viet Nam and, in particular, why the 1965 memorandum did not rely on SEATO, we recommend the following response: /2/Document 86. /3/See footnote 2, Document 86. Our commitments in the SEATO Treaty have all along been an important basis for the United States presence in Viet Nam. But it was not until North Viet Nam's aggression against the South had reached the proportions of an "armed attack" that our formal commitment under Article IV, paragraph 1, was engaged./4/ At that point, action against North Viet Nam in exercise of the right of collective self-defense was justified under the United Nations Charter and under the Southeast Asia Treaty. Prior to that time, we had relied on the request of the GVN for assistance in meeting an aggression externally inspired and supported as the legal basis for our actions in South Viet Nam. There may be some question as to the exact date at which North Viet Nam's aggression grew into an "armed attack", but there can be no doubt that it had occurred before February 1965. /4/Rusk wrote the following note next to this first two sentences in the second paragraph: "This is the point. DR." The memorandum of March 8, 1965 was addressed to specific criticism made at that time regarding the legality of United States air strikes against North Viet Nam under the United Nations Charter and the Geneva Accords of 1954. It was not, therefore, necessary in that context to discuss the question of obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty./5/ /5/There is no indication on the source text that Rusk approved this response.
88. Scope Paper Prepared for the SEATO Council Meeting/1/ SEATO/G-1 Washington, April 4, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 170. Secret. Drafted by Wilber W. Hitchcox of EA/RA, cleared by Rusk and representatives of 15 relevant bureaus and offices in the Department of State and AID. SEATO COUNCIL MEETING SCOPE PAPER U.S. Objectives 1. To demonstrate to the U.S. public and to other countries that SEATO is a going concern, serving an important purpose, and that the U.S. strongly supports the Organization. 2. To demonstrate continuing SEATO support for the GVN in its effort to stem Communist aggression as well as to dramatize GVN appreciation for such support. 3. To demonstrate continuing SEATO support for Thailand in its effort to suppress Communist-directed insurgence there. 4. To sustain SEATO's sense of mission in strengthening "the fabric of peace and freedom" in Southeast Asia. 5. To gain greater public understanding of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, including the relevance of our SEATO obligation, and the danger to the whole area the Communist threat in Viet-Nam represents. Means of Attaining Objectives 1. By providing, as host, conference arrangements and representational functions in accord with SEATO precedents and of such a character as to demonstrate the special political and military importance we attach to the Organization. 2. By generating the widest possible publicity for the Council Meeting, including statements made by our SEATO allies and the Vietnamese observer. 3. By working for a strong endorsement in the communiqué of the GVN's resistance to Communist aggression, of its plans and preparations for the transition of constitutional, representative government in South Viet-Nam and of the GVN's commitment to programs for revolutionary development, economic stability and progress, and national reconciliation as set forth in the Manila communiqué of October 1966. 4. By including in the communiqué a clear endorsement of Thailand's efforts to suppress the insurgency sponsored within her borders by external Communists, and by publicizing this Communist sponsorship and citing the evidence thereof. 5. By making clear U.S. support for appropriate cultural activities of SEATO, including our willingness to contribute financial support for approved programs. 6. By making clear U.S. support for appropriate economic activities of SEATO, including our willingness to contribute financial support for approved programs, and recognizing that SEATO should give priority consideration to countersubversion and counterinsurgency type projects in order to avoid duplication with other multilateral efforts in the region. 7. By developing U.S. statements on Viet-Nam, on Thailand and on SEATO that will be concrete and constructive. Possible Obstacles 1. The U.K. will wish to ensure that there is no implication in the communiqué that the U.K is committed to any military contribution to Viet-Nam and will probably take a generally cautious approach to SEATO's work. 2. Pakistan is likely to be largely passive except possibly in making an effort to include reference to Pakistan-Indian problems in the communiqué. It may register a reservation to any strong reference to Communist aggression in Viet-Nam.
89. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 19, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SEATO. Confidential. SUBJECT You have agreed to meet with the SEATO Council Ministers at 5:00 p.m. today. I sent you a suggested statement last night./2/ /2/Apparent reference to "Talking Points," transmitted by Read to Rostow, April 18. (Ibid.) In connection with any informal discussions with the Ministers, the following background may be useful: --For several years, the Thai and Filipinos have been concerned that we would let the foot-dragging of France and, to a lesser extent, of Pakistan and the UK sap SEATO's vitality. --France, for the first time, refused to send even an observer to the current meetings, but has not given any sign of an intent to withdraw or stop paying its dues. --The UK declined to send any military forces to Viet-Nam and has taken an increasingly restrictive attitude toward many SEATO activities. --Pakistan has stopped active participation in SEATO military planning and intelligence work, but it continues to pay its share of the budget. --The Thai have increasingly questioned the usefulness of participation in SEATO by those who will not assume real responsibility, notably France, the UK and Pakistan. With the exception of Korean forces, the only military contributions to Viet-Nam have come from four SEATO partners (Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines). If you meet the Ministers and one other delegate from each country in the Mansion, you might: (1) welcome each one personally; If the meeting is in the Cabinet room, you might: (1) let Sec. Rusk introduce you to each of the ministers,
going around the table; /3/Rostow added the following handwritten note in parentheses: "I prefer the latter." I personally recommended the former procedure because: --the informal setting will be more congenial; --the hospitality of the President in his home will be appreciated by the members more than a more formal gathering; --these men will have been sitting around a conference table for most of two days, and a more personal contact with the President will mean more to them. Walt
/4/There is no indication on the source text as to the President's choice, but for the account of the meeting, see Document 90. [Continue with the next documents]
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