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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
90. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, April 20, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SEATO. Secret. Drafted by Jorden on April 20. SUBJECT The President met in the Cabinet Room on April 19 with delegates attending the SEATO Ministers Conference. The meeting lasted from 5:15 p.m. to 6:15 p.m. [Here follows a list of participants.] Secretary Rusk opened the meeting with a review of the SEATO Ministerial Council discussions to date. He said that Secretary General Vargas had provided a review of SEATO activities--military and civil. There was a general feeling that "the organization is in good shape." He said there were signs of greater solidarity among the free nations in the treaty area. The delegates had reviewed the situation in Communist China. Also, the situation in Viet-Nam in some detail. There was general concern about the inadequate understanding of the real issues in Viet-Nam on the part of many people in other parts of the world. All agreed more effort should be devoted to promoting a better understanding. Foreign Minister Hasluck (Australia) said he was more and more impressed each year with the growing cooperation among Asian and Pacific states and with the progress that was being made. He said that with all the new cooperative efforts, a great problem in the future may be the need to coordinate all the efforts being made. He underlined the fact that peace is a global problem and that the security of Asia is a major part of the world security problem. Prime Minister Holyoake invited the SEATO Ministers to meet in New Zealand next year. He said it was important that people understand that communism is the outmoded wave of the past. The actions in Viet-Nam were a demonstration of the unity of the member nations. SEATO has New Zealand's full support. Foreign Secretary Ramos (Philippines) said the meetings had "renewed our confidence that SEATO as an organization is important and vital to us." He said his country was grateful for the protective shield SEATO provides. It was grateful for the support of the United States. Foreign Minister Thanat (Thailand) said "the fact that the United States has undertaken to defend Southeast Asia--your defense of Viet-Nam--is an action of great historical importance. "As far as the Thai are concerned, we are ready to bear our share of the responsibility." He was concerned with the political repercussions of the war in Viet-Nam which were the result of a major step-up in Communist propaganda. He hoped that SEATO members could "begin to initiate a counter campaign against this Communist propaganda." Foreign Secretary Brown (UK) noted that he had spoken in favor of SEATO when it was before the House of Commons in 1954. He was happy to see how well the organization is doing. He said that Viet-Nam "will one day be part of history." But the growth and progress of Asia will go on. Foreign Minister Do (Viet-Nam) said his people were "more confident of success" and confident of the future of their country. He described major political events--the Constitution, elections, etc. He noted the new program of Reconciliation just announced by his government. He expressed the hope the "other side" would be willing to accept a peaceful solution by the end of this year. Secretary General Vargas (SEATO) complimented Secretary Rusk's handling of the SEATO sessions. He noted new staffing programs. He said SEATO should help member countries in countering subversion, which he said was the greatest threat to peace and security. He had visited Viet-Nam and was happy to see the progress that is being made. He said the VC "cannot hope to win by force." There was a need to step up Revolutionary Development. Prime Minister Holyoake said he could not let the opportunity pass to express "our amazement and gratitude for the fortitude and courage you are showing in Viet-Nam." President Johnson said "I hope each of you know how glad we are to have you in our country. "Our viewpoints may vary, we may have some differences, but I know I am in the presence of friends. "I did not vote to ratify the SEATO Treaty," he said, "because I was in the hospital." (He noted former President Kennedy also had not voted for the SEATO Treaty.) He recalled a comment made by the U.S. Secretary of State at the first SEATO meeting: "I am confident of one thing--the way of the aggressor has been made harder." He noted that the Senate had held extensive hearings on SEATO. The Foreign Relations Committee ("of which you may have heard") had approved it with only one dissenting vote (Langer of North Dakota). The full Senate had approved the Treaty by a vote of 82 to 1. "That, I think, expressed the feeling of 200 million Americans--the feeling that it would make the way of the aggressor harder. "We were born as a country with the words: 'Give me Liberty, or give me death.' We attach a high price to liberty. And it is so good that we want everyone to have a share of it." He noted that the United States had entered into more than 40 alliances. "We have given our word. We are in great trouble today. I don't like to see men get killed. But our word has been given that in moments of danger we will act. "If we reach the point where the word of the United States is not respected, is not 'good as gold,' we will have a very dangerous situation loose in the world. "If our word is not good in SEATO, tomorrow it will be no good in NATO, or in ANZUS, or with the Japanese or our other allies. "Our enemies would say that the United States does not take its commitments seriously. We would telegraph to the world that aggressors are now free to roam. "We have been engaged in two wars in Europe in my lifetime and two in the Pacific. And now we are in Viet-Nam. Each time we were involved so that aggressors were not free to roam. "We could get our tomorrow. But that would mean that hundreds of thousands would be slaughtered. "So, as difficult as it is, I do want you to know that we think we are right, and we think that right will prevail. I am not going to throw overboard my word." He said this was meant as "no criticism of others." The President said he had recently received a letter from a widow. She said that he had killed her husband just as surely as if he had pulled a gun and shot him. There were not many letters like that, but each one hurt. He recalled visiting a veteran of the fighting who was a triple amputee; he had lost two arms and one leg. He was 20. His wife was 18. When he visited, the wife could only say: "Mr. President, aren't you proud of him?" So this isn't easy for us. "But we want your people to be free Mr. Minister (looking at Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do). If you are not, the Thai won't have freedom next week. The Philippines won't have it the week after that. "We don't want to bomb people. We don't want to punish people. We aren't there for territory or for treasure. "We are there because we want the people of South Viet-Nam to have self-determination. "And I want you to know that if there is a common danger, we will be there." He recalled that his father had told him: "When you get into a disagreement, try to put yourself in the adversary's place; look at it as he does. "If we put ourselves in the Vietnamese position, we see men coming into their country from the North to kill them. We see them killing our public officials, and bombing our busses, and attacking an embassy. "We can kill them by the thousands. But we would rather stop their trucks from moving down. We would rather put their steel mills out of action--and their power plants. So they can't make war. "People keep saying: stop the bombing! But they aren't ready to stop their bombing." He said: "We are not going to tie our hands behind our backs" and tell our Marines and soldiers not to do anything until the enemy is on top of them. "We try to be reasonable." We stopped the bombing five times. He noted that he had written directly to Ho Chi Minh. During that time, many people, some Senators and others, were criticizing him for not being willing to negotiate. Yet he didn't release the letter. Despite the failure of all moves toward peace, "we are going to keep trying." Our goal is "maximum deterrence with minimum loss of life." He said we did not want to "invade North Viet-Nam." "We just want those people to have a chance to have their own way of life." He said he shared the general optimism expressed about Asia and its future. He said we would like to use our resources "for bread and babies"--for food, and health and education. "And this (Asia) is where mankind is--two-thirds of it--in Asia." He said Europe was now strong. "The other side of the world needs us more than Europe ever did. "To those of you who are with us in Viet-Nam, be strong of heart. To the others, I ask: try to be as understanding as you can. "I've got enough troubles without getting them from my brothers. "I am not as patient as an assistant I once had. He was, I think, the most patient man I've ever known. He had a young son named Lyndon. One morning, as the man was sleeping, little Lyndon climbed up to the bed and kicked him in the teeth. My assistant jumped up and said: 'Now, Lyndon, if you kick me in the teeth once more I'm going to take you by the arm and sit you down in a corner.' "I don't think I would have said it quite like that. "I want you to know: we are there; we are going to stay there; but we are flexible. "We have said 'yes' 35 times--to the British proposal, to the Indian Prime Minister, to the United Nations, to the non-aligned nations. "We keep saying 'yes.' They keep saying 'no.' And I get blamed." But, he added: "We think we'll find a solution." The President said he wanted to see SEATO "stronger, not weaker." And he said that "we don't want this war to spread--but if it does, it will not be our fault or our wish." Bill Jorden
91. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright)/1/ Washington, April 21, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, E 11-2 MEKONG. Drafted by Thomas C. Niblock, Director, Far Eastern Development Office of AID, and Ewing, cleared by Barnett and in draft with Gaud and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations John P. White. Dear Bill: I appreciated the opportunity afforded by your letter of April 12/2/ to give you a full report on the Mekong-Prek Thnot project in Cambodia. /2/Attached, but not printed. We have supported the Mekong River development program for many years. The first important move we made after the President's April 1965 Johns Hopkins speech to show our great interest in the political and economic potentialities of this UN-supported initiative was in May 1965, when we took the lead in offering to provide half the funds for the Committee's top priority project in Laos. The Committee took as its next priority project the Prek Thnot irrigation and hydroelectric project near Phnom Penh in Cambodia. It was not, however, until last fall that the Mekong Committee managed to produce the economic and technical analysis of the project which was needed for us to determine whether we could justify assistance on economic grounds. While these studies were being carried out we, nevertheless, attempted to induce other donors to take the lead in raising financing for Prek Thnot, so as to permit prompt collective action. Thus, we sent an emissary to Ottawa in November 1965 in an unsuccessful effort to persuade the Canadians to take the lead. We also urged Japan to take the lead. Our idea was then that it would be preferable to finance the Cambodia project from non-U.S. sources but that, if necessary, AID would contribute the residual, minority share. Given Sihanouk's attitude towards U.S. aid and the state of U.S-Cambodian relations, it was clearly necessary that another country lead such a consortium and work out administrative arrangements with the Mekong Committee and the Cambodian Government. As a practical matter, it also was necessary that Cambodia agree to the use of an international financial institution such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank as the financial agent of the donors. At the May 1966 ECAFE plenary session our delegate stated that we intended to do our share for Mekong Committee-sponsored projects in all four riparian countries. A few months later, we authorized our Ambassdor in Bangkok to say to Mekong Committee officials that we would sympathetically consider a U.S. contribution to Prek Thnot if the Committee and other donors found the project feasible. By this time Japan had indicated increased support for various development efforts in Southeast Asia and stood out as the most promising leader for Prek Thnot. We, therefore, indicated both to the UN and to Japan in the spring and summer of 1966 that if Japan or some other country took the lead with the project and could not raise sufficient funds without us, we would be a minor contributor, assuming there was a finding of feasibility, satisfactory arrangements for financial and engineering management, and Cambodian willingess to accept inclusion of U.S. funds in the package. This was our position when the Congress last October removed the normal Presidential authority to waive on "national interest" grounds the ban on aid to countries which sell, furnish or permit ships under their registry to carry items of economic assistance to North Vietnam. At that time, we reviewed information available on Cambodian official gifts--all of a token character--to North Vietnam or the National Liberation Front and on the increasing use of Cambodian territory and resources by Vietnamese communist military forces en route to or operating in South Vietnam. A continuing difficulty for us, also, has been uncertainty as to the Cambodian position on the project, including the acceptability of U.S. assistance. Cambodian representatives at the Mekong Committee meetings have consistently sought financing of the full $33 million project without qualification as to donors, and the Mekong Committee was assured by the Cambodian delegation in September 1966 that Sihanouk had given the project top priority. However, Sihanouk in December attacked the idea of Cambodia's accepting U.S. assistance for the Prek Thnot project and criticized the suggestion that Asian Development Bank involvement was needed. Then, in a letter to U Thant in January of this year, Prince Sihanouk explained that he did not want to burden Cambodia with new loans, saying that projects presently under construction would be sufficient for Cambodia's projected electricity needs, and he requested that further consideration of international financing be suspended. Although recently the Cambodian delegate at the ECAFE meeting in Tokyo said Cambodia wanted the full Prek Thnot project and welcomed any assistance given for it, the latest indication of Prince Sihanouk's view is his assurance to U Thant that he would review the whole question after his return to Cambodia in early March. He has not as yet communicated the results of his review of the desirability of this project to U Thant. Responses to paragraphs two through six of your letter are in the following paragraphs corresponding to the numbers of your questions. 2. Our decision not to contribute to the project was made, subject to continuing review, last October and reiterated in November. The decision was made by the Administrator of AID, in consultation with senior officials of the Department of State and others. I subsequently reviewed the decision and joined in the effort to persuade other countries to supplement the Japanese offer of half the foreign exchange costs. 3. The decision was occasioned by the need for Eugene Black, then traveling in East Asia, to inform the Japanese whether or not we would contribute in order that they could decide as to their own participation in light of the U.S. position. The decision was based on: a) The Congressional action on the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, referred to above, which deleted the Presidential waiver authority on national interest grounds, and reduced the President's latitude only to the findings--which would almost certainly have become known and been unacceptable to Sihanouk--of a United States national security interest as the basis for a waiver, and b) The possibility that provision of United States aid to a project in Cambodia would provoke criticism from the Congress and endanger its support of future foreign aid legislation, if there were to occur some new Camobdian action in support of North Vietnam or expanded use of Cambodian territory by North Vietnamese or Viet Cong forces. 4. With regard to your inquiry concerning a legal finding as to whether Cambodia is engaged in trade or aid within the meaning of Section 107(b) of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, no such finding has been made. However, aside from the question of whether Section 107(b) constitutes a bar in a strict legal sense, consultation with several members of Congress who have inquired into our position has suggested that it would be unwise to interpret narrowly the Congressional intent behind this restrictive language. 5. The reasons which persuaded us not to contribute last fall still militate against U.S. participation in the Prek Thnot project at the present time. However, Prek Thnot is in itself a good project and an integral part of the Mekong scheme. Following up the initiative taken by the Japanese, we have made strong efforts with the Canadians, West Germans, and others to get additional support for the financing of the full project. There also has been some thought of starting with a smaller project for which presently committed financing seems to be sufficient. There is, however, still uncertainty as to Cambodian interest in this possibility. If adequate financing is not found for the full Prek Thnot project this year and Cambodia remains uninterested in anything less, it may be possible for the United States to participate in this project next year through a lump-sum contribution to a general Mekong Development Fund now being considered by the Asian Development Bank as part of its proposed Special Funds. 6. There have been no objections raised by members of the Mekong Committee to the U.S. decision not to participate in the funding of Prek Thnot, although the decision did occasion disappointment within the Committee. The other three members of the Committee have continued to express strong support for the project, and hope that financing can be found. Cambodia has not attended recent meetings of the Mekong Committee. We believe that Cambodia will in time again participate in the Committee and that the achievement of acceptable financing for the project, either through a Japanese led consortium or a special fund of the Asian Development Bank, could hasten its return. As you know, Eugene Black on May 2 will consult with your committee on U.S. contributions to Mekong and other special funds of the Asian Development Bank. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk
92. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Barr) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 5, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, SEA Development Program, Vol. III (Black Comm) ADB. No classification marking. SUBJECT In my memorandum to you of August 26 (copy attached),/2/ I described to you what I consider to be a classic example of how foreign assistance legislation should be developed. I used as an example the history of the Inter-American Bank proposal. /2/Attached, but not printed. It is probably unrealistic to go through this rather elaborate procedure every time we go for funds for the international financial institutions, but some of the ingredients should be present. The most important ingredient that is lacking in the Asian Bank proposal is the announced willingness of any other nation to join with us in this concessional loan fund. It would help us mightily in our Congressional presentation if we could announce that at least Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand were joining us in creating this new "soft loan" operation. Subsequent to Mr. Black's visit with Congressman Widnall, the Minority Clerk of the House Banking and Currency Committee said that they would like to know the answers to some of the following questions: 1) Is the Bank organized and in a position to run a $200 million "soft loan" operation? (The answer is no--as of two weeks ago they had only a skeleton force in their loan operation.) 2) Has the Bank made any loans from its ordinary capital? (The answer again is no.) 3) Has the Bank prepared any studies as to how it would use these funds? (The answer is that studies on agriculture and transportation are underway, but not complete.) 4) Has the Bank made a formal proposal to its member nations asking for support for this fund? (The answer here is that President Watanabe has had informal discussions with a few nations but has not submitted a formal proposal to the Board of Governors.) Conclusion I am deeply concerned that we can damage the prospects of an extremely useful Asian institution by rushing in prematurely before tying up some of the loose ends that I have indicated above. Joe Barr
93. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Wellington, April 1, 1968, 6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SEATO 8-3. Secret. Drafted by Unger and approved in S on April 4. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Suite at White Heron Lodge. SEATO/SEVEN NATION/ANZUS MEETINGS PARTICIPANTS United States Ambassador Leonard Unger SEATO Secretary General SUBJECT In reply to the Secretary's question, General Vargas said that he did not anticipate any particularly controversial items arising in the course of the SEATO Council Meeting starting the next day. He said, however, that intense interest has been generated by the President's speech about bombing suspension and particularly about his non-candidacy./2/ After some exchange on this subject the Secretary speculated that the likely future President has in fact not yet made his candidacy known. /2/Text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, Book I, pp. 469-476. The Secretary suggested that with the presence in the SEATO Meeting of representatives of both Pakistan and the United Kingdom, he was not disposed to go into a great deal of detail on Vietnam but rather to leave that for the Seven Nation Meeting. He and the Secretary-General discussed the British and Pakistani membership in SEATO and the Secretary indicated his disposition to have them pressed to make more of a contribution if they are going to continue as members of the organization. General Vargas observed that the Pakistani (and for that matter, the French) are neutral in their SEATO activities, and while they make no contribution, neither do they obstruct the work of the organization. Turning to a review of the situation in the treaty area, the Secretary-General described his recent travels around Thailand and indicated his concern over the growing insurgency, paying particular attention to the problem of the subversion of the hill tribes in northern Thailand. He regretted that the Thai insurgency problem had not been tackled with more vigor when it was still small in 1965. The Secretary agreed with this point, urging that we learn the lesson well from past experience and mistakes in the counter insurgency field, including Vietnam, and try to get the Thai problem promptly under control. With regard to the Philippines, the Secretary-General felt that the rural insurgency was not now a matter of serious concern but he was preoccupied with the more classic type of communist subversion among the urban population. General Vargas also described the status of the seminar on Internal Security in Rural Areas. He underlined his strong interest in this and also mentioned the counter insurgency center which he would like to see established. Secretary Rusk commented in general terms about the importance of the SEATO role in counter insurgency. General Vargas then told Secretary Rusk of his recent visit to South Vietnam, including his conversation with General Westmoreland and his visits to PHILCAG, the Queen's Cobras and other allied units. He underlined the added importance he attached, as a result of this visit, to the blocking of the routes of supply to the communist forces and in this connection he mentioned the recent discovery of 90-some sampans in the Mekong near the Cambodian border which were intercepted and sunk with heavy loads of munitions. As a result of his visit to Manila he told the Secretary that President Marcos believes that the extension of the PHILCAG will go through. At the same time he noted that the opposition in the Philippine Congress wants more on the side of medics and fewer engineers in the Philippine contribution in Viet-Nam. Vargas will be returning to Manila and hopes to be able to exert some helpful influence on this project. In conclusion, the Secretary expressed his appreciation to the Secretary-General for his willingness to serve for a further term as SEATO Secretary-General.
94. Scope Paper Prepared for the SEATO Council Meeting/1/ Washington, April 2, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-International Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 276. Secret. Drafted by Peter W. Colm of EA/RA and Bacon, cleared by Rusk and 16 relevant bureaus and offices of the Department of State, AID, and Department of Defense. SEATO/SEVEN NATION/ANZUS MEETINGS SEATO COUNCIL MEETING U.S. Objectives 1. To underscore for the US, our SEATO allies, and other countries our strong support for SEATO and the importance we attach to it as the only multilateral security mechanism in Southeast Asia. 2. To demonstrate continuing SEATO support for the GVN in its effort to stem Communist aggression, to dramatize GVN appreciation for this support, and to emphasize SEATO's interest in a just and peaceful negotiated solution to the present conflict. 3. To emphasize SEATO's role in combatting Communist subversion in the Treaty Area, and specifically to demonstrate support for Thailand and the Philippines in suppressing Communist insurgency. 4. To give due emphasis to multilateral participation in SEATO projects such as military exercises, their civic action components, and the Organization's non-military activities, including SEATO's cooperation in certain projects with non-member countries. 5. To overcome possible apprehension among SEATO members that the UK decision to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia portends a weakening of SEATO's ability to deter or defeat Communist aggression. Means of Attaining Objectives 1. By strong public and private expositions of the US position on issues of concern to SEATO. 2. By working for a SEATO communiqué and developing public statements that will contain support for the GVN and US policies there as strong as or stronger than in prior years. 3. By emphasizing US support for the planned SEATO Seminar on Internal Security in Rural Areas. 4. By emphasizing also US support for cultural and economic projects, particularly when these are related to counter-insurgency and by stressing the fact that all of these projects have significant multilateral support from SEATO members. Possible Obstacles 1. There is a tendency among the SEATO members to question the security significance of the organization and even Thailand, with no other treaty guarantee for its security, has at times been uneasy about the effectiveness of the U.S. commitment under SEATO. 2. The divergence of the policies of France, Pakistan and to a lesser degree of the UK from those of the other SEATO members constitutes a continuing problem, especially to Thailand and the Philippines. So also does the failure of France and, more recently, Pakistan to participate in SEATO's military activities. 3. With the new UK defense policy, UK participation in SEATO military activities can be expected to become more and more nominal. If the UK should be represented at the Council Meeting, as is possible, at a level lower than that of the Foreign Minister, the UK position might have little flexibility. 4. There has been an unimpressive showing by the US and others on the SEATO economic side since the resolution by the Council last year that it would give "sympathetic and urgent attention" to economic requests from Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan.
95. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 30, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, SEA Development Program, Vol. III (Black Comm) ADB. No classification marking. SUBJECT Black wishes to report on his trip to Asia./2/ I expect there will be three areas of particular interest to you: /2/Black met with President Johnson from 12:47 to 1:22 p.m. on September 30. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation has been found, but Black's written report to the President, September 30, is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, SEA Development Program, Vol. III (Black Comm) ADB. There is an indication on Black's report that the President saw it. 1. His experiences in Cambodia. The Black visit accomplished nothing. The Cambodians adhered to their stiff position regarding Communist use of Cambodian territory, and were uncompromising about the release of the LCU crew./3/ However, it is Black's feeling that the Cambodians are concerned at being left behind in economic development, and are now more disposed to cooperate with international programs than at anytime in the recent past. /3/On July 17 the Cambodian Navy captured a U.S. Army landing craft that had strayed into Cambodian waters. President Johnson sent Black to try to release the 11 U.S. soldiers and 1 South Vietnamese policeman held as detainees; see Documents 244-248. 2. Japan. Japanese were surprisingly responsive to Black's exhortation that they should do more in Southeast Asia. In fact, they virtually pledged to double their contribution to the Asian Development Bank's Special Fund. Black feels that it is certain that the Japanese will be extremely active in Southeast Asia. As he sees it, the question is whether their efforts can be folded into a healthy multilateral effort sponsored by the United States--or whether the Japanese will concentrate on bilateral programs aimed mainly at seeking shortrun commercial benefits. 3. Mekong development. Black believes things are moving along well, and the nations of the area are generally committed to moving ahead both with the large projects and the smaller ones. Black will leave with you a written report, which will include four recommendations. The first, and most important, is that the time is ripe for the Asians to organize themselves to handle aid from the United States and Japan as the Europeans organized themselves in the OECD to handle the Marshall Plan. You might question Black on how he sees the timing of such a development, that is, is it practical now or is this something for the next administration to pursue. Black will also recommend that our aid programs for Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and ultimately Cambodia, be placed under the umbrella of an international consortium looking to the development of the Mekong Basin. The other two recommendations are that we press forward on the Special Fund and on the mainstream Pa Mong Dam, neither of which require any action on your part that is not already afoot. W.W. Rostow/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
96. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (Holdridge) to the Director for Intelligence and Research (Hughes)/1/ Washington, November 11, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/ERA Files: Lot 90 D 165, NIE 50-68. Secret. Drafted by Sarris. SUBJECT /2/Approved by the USIB on November 14. (Ibid.) This Estimate was requested last summer by Secretary of Defense Clifford. It focuses on the likely impact in Southeast Asia as a result of a settlement of the Vietnam situation. As its basic terms of reference, the Estimate (1) excludes the possibility of an outright military victory or a precipitous withdrawal by the Allies or the Communists, (2) assumes a compromise settlement which, in a year or two, leads either to Communist control or to the continuation of a pro-US regime in South Vietnam, and (3) does not prejudge future US policies or courses of action in Southeast Asia, regardless of the outcome in South Vietnam. As you recall, USIB remanded the Estimate on October 31 because of ACSI objections to the conclusions on Section II, A Settlement Favorable to the Communists, the main part of the Estimate. In the two ensuing lengthy meetings by the USIB representatives, it became clear, as had been expected, that DIA, the DOD services, and NSA continued to find serious difficulties with the draft and in effect were joining ACSI in an effort to rewrite the Estimate. The present draft reflects considerable effort by CIA to incorporate DOD views in the hope of arriving at a broadly acceptable Estimate. On the other hand, despite a large number of editorial and organizational, as well as some substantive, changes, the net effect has been to recast the conclusions to include specific judgments in the text but without conceding any major compromise by CIA or INR. Therefore, regarding a settlement favorable to the Communists, the Estimate's main conclusions remain: (1) Communist political and military assets in the region probably would not be immediately strengthened, nor would the Communists be likely to rely more heavily on armed violence than at present; (2) Cambodia and particularly Laos might well become fairly early casualties although initially at least Hanoi would probably rely on political rather than military pressure to alter the situation in its favor in both countries; (3) neutralist sentiment would increase in several countries, and throughout the region there would be damage to US prestige and serious doubts about the validity of US power and commitments; and (4) Southeast Asian leaders would nevertheless continue to be influenced to an important extent by US actions elsewhere in the area during and after the settlement, and they "would not be panicked into precipitous changes in policy or posture" and "would probably suspend any definitive policy decision" until there had been time to appraise US intentions. In short, a settlement in Vietnam favorable to the Communists in itself would not necessarily unhinge Southeast Asia. There were very few changes in the second scenario, a situation unfavorable to the Communists. The Estimate continues to hold that there would be a sense of relief throughout the region, US prestige would increase, Communist morale would sag, and the "peoples' war" concepts of Mao and Ho Chi Minh would be seriously questioned. However, few countries would conclude that the Communists had been permanently stopped in Vietnam or that the future of the Saigon regime had been assured, nor would doubts be removed about the willingness of the US to engage on a substantial scale in any new military conflict in Southeast Asia. DIA and the Services retain reservations on all or various parts of Section II and its conclusions. Army and Air Force reserve on the entire Section and all its conclusions (A through F); DIA on Conclusions C, E, and F and on Paragraph 32; and Navy on Conclusion E and Paragraph 32. The NSA representative, although dissatisfied with the Estimate, could not say confidently whether his principal would reserve although he ventured to guess that he would do so if DIA or the Services put forth a "persuasive" position at USIB. In the meantime, I have learned that DIA and the Services are considering a joint footnote on the entirety of Section II and its relevant conclusions. As before, the main thrust of the DOD objections are in a nutshell, that the Estimate understates the adverse impact throughout Southeast Asia of a settlement in Vietnam favorable to the Communists. In this respect, DOD argues that, in contrast to the judgment in the Estimate, the Southeast Asian governments, including Thailand, would proceed to reorient their policies immediately and would not wait to see what actions or policies the US would take in the area. (Paragraphs 26 and 32.) As noted earlier, neither we nor EA have any major problems with the Estimate. We would have preferred the draft submitted to USIB last month on the grounds that some of the conclusions were more clearly stated. Indeed, we recommended during the last round of discussions that, in view of the problems still existing between CIA-INR and DOD, we should return to the previous draft. This would at least have the virtue of clarifying the differences in the various points of view. For a while, CIA considered this possibility but decided against it apparently in the hope of pulling DIA off its reservations and at least presenting a united DIA-CIA-INR front against the Services. We recommend that you approve the Estimate in its present form. [Continue with the next documents]
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