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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
Burma
97. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State/1/ Rangoon, April 28, 1964, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BURMA-US. Secret; Nodis. 669. For the Secretary. I hope you can find time to read mytel 668/2/ giving summary of my impressions after being in Burma approximately six months. You will find it pessimistic and yet I want you to know that I am not ready to write off Burma. /2/Dated April 28. (Ibid.) I did not wish to include in above reference telegram my belief that Ne Win is basically afraid of the US. From reports reaching me he seems to fear that we will do him in, possibly violently. Every rightist coup which the press associates us with increases his fear. The leftists in his Revolutionary Council feed this fear and he is of a nature to let this fear become an obsession. He doubled his guard on Kennedy's assassination thinking this might give ideas to his own enemies, [1 line of source text not declassified] one of his ex-comrades who had fled from Burma, in the . . . period expected to follow. His government's strange refusal to permit only one qualified pilot on the training team for their new F1C aircraft was later identified as connected with his fear that otherwise the aircraft could be flown with only US personnel aboard and it might be used to shoot him down. It was reported to me that his impression of me as a person on our first and only interview was favorable. But he also said "what's the use of dealing with him--he can't control Washington and CIA." I have the feeling that he even thinks friendship with me might be dangerous in that it would soften him up for the kill by elements that he assumes I cannot control. He remembers all too well the publicity following Amb Keyes' resignation that he was not in the know about [3 lines of source text not declassified]. This situation is a real toughy. We certainly cannot afford to miss any opportunity here. Think I was able to make one breakthrough on a matter connected with our road project last week. This and the manner in which I hope our current problem (no Wash action now necessary) over fighter aircraft might make the General pause to ponder US intentions. Had you not been on a SEATO mission I would have asked that you return from Manila via Rangoon for an assist. This might work to our advantage sometime in the future when you are on a trip and I shall watch your movements with this in mind. In Ne Win's present mood no one conference could accomplish the desired results, but it might give an opening to follow through on. We are attempting to find ways of turning Ne Win's suspicious mind to the fact that his leftist personal [garble] may try to dump him when the course of the revolution has gone far enough. I think this is in fact a possibility. If he would start thinking in these terms he might come to us in a hurry. A shock treatment approach to warn Ne Win that there are limits to which he can go and still expect US help in a crisis is tempting but until we can soften him up a bit I believe it too risky. In his present frame of mind I think we would conclude that he had already made the decision to engineer his downfall. I wanted you to have these supplemental thoughts which I did not wish to have area distribution. Upper Burma is still just as beautiful as ever. Regards. Byroade
98. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 13, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. I, 5/1-27/64. No classification marking. RE This bulky file involves allowing the use of just over $1.2 million to military assistance to Burma under conditions which require a determination signed by you./2/ I have reviewed the whole file, and while the case is not open and shut, I believe the recommendation is right. While in formal terms the Burmese have not done what is normally required, they would certainly interpret a failure to go forward on our part as a breach of faith, and the costs to us in Southeast Asian political terms would be substantially more than $1 million worth of military equipment. Moreover, while Burmese neutrality under Ne Win leaves a great deal to be desired, it is angelic when compared to some other people we have to put up with. /2/Attached, but not printed. If you approve, all that is needed is your signature on the paper under the tab./3/ /3/Bundy and the President discussed this memorandum on the telephone. Bundy told Johnson that the Burma determination was "the only one that has any political hazard in it." He noted that, "Ne Win has not been very helpful, but I don't think you want to pick a row with one more neutral who is being reasonably quiet this month, if we can avoid it." Bundy suggested that there would be trouble with Sihanouk and Sukarno, and "that's enough on our plate right now." Bundy stated that "we do get effective connection to the Burmese military and the Burmese have been damn good about preventing any serious communist infiltration, but they are not cooperative in other ways." The President responded: "Okay, much obliged." (Memorandum of a telephone conversation, May 13, 5:35 p.m.; ibid., Transcripts of Telephone Conversation, Alpha Series, McGeorge Bundy) The recording of the conversation is ibid., Recordings of Telephone Conversations. McG. B.
99. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State/1/ Rangoon, July 31, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BURMA-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for POLAD. 81. My comments on Embtel 78./2/ Disappointment reflected in reftel over last talk with Ne Win was as much influenced by impressions of Ne Win as a person as by anything he said. /2/In telegram 78 from Rangoon, July 30, Byroade reported on a conversation of that day with Ne Win lasting an hour and a half. (Ibid.) In anticipation of the conversation, the Department suggested in telegram 37 to Rangoon, July 28, that "if Ne Win is in mood for a frank talk, he may bring up allegations of past or present CIA involvement with ChiNat irregulars or ethnic insurgents." Byroade should assure him that the United States "was not interested in removing him or his government." (Ibid., POL BURMA-US) It seems to me we can live fairly comfortably with his external policies, which, stated simply, are that Burma will tell all comers she not going to be involved in SEA or any other major international question. One might hope for a closer understanding, but as long as he stands up to ChiComs in roughly same manner, we could do worse. What worries me most is that I remain unconvinced he can make the grade internally, and am concerned as to what his government will do to Burma in the meantime. I do not believe Ne Win has anything but the most rudimentary knowledge of things economic. I doubt if he can hold his own at all in any discussion of financial and economic matters with his more skilled leftist advisers. It perhaps did not get through in reftel that he sees it as his task to devote all his government's energies to a "master plan" to carry them through several years--and he admits this will take a long while. I am afraid he believes country and people can remain stopped, or suspended as it were, until that great day arrives, and then suddenly everything and everyone will fall into its proper place. With the loss of government control of a large portion of the country already, and with the economy basically even now at a standstill I don't really see how this approach can succeed. When all plans are finished he willing consider foreign material assistance, but believe he thinks that at that time advice or other foreign technical assistance will not be necessary as everything will already be worked out. I also believe he visualizes a completely regimented society, with all wants and needs supplied by government, according to his master plan. Everyone will then be happy and insurgents will gladly come forth to share in the better life. If anyone not happy, he just hasn't been properly instilled with the new spirit of things. I hope I'm wrong to criticize him so severely, but I believe he is both a naive and narrow person, and apt to become more so as he continues to isolate himself and attempts to isolate Burma. I also believe that to a great extent expressions of grievances against US, at the very least condoned by him, are tactical and purposely exaggerated. These grievances often look very small indeed when analyzed. Of late, Soe Tin and others have stepped up tales of their complaints about the US to other Ambassadors. Some Ambassadors who made calls to explore what Chou En-lai's visit/3/ was all about, received long discourses instead on Burma's troubles with the US. Believe FonOff reasons that if they to take the risk of trying to keep Russia, and more particularly Red China, at arm's length, they must make sure that word they doing same to US reaches both the other giants. They do not really want to criticize US in SEA, so scrape bottom of the barrel for examples against US locally here in Burma and elsewhere. When other embassies query us as to why our relations suddenly worse, they surprised when we say we don't really think they are--and might just be improving a bit. /3/Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai visited Burma February 14-18, 1964. Getting back to Ne Win personally, regret cannot as yet know whether discussion will result in any better rapport between us. Am afraid it is a firm policy to keep the US and others at arm's length--and that we will be unable to break that barrier. Byroade
100. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, March 9, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 BURMA. Secret. Drafted by Ewing and cleared by Trueheart. Sent through Ball and U. Alexis Johnson who both initialed it. SUBJECT 1. Ambassador Byroade continues to believe that an invitation to General Ne Win to pay an official visit to the United States would be useful in terms of our interests in Burma. In recent months, he has received indications on several occasions from Foreign Minister U Thi Han and other Burmese officials that such an invitation would be favorably received,/2/ and Ne Win in February told James Linen, Time President, that he would like to visit the U.S. Bill Bundy and I feel that the timing for an invitation is propitious, particularly in that it would follow the invitation to President Marcos of the Philippines and other recent visits by firm friends and would indicate continued interest in neutral opinion. /2/As reported in telegram 197 from Rangoon, October 25, 1965. (Ibid.) In telegram 149 from Rangoon, September 25, Byroade weighed the pros and cons of a Ne Win visit, and reported that he came "down definitely on the side of extending an invitation." (Ibid.) [2.] Other factors which make a Ne Win visit useful at this time are outlined in the attached Memorandum for the President./3/ /3/In a March 18 memorandum to the President the Department of State suggested that a visit by Ne Win would "demonstrate our support of Burmese neutrality and reaffirm that our interest in Southeast Asia is not limited to our close friends and allies." It would dispel Ne Win's bad experiences of his 1960 trip and the suspicion that the United States was hostile to him. it would also counterbalance his visits in 1965 to the Soviet Union and China. (Ibid.) Recommendation: That you sign the attached Memorandum for the President. 3. Since his takeover of the Government in March 1962, Ne Win has sought to maintain Burma's neutral, non-aligned status. In visits to the Soviet Union and Communist China during the past year he carefully avoided allowing himself to be associated with any derogatory statements regarding the U.S. position in Vietnam. An invitation to pay a state visit to the United States would serve to counterbalance those visits and to emphasize U.S. understanding and respect for Burmese independence and non-alignment as well as the importance we attach to Burma. Such a visit would provide an opportunity for Ne Win to meet the President and other top leaders and help to counteract the impressions of his previous visit and dispel lingering suspicions in his mind that the U.S. is hostile toward his regime and wishes to see it replaced. While unlikely to bring about any major change in Ne Win's policies or relaxation of his program for socialization of the Burmese economy, it could result in a friendlier atmosphere for our Embassy to work in and make it possible over a period of time for us to exercise somewhat more influence upon developments in Burma. The principal purpose to be achieved by the visit would, nevertheless, remain to demonstrate our support of Burmese neutrality and to reaffirm that U.S. interest in the area is not limited to our close friends and allies. Recommendation: That you seek to get Presidential approval for a state visit by Ne Win, if possible during the current year; a memorandum to the President suggesting a visit by Ne Win is attached for your signature./4/ /4/Komer sent the President a March 18 memorandum endorsing the invitation and noting that "with our increasing focus on Asia, having a neutralist statesman like this could be a plus. You should know that Ne Win has carefully avoided any statements pro or con on Vietnam." The President approved the invitation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Burma, Ne Win Visit, 9/8-10/66)
101. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 3, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Burma, Ne Win Visit, 9/8-10/66. Secret. SUBJECT General Ne Win has been invited to the United States as a gesture of support for his efforts to maintain Burma's non-alignment and independence and a reaffirmation of our willingness to accept true neutrality in a Southeast Asian State. The visit is also intended to dispel suspicions which Ne Win has long held that the United States is hostile to his government and help improve the atmosphere of our relations with Burma. General Ne Win has visited the United States five times before, but never as head of government or chief of state. His last visit, in 1960 as Chief of Staff of the Burmese Armed Forces, left him and Madame Ne Win with a feeling of resentment over their treatment about which they are still sensitive./2/ /2/A paper prepared by Ewing on September 6 details these four incidents: U.S. customs officials searched Ne Win's and his wife's baggage; doctors at Minnesota University Hospital were questioned about his health; he was kept waiting for an appointment at the Pentagon; and Mrs. Ne Win overheard an insulting reference to herself allegedly made by Mrs. Eisenhower while she was in a private waiting room at Walter Reed Hospital. (Ibid.) Since taking power in a military coup in 1963, General Ne Win has concentrated all power in his own hands. Internally, he has taken a strongly nationalistic approach, aimed at eliminating foreign influence and pulling Burma up by its own bootstraps. However, drastic nationalization of the economy, under a program of "Burmese socialism", has resulted in serious mismanagement and economic disorder, and chronic problems of insurgency, concentrated in the ethnic minority areas, have continued. In foreign relations, Ne Win has maintained a strict neutrality avoiding involvement or comment on issues not directly related to Burmese interests. Acutely conscious of Burma's long and exposed border with Communist China, he has continued to regard the maintenance of good relations with Communist China as essential to prevent Burma from becoming another battlefield like Vietnam. At the same time he has indicated awareness of the importance of an American presence in Southeast Asia in permitting Burma to preserve its neutrality. There are no bilateral issues that need to be raised in this visit. Your meetings with Ne Win will, therefore, be more in the nature of an exchange of views on subjects of mutual interest. Ne Win may not initially be very forthcoming, and I suggest that you make a point of seeking out his opinions early in the conversation. Recommended Topics to Raise: Vietnam: The Burmese Government maintains a carefully neutral attitude on Vietnam, and has resisted Communist pressure to condemn our position there. Ne Win has an appreciation of the significance of the Vietnam struggle for Burma, although the dictates of avoiding provocation to Communist China will not permit him to say so publicly. I recommend that you have a full discussion with him of our position and aims in Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole. Southeast Asian Regional Development: Burma has not taken part in regional development activities because of concern for its neutral status and belief that its limited resources should be confined to Burma. I suggest that you express your belief in the contribution regional development can make to improving the lives of all peoples in Southeast Asia and point out the encouraging progress made to date. I recommend that you do not press Ne Win specifically on participation, which he would be likely to resent. Communist China: Although most Burmese see China as a long-term threat, their relations with Communist China to date have worked satisfactorily for them. I suggest that you explain our policy briefly and solicit General Ne Win's views. Since Ne Win has made a number of trips to Communist China, you may wish to ask him for his estimate of the recent developments in China as well as his views on the basic attitudes and motivations of the Chinese Communist leadership. Topics General Ne Win May Raise: Burma's Non-aligned Policy: Ne Win has indicated sensitivity that the reasons for Burma's non-alignment are not fully understood and he may wish to explain the rationale for his policy. I recommend you reassure General Ne Win of our understanding and respect for his non-alignment and his efforts to maintain Burma's independence. You might also add we respect Burma's right to choose its own way and have no wish to interfere in Burma's internal affairs. I am enclosing a copy of Ambassador Byroade's cable/3/ discussing the visit, which I recommend that you read if you have not already done so. /3/The Department of State copy of this telegram, 217 from Rangoon, August 18, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 BURMA. Dean Rusk
Attachment VISIT OF GENERAL NE WIN OF THE UNION OF BURMA Ambassador Byroade's Cable of August 18 on For the President and Secretary of State As the visit of Ne Win of Burma will be unusual in a number of ways, I hope the President and Secretary can read this message prior to receiving him. There are no current bilateral problems between the United States and Burma which need attention at the Head of State level: no agreement of any type will be sought; no assistance of any substance will be requested or accepted. The only document involved should be a communique/4/ acceptable to both but too mild to cause enthusiasm in either camp. This can probably be worked into final form before the meeting even starts. /4/The communiqué, September 9, is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 643-644. There were difficulties on the wording on Vietnam. They are outlined in a memorandum from Rostow to the President, September 8. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Burma, Ne Win Visit, 9/8-10/66) This naturally raises the question as to what this visit is all about. Unless we goof badly, Ne Win will accomplish his primary purpose (see paragraph 1 below) simply by visiting America and being received by our President. Our primary purpose is to leave him with certain impressions and to dispel others. We will have to do it almost entirely by the manner in which we receive him, what we choose to talk about, and how we say it. The following constitutes the best guidance I can provide. 1. Ne Win's primary purpose in visiting America is simply to prove his continuing neutrality. His recent visits to Peking and Moscow, and the burdensome number of visits he has had from Communist states of late, make him want to redress the appearance of balance that he is determined to retain in his policy of non-alignment. From our point of view we should welcome the opportunity to help him achieve this aim, and to demonstrate that we can accept genuine neutrality in a Southeast Asian state. 2. A close associate of Ne Win recently told me that this visit could be very successful if only our President and Secretary could find means to let Ne Win know that they realize that a policy of neutrality is not an easy one for him to pursue situated where he is geographically, and with a 1200 mile common border with China, in today's Southeast Asia. He thought an awareness of this, and an appreciation of it on our part, was of overriding importance. I believe this assessment correct. 3. I believe the most important thing the President could do would be to talk frankly to Ne Win about his own great personal convictions regarding the struggle in Vietnam. There need be no fear of an argument from him if we express our position frankly but not in such a manner as to imply that we expect public approval from him. He does not want us to lose in Vietnam, but he worries that escalation may involve Burma. He desperately wants to stay out of this conflict because he is painfully aware of the great destruction past wars have wrought upon Burma. We, on our part, have an equal desire that Burma be able to stay out of the conflict in Southeast Asia. This is the single most important parallel interest between the United States and Burma today, and this point should be made. I believe Ne Win is beginning to realize this, but he should have no doubts in his mind after the talks are over. You should of course seek his views on Vietnam, he probably won't feel he can advise us, but he should be made to feel that we look upon him as an Asia whose frank views we would value at any time. I believe the President should also devote some time to his own conviction that, over and above a successful conclusion of the struggle in Vietnam, there should be increasing attention to the well-being and standard of living of all the independent nations in Southeast Asia. 4. The most important impression we want to leave in Ne Win's mind is that he need have no fear of us. I believe his fears of us are considerably less than even a year ago, and I doubt seriously he would even consider coming to America if this were not so. In the past he has worried about possible U.S. support (or U.S.-backed Thai support) to various insurgent groups in Burma, because he knows that most of these ethnic hill groups have sought support from us (without exception turned down) that some are predominantly Christian, that some fought with us during Would War II, and that they are by nature individualists who want no part of the "Burmese Way to Socialism". (In all fairness to Ne Win and his government I must state that I do not believe the insurgents would, for a long time at least, like any Rangoon government that attempted to extend its influence into their areas.) He has also feared that we might so dislike the radical socialist economy he has tried to force on Burma that we would some day try to overthrow him. He has also, and partly for the above reasons, been obsessed in the past with fear of CIA. The passage of time and our low-key policies have alleviated these worries. He should not dwell on his insurgency problems, although it would be natural to ask him about the difficulties it has caused him in building a better Burma. If the opportunity arises naturally, I think you should tell him quite plainly that we consider that the nature of Burma's internal organization and economy to be none of our business. This would sound more convincing if we added that we have very definite views as to what type of economy was best for people, but that we were not about to press these views on him. 5. Ne Win rather likes to talk about China and his views should be sought. He has had more first hand experience with China's leaders than almost anyone else we can talk to these days, and he holds his own with them quite well. He may not give much because he doesn't believe Washington can keep secrets from the press, and he cannot afford to have his frank views on China leaked, but he may talk if the meetings are small. It would be interesting if he did. I mentioned to him once our hopes for the next generation in China. He said "You Americans shouldn't put too much hope in that." We were unfortunately interrupted at that point. 6. I do not believe Ne Win will ask for any economic assistance from the United States while in Washington. They may have in mind some future requests, but if they do I believe they will broach the matter quietly later here in Rangoon. I feel certain that he wants to avoid any accusation of having come to America for assistance. If the subject of aid arises, he is capable of giving a quite refreshing viewpoint as to how nations must learn to stand on their own feet. We could quite honestly applaud this attitude of self-reliance. We might even go so far as to say we recognize and appreciate that Burma, which has accepted relatively small amounts of foreign aid, has not engaged in the practice of whipsawing both sides in the cold war for ever-increasing amounts of money. The subject of past aid might arise, particularly with the Secretary. The Burmese have a rather irritating desire to convince us that our aid procedures are far too complicated, involve too many technicians, etc. U Ohn Khin, on the delegation, repeatedly wants to explain why they cancelled out our large road project in 1964 just before it finally got started, feeling that Washington may not understand and be unhappy with Burma as a result. (We were, in fact, not unhappy at all to end once and for all discussion of this unfortunate project which was initiated in 1959.) I will try to prevent this type of discussion but if it does occur I suggest you listen patiently and assure them their views will be given careful thought. 7. I do not believe Ne Win will raise the subject, nor should we, of past or future U.S. military assistance, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. You should know that we have had a small and inconspicuous military assistance program here since 1958. When Ne Win refused our offer of a grant program in 1958, primarily because of his concern over Chinese reaction, we agreed to a cut-rate sales program repayable in local currency. Ne Win likes to assume that he can truthfully say that he continues to purchase military equipment from several sources (we are the primary one) and that his arrangement with the U.S. is no more than a normal Sears Roebuck type purchase operation with no political connotations. It is in our interest to let him continue to think along in these lines. He was furious at U Thant recently for mentioning publicly that Burma received U.S. equipment. Our previous arrangements will soon expire. I want to see us continue this program, under somewhat different rules, as Burmese requirements are modest and it gives us our most intimate contact with the personnel who are running today's Burma, and those who will be important in the future. I am submitting recommendations in this regard, but do not want to see this the subject of Heads of State discussion anymore than I think Ne Win does. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] This is a complex and sensitive subject. If he raises it, which I doubt, I could brief both of you more fully in his presence, and in a manner in which I do not believe he would take exception. 8. We should not bring up old irritants of the past, particularly the KMT question. I do not think Ne Win will raise it, but if he does, you should both know that I have been open and honest with him on this subject. I did not deny a degree of U.S. support for the refugee Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma to act as a buffer against Communist China in 1951, but I tried to correct his exaggerated opinion of its extent and duration. Also by putting it into broader context, including the Korean situation at that time, I attempted to convince him that this was not aimed any way at Burma. He has never mentioned the subject to me since. In this regard it might be wise for the Secretary to read report of my talk with Ne Win on this subject sent to Bundy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on 30 June 1964. (Attached to briefing paper on Chinese Nationalist irregulars)/5/ /5/Neither found attached. 9. Burma is one of the few countries in the world that does not, publicly or privately, keep telling the U.S. how to manage its foreign affairs. Soon after he was invited on this visit, Ne Win reportedly said "Maybe the Americans are finally beginning to appreciate a guy who can keep his mouth shut." (This was done in a context which suggested he was thinking of Sukarno, Sihanouk, etc.) Perhaps (by indirection) a way can be found which lets Ne Win know we do in fact appreciate this. 10. You probably should express a normal interest as to how the development of Burma is coming along but let it drop rather quickly. Ne Win is ashamed of the state of his economy which he admits "is a mess". I believe he knows now that some movement towards the right, by loosening the extent of government controls, is virtually a necessity. A reversal now is not an easy matter for him, and in this process there must never be any sign of U.S. prompting which he could ill afford. Ne Win is not a doctrinaire socialist and he would probably be embarrassed if someone were to ask him to give an ideological explanation of the Burmese Way to Socialism. He certainly is, however, a dedicated nationalist. He took power in a Burma that had used the forum of parliamentary democracy as an opportunity for endless political squabbling and corruption. Free enterprise to him means the ownership of the economy by unassimilable foreign groups: British, Indian and Pakistani, and Chinese, with the Burmese looking in from the outside. I believe his basic motive in seizing power in Burma was to make sure that the majority of the people, who are Burmese, had their chance to determine the future of their country. He is paying the price for dispossessing the former in-groups, who were after all the bulk of this country's trained managers, and in the process fastened his countrymen onto a system that is steadily reducing them to the subsistency level. What we have in Burma has some of the elements of a tragedy. 11. Burma tries to keep her problems with her neighbors manageable and appreciation could be expressed that she has no area problems that threaten the region. Don't go overboard about the Thais as he doesn't trust them over the long haul. He knows they look down on Burmese, and wonders how they can be wily enough to have never had a war on their soil while Burma always gets beaten up good and proper. 12. Mention our encouragement over regional efforts in the area and hope that Burma will some day find these useful and profitable. Don't press, as he does not want outsiders to know the true condition of his economy. Besides all border area are sensitive and only partly under his control. Regional projects at the moment mean nothing to him as he thinks he has enough problems internally. He may also feel that, under present circumstances, joining regional activities would compromise Burmese neutrality. 13. Do not mention, even inadvertently, U Nu or others that he has interned (as you may be urged to do by domestic critics of Burmese affairs). We still have some way to go to convince Ne Win that we are not trying to meddle in his affairs. While it would be well if he could be convinced that his own security probably would be enhanced with moderation and release of his enemies rather than in continued repression, this is not a subject he would consider appropriate for a first meeting between Heads of State. 14. Try to keep the meetings small. I realize this is difficult, but the smaller the meeting the better the talks will be. 15. Let Ne Win talk. This unusual injunction is given because he is not a self-starter in official conversations, although he warms up if given a chance. This has been on my mind since the visit of the Mansfield group here, and the Foreign Minister's remarks to me afterward. The size of that group, and their desire not to sit through embarrassing silences caused them to bridge all gaps of conversation. Wait him out once in a while and he will do well. This is important, because he will have a better feeling after the talks are over if he feels he carried his part. 16. We should give every impression of being completely frank and honest with this man in all subjects discussed. There will be no danger whatsoever of any leak from him or his staff, to the press. 17. When alone with him, show a friendly concern for his person. The President could inquire about his health, say he had heard with concern of his trip to London for medical reasons. Offer him at any time our very best medical services, the most immediate delivery of any useful new drug or medicine, etc. 18. I have promised him that we will not take advantage of his presence to criticize publicly third parties. This was a relief to him and if we can live up to this promise in our toasts, etc., he will be grateful. This is a good opportunity to convince him of the difference between us and communist leaders, who invariably embarrass him by public statement casting blame on the U.S. In this regard I have asked for advance copies of your intended remarks. He would approach Washington in a far less tense mood if I could furnish these to him somewhat prior to his arrival. (His staff strongly urged me to see if remarks and toasts could be dropped at the Secretary's luncheon. I told them only that I would do what I could to keep it short.) 19. Please insure that all involved in this visit know of a desire at your level that things go smoothly on this visit. I will leave it to your staffs to tell you how unbelievably badly Ne Win's visit to the U.S. was mishandled in 1960. The above advice on how to approach Ne Win does not reflect in any way my humanitarian concern for the people of Burma under certain current aspects of Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism". Rather it reflects my assessment as to what is good for the U.S. with the present state of affairs today in Southeast Asia. It is based upon my belief that Ne Win, with all his shortcomings, remains our best bet in Burma today. The majority of his Burmese critics do not want him replaced. They are furthermore glad he is going to the U.S. as they see in this a sign of a future more to their liking. My advice is also based upon the conviction that we want above all a stable, independent Burma which can manage to stay out of the Southeast Asia conflict, and whose relations with us continue, in a slow and undramatic way, to improve up to the point of a neutrality leaning slightly--but not too much--on our side. I hope you both can find time to read the bios we have sent the Department on both the General and Madame Ne Win. Byroade
102. Editorial Note On September 8, 1966, President and Mrs. Johnson welcomed Chairman and Mrs. Ne Win at a ceremony held on the South Lawn of the White House. After remarks by the President and the Chairman, Johnson took Ne Win by the arm and walked with him to the Diplomatic Room where they and their wives stood in a receiving line. Then, the President took Ne Win out the South Portico to a waiting limousine for a welcoming parade around Washington. During the motorcade ride the two men exchanged pleasantries, but no substantive remarks. The motorcade returned to Blair House where Ne Win received the key to the city of Washington from the D.C. Commissioner. President Johnson and Chairman Ne Win met privately in the Oval Office from 5:07 to 6:05 p.m. No memorandum of this conversation has been found. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Prior to the meeting, Special Assistant Rostow sent the President a brief memorandum suggesting that the President should outline his position on Vietnam, raise the question of Southeast Asian regional development, and ask Ne Win for his view of what was happening in China. (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, September 8; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Burma, Ne Win Visit, 9/8-10/66) That evening Ne Win and his wife attended a dinner at the White House. On September 9 President Johnson met Ne Win briefly from 5:07 to 5:30 to discuss their joint communiqué and bid him farewell. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Ne Win met separately with Under Secretary George Ball and Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman on September 9, 1966. Their conversations covered Bo Setkya, exiled opponent of Ne Win, China, and Vietnam. (Memoranda of conversations, September 9; Department of State, Central Files, POL BURMA-US and POL 7 BURMA) The difficulties posed by Bo Setkya's presence in the United States during the Ne Win visit are outlined in a memorandum from Rusk to the President, August 23. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Miscellaneous Chron)
103. Draft Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Berger) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 13, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) BURMA. Secret. Drafted by Berger. SUBJECT Summary 1. There have been intimations that the Burmese Government may soon approach the United States Government for economic aid on a substantial scale. This paper examines the factors to be considered in determining our response and concludes that we should be chary of entering into any aid program with Burma under present circumstances. We can, however, be helpful in minor ways in showing our good will toward Burma and, in certain circumstances, it might be in our interest to join, in a limited way, with other friendly nations to help Burma./2/ /2/John C. Bullitt, Assistant Administrator of the Far East, Agency for International Development, commented on Berger's memorandum stating it was "excellent" and the recommendations "just right." Bullitt did suggest minor revisions. (Memorandum from Bullitt to Berger, December 14; ibid.) William Gleysteen, Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, agreed with the summary statement and "the thrust of its subsequent discussion," but suggested revisions in recommendation 8c that would downplay the support Burma could expect in the United Nations. (Memorandum from Gleysteen to Berger, December 20; ibid.) Ralph Clough of the Policy Planning Staff agreed with the recommendations, but felt the paper overstated the insurgent threat directed from China; underestimated Burmese nationalism as a countervailing force; and stressed that Burma's immediate neighbors should take the lead while the United States remained in the background. (Memorandum from Clough to Berger, December 22; ibid.) Burma's Exposed Position 2. Burma's 1200-mile frontier with Red China dictates her foreign policy of neutralism and non-involvement. However much Burma may fear Red China or sympathize with her neighbors who are fighting the expansion of communist influence in Southeast Asia, she will not publicly declare herself in support of others, let alone join others in a common cause. While standing up to Red Chinese pressures and harassments with dignity and firmness, Burma avoids outside entanglements in order not to give Red China additional cause for complaint or activity directed against her. 3. Hence, Burma has stayed clear of regional defense associations or bilateral defense agreements, and is unwilling to join even the more innocuous cultural, political or economic associations such as ASPAC, ASEAN, or the Ministerial conferences on trade, agriculture and education, or the Asian Development Bank. Her sole memberships are in ECAFE, the Colombo Plan, and the Mekong Committee. 4. The strength of Burma's position via-a-vis Red China lies in her nationalism, which is well-developed, real and fervent, and in the continued weakness, up to now, of the Burmese Communist Party. Should Communist China decide to abandon its "respect for Burmese neutrality," which has characterized its policy until recently, step up its support of the Burmese communists and help them to develop cadres for a "national liberation front," a serious insurgency situation could develop within a few years, for there are shocking weaknesses in Burma which can be easily and rapidly exploited. a. The Burmese Government is both ineffective and incompetent in dealing with its internal problems. b. Doctrinaire economic policies, developed under the slogan of Burma's "nationalist way to socialism," have caused the economy to decline in all key sectors: food and manufacturing production, domestic and international trade, and foreign exchange earnings and reserves. As a dramatic example, this nation, which was one of the largest producers and exporters of rice in the world when it became independent, has allowed its rice production to so run down that it has barely enough rice to feed its people. As a result of this and similar shortcomings, there is growing popular dissatisfaction and dissension in Burma in both the Burmese portion of the population as well as among the large minority ethnic groups. c. These ethnic groups, who live in the border areas, have closer ties with similar ethnic groups in Laos, Thailand, and China than with the Burmese. Some of these groups are fiercely independent, and have resorted to arms in pursuit of autonomy. Others are passive or resigned. In their attitudes toward Red China and communism, some ethnic groups are hostile, others indifferent, while still others would not hesitate to take help from communist sources outside Burma in furtherance of their resistance to Burmese dominations. d. Banditry is widespread in many parts of the country. 5. In short, the authority of the Burmese Government even now does not exist or is being challenged in many parts of Burma. With an ineffective military government, a deteriorating economy, disaffected national and ethnic groups, and widespread banditry, Burma is ideal terrain for communist insurgency, whose invariable aim is to destroy the authority of the government, starting in the rural areas, and set up its own authority instead. A real effort by Red China to exploit these weaknesses--and there are signs that Communist China now intends to do so--could in a few years produce an insurgency far more dangerous than exists in Thailand, and one much more akin to what we have been confronted with in South Viet-Nam. 6. Should general economic conditions worsen and the internal danger grow, the Burmese Government will more and more be forced to turn to outside powers, especially Japan and the United States, and possibly Russia, for help--economic and military--to enable it to defend its national independence against these internal threats supported from China. But Burmese nationalism is so prickly, and her attachment to doctrinaire socialism so pervasive, that she would insist that help be without strings, that there be no interference in her internal affairs, and that there be no obligation to abandon either her domestic policies or her neutralist and non-involvement foreign policy. 7. All the foregoing suggests that Burma is, at present, hardly a country to which we should give aid or commit ourselves to support. Yet the temptation to provide help to resist a growing communist-led insurgency within Burma will be great. And, one step leading to another, we could, if we pursued this course, find ourselves in a few years enmeshed in a situation which not only would be costly, frustrating and complicated, but most unpromising as to any successful outcome. 8. It is important, as we move into this new and more dangerous period which is now unfolding in Burma, with the prospect of aid requests being put upon us, that we establish very clearly with the Burmese what we are and what we are not prepared to do: a. In my view we should state bluntly to the Burmese that so long as Burma pursues her present economic policies we are not prepared even to consider aid requests, since aid will produce no meaningful or constructive results in present circumstances. Only if the Burmese abandon unwise economic policies and embark on a course that will reverse the disintegration of recent years are we prepared to consider aid and support. We ourselves are not prepared to give the Burmese advice on what that new course should be. World Bank and IMF services and experts can provide this advice if the Burmese wish to avail themselves of it. This is what Indonesia has done, when it reversed its course, and this is what we suggest for Burma. b. Secondly, we must point out that aid is not the answer to Burma's problems. There is much that Burma can do by itself without aid to reverse its economic decline. The restoration of incentives to produce, especially among farmers, and the restoration of features of a market economy, are essential. If Burma does move in these new directions we are prepared to join with the Japanese and other friendly countries to see what we might be able to do, in concert with others, to help. However, we will not act alone or bilaterally. c. Thirdly, that while we understand and respect Burma's desire, given her geographic position, not to get involved in the wider aspects of the free world-communist confrontation, we cannot treat Burma in isolation of this wider struggle. Before we can provide aid there are domestic and international aspects of such help to which we must pay attention. For us to help Burma we require that she bring forcefully to the attention of the UN the developing insurgency which is being fostered from the outside and seek UN moral support and endorsement of her efforts to preserve her national independence. Unless Burma is willing to seek the support of world opinion on her behalf--an effort to which we would lend our help--we would find it difficult to provide aid. If UN support is not forthcoming, we would be prepared to reexamine our position on aid, but the important thing is that Burma must itself make the effort to obtain UN resolutions calling on member countries of the UN to help Burma. 9. There are other aspects of Burma which would complicate our giving aid, for example, the military dictatorship, the government's narrow political base, the Burmese attitude toward its minority groups, etc., but there is little need to raise these matters in the first instance. The first hurdle to be mounted is the will of the Burmese Government to initiate fundamental economic change. If they would move sensibly and pragmatically in the right directions in these regards, we can assume that they would also see the light in regard to political and minority matters. 10. Meantime we can say that we are prepared to do some simple things even at the outset to show our good will toward Burma. We are willing to train economists in the US, provide books to its universities, put Burma in touch with the latest scientific developments in rice culture, help train civil servants in administration, give Burma the benefit of our experience in countering insurgency, and sell arms and equipment useful in counter-insurgency on commercial terms./3/ /3/According to telegram 151165 to Rangoon, April 23, the East Asia Interdepartmental Review Group reviewed the question of additional aid to Burma. It concluded on April 12 that the United States should decline to give Burma aid under PL-480 and should decline a request from Burma for a pre-investment survey. The United States was prepared to provide a "modest amount technical assistance in form of participant training" and would advise Burma to join the ADB and seek economic advice from international organizations. (Ibid.)
104. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 51-68 Washington, March 14, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA prepared this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with it except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A table of contents and a map indicating the major areas of insurgent activity are not printed. Fred Green, Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, recommended that Hughes approve this estimate. Green noted that DIA and Berger had initially requested its production because of concern about increasing Chinese Communist involvement and cooperation among insurgent groups. DIA was the most concerned about the threat of insurgency, while the State and Office of National Estimates representatives did not view Chinese activities as a real danger. The other area of difference was the Burmese Army as a counter-insurgency force. CIA gave it high marks; DIA considered it totally inept. The estimate's conclusion is a compromise of these extremes, which Green considered the best judgment possible given inadequate sources of information. (Memorandum from Green to Hughes, March 12; ibid.) INSURGENCY IN BURMA The Problem To assess the probable course of insurgent activity in Burma over the next year, with special emphasis on the involvement of Communist China. Conclusions A. The recent sharp rift in Sino-Burmese relations, after a long period of cordiality, and the continuing deterioration in Burma's economic situation have combined to produce a climate more favorable to Burma's persistent insurgents--the Karen, Shan, and Kachin ethnic minorities as well as the Burmese Communists. In recent months there has been some intensification in dissident activity. B. Over the next year there may be a further growth in the insurgent threat, due in part to the limited aid which we believe the Chinese will give to the ethnic minority insurgents along the border and to Burmese Communist insurgents in lower Burma. C. Chinese support will probably remain limited in the near future, and the Burmese Government has stepped up both its political and military countermeasures. Hence we believe the insurgency will be contained during the next year. D. The longer term outlook depends significantly upon the future policies of the Chinese and Burmese Governments. Given time and effort, Chinese supported insurgency could severely strain the re- sources of the Burmese Government, especially if Rangoon continues to generate popular discontent by implementing restrictive economic policies and persists in maintaining an uncompromising attitude towards the status of the ethnic minority groups. [Here follows the Discussion section of the paper.] [Continue with the next documents]
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