NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
197. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State/1/ Manila, October 31, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Seoul eyes only for Secretary from Ambassador Blair. There was no time of dispatch on the source text, which was received at the Department of State at 2:07 a.m., October 31. 4791. Ref Bangkok 5507./2/ /2/In telegram 5507, October 28, the Embassy reported that it had received a "cryptic 'aide-memoire'" from President Marcos to President Johnson, October 27, which is described in paragraph 1 below. (Ibid.) 1. I spoke to President Marcos today about his aide-memoire on Cambodia addressed to President Johnson and he confirmed (Manila's 4431)/3/ that he had received a verbal message from Prince Sihanouk through Phil Ambassador in Phnom Penh stating Sihanouk's desire to normalize relations with U.S. message asked Marcos to discuss matter with President Johnson but said that if anything leaked out he, Sihanouk, would deny making any overtures. /3/Dated October 22. (Ibid., POL CAMB-US) 2. Marcos says he believes that U.S. should convey to Sihanouk through Marcos its regret over alleged mistake bombings and offer to send them team to investigate. Repeat this is Marcos's idea and not Sihanouk's. Marcos further suggested that investigating team once in Cambodia would be able to check on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong hostile establishments for actions inside Cambodian territory. 3. All this seems rather far fetched to us and I conveyed to Marcos Secretary's comments on Sihanouk (Manila's 4431). However, Marcos told me he hopes to serve as intermediary between U.S. and Cambodia just as he claims he did between Malaysia and Indonesia. Once Marcos receives message from us to Sihanouk that we regret the bombings he will transmit it through his Ambassador in Phnom Penh and will then await Sihanouk's reaction to our further expression of willingness to send investigating team. If Sihanouk agrees, Marcos would then announce here our regrets and Sihanouk's willingness to accept investigating team. 4. I understand Cambodian Charge to Manila was called back suddenly to Phnom Penh on October 27th, the day of President Johnson's departure. 5. Will respond to your query on Johnson-Marcos communiqué U.S. state visit in septel./4/ /4/Not further identified. Blair
198. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-779-66 Washington, December 19, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Cambodia, 1966. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. (TS) Reference is made to JCSM-812-65, dated 12 November 1965,/2/ in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you of their views and recommendations concerning Cambodian support of the Viet Cong (VC). The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that forceful action be taken to stop the use of Cambodian territory by enemy forces as a logistics base and sanctuary. /2/Document 159. 2. (TS) You concurred in actions to expand and intensify the over-all intelligence collection program in Cambodia, increased surveillance of the sea lines of communication (LOCs) between the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and Cambodia, increased controls on the Mekong and Bassac waterways, and planning for the conduct of covert paramilitary operations and low-altitude aerial reconnaissance. You further stated that should these measures prove ineffective other recommendations would be considered on a case-by-case basis. The immediate pursuit of VC/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces withdrawing into Cambodian territory was authorized only in emergency self defense/preservation situations. 3. (TS) Measures recommended for the conduct of an aggressive political/psychological campaign to persuade the Cambodian Government to stop support of the VC/NVA were referred to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State advised a gradual and cautious approach and, with respect to covert cross-border operations, full consideration of the political problems involved. He further stated that there was a lack of convincing evidence of the significant use of Cambodian territory by the VC/NVA. 4. (TS) The VC/NVA exploitation of the pseudo-neutrality of Cambodia has increased to serious proportions. This is amply substantiated by a recent DIA assessment (Appendix A)/3/ and attested to by the conclusions reached at a Southeast Asia Coordination (SEACOORD) meeting of 10 November 1966. VC/NVA use of the Cambodian sanctuary constitutes a clear and present danger and thereby requires a continuous commitment of sizable friendly forces to the border area, impedes progress of the land campaign, and results in unnecessary US and friendly casualties. Major US operations conducted adjacent to the Cambodian border during 1966, including the largest ground operation to date, Attelboro, have provided continuing indications that the VC/NVA are using Cambodia as a base of operations, a safe haven, and a source of logistical support. /3/Appendices A and B are attached, but not printed. 5. (TS) Actions authorized under current policy have proven inadequate to counter the growing threat imposed by VC/NVA use of Cambodia. An impasse exists wherein the collection of convincing intelligence is prerequisite to changes in policy, while adequate intelligence cannot be obtained until this policy is changed. COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and Embassy Saigon recommend and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur that additional measures must be taken to obtain adequate and convincing intelligence suitable for use in diplomatic efforts aimed at reversing Cambodia's countenance of the present situation. 6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that current national policy with respect to Cambodia must again by reviewed in light of over-all US objectives in Southeast Asia and the continued use of the Cambodian sanctuary by the VC/NVA. It is noted that Secretary Vance has requested the Under Secretary of State to establish a joint State-Defense-CIA study group to explore problems associated with Cambodia. This will take time. In the meantime, certain minimum actions should be taken now. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The over-all intelligence collection program against Cambodia be expanded and intensified immediately to include: (1) Authorization for ground reconnaissance operations such as Daniel Boone into Cambodia. (2) Authorization to conduct high altitude U-2 photography over Cambodia on a continuing basis. (3) Authorization to conduct medium and low altitude day/night photography, ARDF, IR, and SLAR on a continuing basis into Cambodia to a depth of 75 nautical miles from the border with Laos and South Vietnam (SVN). Excluded from reconnaissance coverage is an area 25 nautical miles around Phnom Penh. b. Immediate pursuit of actively engaged VC/NVA forces which are withdrawing into Cambodian territory be authorized, thereby enhancing our capability to destroy the enemy, gaining hard intelligence, and increasing the security of the border area. c. A more extensive coordinated public affairs and information program and supporting psychological operations be instituted to illuminate Cambodian support to the VC/NVA, to dissuade Cambodia from continuing such support, and to lay the foundation for possible future courses of action. d. A memorandum, substantially as contained in Appendix B, together with a copy of Appendix A, be forwarded to the Secretary of State. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.
199. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 57-67 Washington, January 26, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 57-67. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a covering note, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with its submission except the representative of the FBI who abstained on the grounds it was outside his jurisdiction. SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE Conclusions A. Denying the Communists the use of Cambodian territory and supplies would make life more difficult for them; it would not constitute a decisive element in their ability to conduct military operations in South Vietnam. B. The availability of Cambodian territory is of considerable psychological and military advantage to the Communists. They use it as sanctuary to evade allied forces and more permanently as a refuge for rest, training, medical care, storage of supplies, and as a convenient and secure route for the infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam. C. Access to the Cambodian rice surplus has alleviated one of the Communists' most serious logistics problems. Movements of Cambodian rice to the Communists in the South Vietnamese highlands and Laotian Panhandle during 1966, as a result of an official Cambodian sale and some smuggling, could have reached 20,000 tons and possibly more. This quantity more than met the annual consumption requirements of Communist forces in the rice-deficit Vietnamese highlands and the Laotian Panhandle, and obviated any need to move substantial quantities of food down the Laotian route system from North Vietnam. D. The Communists continue to smuggle small quantities of arms and other military equipment from Cambodia; some of this probably represents unauthorized diversions from the Communist arms now being imported by the Cambodian Government for its own forces. But we have no evidence of large-scale diversions of these arms or of any substantial clandestine movement of arms into Cambodia and thence forward to the Communists in Vietnam. Moreover, its seems unlikely that the Communist command would choose to rely in any major way on such an uncertain and indirect source of arms for its main force units, so long as the overland routes from North Vietnam are available. Some other supplies such as drugs, communications equipment, and chemicals useful in the manufacture of explosives are obtained from Cambodia, but the quantities involved are not critical to the overall Communist effort. E. During 1967, Communist use of Cambodia will probably continue to increase, as it has over the past 18 months. The principal causes are the logistic burdens imposed on the Communists by their own military buildup and the increasing military pressures imposed by allied forces. F. Sihanouk is probably aware of the general nature of Communist activities in Cambodia. He has shown some concern that he has leaned too far to the Communist side, and over possible US-GVN counteractions. But Cambodia lacks the military capability to close its 700-mile border with South Vietnam, and any determined effort to do so would run counter to Sihanouk's basic aims of avoiding direct involvement in the war, of avoiding too close alignment with the US, and of maintaining cordial relations with the Communists. Thus, we do not foresee any substantial change in Cambodia's posture over the next year toward the war in Vietnam. [Here follows the Discussion section of the paper.]
200. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Denny) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 57-67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limited Distribution. SUBJECT /2/Document 199. The attached Special National Intelligence Estimate assesses the nature and the extent of Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory in support of Communist military operations in South Vietnam. The estimate was requested by the SEACOORD ambassadors, following their meeting in Saigon last November. Drawing on a MACV intelligence study, "The Role of Cambodia in the NVN/VC War Effort,"/3/ which was prepared a month previously and served as the basis of their briefing by General Westmoreland's intelligence officers, the SEACOORD ambassadors concluded that Communist use of Cambodia "is growing in magnitude" and cited MACV's view that our "tolerance level" of refusing to expand the fighting into Cambodia "is being reached." Finally, SEACOORD proposed, pending "confirmation of the magnitude and seriousness of the problem" by the intelligence community estimate, a number of specific actions to discourage Communist use of Cambodia and to expand our intelligence assets on the problem. /3/See Document 194. Utilizing intelligence from all sources, as well as the MACV study of last year, the estimate deals with Communist use of Cambodia for sanctuary, infiltration, and logistical support, the extent of official Cambodian involvement, as well as the RKG's ability to counter Communist efforts through Cambodia. It also attempts to assess Communist alternatives to the use of Cambodian territory in the event that Cambodian rice were denied the insurgents. The estimate concludes that, while Communist use of Cambodian territory has increased substantially during the past 18 months and will probably continue to do so as a result of increased requirements created both by their own military build-up and intensified military operations by allied forces, denial of Cambodian territory to the Viet Cong "would not constitute a decisive element in their ability to conduct military operations," even though it would make life more difficult for them. Regarding the RKG's ability to restrict Viet Cong use of Cambodia, the estimate concludes that "Cambodia's capability to detect and resist sizable Communist forces or inhibit Communist activities, particularly in the northeast, is extremely limited." However, it notes that Sihanouk is probably aware of the general nature but not the full extent of Communist activities in Cambodia and that his own attitude has fostered a permissive atmosphere for collusion by officials and private commercial interests. The estimate also makes the judgment that Sihanouk could do more than he is now doing to discourage the Viet Cong, but because of Cambodian military limitations, fear of involvement in the war, and Sihanouk's belief that in the long run he will have to deal with the Communists, Sihanouk's efforts during 1967 to control Communist use of Cambodia "will be minor and ineffectual." In sum, the principal judgments in this estimate are (1) that Communist use of Cambodian territory is not decisive to the Communist military effort in South Vietnam and (2) that the RKG is neither willing nor able to restrict substantially the use of its territory. On the basis of these judgments, therefore, the estimate does not appear to support the tone and implications of the MACV study. Indeed, in its own thorough review and evaluation of the MACV study, CIA has concluded that the MACV study (1) failed to discriminate sufficiently in the use of raw intelligence reports and (2) overstated the significance of Cambodia to Communist military operations in South Vietnam. We agree with CIA on these points. Despite the estimate's divergence with MACV, it is worth noting that the DOD representatives had no major difficulties with it. Indeed, there was considerable consensus among all representatives on the high-lights of the estimate. At one point, DIA threatened to reserve its position over the amount of rice estimated to have been delivered from Cambodia to Communist forces in the central Vietnamese highlands and in the southern Laos panhandle, but later accepted compromise wording on this portion of the estimate. Finally, the conclusion that the Viet Cong in certain areas would probably have to rely on major shipments of rice from North Vietnam if Cambodia were no longer a source is, in our judgment, somewhat overdrawn since we are not at all confident that sources within South Vietnam could not make up the gap or that rice from these sources could be effectively denied the insurgents.
201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Australia/1/ Washington, March 24, 1967, 10:27 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Ewing, cleared by Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC. 161744. 1. Please deliver following personal message from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Hasluck at earliest possible opportunity: "Dear Paul: I very much hope that Prime Minister Holt, during his forthcoming visit to Phnom Penh, will have the opportunity to discuss with Cambodian leaders including Prince Sihanouk the possibilities for an improvement in U.S.-Cambodian relations. We are concerned, as I am sure you are too, at the increasing seriousness of military problems resulting from Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory and support received from Cambodia. The number of recent incidents that have arisen as a result of Operation Junction City/2/ testify to the seriousness of this situation, which we fear will only lead to a further deterioration in relations with Cambodia unless some way is found to reduce the problem and deal with it more effectively than at the present time. /2/In late February 1967, MACV launched Operation Junction City against Communist strongholds in an area northwest of Saigon to the Cambodian border. The operation was a major part of MACV's search and destroy strategy in Vietnam. Communist Vietnamese forces have been using Cambodia as an infiltration route, sanctuary and source of supplies since the early 1960s. With the escalation of hostilities in the past few years, Communist utilization of Cambodia has steadily increased. There is every reason to believe, moreover, that during the coming year, as allied forces successfully clear enemy base areas in South Vietnam, pressure upon North Vietnam and the Viet Cong to expand their use of the sanctuary existing in Cambodia will further increase. The psychological and military advantages of a privileged sanctuary have hindered the effective conduct of military operations against the enemy throughout Vietnam because of the necessity to divert troops to areas near the Cambodian border. Furthermore, in the immediate border area allied forces have sustained casualties from Vietnamese Communist forces which have taken sanctuary on Cambodian soil and under conditions in which they were permitted only limited countermeasures in self-defense. Under such circumstances, border incidents that involve Cambodian lives and property, unfortunately, are almost inevitable despite the care and restraint exercised by allied forces to avoid them. The United States has on many occasions expressed to the Cambodian Government its concern over the problems arising from Vietnamese Communist activity in the border areas and its readiness to support any proposal which offers a reasonable prospect of assuring that Cambodia's neutrality is respected by all concerned. It supported the Cambodian proposal to make the International Control Commission in Phnom Penh more effective and it has declared its willingness to discuss with the Cambodian Government directly any other ways of dealing with this problem. Evidence of enemy use of Cambodian territory has been offered to the Cambodian Government in an attempt to inform it of the extent of the enemy presence. The most recent approach to the Cambodian Government, which covered the aforementioned points, was made through Australian Ambassador Deschamps in Phnom Penh on January 20 of this year. To date the Cambodian Government has neither accepted the offer of evidence, nor the suggestion of discussions to resolve the problem. The United States has been and still is willing to accept as sincere Cambodia's declared desire to maintain a neutral status, despite the fact that over the past two years Cambodia has regularly protested alleged violations of its territory by U.S. and allied forces but has not, to our knowledge, protested or made any official acknowledgment of violations of its territory by Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces. Enemy use of Cambodia has increased during that period, and the problem has grown progressively more serious. The United States has not charged the Cambodian Government with supporting or assisting the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces but, on the contrary, has repeatedly taken pains to describe enemy use of Cambodia as a problem for Cambodia as much as for U.S. and allied forces in South Vietnam. There have been recent signs that Cambodia is attempting to control its frontiers more effectively. Even given Cambodia's physical inability to control by itself its long frontier with South Vietnam, however, it has not been clear that these Cambodian efforts are being applied uniformly or with particular energy against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces entering Cambodia. There is as yet no evidence, for example, of such forces being interned or of systematic efforts being taken forcibly to prevent them from entering Cambodia. Continued failure by Cambodian authorities to deal with this problem effectively or even to acknowledge its existence can only bring into question the genuineness of Cambodia's claim to neutral status. In discussing with Cambodian officials the seriousness with which the United States Government views the present situation and our desire to find a way to bring about an improvement in it, I would appreciate if Prime Minister Holt would again reassure them that the United States has no hostile intent or design toward Cambodia. We recognize and respect Cambodia's independence and territorial integrity and its desire to remain neutral. It remains our wish that Cambodia should have the opportunity to develop in peace and security and that our differences may be resolved peacefully and on a basis mutually beneficial to both countries. (For the Prime Minister's background information, the United States prior to the time relations with Cambodia were broken had given evidence of support for Cambodia through economic and military assist-ance totaling $342.5 million.) The United States accepted, regretfully, the Cambodian Government's decision to break relations in May, 1965. Since that time, we have on a number of occasions stated our readiness to consider a restoration of relations on a mutually acceptable basis and without any preconditions. We continue to be prepared at any time to enter into discussions with the Cambodians of our mutual problems, in particular to consider ways in which to reduce the dangerous situation now existing in the border areas and provide a sound basis for the improvement of U.S.-Cambodian relations. It is a development which we would very much like to see take place. In this respect, we were disappointed last fall at the postponement of the proposed visit by Governor Harriman and would be happy to see the prospect revived for a visit of a similar nature, which could provide the opportunity for frank discussions of the full range of problems and difficulties existing between us. In the meantime, we would hope that follow-up discussions could be carried on by Ambassador Deschamps, or through direct channels where they may be available, in a mutual effort to devise ways in which to bring about an improvement in the existing situation./3/ /3/In telegram 6071 from Vientiane, April 3, Sullivan reported a conversation with Holt who had just left Cambodia and was visiting Laos. Holt and Sihanouk, according to Sullivan, "hit it off well." Sihanouk frankly admitted that "the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were trespassing on some of his territory" and wanted to oust them. Sihanouk also realized that there would be occasional U.S. infringements and bombings in the heat of battle, which he would protest vigorously, but the United States should understand his protestations were pro forma. Sihanouk would not accept "permanent" U.S. occupation of Cambodian territory. Holt's advice to the United States, according to Sullivan, was "to let its relations with Cambodia just simmer along as they are" without reestablishing relations or sending missions to Phnom Penh. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Cables, 2/67-12/67) With warm personal regards, Dean" 2. Australian Embassy here being informed of contents of message. Rusk
202. Memorandum From the Chief, Far Eastern Division, Directorate of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 13, 1967. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files: Job 78-000032R, Chipwood Memos, Vol. II. Secret. 2-1/2 pages of source text not declassified.]
203. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, April 14, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUSTL-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Douglas R. Perry and Ewing of EA/BUC. SUBJECT 1. Mr. Hasluck has deferred replying to your message to him about Cambodia in order to discuss it with you personally while he is here for the SEATO meeting (Tab A)./2/ You have a meeting with him scheduled for April 17 at 7:00 p.m., and I believe this offers a good opportunity to stress our deep concern over Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodia which is becoming an increasingly serious military problem for us. /2/The tabs were not attached. Presumably Tab A is telegram 6071 from Vientiane, April 3, see footnote 3, Document 201. 2. My impression is that the Australians, in particular Ambassador Deschamps in Phnom Penh, do not fully share the seriousness with which we view this situation. You will recall that in your letter to Hasluck prior to Prime Minister Holt's recent visit to Cambodia (March 29-31), you emphasized our concern over the problem, which you requested that Prime Minister Holt convey to Sihanouk along with our desire to discuss ways to improve the present situation (Tab B)./3/ While the VC question and border incidents were discussed by Holt with Sihanouk, Ambassador Deschamps' account of the conversation (Tab C)/4/ does not indicate that Holt undertook to convey the full flavor of your message. /3/See Document 201. /4/Tab C is a copy of an Australian telegram reporting on the Sihanouk-Holt conversation of March 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 AUSTL-US) 3. Hasluck is likely to reflect the impressions which Prime Minister Holt received as the result of his visit to Phnom Penh. These, as reported by a member of Holt's party, are: (a) We should not at this time try to force matters with Cambodia in any direction, whether towards a restoration of relations or towards more determined action against VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory. (b) In Sihanouk's present "anti-American" frame of mind, a visit by Governor Harriman would not be likely to be productive and we should for the time being continue to rely on Ambassador Deschamps. (c) Sihanouk realistically accepted the inevitability of border incidents, although he intended to continue protesting them for the record and would strongly resist anything that looked like a permanent lodgment of American or South Vietnamese forces on Cambodian territory. (Tab D)/5/ /5/Apparent reference to a copy of paragraph 5 (a) of Tab C. 4. I recommend that you stress to Hasluck our strong feeling of the need to find a way to reduce the advantage which Viet Cong and North Vietnamese are now able to derive from use of Cambodian territory. Our intelligence people consider that the ability to use Cambodia offers a psychological and military advantage of considerable value to the enemy and that the use is likely to increase further during the coming year. While we are aware of the limitations of what the Cambodians are able or could be expected to do, we do believe that direct discussions with them at some level could help to relieve some of their apprehensions and establish the base for some form of cooperative action to deal with the problem, at least in some fields. Initially this might possibly take the form of an exchange of intelligence information on VC/NVA activities on either side of the border as well as discussion of ways to improve border controls and reduce the danger of border incidents through further efforts to get an expansion of the Cambodian ICC, use of some other international group or neutral third country, or improvement of Cambodian patrolling capabilities. At a later stage, if a good working relationship were established, we might be able to probe ways in which the Cambodians could be assisted to do more or to countenance certain actions by others which they are themselves unable to perform. 5. In view of Holt's feeling that the timing may not be propitious for a visit by Governor Harriman, you may wish to get Hasluck's reaction to the possibility of establishing direct contact through a visit by an experienced but lower ranking and less visible official. An alternate possibility would be contact in a third country such as Japan, where the Cambodian Ambassador, Prince Sirik Matak, appears to be intelligent and well disposed as well as to have good contacts with the Lon Nol Government. Depending on Hasluck's reaction, you may wish to suggest that Ambassador Deschamps be asked to take some discreet soundings in Phnom Penh regarding the establishment of contact in one fashion or another.
204. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 21, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-International Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 169. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy and approved in S on May 1. Holyoake, Hasluck, and Rusk were attending the 16th meeting of the ANZUS Council, held in Washington, April 21-22. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Hasluck began by reporting on Prime Minister Holt's trip to Phnom Penh. He said that Holt had wished to help, but it was hard on a first visit to get into argument on the difficult questions related to the VC. Holt had engaged in some discussion with Sihanouk, in which without being argumentative he had at least got across to Sihanouk that the US believed it had a real case. Hasluck then adverted to the question of what Deschamps might usefully do. He thought he could readily and perhaps usefully make soundings seeking to have a direct US-Cambodian channel of some sort. However, he was dubious that Deschamps could effectively raise the question of providing or exchanging information on VC/NVA activities. Deschamps could only talk to Sihanouk as a practical matter, since talking to any other Cambodian would arouse resistance from Sihanouk when he heard about it. Sihanouk would fear the Chinese reaction if he appeared to be getting into such an information exchange with us. Therefore, even if the exchange were proposed, Sihanouk would probably turn it down. If he did accept, he would at once wish to know where it led, and this would be most difficult. Hasluck concluded that it was the general Australian view that the US should not rush. Let Deschamps talk about direct contacts, but don't ask him to discuss exchange of information. The Secretary responded that he was agreeable to this proposal. As to the locale of direct contacts, he suggested that they could be in Tokyo, or New Delhi, or at the UN, or indeed wherever the Cambodians wished. The Secretary noted that Senator Brooke felt he had received some encouragement in this direction, though not from Sihanouk himself. Hasluck then went on to say that he himself had made the deliberated decision to leave Deschamps in Phnom Penh, having learned when he took over (in April 1964) that Deschamps was up for transfer. He considered Deschamps ideally equipped to conduct a policy of keeping relations smooth with the Cambodians and particularly never getting into argument. This was in fact Deschamps' own personal inclination, and this he had done. Hasluck considered the results of this policy to have been of value, as the Australians clearly had good standing in Phnom Penh now and even their role in Viet-Nam was not condemned by the Cambodians. The matter was left at that, and Bundy remarked that we would draw up a possible message for Deschamps to use suggesting direct contacts.
205. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Cambodian Study Group (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, May 1, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by Unger and initialed by Kohler. SUBJECT 1. Pursuant to a suggestion to you from Deputy Secretary Vance, agreement was reached last December on the establishment of Joint Study Group under Department of State Chairmanship to discuss means of dealing with the problem of Viet Cong-North Vietnamese use of Cambodia. In addition to State, representatives of the Department of Defense and CIA participated in the study and USIA was included in the discussions of psychological operations. 2. The Study Group has now completed its initial report which I am submitting to you at Tab A. In this report (pages 1-4) you will find a summary and a series of recommendations which provide the essence of our findings. It is our hope that the report will serve as a policy and operating guide for the Cambodian question as it relates to the war in Viet-Nam. The report is labeled "initial" in recognition of the need to reassess its findings regularly. 3. If you approve the report I recommend that you forward it to Messrs. Vance and Helms (see draft letter at Tab B)/2/ and invite their approval as well. Once the report is approved I would recommend also providing an information copy to Mr. Marks, USIA. /2/Attached but not printed. 4. As the work of the Study Group proceeded we were able to reach immediate agreement on certain recommended actions and authorization was given to proceed with these forthwith as noted in the report, beginning on page 26. In addition to those actions, primarily in the military field, we have also been proceeding with diplomatic and informational activities. 5. With respect to certain other recommended actions, the Study Group deferred decision in one instance and in the remaining cases decided it was inadvisable to approve the actions under present circumstances. These deferred and disapproved proposals are discussed in the report starting on page 30. The deferred decision concerns certain limited ground reconnaissance operations, including the participation of US personnel, in a limited area of Northeast Cambodia adjacent to South Viet-Nam and Laos (code name: Daniel Boone). Because of the sensitivity of these operations I wished them to be considered at a high level in the Department but I recommend that they be approved since I consider the military utility high and the risk of exposure low. Recommendations/3/ /3/Katzenbach approved both recommendations on May 9. 6. It is recommended that you: a) Approve the Initial Report (Tab A) of the Study Group and sign the letters transmitting it to Defense and CIA (see Tab B). b) Approve the Daniel Boone operation recommended by the Study Group and concur in the transmittal of the messages contained in Tab K of the Initial Report. [Here follows a table of contents.]
Attachment/4/ Initial Report of the Joint Department of State-Department of Defense-Central Intelligence Agency Study Group on Cambodia /4/Top Secret; Limdis. I. Summary and Recommendations Following a SEACOORD meeting in November 1966, which focussed attention on the increasing seriousness of the problems of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodia, USIB undertook a restudy of the problem in an effort to evaluate its relative significance to our military effort in Vietnam. That study, completed on January 26, 1967, concludes inter alia that VC/NVA use of Cambodia: (1) does not constitute a decisive element in the enemy capability for conducting military operations in Vietnam; (2) is of considerable psychological and military advantage to them; and (3) is likely to increase further during the coming year./5/ /5/Special National Intelligence Estimate 57-67: Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort. [Footnote in the source text; see Document 199.] Based on the USIB study, an interdepartmental Study Group, representing State, OASD/ISA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CIA (with USIA participation on psychological operations) has been meeting since early February under Ambassador Unger's chairmanship to consider what additional actions might be taken to deal with this problem. In particular, the Study Group has examined in detail proposals submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an expansion of existing ground and aerial intelligence collection activities, psychological operations, and immediate pursuit of VC/NVA forces on Cambodian soil. In considering the JCS proposals, the Study Group has worked from the premises that, for the present, our efforts to deal with this problem should continue to be primarily in the political sphere and should be on a priority basis. Provocative actions which would seriously prejudice the success of such efforts and threaten to expand the combat into Cambodia should be avoided. However, those actions which are clearly required in terms of self-defense of our forces in South Vietnam should continue to be authorized as necessary. Although recognizing the limited capability of the Cambodians to control their frontiers, the Study Group noted recent developments in Cambodia which seem to offer an improved prospect for getting the Cambodian Government to take more effective action to reduce the advantage VC/NVA forces derive from use of Cambodian territory. The Study Group supported a stepped up plan of political/diplomatic action aimed at getting Cambodian cooperation or acquiescence in dealing with this problem and bringing about an improvement in US-Cambodian relations. In view of the increased concern over VC/NVA activity in Cambodia and in order to obtain a clearer picture of the extent of such activity and its effect upon military operations in South Vietnam, measures designed to expand air intelligence collection programs and which carry tolerable political risks have been approved. An expanded leaflet operation to reach VC/NVA forces in relatively sparsely populated border areas of Cambodia has also been approved and a psychological operations plan prepared for use as authorized (Tab H). Other proposals involving actions by US forces on Cambodian territory, which would have been difficult to conceal and involved high risk of further worsening our relations with Cambodia, have been deferred pending further diplomatic efforts to reach some understanding with Cambodians which could lead to an improvement in the existing situation. These proposals are covered in detail in Section V of the report. The recommendations of the Study Group are as follows: (1) that the Study Group's initial report be adopted as the basis for actions concerning Cambodia taken by the respective agencies involved, in particular Section IV (Political/Diplomatic Plan of Action) and Section V A. (Approved Actions.) (2) that Daniel Boone-type operations in the border zone of Northeastern Cambodia be authorized on a case-by-case basis as described in Tabs K and L./6/ /6/In JCS telegram 5937 to CINCPAC, May 22, the Joint Chiefs informed CINCPAC that Daniel Boone cross-border operations for northeastern Cambodia were approved subject to certain restrictions: The area was limited; reconnaissance teams were to total not more than 12 men (with no more than 3 U.S. advisers); tactical airstrikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces into Cambodia was not approved; infiltration and exfiltration would be by foot; mission time would be kept to the minimum; all precautions should be taken to avoid contact with Cambodians; purpose of the operation was intelligence and verification; no more than three missions could be undertaken at one time; missions required prior JCS approval with notification of the Department of State; and the operations would not be acknowledged. (Department of Defense, JCS Official Records, 880/211 (22 May 67) IR 2278)6 (3) that those proposals in Section V A. that were partially implemented and those proposals in Section V B. that were deferred in their entirety, at appropriate intervals be reviewed and considered for expansion or implementation. (4) that the Study Group meet as necessary on an ad hoc basis where new developments call for consideration of recommendations for specific actions going beyond the guidelines laid down in this report. (5) that in any case the Study Group reconvene for a comprehensive review of the situation after a three month period. [Here follow section II, "The Nature of the Problem," section III, "U.S. Policy, section IV, "Political/Diplomatic Plan of Action," section V, "Proposals Considered by the Study Group and Action Taken," and Tabs A-M, and Annexes I and II.]
206. Memorandum From the Country Director for Burma and Cambodia (Ewing) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 15, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 CAMB. Secret. Initialed by Habib. SUBJECT 1. Adherence within the past week by the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Liberation Front to the French-type declaration of respect for Cambodia's territorial integrity "within its present borders" is being used by Sihanouk to put pressure on western countries to follow suit. Sihanouk has said, in effect, that he will look upon adherence to such a declaration as a measure to judge friendship for Cambodia. 2. Both the Australians and the British have informed us that they have been asked officially by the Cambodians to take this action, and the Ambassadors of both countries in Phnom Penh have recommended so doing. In this connection, we have received telegrams from Bangkok strongly opposing any such action and from Vientiane stating Souvanna Phouma's opposition to Laos doing so. Copies of both telegrams are attached./2/ /2/Not attached to the source text and not further identified. 3. In my discussions with both Robertson of the Australian Embassy and Gilmore of the British Embassy, I have pointed out that the previous difficulty we had with this statement, without any accompanying qualification that would protect the Vietnamese, Thai and Lao positions in their border differences with Cambodia, still continues to exist. (We discussed this problem at some length previously with the British last October in connection with the appointment of a new British Ambassador to Phnom Penh and with the Australians this March in connection with Prime Minister Holt's visit to Cambodia.) I have indicated that I did not see anything at the present time that changed this, other than the added disadvantage now of clearly following in the Communist wake. Emphasizing that my reaction was a preliminary one, I have pointed out that obviously their adherence to the declaration would make our position more difficult in not doing so, but have not otherwise tried to put pressure upon them not to take such action. I have, however, urged that both consult with both the Thai and the South Vietnamese regarding their intentions. 4. There is a slight possibility that the Cambodian Government might be prepared to make an official statement to the Australian and/or the British Ambassador to the effect that adherence to the declaration did not prejudice their positions with respect to border differences existing with neighboring countries. Deschamps has reported that Son Sann made such a statement to the Lao Charge and British Ambassador Brown has indicated that the Secretary General of the Cambodian Foreign Office made a similar statement to him. I have suggested to both Robertson and Gilmore that an effort be made to determine whether it might be possible to obtain an official Cambodian statement to this effect, which would make the declaration much more acceptable. Although Deschamps has expressed doubt the Cambodians would agree to give a written statement, I think the possibility of obtaining an oral statement may still be worth pursuing. 5. At the present time, the matter stands that I have asked both Robertson and Gilmore for the opportunity to consult again if it appears that the decision is likely to be in favor of making a declaration. Robertson is now uncertain what Canberra will do and appears to feel that adverse reactions from Saigon and Bangkok will carry some weight. Gilmore, on the other hand, has asked for our reaction on the assumption that the decision in London will be favorable, which he seems to feel may be the case. 6. I feel that it would be preferable for us at this point not to go beyond the restatement of our problems with the declaration or try to put further pressure upon either Canberra or London. Hopefully, they will both decide against doing so because of the problems associated with it, without feeling they have done so under our pressure. Should, as may be the case, London decide in favor of a declaration and Canberra against, we would together with the Australians be in a position to make a much stronger case as to the difficulties such a divergence would present for us all. Recommendation/3/ /3/Bundy approved, but with the statement that he wanted "a bigger paper on all implications." 1. That I be authorized to continue my discussions with the British and Australians along the present lines, indicating to the British that it represents the present thinking at the EA level; 2. That, regardless of the British and Australian decision, we do not at this time ourselves consider adhering to the "present borders" declaration in its present form; 3. That we continue to pursue the possibility of an official Cambodian statement along the lines reportedly made to the Lao Charge and British Ambassador Brown, which might provide a basis for us to reconsider our position on the "present borders" declaration, in consultation with the Thais and South Vietnamese. [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |