NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
216. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, December 5, 1967, 6:02, 7:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Meeting Notes. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. There is also a "Summary of the Meeting on Cambodia on December 5, 1967 in the Cabinet Room 6:02 p.m.-7:15 p.m.," which has no drafting information. (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, 12/5/67) Tom Johnson's record is more extensive, but the few minor differences are noted in footnotes below. PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rusk traced the history of diplomatic relations with Cambodia, pointing out that formal diplomatic ties were broken in late 1964-early 1965. Walt Rostow said Sihanouk broke relations when it looked as though the U.S. would lose the war in South Vietnam. Secretary Rusk said Cambodia is getting some Chinese aid. As of late, relations between the two countries have improved. General Wheeler pointed to a map showing the area in which his intelligence shows there are 5,000 enemy troops. Included in this area are three infantry regiments, one division headquarters, and considerable supplies. "These are the troops who were defeated at Dakto. They are licking their wounds and getting re-equipped and having their manpower replenished. The President asked how soon the decision is required. General Wheeler said he believes the enemy will be in this area for the rest of this week--possibly longer. He said he feels the enemy will come out of Cambodia and attack our men. He said the 304th division is moving down through Laos now. The President asked if this operation would involve any invasion of men. General Wheeler said no, that it would be limited to B-52 strikes along with tactical air. The President asked how many enemy would be killed. General Wheeler said that General Westmoreland hopes for 10 percent casualties and very substantial damage to the logistical support. Based on the 5,000 troop figure, this would mean approximately 500 killed and damage to supply depots, and to troop housing. The President asked how do we get intelligence indicating this concentration. General Wheeler said the intelligence came from the following sources: --radio detection The President asked for the size of the area. General Wheeler said the area is 15 miles wide at its widest point. The President asked would the operation leak out. Both Secretary Rusk and General Wheeler said there was no question about it. There would be leaks from the South Vietnamese troops, and, of course, Hanoi would definitely announce it. The President asked if General Wheeler was implying that there could be 25,000 North Vietnamese troops in the total area potentially surrounding about 5,000 U.S. troops. General Wheeler said this was possible but not probable since the enemy would not take a chance of concentrating that many men. The President asked how long can we let Sihanouk get away with giving the enemy this type of protection. Secretary Rusk said we have tried all along to limit this war. "The action which General Westmoreland is proposing would be a significant act of war against Cambodia. This would change the entire character of the war. If Cambodia is attacked, they may ask the Chinese to side with them. Then we will really have a new war on our hands. "If we take this action it would be absolutely essential to consult the Congress and our allies. I know that Australia and New Zealand would be against it although Thailand, Korea and the Philippines would probably go along. "If we could knock out 10 percent of this force why can't we do the same thing with the enemy divisions which we have clearly indicated in South Vietnam? "It would be a major political burden for us to bear with a minimum military gain toward ending the war." General Wheeler said the big difference between the enemy troops in South Vietnam and those in Cambodia is clear. He said that the enemy in South Vietnam digs in well, takes cover when B-52s approach and are constantly on alert, and they did not expect any attacks against them. General Wheeler said there is no information about how many enemy have been killed by the B-52 strikes in South Vietnam but he has reason to believe there have been sizable losses because of the B-52s. The President said: "Aware as I am of the mistakes Generals have made in the past, I place great confidence in General Westmoreland. Both him and Ambassador Bunker have recommended this action. "We must tell Cambodia that we will not continue to permit them to house and protect these killers. Do we have to continue to live with this for the duration of the war?" Secretary Rusk said: "This problem is not really different from the one of mining Haiphong. We run the risk of enlarging the war." The President said: "I see this differently from mining Haiphong or bombing the ports."/2/ /2/The "Summary" version has it: "The President did not agree that it was the same." Secretary McNamara said: "This is analogous to a land invasion above the DMZ. This is not the most effective way to do it. "This raises a basic issue of our policy, and I have thought that this would be the issue to face us in the coming year for sometime. "I believe, Mr. President, that it is most unwise to expand the war beyond the South Vietnamese borders. My arguments are as follows: --"This action would further divide this nation. "Because of these two points, I would strongly recommend against this proposal." General Wheeler said: "I would not disagree with the importance Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara place on this issue. The real question we face is how long we can tolerate these people operating from a sanctuary. I take issue with Bob. Above the DMZ, we can bomb and use artillery against their positions. We cannot use our fire power in Cambodia. "The Joint Chiefs do not want to widen the war either. We only wish Cambodia would be neutral--honest to God neutral, too. Anyone else would not permit enemy troops to use their territory for sanctuaries." Secretary Rusk: "I would have thought that Westy would have drug his shirt-tail along the Cambodian border and drawn the enemy fire. Then the rules would permit him to shoot back across the border when fired upon." General Wheeler read a section of General Westmoreland's letter./3/ /3/Apparent reference to Document 213. Secretary Rusk: "I also think that this action would make liars out of all of us who have been saying repeatedly that Bob McNamara's departure would have no effect on the conduct of the war. We have said his leaving does not mean any change. If we undertook this action, it would raise a credibility gap of proportions we could not stand." Secretary McNamara: "As you know, Mr. President, I am opposed to this action, but if the decision were to hedge on what Dean has just said I would want you to go ahead and take it." The President: "I have never thought that the departure of anybody would make us do or not do anything. I think all of us agree that we'll do all we can to win the war. We will do what we need to do." Secretary McNamara: I am scared to death. I am scared of a policy based on an assumption that by going somewhere else we can war the war./4/ /4/The "Summary" has the correct phrase, "we can win the war." "The war cannot be won by killing North Vietnamese. It can only be won by protecting the South Vietnamese so they can build and develop economically for a future political contest with North Vietnam." Secretary Rusk: It may be that our main job is building a security in the center of the country. I have often wondered why we concentrate more on Conthien and along the borders. General Wheeler said that Route 9 is the only route across the northern neck of Vietnam. He said moving back from Conthien would be giving up Route 9 to the enemy. Secretary Rusk said he was surprised that Ambassador Bunker concurred with this recommendation. The President asked General Wheeler why General Westmoreland did not take the advice Secretary Rusk suggested--that is, to sweep down the border of Cambodia. Secretary McNamara said that this action would not draw much fire. He said the North Vietnamese do not fire across the border. Walt Rostow said in the rhythm of things it would take months rather than weeks to rebuild after a defeat such as the one they sustained. He said we do have some time on our hands. General Wheeler said you cannot count on that. Walt Rostow said the political significance of this act is so great that we must ask some military questions: What is the quality of the targeting data? What would be the pattern of the men during a 72-hour attack by air as proposed. Rostow said the most important need is to make an issue of Sihanouk's neutrality. The President said that the issue of neutrality being made a major question appeals most to him. He said he thought we should go back to Bunker and ask him to elaborate on the reasons why he agreed with General Westmoreland's recommendation. In addition, we should ask General Westmoreland to go into more detail about his recommendation--particularly the question raised of enemy digging in as soon as the first bomb hits and scattering. The President asked if all the Joint Chiefs agreed with this recommendation. General Wheeler said that this recommendation is part of the four months' program for the conduct of the war and how to get it over quicker. The President said we must let Sihanouk know we will not tolerate this action any longer. The President also said he wanted Westmoreland to explore other means of getting at the enemy. "I do not took forward to the day when somebody will say that General Westmoreland asked for this action and we refused it and then a lot of American boys were killed as a result. As I see it, this act could result in Cambodia declaring war against us and in their inviting the Chinese in." Walt Rostow said he did not think Cambodia would bring the Chinese in. Secretary McNamara said this is not an isolated action. It is a basic change of policy. He said there is a lot that can be done short of a B-52 strike. While I recognize this is a good way to fight a conventional war, this is not a conventional war. It is unconventional, and we must use unconventional means. Justice Fortas: Based on that which I have heard tonight, there is an overwhelming case against this action. The issue is the whole question of what you do about sanctuaries. It seems we should communicate with Sihanouk. Domestically, we should surface the use of Cambodia as a sanctuary. The sooner this is surfaced the better. The sooner the American people know about this the better. The President asked what about another try at getting Ambassador Harriman to see Sihanouk. "We must protest this to the world." Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland's recommendation does not make sense to me. You have a certain number of square miles in which 5,000 men are located. The General asked for a B-52 strike. The enemy are scattered all over the countryside when the first bomb hits the ground. I think it is more valuable to fly photo plans over the area, get good quality pictures, and have them reproduced and released. We need to build up a strong case to proceed to remove this sanctuary. I would be unalterably opposed to the action. The President: Then we should go back to General Westmoreland and tell him we do not see the justification on an immediate decision on this. Ask for more details from him and also ask for more information from Bunker on why he supports this decision. Tell them all the reasons why we don't see this as a good decision. In addition, we should point out to the Australians that the Cambodians are permitting the North Vietnamese to use this as a sanctuary. They should protest the action through their diplomatic mission in Cambodia. We should ask Sihanouk to see Henry Cabot Lodge, Bill Bundy, or Averell Harriman. We also should get some pictures of what is happening there to show Sihanouk. I think we have been derelict in our duty in bringing this thing to a head. Let's give it top priority.
217. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/ Washington, December 6, 1967, 0154Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia, 5 E(1)a, 5/66-1/68. Top Secret; Immediate; Specat; Exclusive. No drafting officer appears on the source text; Wheeler approved the transmission. Repeated to Sharp. 4472. References: A: MACJ00 40588;/2/ B: CINCPAC 051230Z Dec 67./3/ /2/Document 213. /3/In CINCPAC telegram 01230Z, December 5, Sharp supported Westmoreland's recommendations in Document 213. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5 E(1)a, 5/66-1/68, Cambodia) 1. Recommendations set forth in references were discussed extensively at highest level conference this evening./4/ Decision was made against an immediate affirmative decision stemming from the political problems involved, foreign and domestic, and uncertainty that military results obtained would be commensurate with the political penalties incurred. /4/See Document 216. 2. In amplification of the above, there was exploration of other means of putting pressures on Cambodia by more direct political démarches and by such actions as closing the Mekong River, etc. Apropos of this, questions were raised as to the quality of the evidence we now have; i.e., do the aerial photographs taken to date support adequately and unmistakenly the validity of our charge that NVA troops are located in and operating from Cambodian sanctuaries. Also, there was doubt expressed as to casualties which would be inflicted on the enemy in view of their possible dispersed positions and anticipated efforts to scatter as soon as the first bombs go down. The thought was expressed that, if possible, it would be expedient to provide a cover for Sihanouk to avoid driving him into the arms of the ChiComs by using artillery in lieu of air strikes to punish the enemy; the thought here being that use of artillery could be justified on the basis of returning fire across the border. 3. Perhaps the most important part of the discussion centered about the realization that your recommendation really is part of a larger problem; namely, that of permitting North Vietnamese and VC units to operate from Cambodian sanctuaries wherein they are immune to any form of counteraction. In other words, everyone recognized the weightiness and the pressing importance of the larger problem in connection with achieving our objectives in Southeast Asia. 4. As a result of this meeting I require ASAP your views concerning the following: A. For what length of time do you anticipate the first NVA division will be disposed in its present vulnerable position? B. How high is your confidence in the quality of your targeting; i.e., do you think that the B-52 strikes can be expected to be on target? C. Related to the above question, how many targets would you estimate would be available for fighter-bomber strikes? D. What is the pattern of enemy deployment at present--are they widely dispersed in bivouacs or are they occupying relatively compact temporary camps? E. What casualties would you anticipate inflicting on the enemy? F. If the strikes are as successful as you anticipate, what would be the reduction in enemy capabilities you would anticipate and for how long? G. Regarding other means of achieving the same objectives, can you employ artillery in lieu of aircraft; can you draw fire by means of patrols to which you can respond, etc? H. What other pressures of a political and economic nature, such as closing the Mekong River, would you advise? 5. I will issue instructions relative to increased aerial reconnaissance in the Cambodian area to include low-level reconnaissance. I would like to have from you any additional recommendations which will assist you in locating enemy facilities and activities and which will support U.S. Government pressures on Sihanouk to obtain his cooperation in dealing with the North Vietnamese Army/VC threat to your forces.
218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Australia/1/ Washington, December 8, 1967, 0027Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Bundy, cleared with Lacey, Steadman of DOD/ISA, Rostow, and in substance with Rusk. Repeated to Saigon and Ottawa. 81314. 1. We have today discussed Cambodian situation with Waller in following terms: a. We now have reasonably clear evidence that NVA forces withdrew after Dak To action into northeast tip of Cambodia, long believed to be significant base area. We believe these forces are regrouping and preparing for further attacks from this sanctuary. Resulting operational implications are extremely serious. b. In addition to this specific matter, our information now points to a considered NVA/VC strategy to make a series of attacks against positions near the Cambodian border, using Cambodian territory as a sanctuary in direct support of these operations. We also believe that this happened at Loc Ninh, giving rise to the camp discovered by Herndon and MacArthur. In an even larger sense, it has taken place at Dak To. We believe it to be the case in the current activities near the Bu Dop area. The pattern of these three efforts alone, plus other information on the deployment of NVA/VC forces, points to a strategy designed to make considerably more extensive use of Cambodian territory in the coming months. c. In the light of this assessment, which could be discussed if necessary by the most senior Australian military representatives direct with General Westmoreland if desired, we believe it is essential to bring the situation more acutely to Prince Sihanouk's attention than we have done through the note and evidence which the GOA was good enough to transmit this week. d. At the same time, it remains our objective to induce Sihanouk to take more constructive action within his own borders. This might be in part through the more effective use of his own forces, but we believe there is now significantly more hope that he might be induced to permit ICC to conduct more effective surveillance. The Canadians have told us of their impression on the spot, as well as conversations in New Delhi, that this is the case--even though these same conversations note that the Cambodians would prefer to have the ICC continue to whitewash the situation. Avoiding this would plainly be continuing a difficult problem for the Canadians, with the Indian attitude a question mark. e. Nonetheless, we think it is well worth a try to make a specific offer of assistance to Sihanouk in the form of helicopters and supporting expenses. This has the additional merit of balancing our disclosure of the UNA/Dak To action and military pattern, and reducing the implication of proximate threat. f. Furthermore, in addition to bringing the new evidence to his attention and offering specific ICC assistance, we believe the situation is so urgent that it calls for the most serious consideration of suggesting to Sihanouk direct contact in some form with an American representative. An alternative might be a high-level Australian visit to Cambodia, either for itself or to broach the subject of direct discussions with us; we would specifically like GOA reaction to this, including even the possibility that Mr. Hasluck himself might undertake such a mission. With or without such a visit, we have in mind proposing to Sihanouk that an American representative either come to Cambodia or meet with a designated Cambodian representative at some site to be chosen by Sihanouk. In making such a proposal, we would make clear that the American representative need not be an official, but might be someone not now in government for whom Sihanouk has regard. (We would leave him to suggest names, but we would have in mind Hamilton Armstrong, McGeorge Bundy, or someone of that stripe. Obviously, we would not take kindly to suggestions of individual senators not in sympathy with our policy.) 2. We have told Waller that we are firming up a message in this sense, but would appreciate the earliest GOA reaction to the elements of this proposal, individually or collectively. We have emphasized to him the urgency we feel in making a maximum secure diplomatic effort to bring Sihanouk to do more, in light of the developing serious military situation. 3. We are submitting these thoughts today in more tentative form to Ambassador Ritchie of Canada for their judgment, emphasizing that the whole exercise must remain absolutely confidential. 4. We have given Waller a copy of this cable for his own paraphrase and use, and he will make full report to GOA. Thus no Canberra action is required, although you may indicate your full awareness of the proposal. Waller raised obvious question whether this might be pushing Sihanouk too hard at this moment, and particularly noted that any Hasluck visit raised major issues. We again stressed that situation was developing to serious point very rapidly. Rusk
219. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, December 12, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E(1)a, 5/66-1/68, Cambodia. Top Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT You asked for an alternative to a military "solution" to the Communist use of Cambodian soil. 1. Close the Mekong River to Cambodian-bound traffic. (Before the end of the day I should have a study from the Agency on the effects of this. Frankly, I do not expect its economic impact would be anything like crippling. But it would have a good psychological effect both here and there.) 2. Vigorous pursuit of the preclusive buying of Cambodian food supplies available to enemy. We do not know how effective such a program could be. At least, however, we ought to be able to complicate and make more expensive Communist use of Cambodia as a supply source. 3. Make use of the anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serei elements in South Vietnam and Thailand. There are dangers in this but they are dwarfed by the disadvantages of overt military action against Cambodia. If a rejuvenated Khmer Serei does nothing else, it might convince Sihanouk and others in the Cambodian Government that their own interests lie in trying to minimize Cambodia's availability to the Communists as a sanctuary. 4. Mount a black operation to create in Phnom Penh Rangoon-type riots and demonstrations (ostensibly the work of the Chinese community). Sihanouk has already proved his extreme sensitivity to Chinese misconduct. We would not have to create much of a "Chinese disturbance" to send him up the wall again with all that this would imply for a more vigorous approach by him to restrain Communist freedom of action in Cambodia. 5. A re-invigorated effort against the Communist supply line in Southern Laos. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Before we go down the road of a widened war in Cambodia, we ought to try the intensification of the one everybody knows about in Laos. (There was a technical discovery some months ago of tremendous promise for making the Ho Chi Minh trail unusable for a substantial part of the year. Its name was Operation Mud./2/ I do not know its present status, but if it lives up to its promise it would go far to reducing the Cambodian problem to manageable proportions. /2/Operation Commando Lava, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, for documentation on this operation. Of course, all of the above will not work. But they do not all need to work to bring or to keep the Cambodian problem down to tolerable levels. They would serve also to alert domestic and world opinion to this problem and give us a period in which people could be prepared for sterner action should it become necessary. Although I know you are aware of my views on this, I feel bound to repeat that I believe American public reaction to military action against Cambodia would be God-awful. I cannot believe that the military significance of the enemy's use of Cambodia is so great that it justifies taking a step so destructive of American public support of the war in Vietnam. In time, the American public could be prepared for what will certainly be viewed as a widened war. But it has not been prepared yet. Marshall
220. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 57/1-67 Washington, December 14, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R 01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret/[classification indicator not declassified]; Controlled Dissem. A note on the covering sheet indicates that the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of Defense and State, and the NSA prepared this estimate. It was concurred in by all members of the USIB except representatives for the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE The Problem To estimate the extent and significance of Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodian territory in support of the Communist war effort in South Vietnam. Conclusions A. During the past year, increasing Allied pressure on the Communists' military structure in South Vietnam has caused them to depend more heavily on the use of border areas. They use Cambodian territory as a sanctuary to evade Allied forces, as a refuge for rest, training, medical care, and in some degree as a route for the infiltration of personnel and military supplies from North Vietnam. We believe that Cambodian rice currently provides an important proportion of the food requirement of the VC/NVA regular forces in South Vietnam. B. We still have no good evidence that military supplies or equipment are moved through Sihanoukville or other Cambodian ports to Communist forces in South Vietnam. But the Communists continue to smuggle small quantities of arms and other military equipment from Cambodia, some of which probably represents unauthorized diversions from arms imported by the Cambodian Government for its own forces. C. If the Communists continue their present strategy, the importance of Cambodia to their war effort will probably grow in 1968, particularly as a sanctuary and as a source of rice. Denial of Cambodian sanctuary would probably not cause the Communist war effort to collapse in the neighboring areas of South Vietnam, but would make it much harder for the Communists to conduct effective military operations in these areas. D. Over the past year, Sihanouk has become more aware of the extent of Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodia and more apprehensive over US intentions. He has made some small efforts to control activity in the border area but he lacks the military capability to impose effective measures. Sihanouk is likely to move toward more criticism of the US for real or imagined violations of Cambodian sovereignty, hoping to deter the US from carrying the war into Cambodian territory and thus avoiding direct involvement in the war. Discussion/2/ /2/SNIE 57-67, "Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese War Effort," dated 26 January 1967, Secret, provides a considerable amount of background and detail on Communist use of Cambodia, most of which is still valid. [Footnote in the source text. For SNIE 57-67, see Document 199.] 1. Communist use of Cambodian territory for tactical sanctuary, for base areas, for infiltration of personnel, and as a source of supply does not appear to have changed fundamentally over the past year. However, as a consequence of growing pressure on the Communist military structure in South Vietnam, border areas have become of increasing importance in Communist strategy. Bases straddling the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border have facilitated Communist operations by providing safety for command and communication elements and refuge for Communist forces. 2. Base Areas./3/ Of the major Communist base areas that make use of Cambodian territory, the most northerly is in the tri-border region where Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet. The Chu Pong and Se San bases in western Pleiku and southern Kontum provinces and the large War Zone C complex in northern Tay Ninh province also lap over into Cambodia. The Kas Kok base appears to lie principally in Cambodian territory, near where the Mekong River crosses into South Vietnam. There are less important base areas along the borders of the Cambodian province of Svay Rieng and the South Vietnamese province of Quang Duc and Kien Giang. /3/See centerspread map. [Footnote in the source text; the map is not printed.] 3. The functions of these base areas have remained about the same as last year. They include facilities for resupply and training prior to major engagements, and various medical facilities to treat wounded after combat. Some Communist combat regiments, which were subsequently engaged in the battles of Loc Ninh and Dak To, used Cambodian territory to refit and prepare for these attacks. 4. Tactical Sanctuary. The Communists continue to use Cambodian territory as a safe haven after combat, but the pattern varies and depends to a great extent on the circumstances of the engagements with Allied forces. During a major US search and destroy operation into War Zone C in early 1967, elements of COSVN took refuge in adjacent Cambodian territory. On the other hand, we have no evidence as yet that Communist combat elements withdrew into Cambodia after the Loc Ninh battle this fall. 5. Prior to the battle of Dak To, two elements of the Communist B-3 Front Headquarters and the NVA First Division moved north from the Chu Pong base to the tri-border area. At least part of this movement probably took place over trails on the Cambodian side of the border. During the actual battle the two elements of the B-3 Front Headquarters remained inside the northeastern tip of Cambodia, apparently directing the fight, and afterwards the First Division Headquarters and the headquarters of at least one of its component regiments moved into Cambodian territory for sanctuary. 6. Communist troops withdrawing into northeastern Cambodia penetrate less than 10 kilometers. Along the more populous southern half of the border, the penetrations of Cambodia are shallower, and smaller numbers of Communist troops are usually involved. 7. Infiltration of Personnel. In general, infiltration trails continuing southward from Laos follow the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border as far south as the Phuoc Long-Binh Long region of South Vietnam. They cross back and forth across the border in many places and lie less than seven kilometers inside the border on the Cambodian side. Along the trials are a number of way stations for rest, resupply, and medical attention. We have little evidence on the actual use of the trails for infiltration during 1967. We do know, however, that units in the B-3 Front and COSVN received replacements this year, and it is likely that many of these replacements used trails in Cambodia for some portion of their journey south. 8. Routes of Supply. We have observed few improvements on the numerous supply routes from Cambodia into South Vietnam in the past year. In general, movement on the roads appears to be about the same as last year while movement on the waterways in the northeast appears to have increased somewhat. The main direction of movement on these routes is north and east from Cambodia into Laos and the highlands of South Vietnam, and the supplies moved consist primarily of food. Some of the military supplies moving southward from Laos to Communist forces in South Vietnam are apparently portered through Cambodia over a system of trails. But there is still no good evidence that the Communists have been using Cambodian roads and waterways for this purpose. 9. Food. Food shipments from Cambodia to the Communist forces in South Vietnam and Laos have continued in 1967 but it is difficult to determine the quantities involved. We believe that the VC/NVA regular forces and administrative support troops in South Vietnam require about 180 tons of food per day, of which 15 to 20 percent probably comes from Cambodia either directly or via Laos. Cambodian food is also shipped northward into Laos to support the infiltration network there. 10. Cambodian rice is particularly important for Communist troops operating out of the tri-border, Se San, and Chu Pong base areas in the rice-deficit highlands. Communist troops in these areas are almost certainly unable to obtain sufficient rice locally or from the coastal plain. If Cambodian rice were not available, Communist forces in the tri-border base area probably could be supplied by shipments of North Vietnamese rice down the Laotian route system. This would substantially increase the daily tonnage of supplies moved and the movement would be more vulnerable to US aerial interdiction. It would, however, be exceedingly difficult to move sufficient rice farther south to the Se San and Chu Pong base areas, and Communist troops there might be forced to relocate. In the War Zone C complex, loss of Cambodian rice would probably force the Communists to allocate additional personnel to the task of collecting rice from nearby areas. 11. Weapons and Ammunition. Because of South Vietnamese controls, it is unlikely that any sizable amount of arms or ammunition is being smuggled up the Mekong to Phnom Penh and thence to South Vietnam. There is a greater chance that such material could be brought in through Sihanoukville or elsewhere along the coast. But despite occasional reports we still have no good evidence of such movements. We believe that in time we would have tangible indications of any continuing substantial shipments of arms and ammunition to Communist forces through Sihanoukville, should such movements occur. The Communists do, however, continue to smuggle small quantities of arms and other military equipment from Cambodia, some of which probably represents unauthorized diversions from Communist arms imported by the Cambodian Government for its own forces. 12. Chemicals and Other Supplies. Some potassium chlorate and other chemicals useful in the manufacture of explosives continue to reach the Communists via Cambodia. But we have little more information concerning the quantities involved than we did a year ago. The amount of drugs, communications equipment, and other supplies obtained from Cambodia appears to have increased slightly over the past year probably because increased Allied pressures make it harder to procure them within South Vietnam. 13. Outlook. If the Communists continue their present strategy, the importance of Cambodia to their war effort will probably grow in 1968, particularly as a sanctuary and as a source of rice. Denial of Cambodian sanctuary would probably not cause the Communist war effort to collapse in the neighboring areas of South Vietnam, but would make it much harder for the Communists to conduct effective military operations in these areas. 14. Sihanouk's Position. Over the past year, Sihanouk has become more aware of the extent of Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodia and he has made some small efforts to curtail it. Nevertheless, we do not believe he is likely to make a major effort, principally because the Cambodian Armed Forces are just not strong enough. The army totals only 32,000 and less than 9,000 regular troops are stationed in provinces along the entire 700 mile border with South Vietnam. In the two large northeastern provinces of Cambodia, moreover, there are only eight border posts and these are manned by small paramilitary units. Four of these are clustered around the junction of Route 19 and the South Vietnamese border, just north of the Communist Chu Pong base area. Along this sparsely manned frontier from Kontum to northern Tay Ninh are over 20,000 regular Communist troops. 15. Sihanouk's basic aim continues to be to avoid involvement in the war. He is increasingly apprehensive that the US will carry the war against the Communists into Cambodian territory. Since he cannot keep the Vietnamese Communists from using its territory, Sihanouk is likely to move toward more criticism of the US for real or imagined violations of Cambodian sovereignty, hoping thus to deter the US.
221. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 15, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cambodia, Miscellaneous Memos and Cables, 1/67-12/68. Top Secret; Nodis. Also sent to Acting Secretary Katzenbach. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President on December 16, noting Harriman's "deep opposition to military action" and his urging of diplomatic action via the ICC. Rostow stated that if renewed ICC action failed, a campaign to educate the public should be undertaken. Only after these steps were taken, should American military power be taken in violation of Cambodia's borders. Rostow observed that, "at the moment he [Harriman] is supporting the track we are on." SUBJECT I well remember the horror felt throughout the civilized world when in 1914 the Kaiser violated the neutrality of Belgium. Of course the present situation in Cambodia as we see it is very different from Belgium in 1914. But the world at large (and a substantial section of the American public) has not yet been presented with convincing evidence that expanding the war into "a tiny, helpless country" is justified. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces do in fact have bases and rest areas at several points along the jungle covered, poorly defined border of Cambodia. Some of those areas seem to straddle the border, some are entirely within, by several kilometers, Cambodia itself. It is worth noting, however, that neither air attacks nor ground sweeps (within South Vietnam itself) have eliminated Viet Cong jungle bases; nothing short of actual occupation of the territory would seem to be able to accomplish this. We do not as yet have evidence that would convince a skeptic that Cambodian territory is regularly being used as a sanctuary by the Viet Cong in the sense that the Viet Cong are staging substantial unit attacks directly from Cambodia and retiring into Cambodia immediately after the engagements. The evidence that we do have (and most of this comes from sources that could not be revealed) demonstrates only that for periods, sometimes of considerable length before engagement, some of the units involved were reinforced and refitted in Cambodia but that most of these units were redeployed into South Vietnam well before the engagement began. I am impressed by the "personal message" of December 12, from Australian Foreign Minister Paul Hasluck to the Secretary: "If the Allied forces in Viet Nam move militarily against . . . Cambodian territory, even in hot pursuit, the area of hostilities will have been widened. The Government of Cambodia itself will become involved, and it will charge the United States with aggression and will bring the matter before the United Nations . . . there will be little sympathy and support in the United Nations for any such Allied action. It is very difficult to get the facts across and accepted either in the United Nations or inside individual countries, and in both the United States and Australia there would be great sympathy for Cambodia even from those who hitherto have been lending their support to our policies . . . . International opinion, and opinion in our own countries, while in a sense intangible, could become a very material factor working against a successful outcome for our efforts in Vietnam. "Furthermore, instead of our fighting being confined to South Vietnam, we may find a much bigger area of operations has developed in Cambodia requiring the deployment of forces and making other material demands. It is important that, before any decision is made to expand hostilities, both sides of the equation be brought into the balance--the new demands that will be made on our men and resources no less than the opportunities for action against communist military forces." We are currently in the midst of a political-diplomatic campaign to induce the Cambodians to do what they can to discourage Viet Cong use of their territory. On November 26, Prince Sihanouk publicly stated that he would welcome strengthening the ICC with helicopters. On December 4, the Australians delivered a United States note to Sihanouk indicating our concern over Viet Cong use of his territory and our willingness to assist him in preserving his neutrality plus a summary of our evidence of such Viet Cong use./2/ While we have received no direct response to that message the absence of vehement denial may itself be significant. We are in the process of sending Sihanouk a note explicitly responding to his November 26 statement and offering two helicopters and related funding to the Cambodian ICC. In anticipation of the probable need to increase the pressure on Sihanouk, we have already prepared the American Embassies in a number of countries which may have influence with Cambodia to present the documentation of our concern to their host nations and to request that they take it up with the Cambodians. If this proves unsuccessful we would then begin to present to the public our efforts to preserve Cambodian neutrality and the details of violations of that neutrality by the Viet Cong. /2/See Document 212. Until the conclusion of this diplomatic campaign and until we have publicly presented convincing evidence of Viet Cong violations of Cambodian neutrality, we should not consider any action in Cambodia that would be an obvious intentional violation of its borders. I greatly fear that such violation will not bring us any meaningful advantages but will decrease our support both at home and abroad and cause very troublesome problems at the United Nations. We should of course continue and perhaps consider augmentation of reconnaissance and information-gathering activities in Cambodia. Therefore, I specifically recommend disapproval of General Westmoreland's proposal that he be authorized to subject a portion of Cambodian territory to 72 hours of B-52 and tactical air strikes./3/ In addition steps should be taken to prevent ARVN forces from crossing the Cambodian border in hot pursuit. The major political difficulties that would result from either move should preclude such action at this time. /3/See Document 213. Averell
222. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Saigon, December 26, 1967, 1009Z. /1/Source: Center for Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Dec-31 Dec 1967. Top Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to CINCPAC for Admiral Sharp. MAC 12674. Subj: Operations in the Tri-border Area of Cambodia. Ref: A. MACV 40588 DTG 050815Z Dec 67 (TS-L)./2/ /2/Document 213. /3/Not found. /4/Not found, but summarized below. 1. Your recent message (Ref C) indicates that no further decision has been made on my recommendation and no further action will be taken at this time. 2. I regret the existence of those factors you point out which prevent the engagement of enemy forces operating in the tri-border area. To bring you up to date, for several weeks running, Rosson has had the area subjected to an intense analysis. The team doing this analysis has had access to highly reliable intelligence data from all available sources. Its findings continue to show that within the area: A. Major enemy command headquarters are actively engaged in controlling operations. B. Major enemy combat forces routinely move through, stage, and train in this area. C. Logistical bases and supply points sustain and support enemy units in contact in RVN. D. The enemy is present in large numbers, and his vulnerability is such that he could be punished severely if pursued by fire. 3. The many targets mentioned would be most suitable for B52 strikes now, and the continuing intelligence collection effort can be expected to produce new targets as well as additional information on those already located. 4. I think it worth repeating that the border in this area is ill-defined and traverses rugged jungle-covered terrain which stretches great distances. The border is indistinguishable from the air and the ground. It is not marked by readily identifiable terrain features. Night B52 strikes and artillery firing only at night would minimize the risk of compromise of the operation. Moreover, there appears to be a good probability that attacks under these conditions can be made without publicity. 5. Amb Bunker is in strong support of my position and intends to again make his views known. 6. I am renewing my request through front channels.
223. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, December 27, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E (1)a, 5/66-1/68, Cambodia. Secret. Received at the Johnson Ranch at 8:55 p.m. This was originally a Department of State situation report on Cambodia, drafted by Lacey and Perry and cleared by Habib. Read sent it to Rostow on December 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 CAMB) CAP 671186. Herewith a situation report on Cambodia. 1. U.S. policy toward Cambodia was stated most recently in a note delivered to the Cambodian Foreign Ministry December 4, 1967./2/ That note expressed our deep concern over continued enemy use of Cambodia, provided a summary of evidence to explain our concern, and offered our support for a more effective ICC monitoring of border activity or any other reasonable proposal for remedying this dangerous problem. /2/See Document 212. 2. On December 20, the Cambodian Government flatly rejected our contention that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces make extensive use of Cambodian territory, publishing its note of reply on December 24. This Cambodian response crossed with our preparation of a second diplomatic note offering helicopters to the ICC, so as to enable that organization to perform more effective surveillance of the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border. Despite the Cambodian Government's negative reaction of December 20, our offer of helicopters was made to the Indian Chairman of ICC/Cambodia on December 26, following courtesy notification to the Cambodian Government the previous day. 3. In order to promote the possibility of ICC acceptance of our offer, we have made follow-up diplomatic approaches: (a) To the Indian Government, both in Washington and in New Delhi; (b) To the Soviet Union in Washington, and a similar demarche is being made in Moscow; (c) The Secretary is meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Pearson December 28 to urge that Canada make more active efforts to improve the performance of ICC/Cambodia; (d) We are also preparing a letter to Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi for the President's signature./3/ This letter will emphasize the potential dangers inherent in a passive posture and urge the GOI to make all possible efforts to improve ICC effectiveness, which is a most important element in containing the area of conflict and preserving Cambodian neutrality. The letter will be forwarded for approval under a separate memorandum. /3/Text transmitted in telegram 90288 to New Delhi, December 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 CAMB) 4. In order not to jeopardize these peace efforts, we continue to believe that it is unwise to approve more militant lines of action, such as blocking the Mekong or Sihanoukville. First, these ports are not significant sources of Viet Cong supplies; second, such actions would be unjustifiable under international law; third, it would create a sharp adverse hue and cry. 5. The Cambodian reaction to our December 4 note has aroused considerable public and international interest in regard to both the basic problem of enemy use of Cambodia and to U.S. intentions in dealing with the problem. (a) The latest review by the U.S. Intelligence Board concludes that the extent of enemy use of Cambodia has probably remained at about the same level as last year, but the strategic importance of Cambodia to the enemy has probably increased. (b) Because of the serious domestic and international problems that would arise out of any attempts to resolve the problem militarily or to retaliate by economic warfare measures, the most feasible approach for the present is to persist in diplomatic initiatives which seek to obtain Cambodian cooperation or acquiescence in more effective ICC frontier patrols or in some other means of ameliorating the problem. 6. We should not expect any immediate indications of improved ICC effectiveness. Even if our diplomatic efforts succeed in impelling the Soviet Union (and consequently the Polish members of the ICC) and the Indian Government to accept our offer of helicopters, it will take a month or six weeks to deliver the helicopters and train crews in Phnom Penh. It will probably take another month to judge whether the ICC can indeed prove itself to be a useful tool in keeping down hostile use of Cambodian territory. 7. In the meantime, we will carry on planned diplomatic moves: (a) We are preparing evidence of specific areas of enemy activity in Cambodia, which can be conveyed to the ICC for use in investigations. (b) Part of this evidence derives from cross border intelligence operations whose mission, however, is primarily tactical. In order to avoid explosive reactions that might occur if these operations became known, we wish to restrict them to those which are essential for the immediate defense of allied forces in Viet-Nam and, to the extent possible, to the remote areas in northeastern Cambodia. However, we have very much in mind promptly authorizing additional reconnaissance missions as they become necessary. (c) We are also instructing certain posts in the field to provide, on a confidential basis, the essential background of U.S.-Cambodian differences along with evidence of enemy use of Cambodia. By this means, we will set straight the record on the nature of U.S. approaches to the Cambodian Government; and, as a result, we expect to enlist some active third-country support for U.S. policy. [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |