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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
232. Note From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 19, 1968, 12:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E (2)a, 1/68-10/68, Cambodia. Top Secret. Mr. President: You may wish to take into account at lunch/2/ these thoughts of the meeting of the Southeast Asian Ambassadors and Gen. Westmoreland at Cam Ranh Bay. /2/According to the notes of the March 19 Tuesday luncheon meeting, neither this cable or the issue that it raised were discussed. (Ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, 3/19/68) They raise, among other matters, the possibility of: --a feint against North Vietnam; W.W. Rostow/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment/4/ Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, March 19, 1968. /4/The attached telegram was a copy retyped in the White House and classified Top Secret; Exdis. SUBJECT [Here follows discussion of Vietnam and Laos printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume, XXVIII, Document 345.] C. Cambodia--Political 1. Discussion at the SEACOORD meeting emphasized the great importance of the collection and exploitation of specific hard intelligence on Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army use of Cambodia, as well as of circumstantial evidence which is convincing by dint of its quality and quantity. Collection of all types of intelligence on Cambodia should be given higher national priority than heretofore. Use of more aggressive intelligence collection methods should be authorized where necessary to obtain such intelligence. Movement of supplies to and through Sihanoukville is a particularly important area for an increased intelligence collection effort. Internal political and insurgency developments should also be covered in new tasking for CIA collection efforts. 2. We should do more to exploit the intelligence assets of other countries. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Efforts should be made to obtain substantially more intelligence on Cambodia from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] friendly missions in Phnom Penh, such as the British and Japanese. (Embassy Bangkok and Embassy Saigon see very little information from these sources; if it is coming to the Department, they would appreciate being put on distribution for it.) 3. Sihanouk should personally be presented with evidence of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army use of Cambodia on a regular and continuing basis. He should be asked what his investigation of the material we have already given him has revealed. The Australians should be asked to impress him again with the seriousness with which we view the situation and call for action on the evidence provided him. 4. Assuming there is no sign of real action to correct the situation of Sihanouk's part in the near future, we should bring our evidence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia to the attention of other friendly governments and ask them to stress our concern to the Cambodians. 5. Pressure should be maintained on the Indians to work to make the International Control Commission an effective instrument for policing VC/NVA use of the border, though we recognize that such a transformation is unlikely. Meanwhile, evidence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia should be presented to the ICC on a regular and continuing basis. 6. No particular pressure should be applied to the Vietnamese to open up the Mekong. The closing of the Mekong puts additional pressure on the port of Sihanoukville, complicating any movement of VC/NVA supplies through that port. 7. The question of reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cambodia should be kept under continuing review. While presence of a U.S. military attaché with freedom to travel would be helpful, the present movement--one in which we do not wish to make a major conciliatory step at a time we are pressing him toward more effective action on his own to deny VC/NVA use of his territory--does not seem an appropriate time to move toward a reestablishment of relations. 8. It is recommended that the Secretary brief his colleagues on Cambodia in the seven nations meeting in Wellington, with a view to bringing them to understand the lines of action we have in mind and to enlist their cooperation where pertinent. Such a presentation would be an opportunity both to encourage governments with access to Cambodian government to join in emphasizing to it their concern over security problem posed by NVN/VC sanctuary and to explain to all the need for restraint in short term actions against Cambodia while determining what Sihanouk can and will do. D. Cambodia--Administrative 1. Primary U.S. field responsibility for matters relating to Cambodia (except for VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory) should continue to be vested in Embassy Bangkok. Bangkok will also take initiative in formulating recommendations on appropriate action as viewed from the field, keeping other SEACOORD posts informed. Embassy Bangkok should be given necessary resources to do the job. Saigon will continue to have primary responsibility for reporting and policy recommendations relating to VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory, keeping other SEACOORD posts informed. Embassy Bangkok will be sending follow-on telegram which will contain specific recommendations for improving collection, collation and dissemination of information. 2. It is recommended that member agencies assign a high priority to the interdepartmental working group under State Department chairmanship that has been established in Washington to coordinate and take action on matters pertaining to Cambodia. E. Cambodia--Military Meanwhile, it would be desirable, in the aftermath of the VC/NVA use of Cambodia in connection with the Tet offensive, to take Sihanouk up on his willingness to have us conduct limited military operations in unpopulated areas of Cambodia. We recommend that increased military activity by U.S. forces against NVA/VC in Cambodia begin now on a small scale, gradually increasing our operations as the situation permits, using care to avoid foreclosing through this program the possibility of obtaining Sihanouk's cooperation with us to reduce VC/NVA use of his territory. We recommend a scenario for U.S. operations in Cambodia as follows: 1. Beginning immediately: A. The present restrictions on the number, depth, and frequency of Daniel Boone insertions be relaxed in Zone A and that more helicopter support be authorized for cross border operations in Zone A of the Daniel Boone area. This is essential if we are to develop better intelligence for use in the Vesuvius Operation. Further we need to develop hard targets that can later be exploited by fire in the unpopulated areas of Cambodia. B. Exercising extreme caution to ascertain no Cambodian presence, initiate active defensive measures of short duration in remote, unpopulated sections of the Cambodian border area. (1) Reconnaissance. Beyond present Daniel Boone squads, author-ize U.S. platoon/company size forces be inserted by helicopter and/or ground. (2) Pursuit by fire on enemy targets retreating into unpopulated areas of Cambodia by use of artillery, gunships and tactical air. C. Task [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] agencies as appropriate to develop resources for the conduct of black psychological operations to exploit differences between the Cambodian government, on the one hand, and the VC/NVA, ChiComs and their Cambodian supporters on the other. D. Expand the area of coverage south to the Gulf of Thailand, exercising safeguards to preclude loss of an aircraft in Cambodian territory. 2. Subsequent military operations: Depending on Sihanouk's reactions to our political pressure and to our increased military operations recommended above, we visualize a carefully controlled and gradual increase in strength and effectiveness of U.S. operations into Cambodia, while at the same time avoiding actions which would jeopardize any political progress we are making with Sihanouk. The following subsequent military operations are recommended for initiation if it becomes clear that efforts to induce Sihanouk to act more effectively are not going to produce results and in circumstances where there would be a clear military imperative. A. Increasing our reconnaissance capability by authorizing over-flights to a depth of 20 kilometers along the entire Cambodian border area with the QT-2 noiseless aircraft as soon as it proved its operational capability. Also allow the airborne personnel detector (people sniffer) to be employed along the border as an additional airborne sensor. In order for this to be employed effectively, authorize additional low-level reconnaissance coverage. B. On a case by case basis, authorize night-time B-52 strikes on clearly defined significant targets in unpopulated, remote areas astride the South Vietnam-Cambodian border. C. Increase the strength of our active defensive measures of short duration in remote, unpopulated sections of Cambodia close to the border by: (1) Raids. Attack specific enemy targets with company/battalion task force supported by artillery, gunships, and tactical air. (2) Pursuit. Forces not to exceed battalion task force size forces to maintain contact and destroy enemy forces retreating into Cambodia. (3) Reaction forces. Employment of company/battalion task force size forces to reinforce reconnaissance/raid action and to assist disengagement and withdrawal of forces as necessary. Bunker
233. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, April 22, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E (2)a, 1/68-10/68, Cambodia. No classification marking. Attached in response to your request this morning are copies of two recent memoranda/2/ which discuss the increasing evidence that Vietnamese Communists are receiving substantial amounts of military equipment via Southern Cambodia. /2/No documents were attached. The information memorandum of March 7 was apparently an attachment and its summary is printed as an attachment. (Ibid.) The other attachment was apparently CIA memorandum SC No. 01939/68, April 4, 1968, a more detailed 14-page account of North Vietnamese/Viet Cong use of Cambodia, not printed. (Ibid.) Joe Alsop has undoubtedly drawn upon MACV sources for his article in today's Washington Post. We believe, however, that his tonnage estimates are too high. R.J. Smith
Attachment/3/ Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence Washington, March 7, 1968. /3/Secret. RECENT COMMUNIST USES OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY Summary The Communists continue to use Cambodian territory for tactical sanctuary, for base areas, for the infiltration of personnel, and as a source of rice, medicines, and sundry supplies. Communist base areas on the eastern border of Cambodia have continued to expand as the tempo of the war in South Vietnam has increased. We do not believe, however, that the step-up in military activity since the Tet offensive has taxed the capability of the established supply route from North Vietnam via Laos and the trail system along the Cambodian border. There is a growing body of circumstantial evidence, however, that the Communists may have stepped up the acquisition of supplies through southern Cambodia. The appearance of new weaponry in the IV Corps area, along with the heavy expenditure of ammunition in the III and IV Corps areas, point to an increasing likelihood that Cambodia may be used to at least augment the military equipment which is reaching this area over more established routes from North Vietnam via Laos and the trails into South Vietnam. [Here follow the body of the memorandum and a map entitled: "Major Vietnamese Communist Infiltration Routes and Base Areas Along the Cambodian Border."]
234. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, May 27, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CAMB. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Cowherd and Leonhart. SUBJECT 1. At Tab A is a request by General Westmoreland for authority to employ B 52's, tactical air, and artillery against VC/NVA in the tri-border area of Cambodia in the near future to exploit the expected defeat of a major NVA offensive against the Central Highlands of SVN./2/ Tab B is a strong endorsement from Ambassador Bunker./3/ /2/COMUSMACV telegram 14988/250450Z May 1968, attached but not printed. /3/Telegram 28267 from Saigon, May 25, attached but not printed. 2. We expect this matter to be discussed at the President's meeting at 8:30 AM May 28./4/ /4/President Johnson held a breakfast meeting at 8:30 a.m., May 28, attended by Clifford, Taylor, Vance, Wheeler, Helms, USIA Director Leonard Marks, Christian, Rostow, World Bank President McNamara, Justice Abe Fortas, Katzenbach, and Tom Johnson. Australian Prime Minister Gorton joined the meeting at its end. According to Tom Johnson's notes of the meeting, the only discussion on Cambodia was Vance's statement that "We should stay away from talks about Cambodia." (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings) Johnson's notes are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume VI. Discussion 3. General Westmoreland points out that B-3 front forces are out from their Cambodian tri-border sanctuary and into Kontum Province in the II Corps Tactical Zone. In his judgment, a major battle is imminent, and may in fact have begun. Enemy forces consist of the 325 C and 1st NVA Divisions supported by the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment. Based on current intelligence and past enemy performances, General Westmoreland has outlined a scenario in which the NVA objective is Kontum City. He posits an enemy defeat and withdrawal under pressure along known routes into his sanctuary in Cambodia. To take maximum advantage of the situation and prevent renewal of attacks, General Westmoreland proposes to pursue by B 52's, tactical air, and artillery along retreat routes and against known targets in the tri-border area of Cambodia North and East of YB 6100 (see map/5/). Combat timing is such that he needs advance authority, which he would use only if the scenario develops as outlined. If used, notification will be made prior to beginning the cross-border attacks. /5/Not attached. 4. Ambassador Bunker in recognizing the political implications argues that increased enemy activity since January 30 and the military and psychological dangers to our position in SVN and at Paris dictate inflicting maximum punishment on the enemy. To give the enemy his tri-border sanctuary, would permit him to come out again, thereby possibly prolonging enemy hopes, the war, casualties, and negotiations. 5. We do not yet have CINCPAC or JCS views. We are advised that General Wheeler strongly supports Westmoreland's proposals and will vigorously endorse them tomorrow, citing enemy mass, fewer friendly forces in the area than six months ago when a similar request was rejected, and the need to correct the ground disparity by B 52's. 6. Although the area concerned is remote, rugged, and unpopulated, we can expect the operation to receive publicity and public denunciations by Sihanouk (despite an earlier statement that he would not mind "hot pursuit" into unpopulated areas). We think it unlikely North Viet-Nam would break off the talks, although they probably would threaten to do so--it is unlikely they would acknowledge presence of their forces in Cambodia. 7. Our reservations concern whether the targets will be sufficiently remunerative to justify the political risks and whether they could be taken by Tac Air and artillery without the use of B 52's. You may wish to have a full discussion of both points. If the case is made on each, we would support Westmoreland's proposal and his rationale. Westmoreland expects that the battle for Kontum may last a month, and in view of the Paris talks, we believe we should reassess the situation before the cross-border phase is initiated. Recommendation/6/ /6/There is no indication on the source text of Rusk's approval or disapproval of paragraphs 8 and 9. Bundy wrote the following note next to the approval lines: "I am somewhat more reserved, but this gives the facts." 8. That, depending on the consideration outlined in para 7 above, you approve for planning purposes the proposal to employ B 52's, tactical air, and artillery against NVA forces in the tri-border area of Cambodia as outlined in the scenario. 9. That the actual execution of the cross-border phase be subject to Washington review based upon the situation obtaining at the time, principally the Paris talks, and prior to an Execute order.
235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 28, 1968, 10:40 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cambodia, Miscellaneous Cables & Memos, 1/67-12/58. Top Secret. Mr. President: George Christian says you wish to have for the 11:30 a.m. meeting with Prime Minister Gorton/2/ the situation with respect to North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and the problem that we face. /2/President Johnson met with Prime Minister Gorton at 11:42 a.m. on May 28. The meeting lasted until 12:16 p.m. Johnson and Gorton were joined by Australian Ambassador Sir Keith Waller, C.L.S. Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, Bundy, Rostow, and Chief of Protocol Angier Biddle Duke. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of discussion of Cambodia has been found, but see Document 236. 1. As the attached paper (Tab A) from the CIA,/3/ which Dick Helms distributed this morning, indicates, the North Vietnamese have been using the Cambodian salient in various ways for the past 3 years. /3/No Tab A was attached. The CIA paper probably was SC No. 08367/68, May 28, not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam, 5E (2)b, 1/68-10/68, Cambodia) 2. At the present time some 12,000 enemy troops are arrayed against allied positions in western Kontum province; we know that an offensive has been planned for some time; it is Westy's intention to pre-empt this offensive, if possible, if not, to defeat them and drive them back. 3. The two maps at the end of the CIA paper, marked with paper-clips, show the transport routes, headquarters, bivouac areas, etc. now in the Northeast Cambodian salient. 4. At Tab B are Bunker's and Westy's cables/4/ which request your permission to attack this salient if and when the North Vietnamese are driven back from their assault on Kontum. The map attached to those cables shows the squares which Westy wishes to attack in this uninhabited base area. /4/See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 234. Walt
236. Telegram From the White House to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) in Texas/1/ Washington, May 29, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cambodia, Miscellaneous Cables and Memos, 1/67-12/68. Secret. Received at the Johnson Ranch at 8:25 p.m. CST. CAP 81159. Message to the ranch. Personal for Rostow from Bundy. 1. For the President's meeting with Gorton tomorrow,/2/ and continuing discussion of Cambodia, you should have the following background for such use as you see fit in briefing the President: /2/President Johnson, Prime Minister Gorton, General Westmoreland, Rostow, and others spent the day at the Johnson Ranch. There was a press conference, a lunch, and sightseeing. There were no apparent substantive discussions or meetings, although Gorton and Johnson would have had ample time to talk. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A. President went over situation at last meeting with Gorton,/3/ explaining it on the map and quoting from Bunker's cable recommending authority for action./4/ /3/See footnote 2, Document 235. /4/See footnote 3, Document 234. B. Specifically on the tri-border area, the Australians transmitted for us some evidence concerning the area in February. This consisted of visual sighting by our own patrols (not attributed), plus some photographs. These materials showed roads and one new small bridge, plus some rather scratchy fox holes--but nothing really impressive by way of a fixed installation or clear proof of present occupancy. C. Since February, we have received additional material mostly photographs. However, in view of Sihanouk's reaction to the February package (reported by the Australians) that photographs by themselves did not show where they were taken and in view of the fact that the evidence showed only somewhat clearer roads, it did not seem to us then--and does not now--that this evidence would add much to what we have done. Finally, photographic evidence runs the risk of triggering Sihanouk's reaction that we are violating his air space. D. At the present moment, we are awaiting a MACV officer who is supposed to be bringing the very latest evidence. It may be that Westy himself will have this with him, and that this will be more convincing than what we have hitherto been able to pull together. E. Perhaps more to the present point, Sihanouk was well aware in November of the Dakto engagement and our clear belief that the NVA/VC went into the tri-border area afterward. During the Bowles visit, Phil Habib expressly included this in the briefing given to Sihanouk, and used arrows to show NVA/VC forces moving into the area in November. 2. You will note that para B in our possible message/5/ would put the message in the mouth of the Australians and would avoid a direct message of warning from us. At the same time its import would be wholly clear to the Cambodians. We feel here that any direct warning from us would have a decidedly negative effect on Sihanouk's reaction if the matter comes to a head. On the other hand, Gorton might well feel that we were asking the Australians to serve as our stalking horses--and might have reservations about going this far. Both we and the Australians value their continued presence and effectiveness in Cambodia, and if Gorton were to react that this was putting him out on a limb, we frankly doubt if he should be put under strong pressure to do it. However, this is clearly for the President to judge. /5/See Document 237. 3. Lest anyone think this is State Department soft-headedness, I went over the matter this morning with Bill Depuy and DOD. Bill at least has reservations even about submitting a new package, on the present state of our evidence, and unless Westy has something more convincing. At the same time, he, and above all General Wheeler, obviously wish to act strongly if the case arises. Our own views on what we do in the military sphere were covered in Nick's memorandum to the President of this noon./6/ In sum, we all agree that we should be prepared to act, and this is the gut issue. The only question, for the President's conversation with Gorton, is whether any message other than a possible new package of evidence would in fact be useful in tempering Sihanouk's reaction or deterring the North Vietnamese. We ourselves doubt that it would be helpful and have some fear that it would be harmful. But the separate message gives you what the President could say if this is his judgement. /6/Apparent reference to Document 237. 4. One final point. Bunker's cable has referred to Sihanouk's remarks to Bowles about not objecting to military action in hot pursuit in unpopulated areas. It is quite correct that Sihanouk told Bowles he would "shut his eyes" in this situation. This gives us some basis for believing that his reaction would be moderate at most. However--again thinking in terms of any message through the Australians--it would be my very strong judgement that it would be a great mistake for the Australians to refer in any way to this statement by Sihanouk. Again, we can act on it, but if we throw it back at him it would be a red flag to a bull. One can seldom have confident judgements about Sihanouk's reaction, but this one is as clear as anything can be in my mind.
237. Telegram From the White House to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, May 29, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cambodia, Miscellaneous Cables and Memos, 1/67-12/68. Secret. Received at the Johnson Ranch at 9 p.m. CST. CAP 81160. For Rostow for the President, from Katzenbach and Bundy. 1. We believe the President in his talk with Gorton tomorrow might do one or both of the following: A. If General Westmoreland has brought new evidence or reports that it is about to arrive from MACV, tell Gorton that we are preparing another package and would like the Australians to submit it just as soon as possible. B. It would ask Gorton to instruct his Ambassador in Cambodia to tell the Cambodians that he, Gorton, has just reviewed the military situation in the highlands, during his visit, that this review indicated that major attacks by the North Vietnamese were imminent, and that there was every evidence that the North Vietnamese forces might again act as they did in November and as the Australians understand Ambassador Bowles' party briefed Cambodians in early January. This developing situation caused Gorton serious concern, and he felt obliged in friendship to report his impressions of it to the Cambodians.
238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 8, 1968, 2342Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB-US. Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Herz and Bundy, cleared by J.R. Burke of EA/VN, and approved by Bundy. 198217. For the Ambassador from Bundy. Ref: A. State 128989; B. State 135669; C. Bangkok 16574; D. Saigon 31032; E. Saigon 22864; F. State 135496./2/ Subj: Cambodia. /2/Reference A, March 13; Reference B, March 25; Reference C, June 26; Reference D, June 26; and Reference E, March 23, are ibid.; Reference F, March 23, is ibid., POL 27 VIET S. 1. I think there is some misunderstanding as to what we are proposing to do with respect to Cambodia. Let me review the bidding. In March (ref A) we set forth advantages and disadvantages of moving toward possible resumption of relations with Cambodia, concluding that we need to explore certain aspects in New Delhi to help us in coming to a decision. The matter was put entirely in terms of where the balance of US interest lies. The crux of the matter was, and continues to be, how we can most effectively move Cambodia back toward position of true neutrality. 2. Later in March, after receiving comments from all interested posts, we concluded (ref B) that we should go ahead with exploration in New Delhi. We once more made it very clear at that time that we were in no way proposing to "reward" Cambodia for good behavior and that if any forward movement toward resumption of relations should result, one of its objectives would be to improve relations between Cambodia and its neighbors. We would have gone ahead with exploration then, in view of no objections voiced by Thai and GVN Foreign Ministers, if the P-3 incident of April 1 had not supervened. As you know, this was followed by other major unpleasantness such as Bavet incident and tugboat episode./3/ /3/On April 1 a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion patrol aircraft was shot down by two Cambodian patrol boats in the Gulf of Siam. All crew members of the U.S. aircraft were killed. On May 25 the Cambodian Navy captured a Philippine tugboat 1 mile inside Cambodian territory on the Mekong River and detained eight Filipino and two U.S. Army crew members. The Filipinos were released on June 8; the Americans on June 10. Bavet is apparently a border village attacked mistakenly by U.S. helicopter gunships. 3. Realize of course that many things have happened in the meantime including talks in Paris about which GVN is understandably nervous. At same time, as we approach some kind of settlement in SVN it is becoming more and more clear that this will have to take into consideration the problems along SVN-Cambodian border and that Cambodia at some point will have to be brought into the talks. This will necessitate the possibility also of informal talks with Cambodia and will mean that the desirability of informal contacts, and perhaps later of more formal ones, has if anything increased. 4. We feel that basically our reasoning of March is still applicable in July and that only procedural problems that remain are to secure general understanding by Thanh of what we are about to do and to give Bangkok 24-hour interval to touch base again with Thanat (ref C). 5. While not strictly relevant to discussion of pros and cons of the New Delhi exploration, I would like to set your mind at rest with respect to the point you make in paragraph 3 ref D about Sihanouk's unresponsiveness to evidence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia, which you had also made in ref E. As we pointed out paragraph 2 ref B, Sihanouk did respond to a substantial extent. Not all this information is documented in State cables since it is based on reporting of Australian Embassy Phnom Penh and other sources, some of them very sensitive. Most recent evidence of such responsiveness that we disseminated was in ref F. There is much more going on in this respect than one would think on the basis of Cambodian propaganda; and we should be guided more by actual behavior than by propaganda. 6. It is for you of course to determine the most propitious moment when matter should be raised with GVN and level at which this is most appropriate. However, we have found that with respect to moving re Cambodia there never is a "right" moment. The present seems better from some points of view than it has been for some time. If our Vietnamese friends were to think we are planning a "rapprochement" with Cambodia they would totally misunderstand what we have in mind. Indeed, the initial exploration would be private, through Nong Kimny, and, while we cannot ever exclude the Prince's making something public, we would suppose he would have considerable reasons not to do so at the present time. 7. If these points still leave you with reservations, let us talk quietly about it when we see each other very shortly. But I did want you to understand what we have in mind. Rusk
239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, July 26, 1968, 0005Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-4 CAMB-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Bennett, cleared by Leonhart, Corcoran, Richard H. Moorsteen of U, and Murray J. Bellman, the Deputy Legal Adviser, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Canberra and Saigon. 209406/UNSEC 19. For Under Secretary Katzenbach from the Secretary. Subject: Cambodian Detention of US LCU. 1. Background. On July 17 a US Army utility landing craft (LCU 1577) with 11 Americans and one RVN policeman on board inadvertently strayed into Cambodian waters on Mekong River and was seized by Cambodian Navy. We immediately expressed regrets and asked for return of vessel and personnel on board. Meanwhile Sihanouk, speaking for domestic consumption, threatened to try the men under Cambodian law and hold them for ransom of tractors. 2. We have now received Cambodian reply rejecting our request. RKG characterizes penetration as deliberate act of provocation, connects it to other border incidents, and states men on board will be dealt with in accordance with Cambodian law. (Text repeated you septel.)/2/ On July 25, Sihanouk, speaking in Cambodian to National Congress, dropped mention of trying men or demanding ransom, and instead indicated they would be interned till end of hostilities and LCU confiscated. Text in FBIS 32 of July 25. Australian Emb Phnom Penh has not yet been accorded consular access to crew. /2/Telegram 209405/UNSEC 18, July 26, 0004Z. (Ibid.) 3. Further Action To Be Taken. We are preparing further evidence showing inadvertent nature of intrusion, to be conveyed to RKG through Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh. FYI. The Secretary is personally asking Hasluck to undertake mission to Phnom Penh to intercede with Sihanouk. (See septel.)/3/ We will keep you informed of Australian plans in this regard, but wish you to go ahead with your approach to Nong Kimny in any event. End FYI. We are also studying other means of communication with or pressure on RKG with a view to bringing about release. /3/Telegram 209404/UNSEC 17, July 26, 0001Z. (Ibid.) 4. Action: Please arrange meeting with Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny and express to him our urgent interest in release of crew. You should present following facts and US views. A. Incident was entirely inadvertent, with no hostile intent. B. LCU 1577 is utility landing craft designed for handling heavy and bulky cargoes. With length 120 feet, beam 32 feet, max speed 8 knots, craft is obviously not one which we would contemplate employing for deliberate or provocative penetration of Cambodian territory. Royal Cambodian Navy possesses several LCU's and can confirm details of performance. Craft was armed with two .50-caliber machine guns and one M-60 7.62 mm. light machine gun, plus individual weapons of crew members and passengers (M-16's, carbines, pistols, and one M-79 grenade launcher). This armament exclusively for defense against hostile fire along waterways within RVN. Cargo included 200 drums of solvent, two commercial forklift trucks, 34 drums JP-4 fuel (kerosene), and 6 containers miscellaneous supplies. As make-up of cargo suggests, craft was on routine resupply run to US installations in Mekong Delta. Route was from base at Vung Tau via Mekong River and cut-off to Bassac River, then down Bassac to Can Tho. Apparently craft missed first turning, about seven miles from border, and proceeded up river into Cambodian territory. Navigational error was same as that of Philippine tugboat Bream, which RKG has now returned, following release of Filipino crew and two US military policemen who were on board. C. We are conducting further investigation to determine how error was made and whether any individual responsibility can be assigned. In addition, we are taking measures to avoid such incidents in future. These include but are not limited to more thorough crew indoctrination and briefing, embarcation of personnel familiar with area near border, establishment of prominent aids to navigation and control points, and provision of positive method to warn shipping of approach to Cambodian border. D. From his service in US, Nong Kimny must understand sensitivity of US public to prolonged detention of US soldiers whose only transgression was that one of them was apparently inexperienced or inadequately trained as a navigator. As RKG doubtless aware, our regret expressed over inadvertent violation above Kurile Islands was quickly followed by Soviet release of our plane with its crew and passengers. Similarly, when Soviet vessel violated US regulations in Alaska, ship and crew were released after Soviet captain paid a modest fine. E. The American people will be especially puzzled if severe treatment is meted out to US servicemen guilty only of inadvertence, when the public is becoming increasingly aware of the use made by VC/NVA forces of Cambodian border areas for attacks against US forces in SVN. Cambodian publications have recently referred to at least three such violations with no record of RKG detention or punishment of any VC/NVA. Our own intelligence shows rapidly expanding use of Cambodia by VC/NVA. We expect to present evidence to RKG soon, in line with our policy of providing such information as it becomes available. VC/NVA use of Cambodia is a large-scale, planned and deliberate violation of RKG neutrality, as contrasted with small-scale, inadvertent LCU intrusion. Contrast in RKG policies toward two situations is hard to understand and will raise question of what we are doing wrong that the VC/NVA are doing right. F. We urge Nong Kimny to impress on his government nature of our position, our desire to settle matter satisfactorily with utmost urgency, and seriousness with which US would respond to continued detention of personnel on board LCU. We would welcome any suggestion he or his government may have as to how best we can achieve release of personnel in shortest possible time. We want the boat back too but return of personnel is urgent and should be addressed immediately. G. In event Nong Kimny refers to other border incidents in which Cambodian lives were lost, you may wish to draw on following: We understand Cambodian sensitivity in such matters and are doing what we can to avert all such incidents. However, it is difficult when VC/NVA increasingly use Cambodian territory from which to attack our forces. In some cases, for instance, VC have dug in on Cambodian territory and then opened fire across frontier. This was case in incident May 4 at Bavet, which ICC has investigated, and on which our offer to make witnesses available to testify before ICC is still standing. We have presented full details this incident to RKG, and we continue use our best efforts to investigate and respond to RKG complaints on border violations. On most serious recent incident (Svey A Ngong, June 29) we have presented to RKG and ICC all facts we have been able to elicit, and again offered witnesses. On later incident (Prasat, July 10) we are urgently investigating. We wish to continue these efforts to avoid border incidents, and would welcome any constructive suggestions RKG might have in this connection, or any suggestions for improvement in investigation procedures. 5. Should Nong Kimny decline to see you, you should discuss with Ambassador Bowles his seeing Nong Kimny in your place. Rusk
240. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Brown) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, July 29, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-4 CAMB-US. Secret. Drafted by Trent, Corcoran, and Charles A. Schmitz of L/EA. SUBJECT While press reaction has been notably scarce in quantity and mild in tone so far on the LCU detention, we are aware that this could change at almost any moment and that continued detention of the men may rouse Congressional and public sentiment, particularly because of the apparent similarity to the Pueblo case. We are therefore proceeding as quickly and quietly as possible to obtain the release of the 11 detained Americans. Actions Taken Immediately following the receipt of information through COMUSMACV that the LCU 1577 had been seen by the RVN outpost to have entered Cambodian territory, we dispatched via the Australians an urgent message to the RKG regretting this inadvertent intrusion into Cambodian territory and saying that we would be grateful to the RKG for the return of the vessel and the personnel on board. We also said that we were making every effort to prevent the recurrence of such an intrusion./2/ Our message has so far had no positive result. On July 22 the Cambodians rejected our explanation and indicated an intention to try the men and confiscate the vessel./3/ (In a message of July 20 through the French Embassy they had officially informed us of the entry.)/4/ Although their propaganda has been offensive in language, it has been low keyed (delivered for the most part in the Cambodian language by Sihanouk) and the RKG's formal communication rejecting our explanation was correct in tone. While the Cambodians have now (July 26) granted access by the Australians to visit the detained personnel (who have been found in satisfactory condition and are being provided by the Australians with sundry supplies), we doubt that further representations in a standard framework would be effective. /2/Text in telegram 204114 to Saigon, July 17. (Ibid.) /3/As reported in telegram 208274 to Saigon, July 24. (Ibid.) Regarding the Cambodian reply, see footnote 2, Document 239. /4/Text in telegram 208274 to Saigon; see footnote 3 above. We have prepared a further note to the RKG confirming the innocent mission of the LCU and, by citing operational and loading data, stressing the inadvertent nature of the intrusion and the navigational error which caused it. We have cabled an advance text to the Australian Ambassador in Phnom Penh and as soon as we have confirmation from Saigon that the GVN concurs, at least informally, we shall add a paragraph inviting FARK officers to visit Viet-Nam and inspect operational and loading data we have cited. We shall then authorize Deschamps to pass this note to the RKG./4/ We have considered a number of courses of action which we might take in view of the apparent unwillingness so far of the Cambodians to release the men. The rationale of these recommendations is that we should move fast and hard diplomatically at first and that the tone of our representations should combine "politesse" and firmness. If and when Sihanouk wishes to release them he will be able to find an acceptable channel in one or the other of our recommendations, although he may of course come up with one of his own which we can accept. It is our intention to have him understand the seriousness with which we view this matter. We would hope to come out of this affair not only with the men (and the LCU) but also with Sihanouk reappraising his involvement with the VC/NVA and their flagrant (in contrast to our mistaken) violations of his neutrality. On July 25, you sent a message to Canberra asking Mr. Hasluck to go to Phnom Penh to make clear to the RKG our concern over this incident in the light of increasing VC/NVA activities in Cambodia and our hope for a prompt and amicable solution. Hasluck replied with a counter suggestion that his Ambassador sound out "elder statesman" Penn Nouth in Phnom Penh. We explored the possibility of the Under Secretary approaching Ambassador Nong Kimny in New Delhi on the matter, but the absence of the latter from his post has closed this channel. We considered asking the French to think about how they might influence Sihanouk to release the men but suspended consideration for the time being. We felt that if we involved the French and subsequently found ourselves obliged to take some action they would not approve, the reaction would be adverse to our interests. We feel the possibility of French intervention should continue to be held in abeyance. We have considered the wisdom of intercession by a prominent American public figure acceptable to Sihanouk. Mr. Macomber has discussed this matter with Senator Mansfield. Senator Brooke might be another possible candidate. We might also consider requesting informal intervention with RKG by former Secretary Acheson who has a special position of favor in Phnom Penh due to his successful representation of Cambodian interests in the Preah Vihear temple case at the ICJ. An approach by him could be informal, as private as possible, and along the line that releasing the men immediately would be in the best interest of Cambodia, and that this could be done without prejudice to negotiations for the release of the LCU which could be pursued subsequently in a less tense atmosphere. We might also consider allowing Sihanouk to save face by agreeing to a controlled submission of the matter to a Cambodian court. The RKG has told us that it intends to submit the vessel and crew to "treatment provided by Cambodian law." (RKG note, July 22, 1968.) During the Tugboat Bream episode the French lawyer for the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh provided some information on relevant Cambodian law. He posited three conceivable charges: 1) illegal entry--maximum sentence 12 months imprisonment and/or fine of 4000 riels ($114); 2) carrying of arms--maximum punishment, one month's imprisonment and/or fine of 1200 riels ($34); 3) espionage--maximum sentence, death (lesser sentences in extenuating circumstances at judge's discretion). While the gamut of punishments is wide, the Cambodian prosecutor, of course, can charge or decline to charge crimes as he thinks appropriate. If the RKG wishes, as is possible that it does, to dispose of the problem of captured Americans expeditiously, yet without compromising on its own sovereignty, it might be amenable to trial of the officer-in-charge of the vessel on (say) illegal entry and to persuade the judge to set the punishment at a fine which the United States could pay on behalf of the officer. Although we would prefer that only the officer-in-charge be made to stand trial, we might consent to trial of the full complement of men if the trial were expeditious. We might also accept a prison sentence for the officer or men which would be suspended or completely off-set by a short period of detention while awaiting trial. Under the circumstances, we should consider accepting as a practical matter, RKG retention of the LCU, although this might be the subject of a later USG claim against the RKG. In practice, the USG has paid fines on behalf of captains of American fishing boats seized on the high seas by Ecuador, which claims a territorial sea of 200 miles; and we have accepted fines paid by the GUSSR on behalf of captains of Soviet intelligence collecting trawlers which have been seized in Alaskan waters. Contingency Actions If we determine that we need to move into a stiffer position, it would be essential for us to have a full and frank discussion on the matter with the Australians before any action is taken. The Australians as our representatives in Cambodia are deeply involved in the whole affair, and we must guard against any move on our part which might take them unawares and put them in an impossible position. We should avoid any public threats of stiff action against Cambodians. If we find it necessary to take such actions, we should do so without verbal threats and let the actions speak for themselves. Such actions might include: 1. Tourists. We might discourage Americans against tourist travel to Cambodia on the grounds that it is dangerous and we could neither protect them against detention nor intervene for them. We estimate if this warning were effective, it would cost the Cambodians, initially, about one-fourth their tourist trade or about $1 million annually. And other tourists might be deterred by our action. (Cambodia's budget is equivalent to about $200 million per year.) 2. Mekong Traffic. Tighten supervision of river traffic by GVN agencies, with American advice and discreet supervision ostensibly to enforce GVN customs, sanitation and navigation rules and regulations but incidentally to slow down traffic to Phnom Penh. This could be done progressively or abruptly, concentrating on POL and other key cargoes in ways that would virtually suspend river traffic. 3. Naval Reciprocity. Exploit Market Time operations in the Gulf of Siam to apprehend any Cambodian naval craft suspected of violating Vietnamese territorial waters with a view of negotiating an exchange for LCU 1577. 4. Reconnaissance. Increase Dorsal Fin, Daniel Boone, and related air and ground operations. 5. Attacks on VC/NVA facilities in Cambodia. All of these means except the first (warning to tourists) would be likely to inspire Sihanouk to characterize them as examples of a great power's attempt to crush a small power, and as proof that the US is indeed Cambodia's enemy as he has alleged, and is cooperating with Cambodia's enemy, SVN, to strangle Cambodia's economy. They are at least as likely to lead Sihanouk to punish the crew as to release them. We therefore do not recommend serious consideration of any of these measures as yet, but see merit in some contingency planning so that we can be sure as to exactly what pressure measures could be employed, should we later decide to use them. Recommendations:/5/ /5/There is no indication on the source text whether Rusk approved or disapproved these recommendations. 1. That we ask Mr. Acheson whether, if requested, he would be willing to make an informal approach to the RKG. 2. That we sound out Deschamps on the feasibility of application of the "Russian Fishing Boat" approach. 3. That we prepare a draft instruction discouraging tourist travel to Cambodia for eventual release at an appropriate time. 4. That we request DOD to draft contingency plans for: A. Tightened supervision of Mekong traffic. B. Exploitation of Market Time to apprehend Cambodian Naval craft with a view to negotiating an exchange for LCU 1577. C. Increased air and ground reconnaissance operations. D. Attacks on VC/NVA facilities in Cambodia. [Continue with the next documents]
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