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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
Thailand February 1964-October 1966: 264. Editorial Note On February 15, 1964, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman began a campaign to win support for sending U.S. Marine forces to Thailand. Hilsman suggested such a move as a signal to North Vietnam and China of U.S. willingness to defend its positions in Southeast Asia in light of Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese advances in Laos and the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk approved interagency discussion of possible courses of action. See memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, February 15, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXVIII, Document 3. For accounts of the interagency discussion, in which Department of Defense officials stated that "there was no credibility left in the idea of deploying military forces to Thailand," see memorandum for the record, February 24, and memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, February 25, ibid., Documents 4 and 6. Attached to Hilsman's February 25 memorandum is a draft memorandum to the President, which recommended deferring for further deliberation the idea of sending U.S. forces to Thailand except for 6 U.S. F-100 jets, their pilots, and crews. On February 26 Johnson administration officials met without the President to discuss Southeast Asia and Laos. The general consensus, according to Hilsman, was that although U.S. military posture in Thailand needed to be strengthened, the situation in Laos did not make the decision one of urgency. See editorial note, ibid., Document 8. On February 28 Hilsman suggested to Rusk that recent Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese military successes in Laos made the sending of U.S. forces to Laos a matter of urgency. Hilsman recommended that a full battle group need not be sent, a force half that size would be adequate. See memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, February 28, ibid., Document 9.
265. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 2, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. I, Memos, 11/63-11/64. Secret. The attached telegram/2/ discloses part of the difficulty with the deployment of troops to Thailand. The difficulties of the JCS are exactly the same as those they had two years ago when we put the Marines in Thailand. As a general principle, they do not favor the deployment of troops anywhere in Asia unless they are assured that it is part of a larger plan to win a war. In short, it is not the political objectives of the move that they question, but the military usefulness. There is an underlying fear that they may be asked to move across the Mekong with insufficient force in the event that things hot up. I will try to talk to Bill Bundy further before he leaves. MF /2/Attached was JCS telegram 5107 to CINCPAC, February 29, in which the Joint Chiefs instructed CINCPAC to prepare recommendations on sending troops to Thailand. The JCS noted that they had recommended "against introduction of ground troops at this time without specific military or political objectives to be served," but they stated that the issue was being discussed at the highest level and the U.S. military might be directed to act on very short notice.
266. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Martin)/1/ Washington, March 2, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 THAI. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Pickering on February 28. Dear Graham: As you can readily imagine, the coup rumors emanating from Thailand recently have us all feeling a bit uneasy. Given the situation in the rest of Southeast Asia, a coup d'etat in Thailand at this time "is all we need". Quite seriously, we are concerned about the impact on American public opinion of such an event, which would undermine the present faith in Thailand as the only stable country in the area, thus adding to the growing feeling of pessimism about the future of Southeast Asia and our ability to influence favorably the course of events there. Thai stock is exceptionally high here at present as a result of their role in the Malaysian dispute, the relative restraint they have shown in the Cambodian dispute, and the smooth transfer of power to Thanom and Thanom's good beginning. I know that the Mission is doing everything it can to keep us informed of the situation and to counsel moderation on the various key figures at every appropriate opportunity. I hope that the JUSMAG officers in particular are providing all possible information on the attitudes and activities of key individuals in the military services. The Department of Defense through the Defense Intelligence Agency has levied on the Attaches a requirement for continuous and thorough reporting on the coup situation. Although their reports on this subject have been frequent, it was considered desirable that this requirement be levied formally because making it formal enables the Attaches to request JUSMAG assistance in accordance with JCS memorandum 947-59/2/ (subject to the primary mission of JUSMAG). This will enable the Attaches to draw on the excellent existing contacts that the JUSMAG officers have with their counterparts in the Thai Military Services. Naturally this should be done in close cooperation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] most importantly of all, under your guidance. /2/Not found. Do you have any suggestions as to things which we might appropriately do to introduce greater stability into the situation? We are restrained from making proposals along this line for obvious reasons. We are most reluctant to see the United States become identified with any faction in Thailand, much preferring the present happy state in which all serious contenders for power are quite friendly to us. Secondly, we are not at all confident that we could exercise effective influence on the situation. This latter feeling is strengthened by persistent doubts as to Thanom's ability to maintain himself atop this heap regardless of anything we might do. If he lacks the acumen necessary to political survival in Thailand, we most certainly do not wish to put our prestige behind an effort to maintain him in office. On the other hand, if he has it, presumably our intervention is not required. I know you will give us any suggestions you may have. Meanwhile, we will watch for every opportunity to express support for the Government of Thailand. Sincerely yours, Roger Hilsman/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
267. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Martin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Bangkok, March 19, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 THAI. Secret; Official-Informal. Dear Bill: I received Roger Hilsman's letter of March 2 too late to reply to before he left the Department./2/ In that letter he voiced concern over the possibility that there might take place in Thailand a coup d'etat, and over the impact which such an action would have on American public opinion. /2/Roger Hilsman resigned as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs on March 15. William P. Bundy was appointed to replace him on March 16. For Hilsman's March 2 letter, see Document 266. Our analysis of coup possibilities is so well on the record that there is no need to analyze it here. I would only say in summary that shifting allegiances may, of course, trigger a coup at any time. But as we see the situation now, there appears to be none in the offing. It is a very delicate matter for us, as Roger recognizes in his third paragraph. From the moment it became apparent that it was unlikely Sarit would survive, we took every opportunity to indirectly indicate our desire for a quiet and orderly transition. In the three-week interval between the death of President Kennedy and Sarit, we quietly drove home the lesson of our own smooth transition and our expectation that theirs would be equally so. All of this was done without stress and always with the concern that it not minimize our influence with any potential successor group. I think we have evidence that the message was clearly understood. Now in regard to Roger's second paragraph, you are far more familiar than am I with the jurisdictional cross-currents within DOD. In addition, certain inter-departmental differences are inevitable. I am sure that in the discharge of your current responsibilities you will exert effort to keep these arguments from being exported. For example, this Washington action, putting great pressure on the Attaches and JUSMAG not to be scooped, had the potential of encouraging what we wished to avoid. Going around every hour on the hour asking "What's new on the coup" inevitably conveyed the impression that we expected one and might welcome one. It certainly conveyed no impression of confidence on our part in the stability of the Thanom regime. I had instituted a rather tight coordinating control so that we might present a balanced and accurate evaluation of the endemic rumors. It is still in effect. In summary, I completely and totally reject the idea that I needed any Washington action to permit two elements of my mission to work together. This was a matter wholly political in context and one of extreme delicacy and sensitivity. As long as I hold this position, I intend to continue to discharge my responsibilities as the President's representative in Thailand. As such, the Attaches, the JUSMAG and CAS all belong to me and if a particular emphasis is desired, a brief message from you to me is all that is needed to achieve it. It was good seeing you here. All the best, Sincerely, Graham
268. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/ Bangkok, May 4, 1964, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 US. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Vientiane and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House. 1864. Deptel 1947./2/
/2/In telegram 1947, May 4, the Department asked for the Embassy's best estimate, without consulting the Thai Government, of Thai reaction to the introduction of U.S. ground and/or air forces during the next week to 10 days. The Department stated that there was "no present intention to do this" but it was "conceivable that developments in Laos would make such action desirable as deterrent to Communist effort take advantage of military situation." The Department suggested it might consider introduction on the scale of 1962, or perhaps only half that size, or even just tactical air units. (Ibid.) 1. In intermittent dialogue with Thai over past eight months dealing with recurrent crises in Laos, Thai leaders have consistently expressed strong reservations on value redeploying US troops to Thailand merely as isolated deterrent measure. (Emb's A-285, Sep 25, 1963 and Embtel 1366.)/3/ In March Dawee explicitly turned down proposal increase F-100 unit as lacking any practical effect (Embtel 1462)./4/ Moreover when on that occasion I sought to draw Dawee out on general subject of troop deployment, he reiterated attitude displayed earlier by Sarit to Dep Under Secretary Johnson, namely objection to deployment in absence other firm measures against Communists. /3/Telegram 1366, dated February 22. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) Airgram A-285 is ibid., POL 1-2 THAI. /4/Dated March 5. (Ibid. POL 1 THAI) 2. I have no reason to believe Thai have changed their minds. They do not consider deployment US combat troops to Thailand per se represents effective deterrent to Pathet Lao/Viet Minh nibbling tactics Laos. They harbor deep suspicion that in absence such clear effect US either could be using Thailand for strategic purposes to which Thai not privy or, even worse, that we have not made up our minds on degree of involvement required and that this is merely stop-gap thrashing around until we have reached decision. 3. This leads to belief Thai remain skeptical over significance of troop deployment as committing US. They are impressed by fact that in providing facilities for such deployment Thailand equally committed and more permanently. In end analysis US could always revoke its commitment by pulling out, whereas Thailand would be left in place holding the bag with much less freedom to shift gears. 4. On other hand, I am convinced Thai ready and willing cooperate fully with us in measures which they believe have firm purpose, and which would in fact [stand] good chance of stopping Communist advance in Southeast Asia. From comments made to me over past two months by Thai leaders including Dawee and Thanat, it clear Thai prepared welcome, and possibly even participate in, retaliatory actions against Communists in North Vietnam and Communist-held parts of Laos. Moreover, Thai clearly recognize that decision take such step requires concomitant decision deal with any likely Communist reaction. In such event, I believe Thai would welcome, if not urge, combat deployment to Thailand as deterrent to massive Communist reaction and as signal we mean business or for purpose of supporting direct intervention in Laos. Thai would however insist on clarity of our objectives, and would be opposed if it appeared that only effect of deployment would be to restrict neutralist/right wing reaction to PL/VM violations of Geneva Agreement. 5. Troop deployment here would have ready Thai concurrence only if RTG convinced it part of larger effective operation to stop Communists. Deep-seated Thai doubt US really prepared grasp nettle and undertake such operation probably strengthened by absence so far for direct retaliation for continuing flagrant violations Geneva Agreement by PL/VM, for growing loss US lives South Vietnam and for such specific attacks on US as blasting of card in Saigon. 6. In summary, my estimate is that Thai reaction to proposal for deployment merely as isolated deterrent measure would be negative and that they could be forced to cooperate only with application of enormous pressure. However, if it clear to them deployment result of firm US decision halt Communists now and part of operation convincingly designed achieve this objective, Thai would cooperate willingly. 7. Wish invite Dept attention to Embtel 1366 which attempts flag numerous important aspects of troop deployment requiring advance consideration. Martin
269. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff/1/ I-35, 889/64 Washington, May 16, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 320.2 Thailand. Top Secret. Drafted by P.R. Knaur of DOD/ISA. Copies sent to Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, and William Bundy. Dear Mike: I had the attached paper prepared on receipt of my copy of your memorandum of May 1 to Bill Bundy on Laos and the possibility of moving some forces into Thailand as a signal to the Pathet Lao and to Hanoi./2/ /2/In this memorandum, which was attached, Forrestal recalled that, "Roger [Hilsman] tried to reactivate plans for moving some forces into Thailand on the west bank of the Mekong just before he left." Forrestal suggested that, "in view of the extreme difficulty of getting a consensus in this town on any response to flare-ups in Laos, it would be prudent to start organizing now." As our review indicates, a mere "show of force" in Thailand without a specific objective would not appear to have the proper effect on the Communists, but would reduce reaction time if those forces were to be employed. Sincerely, Peter Solbert/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Solbert signed the original.
Attachment Memorandum From the Director, Far East Region (Blouin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert)/4/ I-35889/64 Washington, May 13, 1964. /4/Drafted by Captain J.B. Drachnik of OASD/ISA/FER on May 13. Enclosed but not printed was a list of "Forces Readily Available." SUBJECT In response to your note concerning Mr. Forrestal's memorandum of May 1, alternatives for the possible movement of some forces into Thailand have been reviewed. U.S. plans provide for detailed actions for such contingencies. These plans, on which you have been briefed, provide for phased actions by U.S. forces. Actions range from deployment from forward areas into the most important strategic areas of Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, to the deployment of major units from the Pacific and CONUS to defeat external aggression by North Vietnam or by Communist China. As in the past, actions can be taken to signal the Pathet Lao and Hanoi against resorting to military aggression. The actions planned in the event of insurgency in Laos would satisfy the maximum requirement for stabilization. The forces listed in this phase of the plans could equally well be positioned at locations on the Thai side (Ubon and Udorn), as in their planned positions. An outline of the forces readily available is provided in the enclosure. If more detailed proposals are desired, we should prepare a memorandum for the Chairman, seeking additional JCS views. A review of fairly recent actions of a "signal" nature may assist in visualizing an outline of possible moves. In 1962, an Infantry Battle Group (minus) (now referred to as a "Brigade Task Force") of some 2,000 men was engaged in training exercises in Thailand following exercise "Air Cobra." On the fall of Nam Tha, Laos, these units were left in Thailand and additional forces were moved in. The additional forces included a Tactical Fighter Squadron of four F-100's for an operational visit, a Marine Air Wing, the offloading of the Amphibious Ready Group in Bangkok and airlifting them to Odorn, and elements of the Ninth Logistic Command. About 6,400 personnel were involved. These forces remained in Thailand until the Laos situation had been normalized sufficiently to warrant their withdrawal. It should be particularly noted that a delay of about one full week was experienced in obtaining Thai agreement for these forces to go in. In 1963, consideration was given to an early movement into Thailand of those forces earmarked for SEATO exercise "DHANARAJATA". The forces under consideration were an Infantry Battle Group, an Airborne Battle Group, one Tactical Fighter Squadron, a reconnaissance squadron and supporting logistic elements, totalling about 5,000 men. Although reluctant to agree, Dawee conceded to their coming in about ten days early and remaining for two or three weeks after the exercise, provided a big show was not made of it. His reluctance was attributed to the known resistance of Thanom and Thanat to U.S. forces there. Movement of the forces commenced two weeks early and major units were in place by the starting date of the exercise. Upon the conclusion of the exercise, 1700 troops including an Infantry Battle Group with artillery and engineer units remained for three weeks as a show of force, participating in three route reconnaissance marches in the vicinity of the Laos border. There were no incidents. In early 1963 a joint US/Thai amphibious exercise "Jungle Drum" was conducted in the Sattahip area. As a matter of interest and possible use in planning, time and cost estimates for the movement of a Battle Group from Hawaii to Thailand, worked up in 1963 were as follows: Air (MATS), 23 sorties by C-135 aircraft--6 days. Using 12 C-135 aircraft, the move could be made in three days at a cost of $622,135. Sea (MSTS), 13 to 15 days from availability of shipping in Hawaii--$448,000. The latter figure includes an estimate of costs for diversion of other cargo. In light of the history of prior actions of a similar nature, it would appear that this tactic has been used too many times in the past to be of further effectiveness. In this regard, we are inclined to agree with the Ambassador that a deployment into Thailand merely as a show of force without an operation convincingly designed to halt the Communists would be of doubtful effect. Informal liaison indicates that the JCS may also consider such movement to be of little value without a specific further objective. There is no question but that deployment of forces into Thailand would shorten reaction times. F.J. Blouin/5/ Rear Admiral, USN /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Blouin signed the original.
270. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 23, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Special Papers, April/June 1964. Secret. Bundy prepared this paper for an Executive Committee meeting of the National Security Council to be held on May 24. For a record of the discussion at the EXCOM meeting, during which the issue of troops to Thailand was not raised, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 172. INTRODUCTION OF FORCES INTO THAILAND Present Situation We have not formally approached any government on this subject, but have indicated that we might consider such action to the Thai, British, Australians, and New Zealanders. This subject was raised by the Thai themselves, in conversations between Prime Minister Thanom and Ambassador Martin, reported in Bangkok 1971 and 1976./2/ This conversation took place on Wednesday, May 20. The gist of the Thai position was that they did not feel deployment at this time was required as an additional deterrent to further Communist moves in Laos and indeed felt that it might actually "act as a magnet" for some ChiCom counter-move and in any case lead to increased pressures on Thailand. /2/Both dated May 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) As Ambassador Martin puts it: "Thai obviously have no appetite for inviting this by agreeing to casual attempts at deterrents until they can see clearly that we have made decision not just continue on present scale assistance to others to resist Communist aggression in Southeast Asia but also to use directly and overtly such small precise elements of force available to us to insure reversal Communist advances. Thai are not convinced we are really so engaged now and until they are they do not want to risk being left exposed if we decide to withdraw." On the other hand, the Thai have cooperated in digging up Thai pilots for the T-28's and have agreed that if it became necessary Udorn could be used for the direct basing of T-28 operations. In essence, the Thai applaud what we have done to this point but clearly do not think it is enough to form a pattern into which deployment to Thailand would make sense. None of the other governments with which we have explored the matter has expressed a strong view. However, the British did indicate some sympathy with additional military actions to stabilize the situation in Laos, and referred in this connection to the introduction of forces into Thailand. The New Zealanders have also made somewhat forthcoming noises. Possible Objectives and Conditions of Such Action In the light of the above Thai reaction, we would clearly have a considerable job of persuasion in any event to get them to go along, much less to make the affirmative request that would be a much better framework of action. However, if we decide on overflights of North Vietnam and if we actually start to use US civilian pilots in Laos (for which we have given Unger authority) our case with the Thai that we are in fact acting seriously in other respects would be improved, even though we might not have decided to go still further against North Vietnam. As to our objectives in introducing forces into Thailand, we have hitherto thought of such action primarily in terms of deterring further Communist moves in Laos. At the present time, there is no strong indication that such moves are imminent, although there is enough general military activity so that the possibility cannot be excluded. The Thai themselves do not believe the Communists are going to drive further, but have indicated that if additional actions were to take place, they would be prepared to go along with us on virtually anything. However, even though this basis of action may not appear, there may be a second important objective that would in itself make the deployment of forces into Thailand important from a political standpoint. This is the fact that we are trying to forestall a Geneva Conference on Laos by making maximum use of Article 4 consultations in Vientiane. Souvanna's weak military position is one element making it difficult to conduct these consultations effectively. Visible military back-up on the Thai side of the border could be a major factor in stiffening Souvanna and enabling him to carry out these consultations in a worthwhile fashion. This would be particularly true when he and we come to the gut issue of whether the Pathet Lao/VM will accept any withdrawal from former neutralist positions in the Plaine des Jarres. The presence of US forces in Thailand would at least carry a threat of military action within Laos that might considerably improve the bargaining position in Laos. In addition, US (and, of course SEATO) forces in Thailand are an essential military move preceding or accompanying any stronger actions against the north. Recommendation That we not make a firm proposal to the Thai but direct Ambassador Martin to discuss the matter further with them, pointing out: a. Additional actions (e.g., reconnaissance over North Vietnam) that we may then be taking. b. Discussing the necessity for steadying Souvanna during the consultation period and particularly the importance of visible force when it comes to the issue of some Communist withdrawal. This proposition may have considerable appeal to the Thai, because they above all would not take kindly to the idea of any Geneva Conference on Laos, and it is clear that some success in the consultations will help enormously to cut down the pressures for such a conference.
271. Memorandum From the Deputy Director, Far East Region (Loftus) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaugton)/1/ I-24764/64 Washington, May 30, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, Thailand 000.1--091.3. Secret. SUBJECT In view of the seriousness of the situation in Vietnam and recent Communist gains in Laos which have combined to heighten apprehension among our Asian allies regarding our willingness to take effective countermeasures, I believe that some urgent thought should be given to improving Thai capabilities and bolstering their resolve to stick with us in the days ahead. I do not suggest that a few million dollars added to the MAP will do the trick. On the other hand, when the Thais learn that the FY'64 level is some $30 million less than the last two years, they are bound to react rather strongly. This would be most unfortunate at this juncture, and I think we should be prepared to advance a series of proposals designed to reassure the Thais of our continued interest in their security. The attached paper was prepared with these thoughts in mind. I believe that you will find it useful in discussions in Hawaii regarding Thailand's role in the present crisis./2/ /2/The discussions in Hawaii were held at the Honolulu meeting attended by 55 participants, including the President's principal foreign policy advisers, June 1-2. Most of the discussion concerned Vietnam. Accounts are printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Documents 187-189. Some limited discussion on Thailand was in the context of Laos, see ibid., vol. XXVIII, Document 69. See also Document 273. S.A. Loftus, Jr./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure/4/ /4/Drafted by Loftus on May 28. INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND Recent reports from our Embassy in Bangkok warn of growing Thai apprehension over their vulnerability to attack by regular Viet Minh or ChiCom units and their close alignment with the U.S./5/ An irresolute or weakened Thailand would add unreasonably to our problems in South-east Asia. Moreover, recent developments in Laos and Vietnam clearly call for bringing Thai conventional forces up to combat strength and for other measures needed to give key Thai leaders cause to value rather than doubt their commitment to the West. /5/In telegram 2014 from Bangkok, May 25, the Embassy stated that "events propelling Thai toward massive reexamination value their commitment to West." The Embassy believed that the Thai would still honor their undertaking, but minimal U.S. response to the threat from Laos was "almost visibly eroding confidence." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) Irrespective of whether we deploy troops to Thailand again, the Thai Army of some 80,000 men is an important element in the balance of power equation in the area. By Asian standards it is well armed, led, and trained. Many of its officers and non-coms experienced combat in Korea. Thai forces could provide an effective counterweight to Viet Minh cadres or regulars operating in Laos or possibly even Vietnam, if brought up to strength and properly supported. In the past, the Thai Army has concentrated on conventional ground defense tactics, although recently some attention has been given to counterinsurgency. The chief weaknesses of the Thai forces are insufficient combined arms and field training of units larger than battalion and lack of an effective logistics system to support sustained combat operations of a conventional type. However, at present, they are given the capability of conducting regimental and battalion sized delaying actions along the Mekong and in the north against ChiCom or Viet Minh attacks, assuming appropriate U.S. logistical support. The present Thai defense budget, of some $82 million, which is about 2.5% of GNP, supports a total of 120,000 men. However, it does not provide adequate allowances for field training, for civic action programs, or for recruits needed to bring regular units up to combat strength. In order to enhance their military capabilities and to minimize chances of their deserting the Western camp--either from fear of being abandoned first or from a simple calculation of opposing military strength, urgent consideration should be given to the following specific actions: 1. Inform the Thais of our willingness to suspend all further MAP transfers, chiefly POL, for the duration of the crises in SEA--some $1.2 million is scheduled to be transferred in FY65. The Thai reaction to our deletion of these so-called commercial consumables from the MAP was extremely bitter and not yet dissipated. 2. Indicate willingness to negotiate a new MAP package covering the next several years--this should include equipment and training to cover those deficiencies most relevant to improving the capability of Thai forces to defend the border areas or to intervene in Laos, if required. It should also contain specific increments of force maintenance, such as construction or consumables, necessary to induce the Thais to train, man, and deploy their forces more effectively, e.g., agreeing to assume responsibility for providing POL and/or providing additional funds for construction in certain exposed areas, if the Thais provide sufficient funds to bring their regular units up to strength, for field exercises (per diem) and better maintenance of U.S. equipment. Such an agreement would go far to dispel Thai suspicion regarding the firmness of our commitments to their security and provide them with a more reliable basis for their own budgetary planning over the next several years. 3. We might also propose to deploy on a "permanent" basis one or more battalion combat teams plus stocking additional war materiel should the Thais insist that the situation calls for such additional commitments, and 4. AID should accelerate and augment its plans for improving the Border Patrol and other paramilitary forces, such as the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) and the Provincial Police. These steps in themselves may not be sufficient to induce the Thais to take whatever measures our mutual interests may require to save the rest of Southeast Asia from Communist domination, but they do represent certain minimum measures which might be taken now as evidence of our willingness to act in the face of clear and present danger to the vital interests of our allies. Additional MAP funds required to fulfill these agreements could be obtained from either larger transfers from AID accounts in FY64-65 or deviations from other programs judged less urgent--as we have done for Vietnam and Laos over the past several years. In any event, it is not too soon to prepare a "second line of defense" in Asia in the event of a complete collapse of the Neutralists and FAR in Laos and/or a Communist victory in South Vietnam. The Thais and Filipinos may be constrained to accommodate to a new balance-of-power in SEA, but, at a minimum, can be counted on to defend their own independence with whatever means are available./6/ /6/Three tabs: A. Current MAP Situation and Deliveries, B. Commercial Consumables, and C. Basic Data--Thailand were not found attached.
272. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Bangkok, May 31, 1964, 9 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, CINCPAC for POLAD, London, Paris, and New Delhi. Passed to the White House. Rusk was in Bangkok for less than a day on May 30 en route from New Delhi and Saigon to the Honolulu Conference. Secto 27. 1. Major feature of Secretary's call on Prime Minister Thanom May 30 was restrained, frequently indirect but persistent Thai probing for indication of future US course of action in Southeast Asia; Thai questions ranged for significance of Sino-Soviet rift to possibility of diversionary activities against ChiComs elsewhere in Asia. 2. Secretary explained that over past few weeks we have been seeking by various means get clear message to Peiping and Hanoi US takes very serious view of Communist military advances SEA and that issue of peace or war in balance. He noted that while Sino-Soviet rift bitter and deep, both still have same ultimate goal; said diversionary tactics elsewhere not likely be effective. 3. Thanom's first direct question dealt with US intentions if Communists continued advance toward Mekong and threatened such strategic points as Luang Prabang, Vang Vieng, Vientiane, Paksane, Thakhek and Savannakhet. Secretary said he could reply in generalities but that specific concrete answer, to which Thai entitled, could, under US constitutional system, come only from the President. He said purpose of Honolulu Conference was make recommendations on such questions to President and he expected there to be communication between President and Prime Minister very soon afterwards. Secretary added, however, there no limit on what US would do if necessary to defend Thailand and pointed to heavy casualties US had suffered since World War Two as earnest of our determination. 4. Later en route FonMin's residence Thanat again alluded to Secretary's comments on necessity for communication at chief of government level and asked how this would be accomplished. Secretary said through Amb Martin, adding that communication facilities American Embassy enabled instantaneous contact with Washington. 5. Prime Minister alluded to military defense measures being planned and Thai made it clear several times they would feel compelled move across border if Communist advances threatened key points in Laos such as Vang Vieng, Paksane, etc. DepDefMin Dawee elaborated in sense Thai would strike first with artillery and air, following with such forces as necessary. He added that he expected of course if such steps necessary US and Thai would act together. 6. Secretary said he very encouraged to hear Thai laying plans for defense measures and suggested desirability of advance consultation. Secretary several times in course of discussion expressed approval of this line of planning by Thai. 7. In context Thai troop deployments already made to border and possible need for additional measures of this nature, Thanom asked Secretary to review decision to phase out US assistance on consumables. Secretary agreed take a look. 8. In discussion before and after FonMin's dinner, Secretary and Thanat discussed preconditions Geneva Conference on Laos. Secretary made clear we absolutely firm in not attending conference unless pre- conditions satisfied, and Thanat concurred completely. Thanat mentioned that Article Four consultations not likely to be very productive but concurred in our urging that most be made of them. We mentioned that we were giving serious consideration to Polish proposal as possible alternate or supplement, and that it had some advantages including absence of French. Thanat did not demur nor argue that acceptance Polish proposal would impair our basic position, which we made clear would be maintained as to preconditions at any such meeting. Comment: Thai attitude in discussions, particularly on part Thanon, marked by keen and appraising interest in Secretary's comments, especially replies to their questions, which apparently designed to elicit expression of US thinking on broader implications as well as immediate requirements of situation. Thai made no specific demands for action by US, but concurred strongly in desirability of closest advance consultations. Question of deploying US forces to Thailand was not explicitly discussed. Secretary will raise at Honolulu question of bilateral planning with Thai to indicate our capabilities and possible deployment, particularly of air units, in event of Communist push in Laos along lines paragraph three above. Rusk
273. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Honolulu, June 1, 1964. /1/Source: Department of Defense, JCS Official Records, 9510 (1 June 64). Top Secret. The meeting in Honolulu, June 1-2, was primarily to discuss Vietnam and was attended by 55 people including the top civilian and military advisers. This is a record of the Opening Plenary Session of the Honolulu meetings. Certain portions of the plenary session on Vietnam are printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 187. [Here follows discussion of South Vietnam and Laos.] C. Thailand
Ambassador Martin expressed the judgment that the Thanom regime in Thailand has smoothly consolidated its power and is operating well. It is operating more as a collegial institution than the personally authoritarian regime of Sarit/2/ ever did. There has been considerable decentralization, and delegations to the Ministeries have noticeably speeded up the decision making process. /2/Sarit Thanarat, Prime Minister of Thailand until his death on December 8, 1963. Contrary to general expectations in December, Thanom seems to be clearly in charge and is publicly deferred to by General Praphat. The personal and family relationships between these two permit an intimate behind-the-scene which is obviously effective. The cabinet is still basically unchanged since the original appointment of Pote Sarasin to the vital post of Minister of National Development. His public position, his integrity and his ability are a definite asset. Ambassador Martin believes that Praphat has persuaded Thanom to make two changes in the Cabinet before Praphat departs for the U.S. in mid-June for an eye operation at Walter Reed. One will be the elevation of General Chitti to the post of Minister of Agriculture and the other will be the replacement of the present Minister of Industry. Praphat has concentrated the major portion of his time and energies on restoring his position and power in the Royal Thai Army from whose councils he had been systematically excluded by Sarit. In the Embassy's judgment, he has had a fair amount of success. Dawee, as Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff Supreme Command, is playing an increasingly important and useful role in over-all coordination of military affairs. While coup rumors are endemic, the frequency of their circulation has been greatly reduced. Ambassador Martin does not expect this sort of trouble in the foreseeable future. The most significant substantiation of this estimate is the confidence displayed by Thanom and Praphat in permitting the latter to be absent 4 to 6 weeks in June and July. It is therefore expected that the present regime, with occasional changes in Cabinet portfolio, will continue in control. It is probable that Thanom will retire in the next two or three years, perhaps after the promulgation of a new constitution, and that he will be succeeded by Praphat. The principal internal emphasis of this new regime is on the economic and social development of Thailand. Although it is concerned over the increasing amount of domestic resources being absorbed in these programs, it will continue this emphasis. For the present, the principal ingredient of Thai foreign policy is its reliance on the Rusk-Thanat communiqué/3/ as constituting a virtual defense alliance with the U.S. Ambassador Martin has had recent occasion, as have his predecessors, to remind Washington that this policy--this degree of commitment--is a very great variant from the whole sweep of Thai history, of Thai traditions, and basic Thai instincts. In their relations with world powers they are quite conscious that they were almost the prototype of the non-aligned, non-committed nations. While they had to deliver large parts of modern Laos and Cambodia to the French and parts of modern Malaysia and Burma to the British, they nevertheless maintained their independence. They have a certain confidence that their old skills are still present and that if required, they would be able to repeat the process again. /3/Joint statement issued in Washington on March 6, 1962. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1091-1093. They would vastly prefer to continue to maintain their reliance on the U.S. Yet it is now quite clear that certain questions are being posed concerning the effect on Thailand's vital interests on the totality of Thailand's open commitment to the U.S. These questions do not involve qualms about our military capacity. Through many channels they are sure not only that our nuclear power is overwhelming, but also that our conventional military power has been greatly strengthened over the past three years. They know it is now a multi-faceted, flexible, pliant instrument of U.S. National Policy permitting the U.S. to use it if desired in a coldly pin-pointed way, in an almost surgically precise way, to achieve any specific objective within a vast spectrum. They recognize that our conventional military power has only recently provided us with this new and flexible capacity. On the matter of our military capacity, they seem to have two basic questions: (1) whether we have yet developed an effective common doctrine on its use, and (2) whether the Communist Chinese believe we have the will to use it. Both of these questions depend on their analysis of our present basic attitudes towards Southeast Asia. This analysis is not yet completed. They are not yet certain whether we are really prepared to use force to achieve our policy aims in Southeast Asia. They are concerned whether we will merely threaten to do so, while our real intent is to seek only the best political solution we are able to negotiate. If they become convinced that we will use force if necessary as the underlying sanction of our policy, Ambassador Martin has no doubt of their complete cooperation and their willingness to go with us all the way. But until they are certain that we have the will to use such force as appears appropriate, they will wait to see how the situation unfolds. They will not this time be willing to use their real estate as an American base without a clear view of the end of the road. They will demand advanced consultation, and if this is not forthcoming, the very large degree of cooperation which now exists will be seriously jeopardized.
Secretary Rusk asked whether the Thai Government was prepared to put forces into Laos to counter a PL advance. Ambassador Martin said that this subject was currently under serious consideration in Bangkok. Five companies had already been deployed to the northern border area and plans for their augmentation are being prepared. There appears to be a new philosophy growing within the Thai Armed Forces to the effect that they can and should deploy their own forces to meet their own security requirements without necessarily waiting for the deployment of American troops in advance. Secretary Rusk asked Adm Felt what he thought of the capability of the Thai forces to offer material help to Souvanna Phouma. Adm Felt said that this report that the Thai's were considering putting forces across the Mekong was new to him. Personally he doubted that they would be prepared to go this far unless U.S. forces accompanied them. Secretary McNamara asked Adm Felt how many ground forces he thought would be required to give any meaningful support to Souvanna's government. Adm Felt replied that within the context of the present situation somewhere between 2 and 3 divisions would be needed. Ambassador Martin explained that the Thai military do not believe that the mere crossing of the Mekong will bring them into extensive contact with the Pathet Lao. Their current thinking seems to be that they could make such a military move without obtaining prior U.S. concurrence and still be able to count on the over-all protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella should this action provoke a major Communist attack against Thailand. After discussing the time and space factor involved, the general conclusion was that while the Thai might occupy Lao towns on the Mekong, a major move of Thai forces deep into Laos was unlikely. Adm Felt pointed out that it has always been Thai policy to hold a division in reserve to protect Bangkok. As far as Thailand's national interest in Laos goes, Adm Felt stated that his conversations with Thai military leaders indicated they were primarily concerned with re-occupying the former Thai territory lying in Laos to the west of the Mekong River. Ambassador Martin said both of these observations were undoubtedly true under Sarit's regime, but that Thanom had different ideas. Secretary McNamara suggested that we need closer joint U.S.-Thai planning for the movement of military forces into the key towns in the Mekong valley should such deployments become necessary. Ambassador Martin agreed and said he would take the matter up with Thanom when Washington indicated it was ready. Secretary Rusk asked for an estimate of the fighting qualities of the Thai army. Adm Felt said that no one really knew how effective they would be in combat. Ambassador Martin drew attention to the fact that the Thai unit that fought in Korea under the UN flag acquitted itself very well in battle. Mr. Colby added that the Thai officers provided the leadership element for the Meo tribesmen fighting behind the Communist lines in Laos. In this capacity, they have shown high qualities of initiative and aggressive leadership. General Taylor indicated that the general estimate was that the Thais could handle the PL all right but there was some doubt as to whether they could face up to a trained North Vietnamese military force. Secretary McNamara stated that his impression was that the Thai have a very limited military capability to meet any major combined Communist attack. Adm Felt supported this conclusion. As to the combat air capability, he cited the low caliber of senior leadership in the Thai Air Force. [Here follows discussion of North Vietnam.] [Continue with the next documents]
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