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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
274. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/ Bangkok, June 10, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE-US. Secret; Exdis. 2124. For the Secretary. At dinner last night for Australian FonMin Hasluck, Pote Sarasin took me aside and said he had reviewed with Thanom the conversation you had with them May 30 (Secto 27)./2/ Pote said he wished be sure that Thanom, whose compression of English has some limitations, had fully absorbed your remarks. (We understand that Thanom subsequently made personal reports on his conversation with you to the cabinet and the King.) /2/Document 272. Pote went on say Thanom placed greatest importance on advance US-Thai consultations and particularly valued your visit in that context. (This slant was given great emphasis in public statements by Thanom and Thanat after your visit. Embtels 2045, 2055 and 2065.)/3/ I reminded Pote you had instructed me see PriMin promptly upon return from Honolulu and I had done so. /3/Dated May 31, June 2, and June 3, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S, POL 27 LAOS, and POL 27 LAOS) Thanom is particularly anxious, Pote said, for assurance that we will keep up this practice and that he will not be faced, as was Sarit in 1962, with fait accompli and request for concurrence in action already announced by USG and in motion. I told Pote that before I left Washington last fall, I had received assurance from President Kennedy and you that the errors of 1962 would not be repeated. Pote seemed reassured but observed that his long experience with American scene led him to conclude that when decisions made by President, US military tended to act as if no further consultations with sovereign governments necessary. I assured him his concern needless and said that at Honolulu meeting I had made point of necessity of prior consultations with Thai, and that this completely understood by you, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, Chairman JCS. Point which Pote was at obvious pains to emphasize has been reiterated endless times in recent Embassy reporting. Yet on first emergency (see Embtel 2116),/4/ it was apparent that word had not trickled down to COMUSMACV and 2nd Air Division. I am completely confident I can secure Thai cooperation with extreme rapidity on any such emergency authorization required in situation as described ref Embtel: I am similarly confident of obtaining Thanom's approval for larger operations, provided always we can keep dialogue even a small step ahead of actions. Thai have in many ways conveyed their keen appreciation of current atmosphere of genuine mutual trust and consideration between US and Thailand. I am convinced that maintenance of this relationship is essential to continued Thai cooperation and is single most important feature of relations between two countries today. Allowance we have to make in US decision-making process to permit at least going through motions of advance consultation with Thai is relatively small price to pay for benefit gained. /4/The emergency concerned a U.S. request for the use of Thai-based aircraft (F-100's and T-28's) as protective cover for rescue aircraft attempting to retrieve a downed U.S. pilot in Laos. Martin suggested that had he not anticipated the use of Thai-bases and obtained Thai permission beforehand, the U.S. military would have used them without consulting the Thais. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) Martin
275. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)/1/ Washington, June 17, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. III, Memos A, 6/14-8/14. Top Secret. Drafted by Colonel H.H. Reichner of JCS (J-5) and released by D.C. Flickinger, Deputy Director, Implementation Division, JCS. 6914. Subject: US-Thai Planning (U). Ref: a. JCS 6669, DTG 052029Z, Jun 64;/2/ b. CINCPAC DTG 091955Z, Jun 64./3/ /2/Not found. /3/In this CINCPAC telegram, June 9, Felt suggested sending a "small select group" to Bangkok headed by his Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations to consult with the Thais on "concept forces and command relations in situation where the Communists are driving toward the Mekong." Felt believed the U.S. Group should attempt to get Thai commitments and then proceed to discuss possible commitments of SEATO members. Felt recommended that these discussions begin at the working level. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 THAI-US) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to the Secretary of Defense that you be authorized to conduct, on a continuing basis within the framework set forth in paragraph 2 below, such US-Thai bilateral military planning as you consider necessary for contingencies of joint interest. 2. The following guidance applies: a. The purpose of bilateral US-Thai military planning is fourfold: (1) To improve US-Thai readiness to execute measures
envisaged. b. CINCPAC is the US representative for the development of such bilateral US-Thai plans as may be agreed upon for contingencies of joint interest to include: (1) Defense of the Mekong. (In this regard, impress upon the
Thais the need to move their forces rapidly to forestall enemy
occupation of principal Mekong cities.) c. Development of the above plans should include detailed treatment of concept, force commitments, command relations, requirements for use of Thai facilities and US logistic support commitments to the Thai. Submit promptly, as they develop, questions in these fields requiring JCS policy consideration. d. The general applicability of current unilateral and SEATO MPO plans to the above contingencies is noted. The content of US unilateral plans will not be revealed; however, illustrations of possible US reaction may be drawn therefrom. 3. Planning by means of a small planning group as outlined in reference b is considered appropriate. The CINCPAC senior planner will keep Ambassador and Deputy COMUSMACTHAI informed. The JCS do not plan to send representation to any consultations at this time, but probably will do so later. 4. You will be advised earliest of the Secretary of Defense decision in this matter. Meanwhile, pending receipt of JCS guidance, limit initial discussions with Thai to that outlined in reference b.
276. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-529-64 Washington, June 18, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, Thailand 000.1--(092 Thailand), 1964. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. Reference is made to the Honolulu meeting of 1-2 June 1964/2/ and to a Department of State message, State to Bangkok 2204, dated 4 June 1964, with respect to initiation of US-Thai bilateral military planning on contingencies of joint interest./3/ Specifically, the message: /2/See Document 273. /3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 THAI-US) a. Directed the US Ambassador to Thailand to inform the Thai Prime Minister that the United States desires to consult urgently with the RTG regarding measures to be taken in the event of a communist drive toward the Mekong. b. Suggested that the Thais send military planners immediately to Honolulu for consultation with CINCPAC. 2. In response to the above cited message, the US Ambassador to Thailand has advised the Secretary of State that the Thais are prepared to begin consultations whenever the United States is ready, and that they prefer such consultations take place in Bangkok./4/ /4/As reported in telegram 2106 from Bangkok, June 8. (Ibid.) 3. Early stages of bilateral planning should be carefully controlled. This requirement as well as the Thai desire to consult in Bangkok can be accommodated through the use of a small CINCPAC planning group in Bangkok. The objective of this planning group will be to consult with the Thais on concept, forces, and command relations. Accordingly, pursuant to a joint State-Defense message of 13 June 1964,/5/ CINCPAC has dispatched a small planning group to Bangkok. The CINCPAC senior planner will keep the Ambassador and Deputy COMUSMACTHAI informed of developments. /5/Telegram 2276 to Bangkok, June 13. (Ibid.) 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the procedures, scope, and content of possible bilateral US-Thai military planning against the background of a series of contingencies of joint interest. These contingencies range from insurgency in Thailand through the defense of Southeast Asia. As a result, they have determined that: a. Current US unilateral and SEATO multilateral plans provide an adequate basis for bilateral planning with the Thais. The content of US unilateral plans will not be revealed; however, illustrations of possible US reaction may be drawn therefrom. b. Planning on the US side should be accomplished by CINCPAC and appropriate subordinates in the manner of current unilateral and SEATO planning. c. Scope and content of plans should include clear-cut provisions as to concept, force commitments, command relationships, US use of Thai facilities, and US logistic support of the Thais. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. CINCPAC be authorized to conduct, on a continuing basis and within the framework of paragraphs 3 and 4 above, such bilateral US-Thai military planning as may be required; such planning to be finally reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. b. A memorandum substantially as contained in the Appendix be forwarded to the Secretary of State./6/ /6/Attached, but not printed. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor/7/ /7/Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.
277. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn/1/ Washington, June 18, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. V, 10/66-2/67. Secret. This letter was transmitted to Bangkok in telegram 2315, June 19, and was drafted by Pickering, cleared by Trueheart, William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, and Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE-US) Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I thank you for your kind letter of May 25,/2/ which was received for me by Secretary Rusk at his meeting last week with Mr. Bunchana Atthakor, Deputy Minister of National Development in your cabinet./3/ /2/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Prime Minister Thanom) /3/An account of the Rusk-Atthakor meeting of June 10 is in telegram 2247 to Bangkok, June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE-CHICOM) A summary of a memorandum left by Atthakor with Rusk, in which the Thai Government requested that the United States provide a pool of road building equipment and additional funds for assistance in the Northeast, is in telegram 2260 to Bangkok, June 11. (Ibid., Central Files, AID (US) THAI) I know the concern that you must feel for your nation and its people at this time of crisis in Southeast Asia. I am closely aware of the problems presented to your country by this crisis, and particularly by events in Laos. In your letter, Mr. Prime Minister, you referred to America's defense commitments in various parts of the world. America's defense commitment to Thailand is clear, and as I said when we met in Bangkok in 1961, "America keeps its commitments". We regard Communist advances in Laos as a threat to the security of the United States as well as that of Thailand. In accordance with this concept, I have authorized Ambassador Martin to open consultations with you looking toward joint Thai-US military planning of measures to be taken in the event of a Communist drive toward the borders of Thailand. I understand joint planning meetings will begin in Bangkok this week. We must be prepared to act promptly and effectively to check such a drive if necessary. At same time, we must overlook no opportunity for a peaceful settlement which preserves the interests of our two nations. For this reason we are willing to undertake consultations such as those in which we are mutually engaged in Vientiane, and we would be willing to see convened consultations such as those recently proposed by the Poles. We believe, however, that Communist acceptance of the preconditions laid down by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos must precede any convention of a conference on Laos such as that held in Geneva in 1962. Our willingness to keep the door open to negotiations must not be mistaken either by our friends or our enemies as reflecting any wavering of our resolve. It does reflect truly our purpose, which is peace. But the Americans who have died to check the spread of Communism in the Far East, those who even now are dying for that cause, provide the most eloquent testimony of our determination that peace shall not be bought at the cost of freedom. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
278. Memorandum From Director of the Joint Staff (Burchinal) to the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (LeMay)/1/ DJSM-1055-64 Washington, June 22, 1964. /1/Source: Department of Defense, JCS Official Files, 9155.2 (8 May 1964) Top Secret. Prepared by Captain H.S. Jackson, USN, Pacific Division, Joint Staff. SUBJECT REFERENCES /2/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) /3/Dated June 5. (Department of Defense, JCS Official Files, 9155.2 (8 May 1964)) /4/Not found, but summarized below. 1. In reference a the Department of State reported that the Minister of the Thai Embassy in Washington indicated strong dissatisfaction with present US policy in Laos and considers US should build up Souvanna and rightists to be the dominant force in Laos. Recognizing the Lao lack of will to fight he concluded that Thai volunteers must be used, just as the communists use Viet Minh to bolster the PL. He indicated 10,000 Thai volunteers would be sufficient; the US role would be to supply equipment and similar support. 2. Comments on the above are as follows: a. In October 1961 discussions were held between CHJUSMAG Thailand, CHMAAG Laos and C/S, RTA to discuss Thai encadrement. The Thais, as previously, indicated that they could not furnish encadrement without excessive harm to their own units. As an alternative it was suggested that the Thais furnish interpreters to USMAAG units. b. In October 1962 when military assistance was pulled out there were 116 Thai volunteer specialists in Laos (43 interpreters, 73 surgical specialists, x-ray technicians, code clerks, radio operators, T-6 pilots). c. A year ago when the subject of Thai encadrement was again raised the following are applicable: (1) CINCPAC commented that large scale Thai encadrement would be surfaced; that he doubted if Thais would confront Viet Minh without American participation on a shoulder to shoulder basis. (2) Both Phoumi and Souvanna were opposed to Thai encadrement; they welcomed training in Thailand but the traditional Lao mistrust and inferiority complex via-a-vis the Thais were displayed. d. Recently, 8 June, Ambassador Unger has reconfirmed a negative Lao response to Thai help in Laos; he believed we should tread lightly for the moment and reopen the subject at an opportune time. e. On 5 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference b informed the Secretary of Defense that use of Thai Special Forces as cadres and trainers in Laos would create major problems in coordination and control and that current training deficiencies of the Thai Special Forces would make it unlikely that their use would be effective at this time. f. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] g. In reference c CINCPAC reports that at the planning conference in Bangkok which met on 18 June, Thai Minister of Defense Dawee indicated he was prepared to let the US make the decision on how to secure the Mekong River line and said "We will go along with you". Dawee requested that Prime Minister Thanom be the CINC and that the Command pattern of SEATO Plan Five would be acceptable. Dawee further stated that he was prepared to commit the Second Thai Army (one division) and his tactical air forces. 3. These comments are submitted without the specific views on reference a of CINCPAC, or those of the American Ambassadors Bangkok and Vientiane, all of which have been requested. However, it is considered the comments in paragraphs 2c, d and e are still valid. David A. Burchinal/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Burchinal signed the original.
279. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 24, 1964, 6:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. I, Memos, 11/63-11/64. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Pickering. The meeting took place at the White House. According to the President's Daily Diary, July 24, this meeting began at 6:25 and lasted until 6:40. (Ibid.) In a July 24 briefing memorandum to the President Thomson and Komer informed Johnson that his meeting with Prapass (Praphat) "is basically to butter up Thailand's probable next Prime Minister." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. I, Memos, 11/63-11/64) Rusk and Harriman also sent Johnson a briefing memorandum, July 23. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President H.E. General Prapass Charusathiara, Deputy Prime Minister of
Thailand Following an exchange of amenities and gifts, the President recalled with pleasure his earlier meeting with General Prapass in Bangkok in May of 1961. The President went on to express his deep appreciation for the support Thailand is providing to the Free World effort in Southeast Asia, mentioning specifically the T-28 pilots and the artillerymen now in Laos. Mr. Bundy noted that the Deputy Prime Minister was to be congratulated for his excellent support of programs to further economic development in the critical Northeastern area, which borders on Laos. General Prapass said that these programs, and many others, were being carried out to give the people of Thailand a real incentive to fight against communism. He cited as an example of another such program the self-help land settlement program, under which undeveloped land is made available to landless farmers. The President agreed that if the people own their own land, their incentive for defending their country is greatly increased. General Prapass expressed thanks for the economic assistance provided his country through USOM. The President acknowledged the General's thanks. He said that his Administration would fight for a good foreign aid bill for this year, and expressed confidence that a good one would be enacted. General Prapass said that at the time he left Thailand he had noted considerable concern about US determination to take the necessary actions in Southeast Asia. He said this concern was created largely by statements in the Congress and in the press to the effect that the US effort and investment in Southeast Asia were mere waste, creating the impression that the US might be planning to abandon Southeast Asia. However, he added, the subsequent strong statements made by the President, plus the appointments of General Taylor and Ambassador Johnson, had completely removed this concern according to reports received from the Prime Minister since arriving here. The President expressed great pleas-ure at this news. He said he hoped that General Prapass would tell the newsmen of the US that some of the things we were doing had in fact helped the situation in an important Southeast Asian country. The President concluded by saying that so long as Thailand continued its fight against communism, it could rely fully on the continued friendship and support of the US. As he was preparing to leave, General Prapass expressed his heartfelt thanks to the President for making it possible for him to have the successful operation for cataracts at the Walter Reed Hospital./2/ /2/On July 11, just after his operation, Prapass and other Thai officials met with William Bundy and other Department of State officials at Walter Reed Hospital. Their conversation was similar to the conversation between Prapass and the President. (Memorandum of conversation, July 11; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) On July 30 Prapass met with Secretary of Defense McNamara and other U.S. officials at the Pentagon. They discussed the situation in Laos, Northeast Thailand--where McNamara encouraged Prapass to stress special forces over conventional military forces--South Vietnam, and specific Thai-U.S. bilateral military issues. (Memorandum of conversation, July 30; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files; FRC 68 A 306, 333 Thailand)
280. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Washington, July 29, 1964, 2116Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. III, Memos A, 6/64-8/64. Top Secret. Drafted by Colonel H.H. Reichner of J-5 and released by Major General P.S. Emrick, Director for Plans and Policy. 7621. Subject: US-Thai Planning (U). References: a. CINCPAC DTG 100056Z Jul 64; b. JCS 2339/128-3; c. CINCPAC DTG 240300Z Jul 64; d. JCS 6914 DTG 172217Z Jun 64; e. JCS 7084 DTG 252242Z Jun 64./2/ /2/References a. and b. have not been found. Reference c. is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 THAI-US. Reference d. is Document 275. Reference e., authorizing U.S.-Thai joint planning is in Department of Defense, JCS Official Records, 9150 (15 Jun 64) Sec 1. Part I 1. The proposed terms of reference forwarded by reference a have been reviewed and revised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be referred to the Secretary of Defense for approval. The revised terms of reference are contained in reference b. They are quoted in Part II below for your advance information in accordance with your request in reference c. Part II. Terms of Reference US-Thai Planning Section I--Preamble 1. Thailand and the United States have mutually agreed to the need for bilateral military planning for contingencies of joint interest. As an initial step Thailand and the US will develop a plan for the defense of Thailand as set forth in Section II below. Such defense of Thailand will include military operations to hold the Mekong River Valley and its principal cities and military facilities. The following terms of reference are established for guidance in associated military planning. Section II--Plan for the Defense of Thailand Against Communist Forces in Laos 2. The Threat: The plan will be based on defense of Thailand against the communist threat in Laos. The situation envisaged will be beyond that of subversion but less than overt aggression by either Communist China, North Vietnam, or both. 3. The Concept: The concept of operations will provide for the defense of the general Mekong River line and its principal cities and military facilities by US, Thai, and possibly other friendly forces operating in Laos. It is envisioned that the necessary friendly forces will move into Laos, hopefully with the consent of the Royal Lao Government. The defense of Thailand may require any or a combination of the following actions: a. Defensive and punitive actions against communist forces in Laos. b. Punitive actions against communist forces in Laos in the event of border incursions by communist forces from Laos into Thailand. c. Counterinsurgency actions and punitive actions against communist forces in Laos in the event of communist insurgency in Thailand. d. Military actions against North Vietnam to include interdiction of routes of supply and reinforcement from North Vietnam into Laos. 4. Forces: The plan will be based on the military capabilities of Thailand and the United States. Both nations will make available adequate force levels consistent with achieving the planned objectives. In addition, the United States will be prepared to employ under national command such additional air, ground, and naval forces as may be required to conduct military actions against North Vietnam. Further, the plan should be so prepared that other Allied forces can participate if they so desire and the situation permits. Insofar as possible, it should be generally compatible with SEATO plans so that comparable SEATO plans can more easily be implemented. 5. Command: The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Thailand will be the Commander in Chief. He will exercise operational control of all combat and combat support forces committed to this plan through a Commander, Field Forces, who will have primary responsibility for the conduct of military operations. The Commander, Field Forces, will be appointed by the United States. 6. Implementation: Joint Thai-US consultations may be undertaken at the initiative of either party at any time to determine what specific portions of the plan should be implemented. Section III--General Provisions Applicable to All Bilateral Planning 7. Logistic Support: Logistic support of committed forces will be furnished by the nation providing the forces to the best of that nation's ability. In the event major hostilities develop, the United States will furnish logistical assistance to Thai forces as required within available US resources and with priorities determined by the Senior US Operational Commander (Commander, Field Forces). Thailand will allocate air base, rail transportation, port, and highway capabilities sufficient to support the plan and grant over-flight clearances as required. In addition, Thailand will allocate channels in commercial and military communications systems to augment existing US communications-electronics base communication trunks as required to support this plan. Space for bases and operating areas in Thailand required by military forces in support of this plan will also be provided without cost by the Royal Thai Government. 8. Planning Method: Joint Thai-US planning will be conducted in Bangkok by a group to be established immediately. The plan for the defense of Thailand against communist forces in Laos will be forwarded for review through national channels by approximately 30 September 1964. Further planning for contingencies of joint interest will be undertaken as required. Such contingencies may include continued or expanded DRV support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Part III 1. Except as modified above, guidance contained in references d and e remains applicable. 2. Establishment of planning group Bangkok as outlined in Part II is not intended to preclude active participation by CINCPAC in detailed planning or participation by JCS representatives when appropriate. 3. You will be advised earliest of the action of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the recommended terms of reference cited above.
281. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 4, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Pickering. A note on the source text indicates that Rusk saw it. SUBJECT On July 28, Prime Minister Thanom ordered a military and police alert, initially scheduled to be lifted at midnight, July 31 but subsequently extended "indefinitely." On July 31, the Government asked Deputy Prime Minister Praphat Charusathien (then in Bonn) to return to Bangkok immediately. He arrived there August 3 (having originally planned to return August 9). Events Resulting in the Alert The alert seems to have been triggered by reports received July 27 from several junior officers that they had been approached by a young lieutenant colonel (reported now to be under arrest) and asked to join a coup against the Government. The indefinite extension of the alert and the decision to ask Deputy Prime Minister Praphat to return to Bangkok followed a report of an abortive plot to kidnap the Prime Minister as he left the American Ambassador's residence after dinner on July 31. Persons and Groups Reported to be Behind the Coup 1) Those Closely Tied With Sarit. Several reports indicate that the funds being passed and offered to junior officers come from the late Prime Minister's wife, Thanpuying Vichitra Thanarat. There have also been reports that all commercial banks in Bangkok have been ordered to submit to the civil courts all records of the accounts of Sarit and his immediate relatives, which would have exposed many in high places as recipients of Sarit's largess. This threat of exposure was said to have led those so threatened to support an attempted coup. (The names of Thanom and Praphat were not involved in the bank records, according to the reports.) 2) Disaffected Junior Officers. While a coup probably could not be mounted by these elements acting on their own, they could be used by other groups hostile to the Government. 3) Phibunites. Rites for the late Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram were held on July 30, and this fact was cited by some as a reason for the alert. Also two retired military officers prominent under Phibun have been named by various persons as being behind the plot. This may be a mere smokescreen for the first group listed, or there may have been at least an attempt to join forces against the Government. Present Situation Since his return to Bangkok General Praphat has conferred with Prime Minister Thanom. Praphat was reported to be relaxed and completely confident of the Government's ability to cope with the situation. Coup activity seems to have lost its momentum at least for the time being. Significance Assuming that the situation does stabilize now, the result will be a further great increase in General Praphat's already strong position in the Thai Government. The abortive plot may provide Praphat with a clear opportunity to remove potential rivals for power (Generals Krit Siwara, Chitti Nawisathien, possibly even Air Marshal Thawi Chulasap), although the degree of their involvement is far from clear at the moment. Or he might choose to curb further investigations into his rivals' involvement with Sarit but use the threat of exposure to keep them in line. We do not anticipate that Praphat will seek to unseat Thanom at this time. However, Thanom may be moved to step down more quickly than he had earlier planned because of this experience.
282. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green)/1/ Washington, August 5, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE-US. Secret. Drafted by Pickering. Green wrote "Helpful, Thanks, MG" on the source text. SUBJECT 1) During Secretary Rusk's visit to Thailand in May, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister mentioned several times military defense measures which they were planning in the event of a Communist advance toward the Mekong. The Secretary said he was very encouraged to hear that the Thai were laying such plans and suggested the desirability of advance consultation in connection with them (Secto 27 from Bangkok, May 30 [31])./2/ /2/Document 272. 2) It was subsequently agreed at Honolulu that we would undertake consultations with the Thai on measures to be taken in the event of such a Communist advance, and Ambassador Martin was instructed to take this up with Prime Minister Thanom (Deptel 2204 to Bangkok)./3/ The Thai approved the idea of beginning such consultations, but asked that they take place in Bangkok (Embtel 2106, June 8)./4/ We concurred in this. /3/See footnote 3, Document 276. /4/See footnote 4, Document 276. 3) Meanwhile, the President stated in a personal letter to Prime Minister Thanom (dated June 18) that "We regard Communist advances in Laos as a threat to the security of the US as well as that of Thailand. In accordance with this concept, I have authorized Ambassador Martin to open consultations with you, looking toward joint Thai-US military planning of measures to be taken in the event of a Communist drive toward the borders of Thailand. I understand joint planning meetings will begin in Bangkok this week." (Deptel 2315 to Bangkok, June 18.)/5/ /5/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE-US) This telegram contained the text of Document 277. 4) The consultations took place on June 18. General Milton of CINCPAC's staff led the US team, Air Chief Marshal Thawi Chulasap the Thai team. The discussions were fairly general, with Thawi taking the position that in order to secure the Mekong River line it is necessary to go across the Mekong and defend in Laos, and at the same time to take actions against North Viet-Nam, such as raids and air strikes. Thawi said the Thai would prefer that further planning be continued in Bangkok, and that it should begin as soon as possible. It was agreed that both sides would draw up suitable terms of reference which would be used for guidance by the planners who would draw up the detailed plan (Embtel 2203, June 23; CINCPAC's DTG 200002Z)./6/ /6/Telegram 2203 from Bangkok, June 23, is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF/1 THAI-US; regarding CINCPAC telegram 200002Z, June 20, see footnote 4, Document 278. 5) CINCPAC transmitted proposed terms of reference in his message DTG 1000560Z to JCS./7/ These had been prepared by COMUSMACTHAI, based on working level discussions with the Thai and with the concurrence of Ambassador Martin. JCS made some modifications in these proposed terms of reference, and the revised version was sent to CINCPAC for his further comments in JCS message DTG 292116Z./7/ /7/Not found. 6) The Department of Defense has sought and been given our informal, working level concurrence in the terms of reference as approved by JCS. We may be asked for more formal approval later. In any case, the Secretary of Defense must approve these terms of reference before the actual planning based upon them can begin.
283. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/ Bangkok, August 8, 1964, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate, Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Saigon for Westmoreland, and Vientiane. Pierce Arrow was a series indicator relating to the North Vietnamese attack/attacks on the U.S. Destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin and the U.S. response to it. Passed to the White House, Department of Defense, and CIA. 162. Pierce Arrow. Deptels 178,/2/ 141./3/ /2/In telegram 178 to Bangkok, August 5, the Department instructed the Embassy to state in response to press inquiries that the United States contemplated no deployment of U.S. troops to Thailand except for precautionary air movements. The Embassy was also requested to obtain Thai Government advance approval for possible deployment of U.S. ground troops already on alert, unless it would involve wide-ranging discussions with the Thais on the use to which U.S. troops might be put. (Ibid.) /3/Dated July 30. (Ibid., POL 27 ASIA SE) 1. I have delayed answering inquiry relating Thai attitude in event we request deployment of ground forces until I could get the results of special Thai Cabinet meeting that was held on 5 August after I had presented President's letter to PriMin. In course of my meeting with Thanom, I decided to take advantage of his obvious pleasure with US actions and President's message. I said I had not been instructed to bring up question of ground troop deployment, but it obviously matter we should keep under close review as situation developed. Thanom stated that in principle he had no objection to deployment of ground troops but would wish to have further advance consultation as to the timing of any deployments considered necessary. I did not pursue matter further. As I had thought, the Cabinet reaction indicates a divided opinion (see FTG 8110)./4/ I think Thanom would be inclined to agree without much argument over detail but he would be under considerable pressure from Gen Chitti, Marshal Dawee and FonMin Thanat to refrain from doing so until and unless there was a clear indication of the necessity for their use across the Mekong. Motivations are not wholly clear. I am inclined to feel Chitti and Dawee opportunistic in terms personal effect on individual positions. Thanat quite simply would wish to use such consultation to influence US policy in protecting Thai vital interests. /4/Not found. 2. There are several basic factors on which there is general Thai agreement. These are: A. Extreme Thai sensitivity about assuming a stance of open belligerency. [4 lines of source text not declassified] B. As I have reported several times, the Thai simply do not believe that the presence of American troops as such would provide additional deterrence. They believe the wide publicity given to recent logistic buildup plus demonstrated ability to deploy rapidly by air makes actual physical presence in Thailand unnecessary before there is reason for their use and a decision to so use them. C. The Thai are quite frankly extremely loath to increase the American military presence. At present moment we are over the 5,000 mark and rapidly climbing. Until we intend to use combat troops across the Mekong they would hope to limit US military presence here, particularly that growing portion which is primarily intended for US strategic interests. D. Thai sensitivity over imputation they totally dependent on US. Latest Thai public comments carry pointed emphasis on absence present need for US troop deployment and refrain from public comment on US air deployment. RTG obviously attempting make it clear to its own citizens it not abdicating its authority and responsibility to US; and that US assistance will be invoked only when job clearly beyond Thai capabilities. E. US slowness in responding to Thai concern over US Command arrangements. 3. In summary, I have agreement (in principle) for deployment of ground troops subject to consultation on timing. Such consultation will inevitably involve some searching questions as to our plans for their use. Nevertheless, I can secure agreement any time we really determine this essential enough to warrant real pressure and I am given reasonable rationale. In my opinion, it would be serious error to press such request at present time. Martin
284. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-821-64 Washington, September 23, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Thailand 381. Secret. SUBJECT 1. Recent reports from Bangkok indicate that we cannot rule out the possibility that a coup d'etat might be directed against the Thanom government in Thailand. While coups have been a means of political change in Thailand since 1932, such an occurrence, in light of the present Southeast Asia situation, could create serious political problems and be most damaging to the US military posture in that area. 2. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the military implications for the United States of a coup in Thailand, together with alternative US courses of action with respect thereto. 3. A principal US objective for Thailand is to insure that it remains a stable nation, allied to the United States, and available as a forward base for the projection of US power into Southeast Asia. Militarily, Thailand is the only secure mainland base for US operations in that area at this time. We have extensive operating rights and base facilities available for our use in Thailand; these operating rights are for the most part informal and without the basis of a signed agreement. Their value is underlined by our operations in Laos and the recent deployments subsequent to Pierce Arrow. 4. The character of a Thai Government which might come into being as a result of a coup will probably be pro-United States unless the US position in Southeast Asia erodes seriously. In the latter event, we can expect the Thais to accommodate themselves to whatever new power situation exists in the area. Regardless of what the nature of the coup may be, the United States should take steps to insure continuance of the status quo ante insofar as US military forces and operations are concerned. 5. From their examination, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that: a. An anticommunist, pro-United States, cooperative, and stable Thailand is critical to maintenance of the US military posture in Southeast Asia. b. The United States should strengthen and maintain the Thai Government to the above end. c. If warned in advance, the United States should seek to avert an impending coup by appropriate actions. d. If a pro-Western coup does take place, immediate steps should be taken by the United States to insure reaffirmation of US military operating rights in Thailand and continued Thai military cooperation and support. e. If a neutralist or procommunist coup takes place, the United States should attempt to reinstate the Government or an acceptable substitute by supporting it or any prospective counter-coup group which would lead to that end. Where such measures fail against a procommunist coup, the United States should be prepared to take appropriate military action to protect specific US security interests in the area and/or to restore a pro-US Thai Government to power. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:/2/ /2/Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton sent this memorandum to McNamara, October 3, recommending that he forward the views of the JCS to the Secretary of State. McNamara wrote the following note on the McNaughton memorandum: "Not necessary. RM." a. The above stated conclusions be used in formulating US policy with respect to any coup contingencies in Thailand. b. The memorandum contained in the Appendix hereto be forwarded to the Secretary of State./3/ /3/The memorandum for Rusk, which was substantially the same as the memorandum to McNamara, is attached, but not printed. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler
285. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 11, 1964, 12:13-12:40 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. II, Memos, 8/64-3/65. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Dairy. (Ibid.) The meeting was held at the White House. The Department of State copy of this memorandum indicates that it was approved by the White House on December 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Komer and McGeorge Bundy sent the President a briefing memorandum for this visit in which they stated that "the main thing is to add your strong assurance to him of our determination to check the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and to stand firmly behind our commitment to Thailand." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. II, Memos, 8/64-3/65) Rusk sent the President a December 9 briefing memorandum that also made this point. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS 1. South Viet-Nam Situation. The President said that we were deeply concerned about the ineffectiveness and disunity in Saigon, and that this necessarily affected what we ourselves could plan to do. (Mr. Bundy noted that he had briefed the Foreign Minister fully on our immediate plans and views./2/) The President said that the problem of getting the various groups to put the national unity ahead of their parochial welfare was a terribly trying one, and that we needed ideas from any quarter that would help us solve it. /2/Thanat Khoman met with William Bundy in Bundy's office at 10:15 a.m., December 11. An account of that meeting is in a memorandum of conversation of that date. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Thanat responded that he had three specific thoughts: a. He thought that the "so-called Buddhist movement" was in fact heavily political and was indeed infiltrated by the Communists to some degree. b. Nonetheless, he thought it must be remembered that the Buddhists in general had had legitimate grievances under previous governments (obviously meaning Diem) and that there should be utility in trying to reason with them to see if greater understanding could not be reached. The President raised the question whether leading Buddhist groups or individuals in Thailand could play a part in reaching the Vietnamese Buddhists, and Thanat showed much interest in this proposition and implied that he would look into it. c. That the situation in South Viet-Nam was being painted in the blackest possible tones by "friendly groups"--by which it became clear he meant the French in particular. (He did not indicate whether he was referring solely or predominantly to the official French, or rather to the private French community.) Mr. Bundy noted that Ambassador Taylor had reported there were no indications of truly hostile French political action, but that it was certainly true that the French consistently took the worst possible view at any given time, and that this had a bad effect on morale. The President said that Secretary Rusk should take this up with the French when he saw them at the NATO meeting. (Mr. Bundy later carried out this instruction.) Thanat then referred to the value of some demonstrable military successes. Mr. Bundy commented that the Vietnamese armed forces had in fact given a very good account of themselves in several recent actions and the President urged that this be publicized more than was being done and asked that he himself be given such reports more than was now the case. The President asked whether Thanat had further suggestions that might help the situation, and Thanat suggested that visits by South Vietnamese leaders to Thailand might be useful and could probably be arranged in the near future. 2. Southeast Asia Generally. The President several times reaffirmed our appreciation of the firm Thai position and over Thai cooperation, referring specifically to such matters as military personnel in Laos./3/ He expressed gratification that our two nations were seeing the basic problem so closely in the same terms, and Thanat returned this sentiment strongly. Thanat also referred to the indivisibility of the area and to the fact that any loss of South Viet-Nam would constitute an immediate threat to Thailand, beyond Thailand to Malaysia, and to the rest of the adjacent areas. He thought that Laos and Cambodia would be the first to be threatened, and could hardly hold out, and his implication was that Thailand would do its utmost, but that the issue would be in some doubt. /3/This sensitive information is the reason for the Limdis caption. [Footnote in the source text.] 3. Thanat referred briefly to the desirability of certain additional assistance for highway development in the northeast, and Mr. Bundy noted that this had already been discussed between himself and Thanat and that we were prepared to go ahead with a feasibility study by AID. The President asked that he be given a report on the progress of this project when it matured. 4. In closing, following the presentation of a gift from Prime Minister Thanom--a letter from the Prime Minister was also delivered at the outset of the meeting, conveying general sentiments of support and appreciation--the President referred to our Peace Corps activity in Thailand and noted that the numbers have now reached 300. Thanat responded that this seemed to be going very well and that the Thai appreciated it. 5. During the course of the conversation Mr. Bundy mentioned that Thanat had made a most helpful statement to the press about the need for patience on the Viet-Nam problem, and the President expressed the hope that Thanat could hit this note when he saw the press following the meeting. [Continue with the next documents]
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