NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
296. Letter From the Assistance Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ I-23, 740/65 Washington, June 4, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-THAI. Secret. Dear Bill: I very much appreciate the thorough review you have made of the MAP and the proposed add-ons for Thailand. I have the following comments, keeping in mind the Secretary's memorandum of 18 May./2/ /2/Document 294. As you recall, the Secretary made clear the requirement that the Thai orient their efforts towards effective counterinsurgency measures and also develop a "balanced" military force. In his memorandum of 18 May, he made assurances to this effect a condition of proceeding with the funding of the FY 66 MAP program for Thailand. I think we can all agree that Marshal Dawee has given us a commitment to bring his units for Project 22 up to 80% manning strength. This Dawee commitment, along with Ambassador Martin's assurances, is sufficient to permit us to begin the funding of essential items in the FY 66 program, with the continuation of funding being contingent on support by the Thai of Dawee's commitment and of visible efforts to orient to counterinsurgency. I feel that we should reach a formal determination, agreed to with the Thais, of the particular Thai units we are talking about for Project 22. I understand that the necessary details regarding the Thai units that will be committed to Project 22 are now being developed by the Joint US-Thai Planning Group in Bangkok. In this regard, we have some reservations as to the accuracy of the strengths of the committed units described in the attachments to your letter. We understand that the Ambassador is aware of the need for accurate data on the present strengths of these units to provide a basis for a more informed judgment on the Project 22 force structure. I believe that in due course we should also have assurances for Ambassador Martin and COMUSMACTHAI as to the exact Thai plans for raising their manning levels (raising total strength or reducing units), so that there will be effective field training and acceptable equipment maintenance, with follow up reports from the Country Team as to Thai progress. Although we continue to be of the opinion that the existing programs, $33 million in FY 65 and $27 million in FY 66, are ample for the development of Thai forces in the manner outlined by Secretary McNamara and consistent with the ability of the Thai to assimilate assistance, we recognize the desirability of certain of the proposed add-ons. Accordingly, we have raised the MAP level for FY 65 by $2.7 million to $35.7 million to provide Thai funds to pay for [(a)] per diem support in the field (with reimbursement from AID), (b) the two battalion posts at Muang Nan and Sakon Nakhon ($1.6 million), and (c) increased costs for packing, crating and other supply operations (which otherwise would have been absorbed within the current-level program). The Ambassador may notify the Thai of these items at any time. To go beyond these items in FY 65 MAP funding gives us difficulty in view of the tight MAP situation worldwide and the desire not to reduce the FY 65 MAP levels of such forward defense countries as Korea and China. Moreover, in our discussions with Ambassador Martin, he made it clear that he did not view funding of the add-ons in FY 65 as essential, particularly since we were so near the end of the year. Further with regard to FY 65, Ambassador Martin has been informed in detail by a separate message of a significantly large package of U.S. construction for Thailand recently approved as part of the FY 65 supplemental budget request. Major items of this program have joint use aspects and will have a direct impact on the question of influencing the Thai as to the seriousness of the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia. This Thailand construction package of about $22 million (out of a total of $107 million for all of Westpac and Southeast Asia) does not at this time include items proposed as MAP add-ons. In any event, Ambassador Martin may wish, in his dealings with the Thai, to emphasize the Thai-oriented nature of the U.S. construction projects wherever possible. This includes, for example, the Kabinburi-Korat road ($6 million), the Korat tank farm ($.54 million), and the Ban Sattahip port development ($.8 million). I think Ambassador Martin should hold up discussing any of these construction items with the Thais until we have had a final cable from CINCPAC on these items, which should be in our hands shortly. Once there have been adequate assurances that the Thai are in fact moving rapidly in the direction indicated by Secretary McNamara, we can then give further consideration to funding in FY 66 of the various add-ons proposed by the Ambassador which may be thought necessary either in addition to or in place of those initially programmed. In addition, we will have in hand fairly soon a study by Tim Hoopes on the Thai MAP program, which will be supplemented about the end of July by a RAND study which, among other things, will address itself to Thai MAP. Sincerely, John
297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/ Washington, June 29, 1965, 3:56 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-THAI. Secret; Priority; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Pickering, cleared by Dexter, and approved by Bundy. 2208. For Ambassador from Bundy. Embtel 2041./2/ /2/In telegram 2041 from Bangkok, June 15, Martin made a strong appeal that the "add-ons" to the Thai military assistance program were in complete conformity with McNamara's criteria. Martin concluded his long cable with the observation that he had just secured "Thai commitment to massive reorganization of one pillar of power establishment--the Thai police system." Martin thought that the Thai were now receptive to reform and modernization and he believed "we now have a similar opportunity to achieve same massive reorganization of the military power establishment" at "infinitesimal" cost. Martin was confident he could achieve results and would stake his career on it. (Ibid.) We are impressed by recent indications of an atmosphere in which major constructive change can be achieved in Thailand, most notably your remarkable success in negotiating in a very brief span an agreement laying the basis for critically important reforms in the police. We share your belief that an achievement of similar proportions now seems possible vis-à-vis the armed forces. As you know we also share your estimate of the consequences of failure to seize this opportunity. We are prepared to make a maximum effort to obtain the negotiating authority requested reftel, despite great difficulties noted Deptel 2114./3/ Next step will be our reply to McNaughton letter of June 4 to this end. In addition we will if necessary ask Secretary's direct intervention (as we did in support of your request for FY 1965 add-ons--Deptel 2167)./4/ We will have to be prepared to be quite specific about what the Thai must do--and when they must do it--in order to live up to their side of the bargain. In my judgment we will need as a minimum: 1) some concrete evidence that the Thai are starting to move toward fulfillment of the Dawee commitment and that it will be fulfilled within a reasonable time frame; 2) further RTG commitments to undertake promptly a) to provide for intensive field training, with adequate stress on CI missions of all Project 22 units and other units having a CI mission; b) to bring all Project 22 units (including reserves) up to levels adequate to assure ability to utilize and maintain equipment to be provided in FY 66 plus equipment previously provided and to execute missions assigned by joint plans; and c) to assure proper utilization and maintenance by RTAF of all aircraft provided in FY 66 program and add-ons as well as aircraft previously provided under MAP. /3/As explained in telegram 2114 to Bangkok, June 15, the appropriation was not yet voted upon or the program allocated, so Martin's request for immediate authority to pre-sent to the Thais the total Military Assistance requested for FY 66 created great difficulty. (Ibid.) /4/Dated June 23. (Ibid.) Request your comments on likelihood of Thai being willing and able to deliver on above in return for our proposed FY 1966 package. Would also greatly appreciate any suggestions of alternative or additional RTG commitments which we could reasonably seek. Rusk
298. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 5, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. III, Memos, 4/65-12/65. Secret. Also sent to Rusk and McNamara. Our Thai desk officer, Laurence Pickering, a first-rate man with long experience in Thailand, recently spent over two weeks there. His report, which I attach for your personal interest, brings out the central features of the situation more clearly and succinctly than any compact document I have recently seen. I believe it would be worth your while just to look this over for a feel. My office is already working with ISA on the possible terms of an FY '66 MAP package which might be presented in return for firm Thai commitments. We hope to have something ready for high-level discussion during the course of the week. William P. Bundy/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of Thailand Affairs (Pickering) Washington, June 28, 1965. SOME OBSERVATIONS BASED ON RECENT TRIP TO THAILAND I was in Thailand from June 3-20. Of this time, I spent one week (June 10-16) on an up-country trip via Air America helio-courier through Chieng Rai, Chieng Mai, Udorn, Nakon Phanom, Ubon, Roi-et, and Korat. I met with provincial governors (many of whom I had known before) and other Thai officials and with Americans at our many and varied installations. While in Bangkok I had numerous opportunities for discussions with senior Thai officials whom I had known from my previous assignment there in addition to meetings with all senior officers of the U.S. diplomatic mission. Following are the outstanding impressions of the present situation which I carried away. 1. There is evidence of considerable progress toward meeting basic problems. There is no question in my mind but that the Communists are active in Northeast Thailand. The assassination of the Kamnan (township head) of the village on which the ARD project in Nakon Phanom is centered just one day before the visit to that village of General Praphat is one more of a series of incidents which can hardly be explained otherwise. However, Communist activity is as yet not intensive, and there are a great many positive factors at work to make the most of the time we have. A. A big payoff from our investment in roads is beginning to be evident. The Bangkok to Nong Kai highway has tied the Northeast into the rest of the country in a new and important way. Even towns well off the path of the highway, such as Rio-et, have reaped clear economic benefits from the ready access to the Capital and its markets, and travel to and from the Capital is much more frequent (witness the appearance of three new hotels in this small provincial town since the Bangkok-Nong Kai road was opened). Bill Klausner, an Asia Foundation representative who knows the Northeast about as well as any American and who is married to a Thai from a village in Ubon province, tells me that, primarily as a result of better roads plus a long period of political and economic stability, the economic lot of the average villager in the Northeast has visibly improved in recent years. The economic effects of the Northern security road, both in terms of reduced transportation costs and better prices for rice and other produce, are already a matter of record although the road is still under construction and traversing it entails bypassing many bridges still not completed. B. The MDUs have had a valuable impact, and the ARD is just now reaching a point where it should begin to pay off. A great many problems were encountered in the first year of the ARD (e.g., inadequately trained personnel, some hold-up in delivery of certain items of equipment) but many of the bugs have been ironed out and during the coming dry season a great deal should be accomplished. ARD projects are already underway in six provinces and will begin in five more during the next dry season. The main emphasis continues to be placed on road building (which in my opinion is not a bad focus of effort) but in the provinces I visited there is adequate recognition of the importance of improvements in other fields as well. The MDU effort is as always of greatest impact in its initial period, and the need for adequate follow-up is as great as ever. If I had to single out one weakness in this picture, I would cite the evident lack of careful coordination at all levels between the ARD and MDU. I think our side should focus hard on this one. 2. The Thai recognize the magnitude of the problem they face and are prepared to undertake reforms, even drastic reforms, in order to prepare themselves to meet it. A. Their willingness to make unprecedented delegations of authority and budget to the provincial governors in connection with the ARD is already fully documented. In the critical province of Nakon Phanom, the Thai have assigned a tough, effective governor with a record of successful crime suppression in other areas of the country, and have given him extensive authority over the security forces in the province as well as within the traditional range of civil authority. B. During the brief span of my visit to Thailand, the mission negotiated a program with the Thai laying the basis for critically needed reforms in the Thai National Police. Many skeptics felt that nothing meaningful could be achieved in the short period remaining between the completion of the police study and the end of the fiscal year 1965. In the event, however, the Thai not only agreed to put up the equivalent $4-1/2 million to meet local currency costs in this important program, but they also made an important break-through toward open budgeting of police expenditures instead of the traditional single figure in the budget for all police activities, and agreed to the establishment of a joint Thai/U.S. evaluatory committee to measure progress of this program, a committee which will include senior Thai civilians committed to reform as well as senior police. Ambassador Martin very carefully laid the groundwork for this negotiation in a meeting with General Praphat, a meeting which I attended. The Thai clearly understand the implications of this undertaking and are fully prepared to go through with it. C. My conversations with senior Thai left me with a conviction that the Thai are ready for similar basic reforms in the Armed Forces and in the civil bureaucracy as well. If given authority similar to that provided in connection with the police program, i.e., the authority to offer a specific package of assistance in return for Thai commitment to achieve certain goals on their side, I firmly believe we can obtain Thai commitments which will result relatively quickly in bringing all Thai ground forces under Project 22 to a level of manning and training that will make them capable of carrying out their missions, and transform the Thai Air Force into the kind of effective organization which the unquestioned skill of many of its individual pilots entitles it to be. This can and should be undertaken on the basis of the relatively modest requests for FY 66 program and add-ons already on the record. There is no need to wait for the completion of any further studies of the situation. In fact, to do so would run a serious risk of losing the atmosphere of readiness to accept major constructive change which clearly exists at present but which could be quickly dissipated by evidence of hesitancy or uncertainty on our part. I understand from Rand Team members that one of their major recommendations will be for a rather thoroughgoing overhaul of the civil bureaucracy and an across-the-board salary increase of important proportions for the civil bureaucracy as well as the police and Army. (This is basic to getting at the problem of corruption at the lower levels.) Such an ambitious program will of course require an important new increment of U.S. support. If that is forthcoming, the necessary reforms on the Thai side are quite within the realm of possible achievement in the next few years. 3. Many if not most senior Thai feel a sense of uneasiness about the totality of the commitment to the United States which their government has accepted. This showed up most often in comments about Thanat's recent statements and speeches in the United States and Japan. Given adequate attention to this problem on our part, I do not see any real danger that this will result in an erosion of the Thai commitment. We must never forget, however, that this commitment is viewed critically and even skeptically by many Thai and that we must miss no opportunity to demonstrate the fact that it is in Thailand's interest in the broadest sense to continue the commitment. 4. The impact of the U.S. military build up in the Northeast is immense. When I first visited Udorn in 1961, there were seven Americans, mostly missionaries, in the community. My visit was occasioned by our plan to commit at that time a force of 300 Marines to Udorn as a helicopter support unit. We undertook that step with great trepidation about the impact of such a build-up on a sleepy provincial center such as Udorn. The number of Americans there now is approaching 1,500. In addition, there are even larger numbers committed to Ubon and Korat, plus a small force (200 plus) at Nakon Phanom. Their presence is felt not only in the inevitable frictions and occasional incidents which ordinarily come under the heading of "troop community relations." Because of the intense air activity in and out of Thailand occasioned by the fact that practically all the land based raids on North Vietnam are being mounted from Thailand, their presence is felt quite pervasively throughout the region. Not only are U.S. planes almost constantly overhead, but the occasional crash of a U.S. aircraft (my friend the governor of Roi-et has had two in his province in recent weeks) and the sticky problem of disposition of ordnance after missions over Vietnam and Laos abort often become a major focus of attention. In the latter case, the ordnance has to be dropped in Thailand. The present area into which such ordnance is dropped is located near Korat. Although the 750 pound bombs usually involved are dropped on "safe", they very frequently detonate on impact. Two 750s so detonated during a briefing I was receiving from the American base commander at Korat. At present there are said to be some 130 of these 750 pound bombs in the drop area near Korat, all of which will have to be detonated there according to the briefing officer. There have been other cases where it has been necessary to drop ordnance in the Mekong River and in at least one case the ordnance detonated near the Thai side and did considerable physical damage to property. The point of all this is that over the next year or so, as the build-up continues and as air activity intensifies, the government is sure to feel the pressure of complaints of its less pleasant aspects, rendering more difficult the maintenance of a favorable political climate in the country. To my mind more important than the "troop community relations" problem, however, is the danger that, in the course of our build-up, which has only just begun in terms of construction, augmentation of staff and of aircraft assigned to the area, the role of the Thai Armed Forces, and especially of the Thai Air Force, will be relegated to a position of obvious insignificance. The Americans now assigned to senior positions in the Northeast recall the great contribution to the development of our policy made by the Thai pilots who made the first effective use of air over Laos. However, the turnover of Americans is quite rapid there and in the course of the expansion which I have just referred to there will be a strong and natural tendency to completely forget the Thai role and to come to view these bases as strictly serving U.S. unilateral objectives. Nothing could more certainly poison the atmosphere between the U.S. and the Thai Armed Forces, which in light of the political role of the Armed Forces in Thailand could have a general deleterious effect. In my judgment this cannot be overcome merely by paying deference to the Thai base commander (whose role in this respect will tend to become an almost nominal one), but requires the establishment with the Thai Air Force and with the Armed Forces generally of a truly working relationship which has as its objective preparing the Thai forces for roles that are meaningful in terms of the present situation. This can be done, I believe, through the medium of rapid implementation of Project 22 plus increased emphasis on improvement of the performance of the Thai Air Force and preparation of the Air Force for continued and expanded roles in the present action in Southeast Asia. This could best be achieved by authorizing the Mission now to go in with a specific package of assistance which will be delivered contingent upon performance by the Thai Armed Forces of specific commitments respecting field training and adequate utilization and maintenance of equipment provided. In conclusion I want to emphasize that the American forces presently deployed to the Northeast and particularly the mission they are carrying out from there are strong plus factors in our relations with the Thai. In emphasizing potential problems related to their presence my objective is to assure that this continues to be true.
299. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 1, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Pickering. The date is handwritten on the source text. SUBJECT 1. Attached at Tab A/2/ is a letter to Defense Secretary McNamara for your signature proposing that we authorize Ambassador Martin to advise the Royal Thai Government of our FY 66 MAP program, including add-ons, as a means of laying the groundwork for a subsequent proposal for a Thai RCT in South Viet Nam. /2/Tab A was not attached, but the letter was signed, see Document 300. 2. Secretary McNamara's position has been that the proposed MAP add-ons are not justified. However, he is willing to provide them in return for a Thai commitment to put a unit in South Viet Nam. On the other hand, Ambassador Martin, in response to our query (Deptel 168, Tab B)/3/ has told us in Embtel 190 (Tab C)/4/ that to link the MAP add-ons directly or indirectly (by simultaneous discussion) with such a proposal could have extremely serious consequences in Thailand. He has further said that failure to provide the MAP add-ons would badly hurt our position in Thailand. Ambassador Martin may have overstated the case, but FE fully agrees that the risks he cites are present and that they are not remote. /3/Dated July 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) /4/Dated July 31. (Ibid.) 3. Ambassador Martin further states that if given the authority to discuss the MAP add-ons with the RTG now, in relation to getting commitments from the Thai armed forces for improvement of their state of readiness, and if given a little time to otherwise condition the RTG, he would anticipate RTG approval of a request for forces in South Viet Nam. 4. The requested MAP add-ons total $12.7 million, which would bring the FY 66 MAP to $39.7 million. This compares to $38 million for FY 65, $42.8 million in FY 64, $73.5 million in FY 63, and $81 million in FY 62. In other words, what is being proposed is only a continuation of a fairly low level of MAP rather than a major increase over previous levels. In addition, it would be given only in return for commitments to bring about improvements in the Thai armed forces. In view of the relatively small sum involved in comparison with overall expenditures on Vietnam, and in view of vital importance of Thai cooperation in that connection, we feel that it would be extremely shortsighted for us not to go ahead with the Thailand MAP program as requested by Ambassador Martin and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS. If in addition it helps to lay the groundwork for obtaining a Thai unit for services in South Viet Nam, so much the better. Recommendation: That you sign the letter to Secretary McNamara and initial the telegram attached at Tab A.
300. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, August 2, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 1266, Thailand 091.3 MAP. Secret. SUBJECT Attached (Tab A)/2/ is a letter to you from Secretary Rusk which puts us back to where we were three months ago. /2/Not found; see footnote 2, Document 299. In essence, it proposes that we give the Thais not only the FY 66 MAP ($27 million) but also the $12.7 million of add-ons which keep raising their heads in this duel between State and Defense. He wants us to make the concession on MAP before we press to get the Thai troops for Vietnam. Secretary Rusk's approach, in essence, is that "the MAP problem must be settled by itself before we proceed to the question of a unit." I do not see why this is necessarily the way to proceed, but we can bow to his judgment in this regard. We can do so by "settling the MAP issue" on the terms which we have been pressing all along--namely, telling the Thai they can have their FY 66 MAP (without add-ons) provided they take appropriate steps to address the counterinsurgency problem and to increase the manning (and thus combat readiness) levels of their regular forces. We have queried Ambassador Martin as to the commitments which he thinks he can obtain from the Thais and he advises that (a) Dawee's commitment to increase manning levels of Project 22 forces should be broadened to include support forces as well as combat forces; (b) he would press for intensified field training; (c) he would enforce perform-ance by individual services by channeling MAP through Thai Supreme Command; and (d) he would require continued improvement in utilization and maintenance of aircraft. While Martin does not think we should ask for more, we had in mind a somewhat more precise list of conditions or commitments (see Tab B)./3/ Also, we emphasize counterinsurgency. /3/Attached but not printed. The sentence following the superscript is handwritten. Cables referred to in Secretary Rusk's letter are at Tab C./4/ The $12.7 million of add-ons is set forth at Tab D/5/; it constitutes about half of Ambassador Martin's request. /4/See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 299. /5/Not found attached. I suggest that you take this matter up with Secretary Rusk at lunch on Tuesday./6/ /6/McNamara wrote the following note on the source text: "8/3 To Mr. McNaughton. John, please assemble & review with me the entire state of Thai military forces: a) current vs proposed manning levels for all units, b) recent appraisal of training of forces, c) current vs proposed 'in commission' rates for gd & air equips, d) current vs proposed counter insurgency force & programs (popular forces, communication hamlet identification, etc.), e) current vs proposed Thai defense budget, f) current vs proposed MAP for '66, esp. major items, etc., etc., g) describe Project 22 forces & how the 'add-ons' relate to them & their readiness, h) origin of items in Bundy letter to McNaughton, i) content of cable 63, j) what are Stilwell's views--shouldn't he come to Washington before we settle. RSM." Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Valenti had lunch with the President on Tuesday, August 3, from 1:45 to 2:14 p.m. No record has been found, except that the President's Daily Diary indicates that they discussed the "Pakistan situation." (Johnson Library) John T. McNaughton
301. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 6, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Miscellaneous Chron. Secret. In his last conversation with you, Secretary McNamara said that he wanted to look again at the conditions that we might attach to our FY '66 MAP offer to Thailand. I now find from McNaughton that they have been directed to do a complete re-survey of the Thai military situation and that this will take at least a week before the matter could even be faced again. In my judgment, this is simply losing sight of the forest. We have gone into the Thai situation as thoroughly as we possibly can from the data available in Washington, and McNaughton agrees with us that the total MAP package of $39 million at least makes reasonable military sense, even though it might be improved slightly by further examination. McNamara is also questioning the necessity for the add-ons of $12.6 million, but these too have been carefully reviewed and are agreed to make fairly good military sense. The real problem, which McNamara either rejects or does not recognize as the key, is the political one. Since we sent you the memorandum on Monday,/2/ we have had still further indications of the depth of Thai feeling and the real danger that the Thai will really lose confidence in our whole relationship. Praphat has made an unprecedented speech specifically saying our MAP is inadequate, and I have cross-examined the highly competent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who reports that our MAP deficiencies (in Thai eyes) have come up in virtually every recent conversation he has had with any senior Thai military man, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. (Graham Martin's failure to report these conversations is simply another in a list of quirks that forms a separate subject.) /2/Document 299. In short, I am more than ever convinced that: 1. We have got to move now, and specifically when Martin sees Thanom on Tuesday./3/ It is absolutely clear Thanom expects a message on MAP at that time. /3/August 10. 2. We have got to move with the full Thai MAP package of $39 million in return for the kind of conditions Martin has described in his 63/4/ (summary attached). /4/Telegram 63 from Bangkok, July 8. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-THAI) 3. Whatever improvement in the Thai program we could devise by further study in Washington, or by the efforts of General Stilwell when he arrives (he is standing by to go out) are simply not significant elements compared to the political stake in immediate action on the above lines. Recommendation: I recommend that you call Secretary McNamara with the above arguments and seek a decision not later than tomorrow. I hate to be this blunt, but we simply have got to have a policy and an immediate action on this one, in my judgment, and in the judgment of my whole staff, as well as that of Ambassador Martin. William P. Bundy/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment Commitments Which Ambassador Martin Proposes to Obtain from Thai Government in Connection with Provision of MAP Add-ons (Bangkok's 63 to Department) 1. Broaden the existing Dawee commitment to increase manning levels to 80% for Project 22 Combat Forces to include also Project 22 Support Units. 2. Press for Thai achieving desired manning levels before FY 68 (the present goal as outlined in the JUSMAG Force Objectives Study). 3. Try to include reserves in the over-all increase of manning levels. 4. Press for intensive field training. 5. Establish meaningful jointly agreed training standards. 6. Enforce the principle of performance by individual services as criterion for delivery of military support. 7. Seek to assure continuing improvement in utilization and maintenance of all RTAF aircraft provided under MAP. 8. Attempt to remove the present incompetent C-in-C of the RTAF. 9. Increase the effectiveness of the JUSMAG-Thai joint evaluation process. Martin does not believe he should ask for more but hopes that a great deal more may be accomplished: "I am completely confident that if given the support and latitude in the MAP program I am seeking, we will be able to make substantial strides in the direction of producing needed reform and modernization in the Thai Armed Forces. At the same time we will be in a better position to continue cultivating the sense of real partnership with the Thai which is so critically essential to assuring the continuing extraordinary cooperation of the Thai. Without this, attainment of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia will be infinitely more costly."
302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/ Washington, August 9, 1965, 3:09 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-THAI. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Solbert, cleared with McNaughton and Trueheart, and approved by Berger. 224. Joint State/Defense message. Embtel 63./2/ /2/See footnote 4, Document 301, and attachment to it. 1. Your are authorized to inform Thanom that we have examined Thai military needs carefully and desire to do utmost in FY 66 program to meet them at most rapid rate possible; and that we are willing to provide for FY 66 MAP some increase over FY 65 (which FYI was $38.3 million end FYI) provided we have Thai commitments with respect to measures we believe Thai must take to achieve more effective counterinsurgency effort and increased combat effectiveness of their forces./3/ A specific set of goals and performance schedules would have to be worked out as an essential element of reaching final agreement on specifics of FY 66 MAP program. In explaining what we have in mind you should draw on following. /3/In telegram 250 from Bangkok, August 10, Martin reported his conversation with Thanom, Sawaeng, and Pote Sarasin. Martin informed the Thai officials that they could expect at least last year's figure of 750 billion baht in military aid and maybe a little more depending on how quickly they could improve their combat effectiveness and general performance of the Thai military forces. Martin reported that Thanom was relieved and promised to cooperate with the new JUSMAG and COMUSMACTHAI, General Stilwell. Martin ended his report with the admonition that it would be a "mistake to develop a complicated series of mathematical formulae" for military aid. He suggested that Washington should rely on his and Stilwell's judgment to determine how far forward the Thais could be carried. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-THAI) 2. With respect to the counterinsurgency effort, our concern is that a major emphasis must be placed today on speeding up the program of coping with potential insurgency in the northeast and northern areas of Thailand, including the increased AID police programs [1 line of source text not declassified]. From the military side of counterinsurgency, this means such things as increased deployment of forces from headquarters to outlying areas, more effective training exercises and instruction for the military forces for counterinsurgency, increased civic action and the development of systematic analysis of efforts to meet any future insurgency. 3. With respect to conventional forces, you have mentioned in Embtel 63 the fundamental commitments that will be needed (e.g., relating to manning levels, field training, agreed training standards, in-commission and utilization rates, joint evaluation procedures, etc.) The question of increased Thai budgets to cover these improvements will have to be faced. 4. As you know, serious maintenance and other deficiencies noted in last two years have given us grave concern about effectiveness of our assistance and general organization of Thai effort in relation to threat which we believe to be basically subversion but including possible Communist overt moves against Mekong for which Project 22 planning has been designed. Thai maintenance and in-commission difficulties have also occasioned major criticisms in U.S. Congress which are already causing some problems and could become more serious unless it is clear Thai are moving to correct them. 5. We are sending separate cable with our thoughts on specific commitments./4/ We would like your suggestions and recommendations with respect to specific commitments, schedules, techniques for measuring progress, methods of ensuring performance, and best way to work the thing out with the Thai./5/ /4/Telegram 259 to Bangkok, August 12. (Ibid.) /5/Telegram 282 from Bangkok, August 15. (Ibid.) Rusk
303. Special Memorandum Prepared by the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency/1/ 22-65 Washington, September 10, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. III, Memos, 4/65-12/65. Secret. SUBJECT SUMMARY Thailand's chief vulnerability to Communist subversion lies in the northeast region, which borders on Laos. The Chinese have recently increased their efforts to encourage dissidence among poorly integrated minorities in this region, and the level of dissident activity, although still very low, has risen somewhat. Bangkok is responding with more vigorous security measures and efforts to remove economic grievances. The chances are good that the government will be able to stay abreast of the likely increase in Communist subversion. The outlook in Thailand would alter greatly, however, if the Communists achieved definitive victory in Laos or South Vietnam. [Here follows the body of the memorandum.] For the Board of National Estimates: Sherman Kent
304. Memorandum From Richard K. Stuart of the Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)/1/ Washington, September 10, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand, 1965. Secret. Also sent to Deputy Director of INR Denney and Deputy Director for Research Evans. Sent through Albert E. Carter of INR/DDC. SUBJECT /2/Agenda attached at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. No agenda was attached.] PARTICIPANTS Thailand Mr. Colby opened the discussion on Thailand with a brief review of conversations between CIA and Ambassador Martin during his recent period of consultation in Washington. Ambassador Martin had reported that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had approached the Ambassador before his recent return to Washington and asked for help in the election which would follow adoption of the new Thai constitution, possibly in the middle of 1966. These Thai politicians wanted approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] US dollars in order to obviate the necessity of approaching Chinese merchants in Bangkok, the usual source of political funds. While their reasons for approaching the U.S. seemed somewhat far fetched, the Ambassador believed that, in effect, they did not want to be beholden to the Chinese. Before he returned to Bangkok the Ambassador wanted some idea of how far he could go in conversations with these Thai politicians. The Ambassador felt that an ideal solution would be to get 303 Committee agreement in principle for support of the Thai election. Mr. Bundy said that he felt that it might be worth [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] dollars to have control of the Thai political scene but that he did not want to see the government's administrative machinery used as a political party. This had always been done in the past and he did not think that it augured well for the future of democracy in Thailand if this practice were to continue. Mr. Stuart asked who the opponents would be to the politicians presently in power in an election as far off as 1966. He was not aware that there was any opposition worth mentioning now and it was doubtful that, even after the adoption of a constitution, an opposition would be allowed to develop. Mr. Colby replied that the money would be used less to defeat an opposition than to build stability on a democratic basis in Thailand. Mr. Pickering said that he felt that there might be some opposition, particularly in Bangkok, although he was not sure that there would be much in the provinces. He went on to say that we do not know whether the constitution would require the present leaders to stand for election to Parliament before they could lead the government. After an inconclusive discussion of the prospects of future party growth, it was left that CIA would produce a draft paper for the 303 Committee. The paper, however, would be thoroughly discussed with FE before being presented to the Committee./3/ /3/For the paper as submitted, see Document 305. Mr. Bundy said that Ambassador Martin would be returning to Washington early next week and that he expected to discuss this matter further with him at that time.
305. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee/1/ Washington, September 28, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, 10/7/65. Secret; Eyes Alone. For background information on the role of the 303 Committee and its predecessors in approving U.S. covert actions, see U.S. Covert Actions and Counter-Insurgency Programs, pp. XXXV-XLI. SUBJECT 1. Background & Summary Following the coup d'etat of 1957, which resulted in the overthrow of Prime Minister Phibun Songkram, the Government of Thailand was subsequently re-established under an interim constitution. The Revolutionary Party that assumed political control of the Government established a military dictatorship, dissolved the old constitution and the parliament, and proscribed all political parties. An interim Constitution of 1959 provided for an appointive Constituent Assembly charged with the responsibility of drafting a permanent constitution. The final draft of this constitution was completed in June 1965 by the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, and following action on minor amendments and revisions, by early 1966 it is possible that the permanent constitution will be promulgated. If the Constitution is promulgated it is estimated that by the end of calendar year 1966 general parliamentary elections will be held in Thailand. Ambassador Martin has proposed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a program of covert political action to include the financing of a political party, electoral support for this party, and support for selected candidates for parliament from this party. While it is impossible at this time to speak of exact orders of magnitude, past experience indicates that the cost would be at least [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Such a program is now in preparation. After Ambassador Martin has reviewed the program in detail, he will submit definitive recommendations for the 303 Group's consideration. Most of the funds required would be for use in Fiscal Year 1967. 2. Problem Following the final reading of the draft permanent constitution in June 1965, Ambassador Martin was approached [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with a request that the U.S. provide financial assist-ance to support general elections in Thailand which will probably take place in mid or late 1966. Traditionally the ruling groups in Thailand have drawn upon the Government controlled Lottery Bureau for funds to finance political activities, but because the present members of the ruling group have been so critical of the late Prime Minister Sarit's misuse of Lottery Bureau funds, they appear reluctant to use this source. Support is also available from a variety of sources subject to internal pressure such as Chinese businessmen. They would expect legislative favors in return for their contributions, [3 lines of source text not declassified]. Thailand today is still under martial law which does not permit political parties or any activities by individuals, groups, or organizations that could be construed as being politically (particularly anti-government) motivated. Although some small remnants of former legal political parties still exist, notably former Prime Minister Khuong Aphaiwong's Democratic Party, they represent little more than disorganized and undisciplined political "outs". However, the illegal and underground Communist Party of Thailand is well organized and disciplined, and it can be anticipated that the Communists will make every effort to capitalize on the forthcoming election for their own purposes. (In December 1964, Prime Minister Thanom made the statement that if elections were to be held that month the Communists would win easily.) Most certainly the Communists will direct a significant part of their propaganda efforts to create additional difficulties in terms of popular confusion as to the trend of events, domestic and foreign policy issues, corruption and governmental mismanagement, etc. Also, in keeping with traditional Thai politics, there will undoubtedly be a proliferation of political parties organized to contest the elections. The Communists can be expected to attempt to influence and penetrate some of these parties as well as to organize front groups to serve their own political interests. The result can be instability if not Communist influence. To date, the ruling group has done little or nothing to develop and organize politically in preparation for the forthcoming elections, except that largely in response to pressures kept on by the Mission over a long period of time, the key members of the ruling group have agreed to compose any differences they might have and join forces within one party. It is felt that it is both consistent and consonant with U.S. policy objectives in Thailand to support the continuity and stability of the present ruling group. To this end the funds requested in this paper will be used to underwrite some of the costs of organizing and supporting a government party in preparation for the general elections. 3. Factors Bearing on the Problem
The Thai Government commitment to adopt a constitution and establish an elected parliament and other democratic freedoms paves the way for the Communists to increase and expand their political agitation efforts. When political campaigning is again permitted in Thailand, it is to be expected that appeals for neutralism and agitation aimed at discrediting the pro-U.S. leadership of the Thai Government will be encouraged by Communist influence through every available means. There is a danger that in reacting to this increased propaganda and agitation the Government might revert to harsh suppressive measures which, although providing an immediate relief to the situation, will only serve to generate more confusion and problems over the long term. The risk of overreaction can be minimized if the transition from an authoritarian system of government to one more democratic is smooth and gradual, and it is the intent of this proposal to assist the Thai in developing the necessary popular base and political organizational structure to make a smooth and gradual transition to a more democratic form of government.
(1) The primary objective is to promote and organize a Government political party under the leadership and control of the present ruling group. A corollary objective is to attempt to ensure that the party created is successful in winning a comfortable and commanding majority in elections. A breakdown of funds by category of expenditure is not feasible at this time, but when the program has been fully developed and approved by Ambassador Martin, such a breakdown will be submitted. (2) [1 paragraph (21 lines of source text) not declassified] (3) In implementing this proposal, every effort will be made to influence the Thai to conduct elections at the local village and district levels prior to the parliamentary elections. Such elections would be for the purpose of forming elected bodies, such as provincial committees and local district councils. This influence will be exerted by overt means through the Ambassador and covert means as set forth in this paper.
(1) Exposure of U.S. financial support to a RTG political party would provide excellent propaganda material for the Communists. Local Government opposition groups and the World Communist press could cause considerable embarrassment to the U.S. Government and the RTG. The only insurance against disclosure is that of making witting of the operation only those Thai and U.S. Government officials absolutely essential to the accomplishment of the objective. The Thais could be expected to use as much caution and discretion in the selection of witting officials as would we. The actual mechanism by which funds and assistance are to be made available is a vulnerability which will be minimized [1 line of source text not declassified]. This will permit plausible denial of U.S. Government involvement should there be any question of the source of support. (2) To avoid as much as possible the danger of corruption and misappropriation of funds, precise programs will be negotiated with the Thai prior to authorizing and passing funds. Additionally, as feasible and within the limits of security, a system of audits and fiscal controls will be employed to require simple accounting and reporting procedures from the Thai. (3) This proposal for support of the development of a Thai Government political apparatus does not preclude [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support to other political opposition groups [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Any such actions would of course not be undertaken prior to coordination with the Ambassador and approval by the 303 Committee. 4. Coordination
This proposal originated with the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand and has been discussed with the Department of State's Far East Regional Bureau which recommends approval./2/ [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] /2/In a memorandum to Thompson, October 8, William Bundy recommended that the program be supported. (Ibid.)
[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] 5. Recommendation It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve the proposal to create a political party in Thailand using as a basis the current ruling group and secure the parliamentary election of leaders of this party.
306. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, October 8, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, 10/14/65. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Peter Jessup. SUBJECT PRESENT 1. Thailand--Covert U.S. Government Financial Support to Thai Elections a. A rather detailed discussion took place of the proposal to provide covert support to the Thai government for elections projected for autumn 1966. Ambassador Graham Martin noted a change requested by Assistant Secretary William Bundy in the language of the proposal. Ambassador Martin emphasized the importance of keeping together the leaders who have established some cohesion in recent months after the promulgation of a constitution in January 1966 following which political parties would be legalized and an electoral campaign organized. By beginning now and literally building a democratic electoral process from the ground up, reinsurance of a stable pro-Western regime in an anchor land in Southeast Asia was envisaged. b. The Committee members expressed strong sympathy for the purpose but did not gloss over the risks and difficulties in successfully conducting such an operation on a covert basis. Ambassador Martin believed that the number of witting Thai officials could be kept to a figure of six. The proposed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would constitute perhaps a third of the total cost. c. Mr. Bundy stated that the proposal would first have to be presented to Secretary Rusk and later to higher authority./2/ It was hoped that these steps could be taken before Ambassador Martin returns to Bangkok later in the month. Ambassador Martin indicated that he felt he could respond [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the U.S. favored assistance in principle and would hope to provide support on a scale which had not yet been determined. /2/Rusk approved "in principle" on November 5 and Johnson reviewed the proposal on November 11 at his ranch and gave his endorsement. (Memorandum from Koren to William Bundy, November 17; ibid.) [Here follows material unrelated to Thailand.] Peter Jessup
307. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, January 14, 1966. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/Executive Registry Files: Job 80-BO1676R, Box 4, Defense, Jan.-Dec., 1966. Secret. SUBJECT Pursuant to your request at our meeting on 5 January,/2/ I would like to offer the following observations on the security situation in north Thailand. (I understand a full dress assessment of the situation is on the way from the Bangkok Country Team and should be in Washington some time next week. This will undoubtedly contain recommendations for counteraction.)/3/ /2/Not further identified. /3/Transmitted in telegram 1428 from Bangkok, January 20, in which the Country Team stated that there was an intensification of an insurgency threat to northeast Thailand and recommended both short- and long-range programs to counter it. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-7 THAI) The parts of Thailand in question are areas of traditional disaffection from the central government. These areas are racially allied to a large degree with groups in Laos and now Vietnam, with approximately 40,000 refugees from the latter. There has been, in the past few years, an increasing Communist concentration on agitation and organization within this area with Thailand being singled out by the Chinese Communist Government as the next country in Asia in which a war of national liberation would most likely develop. This statement was made by Vice Premier Chen Yi in January 1965 following the announcement of the Thai Independence Movement and the Thai Patriotic Front. Soon thereafter, two ex-members of the Thai parliament, Phayom Chulanond and Mongkhon Na Nakhon, who had earlier left Thailand for Communist China to evade arrest, were installed as spokesmen for these two exile front groups. Since August 1965, several jungle camps have been discovered by Thai Security Services; and concurrently, intelligence reports began to indicate that Thai Communist cadre have received instructions to switch from the defensive to the offensive and since that time several jungle camps have been discovered. During 1965 there were over 30 attacks by subversives against government officials and police informants, with 25 occurring in the last half of the year. The most recent intelligence has indicated attacks on police and security installations. The Thai Government reaction to this situation varied from initial disbelief that it was serious, to a later precipitate deployment of military forces up to and including air bombardment of suspected redoubt areas. The Thai Government has been carrying out, with American support, a variety of programs aimed at showing Government concern with the rural areas, especially in the northeast, and improving the social and economic situation there. More recently, the Thai established a central command to exercise general authority over the suppression of insurgents. The United States program of assistance to Thailand includes a number of elements targeted against the development of subversion or insurgency, and this program has been kept under regular review by the Special Group (Counterinsurgency). This U.S. assistance is given to expand civilian police programs, a village communications project, construction of security roads, Accelerated Rural Development, water development, local Government administrative development, Mobile Development Units, rural electrification, vocational education, etc. [2 paragraphs (30 lines of source text) not declassified]/4/ /4/[text not declassified] January 7, attached but not printed. Despite the current programs to improve the suppressive ability of the Thai Government and the extensive activities aimed at assisting the Thai Government to bring economic and social betterment to its rural population, I am much concerned that, unless this vital element of popular participation and commitment can be developed, our efforts may well be defeated. I assume that the forthcoming recommendations from the Country Team will address themselves to this subject. Richard Helms/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original. [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |