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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
324. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Martin)/1/ Washington, September 23, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL THAI-US. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the source text indicates that the original was pouched to Bangkok. Dear Graham: Yesterday I went to New York and invited Thanat to a lunch which just the two of us had in the Secretary's suite. In brief, I found Thanat in the foulest mood I have ever seen him and for somewhat more than two hours we had the most acid conversation we have ever had. I started out by telling him how well Bill Bundy's hearing had gone before the Foreign Relations Committee/2/ and how no one had challenged or called into question the validity of our commitments to Thailand based on the SEATO Treaty and the Rusk-Thanat communiqué. This rolled like water off a duck's back and he immediately plunged into his request for a bilateral and the regularization of our use of Thai bases. There were long bitter tirades concerning the treatment of Thailand by the American press, some U.S. Senators, and so forth. In effect, Thailand was being called the prostitute of the United States. The situation was intolerable and would have to be corrected. There were many bitter words about U.S. willingness to give a NATO Treaty formula to the "white" countries of Europe but unwillingness to treat the "brown races" of Asia in a similar manner. There was much of the same talk that you had already gone through about our willingness to enter into bilaterals with other Asian nations but not with Thailand. Thailand was always left with the short end of the stick while we showed such great interest in our "great friends" such as Cambodia and India. He had made recommendations to his Government on the whole situation and they would either have to straighten it out or he would resign. SEATO was some "old furniture" which the "conservative Thai" were willing to let lie around but we shouldn't try to kid anybody into thinking that it was worth anything. We would have gone into Viet-Nam with or without SEATO just as we had gone into Lebanon without any treaty commitments. The Thai were exposing themselves to great danger without any assurances or guarantees from the United States. There was no problem with the present Administration in Washington but what would happen to Thailand if there was a change to an Administration which would disengage from Southeast Asia as was being advocated by so many Americans? How could I say that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee really did not have any influence on American policy or how could I assure him that the views of the Chairman and others like him would not ultimately prevail? In this situation, given the attitudes of some of these people, my statements that the de facto situation of American presence on Thai bases was their firmest guarantee of American reaction in the event of a Chinese attack might well not turn out to be correct. American reaction might be to shrink from the contest with China and withdraw, leaving Thailand to its fate, etc., etc., etc. /2/For the statement made by Bundy before the Committee, and the question and answer session by Bundy and Committee members, September 20, see Committee on Foreign Affairs, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. XVIII, Eighty-ninth Congress, second session, 1966, pp. 927-1014. U. Alexis Johnson prepared a summary of the testimony and attached Bundy's prepared testimony as a note for the President's reading on September 20. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, May/Sept 1966) He drew a sharp distinction between the "presence" of American forces in Thailand and the use of American aircraft for "offensive" operations. He alleged that Thanom had told him that, while he had given permission for the introduction of American aircraft into Thailand, he had not given permission for their "offensive" use against North Viet-Nam. When I challenged him on this he pointed to the lack of any "written agreements" and, without walking away from his charge that Thanom had not given permission for the use of aircraft against North Viet-Nam, said that Thanom did not have the authority to give such permission on a matter so deeply involving the whole Government and that he had told this to Thanom. We went round and round the circle of whatever enables us to bring more force to bear on the Vietnamese conflict and thus hastens a satisfactory settlement there contributes to Thai security and the allegation that U.S. "offensive" use of Thai bases increases the "dangers" to Thailand. On the image of Thailand here in the United States, I told him I very honestly and objectively thought that it had been much improved in recent years and that he deserved much of the credit. I pointed out that in recent speeches I have cited him as an outstanding Asian leader who is bringing a sense of community to the area and otherwise went to great lengths in massaging him for his work with ASPAC, ASA, and the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation. I said that our inability to speak more specifically and officially with regard to Thai cooperation was inhibiting our ability to present a still better picture. This led him to say that, in speaking here, he was going to be open and specific and I pointed out that this would completely undercut the basis on which we had obtained executive rather than open hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee. I pointed out that, in spite of the inevitable newspaper leaks, we had rigorously sought to respect what we understood to be the Thai desires on this matter. All of this discussion led around to the only agreement we reached, which was that immediately on my return to Washington I would seek to devise a formula for consideration by both Governments which would surface military cooperation between ourselves and Thailand in the Vietnamese war. The whole discussion reached the point at which I felt it essential that I categorically tell him that, whatever he might feel with regard to the matter or whatever the desires of our Administration might be, the political realities were that there was just no chance whatever of obtaining Senate ratification at this time of a bilateral U.S.-Thai treaty, especially one that would involve the NATO formula. His reply to this was, "Well, we now know where we stand." I probed him hard on what he felt were the implications of this statement but got no place. Following this exchange, he said that he was hereby formally withdrawing the request that the U.S. vote for him for the ICJ. I then returned to our regard for him as Foreign Minister, our hope that he would stay in the job and that he would especially continue to pursue the Asian-wide initiatives he had undertaken but that, if it became clear that this was not possible, we would vote for him for the ICJ. He did not acknowledge this except sometime later to imply that our vote would not be worth much unless we were prepared to give him support with others. As a result of an inconclusive discussion that we had with regard to the formulae in the SEATO Treaty as compared with our bilaterals with other countries in the Pacific, it was agreed that I would get out the texts and make available an analysis to him. There was no specific mention of MAP or other issue, nor was the SOFA specifically mentioned. During the course of the conversation I pointed out that, if his concerns with regard to possible future trends in U.S. foreign policy were justified, a treaty such as he had in mind would not be of much help to Thailand and that we were entitled to have the same concerns with regard to the possible trends in the policy of future Thai governments. He did not deny this but felt that his obligations as Foreign Minister were to do all possible to assure that there was an unequivocal treaty relationship in such a manner that, if Thailand were attacked, U.S. failure to come to its assistance would be a clear treaty violation and thus constitute a maximum pressure on us to come to their help. In sum, my interpretation of his statements and the implications was that, unless a satisfactory bilateral treaty relationship with the United States was established for the future and unspecified steps taken to make our present military relationship compatible with Thai sovereignty, the Thai Government would take unspecified steps with respect to at least "U.S. offensive" operations from Thai bases. If the Thai Government did not do this he would resign as Foreign Minister. However, I am unable to reconcile this with his assertion that he was seriously running for the ICJ. A possible interpretation is that, knowing that he was not going to get a bilateral from us and that he would not be supported in the Government with respect to present operations, he is already reconciled to resigning under circumstances in which, looking to the future, he can present himself as a stout Thai nationalist and defender of Thai sovereignty. Incidentally, in reply to my question, he said that he was not coming to Washington. My feeling was that he did not want a rebuff on seeing the President. He was seeing the Secretary at 5:00 p.m. the same day and I of course briefed the Secretary on what had happened at the lunch. I deliberately did not attend his meeting with the Secretary. As you will see, he of course did not let down his hair in the same way to the Secretary but the essential lines remain the same./3/ /3/See Document 323. Both of us have seen Thanat in his many moods but yesterday was the worst in my own experience. My feeling was that it possibly arose as much from controversy with his own Cabinet colleagues--and especially the failure of Thanom and Dawee to cut him in on all aspects of the military picture--as it did from his hypersensitivity to disparaging American press stories and Congressional statements on Thailand. It was a day in which he was simply not open to reason--at least he would not admit so to me--and I can only hope that some of the things I said will, on reflection, have a little influence on his attitude for, as you know, I feel that he is a valuable man for both Thailand and Asia, and we need to do all possible to preserve him if that can be done. The substance of the foregoing will of course be covered in various ways in official traffic but I thought it important that you have the full flavor. It has been written the following day amid the press of other matters but I believe I have covered most of the important profits. I regret that one of my last forays into Thai diplomacy was not very successful. My only hope is that getting some of this off his chest to me will have some cathartic effect. Sincerely, Alex/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.
325. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/ Bangkok, September 27, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-THAI. Secret. 3954. For the Secretary. 1. I understand you will make a decision today on the Thailand MAP aid level you will recommend to the President./2/ I would like again to request that I be authorized to inform the Prime Minister that we will support the Thai military forces at the level of $70 million for the next three years /2/The issue was not sent to the President until October 13, see Document 329. 2. I would be the last to argue that our professional military establishment has any more claim to infallibility than the rest of us. Yet I do think it important that after the most searching reexamination and reevaluation by Comusmacthai, by Cincpac, by the Joint Staff, and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is still their unanimous judgement that this level is essential. It is also pertinent to record that an independent evaluation by the staff of Assistant Defense Secretary En Tho Ven supports this conclusion and further notes the staff level unanimity throughout the government that the need is apparent, the Thai response and performance has been adequate, and the requests are reasonable in relation to the need and the Thai response. On the basis of my personal continuous, detailed and searching review I fully support these recommendations. 3. It is my understanding that ISA disagrees for reasons which have never been quite clear. Certainly their positions, as they have been made known to me, are demonstrably unsupported by the facts, as any objective examination of the records will clearly attest. The last argument of which I have heard is typical of the rest, that our inability to secure Rtc clearance for permanent PCS establishment of General Accounting Office unit, was indicative of Thai reluctance to have auditors around. The actual facts are (1) The Thai have been concerned that any further augmentation of an already large American presence could cause problems we have so far successfully avoided; (2) they have indicated they do not favor additional permanent assignments with families which will compete for already scant housing; (3) they have no objection to our TDY introduction of as many auditors as we wish, and; (4) eight GAO auditors arrive next week for an indefinite stay. And so it goes. 4. Therefore, I believe the recommended Map level is fully justified on its own intrinsic merits. Even if this was not the fact that all professional judgement certifies it to be, there are still compelling political reasons why it should be approved. 5. The first is the argument you made so appropriately to Thanat at Canberra--that the insurgency should be aggressively smashed now, as, in retrospect, you wished had been done in Vietnam in 1961. Thanat and I have both used this very effectively since to push for maximum commitment of Thai resources to this end. 6. The second reason is the dilemma produced by the first. In this commitment of their own resources, with a consequent budget deficit of 25 percent, they have gone as far as they can without grave risks of inflationary spiral which has cost the Vietnamese and US so dearly. The only other alternative is for Thai to scale back their commitment of the extraordinary percentage of their own income (60 to 70 percent) they have for a decade invested in the social and economic infrastructure programs which have contributed so much to stability here. We learned late in South Vietnam the essentiality of paralleling the military effort with "nation-building." The Thai are deeply so engaged and I think it would be vast and really unforgivable mistake to force them to break this pattern which, in the nature of things, is not likely to be resumed. 7. More current compelling reasons include the dangerous game Thanat is now playing on his own in New York. As is sometimes the case, too much public attention can contribute to certain delusions about ability to translate successes in international affairs into domestic political support. If Thanat is not elected to the World Court, he presently is thinking of avoiding loss of face by challenging this present government in some fashion. He hopes to come back having "forced" US into what he will present openly as far more binding bilateral security commitment, if not, unless Pote dissuades him, he may lash out at US in openly demanding participating in determining military strategy as a price for continuing to enjoy the unlimited freedom now accorded US. Or he may resign with blast at US. In any of these cases his primary point of attack internally will be the inadequacy of our military aid level, hoping thereby to attract a military following essential to a viable power base. In any event he may have done great damage within US and to Thai-American cooperation. 8. I do not believe Thanat can succeed in securing influence internally here he was not authorized to take the actions he has taken in demanding the bilateral. If we can remove the chief point of vulnerability by moving affirmatively on $70 million MAP level, I am confident we can completely box him in here. 9. In view of forthcoming Manila meeting, I strongly recommend we make no concessions to him now. Whatever is decided upon in way of new security arrangements should be done with Prime Minister at Manila. To attempt to mollify Thanat will gain us no lasting advantage with this government which presently is in mood to drop him. I would recommend nothing be done with Thanat to accede to his demands until you or Alex can talk with Pote, who can influence him. And if MAP recommendation is approved we can forget about him as a threat. Although he has been useful, there are other Thai such as Pote or Konthi who could serve our short and long range purposes equally well. Martin
326. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 6, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. IV, Memos, 1/66-10/66. Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw it. SUBJECT /2/President Johnson met with Thanat Khomen and Pote Sarasin at 10:50 a.m. on October 7. William Bundy, William Jorden, and Thai Ambassador Sukich Nimmanheminda also were present. The meeting lasted until 11:05 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No other record of this brief meeting has been found. I have forwarded separately my briefing memorandum/3/ on the above, with State's briefing book./4/ /3/Dated October 6. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, W.W. Rostow, Vol. XIV, October 1-31, 1966) /4/Apparent reference to an October 4 memorandum from Rusk to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, POL THAI-US) You will be interested in the attached memo from Acting Secretary Katzenbach in this connection. It reports on a conversation between U. Alexis Johnson and the two Thai officials. The main points were: (1) That instead of a bilateral treaty at this time, we might consider a joint statement of mutual assurances. If this matter is raised, you may want to assure Pote and Thanat that we will see what can be worked out, perhaps for use at the time you meet with Prime Minister Thanom;/5/ /5/Rostow added by hand the following at this point: "(in Bangkok.)". (2) the Thai have been deeply upset by Senator Fulbright's criticism of them and of U.S. policy toward them. Pote believes that, without engaging in a debate with Fulbright, it would be very helpful if we could issue a statement after his and Thanat's call. The statement would reiterate our support for Thailand and for existing policy. State supports this suggestion. I agree that it is reasonable. A text of the proposed statement is attached./6/ If you agree with this recommendation, you might want to show a draft of the statement to the two ministers. /6/Printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1966, p. 669. Walt/7/ /7/Rostow hand wrote the following comment after his signature: "This would help, sir."
Attachment Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson/8/ Washington, October 6, 1966. /8/Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT The following information is supplementary to that contained in the memorandum of October 4, 1966, on the foregoing subject transmitted to you by Secretary Rusk./9/ /9/See footnote 3 above. Alexis Johnson had a long talk on Wednesday/10/ with Pote Sarasin on the desire that Foreign Minister Thanat has been expressing for a bilateral defense treaty with the United States, and a shorter talk with Thanat Khoman. Pote Sarasin, who is a very responsible and influential figure in the Government, told Alex that the Thai Government fully recognizes that to attempt to negotiate and obtain ratification of a bilateral treaty at this time would not be in the interest of either Government. It was his feeling that the necessities of the internal Thai political situation could be met by a confidential statement from you to the Prime Minister. He felt that the content of such a statement could be similar to things that we have previously said to the Thai Government in such a form as to enable Prime Minister Thanom to interpret the statement as a commitment to protect Thailand against Chinese Communist retaliation for U.S. use of Thai bases even if there should be a change in administration and in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia. Alex pointed out that, to give such a statement a balanced character and the U.S. some assurance against a change in Thai Government policy with respect to Thai bases, in which we were investing so heavily, it would be desirable that something on this be said from the Thai side. Pote Sarasin felt that this was entirely reasonable. Johnson told him that he would see what could be worked out, perhaps for use at the time that you meet Prime Minister Thanom in Manila. /10/A summary of these discussions, Wednesday, October 5, was sent to Bangkok in telegram 61306, October 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL THAI-US) Subsequently, Johnson confirmed with Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman that Thanat was reconciled to something less than a bilateral treaty but there was no discussion of details. It is suggested that you not take the initiative in any detailed discussion of this subject with the two Ministers but, if it is raised by them, you simply indicate that you will be willing to consider something that could be discussed between you and the Prime Minister at the time of your meeting in Manila. We will submit a detailed recommendation to you in this regard. Pote Sarasin also said that he did not think that the Thai Government would in the near future be willing to change its policy toward agreeing to more specific formal statements on our use of Thai bases for our air action against North Viet-Nam. Pote Sarasin told Johnson that, while sophisticated Thais were well aware that Senator Fulbright did not represent a significant body of U.S. opinion, because of the Senator's position as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the fact that his name is so well known in Thailand because of the Fulbright scholarship program, his statements deeply wounded and disturbed most Thais. He felt that, without directly engaging in a debate with Fulbright, it would be very helpful if the U.S. Government could make some statement which would in effect be a repudiation of Fulbright's recent speech. We feel that this is reasonable and that the call of the two Ministers on you offers a good opportunity for making such a statement. We therefore suggest that, following their call, the White House Press Secretary issue a statement along the lines of the attached draft. It would be an appreciated and useful gesture if you would show this draft to the two Ministers. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/ Washington, October 10, 1966, 8:49 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 THAI. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pickering and approved by Bundy. Bundy prepared a briefing memorandum for Rusk for this meeting with Pote Sarasin, October 10. (Ibid., POL THAI-US) 63401. 1. Following is report of main points of bilateral discussion October 10 between Secretary and Minister Pote Sarasin held prior to Secretary's luncheon for Pote. They are uncleared, FYI only, Noforn, subject to revision upon review. 2. Pote said Fulbright was such a well-known name in Thailand because of the Fulbright Scholarships and his Chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee that his statements about Thailand took on special importance. He felt strongly that the President or the Secretary should during their visit to Bangkok make a statement explicitly divorcing the US Government from the Fulbright position on Thailand. Secretary said he thought Manila conference and President's visit to Thailand would be facts which would make this completely clear. Pote agreed but said they badly need something on the record directly addressed to the point. Secretary cautioned that such a statement might simply build up the importance of original Fulbright statements and could result in his making new ones. Pote said he hoped some formula could be worked out which made it clear that, while the Senator was of course entitled to hold dissenting views, the US Government did not share them. The Secretary said we would think about possible ways to deal with this one. 3. Pote asked why Fulbright had singled Thailand out. The Secretary said that Fulbright was a born dissenter, and that his remarks on Thailand should be viewed as part of his general objection to our Vietnam policy. 4. Pote then turned to question of some restatement of our commitment. Such restatement should a) note that Thailand would continue to provide facilities and support to meet aggression, and that while this entailed some additional risks for Thailand of a Chinese Communist attack, the US would in that case come to Thailand's support, and b) make it clear that the commitment would apply even in the unlikely event of a change some years hence to an administration which wanted to pull out of Southeast Asia. He said no treaty or formal agreement was needed, but some written reassurance was. 5. The Secretary said he wished to be very frank on two points. First, he said he simply could not understand how anyone could question the American commitment when we had not failed to fill any commitment since 1945 and when we are suffering 100 casualties per week in Southeast Asia and had suffered 180 thousand casualties keeping commitments since the end of World War II. Secondly, he said that the Thai should not try to use an international instrument to solve a US domestic problem. They should leave that to us. 6. The Secretary then said that the SEATO Treaty and the joint resolution of August 1964 said more than any document which we could possibly add to the record at this time. He emphasized that the Treaty commitment was a national commitment, entered into by the Eisenhower administration and observed by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. With reference to the SEATO Treaty, Pote mentioned the difference between the commitment it contained and that in the NATO Treaty. The Secretary said that as Secretary Dulles had explained at the time the SEATO Treaty was ratified, the practical difference between these formulas was not substantial. Pote said that the SEATO Treaty did not require an automatic US reaction. The Secretary observed that the Thai, because of positions taken by the French and others, had sometimes shown a tendency to downgrade SEATO. He said this was a serious mistake since SEATO provides the Constitutional basis for what we are doing in Southeast Asia today. He said the undermining of SEATO's standing had been done by the Thai, not the US. 7. On the question of committing a successor government, the Secretary said that it was not possible to deal with this problem with a piece of paper, that if a successor government either in Thailand or in the United States took a different view of the situation, the paper would have no effect. Pote did not dispute this but continued to argue that if a future administration were to leave Thailand in the lurch the leadership of Thailand wanted to be sure that it could show it had done everything possible to commit the US to its defense. He said that unless this unlikely event transpired, the reiteration of the commitment need not ever be made public. 8. The Secretary said he was not saying "no" to Pote, but he did want to be sure that Pote understood all the implications of such a statement which could be regarded as certifying lack of confidence. Pote said there was absolutely no question about Thai confidence in the present administration. He felt that since the increased risks entailed by permitting US planes to use Thai bases had led to concern in Thailand that the US should be prepared to reiterate the commitment. He emphasized that no addition to the commitment was needed--merely a reiteration. 9. The Secretary asked whether the concern in Thailand would decrease if we reduced the level of our forces there. Pote said "no", that on the contrary the more we have there the more secure they felt. 10. The Secretary concluded by saying that he understood Pote's point of view, that we would think about it further, but he wanted to be completely certain that we did not take an action showing lack of confidence. Pote said he understood and that he would regard the conversation as completely confidential between himself and the Secretary. 11. Conversation, while somewhat intense, was friendly and cordial throughout, as was luncheon which followed. Rusk
328. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ Washington, October 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. V, Memos 10/66-2/67. Secret. A note at the bottom of the first page reads: "This is one of a series of memoranda produced by the CIA on those countries to be visited by President Johnson. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Office of Research and Reports." THE SITUATION IN THAILAND Summary Thailand enjoys a variety of economic and political assets which augur well for its future stability and independence. Guided by skilled and resourceful economic leadership, Thailand has made rapid economic progress in recent years and the prospects are bright for even greater growth and development in the future. In the political sphere, the country has benefited from nine years of stable rule by an autocratic but benevolent military oligarchy. The status quo is threatened by a nascent Communist insurgent movement inspired and assisted by Peking and Hanoi. Thailand's long history of independence, the absence of a colonial experience, and the actions of an aroused government, have so far kept the insurgents in check. There are, however, some soft spots in the internal situation that could prove troublesome over the long haul. In Bangkok, the Thanom-Praphat government is enjoying its third year of stable rule, but serious factional infighting, during which the fight against the Communists would almost certainly suffer, could flare up with little warning. The present government's greatest weakness in meeting the insurgent challenge, however, is simply the fact that it does not have substantial popular support. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
329. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 13, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. V, 10/66-2/67. Secret; Exdis. SUBJECT The attached memorandum was signed by Secretary McNamara before he left for Vietnam last Saturday. The purpose of this Supplemental Memorandum is (1) to report in context on several developments since his departure, and (2) to indicate the feasibility of funding my recommendation of a $60 million MAP program in Thailand, despite the cut of $125 million in the MAP appropriation. (1) Recent developments and their background. The original planning figures submitted to Congress for MAP included an item of $35 million for MAP in Thailand. Last year's total was $44 million, a figure disclosed to the Thai. There have been a number of changes from the original planning figures in both directions, including an increase in ammunition requirements of $39 million for Laos. After the Thai item was prepared, a thorough review of the Thai situation was made by General Stilwell. His recommendations, approved by Ambassador Martin and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would support a MAP effort of some $60 million, both for conventional and for counterinsurgency forces. The Thai have become concerned about the firmness of our commitment to their defense, in the light of adverse comments by Senator Fulbright and others, and have expressed a desire to embody our present relationship in a bilateral treaty. The visits of the Thai in Washington this week have underscored the reality and urgency of their concern. It is reflected also in Mr. Moyers' telegram (111536Z) of October 11./2/ /2/This telegram from Moyers to the President and Bundy, which was attached to the Department of State copy of this memorandum, October 11, previewed the President's trip to Thailand and stated that the issue to be decided was whether it should be a state visit or just an official visit. Moyers suggested that the "advantage a State visit to us is opportunity to provide tender loving care at time we are unable provide much more." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-THAI) I believe it vital on political grounds, and an important step in preparing for the Manila Conference, to assure the Thai before the Conference that we shall enlarge last year's program, carrying out the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of 1962,/3/ and your letter to Prime Minister Thanom of June 1964,/4/ in which we agreed to engage in joint planning with the Thai against the possibility of a conventional threat. I enclose copies of both documents. I conclude that the Thai have earned this reiteration of our SEATO commitment. Such action is required to prevent them from pressing for a formal public bilateral agreement of support. It is justified by the real progress the Thai have made in their military effort and by their cooperation with us. And I believe that such a step taken now is the best possible insurance against the risk of Thailand degenerating into another Vietnam, if various adverse contingencies occur. /3/Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1091-1093. /4/See Document 277. (2) Ways to pay for the revised MAP programs. The source of funds for the increase of $25 million for Thailand must be considered in connection with other increases in requirements for military and economic aid for Southeast Asia and other areas. There is already a requirement for an additional $39 million MAP for ammunition for Laos, and new economic aid requirements have arisen for the Dominican Republic, Indonesia and Panama as well as Southeast Asia. The high priority MAP increases for Thailand and Laos should be funded in a way that will not undercut the effectiveness of other MAP and AID programs. The options are:
1. Following the Manila Conference, seek a supplemental appropriation package including elements of economic and military aid for South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines, in the light of the situation in Asia as it develops. 2. Seek Congressional authority to transfer the Laos MAP program of $109 million for FY 1967 to the Military Services budgets, just as military assistance to South Vietnam and war-related costs for South Korea are now authorized to be funded.
1. The law permits the transfer of some funds from economic to military assistance. However, the Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund was cut by Congress to a total of $70 million. At the same time, Congress cut Supporting Assistance requests by $57 million. Economic aid requirements for Southeast Asia and other politically sensitive countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Indonesia and Panama, require that the entire Supporting Assistance and Contingency Fund Appropriations be used for economic assistance. Alternatively, to transfer Contingency Fund or Supporting Assistance monies to MAP would mean that we should have to seek a supplemental appropriation for economic assistance. Other economic aid funds cannot legally be transferred to MAP. 2. The law also permits you to authorize the use of up to $300 million of U.S. military service stocks to be repaid from future MAP appropriations, an authority the Secretary of Defense has told the Congress would be exercised only in cases vital to the security of the U.S. It has been used twice for South Vietnam. 3. Political and programming developments in the ensuing two or three months might let us find the funds for Thailand ($25 million) and perhaps Laos as well ($39 million) by transfer from such current MAP programs as the $48 million India/Pakistan pipeline, currently being held in suspense, combined with some marginal contributions from the planned programs for Korea, China and Latin America. Cuts in these MAP programs would, of course, raise problems in each of the cases mentioned. In view of the availability of these alternatives, I believe you can safely make the decision called for by the attached memorandum, and delay a final choice of means until sometime after your return. Dean Rusk
Attachment Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, October 13, 1966. SUBJECT The Departments of State and Defense have been unable to agree on this matter, and have thus been forced to seek your decision. Recommendations A. Secretary Rusk recommends that you authorize informing the Thai Government at once that we will furnish from FY 1967 funds designated MAP items totaling approximately $60 million. The precise dollar amount would not be used, except in the general sense of informing the Thai that the program was significantly greater than last year's total (which they know to have been $44 million). Ambassador Martin would be instructed in the strongest terms that we expect him to use this commitment to persuade the Thai to undertake substantial further improvement in their counterinsurgency performance. B. Secretary McNamara believes that the proper MAP level from a military standpoint is the currently programmed $35 million, (although he is prepared to recognize some military justification for a program totaling approximately $44 million) and that because the Congress cut the Military Assistance Program so substantially, we simply don't have the funds to finance higher levels--if the Thai program is held to $35 million, the Congressional cuts will still force reductions of approximately $85 million in the programs of other countries which were already at austere levels. It is Secretary McNamara's view that any additional funds for Thailand would be pure political pay-off taken from military assistance funds badly needed for military purposes elsewhere. Approve $60 million /5/None of these options is checked. Discussion 1. There is no disagreement on the significance of Thailand to our Asian policy. Its role in relation to the war in Laos and Vietnam, its longer term strategic importance, and its active support of Asian regional cooperation are all matters of the first importance. Our Asian policy requires a continuing strong relationship with Thailand. 2. It is also agreed that the immediate although currently limited threat to Thailand's continued ability to play its important role in Southeast Asia is Communist subversion and insurgency. 3. Further, it is agreed that the Thai have been very forthcoming in response to numerous U.S. requests made on them, giving us invaluable support in both the military and political fields. It is also agreed that the resulting U.S. construction program in Thailand will provide the Thais a new deep water port, a country-wide communications system, new and improved roads, POL pipelines and new and improved airfields, all costing more than $250 million over the last four years. Although U.S. operations out of Thailand are as much in Thai as in U.S. interest, it is an agreed fact that the Thai role beside us in the war leads them to expect us to be forthcoming in response to their needs and requests. 4. Disagreement emerges in connection with the role of our Military Assistance Program in dealing with the Thais and with the threat. The disagreement about the level of the program reflects differing assessments of the proper military structure for Thailand and of Thai performance in making proper use of equipment provided. Finally, there are important political factors which Secretary Rusk believes must be given great weight in making the decision on the level. 5. Basic Facts a. The MAP program in Thailand was $51.9 million in FY 1961, $81 million in FY 1962, and $73.5 million in FY 1963. The figures were considerably lower for FY 1964-66, $42 million, $38 million, and $44 million, respectively. b. In August of 1965, Major General Richard Stilwell was assigned as COMUSMACTHAI and instructed to review the MAP program fully. In February, he recommended, with the full support of Ambassador Martin, that the program be set at a level of $70 million for FY 1967, and that similar figures be envisaged for further years. Secretary McNamara points out that this program, with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, is based upon the premise that there should be a major improvement in the capability of the Thai to deal with a conventional threat from land, sea and air; this to be accomplished by increasing the size and equipment of Thai forces. Secretary McNamara does not agree with this premise. He believes the size and capabilities of the Thai forces should be directed toward internal security, with only limited emphasis placed on Thai ability to stand alone against external aggression. Ambassador Martin has for a long time recommended a $70.7 million program for FY 1967, together with a firm commitment that a program of this magnitude would be maintained for three years. 6. Summary of Positions It is Secretary Rusk's judgment that there is substantial over-all military justification for a program at the $60 million level, and that overriding political factors dictate a commitment of at least this magnitude. Although Secretary Rusk would see much political advantage in committing ourselves to a similar figure for three years, he believes that the uncertain prospects of the MAP account make such a commitment undesirable. He would thus limit the commitment to items totaling $60 million, covering FY 1967 funding only. Secretary McNamara, as indicated above, believes $35 million would, from a purely military standpoint, provide adequate resources to meet likely threats and would provide the Thais with as much as their record shows they can properly use. He believes that Ambassador Martin, especially in view of the recent drastic cut in MAP funds, can handle the political problem. 7. Proper Military Structure for Thailand a. Secretary McNamara believes that, from a purely military standpoint, the Thai forces should be directed primarily to counterinsurgency missions with provisions made for only limited conventional capabilities. And, in connection with conventional capabilities, he believes we should provide equipment only as the Thais demonstrate that they will meet minimum maintenance and usage standards. In his judgment, the $35 million is adequate for these purposes. b. Secretary Rusk, while concurring that the principal current mission of the Thai forces is to combat insurgency, believes that emphasis must be placed upon our SEATO commitment to Thailand to assist in its defense against conventional attack, with the related undertaking to assist in developing Thai conventional capabilities. Secretary Rusk stresses that great weight must be given to the Rusk-Thanat communique of 1962, reaffirming our commitment in effect on a bilateral basis, and to the letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Thanom of June 1964, in which we specifically agreed to engage in joint planning with the Thai against the possibility of a conventional threat. This essentially bilateral relationship with Thailand is at the heart of our whole position there today. Because of these commitments, and solid evidence of Thai reliance upon them, Secretary Rusk believes that our MAP program must provide Thai forces the support for the level of conventional capability believed necessary by the Thai and by Ambassador Martin. He believes this requirement points to the $60 million figure. 8. Thai Performance and Necessary Improvements a. Secretary Rusk agrees that past performance of the Thai military force has been defective in some respects. He notes that the U.S. support effort has also had its weaknesses, and that there has been substantial improvement by the Thai over the past year. This improvement is attributed by Ambassador Martin and General Stilwell in large part to the fact that the U.S. gave the Thai a general MAP commitment of $39 million for FY 1966 in August of 1965, and this experience of improvement is a major reason for Ambassador Martin's recommendation that a firm commitment be made currently. This improvement is not confined to conventional military forces but encompasses such things as basic reorganization of the government efforts against insurgency, and fundamental reforms in the collection, collation, and exploitation of intelligence. b. Secretary McNamara points out that the 1961-63 MAP programs were excessive and led to a serious deficiency in maintenance by the Thai forces, which was highlighted by a 1965 GAO report covering the 1963 period. He notes some improvement in maintenance and utilization rates, but he points to continuing seriously inadequate utilization rates in current Thai performance. 9. Political Factors While not able to take issue with the purely military judgment of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rusk believes that the following political factors make the $60 million level imperative: a. Above all, the great importance of nurturing and preserving our valuable relationship with them. b. The importance of erring on the side of ample resources to enable and to encourage the Thai to deal effectively with the present level of insurgency. c. Failure to supply the additional items, largely of a conventional nature, represented by the difference between $35 million and $60 million, will result in substantial dissatisfaction in the Thai Armed Forces, who represent the controlling element in the Thai Government. Hence, failure to provide the $60 million level could result in significant general damage to our relations with the Thai. d. More specifically, our current relations with the Thai have been significantly soured by adverse comment in the United States, particularly statements by Senator Fulbright about the "shaky" foundation of our military commitment and presence there. As a result, the Thai have recently insisted on the early negotiation of a status of forces agreement and--far more significant--Foreign Minister Thanat has formally requested a bilateral treaty with the United States. We have told Thanat frankly that this is out of the question, and for the time being Prime Minister Thanom is letting the matter lie. However, if we were to come forward with a MAP program that appeared to the Thai to short-change their forces, it is Secretary Rusk's judgment that we would have a major possibility that the Thai would press seriously for a bilateral, and also take action which would impede our Vietnamese operations from Thailand, for example by requiring specific prior Thai concurrence in the target of every air mission carried out from Thailand. Basically, Secretary Rusk believes that failure to provide the necessary MAP items would give the Thai the impression that we did not really expect Thai forces to participate fully in the event of a conventional threat, and would redouble Thai insistence that the U.S. commitment be made even more specific and precise than it is at present. Needless to say, any deepening of our commitment--by a treaty or otherwise--would set off a most harmful debate in the United States. e. While agreeing that the primary Thai emphasis should be on combatting insurgency, Secretary Rusk believes that a $60 million level would provide significantly increased leverage for U.S. influence in a number of areas still requiring improvement, as compared to a $35 million level, thus materially improving the prospects for a successful all-out effort against the insurgency while it is still manageable. Moreover, Secretary Rusk notes that, if the Thai should feel that their conventional capabilities were being neglected under our MAP program, there is the clear possibility that they would use resources of their own to purchase military equipment, perhaps outside the United States, and would thus divert the heavy (60%) proportion of their budget that they have been devoting, with our support, to economic and social development measures which, in the long run, will more effectively insure Thailand's security against subversion. 10. MAP Fund Program Both Secretaries agree that there is a serious problem in funding any MAP sum greater than the present planning figure of $35 million. (This figure dates from last fall, prior to General Stilwell's review.) The Conference has approved a total MAP appropriation of $792 million. This is a cut of $125 million from the Administration request of $917 million. There have been a large number of changes in both directions from the original planning figures. The India/Pakistan program should be substantially reduced. However, increases for Laos, Korea and NATO (the increases now estimated at $58 million) have produced a net shortfall on the order of $85 million before any addition for Thailand. Thus, it is agreed that the allocation of an additional $25 million for Thailand, bringing the shortage to $110 million, would require significant large reductions in the planned programs, over and above the reductions that already appear to be required. 11. In the light of these factors, Secretary McNamara would include the funding problem as a major reason for not going above $35 million. Secretary Rusk, however, believes that despite the serious over-all funding situation, Thailand must be accepted as having such a high priority that its needs should be met even at the expense of additional reductions in other major programs. Dean Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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