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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
Department of State |
November 1966-November 1968: 336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/ Washington, November 10, 1966, 8:09 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-3 THAI-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared in substance by William E. Lang, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and approved by Rusk. 83260. For Ambassador from Secretary. SOFA Agreement. 1. I have reviewed this problem in the light of all the recent exchanges of messages, and have reached the clear conclusion that we should not put forward a draft agreement on this subject with Thailand that is fully reciprocal in the sense that it applies to Thai forces in the US or to anything other than US forces in Thailand. At the same time, we are prepared to put forward significant wording changes along the lines of some of your recent recommendations--for example specifically the use of the terms "sending state" and "receiving state" throughout the agreement--designed to give the agreement the appearance of reciprocity to the maximum possible degree 2. Our basic problem with a SOFA that is reciprocal in substance is that such an agreement would have to be placed before the Senate for its advice and consent. Three elements would then be involved: a. The agreement would be inconsistent with the entire previous pattern of SOFA agreements worldwide, in which they have been placed on a reciprocal basis solely where substantial forces of the other government would be present in the US on a continuing or recurrent basis. This aspect alone would almost certainly cause the Senate to question and quite possibly to reject the agreement. b. In explaining why we had accorded the Thai a reciprocal agreement, we could hardly refrain from mentioning specific sensitivities on their part for which members of the Senate would have little or no sympathy. Arguments about the "multilateral" nature of our commitment in Thailand and about the precise legal ownership of the bases--whether or not persuasive to us--would have little or no effect on the views of these Senators, who are by no means limited to those habitually regarded as unfriendly to our Thai policy. c. Quite possibly criticism of the agreement in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--which would have to be the one considering it--would expand into a Floor debate most damaging to US and RTG interests. 3. Moreover, all of our other SOFA agreements in Asia, which are now non-reciprocal, would immediately be reopened by the several governments, with almost unpredictable complications and results. In several of these cases, the matter might well become a political football, with really serious damage to the position of important governments. I can myself see no basis on which any of these governments would not feel that they had at least as strong a claim as the Thai to a reciprocal agreement. 4. I recognize that only 2a and 3 of the above arguments can readily be used with Thanat and other Thai. But they could be well amplified by one further factor, that a requirement of Senate ratification, in the nature of the upcoming Congress and its heavy load of business, would almost certainly mean that ratification and the coming into force of the agreement would be delayed until late next summer even if it could be achieved. I would go further and give at least a 50-50 bet that it simply would not reach the Floor or would be lost in some last-minute shuffle, as happened this year with the Thai tax treaty. 5. This position is my considered judgment. It could be changed only in the most extraordinary circumstances, which I believe you should be able to avoid. In the accompanying cable giving you textual changes in the current draft, the State and DOD staffs have gone as far as we now think we can. We would be prepared to consider further changes or adaptations, but categorically subject to the basic position stated earlier. 6. The draft you are hereby authorized to table (State 83098)/2/ will speak for itself, and I of course leave to you at what stage to make it clear to the Thai why we cannot accept a truly reciprocal agreement. However, I would see some advantage in facing the issue frontally at the outset, perhaps privately with Thanat. /2/Telegram 83098 to Bangkok, November 10, contained revisions to the Embassy's draft SOFA and approval to table it once the revisions were made. (Ibid.) 7. I see one other problem with possible serious policy implications that may confront you in the course of this negotiation. This relates to descriptions of the nature and basis of our force presence in Thailand. On the one hand, the Thai from a political standpoint may see advantage in language indicating that the present US force presence in Thailand is temporary in nature. On the other hand, if this were baldly stated it might cause Thanat personally, and perhaps some elements in Thai political public opinion, to argue that we were excluding the possibility of US forces entering Thailand at some point under the SEATO Treaty obligations specifically as they relate to armed attack involving Thailand itself, or as in 1962 to meet a threat to Laos and hence a threat to Thailand. We do not here see the answer on this point, and I think it is one on which you will wish to sound Thanat out with some care. However, you must also recognize that any language referring to possible introduction of US forces at some future date will be scrutinized with the utmost care in the Congress here to see whether it involves any change in our Treaty commitment. Thus, if your soundings should indicate a clear and strong Thai desire that references to the presence of US forces be in the direction of the second alternative stated at the outset of this paragraph, you should in no circumstances table any language to cover this point without precise and full clearance here. 8. A further complicating element is that, if any situation should ever arise where our forces were engaged in actual combat on Thai soil, the SOFA agreement would probably be suspended in any event. In other words, we would probably be dealing under the second alternative with a preventive deployment. The complications on this aspect are obviously serious and difficult to foresee. Rusk
337. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/ Bangkok, November 21, 1966, 1035Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 THAI-US. Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. 6625. For Bundy. Ref: A. State 259 Aug 1965;/2/ B. State 88130./3/ /2/See footnote 4, Document 302. /3/In telegram 88130, November 19, the Department informed Martin of its thinking on future military assistance for Thailand. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 THAI-US) Martin answered the points raised in that telegram in the text below. 1. I suppose I should be grateful we are not ducking the issue this year until the last possible moment. But I must confess to a feeling of profound discouragement that again it is felt necessary to start off consideration of the FY 68 Table 36 level and future year planning with a compromise position which at the beginning negates a position the Secretary has already taken--that only the uncertainty of future appropriations restrained him from endorsing my recommendation for Presidential approval of a $60 million level for three years. I still think this level for the next two years is essential to achievement of U.S. policy objectives. I therefore must insist that we maintain this position. 2. As you well know, I have never advocated intervention of U.S. armed helicopters in combatting Thai insurgency, have been adamantly opposed to other troop participation, and have overruled attempts of DOD in-country personnel to get American "advisors" involved in combat situation; nevertheless, I did not complain that no one in the Department bothered to correct these recent leaked distortions. I am human enough to wince a bit at the clippings which have flowed in from all over the world about McNamara's defeat of the "bloodthirsty Ambassador." I have exerted what I had thought to be a strict discipline (until AP story today based on military leak) on all elements of a loyal mission to prevent their telling the truth to some perceptive and persistent American reporters and legislators. I have done so on the theory that any further widening of the "credibility gap" regarding senior officials of DOD is a disservice to the President and to the nation. I had, therefore, resisted the temptation to set the record straight, which could so easily be done with devastating effect, in the hope that, with honor sufficiently assuaged in the Pentagon, we might be able to approach consideration of FY 68 MAP level strictly on the merits of the case, which are compelling if anyone will only take the trouble to examine them. I really think this time I am entitled to your full backing all the way through. If you cannot do this, then at the very least, I think I am most certainly entitled to not have our position compromised at this stage of the year. 3. My comments on your four points in your first para will have more relevance perhaps if they follow comments on your para 2. If the heart of the matter is, as you say, "the question of the optimum size of the RTA, taking account of the implications for future Thai budgets as well as future MAP levels," I can only say, "welcome aboard, my friend. This was where I came in three years ago." There is, I think, no need to recall to you the reception of my attempts to get recognition of the necessity to retool the entire structure for the inevitably growing insurgency. 4. Dawee's visit to Secretary McNamara in May 1965/4/ received almost total emphasis on manning levels. To quote from a DOD summary of official record: "Low manning levels. Secretary/Defense told Dawee to bring Thai forces up to 80 percent manning level. He stated also that he (Dawee) should either go out and recruit or else fire useless ones. Dawee said it wasn't as easy as that--that it was somewhat akin to the railroad fireman problem in the U.S. Secretary/Defense snapped back that the U.S. had solved the 'fireman' problem and suggested Thais solve the problem of low manning levels, and ineffective personnel. At this point Ambassador Martin said that Dawee had made a commitment to bring Project 22 forces up to 80 percent strength. Dawee confirmed that this was so." And Dawee faithfully began to push for these goals when he returned to Thailand. /4/See Document 293. 5. Then in August joint State/Defense message (Dept 259 to Bangkok, Aug 6) asked that we put all possible pressure on Thai to do many specific things. On manning levels, in para 3, after asking that Thai units which do not make sense be reduced or disbanded, we were told: "The balance of forces which make a real military contribution--not just Project 22 forces (although they may be given first priority) and not just MAP supported forces--must be brought up to 80 percent of table of organization manning level." We have consistently kept Thai under pressure to do this and are well on way to reach this goal. 6. In same message, we were required to put on pressure to increase in-commission rates, press for increased intensive field training; and finally in para 3d to press for increase in Thai military budget, stating that double the $15 million increase would be needed in Thai FY67 military budget. Actual increase in FY66 Thai military budget was $13.6 million. In Thai FY67 military budget further increase over FY66 will be $14.5 million, not including a forthcoming supplemental which exceeds joint State/Defense request. I have now, most reluctantly, advised senior Thai that FY 68 Thai military budget must be increased by additional $50 million (see para 10 below). 7. I do not know precisely what you mean by "expansion of RTA foreseen in MACTHAI's plans." Some of the so-called "expansion" is conversion of old units, not creation of new ones, although if Thai are to accomplish "in-utilization" rates, appropriate maintenance units now lacking must be activated. Increase of Psy-Ops unit is in response to 2C, re A. Increased engineer and medical units are in direct response to 2D of same message. Almost all will be within present authorized personnel ceiling for RTA and total personnel strength will not exceed this numerical level in any realistic projection. Certainly the additional rotary airlift is essential. I would be glad to re-examine any particular unit about which you may have questions. 8. I find your statement that "everyone is appalled by the projection of $37 million in operating costs by 1972" somewhat appalling in itself since I had assumed you had available when ref A was drafted last year, the calculation of increased operating costs automatically required to carry out the increases demanded of the Thai in the joint State/Defense message of Aug 1965. Our calculations projected at that time were closer to $42 million by 1972. I must confess I did not give it too much thought because I hoped by 1972 our MILADI program would be fading away. 9. And this brings me back to your first paragraph. (A) On your point A, unless we wish to close our eyes to what is happening in Laos, I would give equal billing to Project 22 forces along with internal security problem. (B) I completely and wholeheartedly agree with the restatement of the principle of avoiding U.S. involvement in combat operations. This is why I so desperately want to accelerate in every way possible Thai capability to do internal job and, if possible, to quietly carry initial brunt of any assistance within Laos. It will be very great tragedy, in my opinion, if we ever have to respond to Thai request to invoke Plan 8, or we decide it necessary to invoke COMUSTAF OPLAN 1-65 (Project 22). And a wholly unnecessary tragedy in case of Plan 8./5/ /5/For information on O PLAN 1-65 (Project 22), see footnote 2, Document 291. Plan 8 is an apparent reference to SEATO Plan 8, not further identified. (C) On your Point C, if I follow you, I would never begin there. Using your 45-50 million range as "normal" over five-year projection would total $225-250 million. I would be perfectly happy to settle for that total spread this way: $60 million for FY68; $60 million for FY69; $45 million for FY70; $35 million for FY71; and $25 million for FY72. This is total of $225 million--the lower part of your range. (D) If your D would be acceptable, I see no reason why sequence I have outlined above would not be equally acceptable. To get it fixed now would save literally thousands of dollars in unnecessary rejuggling of program. 10. I make this recommendation on the spread in 9 (C) above because, although the stories about my defeat were wrong, they were wrong only about the issue. I have previously informed you Thai were going to have very small modernized conventional force structure with or without our help. You may care to take a look at Bangkok 282 (Aug 65),/6/ which was response to Deptel 259. In para 5, I told Praphat I very much hoped that Thai would not change priorities in the use of their resources, which accord first priority to economic and social infrastructure. I have changed that recommendation, because we have too much at stake here to risk basing policy on the incredible vagaries and vanities which are substituted for judgment in determining Thai MAP level. I could not be sure my arguments sent directly to the President before he left Washington would supplement yours sufficiently to get a favorable decision. I had to anticipate an unfavorable one. Therefore, I have been pushing Thai hard to recognize inevitability of their having to stand on their own feet, and have pushed hard to add another $50 million to Thai FY68 military budget. The NSC has now recommended this increase to Cabinet. With the additional $50 million coming into Thai military budget in FY68 from their own resources (partly from reserves), I think we can keep the momentum accelerating--as it must--and at the same time conditioning them to necessity of progressively bearing more of the load themselves. I hope I can discover way to minimize any damage from this diversion from economic and social infrastructure investment. /6/See footnote 5, Document 302. 11. But we do need the $60 million for FY68 and FY69. 12. A final word. These comments are rushed to meet your deadline. If the plain language is abrasive, please attribute it partly to frustration or fatigue--but not to anger. I think I lost the capacity for anger in Chu Lai a year ago this week./7/ But not the capacity for persistence in insisting on decisions which can hasten an end to this war. /7/A reference to Martin's son, a U.S. soldier in South Vietnam, who was killed a year earlier. 13. Good luck, and may you be at the peak of your persuasiveness. Martin
338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/ Washington, November 22, 1966, 8:39 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 THAI-US. Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Bundy and Pickering and approved by Bundy. 89594. For Ambassador from Bundy. Ref: A. Bangkok 6625; B. State 88130./2/ /2/See Document 337 and footnote 3, thereto. 1. On our press handling of stories alleging division between you and others, we have simply taken the position that there is no difference of view at either end on the question of U.S. involvement in combat in Thailand. Naturally, the press has not found this to be newsworthy. However, it is my long experience that if one protests too much on these matters it only builds up the story. I have therefore always taken a position (at some variance with immediately previous practice) of not commenting other than in the sense of unity on stories of division. I am sure that this attitude is shared at senior levels in other agencies, and that they are equally irate at whoever is leaking these stories. The only thing you and we can do is to sit tight and not let it bother us unduly. 2. Now let me clarify a bit what we are proposing to do re Thailand MAP and to reply to some of your specific points. 3. No one questions that in August 1965 we instructed you (a) to identify units of the Thai forces which do not make military sense and to extent politically feasible get them reduced or disbanded (still a priority goal with us, but one on which I gather little or no progress has been made); and (b) to get units which make a real military contribution up to at least 80% manning levels. On this basis, Stilwell's restudy of force levels was undertaken. What we are now saying is that, with the implications of the restudy in hand, and the first subsequent-year item content being formulated, we think a second look is indicated. 4. As we understand it from DOD, if the present MAP-supported units were all to be brought up to 80% manning and the planned new units activated, the RTA would be enlarged from the present 90,000 to nearly 120,000. Working within such a planning context, there is a grave risk that we will emerge at the end of the planning period with an RTA which cannot function either because of manning level or budgetary shortages. It is simply not realistic to plan on US funding of local currency budgetary costs to cure this dilemma. The only answer would seem to be a revised force structure. 5. It is for this reason that we think that budgetary and MAP implications of MACTHAI planning need another look before the FY 67 item content is finalized and the FY 68 and future year planning figures are established. As I said in Ref B, we are not prepared to accept the $37 million "O" costs foreseen in FY 72. We could not of course have known the "O" cost implications of the Stilwell restudy when Deptel 259/3/ was drafted since the study had at that time not yet been undertaken. /3/See footnote 4, Document 302. 6. We are inclined to think that the new look at the force structure should be made on the assumption of MAP availabilities of about $45 million per year for what might be called, in an oversimplification, the "Project 22" element (although we of course recognize that this element has relevance to the CI problem which will increase as the Special Forces training and other projects go forward). As indicated in Ref B, this does not mean we are imposing MAP ceilings for FY 68 (we are holding to $60 million) or even FY 69, although it does not seem to me that at this point in time a planning level of $45 million for FY 69 would be too serious. 7. As for your 60-60-45-35-25 formula, this simply will not square with existing MACTHAI planning since it would barely cover "O" costs in FY 71 and would not cover them at all in FY 72. Frankly, it seems to me that this formula could only fit if planning guidelines something like those laid out above were enforced. 8. I wish you had let us know sooner that there was any active discussion on the Thai side of their FY 1968 military budget, and we could then have discussed whether a position should now be taken on our side. You may well turn out to be right in pressing them to go $50 million higher at that time, but I would have been happier if we had reflected together on this, in the light of the kind of thoughts we are now developing, before we took a position that might turn out to cut across the final kind of advice we all decide should be given to the Thai. We had of course noted your 5227 of October 23/4/ indicating that you had mentioned the possible necessity of an increase to Thanom, but I repeat that it would be useful to review these matters before hitting precise figures. As it stands, it would help us to have your best reading of Thai thinking on their FY 1968 budget in all its aspects, including the military. We have virtually nothing on that now. /4/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-THAI) 9. I of course delayed my meeting with McNaughton when Ref A received. However, both they and we are anxious to move ahead on this now. 10. As to your paragraph 12, I fully appreciate the strain you are under, particularly at this sad anniversary. But we must think this one through if we are to have a solid basis for better decisions./5/ /5/In telegram 6817, November 25, Martin sought to explain why he believed he could not yield on a MAP level of $60 for Thailand in FY 68 and 69. He concluded, "we have thought through this problem of MAP thoroughly here. We have reviewed it again and are completely convinced the recommendations we made are reasonable, sound and in U.S. interests. It is only for this reason that I cannot again agree to a compromise which is not supportable by the facts that are clearly so evident." (Ibid.) 11. Warm regards. Rusk
339. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (Acheson) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, December 7, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 11-5 US-THAI. Secret. RE This supplements our telephone conversation of yesterday/2/ on the cultivation of, and traffic in, opium in the North Thailand area occupied by the KMT irregulars. There is a very clear and informative account of this situation in AmEmbassy Bangkok Secret Airgram A-629 dated January 21, 1966./3/ /2/No record of this telephone call has been found. /3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 11-5 THAI) Much of that opium production is moved down to Bangkok, where illegal heroin conversion facilities have been established. A small portion of that heroin finds its way into the illegal U.S. import traffic, but at the present time it is not a large factor in our own domestic narcotics picture. Most of it is probably consumed in Bangkok, Hong Kong and Singapore. If, however, the present negotiations with the Government of Turkey for the eradication of opium production there should prove successful, and if the representations now being initiated by Ambassador Bohlen to the Government of France should be successful, for the elimination of the illegal French heroin laboratories, I would think the inevitable result would be that the French heroin operators would move their conversion operation to Bangkok, so as to be close to the next largest available source of supply of raw material. In this event, a great deal of the Thai opium production would then be converted to heroin at Bangkok specifically for the U.S. market and that production would become the dominant factor in the U.S. narcotics picture. The Embassy at Bangkok has known about the opium production in the KMT area for a number of years. For the reasons I described over the telephone, and which airgram A-629 elaborates, the Embassy representations to the Thai government to clean up the traffic have never been particularly insistent or productive. Presumably the counterinsurgency buildup under way in Thailand has as one of its objectives the strengthening of Thai border security. One would hope that Thailand may be able to diminish its reliance on the KMT forces for border security, and may have a stronger position to control the KMT trafficking in opium. In any event, it would seem timely to strengthen our representations to Thailand to clean the traffic up. I do not underestimate the obstacles. Our hand should be considerably strengthened when we have, at the end of February 1967, the report of the U.N. Narcotics Commission survey team which is going to Northern Thailand in January for a two-month closeup study of the cultivation of opium and the traffic in opium and heroin. Meanwhile, it would materially serve the long-range interest of the United States in suppressing the narcotics traffic, if the Thai opium problem were persistently kept out on the table, and if the Thai government were forcefully reminded from time to time that they have both a treaty obligation and a moral obligation (not to mention the practical obligation of a large donee of American aid) to move toward effective control of the opium and heroin traffic. The problem is bound to surface sooner or later in the U.S. press. As I have said, there is a substantial possibility that Thailand may, in the not too distant future, be a major source of narcotics supplies for the illegal traffic in the United States. I will see that you are sent a copy of the U.N. survey team's report when it is available and that you get any other information on this problem which may be helpful. David C. Acheson
340. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Washington, January 16, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Thailand 370. Secret. Attached to this memorandum was a memorandum to McNamara, January 13, from Assistant Secretary of State for Systems Analysis Enthoven who recommended that McNamara sign the memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. SUBJECT I am concerned over the steady growth in the number of U.S. personnel planned for deployment to Thailand. It is essential that we provide the forces necessary to support U.S. combat operations, to provide adequate counterinsurgency training for the Thailand Armed Forces, and to meet certain other specific commitments we have undertaken (e.g., improvement of certain key lines of communications). It appears, however, that we should be able to meet these commitments and support adequately our air operations without deploying forces in excess of the personnel that are currently approved. You are aware of the very serious implications that a large and growing American presence has for a small and underdeveloped nation such as Thailand. As experience in Vietnam has shown, economic dislocation can seriously weaken the social fabric of the country and undo much that military actions accomplish. Also, large numbers of Americans provide a very fertile propaganda target for Communist and other dissident forces. Therefore, I believe we must make a continued effort to keep the numbers of U.S. forces in Thailand to a minimum. Robert S. McNamara
341. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 27, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 THAI-US. Secret. Drafted by Bundy. SUBJECT Mr. McNaughton and I have reviewed these problems in detail with Ambassador Martin. We have agreed on two basic recommendations, more fully spelled out in the discussion below: a. That we instruct Ambassador Martin to seek Thai concurrence for B-52 operations from U Tapao at once, with the package defined below. b. That we await the outcome of this discussion before instructing Ambassador Martin to take up the question of a formal agreement on base occupancy and an undertaking by the Thai to handle land costs. As the discussion below indicates, this problem is inherently more complicated and difficult. We outline below possible avenues of approach, with an indicated course of action subject to judgment of the climate at the time. Mr. McNaughton is presenting these recommendations separately and concurrently to Secretary McNamara. I. Concurrence in U Tapao Operations Status In December, Ambassador Martin believed that this could be obtained without any significant undertakings on our part. Unfortunately, subsequent publicity, which the Thai interpreted as a virtual U.S. decision assuming Thai concurrence which of course was not yet given, disturbed the atmosphere. Moreover, our request was finally submitted in late January on a contingency basis, which led the Thai to feel there was plenty of time to explore the issue. Hence, they came forward with a series of general requests, largely in the MAP area. We believe we must now go in with a firm request to begin B-52 operations from U Tapao. Ambassador Martin believes that a decision to do that and to give him authority described below and incorporated in a telegram of instruction attached/2/ would put us in a good posture for seeking Thai concurrence in B-52 operations from U Tapao. Essentially, he would be authorized to convey to the Thai some selected delivery times for already approved FY 1967 MAP items, to give general assurances for air defense, and to reveal to the Thai certain items already tentatively approved in the FY 1968 program. In addition, he would be authorized to indicate to the Thai that our FY 1968 MAP planning level stood at $60 million, subject to the congressional process in the terms described below. In essence, we would not be making any undertakings to the Thai that go beyond what we already propose to do under the FY 1967 MAP program and the hard core of the FY 1968 program; we would be revealing to the Thai earlier than usual elements of the 1968 program, and this is the crucial timing element. /2/Attached, but not printed. Proposed Responses to Thai Requests 1. Prompt Delivery of MAP Items--Ambassador Martin believes that it is essential that we do everything possible to ensure prompt delivery of key items in the FY 1967 program. This applies particularly to anti-aircraft guns, and he will work with Mr. Steadman to identify other categories, so that we can get good reading of what the possibilities are. In the proposed package for Ambassador Martin's use, the delivery date would be specified for the anti-aircraft weapons. Other delivery dates could probably be left to be handled through normal military assistance channels, but rapidly and concurrently with the Ambassador's approach. 2. Air Defense--The Thai express a general need for some assurance in this area, although their military authorities recognize that North Vietnamese air capabilities in fact constitute no present threat to Bangkok. Unfortunately, the Thai are aware of certain rather grandiose military plans worked out by General Stilwell in the fall of 1965 (in the Ambassador's absence), which included substantial numbers of U.S. Hawk deployments and even Nike Hercules. The Ambassador has walked this one back as hard as possible with the Thai, and believes they clearly understand that there is no present threat. Nonetheless, he believes it would be of great assistance if he were authorized to tell the Thai that we would keep the air threat under continuing review, that there were available air defense units in U.S. reserve forces, and that we would consider the deployment of such units to Thailand if the need ever arose. 3. Exact Statement of the FY 1968 $60 million MAP Planning Level--It is of course recognized that any statement on this subject would have to be subject to the appropriation process, and the Thai understand this. Ambassador Martin believes, however, that it would be of great importance to be able to say to the Thai that this was a firm plan unless there were a really disastrous cut in the DOD or MAP appropriations. All of us feel, as a practical matter, that unless there is such a disastrous cut, we would in fact wish to give Thailand a priority that would bring it up to that level. 4. Additional FY 1968 Item--The attached instruction includes authority to disclose plans for helicopter and light aircraft deliveries in the FY 1968 program. In addition, Ambassador Martin believes it would be of great importance to be able to convey one additional item in the FY 1968 program. This item, already in the tentatively outlined program, calls for $.6 million for a logistic support facility in Korat. This is a very small item, and carries no future burdens or implications. Mr. McNaughton believes that it could be properly included. 5. U.S. Public Statements--This is a more general matter, but Ambassador Martin has received repeated urging by the Thai that top U.S. officials say more in public about the Thai contribution and its importance. This is something we all agree should be done. In terms of what he is authorized to say, it would amount to no more than an assurance that we would seek appropriate occasions to do just this, taking advantage of the Thai relaxation of restrictions on news reporting. 6. Helicopters--We discussed this thoroughly with Ambassador Martin. In response to our question, he stated his belief that it would help the atmosphere for the request to begin B-52 operations, but would not be essential, to return to Thailand four of the helicopters withdrawn in January and to authorize use of U.S. helicopters for the kinds of training missions envisaged in the original assignment of the 606th ACS to Thailand. He points out that deployment of the four helicopters had in fact been approved prior to, and apart from, subsequent discussions on the loan of the U.S. helicopters during 1966. On this basis, Ambassador Martin believes that the authority suggested would in fact be enormously helpful to the over-all Thai atmosphere. However, he notes that in August 1966 he carried out our instructions to inform the Thai that all the 25 helicopters then loaned would be withdrawn in January 1967, and he notes that he himself has nailed this down publicly in Thailand in January. Thus, while there has been some ill feeling among the Thai on this issue, he concludes that it is not an essential element in any package we may now present. In sum, the package we recommend would cover points 1-5 above. It does not include the return of the four helicopters or any authorization to employ U.S. helicopters for Thai missions. II. Formal Agreement for Base Occupancy and Base Land Costs Status Going back to 1962, and at an accelerated pace from 1965 onward, we have operated--with full State and DOD concurrence--on the basis of informal oral acceptance by the Thai of our occupancy of bases in Thailand. Similarly, on the land question, we have accepted--again with full concurrence in both Departments--a practice under which the Thai furnished the land where it is already government-owned, but the U.S. pays the cost of land acquisition otherwise. As a matter of practical fact, U.S. land acquisition for bases was never a major factor in construction costs in Thailand. Further, it now appears to be virtually at an end in terms of any needs presently foreseeable. In Thailand, the practical fact is that the Thai view their whole base structure as Thai bases available for the use of SEATO members acting in conformity with their SEATO obligations. The Australians and British, for example, occupy Thai bases without formal understandings. In practice, the present arrangements are ideal; we have never had difficulty in getting Thai agreement to our proposed uses, while the lack of any formal understanding has made it equally possible for us to move or withdraw forces without going through further consultations with the Thai. Nonetheless, the arrangements in Thailand have been less formal than the "life of NATO" agreements in force in Europe and the "term of years" arrangements in some other countries. A more formal arrangement with the Thai would probably not strengthen our tenure of the bases in fact, since this ultimately depends on basic Thai policy and on Thai belief in U.S. policy. However, the lack of formal arrangements has now become a specific, and we gather acute, problem in Congress. Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler have been attacked on the subject in recent weeks by certain Members of Congress generally critical of our policies in the area, and these Congressmen have been using the issue against us. In view of this congressional factor, there is no doubt that it would be desirable to work out formal arrangements, and we have examined with care how this might be handled. Possible Form of Understanding and Its Difficulties The kind of understanding we might seek would be in essence a short piece of paper along the following lines: "The Government of Thailand confirms that the facilities and areas in Thailand currently used by U.S. forces, as well as such additional facilities and areas as may be agreed, will be available to those forces so long as necessary as both parties carry out their responsibilities and obligations under SEATO." Such a formula is in effect comparable to the "life of NATO" formula in use in Europe. Its difficulty, in the Thai case, arises from the attitude of Thanat in particular. We have all experienced his intense feeling that we make our SEATO obligation more binding or even bilateral. If we open up this issue with him, it is almost certain in Ambassador Martin's judgment that he will press at the very least for a formal reaffirmation of our SEATO obligation in the same document. While we could give him this, we definitely could not go any further. A second difficulty that might arise would be Thai insistence that, even as we ask their concurrence for the introduction of our forces, so must we also seek their concurrence for the withdrawal of forces from Thailand. The logic is clear, and the practical impossibility of such an undertaking equally so. Hence, we all agree that any formula that met the need for a formal undertaking might well run into a hornet's nest. It would at the very least put additional temporary strain on our relations with Thailand and would take very careful handling. Hence, our basic recommendation is that the issue be deferred in any event until after we have handled the Thai concurrence, which is a matter of operational necessity. Possible Course of Action In the light of this analysis, we see three possible courses of action that might be followed once we have obtained the U Tapao concurrence and in the light of further analysis and an assessment of the climate at the time. a. We might go back to the Hill and explain frankly that we believe a formal understanding is undesirable since it would almost certainly lead to pressures to call for Thai concurrence on withdrawal of our forces. However we decide to move, if the heat is great, mention of these factors should be made in key quarters to explain why we are not able to act at once. b. We might try to handle the matter in the context of the pending SOFA negotiations. The situation here is that we have tabled Article 10 of the basic SOFA, which would cover land costs, and we have prepared an agreed minute to this article that would cover base occupancy in very downright and possibly unacceptable terms going beyond the form of agreement set forth above. We could theoretically proceed to raise this issue and try to push it to conclusion as part of the SOFA. However, we all agree that it is basically in our interest that the SOFA negotiations be allowed to continue in their present idle state. Hence, we believe that in any circumstances this theoretical option should not be pursued. c. A separate formal document. This would be along the lines set forth above, but presented separately from the SOFA negotiations. Its major difficulties are made clear above. In addition, we cannot exclude the possibility that it would in fact re-kindle the dormant SOFA negotiations which we wish to see remain dormant. However, it seems to us clear that--if we decide the congressional need is overriding--this is the way to move. If Thanat does insist on our strengthening our SEATO obligation, or on Thai concurrence for withdrawal of our forces, we see no alternative to our standing firm and rejecting these demands even if it means we fail to get the piece of paper. In sum, our basic recommendation is that we hold on this issue until we have obtained the concurrence on U Tapao, work on the Hill as effectively as we can, and make up our minds in the two weeks-one month it may take to handle the U Tapao matter. If we then feel we have to act, option c seems the right approach. General Note In assessing the over-all Thai attitude, it is important to note the Thai decision of late December to send combat forces to Vietnam. Present indications are that the Thai will send a force of 2500 men rather than the 1100 men originally envisaged. This action will require only U.S. equipment support such as was given for the first Korean division, without any additional quid pro quo. It of course represents a major forward step in Thai thinking, and does lie beneath their feeling that they should have some degree of assurance from us as they undertake the U Tapao base agreement. We must reckon that, as a practical matter, both the Thai contribution of forces and the U Tapao agreement are already exposing, and will increasingly expose, the Thai to major propaganda attack by the Communist nations. Hence, their feeling about some degree of advance assurance of future plans is not in the circumstances unreasonable. Recommendations: 1. That you approve the attached draft telegram of instructions to Ambassador Martin to seek Thai concurrence for B-52 operations from U Tapao./3/ /3/Rusk approved the draft telegram, which was sent to Bangkok as 145114, February 27. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 THAI-US) 2. That we hold on the issue of occupancy of bases and land costs until we have obtained the Thai concurrence on U Tapao./4/ /4/Rusk initialed his approval on February 27. In a February 10 letter to Rusk, McNamara suggested that it was important to obtain more formal arrangements than then existed. McNamara added the following handwritten postscript: "I do not believe we can continue to buy Thai land for our bases. Nor can we continue to operate without written 'occupancy' agreements." (Ibid.)
342. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 22, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. VI, Memos, 3/67-8/67. Confidential. SUBJECT Secretary Rusk wants to add to the luncheon agenda/2/ the matter of our acknowledgement of the Thai decision to permit U.S. use of the U-Tapao base. /2/Apparently the agenda for the President's weekly lunch with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and Christian, March 22, 12:43 to 2 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No other record has been found. Facts: The Thai have made the basic announcement this morning; it has moved on all wires and been carried on the radio; Our announcement would simply be a follow-up acknowledgement; its purpose is mainly to express our gratitude for the cooperation the Thai are offering in the Viet-Nam effort; The Thai dropped their suggestion that a special Presidential emissary be sent to Bangkok for this purpose on the understanding that the White House would be making a statement after the Thai announcement. My own feeling is that the U-Tapao decision was not an easy one for the Thai. It is going to open them up to strong attack from the Communists. The kind of warm reception by us of their decision that has been proposed is not out of order. If we handle the matter otherwise, we can expect trouble from Foreign Minister Thanat at the Troop Contributors meeting here next month. We may want to take another look at the proposed full text. But I see no overwhelming reason for us to back away from the understanding Ambassador Martin reached with the Thai Prime Minister and his Government. I suggest that George Christian make the statement this afternoon along the general lines proposed./3/ /3/Rusk, not Christian, made a long and effusive statement on March 22; the text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 809-810. Walt
343. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/ Bangkok, March 23, 1967, 1119Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) THAI. Confidential. 12316. For Gaud and Poats. 1. When I testify next month before the HFAC, I fully expect to cover the economic and security justifications of aid from the US--with that from the 18 other contributors to Thailand's development. It is important that the US presentations on Thailand should be consistent with the facts--facts which, of course, I will have to lay on the table. 2. I am mildly disturbed by what I have heard in the past week about a DOD paper for unspecified "use on the Hill" which reportedly says that is "no economic justification" for aid to Thailand./2/ We gather that AID staff have supported that statement. This is disturbing in its conflict with the facts. I find it doubly disturbing when we also receive requests from Washington questioning the MAP level because of grave questions as to the ability of the Thai budget and economy to bear the burden of the proposed MAP. I just don't think you can have it both ways. /2/Not further identified. 3. I plan to make quite clear to the HFAC that the Thai economy is strained in meeting its development and security requirements and that, with our and other help combined with sound Thai management, Thailand can achieve the necessary goals. I shall make clear also that we have, frankly, been fortunate in seeing Thailand put its main emphasis on economic development while doing its utmost on its own "security". For that matter, economic and social development is demonstrably a vital part of security as we see hour-by-hour in Vietnam. Thailand's $125 per capita GNP does not make it easy to sustain the growth rate needed for accelerated development and security. Per capita GNP is less than half what it is in Malaysia and even less than that when compared to Singapore albeit a bit more in India for example. Even in this situation, I would say that the US could relax in its help to Thailand if Thailand were a mid-Pacific island. However, we cannot relax because Thailand is vitally involved in SEA, vitally involved geographically in Thailand's as well as US interests in Asia. 4. The key point here, however, is that we have been fortunate in having generally effective policy lines, with determination and pride on the part of the Thai, we have not been forced to pour in vast sums in order to keep Thailand from "going under." We have not had to justify our programs on the basis of poverty and hopelessness. Rather our aid to Thailand is economically justified as a means of accomplishments which prevent relapse into a US "salvage" aid program. Our aid is justified because of the short time fuse which Communist aggression imposes upon Thai efforts to produce unity and economic stability. Above all, our aid is justified because it has worked. It is one of your real success stories--up to this point. 5. Our relatively small present effort promises to be effective in a classical sense because the Thai are willing and able to make their own great budgetary effort (a record-sized budget with an unprecedented 26 percent deficit this year). They are willing and able to press their effort with deficit finance through the use of their foreign exchange reserves, even though the IBRD is deeply concerned about inflation and too much use of those reserves. They have built reserves by borrowing and attracting investment. They have responded to the call we issue to all US aid recipients--to manage well, to diversify agriculture, to stimulate private initiative, to increase tax revenues to effect some redistribution of income to the farmer, and the like. The vast bulk of second plan development is aimed at the rural areas. The economics of continuing this momentum require and justify US aid. 6. Recently, I heard of an AID/W memorandum/3/ which commendably noted that Thailand's foreign exchange reserves were not the equivalent of budgetary resources. We were amazed, however, to read that there is no economic justification for aid to Thailand and that Thailand has no budgetary problem, because "the Thai Government enjoys an extremely comfortable budgetary cash position" which the memo goes on to describe as Treasury cash balances. Honest to Gaud! I am really tempted to suggest a pre-school seminar in economics. I suppose the IBRD and other able groups have always assumed most elementary economists are aware that cash balances can be built up or erased by simple actions of printing more money or by paying off government debt. If the RTG used its cash balances to redeem an equivalent amount of its debt, would your adviser then say that US aid to Thailand is economically justified? This could easily be done but of course we and the Thai policy makers would oppose such action because of the very inflationary effects which so much concern the IBRD. The simple facts are that while Thai cash balances in 1966 were rising by some 900 million baht (from 2,804 million baht in December 1965); the government's internal debt rose 2,250 million baht (to a level of 12,263 million baht). It was a calculated counterinflationary step, encouraged by us on the assumption that you had all the inflation you needed or could handle in Vietnam. /3/Not further identified. 7. I would certainly agree that in the words of your adviser, "It is a dilemma." Listen to him and you can have Vietnam all over again. I would rather not. 8. Quite seriously, we just must quit picking out isolated bits of statistics and spinning conclusions from them. If there are any serious problems in your minds or in DOD about the economic facts, I trust that they will be resolved before my testimony conflicts with yours, since I faithfully promised the Secretary in December I wouldn't argue with anybody until May. Martin [Continue with the next documents]
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