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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXVIII Laos DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

226. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane March 23, 1966, 09095Z.

1015. Ref: Embtel 1010./2/

1. There seems to be little evidence to support Souvanna's view, as expressed reftel, that Hanoi's primary objective in its current aggressive military action in northern Laos is to threaten Laos so severely that it will "draw in" American ground forces. If their aim were provocation, there would seem to be more direct actions they could take. For example, NVA troops would have no real difficulty in destroying Thakhek or another town on the Mekong, an action Hanoi must assume would bring about some kind of American response. We assume on the contrary that Hanoi wants to avoid actions that might bring about the deployment of American ground forces, that it will probably restrict its actions to what is considered acceptable under current ground rules and that its present objectives in the north are motivated at least as much by political as military considerations.

2. Hanoi's current offensive in the north has been made possible only as a result of key decisions and actions made months ago, including a decision to expand its logistic operations. It has long diverted far more supplies and trucking, if not troops, for military operations in northern Laos than are required merely to hold its own and PL positions. The decisions that lay behind this considerable effort were probably based on a variety of considerations, some of which might be the following:

A. Hanoi wants to show that it can still call the shots in northern Laos. As a result of both Lao and American air action in 1964 and 1965, limited as it was, NVA and PL forces were at first unable to take effective action against friendly positions in the north. Meo and FAR troops in fact were able to make modest advances and strengthened their enclaves in enemy territory. Hanoi may have concluded that the increased relative strength of FAR and Meo forces, the determined Meo attack against Hua Muong, stepped up air action and some boastful Lao talk presaged a serious effort to dislodge VNA and PL forces from key positions in the north. It was time to give the FAR and Souvanna a hard lesson. Hanoi then took steps to counteract the effects of air harassment through an improved road network and increased trucking of supplies and resumed its former practice of taking the offensive against friendly positions during the dry season. They have by now dislodged friendly forces from most of the positions north of the PDJ which were taken since the summer of 1964.

B. As a corollary to A above, Hanoi probably wishes to demonstrate forcibly to Souvanna that no amount of American intervention short of deployment of US troops, if even that, can prevent NVA military successes whenever Hanoi chooses to take the offensive. Hanoi may regard an impressive series of victories in northern Laos, even though limited in scope, as a means of raising doubt in Souvanna's mind about the utility of his American support. Souvanna's proposed trip to Moscow will doubtless give Hanoi further incentive to keep up the pressure.

C. The PL, which is discredited as a political movement, probably put heavy pressure on Hanoi to sustain its military and political position. The PL needed several strong shots in the arm, and Hanoi could not afford to allow further weakening of a movement that has been so useful to its expansionist objectives.

D. Continued NVA military successes can badly demoralize the FAR and Neutralists armies. Hanoi would probably hope exploit such demoralization through political offensives.

3. We ourselves would not expect Hanoi this year at least to press its military advances much beyond the Plain of Jars area and into key valleys and routes that lead into it from the north, east and south. At this point operations carried FAR to the west to their main bases might impose serious logistics problem for NVA troops. Nevertheless we believe they could attempt push to this junction of Routes 13 and 7 if they are prepared to pay a heavy price, and NVA forces might be able carry out operations which could become a threat to Luang Prabang, e.g., a push down the Nam Hou from Dien Bien Phu.

4. At any rate, one lesson from NVA actions in northern Laos is by now clear. Whether or not the North Vietnamese choose to move further in northern Laos they have already demonstrated they are willing and able to mount an impressive logistics and offensive operation in the face of air and guerrilla harassment in a theater that has no direct connection with their main military efforts in South Vietnam. Thus far, of course, our air attacks in the north have largely been only harassment. We have until this week avoided out of political consideration such key supply areas as Ban Liang (because of its proximity to Khang Khay). But heavy and frequent attacks against such targets and stepped up armed recce and inter- diction in the BR area should make it much more costly and difficult for Hanoi to maintain an offensive, which, limited as it might be, poses a serious threat to the political and military stability of Laos.

5. Finally, if friendly forces and positions survive dry season relatively intact, we still hope they will be able recover some recently lost terrain during the monsoon.

Sullivan

Washington, March 23, 1966, 7:23 p.m.

602. Ref: A. Deptel 82 to Vientiane July 24, 1964./2/ B. Embtel 984./3/ Joint State/Defense message.

Use of Napalm in Laos

1. Believe use of Napalm will enhance effectiveness of strikes against targets in Lao Panhandle and provide increased flexibility for US tactical air operations in Laos. We also believe that Napalm should be provided RLAF for use at General Ma's discretion as you suggested.

2. To maximize effectiveness against infiltration-related targets and simultaneously to ensure maximum safeguards against inadvertent strikes on Laos civilians (i.e., prevent use against villages and huts, inhabited areas or civilians) and friendly troops, use of Napalm should be integrated into well-established procedures for FAC operations currently in effect in Steel Tiger area. While it is appreciated that initially limiting the use of Napalm to newly proposed Shining Brass area might have some advantage, this limitation could cause operational difficulty by establishment of still another boundary, within relatively small operating area, involving another set of operating rules.

3. Accordingly, if Souvanna concurs,/4/ you may authorize (a) selected use of Napalm on FAC-directed missions (i.e., with Lao participation in accordance with para. 3 of Annex B of BR/SL operating rules, 2nd Air Div OPORD 433-66/5/ only against validated RLAF targets within Steel Tiger Recce areas, D, E, F, and G, and (b) release Napalm for use by RLAF. In seeking Souvanna's concurrence you should reaffirm to him that every possible precaution is being taken to ensure use only against authorized targets.

4. You are still authorized, with Souvanna's concurrence, use of Napalm elsewhere in Laos in a situation which you consider to be an emergency or a situation in which particular offensive or defensive military action already undertaken would otherwise fail.

5. Use of Napalm like other U.S. combat air operations in Laos will not be publicly confirmed, although we must anticipate possibility that it may become matter of public knowledge.

Rusk

Vientiane, April 4, 1966, 1131Z.

1054. 1. If I were to choose any one word to characterize the situation in this country on the eve of Lao new year, I would suggest the word "fatigue."

2. The Prime Minister is tired, the members of his government are tired, the Royal Army is tired, the Neutralists are tired,/2/ and (according to our information) the Pathet Lao are tired. This condition is partly the result of the current enervating and oppressive heat which precedes the rains and partly because we had no winter to speak of this year. But, primarily, it is because of the long, exhausting conflict which has been the fate of Laos for the past ten years.

3. The Prime Minister took off for Tokyo this morning to attend the conference on Southeast Asian development. Before his departure, I had our Embassy doctor give him a couple of vitamin injections to perk him up a bit. However, he won't gain much zest unless he can get a little relaxation on his visit to Japan. He has agreed to take a few days' rest, and I have attempted to persuade Japanese Ambassador (who will be accompanying him) to be sure he is not overwhelmed with hospitality.

4. The Royal Army is going to have to hang on in its current dispositions until the rains come. Then, there are plans to rotate units out of the front lines, give them some R and R, and to re-form and re-equip them, before sending them back into action.

5. As for the Neutralists, this is a sticky question. They see no future for themselves, yet they do not wish to merge their identity with the FAR and certainly have no intention to defect to the Communists. The enemy is quite aware of the demoralization among the Neutralists and Radio Peking is already crowing about it. The Neutralists are currently (and for this reason) the prime focus of Viet attacks in Laos. Their fate is quite definitely in the balance.

6. The Pathet Lao, as a fighting force, were just about washed up a few months ago. They have been revived by the introduction of additional new Vietnamese cadre and fighting units. How long this new injection of energy will last is anyone's guess, but it is doubtful that it will really survive the rainy season.

7. The sixty-four dollar question, in all this evaluation, is the state of affairs among the North Vietnamese. Starting from the assumption that they are human, we can only suspect that they, too, are feeling the strain. Captured prisoners, recovered diaries, and other evidence bear out this supposition. But the nature of their continued thrust, the vigor of their new invasion give us small comfort that we are anywhere near in sight of a collapse.

8. We must, however, take some notice of the fact that, as a whole, the human fabric of this constant conflict is beginning to fray. Nothing is immediately critical. But it is all beginning to wear just a bit thin.

9. Given these circumstances, it is difficult to predict reactions to any particular situation. The best we can do is to lay in more vitamins, look lively and pray for rain.

Sullivan

Washington, April 5, 1966, 11-11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT
Presentation of Credentials by Lao Ambassador

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. Samuel D. Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. James W. Symington, Chief of Protocol
Mr. Chester C. Carter, Deputy Chief of Protocol
Mr. Norman Armour, Jr., Assistant Chief of Protocol
Ambassador Khamking Souvanlasy

After the formal presentation of credentials the group moved to the Treaty Room where the President and the Ambassador had a brief talk.

In reply to the President's query concerning the current situation in Laos, the Ambassador said that when he left there were no political problems and there had been practically none over the past year. However, the recent attacks by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces in the Attopeu area had worsened the military situation.

The President asked how Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma felt about the situation and the Ambassador replied that the Prime Minister was very much encouraged by the improvement in the political situation over the past two years, to the extent of feeling optimistic about the future. Because the military situation remained difficult he continued to rely on assistance from friendly nations, and particularly from the U.S. in containing invasion and aggression. The Ambassador added that both Souvanna Phouma and the King were following with apprehension the developments in Vietnam, as they were fully aware of the repercussions on Laos of the unfortunate turn of events in Vietnam.

The President commented that we were deeply distressed over the present state of the Government of Vietnam, and that we hoped some measure of stability might be attained. From a military standpoint, we were daily increasing an already substantial commitment. There was no doubt that the attitude of the Government of Vietnam regarding its political stability would affect what we might do.

The Ambassador said that Laos had been encouraged by the visits of the Vice President and of Ambassador Harriman. He noted that both had given Laos assurances of U.S. support and friendship. As a consequence Laos felt more capable of defending and safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and neutrality.

The President remarked that he had received very good reports from both the Vice President and Mr. Harriman. The Vice President had been anxious to include Laos on his itinerary, to follow up on the contacts he had previously made with Lao leaders. The Vice President was encouraged by the progress he had noted.

The very cordial meeting ended with a friendly exchange of amenities.

Washington, April 9, 1966.

SUBJECT
Ground Operations in Laos

Attached is a JCS paper/2/ which is now under consideration in State and could come to your attention at any time. It does the following:

(1) Reaffirmed the 7 January request that US ground forces be authorized immediate pursuit into Laos and Cambodia (same paper asked authorization for immediate pursuit into Chinese airspace).

(2) Pending approval of the above, requested authority to authorize actions in self-defense against enemy attacks coming from Laos.

Immediate pursuit is already authorized for air action over Laos and North Vietnam, and over Cambodia when actually engaged in combat. But ground action is not authorized in any of these countries.

Immediate pursuit would permit US forces to move into neighboring countries as far as necessary to oppose an enemy force that had attacked them, as long as combat were continuous. The lesser request for actions in self-defense against attacks from Laos would permit movement only as long as US forces were in jeopardy.

Since the Laotian Government has previously authorized the bombing of enemy controlled sections of Laos, the new factor here is the proposal to let US troops fire into and maneuver within Laos. The Laotians probably would want us to keep such troop movements secret, as in the case of air actions. Since ground action is more likely to be directly observed and reported by the press, the Laotian political reaction might be more serious.

From past indications I would doubt that Souvanna Phouma would be very disturbed about the surfacing of an occasional ground action taken in self-defense. However, paragraph 4 of the draft message would authorize attacks against Laotian villages when the US commander felt they were necessary for the preservation of his own forces, and Souvanna has been more sensitive when it comes to attacks on villages./3/

Actually, there are very few villages along the border, but it might be desirable to sound out the Laotians before authorizing any such attacks. Weighing the political consequences against the military gain it could prove better to rule out all attacks on Laotian villages

RCB

Vientiane, April 11, 1966, 0515Z.

1076. Reur 638./2/

1. As seems to be always the case with matters affecting Laos, the problem re rules of engagement on the SVN border is not with the substance but with the shadow. RLG officials, in contrast to Cambodians, would have no objection to hot pursuit across ill-defined border by U.S. and friendly forces engaged with Viet Cong. However, they would have great difficulty with a public assertion of our right or intention to exercise such hot pursuit.

2. What bothers me therefore is precisely prospect raised in para 2 reftel that U.S. authority to undertake this pursuit would become public knowledge, despite high security classification. Experience has unhappily shown this to be true, no matter how much we may lament it.

3. Therefore, since neither I nor RLG would in any way wish inhibit friendly forces from defending themselves against attack from Lao territory, issue we must tackle is manner in which public repercussions can be eliminated. I would submit that this is not impossible, and that it can be handled in one of three different ways.

4. First way would be to change rules of engagement and publish them widely, albeit with high security classification. When inevitable leak occurs, Spokesman should merely deny it flatly. I put up this suggestion knowing full well it will not be accepted in Washington. However, it is obviously the best and most logical choice. Yet I realize it remains an unacceptable option.

5. Second way would be to change rules of engagement but not publish them widely. In this context, I would suggest they be held at the COMUSMACV level, on an eyes-only basis for a limited and specifically designated number of responsible officers. These officers could then respond, in the event, to an emergency by a field commander, giving him the authorization if and when a situation like a [garble] develops into a cross-border fight. In this option, I would prefer that the public line to be taken should differ from Thai proposed reftel. If there is a leakage, the answer to queries should be: "You are posing a question on a hypothetical issue which has not arisen. We do not answer hypothetical questions."

6. The third way to handle the problem would be to take the decision at the national level but refrain from publishing it in the field. In this way, the actual change in rules of engagement would take place only when and if a cross-border situation arose. Since, contrary to the Cambodian situation, we are not faced with an immediate prospect of this type attack, there would be no actual handicap to the troops. There would, of course, be much continuing anguish among staff officers.

7. On balance, I suppose the second choice is the most practical. If and when an actual situation occurs and cross-border hot pursuit becomes necessary, then, at the point (but only then) would Spokesman fall back on our standard line for operational matter, affecting Laos, which is "no comment." At no time would I foresee the necessity to go as far as to assert "authority" publicly, as proposed reftel. We could, however, if necessary, reaffirm our policy as outlined last sentence reftel./3/

8. In general, I would feel it improvement to discuss this matter with RLG. However, just in the event that Washington should decide on some course of action from my current expectations, I wish opportunity to comment again on this aspect when you come to a consensus on the substance of your intentions./4/

Sullivan

I-22975

Washington, May 4, 1966.

SUBJECT
Prospective Command Change in the RLAF

As I mentioned in a recent conversation, I have been disturbed by the conjunction of (1) renewed requests for hospitalization (for hernia) and an invitational tour in the US for RLAF BGen. Thao Ma with (2) renewed efforts on the part of Gen. Ouan Rathikoun to have Gen. Ma removed from his command and replaced, apparently, by BGen. Sourith Don Sasorith. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is reportedly sympathetic to this plan. (Key references are EmbTel 1110, TDCS-314/05276-66 and AIRA 00726 Apr 66.)/2/

We of course support provision of hospital care for Gen. Ma when required. USAF has confirmed that he can be accommodated at Tripler or Clark upon his request as well as that the invitation to visit the US is open-ended and that arrangements can be made on 60-90 days notice (CSAF AFNICB 86238 Apr 66)./3/

Ambassador Sullivan has reported his opposition to having the US "used" (by the offer of trips) to cover Gen. Ma's removal from RLAF command, and Souvanna has agreed that Gen. Ma would "still be in charge" of the RLAF "when he returned". This may not go far enough. Based on present knowledge, it seems to me that we should urge Ambassador Sullivan to seek to persuade Souvanna and Ouan not to relieve Gen. Ma, before or after his return from travel to the US. My own judgment is that this is a matter of considerable importance to US and even to RLG military and political interests, but this memorandum is intended only to supplement our brief conversation as you suggested and does not advance a DOD position.

On the military side, I do not believe that a ground force commander should assume command of the RLAF or that Gen. Sourith is the one to try it if it were a good idea. Some notes on the personalities involved are attached. Whatever misgivings some RLAF officers have at present about Gen. Ma's leadership, the imposition of a traditional Lao ground commander on the spirited T-28 jockeys of the RLAF would be a sure step toward diminished morale and military effectiveness. Numerous activities of the US seem to depend on the RLAF remaining sufficiently operational to justify MAP support and the other assistance we have provided to it. We should not run the risk of upsetting a working arrangement, if we can help Souvanna avoid it, unless there are compelling collateral advantages. I do not see any, except that the change would help Gen. Ouan and the Sananikones to consolidate their control of the FAR. Whether this is desirable is more a political than a military judgment.

Because the desire to remove Ma is of long standing, I find it hard not to believe that it fits into a pattern of Sananikone actions against Phoumi and Khamkhong and of inaction vis-à-vis Vang Pao and Kong Le that seem to me to account in part for recent and cumulative severe reverses in the northeast. If Ma goes, Gen. Phasouk Somly may well be next on the list. The Sananikones will then be able to concentrate single-mindedly on management of the central Mekong valley area that appears to be about as far as their strategic vision extends. I doubt that their interest in effective control would long be limited to the military sphere without taking on a political character, raising questions about the stability of the RLG.

There is no assurance that a restatement of our confidence in Ma will save him from the rockpile. And the best course of action in Laos usually seems to be to let the Lao go their own way, at least after obligating them to consider all aspects of a contemplated decision. This does seem one instance, however, when in the US interest some representations should be made

William C. Hamilton/4/

GEN. THAO MA AND GEN. SOURITH DON SASORITH

It has been consistently reported by all appropriate American observers since mid-1963 (when the RLAF went "operational") that among the Lao it is Gen. Ma and he alone who makes the RLAF go. He has significant known weaknesses (fits of temper, inability to organize a staff or delegate work or authority, excessive concentration on one idea at a time, etc), and it is not to his credit that there is no RLAF officer in sight to take his place in the event of either a combat or a political accident: Nevertheless, we must deal with the situation as it is, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that Ma remains of central importance to the RLAF and to the US.

A desire to unseat Gen. Ma, because he is too "independent" of Vientiane, has been expressed by Gen. Kouprasith and other General Staff sources off and on for some time. The revival of the idea appears to have followed a recent visit to Gen. Ouan by the RLAF Chief of Staff, Col. Ou Neua. Although there is unquestionably some basis for various charges leveled by him against Ma, I am sure you will recall Ou Neua as one of the least reliable, most fractious officers we had to deal with (notably as Wattay airport commandant in 1962-3). He has been in and out of the neutralist forces and various right-wing alignments and is known to be jealous of Ma's commanding stature as RLAF chief. It is unfortunate that his testimony (alone, as far as we are informed) enabled Ouan to persuade Souvanna that perhaps it is time to move Ma up and out of the way.

One of the charges brought by Ou Neua, for example, is that Ma is "fixed " on T-28 operations and neglects the transport squadron. Probably there is some truth in this, but part of the translation may be that Ma has cracked down on the use of RLAF C-47s for the transportation of relatives, cattle, and opium.

As to Gen. Sourith, I have tapped the recollections of Col. William Law and Lt. Col. Gibert Grout to fill out my own limited knowledge. (Col. Grout has known him since 1958 and was the principal point of contact with him during our period in Laos.) Sourith has certain technical qualifications:

a. is a French-trained pilot (but is not known to have qualified except in liaison aircraft);

b. about 1958, he served as FAR Chief of Army Aviation (but at that time it was a ground-oriented command consisting of the paratroops and enough aircraft to move them, occasionally);

c. he is presently attending the C&GSC at Fort Leavenworth, and is reported to be cooperative, popular with fellow students, and a "fair student" with some language problem.

This appears to be about the extent of his military qualifications for the RLAF command.

Sourith began his service in the French Army, where at one time he was sergeant-aide to a recent French Assistant Military Attaché (well known to you) who described his talents as having been fully exploited in the aide capacity. He was directly involved in the 1962 Nam Tha episode, making a record no better--though no worse--than the other commanders concerned. After 1962, he remained as CG, MR I, keeping himself aloof from Vientiane and the General Staff. He was regarded by Gen. Phoumi as a "cipher," though undoubtedly in part because he was not responsive to Phoumi's interests. Col. Grout believes that he was sincerely devoted to helping build the reputations of the King and Crown Prince out in the villages, distinguishing himself more for a willingness to bat around in the countryside than for the military activities that accompanied this commendable stress on "nation-building". He was dragged reluctantly into Operation Triangle but, according to Col. Law, did well once he got his battalions under way. He has long seemed content to hold onto his fief in MR I in collaboration with Gen. Norasing in MR VI.

Vientiane, May 15, 1966, 0935Z.

1197. 1. Situation with respect General Ma has come unstuck once again./2/ Despite fact he assured Sisouk, General Ouan and me that he was satisfied with arrangements made, he took off yesterday afternoon and returned Savannakhet. There he found his air force colleagues apparently set against him.

2. Consequently, he joined up with his buddy Colonel Nouphet, Commander of GM 18 and went to latter's headquarters east of Savannakhet, reportedly accompanied by eternal troublemaker Bounleut Saycocie. Wild talk is now emanating from this headquarters that Ma and Nouphet intend to march on Savannakhet and capture it tonight.

3. Except for our communications team at Savannakhet Airfield, I have withdrawn all our personnel from base and instructed them remain in quarters. AID personnel in town have similarly been instructed to stay at home and activate E&E alert.

4. There are eighteen T-28 and about a dozen C-47 aircraft on the field at Savannakhet. If this becomes a battleground, it could produce costly loss of hardware./3/

5. Acting Prime Minister Leuam Insisigmay has flown to Savannakhet in effort head off confrontation. He is about the only person available (except Prince Noun Oum) who could control enough respect to prevent a clash. I have offered him any assistance he may need from our assets for transportation, etc./4/

6. No matter how this turns out, I hardly see that we can salvage any of General Ma's position. At this stage, he looks like a dead loss./5/

Sullivan

Washington, May 31, 1966.

SUBJECT
Rules of Engagement for Combat Operations Involving Laos

1. Defense has asked our concurrence in the attached draft message/2/ which would establish rules of engagement for US forces operating in South Viet-Nam near the Laos border, and authorize them to fire and maneuver into Laos under circumstances of defense and preservation of forces, similar to the rules in force for Cambodia.

2. We believe that para 3 of the proposed new rules should be amended to include a provision for requesting JCS approval in advance when planning operations near the SVN-Laos border. This procedure is prescribed for operations involving Cambodia.

3. That section of the proposed new rules dealing with an emergency situation (para 5) is in harmony with the authority presently in force with respect to Cambodia except that in the case of Cambodia, US forces are specifically prohibited from attacking Cambodian villages or populated areas by air, by artillery fire or by ground forces. We believe that the authority with respect to Laos should have the same limitations.

4. Ambassador Sullivan concurs in principle with the proposed new rules. However, he is concerned with the possibility of premature press leaks of this information and has agreed to knowledge of this authority being held by General Westmoreland at MACV headquarters level only, pending a possible requirement for its wider use. COMUSMACV (and CINCPAC) stated the operational necessity of providing this information in advance to at least the subordinate major field force commanders. We are inclined to agree with COMUSMACV and the handling of this point as outlined in para 2 of the attached revised rules and we do not consider it necessary to return to Ambassador Sullivan on this point, since he is already aware of COMUSMACV views and has not dissented.

5. Pending the development of an actual requirement for use of this new authority in Laos, we would respond to press inquiries that the question is hypothetical or "no comment", as appropriate. If the authority is used and press queries are made we would answer (as in the Cambodian case) by citing the inherent right of self-defense.

Recommendation/3/

6. That you approve the attached proposed new rules of engagement involving Laos, subject to the changes outlined in paras 2 and 3 above, and with press handling as outlined in para 5 above.

Saigon, June 4, 1966, 0900Z.

MAC 4572. Ref: CINCPAC 030345Z Jun 66./2/ Subj: Arc Light.

1. In response to reference, let me stress at the outset that I support fully and enthusiastically the objective of obtaining optimum returns per Arc Light sortie. Attainment of this objective entails detailed consideration of two factors: the operational purpose to be served by a given strike or a series of strikes, and the availability of timely, reliable intelligence as the basis for target selection.

2. With regard to the operational purpose served by B-52 strikes in Laos, we see the effort as one designed to assist in destroying an integrated enemy logistic system associated with well-defined ground LOCs. In a very real sense our tactical and strategic air programs in the Laos Panhandle are directed against a vital portion of the enemy's communication zone. Far more than harassment of infiltration activity is involved. Rather, we seek to identify and destroy storage depots, staging areas, maintenance facilities, [illegible] points, truck parks, bridge and ferry sites, control installations and road repair capabilities.

3. As regards availability of timely, reliable intelligence as a basis for targeting in Laos, we enjoy the benefit of a high order of FAC saturation of the area in question. Rich dividends have been produced as a result of increasing FAC familiarity with the enemy's logistic system and his pattern of activity associated with operation of the system. The impressive Tiger Hound record in terms of trucks destroyed, secondary explosions and structures destroyed is illustrative of effective intelligence based largely on visual observation. Moreover, the fact that the enemy has been operating overtly throughout his LOC network in southern Laos has afforded us an intelligence advantage generally unknown in SVN. It is my considered judgment, in this regard, that our targeting in Laos has been supported more generously by effective intelligence than has the bulk of our targeting for SVN.

4. You have raised the question of how we might obtain more significant targets for Arc Light strikes and more judicious expenditure of ordnance. I know of but one solution to this problem; namely, periodic review in depth of targeting status and procedures. This is an undertaking in which I participate personally, the most recent instance having occurred within the past several weeks. Coupled with the review process must be command approval of each strike based on detailed assessment of all factors, including intelligence. As you know, I personally approve each Arc Light target as an outgrowth of this system. It is for this reason that I am in a position to assure you that our selection of these targets not only reflects maximum refinement of available information, but takes full advantage of all assessment techniques and targeting expertise available. Targets are competing for selection based on the merits and supportability of the target and not upon any preference for geographical division of effort.

5. Since 11 December last year, 240 B-52 strikes have been carried out under approved programs as follows:

It will be noted of the total strikes, only about 20 percent have been directed against targets in Laos. Commitment of resources against these targets has on no occasion been at the expense of more lucrative targets in SVN.

6. Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that our present approach to Arc Light targeting be continued. In light of experience gained to date, I am satisfied that it best supports the objective of obtaining optimum returns per sortie.

Vientiane, June 9, 1966, 1130Z.

1306. 1. I called on Souvanna and King separately this morning to obtain their impressions of recent Royal visit to Soviet Union./2/ Their impressions differ slightly and are reported below in general outline.

2. Souvanna said that, although there had been more sightseeing than serious exchanges of view, they nevertheless had been able to get some points across. He said that they were accompanied on entire trip by Zhukov, Secretary General of Foreign Office, and former Ambassador to China. He described him as well-informed and obviously sent along to talk substance.

3. He said their conversations had been quite specific, concerning detailed accusations by the Pathet Lao, etc., and they in turn had been specific with respect to North Vietnamese actions, etc. He said King had been quite forceful in presenting Laotian viewpoint.

4. However, despite these details, Souvanna had no impression of Soviet policy precision. He said he felt Soviets were engaged in study of their policy towards Lao and it was probably being reviewed with Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky, who remaining in Moscow until end of the month. He expected that when Kirnassovsky returned he would bring more precision with him.

5. King, on other hand, told me he considered Soviet policy was already quite precise. He said he had held long private talk with Podgorny without presence of Souvanna. He pointed out delicately that, since this was conversation between two chiefs of state, it was "privileged" and he could not give me details. However, he would like to make one observation.

6. He said he had read President Johnson's Memorial Day speech and was struck by the fact that what President said coincided with what Podgorny said in two important particulars: (a) desire not to enlarge the war, and (b) desire to avoid damage to other U.S./USSR relations. He considered these perhaps the two most important points.

7. He then said that, if he were to draw the balance of his impressions of Soviet policy with respect to United States policy in Southeast Asia, he would advise the President to "just keep doing exactly what you are doing now," and U.S. will obtain its objectives. He felt that Hanoi was becoming disillusioned with Peking and that the two major points of coincidence of U.S. and Soviet policy would fix the pattern of a settlement in Southeast Asia.

Sullivan

Washington, June 10, 1966.

SUBJECT
Shining Brass

1. Defense has requested Department approval of the expansion into Phase II Cross Border Operations in Laos (Shining Brass) as detailed in JCSM-378-66 at Tab A./2/

2. Present Phase I Shining Brass Operations are limited to reconnaissance missions by 11 man teams (3 US personnel in each team) in the area of Laos east of the blue line on the map at Tab B./3/

3. The proposed expansion into Phase II would authorize exploitation operations by specially trained platoon size Nung units accompanied by not over 3 US advisors in each instance. Each operation would be limited to approximately 5 days and the penetration into Laos limited to 10 kilometers (east of the red line on the map at Tab B). The normal ground rules for these type operations with respect to deniability would be observed, i.e. altered maps would be used and the teams briefed that the operations are conducted only in RVN. Phase I operations would continue with their present limitations.

4. Ambassador Sullivan concurs in the operations as proposed to include a 48-hour advance notice of intent to launch an operation. This would amount to a confirmation of an operation shown in the monthly schedule published by MACV (the first exploitation operation, scheduled for June 10, is in abeyance pending Washington approval of the concept).

5. We believe the proposal to be reasonable in view of the restrictions of time and distance, size of forces, and deniability precautions. However, so that we may monitor the program (and veto if necessary), the Department should also be an addressee of the 48-hour advance notification of intent to launch an operation.

6. That you approve the proposed Shining Brass exploitation operations with the understanding that the Department would receive the 48-hour advance notification of intent to launch all future operations.

Vientiane, June 27, 1966, 0610Z.

1371. 1. Visit by Deputy Assistant Secretary Unger June 24-26 provided excellent opportunity take pulse of Lao body politic in perspective of nineteen-month interval since he left Vientiane. During visit he held discussions with broadly representative cross-section of power elite, highlights of which follow. Big disappointment was weather, which closed in over Luang Prabang for three successive days and forced cancelation of audience with King Savang and luncheon with Crown Prince. Hastily substituted visit to USAID-assisted cluster villages at Banyeun in northern Vientiane plain was also almost washed out by untimely rains.

2. All Lao whom he consulted were unanimous in over-all assessment that there has been steady improvement on political, economic, and military fronts in past year and half. Principal factors cited were (A) ouster of Phoumi and Siho and of disruptive and corrupt influence in government which they represented; (B) return to constitutional forms with election of new National Assembly; (C) steady economic gains, highlighted by continuing success of stabilization program, multilateral undertaking to finance Nam Ngum hydro-electric project, and visible spread of government services (USAID-sponsored) to countryside; (D) growing effectiveness of air strikes and other military and psychological pressures against enemy forces; and (E) increasing Pathet Lao and dissident neutralist defections to friendly forces (from 140 in February to 400 in May). He found, in sum, atmosphere of restrained optimism about internal affairs and also about external situation with Allied military successes in South Vietnam sustaining conviction that North Vietnamese will eventually be brought to bay and RLG achieve some semblance of peace and prosperity.

3. Against this background of relative contentment and moderate progress, Lao nevertheless showed themselves preoccupied with usual set of internal problems.

A. There is strengthening conviction that present government, although composed of able men, is spread too thin, and there is general expectation that Souvanna on his return in late July from France will face concerted pressures to enlarge his cabinet, perhaps himself relinquishing one or more portfolios. Unresolved question is whether he can find truly qualified candidates outside of ranks of portfolio-hungry but not very able deputies such as Assembly President Oudom Souvannavong, said to relish portfolio of Minister of Health or of Foreign Affairs; Serc Volavongsa, who seeks Ministry of Public Works; and Khampha Sackda, candidate for now vacant position of Secretary of State for Finance. Souvanna is undoubtedly wise to keep this Pandora's box closed for as long as he can.

B. Assembly deputies are already exercised that their two-year term expires next year. Min Justice Inpeng Suryadhay (himself a deputy) is at work on proposal that King extend term of present deputies from two to five years, which is normal span of service specific in constitution. Few give this proposal much chance of success against expected opposition of King Savang, who personally endorsed two-year term. Another proposal, advanced by Phoui Sananikone, is that King let this Assembly pass into oblivion and exercise his constitutional power to appoint entirely new Assembly. Phoui would vastly prefer this appointive process to either restricted or general elections in context of a divided Laos. Since Souvanna is apparently only mildly concerned at anxieties of deputies over their future, this problem is likely to lie fallow at least until late fall as far as he is concerned.

C. Souvanna is increasingly preoccupied, however, with problem of national unity against Neo Lao Hak Xat. He suggested to Phoui June 26 that Phoui accept mandate to establish "union of parties" in National Assembly, which we take to mean a national front incorporating all conservative factions and Neutralists. Union of this sort, while eminently desirable, would have to be based on a meeting of minds between Souvanna and Prince Boun Oum, and until that occurs, Phoui sees no useful role for himself in project. Mere fact, however, that Souvanna sees diminishing value in maintenance of separate Neutralist Party underlines evolution of his thought over past several years. If he could achieve political merger of Neutralists with conservatives into national front (while preserving status of neutrality for Laos), way would be eased to unification of Neutralist armed forces with FAR and to greater military as well as political efficiency. Unification of armed forces is also objective which General Kouprasith Abhay has very much in mind.

D. Perhaps because of generally favorable security situation and low level of enemy activity, military concerns did not loom large during talks. Kouprasith said that Lao/Viet may well seek establish fortress base on Bolivens Plateau if pressures continue to mount on their positions in corridor and in South Vietnam. He also anticipates increased enemy rice foraging activity in Panhandle during next dry season. On other hand, he believes friendly guerrilla, conventional, and air operations against enemy in northern Laos are likely to keep him off balance, and a relatively minor threat there, for some time.

4. Visit reaffirmed that Souvanna continues to be central authority on whom all important decisions devolve. He is being roundly criticized by many of his ministers, in particular Vice Premier Leuam Insisienmay, for his failure to consult them on major decisions such as fate of RLAF General Ma. Yet despite his short-comings he remains firmly entrenched in premiership and showed no signs of wanting out. Visits of several foreign personalities to Laos during past week (Unger, Lord Walston, Australian Minister Fraser, British Conservative MP Royle) as well as expected visit of Sainteny/2/ have probably buoyed his spirits. Also, he can look forward to being in France from July 7 to 24 and subsequently to attending UN General Assembly in autumn. His visit to USSR has in no way altered his belief that maximum military pressures must be exerted against Hanoi, and while he would strongly resist entry of foreign friendly forces into Laos, he is equally strong advocate of intensified air strikes against NVN.

5. Unger will undoubtedly have much to add to this from his personal impressions. Our own conclusion is that visit was highly successful, providing occasion for Lao themselves to reflect on strides they have made since February 1965 rebellion and to look ahead to future with some confidence.

Swank

I-35641/66

Washington, June 28, 1966, 4-4:25 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Ambassador Sullivan

Background: Ambassador William H. Sullivan who was in Washington on home leave and consultations, made a call on the Honorable John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), at 1600 hours, 28 June 1966. In attendance were Rear Admiral F.J. Blouin, Director, Far East Region, OASD(ISA), Colonel J.H. Mobley, Staff Assistant for Laos, OASD(ISA), and Mr. Robert F. Slutz, Department of State Desk Officer for Laos.

Ambassador Sullivan reviewed the situation in Laos saying that improvements in the situation in Vietnam are assisting in keeping Laos quiet. He stated that the economic trend in Laos is favorable. Ambassador Sullivan believed that there were hopeful signs that with continued US economic aid, in accordance with the prescription in the President's Johns Hopkins speech,/2/ Laos can eventually become economically independent and viable. To Ambassador Sullivan, this represented a changed attitude from that of a year ago when he was far less optimistic about the economic future of Laos.

The Ambassador informed Mr. McNaughton that he understood from previous discussions that a proposal had been made to transfer Laos military assistance from MAP to the Services. He said that he favored this proposal on condition that the sensitivity and classification of the Laos program be maintained in the presentation of Service budgets and in the implementation of the program by the Services.

Mr. McNaughton and the Ambassador opined that there will be some opposition in the Congress to the proposed transfer of Laos/Thailand programs from MAP, particularly Thailand. Senator Fulbright was mentioned as being potentially the chief opponent.

Ambassador Sullivan discussed the present organizational structure for military assistance in Laos whereby US military assistance in Laos is accomplished by the Requirements Office of USAID. He desired to preserve this organization, since it is considered necessary to abide by the Geneva Accords. A type organization in Thailand (currently DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand) was also believed by the Ambassador to be important to the continued support of the Laos program.

Mr. NcNaughton asked what the Lao attitude would be on a "barrier" across Laos to stop the infiltration into SVN. The Ambassador responded by saying that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma would not condone presence of US or other foreign troops and would quit thereby destroying the neutral posture of tri-partite structure of the Lao Government which has existed since the Geneva Accords of 1962. He thought that turmoil would ensue and the war in Laos would be intensified. He believed that the Soviets would withdraw their current support and tacit approval for the Royal Lao Government and would probably resume support and military assistance for Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao leader. The Ambassador pointed out that no materiel assistance from the Soviets is now being given to the Pathet Lao. This would, in his opinion, encourage increased support of the Pathet Lao from North Vietnam and eventually result in a full-scale invasion and over-running of all of Laos by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces, perhaps with the support of Communist China. In any event, a "barrier" would result in giving all Lao territory north of it to the PL which would arouse violent objection from the RLG./3/

The Ambassador stated that he understood six divisions would be required to establish a "barrier." While Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has said that he would not approve of the presence of US forces in Laos, he has concurred in US activities and operations in Laos. These are the type which are deniable and which do not arouse strenuous opposition from the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. The Ambassador feels that we are now walking a thin wire of tolerance of these activities and operations by the Soviets and Chinese Communists, Ambassador Sullivan remarked that he exercised close control over US personnel in Laos and could, if necessary, cause their removal in a very short period of time.

Rather than employ forces in Laos to form a "barrier," the Ambassador reaffirmed his previously stated proposal for launching an operation against NVN from the sea in the vicinity of Vinh.

Ambassador Sullivan revealed his dissatisfaction of US tactical bombing in Laos which concentrates in the lower Panhandle rather than in the area of Laos near the Mu Gia Pass. He believed that an intensification of bombing in this area will be effective in destroying North Vietnamese personnel and materiel at their most vulnerable point, i.e., immediately after crossing the Mu Gia Pass into Laos. The Ambassador said he intended to make this point with the Secretary of Defense, as well as with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he meets with them on Friday, 1 July./4/

The meeting concluded at 1625 at which time Ambassador Sullivan departed accompanied by Mr. McNaughton for an appointment with the Secretary of Defense.

Vientiane, July 11, 1966, 0930Z.

161. Ref: State circular 4713./2/

1. Believe that two of our recent messages (see Embtel 1371 June 27/3/ and Toaid 2798 June 29/4/) provide background for general conclusion that Laos has made steady improvement on political, economic, and military fronts in past year and half.

A. Although country remains divided and at war, it has enjoyed relative political stability under leadership of neutralist PriMin Souvanna Phouma.

B. His armed forces have extended security deep into countryside, permitting programs of rural development to make surprising strides in bringing roads, schools, dispensaries, and agricultural services to Lao villagers.

C. Under a multilaterally financed program of currency stabilization, value of money has remained relatively stable, allowing urban construction and development to proceed in an atmosphere of increasing confidence.

D. Despite strains imposed by defense of its territory against North Vietnamese supported subversion and aggression, RLG has been able to focus increasing efforts on problems of long range economic development. It is taking measures to enhance rice production. It is member of Asian Development Bank. It has concluded agreement with IBRD looking toward construction, under international financing, of the Nam Ngum hydro-electric project in period 1967-1971. This project, part of over-all multilateral development plans for lower Mekong Basin, will irrigate significant area of Vientiane Plain and will provide needed electric power to Laos and neighboring Thailand. It is outstanding example of international support for regional development in SE Asia and of international confidence in RLG and its future.

2. Although end of fighting is not in sight, RLG takes increasing pride in its capacity to contain and to thwart Pathet Lao/NVN aggression and subversion. Armed forces, greatly abetted by a small but efficient tactical air force, have generally good morale and are being by and large efficiently deployed. Defections from enemy ranks have steadily increased during past six months. Refugees continue to flee from enemy held territory strategically situated Meo and other minority peoples increasingly identify their future with that of RLG.

3. Begin FYI. RLG leaders remain publicly neutral in accordance with their 1962 statement BF neutrality. They have openly condemned, however, NVN violation of that neutrality and privately regard NVN as principal source their troubles. They are therefore profoundly aware that their future is intimately linked with course of war in RVN and have gone so far as privately to authorize unpublicized actions by allied forces against enemy forces in Lao territory. They have taken particular encouragement from evident determination of US and its allies to remain in SVN, and that firmness of purpose, although never publicly acknowledged by RLG spokesman, has more than any other single factor persuaded them that their future is not unreliably bleak. End FYI.

4. In sum, over past eighteen months there has been moderate progress in Laos which is all the more encouraging since it has been achieved against great odds.

Swank

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