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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXVIII Laos DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

241. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/

Saigon, July 13, 1966, 0725Z.

24021. Subj: Laotian air operations.

1. From an informal letter addressed to me from Ambassador Unger,/2/ Deputy Assistant Secretary Far Eastern Affairs State, I conclude that possibly the Cricket Operation/3/ is being touted at Department level as the cure-all for our interdiction efforts in the Laotian Panhandle.

2. This operation has been most effective and shows a sound potential for achieving even more success in the future. However, the tasks facing us in interdicting the principal lines of communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail challenge us to combine and apply all our assets to that end. There is no question of competition between the use of strategic bombing forces and tactical air but only their appropriate application. The devastation and psychological effect achieved by B-52 bombing makes it the most effective and efficient weapons system available for striking area targets. Further, it frees tactical air for use in Cricket and Tiger Hound as well as for explanation of Arc Light results.

3. Our nominations of Arc Light targets in Laos have been for the purpose of attacking a complete LOC system--ration and ammunition dumps, way stations, maintenance areas, warehouses and open storage--as well as the forces involved in support of these resources. It is considered essential, therefore, that the B-52 weapon system be employed in our endeavors in Laos.

Washington, July 16, 1966, 2:27 p.m.

9249. Ref: A. Vientiane's 249. B. ARMA 0471, DTG 140545Z July./2/

1. Based on your estimate of prospects for success of Operation Prasane, we inclined go along with your recommendation that we assist FAR in planned assault on Nam Bac.

2. We somewhat disturbed at magnitude of planned operation in area only 60 miles from Dien Bien Phu at time when both King and PriMin out of country and FinMin Sisouk urgently seeking more foreign economic assistance. Not sure how these plans square with implications Souvanna's recent admonition to General Staff not to provoke sharp enemy reactions (JANAF 0454)./3/

3. Nevertheless, we prepared at this time to approve use of your in-country assets, e.g., Air America H-34 helicopters, to provide needed airlift assistance to FAR for this operation.

4. We have serious reservations, however, over introduction of USAF aircraft and pilots into Laos for airlift operations./4/ We would consider this step as major departure from present policy of tactical air support to but not participation in Lao ground operations.

5. Believe political implications this proposal such as to require, as minimum, request from Souvanna for US intervention in this form./5/

Washington, July 19, 1966.

SUBJECT
Credibility and the Release of Casualty Statistics from Laos

We are faced with a serious problem in connection with reporting U.S. casualties suffered in operations in and over Laos. Although we have claimed total accuracy in the reporting of our casualties from Southeast Asia, which is true for next of kin, actually we have not told the general public of all of our casualties incurred in Laos. In the case of deaths, MIA, and detained personnel, next of kin are notified of the casualty, where the casualty occurred, and the known circumstances. We reply accurately to specific press queries as to whether a specific individual was killed or lost in Laos, but we do not issue full statistics or lists of names of casualties.

This question was raised in a background session of Thursday, May 5, on an off-the-record basis (transcript at Tab A)./2/ We stated or at least inferred at that time that Laotian casualties would be folded in to our casualties report from Vietnam. We were, in fact, only talking about combat deaths and at that time, in response to persistent inquiries, had made a special release of the total number of such deaths incurred since the beginning of our Laotian requested reconnaissance sorties in Laos--11.

Based on conversations with the Deputy Secretary, I assumed that I had authority to fold such deaths in to our weekly statistical casualty reports to the press. However, the Directorate for Statistical Services, OASD (Comptroller) did not agree, and the deaths have not been included. I should add that until now this has not caused difficulty, since the "Pentagon Regulars" understand our problem and have pushed us only mildly on the matter.

It is possibly just as well that the action was deferred since the problem is more difficult than appeared at that time. For example, we have neither announced nor confirmed the 11 servicemen killed in Laos prior to the initiation of our reconnaissance flights, nor have we said anything specific concerning wounded, missing, or captured personnel. The entire problem should be addressed, not just the KIA portion.

What is at stake now is the credibility of the Department of Defense and of the Administration as a whole. We have been accused recently of not telling the whole story with respect to all our Southeast Asia combat casualties, and we cannot truthfully deny such accusations. To date, no one of note has questioned this matter but we cannot hope to stay clear of the problem indefinitely. I have discussed this matter at length with the key members of my office and we are all agreed that we must face up to it now or be subjected to great censure if some enterprising journalist or politician digs into it.

There are several alternatives available:

1. Continue as we are at present, not announcing Laotian casualties as they occur but making future periodic announcements of the total killed in Laos since the initiation of reconnaissance flights. This course would not take care of the 11 KIA's which occurred prior to the beginning of those flights nor would it accommodate other types of casualties, such as missing in action. Consequently, our credibility would still be suspect and understandably so. Further, we would be subject to being caught at any time because of unclassified Defense Department reports of Laotian casualties, which receive wide circulation. I refer particularly to the report issued weekly by the Directorate for Statistical Services (sample at Tab B)./3/

This course probably would be acceptable to Ambassador Sullivan and the Laotian Government but does not solve the credibility problem.

2. Fold in all casualties (not just deaths) on a predetermined date with our Vietnam casualty reports and then keep up to date as casualties occur. This would have to include our daily release of the names of casualties (which do not include mention of the country concerned), since both AP and UPI keep book on us and make sure that the total number of names released equals the total numbers announced. This latter requirement provides the basic weakness of this alternative since the wire services, by specifically requesting where each individual listed was killed or was located when reported MIA or wounded, could extract the total casualties incurred in Laos--even though this information was not available from the published totals. Such action would permit them to publish separately and regularly a Laotian casualty list. This would be obviously contrary to our national policy. We could possibly decline to answer such specific requests on the basis of national security but the information could be obtained from the next of kin if the wire services or some other media or political group wished to take the trouble to check. Needless to say, Ambassador Sullivan might complain. Should we adopt this alternative today, we would have to include 28 KIA (including the 11 killed prior to the beginning of the requested reconnaissance flights, the names of the 11 disclosed in May and six new dead since then), 26 WIA, 34 MIA, and two captured. This influx of names almost certainly would cause a short press flap. However, we could live with this except for the potential problem already mentioned of weekly, press generated Laotian casualty reports./4/

3. Begin issuing regular Laotian casualty reports. This has the major disadvantage of being completely contrary to current national policy, distasteful to the Laotians and Ambassador Sullivan, and might give an indication of the level of our effort in Laos. On the plus side, however, it is the best solution from the standpoint of credibility. We could truthfully rebut any accusation of hiding our casualties in connection with the war in Vietnam.

4. Do nothing. This alternative would be most acceptable to Ambassador Sullivan and Souvanna Phouma, but put us in a hopeless situation should the matter of the credibility of our casualty statistics ever be seriously pushed. We would also be on the spot should we ever begin to use B-52's regularly in Laos or mount clandestine ground operations in that country which result in casualties.

Basically, the problem revolves around two points: (1) Is it more important to the Administration to cater to Souvanna Phouma and continue to try to hide our Laotian casualties, or (2) is it more important to strike a blow to close the alleged "credibility gap" and assure the American public that we are telling the truth about all our combat casualties in Southeast Asia. I believe that the latter point is overriding. Our credibility is under attack and the severe blow which could be inflicted by the revelation that we are hiding casualties could be a telling one in the November elections.

I recommend therefore that we adopt alternative 2, concurrently explaining the national security ramifications involved to the responsible newsmen concerned in the hope that they do not push on the matter of trying to issue regular Laotian casualty reports.

Arthur Sylvester

Vientiane, August 3, 1966, 0521Z.

641. Subj: Effectiveness of USAF operations in northern Laos.

1. Believe action and information addressees will find of more than routine interest following recapitulation of contribution of USAF air operations to ground actions in northern Laos from April 1966 to present.

2. Enemy strength in northern Laos (Provinces of Houa Khong, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Houa Phan, and Phong Saly) has increased spectacularly over past year from total of 39 battalions as of 1 July 1965 to 63 battalions as of 1 July 1966.

A. On 1 July 1965 we estimate there were (1) one bn NVN; (2) 15 bns PL with NVN advisers; and (3) 23 bns PL/NVN (bns with attached NVN units of company size).

B. On 1 July 1966 we estimate there were (1) 13 bns NVN infantry; (2) 10 bns NVN engineer troops; (3) 15 bns PL with NVN advisers; and (4) 25 bns PL/NVN.

3. This large build-up of NVN troops began last fall and culminated in largest DRV offensive yet seen in northern Laos. Offensive began in November 1965 and succeeded in taking number of long existing sites from friendly forces in Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Province as well as sites recently regained by Vang Pao. Friendly forces did not panic, fought series of bitter actions against NVN units, and moved to new bases north and west of enemy forces in order to be so placed as to put continuing pressure on enemy flanks. Enemy intention was apparently to establish a secure LOC along Route 6 to Plain of Jars with ultimate objective of being in position to resume offensive at start of next dry season (October 1966).

4. In April 1966 an integrated close air support system was introduced. Additional forward air controllers were stationed in area; A 1-E's were used as airborne forward control; approximately 32 jet sorties were scheduled daily; and close collaboration was established [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] to provide detailed and timely intelligence on enemy movements and on enemy logistics on Routes 6 and 7.

5. Marriage of excellent intelligence furnished by CAS and superb performance by 7th AE units enabled outnumbered friendly units not only to contain enemy offensive but to mount a counter offensive which has now regained 90 per cent of area lost from November 1965 to April 1966. RLAF T-28's also made considerable contribution to this effort. Enemy troop strength is still greater than friendly troop strength but high casualties inflicted on enemy units plus severe shortage of supplies brought about by airstrikes on enemy logistical system lowered morale of both NVN and PL units. Loss of morale and lack of supplies have enabled friendly elements to gain and hold the initiative.

6. Enemy casualties in northern Laos from November 1965 until June 1966 in total of 952 ground clashes have been 1,359 KIA and 783 WIA; friendly losses this period have been 517 KIA and 678 WIA. During May/June alone, in 348 clashes enemy lost 556 KIA and 134 WIA. Although these figures reflect combined NVN/PL casualties, they were predominantly North Vietnamese regular troops and were result of a grinding guerrilla campaign of ambushes, small unit actions, etc. In addition, from November 1965 until June 1966 enemy lost by conservative estimate (predominantly from ground observers) some 4,300 KIA and 700 WIA from USAF and RLAF air strikes.

7. Apart from their in-country significance, operations in northern Laos have thus made an important contribution to Allied military effort in Vietnam by engaging a substantial portion of DRV forces cited in paragraph 2B above in costly operations outside main theater of operation in SVN. Single most important factor rendering these operations costly to enemy has been USAF tactical support. Recommend CINCPAC extend our appreciation and congratulations to commands concerned through appropriately classified channels.

Swank

Washington, August 8, 1966.

You will be meeting with Ambassador William H. Sullivan, our Ambassador to Laos, at noon today./2/ The meeting was proposed by Secretary Rusk who thought you would be interested in getting Sullivan's report on current political and military developments in Laos and his views on our future course there, particularly as they relate to Viet-Nam.

Sullivan is one of the brighter young (43) foreign service officers. He has been in Laos since December 1964.

You may want to ask him:

(1) How things are going in Laos;

(2) How is Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma holding up; is the internal political situation relatively stable;

(3) How does he read the significant North Vietnamese military buildup in Laos over the last year (one NVN Battalion believed in Laos on July 1965, 13 NVN Battalions in Laos on July 1, 1966);

(4) How much pressure is Souvanna under from the Soviets as a result of our involvement in Laos;

(5) His estimate of the effectiveness of our aerial support in Laos;

(6) Are there things we should be doing that we are not doing in Laos?

A biographic note is attached./3/

Walt

Washington, August 16, 1966.

[Here follows a report of Colby's trip to South Vietnam.]

8. As noted in the cable sent to you (copy attached),/2/ I found the situation in Laos exhilarating. This is not only true of Northern Laos, which my cable discussed, but also of the situation in the South. The bases at Pakse and Savannakhet are vigorously targeted at the principal objective in the area, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and are pressing operations there with courage, energy and a high degree of professionalism. Most heartening was the contrast between this visit in July and my visit to Laos in October 1965. At that time, Pathet Lao guerrillas were at large in the neighborhood of the city and indeed in January 1966 attacked a radio relay post on the hill overlooking the city, the key Plateau of Bolovens was an inviting and vulnerable target for Pathet Lao seizure and the FAR was torn between trying to defend against at least three PL/VC threats near Saravane, Attopeu and Pak Song. In July 1966, an extensive net of local security forces exists on the Plateau except for a small area of residual Pathet Lao presence being encircled and gradually eliminated. The area near Saravane has been subjected to a most impressive exercise in "oil spotting" so that the road is now open between there and Pakse, protected by village security forces and Special Guerrilla Units. Both Lao and USAF aircraft are finding remunerative targets. In contrast to the situation in Laos in October of 1965, these areas are being used as jump off points for road watch and harassment teams moving east of the Sekong River into the Ho Chi Minh Trail area. One limitation on these operations is the availability of adequate armored helicopter support, which we will be trying to increase. Our side in Laos has the initiative and is looking around for additional work to do.

9. The most important point of a review of the Lao situation is the clear effect of a smoothly working country team under a forceful Ambassador and the strength that results from patient adherence to a balanced program of building popular participation in local security forces, guerrilla units for reinforcement and regular forces for contesting the main forces of the enemy, with full use of closely coordinated air support. Since this is a direct development of the President's action plan for Laos initiated in July 1963,/3/ it is reasonable to expect that a balanced program such as this, prosecuted consistently over a several year period, can be relied upon elsewhere not only to hold off Communist encroachment, but to press it backwards.

10. This Station will probably need small additions to its strength levels to enable it to carry on these programs, plus a variety of opportunities which present themselves in Vientiane for coverage of North Vietnam [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The basic approach, however, of small scale U.S. and unobtrusive (except to the enemy) efforts will be maintained and will be afforded henceforth the same priority for calls on Headquarters support as that accorded the Vietnam operation directly. We shall also begin the process of developing the cloak, and later the reality, of legality of the paramilitary forces supported in Laos, so that this support may with all deliberate speed be shifted to more regular channels and the programs not be jeopardized by political difficulties in quieter times.

[Here follow a report of Colby's trip to Thailand, Indonesia, and a very brief general assessment.]

[document number not declassified]

September 6, 1966.

SUBJECT
An appraisal of the political situation in Laos as of 4 September 1966

ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

SOURCE
Staff officer of this organization. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation.

1. Summary. Although there is a temporary lull in the political confrontation between Souvanna Phouma and the National Assembly, the factors that caused the crisis still exist. Souvanna's political demands were emotionally inspired and were not to achieve specific political objectives. During the crisis, anti-Souvanna sentiment and the concept of an inevitable change of government increased in scope; however, Assembly leadership failed to provide a formula of alternate leadership and failed to develop a widespread desire to bring down Souvanna's government. The King's view that it was essential to retain Souvanna government was presented to the Assembly by Dr. Oudom Souvannavong; however Oudom was not in Vientiane when it came to a showdown. The army played a major role in preserving Souvanna as Prime Minister and dispatched officers to persuade deputies to tone down their attacks. Senior generals were prepared to support Souvanna temporarily; but said that time is coming for a change. Lao Armed Forces' schedule calls for a gradual assumption of power through political means. Souvanna's government could fail as a result of: ill conceived vote of censure or no confidence by Assembly; or as a result of an over-reaction by the young-power seeking colonels to a crisis in Vientiane. However, Souvanna will probably not lose his mandate before the Assembly closes in October. The real-power seekers are trying to wear Souvanna down, and, at the same time, are building up their own political machine which will arrange an orderly transition of power.

[Here follows a 10-page report.]

Washington, September 8, 1966.

SUBJECT
Status Report on CIA Counterinsurgency Operations in Laos

From the Fall of 1965 to date an estimated 70,000 North Vietnamese personnel have been committed to a priority campaign in cooperation with the puppet Pathet Lao forces in Laos to:

A. Occupy and control the strategically important North and Northeast area of Laos.

B. To develop and maintain a complex road network through the Panhandle of Laos (the "Ho Chi Minh Trail") in order to funnel personnel and supplies to the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam.

Because of the magnitude and severity of this predominantly North Vietnamese drive, coupled with the war in Vietnam, it has been of priority importance to use CIA-trained and -armed tribal assets as elements of a coordinated Country Team program against these two major North Vietnamese efforts.

During late-1965 and early-1966 there was a major enemy buildup in all three Northern project areas (see Tab A)./2/ Twelve battalions of North Vietnamese infantry, ten battalions of North Vietnamese engineer troops, fifteen battalions of Pathet Lao with North Vietnamese advisors, and twenty-five battalions of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese entered in Northern Laos.

In the Sam Neua compartment the enemy took a number of long-held friendly positions in a series of bitterly contested engagements. Meo units under General Vang Pao moved to positions north and west of the line of advance, remaining in position to put constant pressure on the enemy's flanks during his drive south. In the Nam Ou corridor, south of Phong Saly in North Laos, the enemy succeeded in clearing the significant Nam Ou River Valley of friendly opposition and then proceeded to buildup his logistical channels from Dien Bien Phu down the Nam Ou to the north of Luang Prabang both east and west of the river. Along the Nam Tha corridor enemy action reflected a trend similar to that of the Nam Ou area in efforts to expand south attempting to clear the river valley of friendly influences, secure the rice-producing area, and consolidate gains. In April 1966 the United States Air Force with Forward Air Controllers joined the action. A close collaboration was established between the Headquarters of General Vang Pao (Leader of the Meo Paramilitary force), the 7th Air Force, and CIA/Vientiane [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to provide detailed and timely intelligence to the strike aircraft operating in direct support of ground action. Concurrently a series of guerrilla actions were initiated by friendly forces. The merger of these two actions enabled friendly units not only to contain the enemy offensive but to mount a counteroffensive which regained 90 per cent of the area lost during the previous enemy offensive. Although out- numbered, our paramilitary forces now have the initiative and are engaging the enemy on an almost daily basis. With direct air support provided by 7th Air Force planes who receive target briefs from the target analysis and control base at Udorn, they are tying down a large DRV force, inflicting significant troop casualties, destroying supplies and effectively interrupting logistical lines.

During this same period, we have trained and deployed 29 roadwatch teams along the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" in Southeast Laos to provide tactical information on the movement of men and materiel into South Vietnam. This information is transmitted by radio to the Central Control Base in Udorn, Thailand, and to FAC aircraft to facilitate Air Force interdiction attacks against the Trail. Techniques to facilitate this Country Team interdiction campaign are being improved constantly. Tribal assets are employed to provide security for forward team launch bases.

Additionally, a Country Team area security program called the Sedone Valley Project is proving successful in consolidating the western-half of the lower Lao panhandle and providing a secure base for operations into the "Ho Chi Minh Trail". CIA directs the security aspects of this program.

In the conduct of this counterinsurgency program, CIA provides logistics, salaries, and subsistence to the tribal forces and provides support base and training facilities. One of the largest cost items is the provision of air support for forward supply of field forces and infiltration/exfiltration of teams.

CIA programs in Laos should be continued and in some cases expanded to deal with NVN/PL incursion, as an integral part of the war in Vietnam.

[Here follow sections 3, "Factors Bearing on the Problem" and 4, "Coordination," totaling 14 pages.]

Because of the importance of the counterinsurgency program in Laos to the overall United States effort in Vietnam it is requested that the Committee endorse the continuation and expansion of the program as outlined above and summarized in the attached chart (Tab B)./3/

It should be understood that continuation and expansion of this program as recommended will necessitate raising the funding level in FY 1967 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It will therefore be necessary for CAS to request supplemental appropriations for this purpose in the amount of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 1967./4/

Vientiane, September 11, 1966, 0715Z.

1447. Joint Embassy/ARMA/CAS message. Subject: North Vietnamese order of battle in Laos. Ref: A. CINCPAC 180030Z Aug (notal)./2/ B. FOV 9190./3/ C. AmEmb Vtn 641/030521Z Aug./4/

1. This is a preliminary response to Ref A based on information provided by CAS Vientiane. Mission plans conduct in very near future review of enemy OB in Laos and will furnish addressees with results of this review. We believe that this review will be facilitated as result increased emphasis on south Laos [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Intelligence produced by this effort should enable us to make hard estimate through collection all source data whereas previous estimates for south Laos had minimal input from controlled assets.

2. CAS OB estimate for 1 July 1965 reflected two possible NVNA infantry bns with Lao troops, 4,525 NVNA troops attached to PL battalions in platoon to company strength (PL/NVNA), and 700 NVNA troops attached to PL battalions as advisors (PL/NVNA), giving total 5,825 probable troops in Laos. In addition CAS estimates that there were about 10,000 engineers (including coolie labor) and about 3,000 NVNA personnel in support activities such as medical, supply, transportation, signal, command, etc., which gave total 18,325 NVNA personnel in Laos as of 1 July 1965.

3. OB estimates for 1 July 1966 reflected 19 probably NVNA infantry bns with strength of 7,435 troops, 4,525 NVNA troops attached to PL battalions from platoon to company strength and 680 NVNA troops attached to PL battalions as advisors. Same estimate reflected 21,000 engineers (including coolies) and about 7,000 in support activities which gave total of 42,265 NVNA personnel in Laos as of 1 July 1966.

4. Comparison of 1 July 1965 and 1 July 1966 figures indicate increase of 23,430 NVNA personnel in Laos during that one year period.

5. Eighty percent of the infantry (NVNA) (PL/NVNA) and (PL/NVN) increase attributable to influx of new personnel into Laos from North Vietnam. A 100 percent increase in engineer personnel (including coolies) reflected movement new personnel into Laos in conjunction with 50 percent increase engineer effort at road building maintenance during the past nine months.

6. Support personnel in Laos increased over 100 percent in connection with increased activity in infantry and engineer fields.

7. Above figures considered as confirmed within CAS's OB accept-ance criteria (para 8) and as such reflect reporting from human sources in areas where there is continuing coverage in depth. As indicated paras 5 and 6, therefore, major portion above increase reflects actual movement new NVNA personnel and units into Laos including normal replacement filler troops for KIA/WIA.

8. Determination if new enemy troops are replacements for losses, normal rotation or new units made only after lengthy analysis of several months traffic. On occasion, however, such as NVN prisoner taken Na Khang Battle past February, reported in FOV 8942,/5/ CAS obtained firsthand information on movement new NVN units into Laos. Otherwise professional analysis of reports using well established OB techniques; experience of OB analyst and common sense are blended in making judgements on which troops reflect casualty rotation replacements vis-à-vis troops belonging to new unit. For example, four thousand troops reported Ref B not killed in one fell swoop but over period Nov 65-Jun 66, prior to, throughout and after which period CAS continues receive reports of manpower conscription throughout Laos and of troops arriving in Laos from NVN.

9. Ref A, however, also considered areas not covered in depth by CAS human sources and reflected use of sources such as aerial photography, special intelligence and refugee interrogations to make estimate of enemy strength in those areas. This estimate primarily an extension of enemy strength identified in well covered areas of Laos and as such CAS considers majority enemy personnel in areas where estimates were made to also reflect new bodies from NVN.

10. CAS conclusion: at least two-thirds of NVN increase mentioned Ref B attributable actual movement new personnel into Laos. Increase in PL strength (Ref B) on other hand reflects almost exclusively bookkeeping changes based on refinement of estimates made possible by receipt additional and more detailed information.

11. ARMA believes that there is conclusive evidence of a substantial NVA buildup during period Jul 65-66. ARMA also believes that there is evidence of a diminution in PL combat and combat support activity which may to some extent offset the NVA increase as well as reduce CAS's estimate of PL strength. ARMA not convinced (A) that enemy losses (KIA, WIA, and rallies) are adequately reflected, (B) that enemy effective unit strengths are as high as CAS estimates, nor (C) that enemy unit designations are not inflated by deception tactics as practiced in RVN. These reservations concerning accuracy of existing estimates are being fully examined in ARMA study now under way to which CAS is contributing.

Sullivan

Washington, September 15, 1966.

SUBJECT
Project Pop Eye

As you know, we are vitally interested in reducing infiltration into South Vietnam through the Laotian panhandle. Vehicular travel in this area is virtually halted by softening of the road surfaces during the monsoon season. Project Pop Eye is a covert and highly classified operational experiment which we plan to run within the next few weeks in the Laotian panhandle. It will determine the feasibility of increasing the rainfall during the current monsoon season and possibly extending its duration.

The objective would be to damage the trail structure by heavy rain. The materials involved are non-toxic and will not harm vegetation. The increased rainfall will be limited to a small controlled area, approximately 200 square miles. Plans have been made and will be put into operation within approximately 20 days--just prior to the end of the normal monsoon season.

Concurrence in the merits of the experiment has been received from both the JCS and the theater commanders. Technical adequacy of the experiment has been verified by Dr. Hornig who concurs that we should proceed. Approval for the conduct of the test has been received from Ambassador Sullivan under the condition that it be run covertly, and the State Department has also concurred.

I have authorized the program to proceed even though there may be some objections raised by the international scientific community--if there is a breach in security. Such possible objections have not, in the past, prevented the carrying out of military operations considered to be in the interests of our national security.

The task of inhibiting infiltration into South Vietnam is one of our most serious unsolved problems--this project might offer a partial solution, if the experiment is successful.

Robert S. McNamara

Saigon, September 16, 1966, 0518Z.

160518Z. For Admiral Sharp, info General Wheeler, from General Westmoreland. Subject: Tiger Hound.

1. As result my increasing concern with the enemy's capability to build-up in Laotian Panhandle again this dry season as he did during last northeast monsoon period, I directed my staff to develop a plan to block, deny, spoil, and disrupt the infiltration of enemy personnel and supplies through this area into SVN. I will send you by separate message an outline of my general concept to be known as "SLAM"--(seek-locate-annihilate-monitor).

2. A major goal of our plan will be to achieve better integration and more concerted use of resources available to the several agencies operating in subject area. For example, we sometimes find that an air operation must be restricted because road watchers have been established (without prior coordination) in proximity of a priority interdiction point selected by Tiger Hound task force. There is real need for close advance coordination of Cricket expansion with Tiger Hound. To be effective, Tiger Hound needs more free strike zones rather than more restricted areas.

3. At my request, Ambassador Sullivan, Ambassador Martin and I met in Udorn on 14 Sep to start the ball rolling. Gen Momyer accompanied me; Ambassador Sullivan brought his Army and Air Attaches and a representative of CAS/Vientiane. We started with background briefings on intelligence situation (J2/MACV) and on Tally Ho/route package one (Gen Momyer), emphasizing interrelation these two areas with Tiger Hound and Steel Tiger north. A briefing on the MACV SLAM concept and an update on CAS/Vientiane operations followed.

4. CAS/V outlined current Cricket assets including present and projected locations. Program underway to expand assets in southern portion of Panhandle. Coordination is working well in Barrell Roll area; major goal is to get similar combined efforts underway in Tiger Hound. A major problem has been getting compatible communications. It is anticipated that ground teams will be equipped with HT-2 radios by end of month for communication with FACs. CAS/V is working up an overall package to develop a multi-sensor intelligence collection capability, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

5. Substance of major items discussed:

A. MACV Concept. There was general agreement with the concept. Amb Sullivan emphasized his endorsement of necessity to assume that enemy will meet or exceed his efforts during last dry season. Amb Martin emphasized his endorsement of basic premise that we should start now to intensify operations in Laos to spoil the enemy build-up. In this connection, Amb Sullivan stressed the importance of striking hard between now and mid-November in route package one. If enemy is to build-up in Laos, he will have to assemble construction personnel and equipment in this area during that period; the enemy should present a more lucrative target there than after entering Laos and dispersing. This is part of the MACV concept outlined to them. We currently are giving priority to Tally Ho and route package one with emphasis on flexibility to shift weight of effort whenever necessary among Tiger Hound, Steel Tiger North, Tally Ho, and route package one.

B. Arc Light. I outlined the importance of Arc Light to the SLAM concept and discussed desirability of expeditious concurrence and support for Arc Light strikes from AmEmb Vientiane. Ambassador Sullivan indicated general agreement with strikes in the border areas between Laos and SVN and between Laos and NVN. He stated he was willing to request Souvanna Phouma's concurrence regarding specific areas about which there is hard intelligence; however, State in Washington must approve this and, so far, had opposed his doing so. Considerable discussion developed concerning Arc Light strikes in DMZ and NVN; the thrust of the comments from Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin was that, while they recognized the sensitiveness of this issue, they considered it less sensitive than what we are doing in Laos. I informed them of my position in favor of Arc Light strikes in the DMZ and suggested the Ambassadors get their points across to Washington. The question of B42 bases closer to target areas to improve reaction time also was raised. I pointed out the advantages of bases in the Philippines and Thailand in terms of improved reaction time; Ambassador Martin made a rather strong favorable pitch for Sittahip, Thailand, as a B52 base.

C. Coordination of Operations. I stressed the seriousness of the threat which an enemy build-up in Tiger Hound area poses to my west flank and the importance of having maximum practicable freedom to conduct effective military operations. A particular issue emerging from ensuing discussion was the positioning of ground elements by CAS without prior coordination with MACV, thereby imposing restrictions on US air operations, e.g., road-watch positions located at selected interdiction points (SIPs). Amb Sullivan agreed that mutual coordination was necessary. It was decided to hold a staff-level conference in Saigon during the week of 19 Sep to work out this and similar problems (Amb Sullivan will initiate a cable to recommend specific dates).

D. Exchange of Intelligence. We raised problems of getting information obtained by road watchers into MACV intelligence system quickly and completely. It was recognized that CAS/Vientiane passes intelligence to MACV through CAS/Saigon in accordance with basic CAS policies, but this is a slow procedure. We proposed a full-time liaison officer from J2/MACV be accepted under such cover as Amb Sullivan desires in order to expedite the direct exchange of intelligence between AmEmb Vientiane and J2/MACV. There was some discussion of an alternate plan to station a J2/MACV liaison officer at Udorn; nothing specific was decided. This matter will be discussed further at Saigon coordination conference.

E. Shining Brass. Chief SOG/MACV briefly discussed plans for increasing size and capabilities of Shining Brass assets. Amb Sullivan again raised the comparative sensitiveness of Laos and the DMZ; he seemed to favor putting Shining Brass assets in the DMZ. I pointed out the importance of getting prompt concurrence from AmEmb Vientiane on Shining Brass missions and discussed extension of the Shining Brass special operating area opposite Quang Tri Province from 5 KM to 20 KM. This is required on an urgent basis because of the current threat to Quang Tri Province and the enemy capability to slip around the DMZ and strike into the province from the west. I consider it enemy attempt to mount a "Dien Bien Phu" type operation against, for example, Khe Sanh. Province is part of my overall plan aggressively to seek information and to nip in the bud any enemy attempts to strike from that area into Quang Tri Province. Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin both expressed similar concern and supported my analysis, particularly in view of the enemy's need to achieve some dramatic success in period just before US elections. Nevertheless, Ambassador Sullivan stated that, because of his earlier approval of Shining Brass mission with which Washington did not agree, he now had to forward all Shining Brass requests to State Department for their consideration.

F. Free Strike Zones. There was general discussion on reducing restrictions on air operations in Tiger Hound. No decisions were reached. This matter will be reopened at proposed Saigon conference during week of 19 Sep.

6. It is imperative that we take action now to reduced further enemy build-up in the Panhandle rather than wait until build-up has occurred.

7. I consider this Udorn meeting to be a good start on better integration of operations in the Laotian Panhandle. Anticipate more concrete progress at Saigon conference week of 19 Sep. Will keep you informed.

Saigon, September 16, 1966, 0519Z.

160519Z. Personal for Adm Sharp, info Gen Wheeler, from Gen Westmoreland. Subj: COMUSMACV SLAM concept (U). Ref: COMUSMACV 160518 Z Sep./2/

1. Reference reported on conference between Amb Sullivan, Amb Martin and myself. This message outlines MACV "SLAM" concept referred to in reference.

2. With arrival of northeast monsoon season, weather in Laotian Panhandle will be clearing and enemy is expected to infiltrate personnel and supporting material in quantity through that area. The requirement to counter this threat is evident. If allowed to go unchecked, it will permit enemy to engage our flank in Quang Tri Province from the west and will permit large scale diversionary attacks further south.

3. The seriousness of this thrust led us to development of a new concept to block, deny, spoil, and disrupt the infiltration of enemy personnel and supplies through Laos during the forthcoming dry season. During the previous dry season we were experimenting, developing tactics and techniques, and building up our assets. Capitalizing on our experience and improvement of resources, we now have developed a concept of operations for the forthcoming period of good weather which I believe will improve significantly our ability to counter the infiltration threat through the Laotian Panhandle. The concept hinges on two basic principles:

A. First, we will intensify around-the-clock surveillance and interdiction of known infiltration routes. This process will stress attack of selected interdiction points (SIPs) as well as strikes against targets of opportunity.

B. Second, we will concentrate our resources on successive key target areas to be known as "SLAMs."

4. Highlights of our concept, which consists in turn of a series of overlapping phases, are as follows:

A. Phase One. All intelligence collection agencies (all-sensor air reconnaissance, road watcher, FAC's, Shining Brass, etc.) will intensify their efforts. Our goal in this phase is to refine our knowledge of enemy capabilities to infiltrate through Laos and to obtain indications as to what and where he will put his major efforts. During this collection phase, we will continue normal Tiger Hound strikes and other actions at approximately current rates. In essence, during the pre-northeast monsoon season, we will continue pressure with Tally Ho interdiction in route package one, keeping a sharp eye on Steel Tiger.

B. Phase Two. As our intelligence base expands, we will effect transition from phase one into phase two. Current reconnaissance and offensive operations throughout the Panhandle will be continued, with priority to enemy buildup capabilities, i.e., engineer and other construction efforts, way stations, supply points, and staging areas. Concentrated intelligence on these potential target areas will provide required data for selection of key target areas.

C. Phase Three. Once an area is designated as a "SLAM," we will hit the target with sufficient B-52 and tactical airstrikes to neutralize it. This action will be followed by visual and photo air reconnaissance and/or ground reconnaissance patrols and, if appropriate, exploitation forces. During the stage involving ground forces, the only application of air power will be in direct support of Shining Brass. Latter elements, on withdrawal, will leave mines and booby traps; Air Force will follow with air-delivered land mines. In special instances, we plan to leave "stay behind" reconnaissance parties. Dependent upon the area and intelligence, the sequence of applying these resources will be altered. This process will be repeated against each developed target. It is essential in this regard, to understand that massing our efforts on a specific "SLAM" area does not mean ignoring other targets. FAC's and armed reconnaissance aircraft will be scouring the roads; road watchers and Shining Brass will operate in their territories; and our other intelligence operations will continue.

D. During all phases, there will be an intensification of psychological warfare and herbicide operations.

5. In summary, the enemy capability to infiltrate personnel and supporting material through the Laotian Panhandle is a definite threat to our efforts in SVN. We must use all assets at our disposal to block, deny, spoil and disrupt this infiltration.

[document number not declassified]

September 27, 1966.

SUBJECT
An appraisal of the political situation in Laos as of 27 September 1966

ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

SOURCE
Staff officer of this organization. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation.

1. Summary. Since the defeat of the budget on 16 September 1966 and the subsiding of the flood waters in the city without serious epidemic or starvation, there has been the most intensive period of political maneuvering in Vientiane since the July 1965 elections. The main contestants, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and a majority grouping of the Assembly, have competed to influence the King, the King's Council and the army without, however, resorting to violence or even a serious threat of violence. The extremity of the positions initially adopted by each contestant eased somewhat and a compromise solution which would preserve elements of the positions of both sides can yet emerge from the continuing discussions. The intense political activity that took place in the period from 16 to 26 September was characterized by the following main thrusts:

A. The Assembly acted with a greater degree of cohesion than heretofore, first in its disparate elements combining to vote against the budget and later when the repercussions of this action and Souvanna's counteraction became apparent, to work under some degree of leadership for its survival.

B. Souvanna plunged into the political fight using his influence with the King, with the King's Council and to a lesser extent with the army to bring pressure on the Assembly to back down.

C. The King has not shunned his constitutional responsibility for playing a decisive role in resolving controversies of this sort, but he has thus far sought to let the parties play their game out with a minimum of interference.

D. Lastly, the army as an organizational entity did not intervene to influence the Assembly directly in favor of the government and Souvanna did not seek this. Its overall political role was more passive than in previous crises and it worked to control its own rebellious elements, the perennial angry colonels of the Fifth Military Zone.

[Here follows a 5-page report.]

Washington, October 3, 1966.

SUBJECT
Shining Brass

I have your memorandum of September 30 to Mr. Bundy/2/ and, by means of a review of how Shining Brass has come to be what and where it is, would like to explain our reasons for asking that you seek to clear the proposed Public Affairs Guidance with Mr. Moyers.

Shining Brass operations involving small reconnaissance teams were first authorized in September 1965. They began in October 1965 on an infrequent, experimental basis, with shallow penetrations along the border in the southern portion of the panhandle. The mission was detection, not harassment, of the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam via Laos.

Although the pattern of individual missions has varied, the military authorities judge the over-all operation an unqualified success and an essential adjunct to effective pursuit of our military objectives in Vietnam. The most dramatic result has been an ability to pinpoint targets for tactical air strikes, and in many instances the ground teams have verified good results. Less spectacular but of importance to MACV have been the myriad of particular intelligence items that, in combination with information from other sources, have helped build a picture of the infiltration process.

From the beginning the Department's approval of Shining Brass operations has been predicted on their being conducted in a deniable fashion. This was done initially by severely limiting the depth and method of penetration and by briefings of the teams and other devices to make credible the story that such operations were taking place within Vietnam. This posture has been necessary because Shining Brass has never been discussed with Souvanna Phouma (though some of his military staff officers are aware of it) and because of his flat opposition to U.S. military ground action in Laos. In one statement of his position, on October 24, 1965, he said publicly that he opposes entry of U.S. ground troops into Laos: "So long as I am Chief of Government I will not involve my country in this adventure."

Over the intervening months, at the urgent request of General Westmoreland fully supported by the JCS, the nature of Shining Brass operations has gradually altered. The authorized depth of penetration has been increased and the use of helicopters for infiltration purposes has been extended from a depth of 5 to 12 kms. The approved operating area has been temporarily extended northward to the area in Laos adjoining the DMZ. Further temporary extensions have been granted because of military requirements for flank protection (strategic warning of enemy movements derived from the Recce Team reports) for major U.S. military operations in Quang Tri and adjacent areas in Vietnam. We have authorized limited use of platoon-size "exploitation forces" against targets which the Recce Teams have found attractive for destruction of cached supplies and similar harassment. Ambassador Sullivan reviews all proposed missions in advance and we retain a "veto" power in the Department.

The message/3/ which occasioned your memorandum was prepared concurrently with our approval of another temporary extension in the authorized Shining Brass operating area--into a heavily infested area north of Route 9 and to a depth approaching 20 kilometers from the Vietnam border. This, again, is directly connected with a major current operation in Vietnam and is designed to ensure timely intelligence of any enemy movement aimed toward entrapment of U.S. units along the western Laotian border in South Vietnam. In this new area, the ever present risk of contacts and disclosure will increase. Furthermore, we anticipate military requests for further expansion of operations during the coming dry season. Hence the need for explicit public affairs guidance; earlier the guidance was most general and rested on the relatively easy deniability of the operations because of their proximity to the frontier.

In the light of Souvanna's position and our relationship with him we simply have not been able to devise an alternative to denial. I realize, of course, the possibility of evidence being adduced that would require comment beyond the initial denial. What our proposal means, therefore, is that any disclosure following a denial would have to be dealt with by devising an explanation of a mistake. We would hold firmly to the proposition that the U.S. "is not conducting such operations" (i.e., deliberately, as a matter of policy) and if under pressure from Communist charges explain any transgression as inadvertent (e.g. bad weather, bad maps, retreat in wrong direction). Paragraph 2 of the proposed message is designed to elicit promptly enough information for us to prepare an explanation tailored to the specific circumstances.

We are sympathetic to and respectful of the credibility problem we may face. There are the major domestic factors of the Manila Meeting and the elections. We are also concerned about the possibility that the Communists might spring some specific story connected with these operations timed to undercut Souvanna's expected denunciation of North Vietnamese aggression against Laos before the UN General Assembly in mid-October.

I am satisfied that the military requirements of the situation in northern South Vietnam are such that we cannot withdraw operating authority that has been given only after searching inter-departmental examination. I therefore recommend that, as I understand is your intention, you discuss the problem with Mr. Moyers, for he should be thoroughly aware of this issue, and seek his approval of the proposed guidance.

Vientiane, October 8, 1966, 1103Z.

2104. Subj: Souvanna visit Washington and New York./2/

1. This is first of two rather presumptuous messages suggesting the sort of scenario which I believe will make Souvanna's conversations in New York and Washington most profitable to all concerned. This telegram will concern the meeting with the President. The second will cover conversations with other U.S. officials./3/

2. Meeting with President. Souvanna clearly regards this meeting as the prime objective of his visit. Therefore, he will doubtless have a carefully prepared presentation in mind. I would consequently suggest that the best way to start off this meeting would be for the President to ask Souvanna's general views on Southeast Asia, how to achieve peace in Vietnam, or some equally broad subject.

3. This discussion will doubtless lead into the meat of Souvanna's concerns. There are basically three matters on which he would welcome reassurance from the President personally:

A) That we continue to hope to work positively with the Soviet Union towards the ultimate development of stability in Southeast Asia (Souvanna has long seen the only hope for Southeast Asia as a tacit entente between U.S. and USSR to bulwark against ChiCom ambitions--at least until such time as ChiComs tame down at home and Southeast Asian infrastructure is in better shape).

B) That we have no intention mount invasion of Laos or across Laos from U.S. military positions in Thailand or Vietnam. Communist propaganda (especially Soviet) constantly accuses us of having this intention as sole means effectively cutting Ho Chi Minh Trail. I don't know how explicit President might wish to be on this point. It could conceivably be covered by a more generalized statement about "no desire to expand war beyond its current boundaries, etc."

C) That we will do our best to persuade other nations, such as Japan, Germany, UK and Australia, to continue and to augment their economic and technical aid to Laos. Souvanna is extremely grateful for U.S. aid, but his status as a "neutral" and his ability to hold his tenuous balance with the Soviets will depend upon avoiding the appearance of being a total dependent of the U.S.

4. Aside from these points and whatever Souvanna may wish raise in his presentation, President may also wish:

A) Express our admiration for political risks Souvanna has been willing take in collaborating with our military efforts;

B) Express sympathy for suffering and damage caused to Laos by recent Mekong floods;

C) Give Souvanna brief summary of U.S. expectations in seven-nation Manila conference.

5. There is always possibility Souvanna may unpredictably raise some particular request for aid--as he did with helicopters when he saw Vice President last year. These requests are usually result of promises he had made to general staff or some minister here in Vientiane. I fear I cannot forecast what form this sort of thing might take.

6. President should be aware that Souvanna is not an expert in fiscal affairs, economic development or regional planning. He has good individual ideas and his enthusiasm can be aroused for specific projects. However, he has no coordinated plan and is not much of a genius in this field.

7. I don't know whether Souvanna will specifically raise with President the Soviet proposal to overfly Laos in order avoid China./4/ I think this may depend on how far advanced the Soviet-Chinese rupture is at the time, and whether proposal has been formally made. Since Souvanna will probably not have seen Gromyko before he sees President, I would rather expect him to defer this point until his talks with Secretary Rusk and State Department officials.

Sullivan

Washington, October 11, 1966.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Prince Souvanna Phouma

You have agreed to see Laos Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday in New York.

He comes at a time of political conflict and uncertainty in Laos. The National Assembly has been dissolved after rejecting his government's new budget, tantamount to a vote of "no confidence." New elections probably will be held early next year, but the viability of the tripartite coalition government established by the 1962 Geneva Agreements has been shaken. Souvanna, nevertheless, continues to personify "tripartitism," and your meeting with him will serve to buttress his leadership.

Souvanna is openly dedicated to Lao neutrality but in private strongly supports our actions to end North Vietnamese aggression.

King Savang Vatthana has told Ambassador Sullivan that our policy in Laos is "exactly right" in all respects and hoped we found Laotian policy "useful" to our larger purposes in Asia.

At the outset you may want to:

(1) Regret that your illness a year ago prevented your seeing Souvanna then. A meeting had been tentatively arranged.

(2) Note the unfortunate loss of life and crop damage from the recent flooding of the Mekong--the worst in 40 years--and promise our continuing assistance to help the Lao recover.

I recommended that you then give Souvanna an opportunity to present his general views on how to achieve peace in Vietnam and prospects in Southeast Asia. Specifically, he will want reassurance from you personally that

--We still hope to work positively with the Soviets toward stability in Southeast Asia. He has long viewed a tacit U.S.-Soviet détente as the best bulwark against Chinese ambitions.

--We have no desire to expand the Vietnam conflict beyond present boundaries. He is highly sensitive to Communist propaganda on this point as it affects Laos.

--We will continue to encourage other nations to augment their technical and economic aid to Laos. He is grateful for our aid but sees his country's neutral status and tenuous balance with the Soviets endangered by any appearance of being dependent on the U.S.

Aside from reassuring him on these matters you might also:

(1) Reaffirm our desire for Laos to live in peace and tranquility with its neighbors, our continuing economic and military assistance to build the economy and enable Laos to resist Communist pressures, and our commitment to the 1962 Geneva Agreements.

(2) Express understanding of Souvanna's difficulties in implementing those Agreements and our support for his continuing efforts as Prime Minister.

(3) Let him know how much we appreciate the political risks he takes in collaborating with our operations against infiltration routes into South Vietnam. (As cooperative as he has been, it should be noted that he has no official knowledge of Shining Brass operations and only limited knowledge of the Arc Light program.)

(4) Summarize briefly your expectations from the seven-nation conference in Manila and your Asian trip.

There are three specific matters that Souvanna may introduce:

Soviet overflight request. The Soviets have requested permission to make Soviet "air line" overflights of Laos en route to Hanoi. Souvanna has deferred a response pending discussion with us. You might note the complexity of this and steer him to Secretary Rusk.

Foreign exchange stabilization. We support a Foreign Exchange Operations Fund along with the UK, France, Australia and Japan. There is a shortfall in CY 1966 funds available. If Souvanna expresses concern he might be reassured of our efforts with the other donors and again be referred to State.

Future of "tripartitism." Souvanna and other Lao leaders are increasingly doubtful of the further utility of the coalition governmental arrangements specified in the 1962 Geneva Agreements. They tend to believe that an avowed neutralist prime minister, replacing the tripartite facade, would still satisfy the Soviets. This is a tricky area, and it might be advisable to hear Souvanna out without substantive comment.

Souvanna has keen insight and knowledge about most Southeast Asian leaders and their policies, including the North Vietnamese. He is particularly interested in the shifting relationships among Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. As committed as he is to maintaining the neutral image of Laos he recognizes that aggression from Hanoi is the source of troubles in Indochina. Advance information is that he will identify Hanoi as the aggressor in his UN address on October 18, and by implication condemn "wars of liberation" as well. Laos had an observer at the ASPAC meeting in Seoul, has joined the Asian Development Bank and is cooperating in regional programs as politically feasible.

Secretary Rusk elaborates on these matters in the attached memorandum, which includes a biographic statement./2/

W.W. Rostow/3/

Washington, October 12, 1966.

SUBJECT
Geneva Agreements and Lao Elections

PARTICIPANTS
Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
Khamking Souvanlasy, Lao Ambassador
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Mr. Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far East

The Governor said that since Hanoi had not respected the 1962 Geneva Agreements for even one day, how could we be sure that the North Vietnamese would respect them in the future.

The Prime Minister believed that it was necessary to work on the Soviets, to get them to help bring peace to Laos. If peace could be achieved there, it would open the way to a general détente in Indochina.

The Governor commented that the tragedy was that the reconciliation we had worked for in Laos had not come about. Moreover, it looked as though the Pathet Lao was moving closer and closer to the Chinese and farther away from the Soviets. The Prime Minister agreed, adding that Chinese influence over the Pathet Lao had grown considerably in recent months. The North Vietnamese, owing to the difficulties they were now experiencing, could not help the Pathet Lao as they had in the past.

The Governor asked what Hanoi's current attitude was toward Moscow and Peking. The Prime Minister said that Hanoi is still very close to Moscow. The Governor commented that Moscow seemed to want an end to the struggle but not only did not have enough influence to bring it about but also feared that Peking would accuse the Soviets of being agents of U.S. imperialism.

The Prime Minister said he had been in Moscow in April and had talked with Mazuov. He learned that nothing could be done about Laos. The Soviets recognized the existence of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, ergo the presence of North Vietnamese in Laos, but would not act to settle the problem.

The Governor said he hoped that the Prime Minister would do everything possible to maintain good relations with the USSR, because if the Soviets considered Laos to be friendly, they would be more comfortable in any steps they took vis-à-vis Hanoi. The Prime Minister said he did not think the Soviets had changed their attitude toward Laos; they continued to trust Laos.

Mr. Unger asked the Lao Ambassador whether any decisions had been made concerning the forthcoming elections for the new Assembly. The Ambassador replied in a tone reflecting some surprise since the Prime Minister had informed Finance Minister Sisouk and him only that morning that the elections would be held on January 1. He said the elections would be regular, as distinct from the special elections held in 1965; they would accord strictly with the Constitution, a condition by which the Prime Minister set great store; and they would be on the basis of universal suffrage without discrimination of any kind. In response to Mr. Unger's inquiry, Ambassador Khamking replied that they would be under the electoral law of 1957, as amended in 1959 or thereabouts.

Mr. Unger asked the Prime Minister what he expected the election outcome to be. Souvanna replied with unwonted heat, "the non-election of the members of the present Assembly!" ("He is a hard man at times," the Lao Ambassador commented in an aside.) Mr. Unger asked whether the elections would bring young, new men to office--men young in thought and spirit, concerned for their country's welfare and not their own pockets. The Prime Minister said he did not foresee much of a change since the Lao people were tradition-minded and clung to old, well-known figures. The younger men were "illustres inconnus" to the general populace and did not stand much chance at the polls.

The Prime Minister went on to say that he did not plan to resign as Prime Minister after the elections, because that would mean the end of the Government established at the time of the 1962 Geneva Agreements, a development which would have an unfavorable effect internationally. Mr. Unger stressed the importance from the international standpoint of maintaining the form of the Geneva settlement of 1962. Souvanna agreed vigorously, in a manner implying there was no need to convert the converted. It was precisely because of this consideration that, while he would probably put two or three new people in the Cabinet, he would keep open the Pathet Lao portfolios. "We do not care," he said with unusual force, "whether the Pathet Lao participates or not. Others could be named acting to do the work, but the Pathet Lao places would be there." The main thing was that the form would be preserved.

Governor Harriman expressed the hope that those who were creating political troubles would come to realize the importance of Laos' role in Southeast Asia and in the world at large. The Prime Minister thought that they were becoming more and more aware of that. He said he often stated that if Laos had not achieved its neutrality and if it had not adhered to the 1962 Agreements, it would be a much greater battlefield than it is now./2/

Washington, October 12, 1966, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT
Hanoi-Peking-Moscow Impact on Laos; Tripartitism

PARTICIPANTS
H.H. Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
H.E. Sisouk na Champassak, Minister of Finance of Laos
H.E. Khamking Souvanlasy, Ambassador of Laos
The Secretary
Mr. Norman Armour, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Ceremonial Affairs
Mr. William C. Hamilton, Country Director Lao Affairs

The Secretary greeted Souvanna and, noting that Southeast Asia is an area of great preoccupation for us, said he would be interested in what Souvanna could tell us about what is going on in Hanoi./2/ After expressing his regret that he would be unable to lunch with the Secretary on October 13, because of his appointment with the President in New York,/3/ the Prime Minister stated that the Lao knew very little about what was going on at Hanoi. There had been no sign that North Vietnam wanted to initiate talks to end the war, in spite of great difficulties because of US bombing of means of communications and vital centers of North Vietnam. Evidence of the difficulty shows in a decline in North Vietnamese aid to the Pathet Lao.

Unfortunately Communist China's influence is increasing, replacing NVN's influence on the Pathet Lao. Souvanna thought the Secretary would know of statements by Pathet Lao leaders (Souphanouvong, Singkapo, Sot) to the effect that Mao's thought must be the guide of revolutionary people. This is surprising and worrisome for no such statements have come from North Vietnamese themselves.

The Prime Minister declared that direct Chinese Communist aid was coming to the Pathet Lao. North Vietnam is not in a position to supply the Pathet Lao with items they need because of their own internal troubles. All aid comes from China. The Lao have spotted a number of aircraft over the Plaine des Jarres, continued the Prime Minister. Since North Vietnam would use trucks and since they have no planes, these planes must be Chinese. Furthermore, recent intelligence shows that North Vietnamese troops in Northern Laos (Muong Sing-Nam Tha) have been relieved by Chinese Communist (Lu) troops. Souvanna said the RLG concern at the moment is to extend its zone of operations north of Luang Prabang.

At a later point in the conversation, the Secretary observed that perhaps the most important development in the area today is what is going on inside China. Did the Prime Minister feel that a more moderate leadership would emerge? Souvanna commented that only good can come out of the situation as far as the free world is concerned. There is strong opposition to the Red Guard among the people and the military. Even today, most Chinese people have lived under the former regime. They are traditionalists; we might almost say conservatives. The Red Guard had gone so far as to accuse the widow of Sun Yat Sen, which was a major blunder because she is greatly respected even within China.

Today Mao alone dominates the scene, Souvanna continued. He's sick, however, and the Prime Minister wondered how long he will last. In 1961, he had needed to sit in an arm chair to ride in the elevator from the 1st to the 2nd floor. If Mao goes, the regime cannot hold. Lin Piao is sick also. Souvanna thought we must do something to help topple the regime, which he did not think would be too hard. "Should we use a stick or a carrot?" asked the Secretary. "Both," replied the Prince. Souvanna said he had information that many Chinese were trying to leave China. There were perhaps two or three million Red Guard with a hard core of four to five hundred thousand. The rest followed from fear.

The Secretary asked Souvanna to do all he could to enlist the Soviets in support of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. He said it was his impression that the Soviet Union did not want a major conflagration in SEA. It was important to hold the Soviets to the 1954 and 1962 agreements. The Prime Minister responded that this is what the Lao are trying to do. This is why they strive to maintain the tripartite government. It does not disturb them to keep open the seats of the absent Pathet Lao. Souvanna thought that in the near future, if a complete diplomatic break took place between Moscow and Peking, the Soviet Union could then assume a more constructive, more positive role with respect to the 1954 and 1962 agreements. Until there is such a break, Moscow hesitates. Moscow is still trying to bring China back into the Communist world. After a final break, he concluded, Moscow will have a different attitude./4/

New York, October 13, 1966.

SUBJECT
Situation in Southeast Asia

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
Sisouk na Champassak, Minister of Finance
Khamking Souvanlasy, Lao Ambassador
Leonard Unger, Deputy Asst. Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Norman Armour, Assistant Chief of Protocol

The President expressed his regret at having been unable, because of his illness, to meet with the Prime Minister last year. He was following with much interest the efforts of the Prime Minister./2/ He was aware of the Prime Minister's responsibilities and that many problems came with them. He had been looking forward to this meeting very much and hoped that the Prime Minister would give him a good fill-in on the situation in Laos and Southeast Asia. He would greatly value hearing the Prime Minister's views and opinions on any subjects he cared to discuss.

The Prime Minister responded that the situation in Southeast Asia was very complex, made even more so by the show of bad will on the part of the Chinese and the North Vietnamese. It had been apparent for some time that the Chinese influence was now the dominant factor. The North Vietnamese tended to draw closer to the Soviet Union and their attitude was more reasonable than the Chinese. Asked by the President if this was a good development, the Prime Minister said that it was indeed encouraging. North Vietnam had much to fear from a neighbor such as China which had dominated Vietnam for centuries. (Later the Prime Minister elaborated on Soviet influence in North Vietnam stating that the Soviets were attempting to gain more influence in that country, but do not have much at the moment.) With the Soviet Union there was at least a possibility of reaching an understanding. The Soviet Union was closer to the countries of the West than China which was completely isolated.

Asked by the President to place himself in the President's role for a moment and say what he would do differently, what he would do that the President was not doing at this time, the Prime Minister emphasized that there was no other solution outside of what the President was now doing. "Would you stop the bombings?" asked the President. "No," replied the Prime Minister, "because the time is not propitious. North Vietnam has been living a fiction based upon their victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu." The Prime Minister said he had talked many times with General Giap; Giap feels very strong, he feels that when it comes to infantry the North Vietnamese troops are the best in the world. "What do you think?" asked the President. The Prime Minister asserted that as fighting men they did have great valor. "Why aren't they fighting then; they have 4 to 5 divisions there?" continued the President. The Prime Minister stressed that they were waiting for the right moment.

He said that the North Vietnamese have two aims, one is the socialist conquest of the other countries of Indochina: South Vietnam, Central Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The North Vietnamese flag shows a star with five points denoting the five countries of Indochina. The Prime Minister explained that with their dense and increasing population the North Vietnamese needed more land. As the President knew, under the French South Vietnam fed the North. With more population the North needed to extend itself toward the delta. The North Vietnamese had also taken over a concept which was developed by the French Government in colonial days: Laos, with its still abundant resources, colonized by Vietnam and controlled from Hanoi. This then was the dual thrust of the North Vietnamese: the socialist conquest and the need for more living space.

The President reiterated his question to the Prime Minister: What would he do that the President was not doing? The Prime Minister replied that the North Vietnamese needed to be shown how much stronger the United States was than they, then they would come to the conference table. They counted on a victory by force of arms as they did over the French. The second point was to give South Vietnam a democratic and stable regime. It was also necessary to give that government the means to increase its economic level to a point where it would be higher than that of the North. The last elections in South Vietnam, continued the Prime Minister, had shown that the people were against a communist regime. He added that even in North Vietnam, where the regime dominated by force and terror, it would be an error to believe that all North Vietnamese were communists. So if for some time the United States continued to bomb North Vietnam, destroying its economic potential and its military installations, and at the same time continued to conduct military strikes against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in the South, this would help bring them to the conference table. The Prime Minister said that the President had been absolutely right to assert that his country was not attempting to destroy the regime of the North; this point was very important for their leaders. Asked what kind of installations he would bomb, such as steel mills, cement plants, dikes, etc., the Prime Minister answered that these were the type of targets he had in mind and he commented further, after being asked by the President if this would not entail many civilian losses, that such plants were usually on the periphery of the towns and that in any case the towns had been evacuated and there would not be many victims. He felt that while in April 1964, at the time of his last visit to Hanoi, the North Vietnamese were very confident of military success, this could no longer be the case because of the strength deployed by the U.S.

The President asked if the Prime Minister would be agreeable to saying a few words to the press and together they outlined what the Prime Minister might say. The Prime Minister listed the following points: This was his first call on the President. He had availed himself of this opportunity to inform the President of the situation in Southeast Asia. Together they have reviewed the situation there trying to find the solution to the present problems. The Prime Minister saw the convening of a conference with a membership similar to, or broader than, the Geneva conference of 1954 as the way to a solution.

While waiting for the press to appear, the President asked the Prime Minister for information about the recent floods. The Prime Minister emphasized what a great disappointment this tragedy had been for his country. They had lost a bumper crop of rice. Thanks to the aid of friendly countries and in particular of USAID they had overcome the difficulties and forestalled epidemics. Damage was valued at approximately $5 million mostly in crops and buildings destroyed and livestock killed. The President asked if there had been many losses in human lives and the Prime Minister said there had been about one hundred victims. It was the worst disaster in 40 years. The President assured the Prime Minister that we wanted to work very closely with his government to meet the problems caused by the flood and that we wanted to do all we could to help.

The President assured the Prime Minister of our desire to play a positive, constructive role for stability in Southeast Asia. We did not want to keep troops there, or bases, or dictate the political affairs of any of these countries. We wanted to be a helpful friend, not a dominating presence. At the same time we believed that freedom and self-determination were very important for the people of Southeast Asia just as they were for any American family. We did not want to widen the conflict, stated the President.

The President urged the Prime Minister to stimulate as many countries as possible to take an active interest in helping foster the economic development of Laos. We were very much aware of our commitment under the 1962 Agreement and we wanted Laos to live in peace and tranquility and we would continue to help in the economic development of Laos.

The President pledged his personal support to the Prime Minister and his difficult task. The President emphasized the importance of a meeting such as the forthcoming Manila conference. He said also that the Asian Development Bank and our concern with regional development in Asia must surely help convince the people of that region that we were not interested in Europe alone. At Manila we shall meet with the chiefs of state of all countries having troops in Vietnam. We were ready to go immediately from the battlefield to the conference table. It should be clear to all by now that it was Ho Chi Minh who refused to do the talking. The Koreans had about 50 thousand troops in South Vietnam now, the Philippines were sending a contingent, Australia/New Zealand had sizeable contingents and we were increasing our own forces. Hanoi must certainly understand that it could not win.

Asked about his own plans and projects for the development of Laos, the Prime Minister mentioned the trips he had made to get help from other friendly countries. Then he cited a project involving a bridge over the Mekong. It was hoped that Japan would participate in that venture, and he would be happy if USG would take the initiative with regard to the project. The President said he would explore this. The President also assured the Prime Minister of our continued participation in FEOF.

[The press then came in and the Prime Minister and the President each made statements.]/3/

Following the statements to the press, the President told the Prime Minister that, although he had only a few moments left, he wanted to hear the Prime Minister's views on what was happening in South China today, what were the real conditions in North Vietnam, how much longer could they hold, and who was the real key in bringing them to the conference table. On China, the Prime Minister thought that the activities of the Red Guards were indeed a very serious development. He thought the situation could not remain as it was in North Vietnam very long. Their difficulties were very serious. They had very little food; they had to work at night. They could not sustain this very long. Asked who was boss in Hanoi, the Prime Minister pointed out that Ho Chi Minh was largely a figure-head whose name and reputation were used. The most influential members of the collective leadership were, in his opinion, Pham van Dong and Giap. The former, an intellectual, was more reasonable than Giap who was very militant and impressed with the past victories. As an indication of the difficulties in North Vietnam, the Prime Minister cited the fact that the North Vietnamese no longer aided the Pathet Lao; this aid was now given solely by the Chinese.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister reiterated what he had said publicly on other occasions that if South Vietnam became communist tomorrow, Laos would be lost. Laos stood as a buffer in front of Thailand, Laos was actually the front line for Thailand. The Prime Minister fully agreed with the President that if the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam, it would not take the Chinese too long to be in Honolulu.

The President again assured the Prime Minister that he was giving him his full personal support in the efforts he was making.

Washington, October 15, 1965, 4:54 p.m.

66917. Ref: Vientiane 2276./2/

1. Share your dismay over possible new disturbance within neutralist ranks and agree direct action to unseat Kong Le would be unfortunate, particularly while Souvanna in U.S.

2. We are arranging to contact Souvanna in New York and inform him along lines of your para 6,/3/ including offer of communications assistance should he desire. You should also contact Sisoumang in similar vein, since it would be impossible to explain to Souvanna why we credited report sufficiently to alert him without informing designated acting MinDef.

3. Also believe it would be useful to spread knowledge of rumored "coup" somewhat more widely if you can arrange to do so without attribution.

4. If your late reading of situation warrants, including Sisoumang's reaction, recommend you consider feasibility of delaying Kong Le's return to Vang Vieng by aircraft "mechanical difficulty" or other means. An alternative would be for ARMA rep to accompany him back to Vang Vieng which should disrupt plan at least to some degree, unless you feel this would betray knowledge of plot.

5. Source of FOV 9469/4/ is such that we are concerned report may have been launched to test U.S. reaction, and caution obviously called for. Agree it is important to avoid appearance of taking sides (though it is somewhat difficult to see clearly who is on whose side). Though fully cognizant of Neutralist commanders' grievances toward Kong Le over money, faltering leadership, etc. and of their desire to improve future career prospects, we have not been aware of breach in close personal tie between Col. Sing and Kong Le that would permit former to consider participation in plot that might involve his leader's death.

6. We continue to believe a reasonable long-range goal is to work for orderly reincorporation of Neutralist forces into National forces, at pace and in ways that will remove rivalry and mutual suspicions, offer security for future of able officers and troops, and preserve Neutralist label at least for time being. Disappearance of distinctive Neutralist units, however reorganized and subordinated to National command, would, we think have general political disadvantage and might lead to further defections toward Deuane or PL from among those who have followed Kong Le so long in pursuit of principle of neutrality.

7. Recognize that if Kong Le has come to be serious and unmanageable impediment to progress in this direction, we cannot indefinitely prop him up in place despite his apparently constructive interest in socio-economic development of Vang Vieng area. Unable judge from here to what extent his retention as Commander is still of symbolic importance to civilians in Neutralist areas and to line troops, as distinct from disillusioned staff and selfseeking unit commanders. But forcible removal of once popular if now tarnished leader (especially by violence and with FAR connivance), under circumstances reminiscent of departure of Siho and other such incidents, would clearly be disruptive and increase sense of personal insecurity among Lao to which you have recently referred. Without implying we would step in to stop contemplated action, your conversations dealing with reported move against Kong Le should make clear we not endorsing any such attempt to solve a basic political problem by force./5/

Rusk

Vientiane, October 17, 1966.

Dear Bill:

Shortly after I received your message about General Starbird's Task Force 728, I received a message from John McNaughton asking me to send my comments on the Task Force proposal to Secretary McNamara in Saigon./2/ I have not yet received the Task Force papers,/3/ but John gave me a synopsis of the Project as it has emerged; and, of course, I had an original acquaintance with it during the meetings which Max Taylor and I had with the JASON Group/4/ last summer in Santa Barbara.

Unfortunately, I was extremely pressed at the time John's message arrived and had only a couple of hours to consider and compose a reply which would get to Saigon in time for the McNamara review with Westmoreland. Consequently, my cable/5/ was rather abrupt and lacking in nuances. However, I enclose a copy to give you the general thrust of my reaction.

Since this message was sent, I had the pleasure of about two hours of discussion with John McNaughton here in Vientiane. During that talk, I was able to flesh out my thoughts in greater detail and give him a better appreciation of my views. He was not unreceptive to my perspective and promised to relay my thoughts faithfully to Secretary McNamara. He suggested that I write them out in a long letter to you so that you could then discuss them with him in Washington. Hence, this epistle.

First, I start from my impression of the group who developed these proposals. They are, as you know, physicists, mathematicians, and a few engineers. They are relatively unsophisticated in politics and quite innocent of knowledge affecting Southeast Asia. The views of most of them are underlain with a considerable emotion about war--and especially about war "between white men and yellow men."

The thrust of their effort was to create a proposal which would provide the United States with a plausible excuse to terminate the war and evacuate Vietnam. Some members of the group (one father and son combination in particular) were quite intellectually dishonest in the presentation of "facts" and "cost estimates" tailored to their emotions. Others were clearly disinterested. In the Santa Barbara session, neither Jerry Weisner nor George Kistiakowsky was present, so I don't know their views. However, Murray Gell-Mann, who was clearly the most intelligent among those present, took me aside and described the proposal as totally impractical. He said, however, that he would not resist it because he could think of nothing better to suggest.

Starting from this inauspicious beginning, I move into some of the considerations I mentioned in my cable, and some others which I omitted because I was not sure of the political context in which the proposal was being considered. After my talk with John McNaughton, I feel I can comment more directly on these aspects. I shall therefore repeat here what I told him in Vientiane.

It is my feeling that barriers ought to be considered in two con- texts--either as tactical measures to be used during the current fighting phase, or as enforcement measures to define a territory which is politically as well as militarily defensible when the war ceases. It might be possible for one barrier to serve both purposes, but I frankly can't see it in this case. There is nevertheless no reason why planning and even execution could not go forward simultaneously on both types of barriers.

Let us take the tactical barrier first. John tells me some consideration is being given to establishing this, and then suspending the bombing of North Vietnam. He seemed surprised to learn that I felt, under such circumstances, that we would soon also have to suspend bombing in Laos. It is not only a question of "uncovering" us by the absence of North Vietnam raids. It is also a question of exposing Souvanna to increasing pressure from Soviet and other sources to force a suspension in Laos. There is moreover the factor of predictable public opinion pressure in the U.S.

Therefore, the sorts of barriers Jason proposes, south of the Seventeenth Parallel, and in Laos, accompanied by a bombing pause, would cause all sorts of problems here. It would first lead, in my judgment, to suspension of bombing in Laos. This, of course, would destroy the concept of the vehicle barrier as proposed. It would also make it very difficult, but perhaps not impossible to maintain the personnel barrier. However, it would generate pressures to disclose that a personnel barrier exists in Laos so that you could sustain the logic of your bombing pause. This in turn would raise pressures for the elimination of that portion of the personnel barrier in Laos. In short, I think the Jason barrier plus the bombing suspension is a non-starter for Laos.

If the barrier is mounted in the place Jason suggests, but bombing continues, the political problem would be less. However, we would then encounter some practical military considerations. Our Tiger Hound, Cricket, SLAM and Road Watch operations are a barrier in being. They are naturally not 100% effective, but they did cost the opposition about 1000 trucks destroyed last year and may have been a large measure in his decision to go straight across the DMZ. It is too early in the season to predict, but we currently see very little moving down the Ho Chi Minh trail. This may mean, that from a cost effectiveness viewpoint, our "barrier" has already had a considerable measure of success.

Consequently, we would be loathe to drop it in favor of a new and untested type of barrier which is highly dependent on gadgetry. There may be some resentment from the Stateside "experts" that my "experts" are willing to second guess them on subjects in which the former hold doctorates. But, I submit that my team knows more than anyone else outside Hanoi about the Ho Chi Minh trail. I am therefore most reluctant to consider trading a road watch team for a sono-buoy sensor, or an FAC strike controller for a sack of "gravel." In short, we have and will continue to have grave doubts about the technical feasibility of this scheme.

There is also one consideration here. If we assume that our current "barrier" operations in Laos have directed the enemy into the DMZ, then we can assume that a new barrier along the DMZ will cause him to consider going back into Laos again. Naturally, from our parochial viewpoint, this hardly represents progress. Moreover, from an international political view, it is a better wicket to have North Vietnamese aggression directly across the DMZ than it is to have it routed through Laos. This shade of difference has significance, especially in our relations with the Soviets.

Now, if we still wish to talk about barriers in the "tactical" sense, for use at the current stage of the war, I have a counterproposal. This proposal would have both a military and diplomatic dimension. I have discussed it in some detail with John McNaughton and he may already have relayed it to you.

It envisages the erection of barriers, both personnel and vehicle, in North Vietnam. The principal line of blockage would be across the narrow neck of North Vietnam, south of Vinh, from the coastal region up into the badlands. This would be a broad strip, sown with "gravel", mines, or any other beastly devices Jason can devise. It would be laid either by air or by large naval vessels lying off shore, which could deliver their charges by naval gun-fire or by rockets. Everything south of this region (that is to say, Route Package One) would be subjected to the sort of anti-vehicle barrier treatment proposed by Jason for Laos. And all this deviltry would be coupled with a suspension of bombing in North Vietnam north of these barriers.

Now, the virtues of these proposals are (1) that they appear to be a step in de-escalation (2) they address themselves to infiltration heading both into Laos and into South Vietnam (3) they permit our current operations to continue both in Route Package One and in Laos. The drawbacks are the same as those associated with any bombing pause: they permit the enemy to relax a bit and they ease the pressures on the rail link with China. However, they are a better combination by far then current Jason proposals, if those are to be associated with a bombing pause.

If, on the other hand, the Jason proposals are not to be associated with a bombing pause, then they are still a better proposition because they add a new dimension of deterrent in an area which does not degrade anything we are currently doing. Therefore, if we are hell-bent to do the Jason business in any event, this is the way I would like to see it configured.

Finally, I would direct a few words to the other type of barrier--the one we might consider to define, demarcate, and "hermetically seal" the territory of South Vietnam after a settlement has been reached. This, too, was discussed at Santa Barbara and is perhaps not as far-fetched as it may sound. I think it is clear that, at the current juncture of events, it would be extremely costly, both in terms of men and money, to erect a physical barrier along the borders of South Vietnam, to include the DMZ, plus the Lao and Cambodian frontiers. However, this might not be total folly if and when the fighting reaches some level that would free our forces for such an exercise. If we are to begin such barrier, I would suggest that the mountainous regions along the Cambodian border would be the best place to start. It would be internationally defensible and perhaps even of some interest to Sihanouk. In fact, it might be a better occupation for all General Larsen's troops than their current game of watchful waiting.

Having put all these thoughts on record, I would like to repeat what I said in my cable to you on this subject. I would like a full hearing on any final decisions with respect to this matter and would probably want to participate in the decision. It seems to me to be a matter which could so thoroughly affect our whole posture and all our operations in Laos that it would need the most careful consideration by all concerned with this country.

Please keep me posted, and don't sell the Crown Jewels.

All the best,

Bill

Vientiane, October 20, 1966, 0200Z.

2420. 1. At 0830 hours this morning General Ma's 5-28 pilots from Savannakhet launched bombing and staffing attacks against Phone Keng and Chinaimo in what appears to be last ditch effort by Ma to salvage his own position and force change in General Staff.

2. We received word an hour ago that Ma, assisted by Nouphet, had placed General Ouane (traveling in south) and General Bounphone under arrest in Savanakhet. Elements of FM's [GMs ?] 18, 15, and 21 are said to be supporting Ma and Nouphet.

3. I have seen Leuam, who entirely ignorant of developments, and have asked him to contact Boun Oum, who is apparently in town.

4. T-28's continue to fly over city as we draft this and machine-gun fire heard near Embassy. Bombs have hit barracks near AOC at Wattay as well as Chinaimo and Phone Kheng.

5. AIRA and ARMA have seen Kouprasith who totally surprised by developments.

6. Ma has sent me emotional message asking for support in overthrow of General Staff.

7. We are in for a busy morning.

Sullivan

Washington, October 21, 1966, 12:39 a.m.

70350. Ref Vientiane 2420./2/

1. Assuming that Acting MinDef Sisoumang as well as Leuam may lack prestige to issue effective orders, recommend you seek inform King of situation and suggest that in Souvanna's absence he issue cease fire order to General Ma and any other commanders identified as involved in action. First objective should be total stand down.

2. Assume you have directed US personnel to take all possible steps to withhold ammunition and disassociate US personnel from RLAF Tactical Air except for personnel left for contact purposes at your discretion.

3. Leave entirely to your discretion whether any answer to Ma's appeal likely be effective without being misunderstood by General Staff and Cabinet. Suggest you consider message to effect that after you have valid evidence all hostile acts have been halted you prepared meet (or have representative meet) with Ma at some agreed neutral point, perhaps Udorn, to hear his problem. Any such response should of course make clear this does not constitute "support" and should probably be made only with agreement of Kouprasith or whoever is acting for Ouan.

4. Unless you have objection (by flash message) we intend pass summary of all info on Ma's attack to Souvanna in Paris.

Katzenbach

Washington, undated.

The potentially explosive Laos situation now appears to be de-fused. General Ma was unable to rally other military units in his personal quarrel with the Lao military leadership./2/

Sullivan, the British Ambassador and Boun Oum flew to Savanna-khet to persuade Ma to go into voluntary exile. They failed at the time but apparently succeeded in convincing Ma that his military situation was hopeless.

Lao army Generals Kouprasith, Ouane and Bounpone (the latter two erroneously reported in Ma's hands) directed General La, third military district commander, to move against Ma and capture Savannakhet airfield.

In the face of this Ma has flown out 10 T-28s to Udorn and one to Ubol in Thailand. Ma is now with the Thai base commander at Udorn. Seven T-28s remain at Savannakhet. General La is now moving to reassert the government's control over Savannakhet and anticipates no opposition.

Souvanna departs Paris on October 22, reaching Bangkok and Vientiane on October 23. While Ma's abortive action posed no immediate threat to the continuity of Souvanna's government or to the fundamental loyalty of the Lao armed forces, it has increased the political and military tension that has been building. Souvanna will face a dicey situation on his return, with the fate of Ma and Kong Le who are both in Thai hands, first order of business./3/

Washington, October 21, 1966.

6070. Joint Defense-State message. DOD Special Task Force now approaching point of determining and making commitments for assets needed to lay barrier in South Vietnam and Laos. Current planning is to have this barrier installed and in operation by September 15, 1967.

Present concept is to deny vehicle traffic no motorable roads in Laos in what is generally the "Cricket Area." This zone is to extend from just south of the 17th Parallel (in vicinity of Route 9) north to just beyond Mu Gia Pass. To be effective the several alternative routes must be covered. The area is expected to extend westward into Laos as far as Mahaxey at the northwest limit and as far as Moung Sen at the southwest extreme. There can of course either be "sanitary" areas for known friendly populations or resettlement of friendlies outside the denial area.

The concept, to be effective, will involve (1) daily seeding of short-lived self-sterilizing mines on and adjacent to selected vehicle routes which are capable of blowing a truck tire or causing loss of a foot, (2) biweekly laying of sensors along the same routes, (3) continuous visual and sensor surveillance aircraft over the area in question, and (4) very quick reaction air strikes where traffic is detected (probably barring case-by-case approvals from Washington, Saigon or Vientiane--implying that advance approval of a broad class of cases will have to be given). Each of these--especially the first and fourth--involve large investment of resources and obvious political implications.

The concept, as it applies to Laos, also includes the denial to enemy foot infiltration traffic of the network of trails skirting the western edge of the DMZ. This area is a strip 20 km deep running west from the DMZ to Route 90 northwest of Tchepone. Denial techniques will include mining of traversable terrain, positioning of air surveilled sensors in the more likely avenues of infiltration, e.g. Se Bang Hieng river valley east of Tchepone, and fast reaction air strikes on detected intruders.

ASD/ISA understood you to say that--if we kept publicity down, if we continued bombing North Vietnam, and if we avoided friendly populations--you thought the probability was better than 70% that Souvanna would go along with a program of this kind.

We would appreciate your assessment of the political factors which will affect the allocation of resources that is now being made. Please make response personal for Bundy and McNaughton.

You should know that the Task Force is now pursuing tests along the lines of your suggestions.

With respect to other points you raised with ASD/ISA, thinking here is that barrier will not be inside North Vietnam.

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