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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXVIII Laos DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

286. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/

Honolulu, May 13, 1967, 0319Z.

130319Z. SLAM expansion. A. COMUSMACV MACCOC2 12796/180059Z Apr 67./2/

1. Ref message proposed a two-phase extension of the SLAM concept. Phase I involves the employment of a reinforced ARVN battalion, Airborne or Ranger, to exploit intelligence gained by Prairie Fire assets. Phase II visualizes employment of an ARVN division-size task force in sustained operations against enemy bases in Laos.

2. As ref message points out, Prairie Fire forces are now encountering well-armed and well-trained company or larger sized NVA troops who are willing to fight to protect their supply bases and keep their LOCs open. This is to be expected when considering that Prairie Fire forces of up to three platoons conducted continuous operations in the SLAM III area for almost six weeks. The results of Prairie Fire operations in SLAM III are impressive.

3. You propose the use of regular ARVN forces up to division size. A commitment of large RVNAF ground forces into Laos will almost certainly be opposed by a large commitment of North Vietnamese ground forces to protect their valuable base areas. Thus, a chain of requirements could be initiated of almost open-ended proportions, including the commitment of sizeable US ground forces to assist the beleaguered ARVN.

4. The commitment of regular GVN troops into Laos could not be done covertly. Indeed, it is improbable that the plan could be kept secret once GVN is consulted. Thus, there would be an overt violation of the Geneva Accords which would put Souvanna Phouma and his government in jeopardy. Consider it far preferable to maintain our ground posture in Laos by the use of non-regular, deniable ground forces. Serious consideration of the political complications is required before initiating overt operations which would move the battleground into Laos.

5. Our operations in Laos should be oriented primarily toward maximizing destruction of enemy facilities, base areas, LOCs, and, where feasible, his forces at minimum cost to US. Air power, both tactical and Arc Light, can do this for us when the necessary pin-point intelligence can be made available. Prairie Fire operations do this effectively and at low risk and cost. While in full agreement with the need for increased pressure against the enemy in Laos, it would appear more logical to substantially increase the numbers of Spike Teams and Hornet Force operations, thereby acquiring the necessary intelligence for bringing air power more fully to bear. Use of recon/intelligence Spike Teams is limited only by numbers of teams available and helicopter support. It is now permissible to use up to three Hornet Force platoons in one operation at any given time. There is no restriction on numbers of operations. Efforts to bring the three Prairie Fire battalions, now authorized, to full strength should be accelerated to the extent practicable.

6. Increasing Prairie Fire operations to pin-point enemy targets and then destroying such targets by the use of air power, appears to provide the most practical, as well as the most politically acceptable, means to increase pressures on the enemy at least cost and risk to our primary objectives in Laos and SVN. Action to gain JCS approval for use of ARVN regular forces in Laos is not planned at this time.

NIE 58-67

Washington, May 18, 1967.

SHORT-TERM POLITICAL PROSPECTS FOR LAOS

The Problem

To estimate the prospects for political stability in Laos over the next year or so. In addition, to estimate the reactions of Souvanna Phouma and the effect on his government of expanded Allied ground action in the Laos Panhandle. The reactions of other foreign governments to these courses of action are not considered.

Conclusions

A. During the past several years, the Kingdom of Laos has achieved a substantial degree of political stability. This rests, in part, on the international support which the Royal Lao Government has enjoyed since the 1962 Geneva settlement, support which Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma earnestly seeks to retain. More important, it rests on an understanding among Souvanna, the military, and--to a lesser degree--the conservatives and neutralists, which aims at preserving Lao independence and the attributes of neutrality and tripartitism. In the short term, at least, we see no serious diminution of military support for the regime, nor does a military-inspired coup attempt seem likely.

B. We believe that Souvanna, if approached officially, would disapprove any proposal put to him involving Allied ground action in the Laos Panhandle./2/ [11 lines of source text not declassified]

[Here follows the "Discussion" section of this estimate, comprising 6 pages.]

Saigon, May 24, 1967, 0350Z.

MAC 4866. Ref: AmEmb Vientiane msg to SecState, DTG 151245Z May 67./2/

1. The reference was read with mixed emotions. The fact that Souvanna Phouma has accepted readily the idea of an anti-infiltration system in Laos is extremely gratifying. Moreover, the manner in which his approval was given, as described in the reference, leads me to believe that Souvanna would be amenable to further excursions on the part of the U.S. to operate in Laos against the NVA.

2. Ambassador Sullivan's statement that he does not intend to approach Souvanna on the subject of Prairie Fire operating in connection with the air supported anti-infiltration system is disappointing to me. I have always considered Prairie Fire support of Practice Nine absolutely necessary if the program is to succeed, and recommend that Souvanna be informed of the use of ground teams in the area as soon as possible. Additionally, I believe that Phase III of Prairie Fire should be surfaced with Souvanna at this time and presented as a necessary adjunct to the anti-infiltration system, and as a logical extension of present Prairie Fire operations.

3. [3 lines of source text not declassified] He refers to this as a "contingency plan" whereas it is an elemental facet of Practice Nine. During a period of five months of the year, November thru March, the launching of Prairie Fire teams into the Practice Nine area from RVN will be severely limited due to the influence of the northeast monsoons. The use of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] during that period is essential if the anti-infiltration system is to be supported adequately by Prairie Fire operations.

4. Even though no single program is the panacea to the NVA infiltration problem, the combination of the Practice Nine program in Laos, Phase III Prairie Fire, and programmed increases in current Prairie Fire operations would seriously degrade the NVA capability to move troops and supplies through Laos.

5. I believe that an excellent opportunity still exists to present the entire program to Souvanna if it is tied properly to his current interest. I strongly recommend that actions be taken by SecState to implement this approach as soon as possible.

Vientiane, May 29, 1967, 1000Z.

7403. Subject: Operation Commando Lava.

1. During Udorn meeting last Saturday,/2/ I had my staff give Generals Westmoreland and Momyer a briefing on operation Commando Lava, which we have been conducting in Laos. This operation is an experiment in soil destabilization, for the purpose of producing impassable mud on enemy lines of communication. In our view, experiment has proved successful and we believe it should be given expanded military application./3/

2. Essentially, operation involved air-dropping common chemicals on two interdiction points along Route 96 and Route 110. Rain falling on these chemicals results in chelation and dispersion of soil, in such measure that mud loses all consistency and becomes incapable of supporting vehicles or any other substantial weight. This not only vastly enhances nature's own mud making in quality, but also extends the effect of the rainy season because of the chemicals' persistency.

3. We believe this could prove a far more effective road interdiction device (at least in rainy season) than iron bombs and infinitely less costly. Chemicals are commercially available, paper sacked, and air dropped from cargo type aircraft. We would hope that, in proper application, we could close all the main routes into Laos for vehicle traffic during the rainy season, and, perhaps extend that effect for a month or so beyond the normal scope of that season. We also believe program has considerable application in Vietnam.

4. Moreover, I have asked that another experiment be carried out concerning hand application of these chemicals to defense perimeters where soil is also protected by vegetable roots and matting. If this is successful, we may be able to develop some use for this technique in an anti-personnel sense as well.

5. General Westmoreland has expressed considerable interest in following up this program. Therefore, our control team, which consists of three representatives from CAS Headquarters, will visit Saigon later this week, then CINCPAC and then back to the putty-knife factory at Langley.

6. I believe this program demands immediate, high level attention in Washington. I would hope that both Secretary McNamara and Joint Chiefs will have opportunity to be briefed. I would like to make mud on several routes in Laos, starting from 19 in north, through 6, 7, and 4, plus the entire Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trail structures. If the drop aircraft are available and if the chemicals can be shipped, I feel that we can close more routes more effectively, and at a minute fraction of the current cost, than we can with our bombing efforts.

7. I also feel that, if we could combine these techniques with techniques of Operation Popeye, perhaps within concept of Practice Nine, we might be able to make enemy movement among the cordillera of the Annamite chain almost prohibitive. In short, chelation may prove better than escalation. Make mud, not war!

Sullivan

Washington, June 3, 1967, 12:15 a.m.

207815. Subject: MSQ-77. For Ambassador from Kohler.

1. We have carefully reviewed JCS request for MSQ-77 installation at Phu Thi (Site 85),/2/ in light your judgment of political risks and liabilities for us and Souvanna, expressed in previous correspondence and during your consultations, and of renewed DOD affirmation of need and urgency to achieve maximum effectiveness in air operations over North Vietnam.

2. Unless you perceive new factors not previously taken into account, I would like you to discuss this matter with Souvanna at earliest time you judge opportune. To minimize possibility of damage to our essential relationship with him, you should present proposal as an idea we are considering--with view to obtaining his acquiescence but short of making direct request for authority. You should note that basic function of this installation--like others on SEA mainland--would be precise navigational control of aircraft; that MSQ-77 is a quantum jump beyond TACAN facilities already emplaced within Laos; and that USAF has necessary equipment and personnel for immediate installation. Such a facility may have appeal to Souvanna with respect to US operations in Laos (though we are aware that you believe tactical changes would in fact be minimal at least initially). You will, of course, have to acknowledge capability of system to direct air strikes against North Vietnam. In other words, you should avoid both exclusive concentration on offensive use against North Vietnam of ground installation in Laos and dissimulation that would jeopardize our relationship of candor and trust in event we decide to approve emplacement and installation should ultimately be exposed./3/

3. If Souvanna does not object and you can now agree to positioning of MSQ-77 at Site 85, you may wish to provide your judgment as to whether USAF personnel need be under shallow cover and on any necessary restriction on pattern of crew rotation by helo.

4. I plan to review this proposal with the Secretary on basis of your report.

Rusk

Vientiane, June 9, 1967, 0929Z.

7638. 1. After some delay, the rainy season has begun in earnest throughout Laos. Heavy rain has been falling for the past two weeks in the Panhandle. During last several days, downpour so heavy in northern Laos as to make flying almost impossible. Mekong River Valley, which had already received nearly two feet of rainfall by this time last year, has received several inches in past few days and rice cultivation cycle has begun.

2. Result of this seasonal change, as in the past, has been dramatic reduction in level military activity throughout country. Major difference between this year and previous years is that Lao Government and friendly guerrillas hold considerable territorial advantage, which they feel fully confident to preserve. In fact, they have previously used rainy season to regain dry season losses. This rainy season they may be able convert that sort of forward activity into positive territorial gains.

3. On Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trails, vehicle traffic has ground virtually to a halt. There continues to be some shuttle movement on firm, high stretches of road structure, but lowland reaches have become impassable. Our road watch teams report that in many stretches of both structures, ground has already reached saturation point and standing water has covered roads. With good luck, this condition will prevail from now until late October. It will mean that truck traffic on full length of trails will be impossible during these several months and that major use of these logistics arteries will be ruled out.

4. This does not mean that enemy use of Lao territory for logistics purpose will cease altogether during the rains. Waterways, bicycle trails, and human porters will still be used. We will shift our road watch teams and our tactics to take this into account. However, it does mean that, by and large, those enemy units in South Vietnam which depend on these two logistics routes must live on supplies already in place or in cache for the months ahead. It certainly means that they could not call up major emergency logistics over these two structures during the period ahead.

5. We do not intend to relax our road watch and other vigilance in the Panhandle , or elsewhere in Laos, during the rains. Instead, we intend to use this time to extend and improve communications, to work out better liaison and response arrangements with 7th AF, etc. but we will be surprised if we encounter much enemy activity in most regions and will report and evaluate what we see.

6. We will, of course, be acutely interested in any reflections, either political or military, which addresses may detect to bear out inevitable enemy acceptance of the fact that the monsoon has made its annual mark.

Sullivan

CM-2453-67

Washington, June 17, 1967.

SUBJECT
Prairie Fire--Phase III

1. Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-215-67, 20 April 1967./2/

b. Letter from the Director, CIA, to Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 19 May 1967./3/

2. Reference a recommended approval of a COMUSMACV concept to initiate a guerrilla warfare program in southeastern Laos. This program would exploit certain highland tribal groups who inhabit the area and are currently being exploited by the enemy to support infiltration activities. The concept is visualized as a supplement to ongoing Prairie Fire reconnaissance and interdiction operations and would be stated within the existing Prairie Fire zone with tribes who live astride the RVN/RLG border. If and when successful development of the guerrillas indicated, expansion beyond the existing Prairie Fire zone would be desirable in specific areas. Such expansion would, of course, be coordinated with any ongoing CAS operations.

3. Reference b raised certain objections of the Central Intelligence Agency to the concept. First, the capability to develop an effective guerrilla force is questioned; and second, a conflict between Prairie Fire and CAS operations is feared should the program expand.

4. The southeastern Panhandle of Laos is an immense, heavily jungled area, where the enemy has shown great skill and ingenuity in keeping his routes open and his bases secure. Although air operations, CAS, and Prairie Fire have all increased in capability and enjoyed increasing success, they have only reduced slightly the flow of enemy troops and material. Proportionate to the area and the size of the enemy forces deployed therein even the expanded CAS and Prairie Fire programs would be very modest in scope. The guerrilla concept is simply one more way to reduce the enemy's security in the Panhandle and to force him to divert more effort to protect his supply lines and base areas. MACSOG has already made sufficient contacts with tribal groups living astride the RVN/RLG border to be confident that a real potential does exist, particularly with the Bru and Sedang tribes.

5. There is no intent on the part of CINCPAC or COMUSMACV to enter into conflict or competition with any CAS program. On the contrary, these programs are seen as being complementary. Initially, recruiting and development activity would be restricted to the Prairie Fire area. Only when and if the potential developed and the situation indicated, would a guerrilla warfare area be designated beyond that limit; and then such an area would be coordinated with CAS to ensure the most effective use of assets and over-all program. There is no intention to simply move the Prairie Fire line west to the Se Kong-Tchepone line.

6. Discussions between SACSA and CIA representatives indicate that the reservations expressed in Mr. Helm's letter may have stemmed from a misunderstanding of the proposal, and that the CIA would not, in fact, object to the program within the present Prairie Fire area./4/ However, they would rather defer any discussion of expansion beyond those limits until such a time as a guerrilla potential has actually been developed and a specific proposal can be made. This position is not incompatible with the JCS proposal, which recommends initial efforts limited to the present Prairie Fire area with later expansion as indicated by the situation that develops.

7. Accordingly, it is recommended that approval be granted to initiate the guerrilla warfare program within the present Prairie Fire zone. The problem of coordinating an expanded area will be reopened if and when it arises.

Earle G. Wheeler

New York, June 21, 1967, 8:15-11 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Dinner for Foreign Minister Gromyko: Laos

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side:
The Secretary
Ambassador Goldberg
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., EUR

Soviet Side:
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko
Mr. Aleksandr Soldatov, Dep. Minister of Fon. Aff.
Mr. Viktor Sukhodrev, interpreter

The Secretary wondered if there were any possibility of solving the situation in Laos. We thought it could be solved in 8 hours. Did Mr. Gromyko see any way to proceed?

Mr. Gromyko said that the broadening of U.S. interference in Laos is the problem. U.S. aviation and U.S. military activities had increased. He was sorry about the U.S. behavior in Laos, which weakened Soviet arguments for maintaining the Laos agreements. The U.S. knows that the Soviet Union is not in Laos and is not active there.

The Secretary asked if the Soviet Union was prepared to go to 1000% agreement of all parties in Laos.

Mr. Gromyko asked if the U.S. was ready to do so tonight, to which the Secretary replied affirmatively. But, Mr. Gromyko said, the U.S. is in Laos tonight.

The Secretary said that 6,000 North Vietnamese troops had been left behind in Northern Laos after the agreement had been signed.

Mr. Gromyko said this was one-sided information which he could not accept as factual. However, it was a fact that the U.S. was in Laos. How could the U.S. say it was not interfering?

The Secretary said it should be understood that if a North Vietnamese division moves into Laos, we will bomb it. We don't want to do so, but this is what will happen.

Mr. Gromyko said that if the U.S. was not in Laos it could talk of no interference with the observance of the agreement. But the U.S. is in Laos. There is not one Soviet soldier there.

The Secretary said that North Vietnamese troops are there. If we got out, would they get out? He suggested that the USSR should use its influence, as co-Chairman, to bring about the departure of the North Vietnamese troops.

Mr. Gromyko said that the U.S. was not a good example for others. At one time, the U.S. was not in Laos openly. We had military personnel there but they were in civilian clothes. Now the U.S. military operates openly. The U.S. is present, and this weakens the Soviet position as co-Chairman, and makes it difficult to use its influence positively.

The Secretary asked if the USSR would join with the other co-Chairman to get all of the parties out of Laos.

Mr. Gromyko thought it would be better for the Control Commission to take such responsibility. There are three groups in Laos. They should coordinate their actions better than they do. This difficulty is probably a result of U.S. influence on certain factions. If the U.S. used its influence correctly, there could be better cooperation among the 3.

The Secretary said it was our understanding of the English text of the Harriman-Pushkin agreement/2/ that none of the three powers of the ICC could use the veto to restrict ICC activities.

Mr. Gromyko said they had a different interpretation. He continued that the U.S. position on Laos is weak--weaker than before. The U.S. is not only present, but it is present in a new way.

The Secretary asked what Mr. Gromyko thought about the North Vietnamese presence, but Mr. Gromyko said the problem was the United States presence.

The Secretary said that we had an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1962, but the North Vietnamese didn't recognize it for a moment.

Mr. Gromyko thought there should be a discussion between the three groups in Laos. He thought the U.S. had more influence with Souvanna Phouma than the Soviets. It probably was the U.S. which complicated efforts at coordination among the three groups. If one compared the U.S. position in Laos with that of the Soviets, the U.S. position was worse.

The Secretary said this was not the point. The North Vietnamese are there and that is against the agreement.

Mr. Gromyko, in something of a non sequitur, said that the killing of a well-known leader of one of the political factions--Foreign Minister Pholsena/3/--had complicated the situation.

The Secretary said the circumstances of this were unclear. Some said Pholsena had been involved in the assassination of other figures.

Mr. Gromyko reacted strongly, saying there was not a grain of truth in this story. Had there been an investigation? Pholsena had been a neutralist, a Souvanna Phouma man. In any event, the Soviets were sorry that the situation in Laos had become worse. They had wanted agreement. He did not exclude that the Soviets would revert to the Laos problem again.

The Secretary asked why we could not all act to support the original agreement in Laos.

Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviets would be prepared to consider realistic problems without prejudice, but that we should not complicate the situation with false stories. (The latter was apparently in reference to the discussion about Pholsena.)

Washington, June 29, 1967, 4:43 p.m.

218801. MSQ-77. Refs: A. State 207815./2/ B. Vientiane 7712./3/ Joint State/Defense message.

Part One: For Vientiane

1. We are pleased that Souvanna reflects a generally positive attitude about MSQ-77 installation in Laos. His concerns are fully understood and, except with respect to location, those mentioned in Ref. B can be allayed:

a. Souvanna's position that he would wish to be able to deny knowledge of installation is understandable. If facility were to be exposed, we would propose to acknowledge presence of navigational aid in area where such facility woefully deficient. In such circumstance, is it likely that Souvanna would be willing to acknowledge in general that US has provided navigational aids to RLG, so that question in fact directed toward MSQ-77 might be dealt with by allusion to TACANS which we understand Souvanna has approved for use in Laos? We hope in any event that Souvanna would hold in abeyance any comment on "violation" until nature of disclosure precisely known and could be discussed.

b. USAF personnel will operate facility, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

c. Equipment would be prepared for emergency destruction at time of installation. In event of communist attack, we will wish to count on Vang Pao for vigorous defense long enough to evacuate personnel but not, if pressure heavy, for defense of equipment.

d. Previous communications should provide basis for assurances that every feasible measure will be taken for physical and electronic camouflage.

2. Taking into account technical requirements (primarily line-of- sight feature and range of system) and security and low visibility requirements, it remains Washington judgment that Site 85 is not only best but only feasible location. We have understood your analysis supported this judgment. Unless you have alternate proposal we could quickly review, believe justification for this selection must stand.

3. Secretary Rusk has determined that military requirement justifies accepting potential political liabilities and we are hopeful Souvanna will understand basis on which this difficult decision made. In light contradiction (Ref B) between Souvanna's desire for reassurances on specific points and his wish not to know what we are doing, will have to leave to your judgment how best to bring him to awareness that we have taken his concerns (which we share) fully into account in reaching decision to proceed. Advise action taken to square your account with him.

Part Two: For JCS

4. Unless report requested from Vientiane in para 3 above indicates new objection, you may proceed installation of MSQ-77 at Site 85, subject to coordination of arrangements for installation and continuing support with US Ambassador Vientiane by appropriate USAF authority.

Rusk

Washington, July 5, 1967.

SUBJECT
Prairie Fire--Phase III

REF
CM 2453-67, dated 17 June 1967/2/

Problem: 1. In the memorandum to Secretary Vance at reference, Gen. Wheeler requests approval to prepare for and initiate a guerrilla warfare program in the Prairie Fire zone of Laos, using tribesmen indigenous to the Laos-Vietnam border area under command and with participation of US Special Forces personnel. In a reply dated 30 June, Secretary Vance asks Gen. Wheeler to handle the matter with you./3/ (Memos attached).

Recommendation: 2. If Gen. Wheeler raises the subject with you before or during the forthcoming trip, we recommend that authorization be withheld pending thorough study of the problems and uncertainties identified below. Alternatively, if you determine that some action is required at this time, I recommend that approval be limited to that aspect of the proposal discussed in paragraph 4d.

Summary of proposal: 3. The concept underlying Gen. Wheeler's current request is outlined in JCS Memorandum 215-67 (also attached)./4/ The military authorities propose to supplement present anti-infiltration efforts in the area of Laos south and east of Tchepone and running along the Se Kong River line by seeking to identify, exfiltrate, train, and re-insert indigenous guerrilla forces. The target is a force of 3000 Kha or similar tribal people of the hills, operating in 100-man units under control of US Special Forces A Detachments (total US personnel 135).

Initially, Lao approval would be sought through RVNAF/FA liaison, and both recruiting activities and operations would be confined to the presently approved Prairie Fire area.

Discussion and Conclusions: 4. Our initial reaction/5/ is that the proposal is not susceptible of early realization, that attempting it would divert personnel from other positive programs underway or approved, and that if it were fully implemented it would come into conflict with other projects in Laos and raise to an unacceptable level the risk of exposing US ground operations there.

a. Manpower: We understand that US Special Forces personnel available for the Pacific Theater remain in seriously short supply. We do not understand, particularly in the light of other drawbacks, a recommendation to allocate up to a total of 10 USSF A Detachments and support personnel to this program when authorized Prairie Fire operations are already inhibited by shortage of personnel and when prospective requirements in connection with Illinois City remain unfilled.

Similarly, indigenous personnel are lacking to meet approved Prairie Fire quotas and operational needs. The shortage looms so acutely, as planning for Illinois City progresses, that COMUSMACV is still pressing for use of Thai units, despite the judgment of both Ambassador Martin and Ambassador Sullivan, which we share, that use of US-Thai teams will not be acceptable under the conditions contemplated.

It would not seem prudent to dilute programs already approved for the sake of a new variation unless there were exciting prospects of success. We do not believe this is the case. CIA has had several years experience with Kha tribal groups analogous to those envisaged for the guerrilla force. Prolonged and careful training has resulted in creation of the passive road-watch teams which are increasingly effective in monitoring the flow of supplies through the Laos Panhandle. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

b. Anti-Infiltration Tactics: The plan to raise guerrilla forces is in harmony with past military proposals for Prairie Fire--that is, of seeking approval for progressively larger units as well as more numerous operations to greater depths. It is one step further in the direction of commitment of both US and Vietnamese combat ground forces, which we know informally Gen. Westmoreland has at least been contemplating. Given the extent and difficulty of terrain and the political problems of Laos, we cling to the belief that the optimal way to cope with infiltration through the Panhandle is to detect and monitor movement of men and supplies by quiet surveillance and to seek to deter it through controlled use of air power rather than with battalions. We recently suggested that Defense consider breaking up the already constituted larger Prairie Fire units to form more of the small reconnaissance teams, thus far without receiving comment. This is an alternative we consider worth pursuing.

c. Extent of Operations: Gen. Wheeler's memorandum of 17 June says that operations can be initiated within the presently authorized Prairie Fire area and that "the problem of coordinating an expanded area will be reopened if and when it arises". We believe this issue should be faced now. The approved JCS study (JCSM-215-67) says that although initial steps (recruitment, training, etc.) can be undertaken within the Prairie Fire area and without additional US commitment inside Laos, "this initial activity should not be undertaken without conceptual approval of the over-all program". The over-all program envisages more than doubling the present depth of the Prairie Fire zone. The greater the depth, the greater the dependence on vulnerable (US) helicopter lift and escort and, in general, the greater the risk of exposure of operations which Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has not approved and has declared in advance he could not approve. Such an extension would also create difficult problems of coordination with the successful CAS road-watch operation and would probably revive earlier CIA objections to the proposal (which Mr. Helms has withdrawn "so long as the guerrilla force is deployed within the current Prairie Fire area").

Ambassador Sullivan has recorded the judgment that the Prairie Fire area cannot be further extended nor larger units introduced without crossing the threshold from covert to overt operations to which Souvanna would be obliged to react. He has recently reaffirmed these views and the belief that it is unrealistic even to consider extension of the zone--with attendant risks--when our resources do not permit more than nibbling at opportunities for application of the SLAM concept of concentrated ground-air interdiction within the established Prairie Fire zone. He would specifically oppose use of Special Forces A Detachments--without which the Kha guerrilla units would be unlikely to function effectively--in Laos.

d. Lao Involvement: The concept envisages preliminary discussions between South Vietnamese and Lao military authorities (RVNAF and FA) to obtain Lao agreement to the program and the services of selected Lao personnel to make initial contacts, with US involvement and control kept in the background at this stage. An apparently similar proposal has in fact already been discussed during the recent visit of Lao General Kouprasith and others to Saigon, on which we unfortunately lack detailed reporting. The Lao interest, however, is known to be limited to obtaining Vietnamese logistic, training and probably financial support for the development of guerrilla units that would operate under Lao, not Vietnamese or US, control. To the extent this can be done without direct US financing or other involvement, we would have no objection. We may, in fact, derive from Lao and Vietnamese pursuit of the idea some further insights into the possibilities of developing guerrilla formations in this remote area.

Vientiane, July 6, 1967, 0830Z.

108. Ref: State 909./2/

1. Souvanna agreed this morning to installation of MSQ-77 at Site 85. I assured him that:

a) All USAF markings would be removed from equipment,

b) Detonators would be affixed to permit immediate destruction in case of imminent danger,

c) Personnel would be under civilian cover,

d) Maximum measures would be taken to camouflage against detection from the air, and

e) Electronic camouflage would be undertaken by scrambled transmission to relay aircraft over Gulf of Tonkin.

2. In turn, Souvanna accepted agreed formulation on public relations posture. If there are deniable allegations concerning presence of this installation, he will say "I have no knowledge of such facility in Laos". If it is blown in undeniable fashion, he will say "I did not know it was there". In both instances, U.S. can either remain silent or say "no comment." This should bring all of us angels together on the head of the same pin.

3. Souvanna also asked whether this radar could function to detect violations of Lao air space. There have been contributing reports of unidentified aircraft in vicinity Plain des Jarres. (Just last evening, we made an abortive effort to intercept a reported Ilyushin 18 near Moung Kheung.) He says he fears these are ChiCom planes used to provide liaison with ChiCom Mission at Kheng Khay. I told him I thought this could probably be worked into installation, but it might degrade our communications security.

4. Please provide technically sound reply whether MSQ-77 could serve as early warning radar, or, in a pinch, as intercept control./3/ If so, would this cause shift from agreed line of sight, scrambled, and relayed emanation pattern.

5. Assume JCS will now direct 7th AF to make contact with my Air Attaché to get this project moving. Timing and other factors involving sensitivity will be coordinated by this Embassy.

6. I would like assurances that info on this installation will be held on the closest need-to-know basis, that all personnel who do know will be briefed on need for maximum security and that all efforts will be made to avoid indications of its location on maps, charts, or instructions. If operational strike units can function without actually knowing exact location of MSQ-77, this would clearly obviate possibility that captured air crews could become source of compromising information.

7. Please advise steps being taken to accomplish objectives of para 6 above. It should be made clear that a compromise might result in a requirement to remove the installation if it, and the RLG, are sufficiently embarrassed.

Sullivan

Saigon, July 10, 1967.

SUBJECT
Laos

1. During the briefing on Laos and Cambodia, 8 July 1967,/2/ you asked for my specific recommendations on expanded operations to locate and destroy enemy personnel, supplies and equipment in the Laotian Panhandle. In conjunction with Illinois City, I recommend immediate approval of two additional programs described here:

a. Phase III, Prairie Fire: An expansion of our existing covert operations to provide for organizing a 3,000 man indigenous guerrilla force to operate under US leadership against the enemy LOC in the Southeastern part of the Laos Panhandle.

b. Southpaw. Airmobile raids of 3-7 days duration employing South Vietnamese regular forces up to brigade size against known enemy base areas contiguous to the RVN border.

2. Phase III, Prairie Fire: The plan is to recruit, train, and control indigenous Lao tribesmen within the present Prairie Fire Operational Area, initially. Development of a friendly guerrilla force in the mountains of the Eastern Laotian Panhandle is of critical importance to the ultimate objective of Prairie Fire Operations, i.e., destruction of the NVA/VC infiltration system and denial of the area to the enemy. The area in question is completely under NVA/Pathet Lao/VC control. The Royal Laotian Government exercises no administrative control nor does it maintain a presence in the area. The region is populated by tribal groups collectively called Kha on the Laotian side of the boundary, and Montagnards in South Vietnam. In the Prairie Fire area, it is estimated the indigenous population could support a friendly force of 3,000 organized guerrillas. Such a force, coordinated with other Prairie Fire operations and provided tactical air support already available, could effectively reduce enemy control of the area. Following approval, the guerrilla force will be developed nominally under the flag of the Royal Laotian Government, thus contributing to the extension of Royal Laotian control areas where it never existed before. Although the estimated goal of 3,000 guerrillas will take over a year to develop, it is envisioned that a 1,200 man force would be ready to carry out operational missions in nine months. Specifically, authorization is required to recruit, support and control Lao citizens now residing in the proposed operating area. Authorization is also required to permit employment of US leadership in Laos on a sustained basis with the proposed guerrilla force. Approximately 120 US Special Forces personnel will ultimately be required in Laos for proper control and development of the guerrilla force.

3. Southpaw: a. This plan provides for conducting ground or airmobile operations across the Laos border by regular South Vietnamese units of battalion or brigade strength against close in known enemy base areas. The operations would pit Vietnamese against Vietnamese in areas controlled by Communists for short duration missions of 3 to 7 days. No publicity would be given the operation and appropriate precautions would be based on current intelligence verified by Prairie Fire forces. Targets will be in unpopulated areas not under Royal Lao control. Prairie Fire forces will precede task force operations for validation of targets and landing zones. Prairie Fire forces will operate in conjunction with the ARVN units as reconnaissance and/or maneuver elements. Preparatory air strikes by tactical aircraft and/or B-52s will be employed as required. The task force will execute blocking, search and destroy, or raid operations against selected targets in the Prairie Fire operational area. Blocking actions will entail occupation of defensible terrain astride known major infiltration roads and trails in order to disrupt force reaction by NVN forces. Search and destroy and raid operations will follow established procedures. Command and control of ground operations will be exercised from a provisional CP established at a Forward Operating Base. The task force commander, intelligence and operations staffs will consist of Vietnamese with US Army advisors experienced in cross border operations. It is visualized that approximately 25 US advisors would be required with a three battalion-brigade force in addition to US personnel that normally accompany the Prairie Fire elements which might be committed.

b. Preparatory to the raid operation and as a portion of the cover and deception plan, a CIDG camp with a C 130 capable airfield will be established close to the border of SVN and as close as possible to the planned area of operations in Laos. Materiel necessary for support of the operation will be stockpiled covertly at this camp. Once established, this camp will serve as the launch base for the raid. Close support by US or ARVN artillery units and logistical support for the task force will be provided from this base. The raid task force will depend in the main on tactical air for support and protection.

4. It should be pointed out that while Southpaw and Prairie Fire III are not mutually dependent, they are nevertheless mutually supporting. Taken individually or together, they will enhance the effectiveness of the Illinois City operations.

W. C. Westmoreland/3/
General, United States Army

Saigon, July 11, 1967.

SUBJECT
Arc Light Restrictions and Thai Based Fighter Aircraft

In accordance with your instructions, the two proposed papers are attached which would lift restrictions on B-52's and Thai based fighter aircraft./2/

For the Commander:
Walter T. Kerwin, Jr./3/
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

B-52 ARC LIGHT RESTRICTIONS

(1) B-52 strikes in Laos by Thailand based B-52's are prohibited.

(2) B-52 strikes in Laos from Guam based aircraft must be made during the hours of darkness.

(3) Over-flights of Laos by B-52's en route to targets in North or South Vietnam are prohibited.

(1) B-52's based at U-TAPAO could strike any target in South Vietnam or Laos and return in four hours or less. U-TAPAO based B-52's could strike targets in DMZ or Mu Gia Pass area and return in less than three hours. Present route south of Cambodia requires up to six hours.

(2) Requiring B-52 strikes in Laos from Guam based aircraft only during the hours of darkness, places an undue restriction on the employment of the force. We should have maximum freedom to schedule the strikes so that we can take advantage of a divert situation for a target of opportunity in South Vietnam. Thus, the scheduling of strikes should be related to ground action in South Vietnam whenever possible. To limit such flights to the hours of darkness is tactically unsound.

(3) For an 800 sortie per month rate, the desired basing is 30 aircraft at U-TAPAO. To realize the best effectiveness from such basing, the three to four hour flight time is crucial in order to get strikes into the ground battle area when the ground commander wants them. Overflight of Laos is essential for exploitation of U-TAPAO basing. No tankers are required with this basing, thereby saving some 350 air refueling sorties per month.

(1) Agreement between State and Defense to lift current restraints.

(2) Instructions from State to Ambassador Thailand and Vientiane to work out local arrangements in accordance with State/Defense agreement.

Vientiane, July 18, 1967, 0330Z.

326. Joint Embassy, ARMA, AIRA, USAID, CAS message. Subject: Dry season wrap-up.

1. After a false start in early June, the rainy season made a tardy beginning in July. Lao "patriotic" forces preferred to call an earlier and more traditional halt to the dry season at a May 18 celebration in Sam Neua. Despite their grossly exaggerated claim of having killed over 3500 "reactionary" troops, shot down or damaged 183 planes, and liberated over 40,000 people, they were probably much more anxious to see the end of this than previous dry seasons.

2. Unlike prior years when they made significant dry season gains, North Vietnamese troops, abetted by the Lao People's "Liberation" Army, were unable to seize and hold any major objective except Nong Khang in northern Houa Phan Province. They additionally lost control over a substantial area in the Sedone Valley that had been under Communist jurisdiction for approximately a decade. Despite repeated attacks, government troops were able to retain exposed sites like Nakhang in Xieng Khouang and Nam Bac in Luang Prabang. A steady flow of refugees from Communist zones testified to the difficulty of life in enemy areas.

3. The government military stance was stronger because of increased devastation from air strikes due to (a) improved intelligence from road watch and reconnaissance teams; (b) better exploitation of; prisoners, particularly North Vietnamese and LPLA defectors of stature; (c) improved communications between ground observers and strike aircraft that have shortened the time gap between reporting and attacks on targets; and (d) night flying aircraft that made their debut November 2 and have been hampering enemy truck movements during darkness. Other factors include increasing North Vietnamese involvement in South Vietnam which has brought no fewer but much greener North Vietnamese troops to Laos; a lowering of enemy morale because of food shortages, labor levies, and fear of air strikes; increased cooperation, since Kong Ke's ouster on October 17, between FAR and Neutralist troops, even to the extent of conducting the joint operation around Lao Ngam in April and May; and slightly improved morale of government troops due to successful retention of the Nam Bac Valley and the military achievements of the Lao Ngam operation.

4. Better government posture did not always match military success. However, the army still largely thinks in terms of occupying territory rather than winning people. While civil-military relations were good in Vang Vieng, Nam Bac, and Lao Ngam, they were poor in other areas like Kassy, southeastern Wapikhamthong Province, Pakkhanya, and Muong Soui. Some of these unfavorable examples permitted enemy exploitation of the civil populace in attacks against both Lao and Americans.

5. The most significant new enemy activity during the recent dry season was increased terrorism against Americans. An IVS worker was assassinated in Pakkhanya March 25. The USAID house was attacked and looted at Houei Mun in southern Savannakhet March 30, but Americans had already been withdrawn. LPLA troops have been firing on and stopping USAID vehicles at several locations in south Laos during the last few months. The LPLA blew a hole with a bazooka round through the USAID house in Kassy June 8. No one was killed but some non-Americans were wounded. LPLA soldiers have warned villagers near Nong Bok not to ride in American vehicles lest they also become targets.

6. This shift to enemy concentration on Americans is in part testimony to the impact USAID efforts are making in rural Laos. Failure to establish full security in cluster and forward area operations has halted or hampered USAID development efforts in Kassy, Nong Bok, Nam Bac, Houei Mun, and Pakkhanya, however.

7. Although Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky attributed the absence of significant Communist military action during the dry season to a Communist desire to freeze the military position along its present lines (State 208755),/2/ the North Vietnamese actually tried hard to make advances but were less successful this time. They may well look to a freeze, based on incapacity rather than willingness, as the only means of maintaining the status quo.

8. Thus although the recently ended dry season marked modest gains in the government position, the costly war of attrition in Laos is far from over. The North Vietnamese retain their dual objective of keeping the corridor open to South Vietnam, and occupying much of North Laos under the facade of the Lao "Patriotic" Front. They may favor a freeze tactically, judging that for the time being their resources would be better used elsewhere. Strategically, there is no indication of North Vietnam's willingness to abandon its ultimate goals in Laos.

Sullivan

Washington, July 21, 1967.

Dear Phil:

As you are well aware, we have been trying for over two months to resolve the problems posed by the proposed ground surveillance activity in support of Illinois City and the political objections thereto. The areas of controversy are three: first, the expansion of the Prairie Fire operational area; second, the launching of operations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; and third, the employment of US/Thai teams in Laos.

Since the desired operational date of 1 November is fast approaching, and since the Illinois City capability will be a limited one at that time, we need to reach an agreement promptly on at least a limited, initial program. As time goes on, as the Illinois City program expands, and as our operational experience dictates, we can address the appropriate modifications.

The essentials of this limited program are outlined below. It should be realized that this is far less than an optimum solution from a military standpoint and may not prove satisfactory. This would only be an initial effort sufficient to provide limited ground support to the early Illinois City system and to develop operational experience.

a. Operations limited geographically to the existing Prairie Fire area.

b. Team composition to be US/Vietnamese.

c. Operations to be conducted from RVN to the maximum extent possible.

d. Operations to be conducted from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] when weather precludes operations from RVN.

e. Teams to be staged through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] remaining in isolation on the base for minimum periods (probably no more than three nights).

f. Use of Muong Phalane in Laos as a site to refuel and replenish ammunition for helicopters when operations are launched [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

As the additional munitions and aircraft become available, the Illinois City system will unquestionably expand its coverage in Laos. Whether the expansion will swing north, south or west (see map attached)/2/ is still uncertain and will depend a great deal on what the VC/NVA reaction will be to the initial efforts. When this expansion takes place a comparable extension of Prairie Fire limits will be required; however, this extension can be deferred and addressed specifically at the appropriate time.

The concept of shuttling teams from RVN [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is unwieldy and unresponsive and one which COMUSMACV has indicated as the least desirable solution. Operational experience with this concept may well dictate that this restriction be modified to permit a longer stay for teams at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], or perhaps at some other isolated location [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Again, however, we are prepared to make the initial effort using [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for minimum staging and control only.

We still consider that the use of US/Thai teams for this operation is a worthwhile concept, which should not be finally dismissed. Not only would these teams provide a higher quality source of manpower, but their use would eliminate any political problem which might stem from introduction of Vietnamese into Thailand. The objections to this concept in Embassy Vientiane are still somewhat obscure; and we feel that this idea merits further consideration.

In summary we seek your concurrence in the limited program outlined in paragraph 3 above, with the understanding that this should not be considered as a final resolution of those aspects of the plan which we now agree to defer.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Steadman/3/

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