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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXVIII Laos DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

301. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, July 24, 1967, 0550Z.

433. Ref: CINCPAC 200137Z Jul 67./2/

1. If the CINCPAC staff officer who wrote reftel will kindly raise his right hand, he can have my job tomorrow. However, when he comes (and if he persuades higher authority to accept his plans) he had better bring another 200,000 U.S. troops with him to "pacify" the area he wants to occupy in Laos and to defend it against North Vietnamese forces operating against it on short DMZ-type logistics lines.

2. I am disappointed that messages of this type are permitted to move in official channels and receive wide dissemination. It is the sort of thing which is giving marijuana a good name.

Sullivan

Vientiane, July 29, 1967, 0930Z.

543. Eyes only Bundy from Sullivan. Ref: State 13477./2/

1. Thanks for the red flag in reftel. I realize tone of three messages/3/ you cite was harsh and assure you that they were deliberately so phrased after rather lengthy consideration. There are two reasons for this.

2. First reason is that military commands as matter deliberate practice seek expand upon and nibble away at restrictions imposed upon them by policy decision. This is a game at the colonel level and continues unabated if met only with gentle demurrers. Unfortunately, these colonels serve only one year duty tours, have no background of history and no future of responsibility. An occasional nasty-gram raised the matter in an attention-arresting way to command levels in an effort to remind commanders that they have policy responsibility even if subordinates ignore it. I realize this skims off some of my popularity rating, but it does usually result in corrective action.

3. The second, and perhaps more compelling, reason is a tactical one which has developed around the Department's suggestion for a SEACOORD meeting. Since the subject of the meeting is a rehash of old proposals which were rightfully turned down in Washington last May, Department's failure to turn them down this time is being interpreted by the military as indication that you have weakened on these points and have passed the buck out here to me. Since I have the ill-deserved reputation of being more "realistic" than you fuzzy fellows in Foggy Bottom, they have assumed I would be a patsy for their proposals. I happen to think their proposals are very poorly conceived and have served notice by my three messages that I am going to be most negative in this regard.

4. While it may be that, for tactical reasons, it was prudent for you to delay your decisions on this matter until after a SEACOORD meeting, you and Nick must realize that it has made you look soft on these matters and is going to require me to look hard. If, as I trust, you are still with me in principle, you are going to have to begin looking tough also. I realize it doesn't suit the dignity of State to use quite such tactless language as I have resorted to, but a good firm tone on occasion will close the apparent chinks and crannies.

5. As you will realize, I feel very strongly about this because I believe we are once again facing a crucial decision in principle which it might be tempting to sweep under the carpet by what appears to be a minor concession in practice. To my mind the point at issue is not whether Westy or I will control and direct the irregular troops we use in the corridor. (I happen to have more and better ones than he can muster, but that is irrelevant.) It is not even a question whether Souvanna would quit if we abandon clandestine levels and move overly into Laos. (I really believe he will, and for tactical reasons, his quitting could make good sense to him.)

6. His quitting would not only face us with the whole dreary cycle we went through once before with General Phoumi (this time it would probably be Kouprasith) but, more importantly, it would change the whole name of the game. We would have to accept overt responsibility for the defense of Laos. I am not exaggerating when I say this would require 200,000 U.S. troops. Worse still, it would be at no net advantage to our position in South Vietnam.

7. But, beyond this, we would throw the Soviets right out of the ball game. I may be wrong, but (as you know) I have always maintained that the only way we will get out of this Southeast Asian engagement is by the Soviets moving to persuade North Vietnam to negotiate, after having accepted the responsibility towards Hanoi and the price towards China which this would entail. The U.S.-Soviet agreement on Laos is the stepping stone towards Soviet action on this front. So long as we keep our fighting in Laos clandestine and covert, the Soviets tolerate it. If it becomes overt, they quit and withdraw their stepping stone.

8. Now, of all times, is not the time to do this. Civil war seems about to start in China. Sihanouk may be in the process of a change. Hanoi may be having its second thoughts. The Soviets themselves may be shaping up to a move. To kick all this away in favor of a military move which has questionable value (and which in my judgement would boomerang militarily) seems less than statesmanlike.

9. Moreover, in purely military terms, Westy's move would accomplish very little at best. The Viets have already set up a new logistics system in Cambodia which would absorb the loss of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The overwhelming proportion of infiltrated personnel are now moving straight across the DMZ rather than through Laos. Our CAS controlled forces in the Panhandle are on the point of a major take-off in the very territory MACV would like to take over. If they would assign 50 propeller-driven aircraft to work regularly with our assets in the Panhandle, we could clean up those routes and dry up those base areas twelve months of the year.

10. Our military friends are getting a juggernaut complex. With John McNaughton and Des FitzGerald gone, we have to count on a few like you and Nick to keep an eye on the political objective and not let it become lost in the flailings of military expedience. It would be very reassuring if you can reassert your touch with the holy grail.

Sullivan

[document number not declassified]

July 29, 1967.

SUBJECT
The improved position of General Vang Pao's forces operating in the second military region between the latter part of the dry season and the first part of the rainy season; situation appraisal as of 26 July 1967

ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

SOURCE
A staff officer of this organization. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not an official judgment by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation.

1. Summary: An analysis of the enemy's tactical posture in the Lao Armed Forces second military region of northern Laos as of 26 July 1967 reveals that the enemy was only able to take one significant piece of terrain from the regular and irregular forces of the Royal Lao Government during the dry season of October 1966 to July 1967. This limited success put the enemy in control of the Nong Khang (VH-0581) area but this gain was far short of the objectives which the enemy had reportedly set for himself in his 1966/1967 dry season offensive. This lack of enemy success has resulted in a tactical shift in the balance of power in the second military region in favor of the regular and irregular forces of the Royal Lao Government under General Vang Pao. As a result of this shift the Royal Lao Government has the opportunity to exercise several offensive options in the second military region during the 1967 rainy season. The successful implementation of these options could contribute to permanently changing the tactical balance of power in northern Laos in favor of the Royal Lao Government. This success by the Royal Lao Government is attributed to General Vang Pao's improved intelligence apparatus and the fact that it has furnished him with information he could use to hit the enemy with spoiling attacks in staging areas. Individual members of Vang Pao's regular and guerrilla forces have come to realize they have developed a tactical superiority over the enemy during the past dry season and their morale has improved accordingly. They know from experience that they can successfully defend their position against North Vietnamese Army regulars and that air support and other assistance is close by when they need it. As Vang Pao's units take the offensive during this current rainy season, they can be expected to expand outward from existing positions in Houa Phan Province. This will include attacks designed to retake Nong Khang. This appraisal updates the previous appraisal [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the lack of enemy military successes in Hou Phan and Xieng Khouang Provinces during the 1966-1967 dry season./2/

[Here follows the 9-page report.]

Washington, July 31, 1967.

SUBJECT
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

1. Once again a visit to Laos impresses me with the substantial gains being made toward [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] overall U.S. objectives.

2. South Laos is a particularly striking example of forward motion on these objectives. During the past year roadwatch team effort [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has been expanded from an intermittent coverage of a few spots to an almost continuous coverage of all major trafficable routes running from North Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam. A trained and experienced pool of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] teams now rotates so that there are at almost all times [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] teams on the roads. Aside from information provided, this program is causing very substantial damage to the North Vietnamese as they transit Laos. As an example, on the night of 7 July when a roadwatch team reported the passage of 37 trucks, the information was flashed within two minutes through our communications channels to an Air Force command plane in the area, which diverted jets to arrive at the target seven minutes after original sighting to produce a total of 50-odd secondary explosions. On the ground, a force of action teams has been developed to produce minings, ambushes, and other attrition against enemy traffic in the panhandle. This marriage of the guerrilla with jet aircraft has caused the enemy in the corridor to suffer the loss of some 40 trucks to ground action, and 1,565 to air action, during the period November 1966 to June 1967. To these truck losses can be added the early trickle of what should increase to a steady flow of defectors from the transitting enemy.

3. In 1963-64, the Pathet Lao were probing into the Sedone Valley near Pakse and were establishing a foothold on the strategic Bolovens Plateau. The pacification program for this area was conceived by our station and implemented with Country Team help. It was a microcosm of technique now being wrestled with by the CORDS structure in Vietnam. Regular screening forces were organized, self-defense units were trained and armed, economic and social programs were implemented, and a political program of improving local leadership and popular commitment was carried out. The effort followed a careful plan of oilspot expansion. The result this year is that the enemy's threat has been purged from an area up to 90 kilometers east of the Mekong, self-defense forces are now being demobilized, their arms recovered and screening forces are being made available for employment further east against the Ho Chi Minh trail. There are small "islands" in Vietnam proving the feasibility of this technique of pacification, but in Laos the program indicates how much more can be done if the process is started before the enemy grows to be a major military threat. The example is compelling for application in Thailand and other areas where our enemies might seek to emulate the Viet Cong experience.

4. The North Laos "quiet war" goes remarkably well. Some idea of our contribution can be gained by such facts as:

A. We completely fund, support, and direct a force of local defense units, area security units and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] special guerrilla battalions, plus heavy weapons units, intelligence teams and a spider-web of communications [3 lines of source text not declassified].

B. CIA-supported forces in North Laos directly cause the enemy average monthly casualties of 300 KIA, 115 WIA and an average of 40 defectors and captives processed monthly; they also contribute enormously to casualties from air strikes of some 800 KIA per month. In contrast, the Royal Lao Army has caused an average of 70 enemy KIA monthly.

C. From its positions dominating all of North Laos some years ago, the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao enemy has been pushed back to holding a thin edge of North Laos, with a single substantial salient into the Plaine des Jarres, and there is even debate among knowledgeable observers whether this should be taken; there is reason to believe that it could be if it were deemed politically and militarily desirable.

D. Behind these military successes, the process of consolidating political cohesion and strength of North Laos continues apace. The most successful action has been the integration of the Meo tribe into the Lao Kingdom, instead of allowing our support to become a centrifugal force to fragment rather than coalesce the variety of peoples called Laos. This has involved the development of the Union of Lao Races Radio Station, an enterprise to handle through commercial channels the supplies formerly dropped from the sky (and incidentally, help develop a Meo managerial middle class), and police administrative services [3 lines of source text not declassified]. In the process, Meo school registration has risen from 3,000 in 1962 to 12,000 in 1967, settled agriculture is replacing mountain village slash and burn farming, an elected Meo sits in the National Assembly and there is a Meo among the generals of the Army. Seventy Meo attend the top lycee of Laos where only 10 were present in 1962. Of course, where CIA conceived plans are non-covert, they are supported for the most part by other agencies.

5. There are a number of substantial policy problems which will have to be faced relating to the corridor. MACV has made a series of recommendations for vigorous prosecution of cross border operations into Laos from South Vietnam. What began as activities by irregular Vietnamese forces (which the U.S. Special Force believes they must accompany) would be increased in terms of regular Vietnamese battalions with U.S. advisory teams and accompanying air and helicopter support. There is always the danger that we may be faced with a general extension of a Vietnam-style war into the corridor. Policy makers will have to consider whether this kind of effort will actually have more real effect than our current ones, as certainly the enemy has shown the capability of utilizing the DMZ itself, maritime infiltration and Cambodian channels. A more serious effect could well be the upsetting of the Souvanna Phouma Government of Laos, which has provided for collaboration of right and neutral wings of Laotian politics with the result that Laos is left as a clearly secondary theater. Polarization of Laotian situation could provoke more forceful probes by the North Vietnamese toward the Mekong with substantial increase in requirements for U.S. defensive support of Thailand and Laos. The most serious policy question, however, would seem to be the degree to which the U.S. wishes to contemplate increased commitment of U.S. forces in active operations in Southeast Asia. The contest in Laos has been by proxy, engaging minimal U.S. prestige, tying down no U.S. forces and involving few casualties.

6. There is still much unfinished business for CIA in Laos. We must have better penetrations of the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh enemy so we know his activities, capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions in advance, not just by observing him as he passes or as we exchange shots. We must increase our toll on his use of the Lao corridor to Vietnam, by placing more action teams and special guerrilla battalions on the job. We must further exploit the several opportunities Laos offers for intelligence operations into North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China. We must also assess and assist the process of succession when 67-year old Souvanna Phouma steps down. Our station is fully aware of these areas of challenge and is already attacking them.

Washington, August 9, 1967.

SUBJECT
Military Projects in Southeast Asia on which Action is Pending

In accordance with your request, we have prepared a summary of military projects relating to operations in Laos and Cambodia on which some sort of action is still pending. We have sought to highlight problems and areas of disagreement in each case but have not attempted to set forth here the details of the various positions. We would, of course, be glad to provide you with more detailed information should you require it.

At the moment we have not been officially seized with any requests for military actions against VC/NVA forces in Cambodia. However, we anticipate renewed pressure from Defense for more forceful actions to limit the advantage the enemy derives from use of Cambodian territory. Defense has made it known to us that they have had under consideration a wide variety of actions which would begin with expanded cross-border intelligence operations and aerial reconnaissance and might eventually work up to such actions as establishment of guerrilla warfare operations in northeast Cambodia, blockade of the Mekong, the immediate pursuit of the enemy across the border, and air strikes against known enemy installations inside Cambodia.

Any proposals which may emanate from Defense will, however, be carefully considered by the inter-agency committee on Cambodia before they reach you for a decision as will any recommendations of the Cambodia working group established by SEACOORD. We expect to have the next meeting of the committee on August 15. I will keep you informed of any significant developments.

COMUSMACV has been pressing for authority to conduct raids into Laos using regular ARVN forces of one- to three-battalion strength. Ambassador Bunker apparently endorses this proposal. However, at the SEACOORD meeting Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin allied themselves with CINCPAC, who has firmly opposed the concept in view of the political and military complications it raises. Although the Department has never been asked for an official view, it is EA's opinion that the Southpaw concept should be opposed for several reasons, primarily because it would violate the principle of keeping allied operations in Laos at a deniable level. We do not know to what extent the JCS may press for execution of the Southpaw concept, but we doubt that it will get much of a hearing in the Pentagon in the face of the opposition of CINCPAC and Ambassador Sullivan.

Phase III of the Prairie Fire operation includes the use of indigenous tribal personnel (Kha) to conduct guerrilla type operations in the Laos Panhandle. The Joint Staff supports the concept but believes that unless the area of operation can be extended beyond the present Prairie Fire zone, there is little merit in proceeding with it. You will recall, however, that General Wheeler submitted a proposal to you on July 5/2/ requesting approval of the recruitment and training of Kha and other local tribes in Laos, while deferring the question of extending the Prairie Fire operating zone.

The views of the SEACOORD participants are as follows:

--Both General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker, to the best of our knowledge support the proposal, either in its limited form or expanded beyond the Prairie Fire area, if possible.

--CINCPAC apparently endorses the proposal to recruit guerrilla personnel in Laos, but we deduce from his general position on cross-border operations that he desires to limit the area of ground conflict as close to Viet-Nam as possible, i.e. within the current Prairie Fire area.

--Ambassador Sullivan believes that it is unrealistic to initiate Phase III of Prairie Fire on the grounds that there are insufficient personnel to exploit existing opportunities and that it will prove impossible to find 3000 Kha suitable for such operations. He continues to oppose any significant extension of the Prairie Fire zone because of the exposure problem.

--Ambassador Martin also opposed the Phase III plan.

EA's view was set forth in a memorandum submitted to you on July 5./3/ In brief, we are not persuaded that the added military benefit from moving into a phase of guerrilla combat inside Laos would match the added political costs. Moreover, as noted by Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan in expressing some of their objections to Dye Marker (see following), there is more we can do in this area along current lines of action.

The SEACOORD meeting brought out clearly the uneasiness of officials in the field regarding the Dye Marker concept and the way the project has proceeded.

We have learned from cables amplifying the SEACOORD summary cable that Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan now have strong reservations about Dye Marker, particularly the anti-vehicular phase which involves operations west of the Prairie Fire area. They argue that by doing more and better what we are doing now, particularly with propeller planes and current and planned Lao indigenous forces under CAS control, we can critically reduce infiltration except via Cambodia. They believe Dye Marker will not work and will cut across efforts now in train which will work.

We are not certain how strongly Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland support the project although the plan bears Westmoreland's signature. We know that the JCS were not originally keen on it but that there was strong pressure in DOD to get it moving.

We have had our own doubts about the efficacy of the program but were willing to let DOD give it a limited trial and, indeed, Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan seemed to share this view as of last spring, when only the anti-infiltration measures close to the Viet-Nam border were being considered in detail. In the light of the concerns about this project both here and in the field, we are planning to have a thorough-going review of the entire project when we have received the report of the Dye Marker working group set up by SEACOORD. We will keep you informed as it progresses.

The code name identifies a soil destabilization project on which successful experiments have recently been conducted in southern Laos. The process involves application to the soil in target areas of a harmless dry powder which breaks down soil stability. Both MACV and Ambassador Sullivan have expressed interest in operational use of this technique to create untrafficable mud fields along road and infiltration trail routes and, possibly, to supplement mine fields in strengthening defensive perimeters in hostile areas. Ambassador Sullivan is most anxious that the technique be applied in northern Laos as well as in the Panhandle and anticipates no difficulty in obtaining Souvanna Phouma's concurrence in the program.

Mr. Kohler, Mr. Bundy and other Department officials have been briefed by the technical experts on the first experimental effort. We believe that the political problems which might result from the Commando Lava project would be manageable and we expect to forward a favorable recommendation to you when DOD is ready to recommend a specific operational plan.

Vientiane, August 10, 1967, 1210Z.

101210Z. Ref: MAC 7473./2/

1. Your message on Prairie Fire touches on the question of the collaborative effort required to deal with the problem of enemy operations on Lao territory. I fully endorse this principle of collaboration and assure you that I also subscribe to the principle of flexibility, within the limits fixed by the imperatives of our larger national objectives here in Southeast Asia.

2. However I would like to stress three points which I will wish to discuss with you in further detail tomorrow at Udorn.

A. The Prairie Fire zone is not a piece of territory which has been detached from my responsibilities in Laos and given over to your command. It is instead an area in Laos where MACSOG is permitted to conduct certain types of operations which have been agreed to by higher authority in Washington, subject to my concurrence. Therefore, question does not arise of you "allowing" CAS Road Watch teams to land in Prairie Fire zone. I will send Road Watch teams anywhere in Laos I feel they are needed, including Prairie Fire zone, if that seems the best method of handling the problem. Naturally, if I undertake any operations in the Prairie Fire zone, I will effect the closest coordination with MACSOG to avoid conflict. In practice, I feel it is best to avoid CAS operations in the Prairie Fire zone because of possible conflicts and confusions. However, the principle exists and is valid.

B. On the other hand, there is not a reciprocation in principle for Prairie Fire operations in Laos elsewhere than the Prairie Fire zone. In practice, there has been one instance of Prairie Fire authorization west of the zone, although this has required clearance with Washington.

C. The case at issue is not quite so black and white as you have described it. It was not a question of employing Prairie Fire forces against a known enemy force astride the boundary of the Prairie Fire zone. The circumstances are as follows:

A CAS special guerrilla unit is in the area of an enemy force which is well west of the Prairie Fire zone. For Prairie Fire teams to attack in this area would have required their introduction into the vicinity of our CAS unit, from which they would then have mounted their action. This would have brought the Prairie Fire team into potential conflict with the CAS unit. For this reason it was decided that the CAS unit would undertake the mission and it is currently moving to engage the enemy. While it is true that there are other elements of the enemy (probably associated with the same organization), which are located east of the Prairie Fire zone, the circumstances of their total disposition are such that it does not seem to me to give rise to the considerations reflected in last sentence para 2 reftel.

3. This business of coordination requires the closest and most trusting mutual efforts. It will not be otherwise unless the JCS turns Singlaub and his MACSOG unit over to me or else the President names you Ambassador to Laos. The larger national interests would suggest that we avoid both these extremes. Warm regards./3/

Saigon, August 13, 1967, 1310Z.

MAC 7617. Subject: Conference with Ambassador Sullivan with respect to Prairie Fire coordination line.

1. Following the Dye Maker discussion,/2/ Sullivan and I met privately to discuss matters of coordination between us. Specifically, I expressed my concern that his staff, based on his guidance, had interpreted the coordination line for Prairie Fire operations to be a barrier that could not be crossed regardless of contingencies. I objected to this interpretation as contrary to sound military practice. Sullivan suggested, and I agreed, that our representatives sit down and trace a new Prairie Fire line to include certain terrain features and roads that naturally fall in the Prairie Fire area. Following this, Sullivan will ask Washington to approve the adjusted line. I put forth the proposition that we should go through our respective channels and urge that the new line be accepted by State and Defense as a coordination line, not a barrier, and we should be delegated authority to coordinate operations across the line on a contingency basis. Sullivan would not agree with this and implied that MACV would take advantage of the situation if such authority were delegated. When I pointed out that he would retain a veto in any given situation, he made the point that he might be succeeded by a weaker individual who might be overwhelmed by the military.

2. It is incomprehensible to me that coordination of operations across a line on a map cannot be delegated to senior officials in the field. Despite Sullivan's attitude, I recommend that when the new Prairie Fire lines come to State and Defense for approval that Defense urge State to agree to authorize MACV and Embassy Vientiane to coordinate operations on a contingency basis across the line without reference to Washington. Failure to permit this creates delays in reacting to intelligence and, in my view, makes no sense whatsoever. Needless to say, most requests to operate across the coordination line will be from this flank. At the same time, Embassy Vientiane will have veto authority which hopefully would be exercised, not arbitrarily, but in accordance with the best interest of our war efforts.

I-35851/67

Washington, August 26, 1967.

SUBJECT
Operations-Laos (C)

COMUSMACV has recommended expanded operations in Laos in two proposed programs: Prairie Fire Phase III (organizing an indigenous guerrilla force in the eastern Panhandle) and Southpaw (airmobile operations into Laos by regular GVN units). You had briefings on these programs during your last visit to Saigon.

The Prairie Fire Phase III concept, previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of staff, was considered at the 1 August SEACOORD meeting in Saigon where it was agreed in principle there were no objections provided operations are restricted to the existing Prairie Fire area in Laos. Agreement was reached that representatives of MACV and American Embassy, Vientiane would review the specific details in order that Ambassador Sullivan might assess the political implication of these operations in terms of their impact on the Royal Lao Government. Results of this review and assessment by Ambassador Sullivan have not reported but are expected soon. Department of State concurrence in Phase III of Prairie Fire is anticipated.

In the attached JCSM-461-67 (Tab A),/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Southpaw not be implemented at this time since they consider that the political and military risks outweigh the merits of the proposed concept. They leave open the possibility that future conditions may warrant a re-evaluation.

I concur in this position and therefore recommend that you sign the attached proposed memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff./3/

Paul C. Warnke/4/

Washington, September 1, 1967, 2338Z.

31287. Joint State/Defense message. Subj: Dye Marker.

1. Decision here is that there must be U.S. leadership and technical skill in ground teams for support of Dye Marker anti-personnel system./2/ Accordingly either US/Vietnamese or US/Thai teams will be used to provide this support.

2. Because bad weather precludes launching of teams from SVN during most of December-March, facilities and authority must exist for such launching [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

3. Judgment here is that overcoming Thai reluctance to permit [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] teams to stage through Nakhon Phanom, utilizing isolated, fenced facilities, is less formidable obstacle than political risk to Souvanna of use of US/Thai teams.

4. Accordingly, Ambassador Martin should again seek Thai concurrence for staging [less than 1 line of source that not declassified] teams through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./3/ We are sure that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be prepared to go to Bangkok give Dye Marker briefing to Dawee and others as appropriate. This would emphasize the importance we place upon this project and upon the absolute requirement for use of Nakhon Phanom as a staging base. Amb. Martin should not hesitate to ask for this assistance if he believes it would be helpful in securing Thai concurrence.

5. Requirement to launch from Nakhon Phanom means that a refueling area in Laos must be utilized. Request Amb. Sullivan's recommendation where this could be placed. We assume Amb. Sullivan will not wish to secure Souvanna's permission to conduct such refueling.

6. The anti-personnel system will initially be located substantially within the existing Prairie Fire area.

7. With reference to anti-vehicular system, assume any problems will be overcome by work of coordinating group now meeting in Saigon.

Rusk

Washington, September 12, 1967, 1:25-3:10 p.m.

SUBJECT
Weekly luncheon with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow and George Christian (General Harold Johnson also was present)

[Here follows extensive discussion on Vietnam scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V.]

The President then asked General Johnson to have the Joint Chiefs "search for imaginative ideas to put pressure to bring this war to a conclusion." He said he did not want them to just recommend more men or that we drop the Atom bomb. The President said he could think of those ideas. The President asked Johnson to have the Joint Chiefs come up with some new programs. He pointed out that when this Congress comes back in January they will try to bring the war to a close either by getting out or by escalating significantly. The President asked Walt Rostow to put on a chart the good items represented in the "Blueprint."/2/

The President then read excerpts from the "Blueprint." (Copy of this is attached.)

After reading paragraph B from the "Blueprint" memorandum concerning approval of an elite battalion-size South Vietnamese force with U.S. advisors to raid enemy supply bases in Laos--Secretary Rusk replied that we can do a good many things with Souvanna Phouma if the President will spend an hour with him when he is here this fall.

The President said yes, I have already agreed to that.

In response to Paragraph A concerning approval and expedition of "Dye Marker" program for electronic devices in Laos to be used in connection with the air program--McNamara said that "Dye Marker" is a barrier and he does not expect any trouble in Laos.

Again referring to Paragraph B (the South Vietnamese and U.S. troops raiding the enemy supply bases in Laos)--Johnson said it will become known in Laos because of the way the correspondents travel out there. General Johnson pointed out that this meant violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962. He also said that this action would create no military problem.

Rusk pointed out that the key problem is getting Souvanna Phouma aboard.

The President said if we get Souvanna aboard, then should we go ahead and do it?

Rusk replied, yes.

The President asked that we give some thought on how we can do this.

Rusk said maybe we can get some Laotian troops in on this.

McNamara says this is worth doing if we can do it, and if we can keep from destroying Souvanna.

The President then read from Paragraph D concerning "obtaining for Laos corridor work additional propeller type aircraft by the beginning of the next dry season."

McNamara replied that there are "lots of aircraft there now." He pointed out that the weather has been bad and also that not many trucks have been moving down the corridor. McNamara said that Westmoreland has not asked for any propeller aircraft that has not been approved.

General Johnson agreed with McNamara.

Rusk asked "if we couldn't fly a good many planes out of Laos as Laotian planes, even with our pilots."

McNamara said "we don't have to Dean, because we have time . . ."

[Here follows additional extended discussion on Vietnam scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V.]

September 12, 1967.

Things I recommend we do in connection with the Vietnam war are:

1. Improve our interdiction efforts in Laos by:

a. Approval and expedition of "Dye Marker" program for electronic devices in Laos to be used in connection with air program. (This now I believe approved by our Ambassador to Laos, subject to working out details to blend with his guerrilla program there.)

b. Approval of use of elite battalion-size South Vietnamese forces (with U.S. advisors) to raid enemy supply bases in Laos. (We now have 12-man teams operating there, and this would merely enlarge the size of the team. They would not stay in Laos permanently, but would hit and run. Our Ambassador to Laos is opposed to this because he believes it would become known, and Souvanna might resign. We believe if North Vietnamese troops violate Geneva Convention by being in Laos, South Vietnamese troops have a right to oppose them, and solving infiltration problem central to winning war, and risk of Souvanna reaction must be taken. We see little additional risk beyond what we are now doing, and believe U.S. Ambassador to Laos principally afraid of future use of U.S. troops in Laos on massive scale. We can cross this bridge when we come to it.

c. Other measures suggested by General Westmoreland in briefing of Secretary McNamara, which I believe have now been approved by everyone.

d. Obtaining for Laos corridor work additional propeller-type aircraft by beginning next dry season (December). Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin have impressive statistics that propeller craft hit over twice as many trucks as jets per given number of sorties. Air Force prefers jets, if they have to choose, because they can be used in North Vietnam during Laos monsoon season, whereas propeller planes cannot be used there because of excessive antiaircraft fire. I believe that if more propeller planes would improve interdiction, they should be used there even if they are laid up six months out of the year, and they should be additional to, not in lieu of, other planes needed by Air Force. Air Force does not accept Sullivan figures.

[Here follow items 2, Improvement of security efforts in the South Vietnamese countryside; 3, Intensification of operations against North Vietnam; 4, Pacification efforts; and 5, Political front efforts. The remainder of this memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V.]

Eugene M. Locke/4/

Washington, October 19, 1967.

SUBJECT
Your meeting with the Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, October 20, 1967

Souvanna arrives tomorrow (from New York where he has attended the UN General Assembly)--and comes directly to your office for a meeting, following which you are hosting a working stag luncheon for 3 people. Later, Souvanna will see the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, and Averell Harriman. He leaves the country Saturday evening on his way to visit Australia.

He is anxious to have a thorough discussion with you on the current situation in Southeast Asia and the chances for peace. He has been shaken by the accounts he has read of domestic opposition and needs reassurance that our commitment in Southeast Asia is firm. You might also wish to:

--Assure him we seek no wider war and intend to try to try to keep the Viet Nam war within its current boundaries.

--Express appreciation for his speech at the UN (October 13), in which he emphasized the UN's responsibility for peacekeeping.

--Express concern about the rice crop (which was hurt by floods last year and droughts this year).

Souvanna will probably raise the following matters:

--His concern at the effects on Laos of the continuing war (each year 1500-2000 Lao are killed in combat--the per capita equivalent of 100,000 American combat deaths a year).

--He may plead for decisive action to bring the war to an end. In the past, he has privately argued that we should increase the pressure on North Viet Nam by bombing the dikes and other civilian targets. In New York he spoke at length with Ambassador Goldberg, urging a 15 day bombing pause on the basis that there was an obligation to try anything that might bring a settlement.

--The Laotian need for additional military assistance because, in his view, Laos can no longer support the financial burden of both national defense and economic development. If he raises this point, I suggest that you reply that we are aware of his needs and are undertaking to provide for them.

A particular problem which Souvanna will probably raise with you is "the barrier". He is very fearful that "the barrier" will cause the North Vietnamese to be more aggressive in Laos, that it may lead us to commit U.S. forces overtly into Laos, and that we may use the barrier as an excuse to stop bombing North Viet Nam. Any of these actions, he thinks, would lengthen rather than shorten the war. He is absolutely opposed to any overt U.S. troop presence in Laos and has made it plain that he will have no choice but to publicly denounce any overt military presence as a violation of Laotian neutrality.

Ambassador Sullivan has discussed "the barrier" plan with Souvanna, obtained his agreement to the introduction into Laos of an Air-Delivered Detection System, and assured Souvanna that we have no intention of introducing "any manner of ground system into Laos." Souvanna has reserved the right to approve the precise location of the detection system before it is installed.

If he raises this matter, I think you will want to reaffirm Ambassador Sullivan's reassurances.

A special caution. Our sensitive operations in Laos are something which Souvanna seldom discusses, even with his closest colleagues. Except when you are talking with him privately you should avoid mention of any operations in Laos unless Souvanna specifically raises them. Also, Souvanna does not expect, and would not be pleased by an expression of "gratitude" for his cooperation. In every instance, his cooperation has been obtained on the basis of Lao national interests. Souvanna does not consider that we are allies, but rather that harsh conditions force us to work together on some matters because "we are in the same boat."

Another caution concerns the Prairie Fire program in which we operate intelligence patrols in the Laotian Panhandle. Souvanna has made it very clear that he could never officially agree to these operations. So far as we are concerned in discussions with him, he wishes to pretend that this program does not exist.

Souvanna will be accompanied by his daughter, Princess Moune (pronounced Moon)--a tough-minded woman and a principal figure in the Lao Foreign Ministry. At Souvanna's request, she will be present at your "stag" luncheon. Souvanna is also accompanied by his Minister of Finance, Sisouk (See sook), the second most powerful man in the government and Souvanna's heir-apparent.

The briefing book prepared by State is attached./2/

Walt

Washington, October 20, 1967, 12.30 p.m.

SUBJECT
War in Southeast Asia and Prospects for Peace

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
A. Toumayan, Interpreter

After greeting his visitor and commenting on their previous meeting a year ago,/2/ the President told the Prime Minister that he looked forward very much to conversation and luncheon with him at the White House.

The President asked the Prime Minister for his views on the situation in his country and remarked how much confidence he had in Ambassador Sullivan and the reports he receives from him.

The Prime Minister emphasized that the difficult situation of his country was caused more by the war than by political and economic causes. His government had made progress in reducing corruption and in stabilizing the currency thanks to the friendly countries which contributed to the stabilization fund.

This year, thanks to USAID, $6 million had been programmed for the building of small dams and irrigation projects and the purchase of seeds, insecticides, and fertilizers. The Prime Minister felt that his country should once again become an exporter of rice. Today, with 100 thousand young men under arms there was a shortage of labor and therefore production of rice was inadequate. He intended to supplement labor with mechanized tools. The Prime Minister recalled his conversation on the subject of agriculture development with the Vice President when he visited Vientiane last year./3/

The President remarked that the Vice President very much wanted to meet with the Prime Minister again. The President also invited the Prime Minister and the other members of his party to return for an informal luncheon at the White House on Saturday/4/ with the Secretary of State, Secretary McNamara, and the Vice President. The Prime Minister said he welcomed such an opportunity because he had many different matters to discuss with the President.

The Prime Minister resumed his presentation, pointing out that he has to wage two wars. He said he would only outline broadly his problems at this time and would go into more details in subsequent conversations. The first was the military one but the second war, the economic war, had to be waged in parallel. The Prime Minister emphasized that winning the military war while neglecting the economic one would only expose his country to the risk of Pathet Lao, Communist subversion. He wanted the US Government to be clearly aware of the fact that Laos is in a state of war where it loses 10 to 20 men every day.

The President commented that we were keenly aware of the heavy burden this represents for Laos.

The Prime Minister stressed that in addition to the high cost in human lives, half the Lao budget goes into defense (he cited $50 million as his annual budget). Thus, he would be very happy if the US Government would help in some circuitous way, because the neutrality of Laos had to be maintained, to relieve these financial pressures.

The President remarked that we also have great budgetary problems and that we spend $75 billion on defense out of a $130 billion budget. The President said he was trying to get additional taxes passed and his foreign aid program had just been cut by one-third.

The Prime Minister asked if some way could be found to place under Defense assistance some of the items which at the moment were funded by AID. He cited such items as refugee care, consumables for the armed forces, etc. The President advised him to discuss this with Secretary McNamara.

The Prime Minister told the President he had read his San Antonio speech with great attention and also the Secretary of State's press conference with much interest./5/ Unfortunately, there was no improvement in the North Vietnamese attitude on the war. The President noted that in recent days North Vietnam's position was even harsher.

The Prime Minister asked what would the US Government do, would it also harden its own stand? The President replied that we would continue with what we have been doing, we would continue to apply the pressure we had been applying.

The Prime Minister stressed the vital interest of his country in this subject because the majority of the North Vietnamese equipment that infiltrated to the south went through Laos. If the US Government hardened its stand, the Lao would be happy, the Prime Minister continued, if all passes from North Vietnam into Laos are very heavily bombed. The Lao fear that during the next dry season North Vietnam may launch an offensive against Laos. Since North Vietnam has failed to achieve victory in the South, or at the 17th parallel south of the DMZ, during the next dry season it might very well turn against Laos. The President assured the Prime Minister that we would do all we could to prevent such an event. The Prime Minister stressed that the North Vietnamese could draw upon reserves that his own country did not have.

The President asked him what he thought about Hanoi's present intentions as opposed to a year ago when he and the Prime Minister last met. The Prime Minister replied that last year upon his return to Vientiane he had asked the NVN Charge what Hanoi would do if the US ceased bombing. The Charge had replied that Hanoi would not accept anything short of a final and unconditional cessation of bombing. Both the Prime Minister and the President agreed that this was the standard answer that had been heard for several years.

The President asked him how he thought that the war could be brought to an end. The Prime Minister replied that he thought pressure could be brought upon the Soviet Union to exert its influence on Hanoi toward that end. The President pointed out that the Soviet Union had already tried this but the Chinese Communists were opposed.

The President then asked the Prime Minister if he felt we were nearer peace today than a year ago. The Prime Minister replied that perhaps this might be the case although it was a very difficult question to answer and one which he had discussed many times. His own feeling was that during November and December we should try to subject North Vietnam to extremely heavy bombings including all the access roads into Laos. Then there would remain no strategic targets in the north.

The President took the Prime Minister and other invited guests to the luncheon.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Visit of Souvanna Phouma, 10/20-21/67. Top Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted by Toumayan and Slutz.

Washington, October 20, 1967, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT
Suggestion for a Bombing Pause in North Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
A. Toumayan, Interpreter

During his luncheon with the President, the Prime Minister formulated in greater detail his proposal regarding a pause in the bombing: the United States should bomb very intensively during the months of November and December, destroying practically every strategic objective still left in North Vietnam. It should then proclaim a halt to the bombing around Christmas or New Year without in any way indicating for how long it intended to stop the bombing. This pause would be in response to demands of public opinion both here and abroad and to the statements made by a number of governments (Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, etc.) that by stopping the bombings the United States would create a climate favorable to the initiation of negotiations. Although the bombing would be halted over North Vietnam, the United States should continue to bomb very intensively all access roads leading from North Vietnam into Laos to preclude the infiltration of men and supplies through Laos. This could easily be achieved by blocking a limited number of mountain passes which were the only accesses into Laos; these were mountainous terrains with no population and no Lao citizen would suffer from these bombings.

After about a week of the bombing pause the United States should begin to pressure the governments mentioned above to help bring about negotiations. After another eight days or so, if there still had been no opening of talks, the United States should redouble its pressure on these countries, pointing out that the United States had brought the bombing to a halt and that there were still no talks with Hanoi. The Prime Minister felt that if after two to three weeks there had been no indication that Hanoi was going to open talks, the United States, having demonstrated its good-will to the world, could resume its freedom of action without further delay./2/

Washington, October 21, 1967, 11:30 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Laos and Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
Ambassador Khamking Souvanlasy

The Secretary said he felt he had to ask the Prime Minister one question even though he knew the answer the Prime Minister would give him. We believe that we have a direct, clear, and simple commitment from the Soviets with respect to Laos. This is the result of the meeting between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. It is an understanding that affects the totality of our relations with the Soviet Union. Did the Prime Minister believe that there was one chance in a thousand that the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos would be respected by North Vietnam before a settlement took place in Vietnam?/2/

The Prime Minister replied that he did not think there was such a chance; in his many conversations with the Soviets on Laos he had always stressed that the question of Laos was settled in Geneva in 1962, that Laos has nothing to do with the Vietnam question. He said the Soviets never answered directly, but always advised him to be patient, his problem would be settled as soon as the problem of Vietnam was settled. The Secretary pointed out that Vietnam had not been considered at all in the 1962 Agreement. The Prime Minister concurred and added that the North Vietnamese had violated the agreement immediately after it was signed and had, in fact, never pulled back their troops.

The Prime Minister said Moscow was well aware of the fact that North Vietnam had an absolute need to use Lao territory for infiltrating into South Vietnam. He said he had pointed out to Moscow that he had requested the United States to intervene in Laos because of this violation of the 1962 Agreement by North Vietnam; if North Vietnam had not violated the agreements there would have been no need for US assistance. He had repeatedly stressed to the Soviets, he said, that US aid was requested after large-scale fighting broke out in North Laos. As far back as the middle of 1963, he added, North Vietnam had ordered the Pathet Lao ministers to leave Vientiane on the grounds that it was not safe there; this was a lie--at the time all was calm in Vientiane. The real reason for the order was that North Vietnam felt the Lao factions were getting close to an agreement among themselves and if such an agreement were reached the Royal Lao Government would control all the territory then occupied by the Pathet Lao, thereby hampering North Vietnamese passage through Laos. (The Prime Minister seems to have forgotten that the assassination of the Foreign Minister in April 1963 triggered the abrupt departure of the two Pathet Lao ministers.)

The Secretary said that he felt the fact that Russia has never denied the existence of a specific agreement on Laos could be useful one day. The Prime Minister said if we could get the Soviet Union to tell Hanoi to leave Laos alone just as Hanoi wanted the United States to leave Vietnam alone, then there might be some hope for Laos.

The Secretary asked the Prime Minister if North Vietnamese helicopters were ever observed over Laos. The Prime Minister said the North Vietnamese have only Soviet helicopters and they do not have sufficient range to fly over Laos.

The Prime Minister said that in 1964 he had asked Peking and Hanoi for a declaration of their respective policies toward Laos but had been unsuccessful in obtaining one. He had no difficulty, however, in obtaining a statement about US policy from Ambassador Unger.

The Prime Minister said the only way for Laos to have peace is for the North Vietnamese to go home. He added that their presence in Laos was simply a matter of socialist expansion, when he tells the Soviets and other socialist countries that they are interfering in Laos, they tell him that the United States is interfering in Vietnam. The Prime Minister said he must constantly repeat that Vietnam had nothing to do with Laos.

The Secretary wondered if it would be advantageous to obtain from a number of Asian governments a declaration of policy regarding Laos similar to the declaration of 1962; he had in mind countries such as India, Indonesia, Japan, and Pakistan. He said that although some countries were reluctant to take a stand on Vietnam, they might not hesitate to take a stand on Laos. He added that we did not conceive of peace in South Vietnam as opening the way for further North Vietnamese aggression into Laos. The Prime Minister said he did not believe the North Vietnamese would dare attack Laos after peace had been restored in Vietnam. Laos is attacked now, he said, because North Vietnam needed to use Lao territory in infiltrating South Vietnam.

The Prime Minister said that North Vietnam was to a very large extent still glorying in its victory at Dien Bien Phu, still considering itself invincible. The Secretary said that for the past week or ten days Hanoi has been increasingly negative and harsh and expressed the hope that he and the Prime Minister would maintain close contact in order to ascertain North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese intentions. The Prime Minister said he would do all he could to develop more specific information, but said that the North Vietnamese Charge d'Affaires in Vientiane was very quiet. He added that Hanoi's recent harshness might conceal an intention to accept some form of arrangement. The Secretary asked if the Prime Minister felt that Hanoi's decisions were being affected by internal strife among North Vietnamese leaders. The Prime Minister said he did not think such internal factors were at work in Hanoi, that under their socialist regime decisions were made collectively. The Secretary asked if under such a system six or eight leaders sat around a table and one of them dissented, did that not make him a traitor in the eyes of the others and render his expression of opinion much more difficult? The Prime Minister recalled that when he was at Khang Khay, discussions would go on for a very long time and if, at the end of a meeting, the Pathet Lao leaders had not reached an agreement, they would simply close the meeting and resume it the next day. Sometimes discussions would go on for two weeks or a month until a consensus had been obtained./3/

Washington, October 20, 1967, 2331Z.

59769. For Sullivan from Katzenbach. In recent list of possible actions to accelerate war effort,/2/ JCS proposed several which involve Laos. We are obviously going to look hard and long at each one before moving.

The actions suggested included:

1. Increase air interdiction in Laos and along NVN borders--selective bombing of Lao waterways traffic, special saturation bombing interdiction airstrike zones in Laos; e.g., NW of DMZ, Nape and Mu Gia passes.

2. Eliminate operational restrictions on B-52s with regard to Laos--allow overflights of Laos by day or night, by B-52s to or from targets in Laos and Viet-Nam; allow daylight bombing in Laos; eliminate requirement for cover strikes in SVN when bombing targets in Laos; allow limited penetration Lao airspace during approach to and withdrawal from targets outside Laos.

3. Expand Prairie Fire operations in Laos--consider limited increase in size of teams, but not approve MACV request for battalion sized units; authorize Westmoreland and Sullivan to work out specific case-by-case extension of Prairie Fire area.

I know you have heard these ideas before. But since they are likely to come up again in near future, would appreciate your private thoughts through this channel on above moves soon as possible./3/

Rusk

At a breakfast meeting at the White House on November 21, 1967, President Johnson met with his Saigon and Washington advisers. The discussion dealt mostly with Vietnam, but the President raised the issue of operations in Laos:

"The President asked about recommendations for operations inside Laos.

"General Westmoreland said he was anxious to initiate action in base area 607. He pointed out that the missiles that hit Da Nang came through this base area. He said this action would require two Vietnamese battalions and a raid of three to four days.

"Ambassador Bunker said he was anxious to see this act taken. 80% of their supplies come through Laos. 'To give them a free hand is suicidal.'

"General Wheeler said over the past 12-18 months the enemy has built a truck road through this area. He said the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that within the next 60 to 90 days General Westmoreland should be authorized to initiate action in this area." (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, 11/27/67)

The full memorandum of this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V.

Washington, November 28, 1967.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message from Bill Sullivan,/2/ which states:

--trucks damaged and destroyed in Laos during November are already over 600;

--practically none of the dry-season cargo is getting as far south as Route 9; and

--if the rate continues, North Vietnam's truck inventory could be wiped out by the end of the year--which would constitute a major but unpublicizable victory.

General Wheeler has asked DIA to evaluate the situation.

In the meantime, some preliminary observations.

--There has been a manyfold increase in trucks sighted, damaged, and destroyed compared with any previous period (Tab B)./3/

--Most of the traffic has been in the upper panhandle.

--Truckable mileage is 600 compared to 300 last November and 400 in September 1967, although only relatively short segments are in use.

--Surveillance has been more extensive this year.

--Weather has permitted large-scale trucking beginning the last week of October, whereas last year traffic flow was restricted until late November and December.

Increased truck activity could result from a combination of the following:

--enemy intent to accelerate military activity during the current dry season (Loch Ninh and Dak To);

--resupply effort to replace supplies expended during heavy enemy activity in I Corps this year;

--resupply to replace large amount of supplies destroyed in Laos (secondary explosions: 3,929 from Nov 1966-Sep 1967 versus 1,224 from Nov 1965-Sep 1966); and

--enemy effort to preposition supplies farther south in anticipation of the barrier.

W.W. Rostow/4/

Washington, November 29, 1967, 1:40-2:37 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. George Christian
Mr. Tom Johnson

[Here follows discussion of Cyprus and Thailand.]

The President asked about the over-flight of B-52s over Laos.

Secretary Rusk said Souvanna Phouma had some problems with this. Secretary Rusk recommended night-time flying if this is possible.

General Wheeler said there are three aspects involved:

(1) Recommends doing away with restriction against flying over Laos during the day and night. This will shorten the turn-around time, will permit the B-52s to get up to their twelve hundred sorties per month, and will cut down on operational cost.

(2) Even trained eyes cannot identify B-52s flying at 20,000 to 30,000 feet, and tell them apart from KC-135s which are permitted to fly over Laos now.

(3) It is no longer necessary to couple strikes in South Vietnam with the flights out of Thailand since B-52s stationed on Guam are hitting areas in South Vietnam already.

The President approved the over-flights./2/

/2/This approval was transmitted to Vientiane in telegram 76627, November 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

[Here follows discussion on Vietnam scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V.]

Washington, November 29, 1967, 2337Z.

JCS 10250. Ref: Vientiane 2919, DTG 271051Z Nov 67./2/

1. I have just been informed that the President is very much interested in the recent success of the air strikes against trucks in Laos as reported in reference. He desires that you be informed of his interest and further, that you assure that all possible usable resources are being applied in order to get maximum effectiveness in this area. I might add that I too am impressed with these successes, particularly since as I understand it, approximately 95 percent of these results have been obtained at night. This I regard as phenomenal.

2. In this regard, DIA has validated the figures contained in the reference and confirms that the total number of trucks destroyed in the Panhandle during the month of November will be approximately 600. On the other hand, DIA believes that the conclusion contained in the reference, that practically no cargoes are reaching the Route 9 area is optimistic since truck sighting figures exceeded damaged and destroyed vehicles during the period 1-25 November by approximately five to one. In addition, about 200 of the trucks reported destroyed or damaged were northbound and probably were not loaded with cargoes destined for areas of Route 9. DIA estimates that more than 300 trucks are currently operated by North Vietnam in this sector of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and are backed up by approximately 2,000 more. Nevertheless, there is no doubt but that we are reducing enemy logistic capabilities in the major combat area, and we are hurting him (I believe more than we realize). Therefore, we should keep up the good work.

3. I would imagine that the implementation of the Mud River project/3/ on 1 December will contribute significantly towards your continuing successes in this area. In this regard, DIA has briefed me on the data base which they intend to maintain here in Washington in connection with this project and it looks good. Warm regards.

Vientiane, November 30, 1967, 1325Z.

2998. Ref: State 76627./2/

1. Although [garble--instructions?] contained reftel may be subject to different interpretations, I suppose it would be appropriate for me to assume that "authorizations" and "decisions" described therein are still subject to rudimentary reconciliation with the vestigial shreds of Lao sovereignty. Therefore, I will discuss the matter with Souvanna and feel confident I can obtain most of what is desired.

2. Before doing so, however, I feel it pertinent to refresh Washington memories on certain aspects of this matter. In particular, I wish to recall that my "suggestion" about the period of "diplomatic curiosity" arose from the fact that the Soviets had protested to Souvanna about U.S. intentions to overfly Laos with B-52s. Our pattern at that time was intended to permit him with honesty to tell the Soviets that B-52s were not overflying Laos, but at the same time, preserve the option of that eventuality when heat was off him.

3. I also wish to point out that requirement for [garble--cover?] strikes in Vietnam arose entirely because public relations offices of Strategic Air Command felt it necessary to announce each Arc Light mission executed by their resources. If cover strikes are to be discontinued, I assume I am correct in understanding last sentence of para 5/3/ to mean that this public relations policy will also be discontinued and that no announcements will be made concerning Arc Light missions in Laos. Please confirm.

4. Paragraph 4 states that "optimum force utilization in SEA may require daylight strikes." As Washington aware, daylight strikes into easternmost areas of Laos have been authorized for some time for those missions entering Lao airspace from the east. The most sensitive feature of this proposed package will be this question of daylight strikes. It therefore may (and probably will) mean that Souvanna's acceptance of daylight strikes in Laos will be predicated on condition that these missions enter and withdraw from Lao airspace across the eastern frontiers of Laos.

5. I will seek appointment with Souvanna soonest and report results.

Sullivan

S-2543

Washington, December 1967.

1. In a cable of 27 November 1967 commenting on the air war in Laos, Ambassador Sullivan stated that 1) the total of trucks destroyed in Laos in November would in all probability exceed 600, 2) an overwhelming proportion of the truck "kills" had been on Routes 911 and 912 and as a result practically none of the North Vietnamese dry season cargo is reaching as far south as Route 9, and 3) "if this rate of success continues, the entire inventory of trucks which the North Vietnamese hold for the Ho Chi Minh Trail activity will be wiped out before the end of this calendar year."/2/

2. During November, Seventh Air Force pilots reported 531 trucks destroyed and 198 damaged, the highest monthly rate of destruction reported in Laos during the past two years (see Table 1). Ninety-eight percent of the trucks reported destroyed in Laos during November and 95 percent of those reported damaged were found in the Panhandle (Steel Tiger) Area of Laos. The number of trucks reported destroyed in Laos in November has been exceeded in North Vietnam only during the months of July and August 1967 when 603 and 743 respectively were reported destroyed (see Table 2).

3. The record level of reported destruction of trucks in November results from a combination of factors; (1) exceedingly good weather in Laos and the highest number of sorties over Laos since April, (2) the first full month of the dry season and an increase in traffic densities, and (3) possibly poor convoy discipline resulting from the use of inexperienced truck drivers. We know of no change in US tactics or weapons systems that would account for the increased effectiveness of US air attacks.

4. We agree with Ambassador Sullivan that air operations in Laos were especially effective in November. Even allowing for the inflation known to exist in pilot reporting, a continuation of such heavy losses would seriously erode the North Vietnamese truck inventory in Laos and North Vietnam unless imports from the Communist countries increased substantially. It is to be noted, however, that reported truck losses in North Vietnam in November were light, only 50 destroyed and 66 damaged.

5. We disagree with Ambassador Sullivan's claim that practically no traffic is reaching as far south as Route 9. While road watch teams report little traffic south of Route 9, recent aerial reconnaissance covering the period 4-17 November shows that at least 15 percent of the trucks sighted in the Panhandle were operating on Route 9 or south of Route 9. Finally, there are anomalies in the data for November which cannot yet be explained. In November relatively more trucks were destroyed than damaged than in any previous period. In addition, only 6 sorties were required per truck destroyed or damaged compared to 35 sorties per truck destroyed and damaged in November 1966, when about the same number of sorties were flown but only 115 trucks were destroyed.

6. We believe that the November experience is heartening but it is still too early to conclude that a major turning point has been reached in the US air interdiction campaign in Southeast Asia. Based on past experience there is considerable doubt that the November performance in Laos can be sustained.

[Here follow 3-1/3 pages of "comments," two tables, and a map of Laos.]

Vientiane, December 16, 1967, 0340Z.

3326. 1. Although it is too early and difficult to predict the degree of aggressiveness the NVN/PL enemy will manifest this dry season, indications so far are that we shall probably be in for a rather lively time.

2. To the north, immediate pressure on Nam Bac has been relieved but the enemy remain in the area in force and the situation continues to be precarious. There is also a NVN/PL build-up in the vicinity of Site 85. In the south the enemy has made a harassing attack in strength on Lao Ngam during the past two days, withdrawing after inflicting heavy casualties on the friendlies (estimated 42 KIA and 33 WIA) as well as destroying supplies, etc. No US personnel were in Lao Ngam at the time. Also in the south, the enemy continues to build up around Saravane and the Bolovens Plateau. We can probably expect more aggressive enemy activity here and there along the perimeter of friendly held territory in Laos.

3. Our policy and advice to the RLG and FAR has been that the loss of such places as Nam Bac and Lao Ngam would be regrettable but these places should not be defended at all costs. Orderly withdrawal is far preferable to a possible significant military defeat. We believe we can effect our policy through our control of military supplies and our general influence on military matters.

4. Although the FAR has given a fairly good account of itself in the face of enemy pressure at Nam Bac and the FAN similarly at Lao Ngam, experience has shown that when faced with heavy pressure, FAR troops are also capable of panicking. On one such occasion in 1962 (Nam Tha), FAR troops did not stop retreating from the north until they had reached the safety of Thailand across the Mekong. Should FAR troops crack again under pressure, in Nam Bac area or elsewhere, the enemy may well be tempted to press on to more vital objectives. Our estimate is that, with current enemy strength, there is no major threat to vital positions, although the enemy retains the capability of launching attacks to seize temporarily and hold certain positions. We have recently detected, however, through road watch teams in NVN, signs of NVN reinforcements heading towards Laos along Routes 6 and 6 A. The numbers involved are about 3000. For those who are focusing on the war next door this magnitude may seem small; for our little war where friend and foe are evenly matched, the influx of 3000 troops is significant.

5. As the Dept will recall, during November 1965 the NVN/PL came close to taking Thakhek on the Mekong. At that time Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky became quite uneasy that capture of Thakhek would bring US and Thai retaliation. Soviet pressure may have been instrumental in dissuading the DRV from pressing their attack on Thakhek in particular, and the Soviets may also have subsequently discouraged the DRV from launching similar provocative military initiatives in general.

6. I am dining with Kirnassovsky next week, in an effort to forestall NVN attacks, I intend to use that occasion, provided the Dept perceives no objection, to let him know that we know that the NVN are building up, that this build-up continues to violate the Geneva Accords, and that should this build-up threaten the stability of the current political/military situation in Laos, such action would be the cause of grave concern. I would not intend to be drawn out further and would just let him mull it over. Please advise./2/

Hurwitch

Washington, December 18, 1967.

SUBJECT
The Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos

The enclosed study indicates that propeller aircraft are approximately 9 times as effective as jet aircraft per sortie in destroying trucks and water craft in Laos. It appears possible to substitute two A-1 squadrons for two F-4 squadrons in Thailand and significantly increase the effectiveness of our air interdiction campaign in the Laotian Panhandle without reducing the number of jet sorties in North Vietnam.

Would you please review the enclosed study and give me your recommendations by December 29, 1967./2/

Robert S. McNamara

ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF
PROPELLER VS JET AIRCRAFT IN LAOS

1. Jet aircraft are relatively ineffective against moving targets in Laos. During the first nine months of 1967 jets destroyed or damaged (D/D) only 366 moving vehicles, 1.5 per 100 attack sorties, at a cost of $700,000 for each truck or water vessel destroyed or damaged.

2. Propeller aircraft are approximately 9 times as effective as jet aircraft per sortie in destroying trucks and water craft in Laos. The prop aircraft destroyed/damaged 996 vehicles, or 12.8 per 100 attack sorties. The cost per vehicle D/D was only $55,000, even though loss rates for propeller aircraft operating in Laos are approximately 4 times greater than the comparable loss rates for jet aircraft.

3. Two additional A-1 squadrons could be deployed to Thailand in 1968 and two F4 squadrons returned to the U.S. without reducing the jet sorties available for use in North Vietnam. The A-1 aircraft are expected to destroy or damage an additional 1200 moving vehicles in Laos over a 12 month period. This proposal would save about $28 million per year over the current plan for the next 2 years. However, an additional 18 aircraft and 8 pilots would be lost under the proposed plan.

[Here follow an analysis of "Aircraft Effectiveness," a table on "Attack Sorties, Losses, and Results in Laos," a "Discussion of Relative Mission/Effectiveness," a table of "Propeller Aircraft Deployments," a discussion and tables of "Alternative Deployments," a discussion and table of the "Cost of Additional Deployments," a discussion and table of the "Cost of Proposed Plan," two enclosures on the USAF A-1 Program, and a table on planned sorties in NVN by Thai-based F-4's.]

Vientiane, December 20, 1967, 0603Z.

3052. Ref: A) State 76627./2/ B) Vientiane 2998./3/ C) State 78120./2/

1. I saw Souvanna this morning and obtained his concurrence in Arc Light overflights of Laos. He stipulated certain conditions and limitations which will be spelled out in following paragraphs.

2. On night-time overflights for strikes in Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, he asked that planes be instructed to fly at high altitudes, that they enter Laos on a corridor north of Pakse but south of Savanna-khet and that they avoid overflight of population centers such as Saravane. This would seem to pose no serious problems and my air attaché will be in touch with MACV to work out details.

3. On day-time overflights for strikes in NVN and SVN he was a little more skittish and asked whether we could avoid mass formation overflights with ostentatious contrails. I said I would look into this, but undertook no commitments. He did not press it further, so I consider his statement stands in the form of a desideratum rather than a condition. It seems to me that his desideratum would be met if strike missions are flown in cells of three, which I gather is normal practice.

4. On daylight strikes in Laos itself, he had problems. He felt that strikes and flights could be easily correlated and he would have hard time justifying Arc Light missions as "reconnaissance activity." He therefore asked that daylight strikes [on?] Lao soil, when needed, enter and withdraw over eastern frontiers.

5. Comment: I feel this package fulfills essential requirements ref A. As for execution time, he said we could begin tonight if we want. The limitation on routes will add nothing more than a few minutes to any conceivable operation. The limitation on those rare daylight strikes in Laos will add a maximum of about one hour to best conceivable response time and perhaps two hours to entire mission. However, fleeting target situations on Lao soil have been so seldom that this should pose no real burden on our forces.

Sullivan

Washington, December 26, 1967, 6:02 p.m.

CAP 671165. Laotian Situation Report (as of 6 p.m. EST, 26 December 1967).

1. Communist forces are keeping up their pressure against government positions in Laos.

2. An enemy unit, estimated at about battalion strength, raided the government base and airstrip at Muong Phalane on 25 December, and destroyed most of the camp's facilities, including the USAID and Air America buildings. Although government reinforcements apparently have moved into the area, they have not yet reoccupied Muong Phalane.

3. Preliminary reports suggest that the attack was specifically aimed against the U.S. presence at Muong Phalane. Two American technicians who manned a navigational station which assists U.S. air operations in southern Laos are missing. The station itself apparently was not damaged.

4. The attack on Muong Phalane is the first significant enemy action in this part of the Panhandle in over a year. It may be related to recent attacks farther south in the Bolovens Plateau area. These operations appear to be part of a new Communist campaign to forestall stepped-up allied efforts to interdict the infiltration corridor.

5. In northern Laos, the Communists launched a mortar attack on the government airstrip at Nam Bac on 24 December. Continuing reports of a Communist build-up in the vicinity suggest that more ground assaults against Nam Bac's outlying defenses may be in the offing. Government troops are being repositioned in an effort to reduce their vulnerability.

6. Although the Communists appear to be putting a little more bite into their dry season offensive this year, there is no evidence that they intend to mount a concerted drive into government-held territory. We agree with the U.S. Embassy's appreciation that the Lao reports out of Vietnam on the status of the North Vietnamese threat are highly exaggerated. In fact, the recent Communist effort against Nam Bac in the north and the Bolovens positions in the south, appears designed to restore the status quo. Until last year, both areas long had been under Pathet Lao control.

7. Nevertheless, we believe that the Communists will make things even hotter in the coming months as they attempt to regain some of the military initiative in Laos. This probably will be particularly true in the Panhandle, where stepped-up allied operations into the infiltration corridor will hit a highly sensitive nerve.

January to December 1968: The Fall of Phou Pha Thi; Reassessment of Policy; Laos and the Paris Peace Talks; Increased Bombing in Laos

CM-2876-68

Washington, January 2, 1968.

SUBJECT
Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 18 December 1967, subject as above./2/

2. Findings of the study forwarded by the reference state that the effectiveness of the propeller aircraft in Laos over that of the jet is significant; and, based thereon, it appears possible to substitute two A-1 squadrons for two F-4 squadrons in Thailand.

3. On the basis of a review of the study, it appears that use of propeller aircraft against a specific target--trucks--is more effective than the jet type aircraft in the relatively permissive air defense environment of Laos. However, our present force posture in Thailand was based on the fact that these forces would be primarily assigned to targets in North Vietnam (NVN), with Laotian targets as their secondary mission. During good weather periods in NVN the maximum number of Thailand based aircraft is required for strikes in NVN. As a bonus effect, this capability is used to provide a maximum number of sorties in Laos during bad weather periods in NVN. Accordingly, the replacement of two F-4 squadrons by two A-1 squadrons would seriously limit the tactical air capability to prosecute the air campaign against NVN. Specifically, the loss of two F-4 squadrons would result in an approximate 16 percent loss to the current CINCPAC Combat Sortie Program for Thailand based aircraft.

4. A preliminary review by the Joint Staff indicates that a number of factors, essential to a thorough and objective analysis of the effectiveness of propeller versus jet aircraft in Laos, may not have been fully considered in the study. Some of there essential factors are listed below and discussed in the appendices.

a. Type mission scheduled (Appendix A)./3/

b. Bomb damage assessment (Appendix B)./4/

c. Day versus night sortie effectiveness in Laos (Appendix C)./5/

d. Muscle Shoals considerations (Appendix D)./6/

e. Enemy air defenses (Appendix E)./7/

5. The conclusions drawn in the referenced study are, in some cases, based on highly questionable assumptions. Two examples are cited: a. since there was no bomb damage assessment made on the majority of over 2,400 night/weather radar controlled level bombing sorties conducted by jet aircraft during the period of the study, the study assumes that there was no destruction of the targets attacked; and, b. the study assumes loss ratios will remain the same in the face of increased enemy defenses and the recent rising trend of propeller aircraft losses in Laos.

6. In summary, the study is too narrow in scope to form the firm basis for a decision to exchange two A-1 squadrons for two F-4 squadrons in Thailand. A more comprehensive study of propeller versus jet aircraft in the overall context of Southeast Asia operations is underway. It is therefore requested that the suspense date for the submission of recommendations on this matter be extended to 1 March 1968 in order to include the results of this analysis./8/ However, if a decision is required earlier than 1 March 1968, my recommendation, based upon the evidence at hand, would be against the proposed exchange of A-1s for F-4s.

Earle G. Wheeler

Honolulu, January 21, 1968, 1948Z.

211948Z. The situation in Laos. In view of the recent developments in the Ban Nam Bac area of Laos/2/ and current considerations concerning the Laos Panhandle, I am forwarding our assessment of the situation in both of these areas.

We view the increase in tempo and intensity of enemy activity in northern Laos as a kick-off of the dry season activities in that area. While serious, and a situation that may develop further, at this point it is not believed to be a general offensive any more than in past dry seasons. The results of the enemy attack on Ban Nam Bac will probably encourage further attempts at offensives in the area. The current emphasis on enemy offensives in SVN may explain some of the increase in activity in northern Laos. Guidance and direction for such offensives undoubtedly originate in Hanoi and are intended for areas of active conflict. Considering the Communist forces presently available in northern Laos, and the currently reflected performance of the FAR forces in this area, NVN has the capability of reinforcing with one division, moving into the Luang Prabang area and sufficiently controlling the situation to permit a Communist take over of most of northern Laos. This probably is not their intention but the capability is there and the situation appears to present few obstacles should the NVN decide to move in force.

Turning to the Laos Panhandle area, US/ARVN ground operations in this area, over an extended period, could restrict enemy resupply activities and movement of replacement personnel, destroy his supply caches, and deny him the base areas/sanctuaries he needs. In such a circumstance, the enemy would be expected initially to divert infiltration activities further to the west, and attempt to increase his use of sea infiltration to include use of Cambodian ports and overland route. He could consider our blocking of his infiltration/logistical effort of sufficient import to divert forces from other operational areas and, if necessary, provide additional forces from NVN. He may act to intensify the threat in northern Laos thereby causing FAR and other friendly Lao forces currently in the Panhandle to be diverted to assist in the north and thus further expand the war in the north. It is improbable that the enemy would attempt a complete take over of northern Laos as a reaction to US/ARVN ground operations in the Laos Panhandle area, but, with encouragement and material support from China, he might attempt to extend presently held territory in northern Laos to a much greater degree.

In summary, we see the current northern Laos picture as a successful enemy launching of his dry season offensive with limited objectives around the Nam Bac area. The situation is serious but it is not believed that the enemy intends to attempt a complete take over of this entire area. US/ARVN operations in the Laos Panhandle area could create a serious resupply and personnel replacement problem for the enemy. The enemy would be expected to divert to the west and increase his other available means of infiltration. Should our operation be of a magnitude which would result in an unacceptable curtailment of the enemy infiltration effort, he probably would, in an attempt to regain full control of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, reinforce with troops from the north, and may intensify his threat to the northern Laos area.

Warm regards.

Washington, January 22, 1968.

I talked with Bill Sullivan on Saturday, January 20. He explained he thought we would be better off if the bombing [of North Vietnam] were stopped in May, rather than now, since in Laos that was the beginning of the rainy season which lasts until the autumn. The North Vietnamese trucks get bogged down in Laos during this period and the roads are unusable.

From Bill Sullivan's standpoint, this idea has two values:

(1) It automatically contributes to taking "no advantage" in Laos.

(2) He is afraid if the bombing is stopped in the North during the dry season, there will be a marked increase in bombing in Laos. This might have adverse repercussions in our relations with Souvanna Phouma as well as make Souvanna's position of "neutrality" more difficult with Soviets and others.

W. Averell Harriman/2/

[document number not declassified]

January 30, 1968.

SUBJECT
Appraisal of the Lao armed forces defeat at Nam Bac and repercussions from this defeat as of 30 January 1968

ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

SOURCE
A staff officer of this organization. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation.

Summary: The defeat of the Lao Armed Forces (FAR) at Nam Bac has wiped out the government's effort over a two-year period to link up its first and second military regions in a meaningful manner at the Nam (River) Hou and to expand its influence westward in the direction of Muong Sai and to the northwest to Nam Tha. By eliminating the FAR salient at Nam Bac the enemy has put himself in a better position to harass Luang Prabang and its environs and to disrupt pro-government guerrilla operations into north central Laos. FAR's defeat at Nam Bac and its subsequent inability to regroup approximately 2,000 men from the Nam Bac salient has robbed FAR of all its reserve force. In addition FAR lost over one million and a quarter American dollars' worth of equipment./2/ Although the military repercussions appear to be more serious than do the political ones there is a movement within the FAR seeking the ouster of Colonel Bounchan, who commanded the ground forces at Nam Bac, and of General Ouane, the commander in chief of the FAR. The defeat at Nam Bac could have been prevented had FAR taken a more aggressive stand against the enemy initially and supplied its men with stronger leadership. End of summary.

[Here follows the body of the cable.]

Washington, February 1, 1968.

SUBJECT
Enemy Pressure on Site 85

1. The most recent reports of enemy action around Site-85 (Phou Pha Thi) indicate that an attempt to seize the site is imminent. Two key outposts defending the approaches to Site-85 have already been taken by the North Vietnamese and pressure is continuing to close in around the site.

2. Over a year ago when Vang Pao attempted to defend Site-36 (Na Khang), his troops suffered a great number of casualties. At that point he decided never again to commit his units to the all-out defense of a position. That tactic is still being followed and, while his units will continue to defend Site-85 as long as possible, he does not intend to accept heavy casualties in exchange for real estate.

3. As you know, the TSQ 81,/2/ as well as a TACAN facility, is located at Site-85. When the decision was made to install these facilities it was understood that no last ditch stand would be made to defend them. Although this equipment is costly, it is expendable--the men who service it are not and they will be removed prior to the fall of the site, if the situation becomes hopeless.

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