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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXVIII Laos DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

351. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, March 27, 1968, 0610Z.

5412. Following sent action immediate Seventh AF; info COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, CINCPAC, CSAF, 16 Mar; sent to you for info. Request this be given absolute minimum distribution to be determined by Mr. Read, S/S, only.

"Personal for Gen. Momyer from Amb. Sullivan.

Reur 141246Z Mar 68./2/

1. I thoroughly concur that post mortem of loss Site 85 is in order. Suggest your people and mine work out procedures for such analysis at next weekly Udorn meeting.

2. Believe you should understand, however, that enemy force was not "relatively small." Our intelligence indicates their numbers between five and seven battalions, with artillery and rocket support, considerably outnumbering local defense forces, which never numbered more than 1,000 men in 12 kilometer defensive perimeter which drawn around Site 85.

3. We made clear from the very beginning that this site could not be defended against a determined and superior enemy force. We gave regular and accurate estimates of its progressive deterioration, and as early as Feb. 26, advised you that it could probably not be held beyond March 10. Therefore, its fall should have come as no surprise to anyone.

4. The manner in which enemy accomplished its fall is, however, instructive, and should, I think, be carefully studied with view to future operations. Artillery fire, at relatively long range, was surprisingly accurate. According fragmentary reports of survivors, direct hits were scored, very early in the barrage, upon personnel quarters, operations structure, and bunkers. It seems possible that installations were rendered effectively inoperable even before destruction order was given. There may be some lessons in this which should be studied with respect to length of time technical personnel should be required stay at their posts after installation falls within artillery range. In hindsight, it seems to me we should have pulled all technicians out morning March 10 even if this meant losing the last several hours of the installation's capabilities.

5. What concerns me most is not the defense action, but the disruption of pre-planned evacuation procedure. It is still not clear why technical personnel went over cliff to a narrow ledge rather than down trail to chopper pad. CAS and local personnel subsequently went up same trail to installation searching for technicians, so we know trail was traversable, even if under artillery fire. It is also not clear to me how small Vietnamese suicide squad got to installation site, although it seems they must have scaled the cliff which all of us considered impassable.

6. We can give you details of action taken by 224-man local defense forces at the site and casualties which they suffered in fighting. In their defense effort, these amounted to 8 killed, 18 missing, and 33 wounded. Their defensive tactics, of course, are based on guerrilla doctrines, and we will be pleased review with your people how we think these should be handled in future instances, and especially the role which air power can play in these tactics."

Sullivan

I-35319/68

Washington, March 28, 1968.

SUBJECT
Prairie Fire--Phase III

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have withdrawn their April 1967 proposal for recruiting, training and employing up to 3,000 Kha tribal personnel in the Prairie Fire area of Laos (Tab A)./2/ The Joint Staff (SACSA) determined in December 1967 to abandon this program after it became clear through our diplomatic channels that the Royal Lao Government was insistent upon the proposed program being under the command and direction of the Lao Armed Forces, instead of being under MACV.

The current JCS paper/3/ is designed to apprise OSD and the Department of State officially of the close-out of the Prairie Fire Phase III proposal and to indicate that some intelligence collection features of the Phase III proposal are included in a separate JCS recommendation (JCSM-171-68)./4/ The latter is now being coordinated with the Department of State.

Recommend you sign the attached draft memorandum/5/ to the Under Secretary of State.

Paul C. Warnke/6/

Washington, March 30, 1968.

Dear Dick:

The Department of State concurs in the JCS proposal to authorize CINCPAC to establish intelligence nets in the authorized Prairie Fire area./2/ We understand that in accordance with the established Prairie Fire coordination procedures, all such recruitment missions pursuant to this authorization will as usual be cleared with Embassy Vientiane prior to launch, and we have amended the authorizing message accordingly.

Ambassador Sullivan and MACSOG have agreed that this program is to be implemented as follows:

a. All recruiting will be conducted by indigenous Prairie Fire personnel; recruits (later agents) will have no contact with U.S. Prairie Fire personnel.

b. Training in RVN will take place in sanitized setting with minimum contact with U.S. personnel. Airlift of recruits and agents to and from RVN will be by VNAF copters.

c. Intelligence net, when fully operational, will not exceed a total of sixty agent personnel. Ten principal agents are to be recruited and trained during six-month period. After training, each principal agent will in turn attempt to recruit five sub-agents or informers.

State's concurrence in the program is based on this agreement.

I am returning the copy of JCSM-171-68, dated March 21, 1968 and the two appendices enclosed with your letter of March 26./3/ State concurs in the JCS message, as amended at Appendix B./4/

Sincerely yours,

Philip C. Habib/5/

JCSM-195-68

Washington, March 30, 1968.

SUBJECT
US Policy for Laos (U)

1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the situation in Laos on a continuing basis. Since 1962, the US Government has based its policy for Laos upon observance of the Geneva Agreements Respecting Laos (1962) which were signed by 14 nations, including the United States and North Vietnam. The Agreements were designed to guarantee the neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity of Laos and the sovereignty of the Royal Laotian Government.

2. (TS) The Government of North Vietnam has manipulated the Agreements to suit its own interests. The North Vietnamese use the eastern Panhandle as a sanctuary and have developed a logistic and troop movement system from North to South Vietnam through that area. In addition, regular North Vietnamese Army units are being employed in offensive operations against the forces of the Royal Laotian Government.

3. (TS) Generally, the US Government has adhered to a policy of respect for the Geneva Agreements and has undertaken military actions in Laos only in response to mounting North Vietnamese violations. These military actions have been generally of low intensity and have been conducted largely with the knowledge and consent of the Royal Laotian Government. Further, these military actions have been planned and executed carefully in order to preserve the fragile political balance of power in Laos, to avoid public exposure, and to minimize the likelihood of communist takeover of the entire country. The North Vietnam/Laos Panhandle logistic and troop movement structure has been expanded to the point where major North Vietnamese Army forces threaten operations in I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones in South Vietnam. Due to the enemy Tet offensive, supported in large measure through the Panhandle, pacification in South Vietnam suffered a serious reverse. So long as North Vietnam controls eastern Laos, attainment of US objectives in Southeast Asia will be most difficult.

4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose that you take action to initiate formal interdepartmental reassessment of US policy for Laos. There is a need to identify methods whereby efforts to obtain international support to eliminate North Vietnamese exploitation of the Geneva Agreements can be broadened and intensified. Measures to be considered could include reconvening of the Geneva Signatories, direct action to strengthen or replace the International Control Commission, injection of a UN peacekeeping force, or other actions worthy of investigation.

5. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum, substantially as contained in the Appendix hereto,/2/ be forwarded to the Secretary of State expressing concern over the gravity of the situation in Laos and proposing formal consideration of the problem by the Interdepartmental Regional Group/East Asia or other appropriate interdepartmental group.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, April 22, 1968.

SUBJECT
Sullivan, the Dove

General Westmoreland, supported by Admiral Sharp, has requested authority to use Prairie Fire forces of up to battalion size if necessary into Base Area 607 in Laos/2/ in conjunction with operations in the Ashau Valley.

Ambassador Sullivan states that he has no authority to concur in this concept and has referred the matter to Washington for decision.

The current operation (Delaware/Lamson 216) does not involve employment of U.S. or ARVN units in Laos. In emergency situations, however, U.S. forces are authorized to act in self-defense against attacks from locations in Laos. Furthermore, Prairie Fire forces of up to three platoons may be used in Laos under current authorities. Past Prairie Fire operations of up to three platoons have been satisfactorily protected from publicity and have not resulted in any major outcry.

Present authorities may be adequate. However, the size and dispersion of enemy units and supplies in this area may require the commitment of Prairie Fire forces larger than three platoons, especially in view of pressures being exerted by U.S. and Vietnamese forces operating in the Ashau Valley.

General Wheeler's tentative view is that the additional authority does not entail a significant additional risk./3/ He should have available by tomorrow a JCS recommendation./4/

Decision of this issue involves a balancing of the following:

--military importance of the additional authority;

--risk of disclosure; and

--political repercussions if the authority were used and if the operation became public knowledge.

G

Washington, April 23, 1968.

SUBJECT
Expansion of "Prairie Fire" Operations in Connection with Operation Delaware

1. General Westmoreland is proposing, and DOD will be raising at the luncheon today,/2/ an operation into Base Area 607 which is in Laos just across the border from the Ashau Valley. Although this is presented in terms of an "expansion" of Prairie Fire operations, it is really a conventional battalion-sized operation although limited in time. It is supposed to last four to six days.

2. A battalion-sized operation across an international border cannot be kept secret, even if it is Top Secret. The record is replete with cases where Top Secret operations in Laos of less intrinsic newsworthiness have been compromised within a short period of time. The press is more likely to exaggerate than to underplay the scope of the operation.

3. Ambassador Sullivan has not commented on this proposed operation because he considers that it involves a major political decision which can only be made in Washington. In the past, he has consistently expressed strong doubts that any such operation could be realistically limited in duration, extent of U.S. troop involvement, or publicity.

4. Souvanna Phouma has repeatedly made clear that he would oppose any intervention of U.S. ground forces in the war in his country. In undertaking an operation which could not (as in the case of Prairie Fire operations) be concealed from him and from the world, we would risk a strong public reaction from him.

5. The proposed operation into Laos would be widely judged to constitute escalation of the war in Vietnam. We would be accused of bad faith at a time when we are seeking to get negotiations going. We would also be accused of violating the neutrality of Laos. In the U.S., the UN and in world capitals, there would be questions and accusations for which we would lack plausible answers.

Recommended Action: That you withhold concurrence in the proposed "expansion" of Prairie Fire operations in the Ashau Valley.

Washington, April 23, 1968.

SUBJECT
Restrictions on Barrel Roll Operations--for Tuesday Luncheon

When the President gave orders to suspend air strikes north of the 20th parallel in North Vietnam, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos was told that this limitation would not have a serious effect on the military situation in his country because additional air power, used until then in the North, would probably be used in Laos--and that, in any case, no policy change was contemplated as regards air operations in Laos.

Then came Hanoi's allegation of an attack on Lai Chau, in North Vietnam. Since it was possible that that attack might have been related to U.S. air operations in Laos, the President issued an order that operations in Northern Laos along the North Vietnamese border be more effectively controlled. As a result, operations in the entire Barrel Roll area have been temporarily suspended.

Subsequently, it turned out that Lai Chau could not have been attacked by U.S. planes. Improved controls were promptly worked out to make any strikes across the Lao border even less possible. Our Embassy in Vientiane worked out such measures with Seventh Air Force and recommended on April 13 that strikes in the Barrel Roll area be authorized again. Our good faith vis-a-vis the Lao Government is involved. Strikes in the Barrel Roll area are very important to the Lao Armed Forces in view of friendly guerrilla assets there and North Vietnamese road traffic feeding into other areas.

State, Defense and CIA are agreed to reinstitute strikes (carefully controlled) in the two southern segments (Bravo and Coco) of the Barrel Roll area, but to retain temporarily the suspension for the Alpha zone which is strategically less important and closer to Communist China. General Wheeler had intended to discuss this matter with the President in Honolulu, but had been unable to do so. An early decision is very desirable.

Action Requested: At the luncheon today,/2/ support JCS and CIA in urging the lifting of current restrictions on air strikes in the Bravo and Coco zones of the Barrel Roll area in Northern Laos.

A luncheon meeting held at the White House on April 23, 1968, from 2:15 to 3 p.m. with President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, General Wheeler, Director Helms, George Christian, and notetaker Tom Johnson attending, discussed Vietnam. As part of these deliberations, the question of operations in base 607 in Laos was discussed. According to Tom Johnson's notes, the discussion on the proposed operation into Laos went as follows:

"The problem of entering base area 607 in Laos was discussed.

"Secretary Rusk: I would send indigenous forces in with U.S. advisers. Our Ambassador (Sullivan) has great problems with this. We should limit this to 'Ashau Valley fighting.'

"General Wheeler: Westy wants to put one battalion in for 3-5 days. We will call it the Ashau Valley operation.

"Director Helms: All you have are primitive tribesmen in the area.

"General Wheeler: Ambassador Sullivan is worried about three sites for Air America flights being knocked out. We have a plan to hit Route 7 up to the 20th parallel.

"The President: Let's get the Defense supplemental up, together with other items." (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes, 4/23/68)

Vientiane, April 24, 1968, 0346Z.

6011. Ref: A. State 150585; B. State 150873./2/

1. Any assessment of U.S. policy with respect to Laos must start from an assessment of the commitments and obligations which the U.S. is willing to undertake towards Laos. If the U.S. were willing to underwrite the political and territorial integrity of Laos as we have done for Thailand and the Philippines, we would be faced in Laos with an overt challenge to our self-declared national interests and would presumably be required to react by overt deployment of U.S. forces. If, on the other hand, our commitment is decidedly hedged and deliberately obscure, then our reaction to events in Laos has to be less precise, less overt, and less conventional.

2. A second consideration with respect to Laos must be our understanding about the source of the trouble in Laos. It should be clear to all that the troubles are not indigenous, but stem from North Vietnam. The most direct, effective, and decisive attack on the problems of Laos should in practice be an attack against North Vietnam. If a decision were made that we should resolve our difficulties in Laos by purely military means without regard to the political consequences, then I would unreservedly recommend that we invade North Vietnam, invest its terrain, and strangle its military potential to operate in and against Laos.

3. A third basic consideration should embrace an understanding of the strategic significance of Lao territory to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. This significance is partly in relationship to Lao territory as a buffer in protection of Thailand, and partly in relationship to Lao territory as a buffer (or conversely a threat) to South Vietnam. It is hard to assess which of these relationships is the more significant to U.S. long term interests, as distinct from immediate interests of a tactical nature. However, if I were required to make a choice, I would opt for the protection of Thailand as being the more important. This is not to say that I believe we have to consider these matters as alternatives, since our policy should be directed towards preserving both elements of our interest. However, it is a way of saying that we should not sacrifice a long term strategic interest for a short term tactical objective.

4. Having stated these premises, it then becomes important to know something about the nature of the Lao state. Laos is an agglomeration of territories, families, interests, and personalities which, taken together, fulfill the geographical expression of statehood. However, the state does not articulate through a central, linear system of controls but rather through the inspiration of a series of ganglia-like control centers which have to be stimulated simultaneously and in the same direction. If the sequence of stimulation is not simultaneous, or if the directions do not coincide, the agglomeration could disintegrate into separate geographic, political and ideological entities. These would become subject to external manipulation and each would contain, in multiplicity, the same problems and divisions which currently beset the state as a whole. This would mean three, or possibly four, political creatures, each requiring a different and competitive degree of commitment and none of them providing the strategic buffer protection for neighboring territories. We went this route once before in 1959-61 with disastrous consequences.

5. By application of these several considerations and experiences, we have come to the conclusion that the form and framework which is most feasible for us to obtain (given the limitations on the commitments we are willing to make) is the sort of Lao state envisaged by the Geneva Agreements of 1962. In a larger geopolitical sense, those agreements are important because they incorporate a tacit U.S.-Soviet agreement to collaborate in the support of independent, non-Communist states on the southern flank of China as a means to contain the southward thrust of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. This same tacit collaboration exists in such forms as the Dept schedules for Indonesia, the mutual provision of arms to India, the Tashkent agreements on the sub-continent, etc. But, nowhere else is it incorporated in a formal document except in the case of Laos.

6. Therefore, the first conclusion which I would like to see established in your assessment is the fact that the 1962 Geneva Agreements, as written and signed, constitute the basic desideratum of our policy with respect to Laos and that it is [not?] in our national interests to see these agreements being "exploited" by anyone. (If any nation has been able to "exploit" them successfully, it is the United States.) It is, however, a very clear and precise question of the agreements being violated by North Vietnam. If you can agree on this fundamental, then you can go on to a successful assessment of U.S. policy re Laos. If you can not agree on this point, then I would suggest you scrap the whole project right there and kick it upstairs, because anything other than this is moonbeams.

7. The central problem facing you, therefore, should be the question of how to obtain enforcement of the 1962 agreements. It should be agreed that the primary violator of the agreements is North Vietnam, egged on by the ChiComs. It should then be understood, however, that the Poles, supported by the Russians, are also violators, because of their default in observance of the protocol governing ICC matters. It should then, finally, be understood that the Geneva Agreements do not govern the internal structure of the Lao Government, do not underwrite the status of the Pathet Lao, and do not sanctify a tripartite coalition government. Those actions were all Lao national actions as distinct from international actions. Our attention therefore should be focused on the problem of requiring (a) the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos, and (b) the active participation of the Poles in the functioning of the ICC.

8. At this stage, it should be realistically understood that it is nonsense to consider Laos in a vacuum, and that it can really be discussed only in relation to Vietnam. (At this stage, some of the more astute participants in the IRG exercise may become aware that this whole IRG "reassessment" is consequently nonsense.) Therefore, in determining what we can do to achieve 7 (a) above, we have to relate our abilities and our will to that which we are prepared to do in order to achieve success in Vietnam. If we are prepared to use that military force necessary to invade, invest, and defeat North Vietnam on its home territory, then, presto, we will have solved the problem of North Vietnamese troops in Laos. If we are not prepared to use that degree of force, then we have to consider other methods.

9. One such method often proposed is the introduction of U.S. and/or GVN ground forces into the area of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to invest that terrain and therefore drive the North Vietnamese out of Laos. This is the hard way. In fact, it is about the hardest way that could be devised. Le Duan, Secy Gen of the Lao Dong Party, has examined this prospect and written about it. He has concluded that even Americans wouldn't be so obtuse as to try this system. It would require, he points out, that the U.S. first seize control of the Do Xa and the western highlands of South Vietnam. (We have never yet had adequate troops to do this.) It would next require a major logistics effort into the trail area. Then it would require a few divisions of troops to be sustained in that area against the threat of massive, concentrated attacks by regular North Vietnamese forces who will be able to attack from short lines of communications in terrain which they know and which favors them. The military picture Le Duan paints is that of a series of Con Thiens and Khe Sanhs along the southwest border of North Vietnam.

10. While I don't wish to hold up Le Duan or Giap as military experts superior to some of our own deep thinkers on these matters, I would submit that their experience is enough to credit them with the description of a military threat which would require at least 206,000 additional U.S. troops to encounter. I would also note that Le Duan goes on to comment on possibility that the U.S. might eschew a major action like this and choose to attack with lesser units. He says "If a small force is used the problem remains insoluble." He goes on to add that "The U.S. will be severely condemned by people all over the world and the anti-U.S. movement will turn out to be stronger." If he knew the U.S. Senate better, he might have added a few gems about its reaction as well.

11. In short, we do not have the will to make the only military move which would be effective (invasion of North Vietnam). We do not have the means to make a military move which, at great cost, might prove significant. The only military means we have could achieve very little of lasting effectiveness, and would predictably do that at a political cost which would further erode the will and the support which remains for other military operations elsewhere in Vietnam.

12. These considerations really address only the immediate local military problem. As such, they are serious enough. However, they pale beside the indirect military consequences and the political results. The indirect political consequences would involve North Vietnamese (and possibly ChiCom) action to exploit in north and central Laos the fact of the immense forces which we would tie down in southern Laos, this in turn would bring into play the whole question of Laos as a buffer to Thailand and our commitments to Thailand. We would probably be called on to deploy at least one (and probably two) divisions to Thailand for the latter's protection. Moreover, since Souvanna would quit Laos, the country (as described in para 4 above) would break up into smaller units, at least two of which would predictably ask us for other troops to protect them (say, about four more regiments, with associated air power). We could elaborate the nightmare further by citing the probable consequences in relation to the Soviets. With Souvanna gone and a Pathet Lao "Liberation Front Government" emerging in at least a portion of Lao territory, we could expect the Soviets to withdraw recognition from whatever political group replaces Souvanna in Vientiane and transfer their support (both political and material) to the Pathet Lao. This could only be considered a step backward in the Southeast Asia situation as a whole.

13. It therefore becomes quite clear that the framework in which we have to operate with respect to removing the NVN from Laos is the framework established by the President's March 31 speech,/3/ which looks towards military de-escalation and a political settlement. The occasions for the introduction of the Lao problem into this framework are myriad, and will begin with the very first contact. If, as Hanoi insists, we are to establish arrangements for the total cessation of bombing over North Vietnam, then we must insist upon some reciprocity and a system to enforce reciprocity. The establishment of ICC teams on the passes leading into the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos would assure us whether or not that trail was being used by trucks, since the passes are few and well known. If we can expand this to include all other known logistics routes into Laos, then we would assure observation and control of all the means which sustain and support the NVN in Laos (they do not live off the country). This would mean that the NVN supply system would disappear and they would have to bring their troops home. This is obviously the cleanest, the most logical (and most typically IRG) solution. If the North Vietnamese badly enough want the bombing stopped and are prepared to give up the war, this way would be ideal because it would involve ["]invisible reciprocity." Hanoi denies there are North Vietnamese in Laos; hence an ICC presence would be no formal embarrassment to them.

/3/The speech in which Johnson announced his decision not to seek reelection. Text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, Book I, pp. 469-476.

14. Another way, short of bargaining for this reciprocity, would be for the ICC, by majority vote, to move out onto the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other areas of interest in Laos. This could be done if the Indian and Canadian members were willing to take the physical chances inherent in this move. I rate the chances for this as quite limited, but given Dr. Barnard's success with heart transplant cases, perhaps we could get him to try a spinal transplant into some pliant Indian bodies, using the ramrod vertebral columns of some of the more unbending warriors in the Pentagon.

15. Still a third way is to achieve a change of heart in the UK and USSR co-chairmen, especially the latter. It is not clear that Soviets would ever be able to influence Hanoi strongly enough to change the latter's policy.

However, if Soviets were willing pay a great deal to support North Vietnam, if they would be willing protect it against ChiCom subversion, and if they were willing to muscle a pro-Soviet Government into power in Hanoi, they might be able to achieve our objective for us. Only way I can conceive of this happening would be in exchange for our giving them something very dear to their hearts--West Germany, for instance. The disproportions here are obviously ludicrous, but I am merely suggesting some parameters for IRG consideration.

16. Fundamentally, I conclude (and assume IRG will also) that the maneuvering room re Laos is quite limited. There are many of the old pressure points that we can re-invigorate, such as London, Moscow, Delhi, etc. There may be a few new ones we can devise in the old context, but I would doubt their efficacy in obtaining genuine results.

17. In my judgement, the major new opportunity for action re Laos arises from Hanoi's new-found willingness to move to the conference table. No matter how they disguise this it is still a retreat from their previous cocksure ambition of winning the war militarily. Therefore, it seems to me that the best, positive contribution the IRG can make at this time is to examine realistically where Laos should fit into the negotiating picture, what elements of satisfaction can be derived from Laos from these negotiations, how those elements rate with respect to our objectives in SVN (pretty high, I would judge) and which other nations can be called on to help out in this process. The need for this sort of judgement is real and not academic.

Sullivan

Vientiane, April 24, 1968, 0942Z.

6025. Ref: State 151990./2/

1. Reftel advises that highest level has authorized Haymaker operation, in Base Area 607 and asks my views about handling with Souvanna.

2. As far as discussion in advance with Souvanna, answer is categorically negative. He would have to oppose it, possibly in public. We would then have to reconsider, or else defy his sovereignty.

3. I am relieved that policy will be to "refrain from all U.S. official comment," but I share your doubts that this will work. Therefore, assume there will be leaks which will have to be handled in some fashion. JCS has directed that there be "No admission that forces have crossed the border." This is a good, sound and simple directive and I hope we can stand on it.

4. In the contingency that some superior conscience feels an "admission" has to be made, I would foresee various complications:

(A) Souvanna would ask for an explanation privately, and would be harassed both by press and by unfriendly diplomats for public expression of disapproval. If level of public evidence is high enough, he will have to make a protest.

(B) Our explanation, if we have to give one, should be based on "swirl of battle" and vagueness of frontiers in Thai area. Fact that battlefield extends across border would have to be an unstated, but evident, presupposition.

(C) Possibility might arise, in light 4 (A) above, that we might also have to make a public apology. If so, and for consistency's sake, it also should be based on "swirl of battle" concept.

(D) Fact is that Haymaker Battalion will consist of 540 Vietnamese nationals accompanied by only 50 U.S. advisers. Hence, border violation will in essence be Vietnamese, although it is questionable whether GVN would even be aware that this particular MACSOG-controlled group is involved. Nevertheless, if all gory details eke out, it might also become incumbent upon GVN (as in 4 (C) above) to associate itself with any apology. This is one bridge I feel we should cross only when and if we come to it. Otherwise chances of leakage are multiplied. In any event, Tran Van Do would probably feel no qualms about making an apology to his old friend and classmate Souvanna.

5. In general, it is obvious that best hope is to conduct operation without press detection. In case of detection, steadfast "no comment" and "no admission" are best line of defense. If this line is to be breached, request full interchange among Washington, Saigon and Vientiane before any other press line is taken. I do not believe it would be useful to attempt develop a contingency line in advance.

Sullivan

Washington, April 29, 1968.

SUBJECT
Modifications of Restrictions on US Air Operations in Barrel Roll Area of Laos

Ambassador Sullivan has acknowledged the revised restrictions that were placed on US air operations in the Barrel Roll area of northeast Laos (see attached map)/2/ on April 23. However, in his discussion with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, also on April 23, Souvanna indicated his strong desire for continuing US air strikes on the major access routes into north Laos from North Vietnam, in particular routes 7, 6, 65, and 19, as well as nearby storage points.

Current intelligence indicates that there is a considerable NVN build-up, including daylight truck movement, along these lines of communication inside Laos which now enjoy immunity from US air attack. In Area Bravo, 215 of 228 carefully selected targets validated by Lao authorities for US air strikes in Area Bravo now lie outside the authorized zone, i.e., east of 104 degrees. In particular, the huge enemy cave and storage complex near Sam Neua which was specifically authorized by Souvanna in March cannot now be struck. Also east of 104 degrees in the Bravo area are several important CAS-supported RLG guerrilla outposts which normally count on US air strikes to assist in their defense. In Area Alpha, Route 19 from Dien Bien Phu into north Laos is now spared from interdiction and several more RLG guerrilla bases in that region are consequently menaced by the movement of enemy troops and supplies over this road.

Ambassador Sullivan has suggested that either of two further modifications would enable us to respond positively to Souvanna's request and to meet both US and Lao needs in Alpha and Bravo areas:

a. Authorize strikes under strict controls in all portions of the Barrel Roll area except a 10 nautical mile strip on the Lao side of the NVN border, or

b. Authorize strikes in Bravo area west of 104 degrees 15' (instead of 104 degrees) east longitude (to include the Sam Neua storage complex), and in Alpha area along route 19 up to 10 nautical miles of the NVN border.

We believe Ambassador Sullivan's request takes into account the need for controls to prevent inadvertent strikes into North Vietnam, and we support either of the proposed modifications of the current restrictions. In addition to the geographic limits, several other controls are in effect to prevent the possibility of strikes into North Vietnam.

Recommendation: That you arrange to have this matter re-opened with the President next week at the Tuesday lunch and seek the President's approval for loosening of present restrictions in accordance with Ambassador Sullivan's request./3/

Vientiane, April 29, 1968.

Dear Martin:

Thank you for your letter of March 23/2/ in which you asked for our comments and assessment of the contingency study which accompanied your letter. I have had the appropriate members of the staff go over the study and our collective views follow.

We all agree that the study is very well-organized, covers the essential points and is a reasonable and realistic assessment of the situation. This is all the more remarkable considering the pressure upon you and the haste with which it must have been put together.

We all share your dismay over the dismal state of the US military capability to react to a "Drang nach Western." Nor are the prospects for enhanced capability encouraging. This plight of the military places even greater premium upon the political restraints currently operating to keep the Lao situation on reasonably even keel and should, therefore, make us all even more sensitive than heretofore to the serious damage that removing these political restraints would eventually entail.

Concomitantly, overt U.S. military operations in Laos would carry with them an undeniable US commitment to Laos--we would commit our prestige to the protection of all of Laos once having openly sent troops into the country. The advantage of our military posture in Laos today is that, were it to be unfortunately necessary, we could fold our tents and fade quietly away, for we have made no overt military commitment. These are the major points that I wish to make with respect to the study and ones that I trust will be constantly borne in mind by our top policy-makers when they are repeatedly badgered to acquiesce in seemingly simple US military operations in Laos.

Our remaining comments are keyed to the order of your study. With regard to your first assumption, we question whether the small forces maneuvering in open country would be highly vulnerable to air power. We think that these forces would undoubtedly move at night for the most part and we doubt that we could do them much damage, even with several squadrons of Sopwith-Camels all piloted by Red Barons.

You are right when you say that the US has no defense commitments to Laos. The Lao, however, regard the Geneva Accords as a vehicle for their protection, and in the event of a violation or threat of extinction, Laos would look to the signatory nations to honor their commitment to maintain Lao sovereignty, etc. Souvanna has made this point to us many times. As you recall, when Souvanna was asked not too long ago (when the NVN/PL seemed to be really pushing) whether in appealing to signatory nations he was not in fact asking for troops, he replied that the manner in which the signatory nations fulfilled their obligations was their affair.

Our reasoning is that if the enemy were to violate the Geneva Accords in a manner to threaten Laos' survival, Souvanna would press hard within the Accords for meaningful Article 4 action. He would look to us primarily--and in light of our stated policy and interests, we would have to conjure up some sort of reply. Given the prevailing military situation, it seems that we would have to rely essentially upon political/psychological measures. If we failed and Laos were about to go under, we think that then and only then would Souvanna resign--as admission that the Geneva Accords upon which he had staked his basic policy were ineffective. But we do think that he would remain in place and play out the Accords to the end. This view differs in emphasis from that expressed in the last two full paragraphs on page 3 of the study regarding probable Souvanna actions. (We would expect Laos also to engage in a series of bilateral efforts to extricate itself--USSR, Thailand--in addition to the multi-national approach, but with little if any positive result.)

You have my 5692 regarding covert and overt use of Thai air assets./3/

With respect to US military actions which might have some psychological value in the event Hanoi goes hog-wild, we like to keep the possibility of an invasion of North Vietnam dangling before military eyes--either as a real threat, or as a bargaining counter which brings them to the table.

Finally, I think that we all ought to recognize flatly that project 22 exists on paper only. Your study mentioned that many of the Thai units destined for this project do not even exist. We might just as well confess that the US forces of 138,440 "committed" to the project do not exist either--therefore, no Project 22. Moreover, since it has recently been compromised, I think it ought to be forgotten.

Of course, all these considerations may be altered in the next few weeks if we really get down to serious negotiations. At that stage, I think, as I have suggested to the IRG, that your efforts are better expended on relating Laos to the negotiating picture and seeing what advantages can be drawn from the strengths of the position we do have here, rather than reinforcing our weaknesses. That should be a truly educational exercise for the Pentagon and, perhaps, the White House.

We hang on bated breath to hear whether it's true about you replacing Arch Calhoun in Saigon. I sincerely hope not. It would seem most upsetting to do that to you--and to us--at this moment.

All the best.

Sincerely,

Bill

ER IM 68-46

Washington, May 1968.

ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE AND ADJACENT AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, 1967-68

The North Vietnamese are engaged in an intensive program to construct new supply routes, with limited all-weather capability, into South Vietnam from Laotian trunk routes to support military operations (see the map, Figure 1). Work started on a number of new roads during the last quarter of 1967, prior to the Tet offensive, and is still in progress. All of these new roads branch off a north-south trunk route in the Laotian Panhandle and run directly across the border toward important US-South Vietnamese military installations in South Vietnam. The newly completed routes provide the Communists with an increased capability to introduce troops, heavy weapons, and sizable amounts of materials by truck into four widely separated areas in the northern part of South Vietnam.

North Vietnamese strategy provides for connecting their road network in North Vietnam and Laos with the existing road system in South Vietnam. To achieve this goal, the North Vietnamese have simultaneously built or upgraded five new crossings of the South Vietnamese border (a total of 215 miles of road) during the past six months. Two of the new roads parallel Route 9 in Laos and lead toward the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Further south, a road in Laos has been connected with a road in the A Shau Valley in South Vietnam leading to Hue. The North Vietnamese have joined a fourth road with an important north-south route in South Vietnam. From the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese have also extended a new road to the vicinity of the major US base at Dak To. New feeder roads branch off this route and lead southeast towards the provincial capitals of Kontum and Pleiku.

The new and expanded roadnet is an attempt to establish a more reliable year-round logistics system. All the new roads crossing into South Vietnam, except the two roads paralleling Route 9 in Laos, are limited all-weather; all connect with logistical base areas along the main trunk route. Sections of the main north-south route in Laos, and especially the segment north of Chavane, at times become impassable during the rainy season, but the enemy may be able to maintain most of this primary logistical route for a longer period this year than in previous ones. In addition, a new road which appears to have limited all-weather capability is under construction from North Vietnam around the western end of the DMZ.

[Here follows the 13-page memorandum.]

Vientiane, May 6, 1968.

Dear Martin:

I was just about to answer your letter of April 24/2/ when I received Westmoreland's message to Wheeler advising him that he had decided to cancel the Haymaker aspect of Operation Delaware. Although the reasons attributed to this move reflect the possibility to leakage to the press, I would guess that another aspect is the fact that there currently appears to be very little enemy presence in the area where the operation was intended.

I don't think, from this development, that we have seen the last of Haymakers, because I suspect that an effort will be made to launch a similar operation into some other more promising base area. Now that the principle has been established I am sure that MACV will not fail to exploit this possibility./3/

As you point out in your letter, I did not submit any specific comments on the MACV proposal for Operation Delaware. My decision to take this course was based on a number of considerations. First, the Haymaker conception, which is a considerable retreat from Southpaw and York, brought into action forces which have already demonstrated their ability to operate in Laos without press leakage. Secondly, the move was contrived in such a way that it could be described entirely in terms of action to be taken for the protection of United States forces on the A Shau battlefield. Thirdly, it was within the framework (Prairie Fire) which Oley Sharp, Westie and I had agreed in our last SEACOORD meeting might be the only tolerable arrangement to which I could give concurrence./4/

Therefore, I placed my entire considerations on the question of the relationship of this proposed action to the President's de-escalation policy. The Air Force has been so nervous about air operations in the north of Laos which might impinge on that policy that I was frankly somewhat surprised when approval for Haymaker was given quite so rapidly. However, I suppose it reflects the President's annoyance that North Vietnamese infiltration efforts have apparently stepped up rather than relaxed since the March 31 speech.

There have been some communications back and forth between Westmoreland and myself on this whole subject which have not been repeated to Washington. I think that it is probably best that they remain in this category for the sake of mutual good faith and continued collaboration. On the whole, however, I think you on the desk and we in the field have remained very much on the same wave length and I appreciate all that you have done to hold the line. As we move into the successively more complex period of negotiating while fighting, I think this sort of entente becomes even more important. Especially, I believe it is going to become important for us all to have our facts and our intelligence straight before making decisions. I have recently sent in a cable expressing some skepticism about the infiltration figures projected from North into South Viet Nam during the rainy season./5/ This will doubtless cause some consternation in DIA and elsewhere, but I feel it would be very useful for you to bring it to the attention of Bundy, Katzenbach, and the Secretary/6/ as the sort of thing we must be absolutely sure about when we make political and military decisions in the near future. We must remember that the North Vietnamese are perfectly capable of running deception operations and that our military intelligence system is so attuned that it vibrates violently in response to such deceptions.

For the moment then all is well that ends well on Haymaker. But for the future, I think a little more careful questioning of intelligence premises and the alleged facts needs to be done by our State Department sources whenever they are called upon to make decisions of this dimension.

All the best,

Sincerely,

Bill

Vientiane, May 7, 1968, 0435Z.

6316. Ref: A. Vientiane 5929; B. Vientiane 6045./2/

1. Souvanna told me Saturday/3/ evening that he had finally signed the degree reorganizing the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. He said that, after a month of haggling, the generals seemed satisfied with the new plan.

2. As predicted Ref B, the plan falls far short of Souvanna's original intentions, but it is at least a step in the right direction. It preserves the "one man, one job" principle by abolishing both deputy C-in-C spots formerly held by Kouprasith and Bounpone, making them respectively commanders of fifth and third military regions. It also abolishes the north and south tactical headquarters, as well as the Groupes Mobiles.

3. The Ministry of Defense, instead of being placed under direction of a weak general such as Bounleut, will remain (at least for now) in the hands of the colonels. Thongphanh will be asked to act in lieu of a director general and Souvanna has asked him to move six or eight "good colonels" out of the General Staff to head the new functional divisions being removed from the General Staff and transferred into MOD.

4. Souvanna said his next problem was to remove several generals who were useless and get them retired by one means or another. There might also be some colonels in this category. He had asked Quan to draw up an "execution list" of those who should disappear. After he got rid of these, he proposed to promote some of the "good colonels" to generals.

5. I told Souvanna that I thought his next serious problem was the Air Force, particularly the transport aircraft which were being used for smuggling and private commerce. He agreed and said that he had caught Bounpone red-handed in the latest smuggling effort to Saigon. I said Sourith seemed honest but not strong enough to control the senior generals. Souvanna again agreed and said he was thinking of putting the Air Force directly under the Ministry rather than the General Staff. I said I thought that would be pretty difficult for tactical air, since the I-28s had to be handled by the officers in charge of operations. However, I saw no reason why transport aircraft couldn't be brought under direct control of the new logistics section of the MOD. He said he would look into that approach.

6. We have other information being reported separately which indicates that long-standing problem of integrated ranks for neutralist officers has also been agreed and forwarded to the King. If King accepts this proposal, this will resolve another nettlesome issue.

7. Comment: Although progress is slow and tedious, it is generally in the right direction.

Sullivan

Washington, May 8, 1968.

Dear Paul:

In answer to your letter of April 13,/2/ we will be pleased to undertake a reassessment of U.S. policy for Laos by the Interdepartmental Regional Group/East Asia. I would suggest one change in the purpose of the exercise as stated in your letter: the Geneva Agreements have not been "exploited" but rather consistently violated by the North Vietnamese in the most blatant manner. I presume that North Vietnamese "violation" rather than "exploitation" was meant, and we are proceeding to set up the policy review on that basis.

It is now over a month since the Contingency Study Laos/Thailand/3/ was approved, and I enclose a Status Report on developments during the intervening period which may be of interest. I also enclose a paper entitled "What the Enemy Has Not Done in Laos" which may also be of some help to the participants in the policy review. Copies of these two papers will be separately disseminated to all members of the Interdepartmental Regional Group/East Asia.

Sincerely yours,

Nick

/4/Secret.

CONTINGENCY STUDY LAOS/THAILAND

Status Report as of May 1, 1968

In the approximately six weeks since our Contingency Study was approved, there has been no major enemy attack in Laos. The NVA has continued to apply pressure not only in South Laos around the provincial capitals of Saravane and Attopeu, but also around Thakhek on the Mekong in Central Laos and against guerrilla posts in north Laos. It has taken only a few minor friendly positions, for example Lahanam in southern Savannakhet province on April 13, and such successes were not the result of major military operations. The NVA still retains the capability to overrun much of Laos, but the approaching rainy season will soon limit the magnitude and speed of a possible new NVA offensive.

Consultations were begun with our Embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok about the possible utilization of Thai T-28's (either "sheep-dipped" or overt) and additional deployment of US air assets to Thailand. Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane believes that the political disadvantages would greatly outweigh the marginal military advantages of overt use of the Thai air force in Laos. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] he considers it preferable to augment the number of "Class B" pilots (Thai pilots flying RLAF aircraft under control of our Air Attache in Vientiane). A much more significant increase of tactical deterrent air strength will result from the contemplated expansion of US air resources in Thailand, particularly in propeller planes which seem best adapted to operations in Laos. Ambassador Unger in Bangkok believes that there would be no Thai political objections to the increase of US aircraft in Thailand if the purpose is to shore up the defense of Laos. This finding should help in speeding up deployment of additional tactical prop-aircraft to Thailand, though they could not be there in time to help counter an enemy offensive in Laos should one occur before the advent of the rains later this month.

On December 30 and February 29 Souvanna Phouma wrote to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference denouncing the North Vietnamese attacks in Laos and calling for consultations among the signatories under Article 4 of the 1962 Geneva Agreement. In March the UK suggested to the USSR that the Co-Chairmen circulate both letters along with a joint message for which they submitted a draft. Since the USSR has not replied, the UK at our urging has now finally decided to circulate both of Souvanna's letters unilaterally on May 6.

1. The February 21 ICC "visit" to Saravane (which may have played some role in restraining the NVA in South Laos) was followed by a visit of the Indian Chairman and the Canadian Commissioner on April 12-13 to Attopeu, Saravane and Lao Ngam. The Polish Commissioner again declined to join his colleagues. Although a mortar attack on Attopeu occurred while the ICC visit was taking place there, it is possible that the increased ICC activity may have some deterrent effect on Hanoi. At any rate, it helps to buck up Lao morale. We can claim no credit for the more positive Indian attitude in the ICC, which seems due largely to the personality of the new Indian Commissioner and some tactical gaffes by the Pole, who has now completed his tour of duty and been replaced.

2. To encourage the Indians in their forward posture, we have suggested to several governments that New Delhi be encouraged to maintain its present relatively active attitude. The UK and Japan have taken action. France is willing to help, though in a lower key. We do not wish demarches in New Delhi to be too obviously orchestrated, so are still holding in reserve the encouragement of similar diplomatic actions by Germany and Thailand, both of whom are judged to be willing. Australia will weigh in with Prime Minister Gandhi when she visits Canberra in May. We have no illusions that even the cumulative effect of such efforts will have any decisive influence on the Indians, but it may make backsliding more awkward for them.

Souvanna and the King are anxious that US military support for Laos will continue even while we de-escalate in North Vietnam and that Laos should benefit promptly from any lessening of hostilities in South Vietnam. To that end, they are seeking both private and public assurances from us that our negotiations with Hanoi will include a strong requirement that the Geneva Agreements of 1962 should be respected by North Vietnam.

/5/Top Secret.

WHAT THE ENEMY HAS NOT DONE IN LAOS

The Contingency Study of March 23 implies certain advantages of continued U.S. adherence to the Geneva Agreements of 1962. These may become more apparent by sketching out some of the actions the enemy continues to be capable of taking in Laos but which he has not yet taken, partly because we have not overtly upset the framework of the Geneva settlement.

1. Setting up a rival ("neutralist") government in Laos.

2. Obtaining Soviet and Chinese recognition for such a government.

3. Raising the specter of Chinese intervention.

4. Pushing to the Mekong on a broad, or even limited, front, thus diverting U.S. and Thai troops.

5. Pushing to Luang Prabang, thus delivering a major psychological blow to the Lao Government forces.

6. Conducting terrorist raids against vulnerable Lao targets.

7. Denouncing US/SVN intervention in the Prairie Fire zone on the basis of hard evidence.

8. Exploiting sensitive U.S. operations in Laos, using materials and equipment captured at Site 85 and in the Muscle Shoals area, and aircraft downed in Laos.

9. Increasing harassment of U.S. economic as well as military activities in Laos.

10. Conducting terrorist raids against U.S. bases in Thailand, such as Nakhon Phanom.

If the U.S. were to abandon its formal adherence to and observation of the limitations of the Geneva Agreements of 1962, any inhibitions on the communist side would disappear and the Geneva settlement would collapse entirely; the Royal Lao Government would quickly lose much of the international (including communist and neutral) support which it now enjoys by virtue of its adherence to the Geneva agreements, and leave us as virtually the sole supporter of a no-longer neutral Laos--a costly and diplomatically poor position to be in.

We would then have to deal with a government whose area of control was rapidly shrinking and which would have lost the ability to appeal to the Geneva Agreements which had created the basis for its very existence.

Vientiane, May 16, 1968, 0430Z.

6562. Ref: Vientiane 6554./2/

1. When Souvanna urged yesterday that we intensify our bombing throughout Laos, he volunteered that he knew there were many villages in the area between Paksane and Xieng Khouang, but that it was more important to get on with the job of rooting out the enemy. If some friendly villages were damaged in the process, he went on, "Tant pis! You can't make an omelet without breaking some eggs!"

2. While Souvanna in the past has been cold-blooded about civilians in North Vietnam ("bomb the dikes"), I have not before heard him reflect quite such a diet of raw meat regarding his own population. He is undoubtedly feeling pressure from the King who reportedly had adopted a "bomb them wherever they are" attitude toward the enemy, as a means of forcing them out of Laos. Both the King and Souvanna manifest the amateur's overconfidence in the effectiveness of air power.

3. Despite Souvanna's statement, I intend to continue the meticulous care and cautious judgment exercised by Ambassador Sullivan in approving targets within Laos. We shall continue to avoid villages. Nonetheless, I wish to record Souvanna's current position which may prove helpful in the event of a navigational error or a really border-line decision on an important target.

Hurwitch

Honolulu, May 24, 1968, 0229Z.

DTG 240229Z. A. JCS 04864/062200Z May 68 (Notal)./2/ B. CINCPAC 120141Z May 68./3/

1. Ref A requested additional views concerning operations in Laos. Ref B provided the CJCS with an analysis of the effects of a bombing cessation and informed him of how the air campaign would be organized and managed to enhance our overall operations, including aerial reconnaissance.

2. Our current overt and covert military programs in Laos have been reviewed. Any radical change of ground operations in Laos at this time would be counter-productive. Deployment of U.S. ground forces of any significant size into Laos would be particularly undesirable. NVN still has the capability to overrun all of Laos in a matter of days if they choose and a sizeable deployment of US/FWF in Southern Laos might well spark such a reaction. Deployment of even a corps-size force in southern Laos on a permanent basis would not prevent a complete takeover of northern Laos by the NVN.

3. The cessation of all bombing and NGF in NVN would permit a sharply accelerated and unimpeded flow of men and supplies into Laos and SVN, resulting from the release of forces previously occupied in LOC and facility repair and in air and coastal defense. Since we would be deprived of the advantage of striking enemy resources at or near the source, it follows that to compensate for this loss we must increase our operations around the entire perimeter of SVN. Although your message addresses only operations in Laos to reduce the flow of men and materiel through that country, we need also to emphasize the restriction of enemy movement through the DMZ, along the SVN coast and through Cambodia.

4. The following is a resume of improvements and changes in Laos which would be desirable in event of cessation of all bombing of NVN:

A. Cessation of bombing in all of NVN will release presently available assets for intensifying the air war in Laos and SVN. A comprehensive and coordinated air effort using the additional resources should further inhibit the use of LOCs and staging areas in Laos. However it must be recognized that during the summer monsoon period visual bombing is largely ineffective in Laos. The following changes to operating rules in Laos are required to optimize the application of these air assets:

(1) Authority to attack targets of opportunity when located within 200 yards of a motorable road or trail should be expanded to 1,000 yards to provide strike flexibility in Zones II and III of Steel Tiger.

(2) FAC's are required for strikes outside of the 200 yard limit in Zone II, and within all areas of Zones III and IV and Barrel Roll areas A, B and C. (Strikes may be made in Zone III if under MSQ 77 control.) These restrictions should be modified. If not, additional FAC aircraft and personnel will be required to provide control for increased strikes in Laos.

B. Improvements in the air supported Muscle Shoals anti-infiltration system can be realized by expanding the area for employing hand emplaced sensors. Presently spike teams are restricted to operations in the Prairie Fire area. Additionally, a reasonable increase of exploitation forces up to battalion size on a case basis should be authorized. This will give the teams greater staying power in the face of enemy opposition and increase the effectiveness of the combined indigenous/special force teams.

C. Leaflet drops in Laos should be increased and refined to obtain optimum exploitation of PLA as well as infiltrating NVA.

D. Employment of MSQ-77 radar bombing should be expanded to ensure all-weather operation. This can be done by locating an MSQ facility at Site 98 or other suitable location, to provide coverage over a wider area.

E. Comint and ARDF coverage of Laos and NVN should be increased to permit early warning of enemy intentions.

F. An additional program for consideration would be to expand guerrilla operations in Laos. MACV SOG has identified the Bru Tribe in the Annamite mountains as having a guerrilla potential.

5. The program for advisory and logistical support for RLG military units should continue generally in its present scope and an accelerated expansion of the program is not warranted. It will take years of training before FAR/FAN forces achieve operational competence. A rapidly expanded program would cause unfavorable political implications, tend to extend U.S. commitments and project a climate of escalation.

6. It is important that we continue the reconnaissance of NVN to provide maximum intelligence on movement of men and supplies. Reconnaissance over Laos should be increased to the level necessary to ensure adequate support of stepped up interdiction strikes in that area.

7. Increased authorization is required for intelligence collection in the Laos and Cambodian areas. This is particularly pertinent in Laos where U.S. military is severely restricted by the Geneva Accords. Present restrictions necessitate our operating through third country nationals over whom only limited control or influence can be imposed.

Warm regards.

Vientiane, May 30, 1968, 0847Z.

6924. For Admiral Sharp from Charge Hurwitch. Subj: Tactical Air Requirements for Laos. Ref: A. JCS 9149 DTG 152301Z May; B. State 172328 May 28; C. Vientiane 6896 May 29./2/

1. It has occurred to me in reviewing history of messages concerning our tactical air problems in Laos that you may not have full background of situation which led to our pleas for augmentation of tactical resources to support our counter-insurgency operations.

2. Hard facts are that in past year we have been getting our air on targets less than 50 percent of the time we ask. TACAIR response to road- watch team reports has, on average, run about 45 percent. If 10 to 20 percent of these failures can be ascribed to weather, this means that 35 to 45 percent of the time there were just no aircraft. Situation has improved somewhat since reduction in air operations in North Vietnam freed jets to conduct more strike sorties in Laos. I know that our respective staffs could juggle the statistics endlessly, but my conviction is that we are still not getting all we need on daily basis.

3. Seventh AF has usually responded well to our crisis requirements, such as present buildup at Site 36. However, we believe that many of these last-ditch, crisis situations might have been averted if we had sufficient strike resources on daily basis to hit enemy troops, staging areas, and supply bases before our positions are placed in jeopardy.

4. To cover adequately existing targets and to respond quickly to new, we estimate that in north Laos we require as daily minimum nine A-26 and twenty-six A-1 sorties (with flare ship support). In south Laos we need thirty A-1 sorties per day, four of which would be for infils/exfils, the balance for tactical targets. (We boosted our earlier estimate of requirements in south Laos based on developing tactical situation over past six months, identified hard targets, and estimate of required daily sortie rate.) Our minimum copter requirement is estimated to be 700 hours per month (200 hours in north Laos, 500 hours in south).

5. We believe that in addition to the tactical requirements above, we will probably continue to need, from time to time, concentrated strike efforts to meet fast-breaking tactical situations, such as occurred at Phou Pha Thi (Site 85) and Site 36. We would expect, however, that fewer such "surge" operations would be required if we receive our minimum daily sortie requirements.

6. You already have general outline of our TACAIR needs but I wanted to be sure that you knew more of the background of our requirements in order to formulate "revalidation" recommendation requested by JCS. Question of adequacy of US air support looms large in future of our counter-insurgency operations in Laos.

Warm regards.

Hurwitch

ER IM 68-74

Washington, June 1968.

ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND WET WEATHER LOGISTICS IN THE
LAOTIAN PANHANDLE

The North Vietnamese have made substantial improvements to the wet-season capacity of the road network in Laos used for truck transport of supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in 1967-68. The estimated wet-season capacity for continuous truck movement as far south as the A Shau Valley has been increased from 50 to 100 short tons a day. An additional 50 tons of capacity is available for movements along routes leading into Quang Tin and Kontum Provinces.

The increased wet-season capacity of this road network, if fully used, could sustain traffic volumes amounting to 85 percent of the daily average--175 tons--moved during the 1967-68 dry season (September 1967-April 1968). The current requirement of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam for logistic support from the north via Laos is only slightly more than 30 tons a day.

The improved capacity of the road network strengthens North Vietnam's capability to provide sustained logistic support to Communist forces in the South. It will also reduce the dependence of these troops on storage areas and porterage for logistic resupply.

[Here follows the 11-page body of the memorandum.]

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