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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXVIII Laos DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

391. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, November 11, 1968, 1045Z.

10177. 1. In our responses to requests for intelligence estimates and for contributions to planning documents, we have consistently projected for the foreseeable future a level of enemy military activity in Laos roughly comparable to that which we have experienced in the past few years. Since these projections have occasionally been questioned I thought it might be useful to elaborate the rationale on which they are based. Needless to say, if the rationale proves in error, the projections lose their value. Hence, I feel it is important that addressees should weigh these premises.

2. I start from the premise that the North Vietnamese have failed in their objective to gain a military victory in the south by the massive introduction of main force units. I assume that they recognize the fact that the more they put in and the higher they raise the level of conventional combat, the greater are their losses to superior American firepower. They have therefore apparently decided to desist from further "escalation" of conventional combat in the south and move back to a clandestine guerrilla situation./2/

3. Their purpose in doing this is to "de-Americanize" the war by persuading U.S. authorities that it is feasible to withdraw U.S. forces from the south. Since their basic objective is to get these forces irrevocably out, they recognize that they must pay some price for this. But they hope to keep that price low enough that it will not curtail their ability to maintain an effective guerrilla presence in the south which can eventually destroy the political and military fabric of a weak southern regime.

4. Our purpose, on the other hand, must be to exact such a high price from them, and at the same time repair the weaknesses of the southern regime, that we leave a balance on the departure of our troops which is firmly and irrevocably favorable to the south, and destined to defeat northern ambitions in that republic.

5. Since their concentrated and overriding purpose is to get U.S. forces out of the south, it follows that Hanoi must comport itself in such a way as to convey to us a confidence that we can safely remove our forces without scuttling our objectives. It would be counter-productive for them to launch major conventional attacks while this negotiating process is going on. Anything which convinces the U.S. that it must retain its troops in South Viet Nam is a defeat for the north, since U.S. troops are the immovable obstacle to their military success.

6. If this logic is true in South Viet Nam, it is equally applicable to Laos. For the North Vietnamese to "de-escalate" conventional operations in the south, but to step them up in Laos runs the risk of providing Washington with confused signals which could only deter or delay any moves to reduce U.S. troop presence in the South.

7. Therefore, we have risked the calculation in our projections that no dramatic changes will ensue in North Vietnamese military operations in Laos while the Paris talks remain active. Anti-aircraft density may well be augmented to match our new levels of air activity. Psychological and political activity may also expand. But if ground warfare steps up dramatically over the normal dry season levels, then our premises and projections will both prove wrong.

8. The fact that it is altogether possible we could be wrong seems, in my judgment, to require some study in Washington and Paris.

9. I feel we ought to have some way of correlating negotiating attitudes to the North Vietnamese with the pattern of their behavior in Laos. I assume there is some such correlation with the pattern of their behavior in South Viet Nam. I would commend to Washington and our Paris negotiators that this contingency also be extended to cover the more unpleasant possibilities in Laos.

Sullivan

I-35979/68

Washington, November 11, 1968.

Dear Bill:

As you recall, Walt Rostow asked for an appraisal of possible future troubles in Laos if the North Vietnamese should use there some of the assets currently being used in Vietnam./2/ I understand that Mac Godley will coordinate the response, which will involve several elements: CIA has prepared a recent SNIE/3/ on Communist intentions and capabilities in Laos; the Country Director for Laos is working on the political aspects of the problem; and we have been assessing the military options against several contingencies.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested specifically to appraise the military courses of action by which the U.S. Government might respond to three alternative courses of action by the North Vietnamese in Laos:

(1) That the forces withdrawn from South Vietnam will remain in Laos but not engage in any overt action against the RLG forces but will remain as threat to the security of Laos and re-entry threat to South Vietnam.

(2) That the North Vietnamese will provide enough additional support to PL forces to create a threat of overrunning Laos gradually measuring our responses as they go.

(3) That the North Vietnamese will provide sufficient additional support to the PL forces to support an attempt to overrun Laos quickly.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff/4/ consider it appropriate to identify and to appraise possible military actions which the United States might take in response to North Vietnamese actions in Laos. However, with respect to the specific questions posed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it important to recognize two relevant points:

a. First, that the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao (PL) Forces now in Laos have the capability to overrun most of Laos quickly without reinforcement by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Forces withdrawn from South Vietnam.

b. Second, that the fact that the PL/NVA Forces have not thus far attempted to overrun Laos is the result of a policy decision and is not due to insufficient means.

Therefore, they consider that the threat postulated in NVN course of action 3 already exists. PL/NVA overrun of Laos can occur without withdrawal of enemy forces from South Vietnam and with no lessening of pressure there. Accordingly, analysis of courses of action available must be considered as a function not of additional NVA support provided to the PL and the resultant threat but of observed PL/NVA actions.

Military actions which the United States could employ in response to NVN course of action 1 (NVN Forces withdrawn from South Vietnam remain in Laos but do not engage in any overt action against Royal Laotian Government (RLG) Forces) are set forth in Appendix A hereto./5/ As long as PL/NVA Forces do not attempt to overrun Laos, US military actions in support of RLG Forces operating against the PL/NVA should continue essentially as at present. This envisages close air support of RLG Forces by US air elements consistent with the priority of other requirements.

If the PL/NVA take the actions implied in NVN course of action 2 (PL/NVA Forces commence overrunning Laos gradually, measuring US responses as they go), the United States will be required to reevaluate its position and its entire strategy in Southeast Asia. Such action on the part of NVN would indicate that its participation in the Paris talks is fraudulent and that NVN expansionist policies have changed only with respect to direction. If the United States decides to meet this new communist challenge, the most important initial actions should necessarily take place in diplomatic channels, through which the United States could inform Hanoi that continued NVN aggression would result in intensified military action against NVN. It would not be militarily sound to commit US ground forces in Laos unless the decision were also made to destroy the capability or the will of NVN to persist in its aggression. Accordingly, military actions on the order of those presented in Appendix B5 hereto would be required if the United States should elect to defend Laos and defeat NVN. If, on the other hand, the United States were unwilling to assume a national commitment to defend Laos and defeat NVN, US military actions in Laos in response to NVN course of action 2 should be limited to increased air interdiction of base areas and lines of communications in Laos and close air support for defending FAR units.

If the actions implied in NVN course of action 3 occurred (PL/NVA attempt to overrun Laos quickly), the situation would differ from that envisaged for NVN course of action 2, principally with respect to the time available for decision making, diplomatic exchange, and military response. Military actions which might be considered in this situation are those in Appendix B not preempted by enemy initiatives. If the North Vietnamese attempt to overrun Laos quickly, it is unlikely that even greatly increased US air support of RLG Forces could prevent it. Further, it would not be possible to introduce US/allied ground elements into Laos in such force as to prevent PL/NVA Forces from overrunning the country, with the possible exception of forces sufficient to defend bridgeheads across the Mekong River to cover Vientiane and some other key population centers. Subsequently, to recover Laos from the communists would require a major campaign against their forces in Laos, a campaign which would be costly and uncertain of success unless accompanied by the defeat of NVN. If such direct action is not taken, the United States must be prepared to accept communist control of Laos and the resultant substantially increased threat to Thailand and the remainder of Southeast Asia.

Even if a national decision to defend Laos and defeat NVN were made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that unilateral US military action in Laos probably would not be effective in the achievement of US objectives in Southeast Asia. Unless the free nations of the area perceive the threat and respond with the full commitment of their resources, the basis for effective US intervention is missing. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to multilateral action in the common defense and to the fullest appreciation of all diplomatic measures before a resort to military alternatives, even those undertaken on a multilateral basis.

We agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we should make every effort to secure diplomatic support for the integrity of Laos and should attempt to obtain multilateral support for any actions we might take. For this purpose, in addition to such diplomatic initiatives previously suggested by ISA, two actions with regard to the RTG might be considered: (1) we could furnish the RTAF with as much training as it can usefully absorb to take over a part of air-support actions in Laos, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the same basis as the US now operates; and (2) we could furnish the Thai armed forces with increased amounts of equipment when it becomes excess to our needs in South Vietnam to serve in part as a deterrent against NVA actions against the Mekong Valley towns./6/ Both actions would serve the additional purpose of helping to dispose the Thai favorably to grant the US access to Thai facilities should this be desired in a post-Vietnam context.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the applicability of the military actions outlined in the Appendices hereto can only be determined in the light of all the circumstances obtaining at the time of the decision. Nevertheless, it is their intention to continue their appraisal of these contingencies.

We believe that the foregoing assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff offers a sound basis for further consideration of this problem. Dick Steadman's office will continue to be the focal point for DOD participation in the further development of a report for the White House. Appropriate OSD and Joint Staff members are available whenever Mac Godley is ready to proceed.

Sincerely,

Paul C. Warnke

A-407

Washington, November 18, 1968.

SUBJECT
Assessment of U.S. Policy for Laos

REF
a) 11 FAM 212.3-5/2/

b) Vientiane 10177/3/

There is attached the Country Team Assessment of U.S. policy for Laos in which I concur. The Summary of this Assessment is as follows:

Both wars in Laos (in the North/Northeast and in the Panhandle/Ho Chi Minh Trail area) have maintained their see-saw character during the past nine months. Political restraints operating on both of the contest-ants and their supporters make improbable the achievement of a decisive military victory by either side. The Lao political scene during this period has been relatively stable with nearly all of the major civilian and military power centers supporting Souvanna Phouma, who continued to enjoy US/USSR support as well. The enemy has signalled that it has been preparing for political competition should the talks at Paris lead to an end to military hostilities in Laos.

The wars constituted a substantial drain on the small Lao economy, both financially and from the standpoint of manpower. Some progress toward self-sufficiency was made, however, and the production of rice and lumber increased in the secure area. The U.S. continued to bear most of the economic burden of keeping Laos solvent, assisted mainly by Japan, France, Great Britain and Australia.

The outlook for Laos during the next twelve months is directly related to progress or lack thereof at the Paris peace talks. Lack of progress would probably not have significant effect upon the conduct and result of the wars in Laos. The economy would progress only in the secure areas and the economic burden for Laos' friends would be about the same. The political situation would show signs of strain, however, as the Lao will to continue the war began to erode and the effectiveness of Souvanna's neutralist policies called into question. To achieve its goal in Laos (a viable, neutral, independent buffer state whose existence will reduce the risk of direct confrontation between North Vietnam and/or China on the one hand, and Thailand on the other, thereby diminishing the possibility of further U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia) the U.S. would need to reassure the Lao of the firmness of our policy and of our resolve to see them through. The U.S. would also continue its efforts to persuade other nations, particularly in Asia, to share the burden even more.

If the Paris peace talks were to achieve a cease-fire in South Vietnam but not in Laos during the next twelve months, we would not expect the basic character of the wars in Laos to change, despite the consequent increased availability of NVN troops for duty in Laos. This judgment derives from the assumption that the existing political considerations which deter the NVN/PL from moving dramatically to the Mekong, despite their probable, current capability to do so, would continue to operate in the new situation. This assumption would be reinforced if Hanoi, which has shown that it can be sensitive to world opinion, decided that agreeing to a cease-fire in Vietnam while at the same time stepping up military activities in Laos would be an unacceptably inconsistent public posture.

Although the economic situation in Laos would not be significantly affected by a cease-fire in SVN, the political pulse here would certainly quicken. The prospect of possibly imminent peace would goad the friendly Lao into a semblance of unity as they prepared to compete politically with the Pathet Lao. Significant Lao political elements (primarily rightists and military), however, would probably seek solutions that did not involve integration of the PL into the government. Various ethnic tribal groups would seek to assure that their interests were considered in any future arrangements. Every nation with an interest in Laos would reassess its policies. The NVN/PL for their part would take steps to refurbish their political position. They would propose political formulas for settlement which would, if accepted, considerably enhance their political power and prestige. Cessation of U.S. bombing in Laos would be one of their main goals and they could probably focus sufficient public attention on this issue to force the RLG to ask for cessation in return for a PL promise to enter into "serious" negotiations. In all, it would be an active, delicate and trying political period, which would demand of the U.S. the utmost in flexibility, resourcefulness, skill and energy. We would very likely continue to support Souvanna Phouma as holding out the best hope for the various Lao factions. We would take all steps necessary to ensure that the agreement bringing peace to Laos was based upon the Geneva Accords of 1962.

If the Paris peace talks were to end hostilities in both Vietnam and Laos during the next twelve months, pressures would be strong to scale down the opposing military forces. The Lao military would insist upon retaining at least sufficient force, including its guerrilla capability, to overcome decisively any Lao-based unrest. The most important international political problem would be that of ensuring that all NVN elements departed Laos and that means were devised to prevent any significant re-infiltration. Internally, the warring factions would agree upon a formula for settlement which would be fragile at best and might in fact result in only the appearance of a settlement. There would be a period of very difficult adjustment to the new circumstances. Lao economic prospects would brighten as the reduced cost of the Armed Forces, the release of manpower and increased production of foreign exchange earners and of import substitutes (lumber, rice, tin, etc.) augured for eventual basic self-sufficiency. Great flexibility and caution would be required of the United States during this period. We would have to eliminate activities that could be reasonably interpreted as violating Lao neutrality and yet retain sufficient presence to be able to assist Laos in the ways the agreement will require. The prospect of a "permanent" peace in Laos should not, however, lull our sensitivity to the enemy's ultimate aim of taking over Laos and we should be prepared to reverse rapidly the reduction of RLG Armed Forces as well as of our own presence in Laos should the enemy reveal his disregard for the agreement. The retention of some bases in Thailand would be required for this purpose.

W.H. Sullivan

[Here follows an 18-page enclosure entitled "U.S. Policy Assessment--Laos."]

CM-3776-68

Washington, November 20, 1968.

SUBJECT
Status of Air Interdiction in Laos (S)

1. During our meeting on 18 November, you requested a report on the status of our interdiction program in Laos.

2. (S) During the summer interdiction campaign in North Vietnam a strategy of impeding logistic flow by heavy saturation of selected LOC choke points was initiated. The terrain in the southern panhandle of NVN was particularly suitable to such a strategy as all logistics destined for Laos and SVN had to be channeled through approximately six key points.

3. (S) This same strategy is desirable but not as easily adaptable to the geography of Laos. There are few roads from NVN through Laos that can be entirely closed by aerial bombardment, due to more readily available by-passes and alternative routings. Consequently, in order to realize an effective degree of interdiction, it is necessary to commit a large number of attack and Arc Light aircraft against the entire LOC network. These strike forces (approximately 12,000 sorties per month) will operate in a closely integrated air campaign, the concept of which was forwarded to you on 16 October as "The Northeast Monsoon Plan." This plan was initiated on 15 November 1968.

4. (S) The Northeast Monsoon Plan prescribes a concentrated, intensified air campaign designed to bring maximum pressure against the enemy LOC in Laos. The essence of this plan is a quantitative increase in sorties and qualitative improvements through further improvements in responsive command and control systems, strategic placement and coordinated monitoring of seismic and acoustic sensors (Igloo White), use of improved air munitions, and integration of other reconnaissance and intelligence resources. The requirement for improved air interdiction munitions in support of the campaign was submitted by CINCPAC, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and forwarded to you by JCSM-668-68, dated 7 November 1968./2/ A significant increase in sorties began on 1 November (Enclosure);/3/ however, the qualitative improvement in munitions and sensors will be a gradual process as improved items complete development and test and reach production.

5. (S) Since the Northeast Monsoon Plan was not activated until 15 November 1968 it is too early to obtain a useful evaluation. The limited statistics in the Enclosure reflect the period 1-17 November 1968./4/ This was a shakedown phase of the campaign and the results during this period cannot be considered criteria of effectiveness or potential. It should also be noted that the interdiction campaign is designed to destroy point and perishable area targets such as bridges, fords, truck parks, POL, and supply dumps as well as vulnerable road segments and trucks.

6. (S) MACV has a program for comprehensive evaluation of interdiction effectiveness in Laos. As the campaign progresses and a meaningful evaluation can be made, you will be informed.

John P. McConnell

Vientiane, November 26, 1968, 1220Z.

10490. 1. Prime Minister Souvanna yesterday asked me to have our aircraft take special precautions to avoid inadvertent attacks against Chinese road building crews in northern Laos. He said that there is just enough substance to "agreement" which ChiComs made with General Phoumi Nosavan in 1962 to give them legitimate pretext for doing this work as "aid" to Laos.

2. In general, his attitude is to "avoid poking the animals" while waiting to see exactly what the Chinese intentions are. He is most mindful of constant Peking reference to its 700 million citizens who will avenge "wrongs" done to them.

3. On other hand, Souvanna would like regular photography run of this area, in order to watch Chinese activity. He is especially interested in observing whether Chinese attempt to go beyond Muong Sai or Nam Tha in their construction work.

4. He speculates that Chinese may have been moved to pick up Houmi's road building invitation by concern that North Vietnamese construction of Route 19 westward from Dien Bien Phu was intended to bring area along Chinese border under direct control of Hanoi. Heretofore, North Vietnamese have had to supply their forces in Nam Tha area from China./2/

5. Comment: We will send operational message through other channels requesting Air Force to institute limitations suggested para 1. Entire area north of QD line and west of TJ square is already off limits. Small sector will be added to encompass Muong Sai.

Sullivan

Washington, undated.

US NEGOTIATING POSITION CONCERNING LAOS

Summary

I. Objectives in Laos (Tab A)/2/

A. United States: Since 1962, the United States has consistently supported the aims of the Geneva Agreements of 1962 to perpetuate Laos as a neutral national political entity serving as a buffer between Communist and non-Communist Asia.

B. Hanoi: There are two views of NVN objectives with respect to Laos: (1) that Hanoi desires to control all of Laos; (2) that Hanoi's interests in Laos are limited to its value in seeking to control South Vietnam. The evidence seems to support the second view.

C. China: The present Chinese leadership probably regards NVN as a transmittal belt for wars of national liberation in SEA. Peking will probably press Hanoi to move vigorously in Laos so as to facilitate Communist control of the country and broaden support for insurgent efforts in Thailand.

D. USSR: The USSR apparently continues to regard the Geneva Accords of 1962 as offering the best means of attaining its purposes, and has consistently reaffirmed its support for the Accords. The neutralist solution gives the Soviet Union considerable flexibility and interposes a barrier to Chinese expansion in SEA.

II. Implications in Laos of Various Political Settlements in SVN (Tab B)

The future of Laos in the post-war period will, to a large extent, depend on the type of settlement achieved in SVN; the most favorable terms for the US would be inclusion of provisions for a return to the Geneva Accords of 1962.

However, the future of Laos will be determined more by what NVN intentions are for Laos than by any particular kind of settlement in SVN.

III. Diplomatic Actions During Negotiations (Tab C)

A. US: The initial negotiating position of the US should consistently and publicly tie our goals of NVN withdrawal from SVN to our goal of NVN withdrawal from Laos and should link the withdrawal of US forces from SVN with compliance by all parties with the 1962 Geneva Accords.

If in the end we conclude an agreement for the mutual withdrawal of NVN and US forces from SVN without reference to a similar withdrawal from Laos and without agreement on implementing the Geneva Accords of 1962, we probably cannot expect more than a maintenance of the present division in Laos and a scale down or cessation of hostilities. This can be sustained only if we are successful in deterring North Vietnam by inducing Asian and other states to maintain intense and prolonged diplomatic pressure against further NVN expansion. The threat of US or Thai military actions can, to some extent, also deter further NVN expansion. A scale down or a cessation of hostilities must be part of this course, both because the RLG cannot sustain its present level of hostilities indefinitely and because it would be extremely difficult for the US to provide necessary tactical air support after fighting in Vietnam was stopped.

B. NVN: It appears likely that Hanoi will keep its military activity in Laos in low key during the Paris negotiations and confine its activity to controlling such Laotian territory as is necessary to conduct military operations in SVN.

IV. Possible US Military Actions in Laos During and After Negotiations (Tab D)

If Hanoi continues to confine its objectives to control of such Laotian territory as is necessary to support operations in SVN, the level of US/RLG military activity in Laos should not increase. If, during the course of negotiations, Hanoi attempts to extend its domination over Laos, a selective increase in US military actions might be required although we could not prevent Hanoi from capturing most of Laos.

V. Post Settlement Laos (Tab E)

A. Hanoi's Objective: At a minimum, the DRV will wish to consolidate its control over the area it now holds in Laos, and solidify the trappings of an "independent" Pathet Lao. Maintenance of NVN/PL control of northern Laos and areas contiguous to NVN will remain more important to Hanoi than the maintenance within Laos of a large military force. Having waited out US withdrawal, Hanoi could be expected to use its ample resources to assist the Pathet Lao to press for full control of Laos.

B. Soviet Objective: The USSR probably sees support for a coalition government as the best way to both restrain expanding Chinese influence and to avoid a larger conflict, possibly involving themselves. There is some likelihood, however, that the Soviets would mainly follow Hanoi's lead, accepting the risks.

C. Chinese Objective: The Chinese probably fear that a Laos buffer zone might turn into a semi-permanent block to the extension of Chinese influence. Accordingly, Peking can be expected to urge Hanoi to take over all of Laos rapidly, using whatever military forces are required.

D. The Lao Government: The RLG, as in the past, will remain almost totally dependent on outside support from its friends and restraint on the part of its enemies. There is good reason to hope that with adequate outside economic and military assistance, the RLG can be sustained as the recognized authority in areas under its present control.

E. US Objectives: US objectives in Laos could be achieved through a reaffirmation of the Geneva Accords. If we are not to create serious misgivings in Thailand, however, it may be necessary to underscore with our actions and military posture outside of Laos' borders our determination to see that a neutral Laos is preserved in fact as well as in name.

1. At Paris, continue to link DRV withdrawal from SVN to DRV withdrawal from Laos. At the appropriate point, state that US withdrawals from SVN will be contingent upon DRV compliance with the 1962 Accords.

2. With Souvanna, urge him to take the lead in both highlighting the Laos problem and possibly in calling for a reconvening of the 1962 Geneva conferees. At some point, we may wish to separate the Laos and Vietnam negotiations.

3. With the Thais, continue to reassure them of our interest and commitment to their country's independence. Discuss with them organizing greater Asian support for Laotian neutrality.

4. With the Soviets, begin a dialogue to remind them of our responsibilities in Laos and to suggest the consequences of an attempt by Hanoi to take over Laos before or after a settlement in South Vietnam.

5. With interested Asian Nations, try to focus their attention on Laos (where they may be more sympathetic to us than on Vietnam), and try to get them to organize an "Asian solution" to the Laos problem.

6. With respect to military actions during negotiations, continue military operations at their present level but be prepared to intensify air and ground operations, accompanied by increased Thai activities in Laos, if Hanoi attempts to extend its domination.

[Here follows the remainder of the paper.]

Vientiane, December 3, 1968, 0553Z.

30553Z. Ref: CINCPAC 202321Z Nov 68./2/

1. Reftel proposes enlargement of Prairie Fire operating zone at Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. It has been examined here in considerable detail and with some anguish. It causes problems of a significant nature which have their roots in the very complex arrangements we have worked out for Prairie Fire over the years.

2. Fundamental to these arrangements has been the necessity to coordinate Prairie Fire operations on one side of the line and CAS guerrilla operations on the other. This coordination is important not only to avoid inadvertent fire fights between these different units operating independently, but also because the roles and missions of these units are basically different.

3. The CAS units have two distinct roles and never mix the two. They are either passive intelligence teams which deliberately avoid contact with the enemy or else they are special guerrilla teams which carry out pre-planned raids and ambushes. It is our experience that these two types of operation can not be carried on in the same zone. The guerrilla actions always produce a reaction which would have the effect of sweeping intelligence teams out of their operating zone. Hence, we pick the areas for intelligence operations away from the areas where guerrillas operate.

4. Prairie Fire teams, on the other hand, combine both passive intelligence and active military operations. Even when the primary mission of the team is described as intelligence, we note that the mission usually involves at least one fire fight. Therefore, we consider them, on balance, to be essentially guerrilla rather than intelligence units.

5. As you may be aware, there is currently a special U.S. Intelligence Board action (involving CIA-State-Defense-JCS reps in Washington) which is assigning intelligence priorities in the Lao Panhandle. CAS Vientiane is under activities to measure North Vietnamese movements in critical areas. These involve certain points inside North Viet Nam and other points in Laos near the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes.

6. Despite much juggling of operating zones to accommodate commando hunt bombing objectives, CAS has just completed a realignment of its intelligence teams in these critical areas to meet the Washington objectives. These teams operate in those same areas in which Prairie Fire has expressed an interest. For the reasons outlined above, it is not possible to mix Prairie Fire operations into this terrain.

7. On the other hand, at Washington request, CAS Vientiane has also established intelligence teams inside the Prairie Fire zone at the point where Route 1036 enters Laos. This is a precaution against the possibility that the North Vietnamese may decide to shift their pattern of truck traffic in order to take maximum advantage of shelter in North Viet Nam rather than exposing it to attack in Laos in the northern stretches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

8. This move into Prairie Fire territory has been coordinated with MACSOG, and causes little problem because Prairie Fire has not operated in this area for some time. If Prairie Fire currently has spare assets because it has terminated strata and other operations in North Viet Nam, this general area, which has been dormant for some time, would seem a logical place for them to be put to work. Although we would have to clear the matter with Washington, we would nevertheless be willing to entertain a request that the coverage of this particular territory be turned back as a Prairie Fire, rather than a CAS, responsibility.

Honolulu, December 11, 1968, 0320Z.

110320Z. Prairie Fire (U). A. CINCPAC 070502Z Dec 68 (Notal); B. COMUSMACV 16836/090158Z Dec 68 (Notal); C. CINCPAC 020910Z Nov 68;/2/ D. AmEmb Vientiane 10045/030642Z Nov 68;/3/ E. CINCPAC 202321Z Nov 68;/4/ F. CAS Vientiane 030553Z Dec 68;/5/ G. COMUSMACV 16905/101102Z Dec 68 (BOM) (PASEP) (Notal)./4/

1. Ref A cited an exchange of messages (Refs C thru F) with Ambassador Sullivan concerning a COMUSMACV and CINCPAC proposal to expand the Prairie Fire area of operations (PFAO) to include the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. Ambassador Sullivan nonconcurred. Ref A further requested Abe's [General Creighton Abrams] comments concerning the effectiveness of present air operations in Laos and the feasibility of seeking authority to conduct Prairie Fire operations in the proposed area on a case by case basis. Ref B strongly recommended that authority be obtained to employ PF assets without restriction in the proposed areas around the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes.

2. Ambassador Sullivan's objections as expressed in Refs D and F and our comments follow:

A. Ambassador Sullivan stated that operations conducted in the positive control area (PCA) will have to be limited and, therefore have optimal estimated effective returns for the risk involved. Ambassador Sullivan stated he had pulled CAS assets out of these areas to permit greater latitude of air operations and did not intend to reverse this procedure for Prairie Fire. Comment: Prairie Fire operations in these areas will comply with PCA rules. Prairie Fire insertions and air operations in proposed areas can be coordinated as they are now in the present PFAO. The interdiction effort we are making in Laos should be the maximum we can devise and target selection is an absolutely vital part of this program. The value of Prairie Fire teams is that they afford a real time target acquisition, reporting and exploitation capability which CAS teams do not possess. The U.S. led Prairie Fire teams can move quickly to and from areas, direct air strikes on targets on opportunity through secure voice communications (PRC-77 and KY-38), perform ground operations against selected targets, emplace mines and sensors, conduct wiretap operations, seize and evacuate prisoners, and report critical intelligence information. Another major advantage is that both ground and air operations will be controlled by a single headquarters. What is required immediately is U.S. led personnel on the ground that can search beneath the jungle canopy, uncover truck parking areas, locate portering points, identify road by-passes, pinpoint troop concentrations and report these findings directly to the FAC in an understandable language using familiar terminologies. This is the kind of ground-to-air communication and coordination that is urgently required and essential to effective interdiction operations.

B. Ambassador Sullivan expressed a concern for the political sensitivity of additional U.S. personnel in Laos, stating that this could result in jeopardizing our present operational understandings if an unauthorized ground operation were exposed. Comment: The proposed PF areas are under NVA rather than FAR control. The NVA has consistently denied its use of Laos and it is highly unlikely that PF operations would be surfaced by the NVA.

C. Ambassador Sullivan stated that he does not mix CAS road watch teams (which conduct passive intelligence) and special guerrilla teams (which carry out pre-planned raids and ambushes). Guerrilla actions cause the enemy to react and sweep the intelligence teams from their zones. He indicated that PF teams, while having an intelligence mission, are primarily guerrilla and should not operate in the same areas as CAS road watch teams. Comment: Concur that PF and CAS teams should not operate in the same area. In view of the benefits to be gained by Prairie Fire operations, I support Abe in strongest terms, the objective must be to gather the best possible targeting information. The threat to his command requires it. This is substantiated by the fact that the Lao Panhandle enemy logistics activity since 1 Nov 68 has reflected a significant increase in intensity. It is estimated that enemy vehicle movements southbound in the Lao Panhandle have moved 300 short tons per day. The Arc Light and TAC air efforts alone have not been able to stop this traffic. A maximum effort is called for, of which the PFAO expansion is an integral part.

3. An additional factor bearing on this request is the significant increase in NVA/VC air defense activity in Laos. The annual dry-season increase in NVN anti-aircraft capabilities in the Lao Panhandle is far greater than that of the past years. This trend is expected to continue, especially along primary supply routes. Communist air defenses in Laos still rely for the most part on the 37mm AA gun but a considerable increase in smaller-caliber automatic weapons and larger-caliber guns has been noted. The longer we delay full exploitation of our air-to-ground capability, including PF initiated strikes, the more difficult it will become to penetrate these areas.

4. Additional detailed supporting rationale is contained in Ref G.

5. Recommend that authority be obtained as expeditiously as possible, to permit expansion of the PFAO as outlined in Ref E.

6. Very respectfully and warm regards.

Washington, December 11, 1968.

SUBJECT
Effectiveness of Air Operations in Laos

In my note on the above subject last Friday I promised you my thoughts on the effectiveness of our air operations in Laos during November.

Our tabulation of the effectiveness, as compared with that of Systems Analysis, is as follows. (SA figures are in parenthesis; where there is no number, their paper had none.)

Several points need to be made relative to the above statistics:

1. Using destroyed/damaged estimates rather than just destroyed doubles the effectiveness against trucks; but the figure is still roughly only one-sixth that of last year.

2. The objective, of interdiction operations--impeding the flow of materiel to SVN--can be accomplished in several ways, e.g., truck kills, creating choke points. A major facet of current operations, Commando Hunt (accounting for over 30% of the above Air Force attack sorties), has as its objective impedance of flow into and through the system, rather than killing trucks. The 7AF preliminary estimate is that November operations impeded up to 75% of the logistics throughput to SVN. A major contributor to this effectiveness was the closure for a large portion of the month of the two major choke points of Ban La Boy (south of Ban Karai Pass) and Ban Pha Nop (south of Mu Gia Pass). Even if 7AF figures are off by 100%, they estimate there would still have been insufficient throughput to enable major stockpiling in SVN.

3. There may be fewer trucks operating in Laos this year than last. Sightings have remained relatively constant, whereas both FAC and reconnaissance sorties each have increased about 50% (from a combined total of 1905 to 2812). Thus, there probably has been more double-counting of trucks this year. 7AF believes, because of their estimate on reduced throughput, that truck sightings this year largely are limited to trucks shuttling within Laos. Any reduction in truck operations could have several possible explanations. It may be, as 7AF believes (and our intelligence tends to confirm) that the choke points have effectively reduced the inflow of trucks. Another possibility is that the NVN by choice are using Laos less. With their newly achieved immunity, it seems logical they would want to reduce their vulnerability by employing NVN routes to just north of the DMZ, then end-running or crossing it. There is at present, however, no road network to support such an endeavor by them of any magnitude; nor does our intelligence indicate any such effort at this time.

4. A very large percent of our recorded truck sightings and kills (almost 90%) in Laos accrue at night. Operations during the day concentrate on lucrative truck parks that Task Force Alpha sensors uncover during the night. The results of this effort are hard to assess in specific truck kills because of limited BDA.

My own conclusions after reviewing the data are twofold. First, it is too early after the bombing halt to make firm judgments about the nature, extent and effectiveness of our interdiction operations in the new environment. Looking solely at truck kills, we did not do so well. On the other hand, if the 7AF estimate on the reduction in throughput is borne out, our air operations should be judged successful. It will take a little longer for us to sort these things out and adjust to the new situation. It may develop that the NVN demeanor and reduced activity will show we have too much air power in Laos to employ it effectively. Alternatively, NVN activity may require all the air power we have, if not in Laos, in SVN along the infiltration routes or, though we hope it proves unnecessary, in renewed operations in the north.

My second point relates to the point in my note of last Friday about prejudging the nature of the war during 1969./5/ I recognize and fully support the goal of holding the FY 70 budget to the lowest possible figure. Since, however, any planned phasedown of operations in SEA included in the President's budget almost certainly will become public knowledge once it reaches Congress, I believe we should carefully weigh the impact of such revelations on the negotiations in Paris, on our SEA allies, and on the course of operations in SVN itself.

Finally, I cannot resist pointing out that no more than four months ago, an SA paper in their monthly SEA Analysis Report announced that truck kills were not a good measure of effectiveness, because what counts is whether enough materiel gets through, and besides there is an almost infinite truck reservoir in China and the USSR (as there is). How quickly views change!

We will continue to look into this matter and keep you informed of any significant developments that would provide a more firm basis for making any force structure decisions.

Harold Brown

Honolulu, December 21, 1968, 0403Z.

210403Z. Threat in Laos (U). A. JCSM-650-68 of 30 Oct 68--Contingency Planning for Enemy Actions in Laos (S)./2/

1. The renewed enemy offensive at Ban Tha Teng increases [our] concern over North Vietnamese Communist designs. The enemy's new aggressiveness there further emphasizes that Laos represents two geographic fingers, one reaching south to Cambodia flanking northern South Vietnam; the other pressing against northern Thailand.

2. The attacks at Tha Teng and the reported build-up against Attopeu and Saravane could presage a dramatic change of Communist policy; all three areas are west of the "de facto Geneva line" of the 1962 agreements. These latest maneuvers could lead to the acquisition of new territory in Laos, threatening Vientiane's existing control in the southern panhandle. Additionally, the Bolovens Plateau is the key terrain for all U.S. operations plans in the panhandle. It is equally as important to the Communists.

3. Thus far, the main strategic value of Laos has been as a corridor area. Communist forces are now increasingly active in areas which are of relatively minor import to the LOC/logistics system serving South Vietnam. In the event of reduced NVA participation in SVN, Hanoi could be expected to turn its attention westward.

4. The following are likely enemy objectives:

A. Seizure of the Bolovens Plateau.

B. Coercion of the Royal Lao Government into abandoning Saravane and Attopeu.

C. Expansion of operations in order to convince the United States that continued presence in Southeast Asia is futile.

D. Enhancement of Communist efforts against a primary free world stronghold in SEA--Thailand.

5. Current enemy actions in Laos could foretell an initial attempt toward achievement of all of the foregoing objectives. As the enemy's intentions become more clear, it may well be that, as pointed out in Ref A, a complete reevaluation of U.S. position and strategy in Southeast Asia will be required. Hopefully, such a reevaluation would result in a favorable decision to implement the military actions outlined in Ref A.

6. Very respectfully and warm regards.

Vientiane, December 31, 1968, 0545Z.

11150. Eyes only for Godley from Sullivan. Ref: State 293220./2/

1. Useful additional point for you to make in Prairie Fire meeting concerns marginality of effect which could be expected from MACV proposals. As we read current record of truck kills and interdiction effort on Ho Chi Minh Trail, air strikes are destroying approximately fifteen per cent of throughput. Even wildest Air Force claims do not exceed twenty per cent.

2. By inserting Prairie Fire teams under the trees in the two passes, it might be possible to raise the level of destruction a few percentage points, say to eighteen or nineteen per cent. Question has to be whether these few percentage points are worth the certain entrapments of teams, losses of lives and heavy propaganda risks.

3. Finally, it should be understood that neither of these areas can be serviced from current launch bases. Mu Gia will require a base in Thailand (probably NKP) and Ban Karai a forward site on the Bolovens Plateau. This makes this marginal effort a major peninsular move.

4. Ne illegitumi carburundum.

Sullivan

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