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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXVIII Laos DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

45. Summary Record of the 531st National Security Council Meeting/1/

Washington, May 5, 1964, noon.

SUBJECT
Laos and Overflights of Cuba

The meeting began without the President. Secretary Rusk asked Secretary McNamara to review the problem of the use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) on U-2s overflying Cuba.

[Here follows 6 pages of discussion unrelated to Laos.]

In response to the President's question, Mr. Bundy said the experts on Laos were prepared to give a short briefing if the President so desired.

Assistant Secretary Bundy briefed on the operations which were now being carried out. No request for additional authority was made to the President. The cross-border patrols and low-level reconnaissance missions, which the concerned Departments in Washington agree upon, will be undertaken. They fall within the authority given by the President following Secretary McNamara's last trip to Vietnam. Certain of the operations which were opposed by Ambassador Unger for political reasons will not be undertaken for the time being.

Secretary Rusk said he agreed that we should postpone for a week low-level reconnaissance, but he did not wish to delay much longer. The need to know more about what is going on in Laos as regards the infiltration of men and equipment is so great that a decision needs to be taken soon if our information is to be augmented. He suggested that we should persuade Souvanna Phouma to ask the International Control Commission (ICC) to undertake the intelligence missions we would like to see carried out. We could offer to hold up low-level reconnaissance if the ICC would agree to undertake the necessary missions.

Secretary McNamara said the Viet Cong is increasing its pressure in the areas north of South Vietnam. He cited a significant communications buildup which might mean that a major effort was being undertaken by the North Vietnamese to increase their military buildup for use either in Laos or in South Vietnam. He agreed we should wait for a week to see what developments take place in Laos. Our capability to undertake low-level reconnaissance will be brought to a 24- to 48-hour readiness status.

Bromley Smith/2/

Washington, May 5, 1964.

SUBJECT
National Security Council Meeting, 5 May 1964

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Valenti, Mr. Smith, Mr. Forrestal
Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Governor Harriman, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. William Bundy
Secretary McNamara, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. McNaughton
Secretary Dillon
The Attorney General
Mr. McDermott
Mr. Rowan
Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby

1. The first part of the meeting was addressed to Cuba.

2. With respect to Laos, Mr. William Bundy briefed on the plans for increasing intelligence coverage of the routes through Laos to South Vietnam. He stated that Presidential approval had previously been obtained for the actions mentioned. He said that small patrols would be authorized in the areas north and east of Tchepone, with air in-and-ex-filtration, although it will take several weeks to launch the first of these patrols. With respect to air photo reconnaissance, pursuant to Ambassador Unger's reservations, these will be withheld, but a new look will be taken after a week. Meanwhile specific targets for these will be determined. Secretary Rusk believed that we should not postpone these more than a week or so unless Souvanna clearly moves to take action. He suggested that we urge the ICC to inspect the Tchepone area and begin our overflights and offer to suspend our overflights if the ICC carries out proper inspection. (Action: FE/TBL with OCI and DIA--Please keep in touch with the list of specific targets.)

2. Mr. Bundy also added that an effort will be made to establish a single point at which detailed reports from all sources can be immediately analyzed in Washington, to analyze the traffic running over the routes from North Vietnam into southern Laos, and arrangements made to cross-fertilize the various intelligence operations in the area. (Action: FE [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] arrange for immediate integration of Vientiane reporting and participate with OCI, DIA, etc., in this center). Secretary McNamara emphasized that this information is badly needed as there has been a sharp increase in communications between North Vietnam and Viet Cong stations on the Lao/South Vietnam border, indicating a sharp upsurge in Viet Cong attention to this area.

WE Colby
Chief, Far East Division

Vientiane, May 15, 1964, 5 p.m.

1314. Bangkok's 1864 to Dept, 289 to Vientiane; Embtel 1201./2/ PL/VM are currently engaged in their usual efforts before rainy season sets in to improve their military positions and secure lines of supply. Principal effort now appears be aimed at Tha Thom (which reported to have fallen May 14), with some action also threatened northern Plaine des Jarres sector toward Munong Soui. Heart of Plaine des Jarres itself now under PL guns but since taking of Phou San there have been no important indications of further push in that area. First stages these actions already evident before April 19 coup and could represent nothing more than continuation persistent PL effort take over all areas which occupied separately or jointly by them and neutralists as of June 1962.

If this continues be Communist policy we can expect PL/VM forces stop short of Mekong itself. In Tha Thom sector this would probably mean advance up to but not including Borikane (UF 6653). While further improvements of PL/VM positions might be made in Plaine des Jarres and effort made cut route between Plaine and Munong Soui, would not anticipate, under this thesis, effort to push neutralists off Plaine.

We are however in new situation which may result in change in Communist calculations and therefore possibly intention on their part move farther than in past and even make all-out effort take over all of Laos including Mekong lowland. Thus far we have no indications any such change but believe it wise consider what this would call for on our part in way of contingency plans and decisions, together with possible deterrent measures to be taken now.

(1) April 19 coup introduced new element and may have been taken by Communists, who firmly persuaded U.S. and other anti-Communist nations in region supported it, as indication U.S. has backed away from Khrushchev-Kennedy decision of July 1961 and means install regime in Vientiane which will work for military solution. Communists might consider such a U.S. shift as logical accompaniment our firm policy South Viet Nam. This might persuade Communists that with political excuse of coup available to them and while military leadership in Vientiane thoroughly confused, this is moment take advantage their clearly superior position and take over.

(2) Souvanna's recent statements and actions more hostile to Pathet Lao (see A-341)/3/ may be persuading Communists that Souvanna has lost last vestige neutrality (as seen through their eyes) and they no longer have any reason restrain themselves because of disappearance all hope of using him to their advantage.

(3) Although we have no overt indication of this, also conceivable that Communists have changed their assessment of U.S. position and no longer fear prompt response from us if they should approach Mekong. Factors contributing to such an appreciation by Communists, if this is case, would be our decision not to move against North Viet Nam directly, at least now; reluctance become involved in any more military actions in election year; and absence any sharp U.S. reaction to PL/Viet Minh advance almost to Mekong in Thakhek area last January.

Thus first question is whether we should seek some way tell Communists that we continue be prepared resist with force their stepping over invisible line guarding Mekong lowland. We would of course wish do this in such way as to avoid persuading them, in line with point 1 above, that U.S. bent on resumption warfare in Laos. Tend to agree with Amb Martin that deployment U.S. troops does not provide satisfactory answer; on one hand there is Thai reluctance increase their involvement to this degree if they cannot be assured our readiness follow through if challenged and on other hand I am not sure how seriously it would be taken by Communists unless it were considerably larger scale than in 1962. More persuasive, I believe, would be 7th Fleet action off North Vietnamese coast which would not involve Thais but rather be pointed directly at North Vietnamese who pull strings in Laos and would also represent pressure which could be applied selectively./4/

At same time we must of course be ready with our plans for direct military action, including use of U.S. and/or SEATO troops, in case becomes clear Communists intend seize lowland to any significant degree. Under such circumstances believe government would request SEATO and/or U.S. forces sent to support it to cross Mekong and take principal towns along river at least, so that Communist forces could not credibly charge invasion but would be themselves clear aggressors against lowland territory still held by government. I realize this question becomes immediately involved in highly classified U.S. and SEATO planning and I mean only to suggest it be kept under constant review, particularly should there in future be any clear sign that Communists will not this time be inhibited, as in past, from establishing themselves on Mekong. Should this occur we would still have choice available as to whether we wished accompany action from Thailand with use 7th Fleet off North Viet Nam.

Unger

Vientiane, May 17, 1964, noon.

1329. This morning I raised three questions with Souvanna and got following answers:

1) If appropriate targets presented themselves would Souvanna agree to use of bombs by T-28's under present circumstances? Souvanna promptly replied that he would, adding only that target selection should be worked out in conjunction with General Amkha. Therefore we are now seeking get Gens Ma and Amkha together to bring T-28's into action, if they can be useful. I take Souvanna's okay to cover not only 100 lb but also, if necessary, 500 lb bombs.

2) I referred to US-piloted T-28's in Udorn which I said could be promptly converted to be indistinguishable from Lao T-28's and flown with considerable effectiveness in sorties against PL/VM in present situation (JCS 5197; March 052153Z)./2/ I said I had been assured this could be done without American involvement becoming known. Souvanna concurred in this action.

3) I exposed to Souvanna idea convening SEATO military advisors in Bangkok (as set forth Deptel 1006, para 4)/3/ and Souvanna said he thought this might have useful effect. He went on to speculate that current action here as well as South Viet-Nam probably timed from North Viet-Nam to coincide with McNamara visit Saigon and he volunteered thought that direct action (e.g. 7th Fleet against North Viet-Nam) would also provide effective warning.

Souvanna informed me that as of about 1030 am Gen Amkha in touch with Kong Le (not clear whether at Muong Phan or at Ban Khong, TG 9345). At about 1115 Col Law expected land Muong Phan if appears clear from air that situation permits. Thereafter we should have better understanding of Plaine des Jarres situation. Souvanna also told me PL/VM currently only about 30 kms north of Paksane; this word given him by Gen Ouane.

At time of writing this message (11 am) co-chairmen reps and ICC calling on Souvanna at his request. Denson and Munro have diplomatic actions well in hand and I am concentrating on material help to defending forces.

Do I have authority to: 1) bring 500 lb bombs into Laos and employ them and 2) can US T-28's from Udorn be employed as discussed above?/4/

Unger

No. 716A

Washington, May 17, 1964, 4:30 p.m.

We have reviewed all evidence available to date concerning recent Communist military action in Laos and conclude as follows:

We believe that the Communists are seeking to regain all of the Plaine des Jarres area and that continuation of their attacks will make the neutralist position there untenable. The Communist capture of the Plaine des Jarres and other positions in southeastern Xieng Khouang Province will place them in control of almost all of Laos except for the Mekong Valley. We believe that current Communist operations will stop short of attacks against major positions in the Mekong Valley.

Washington, May 17, 1964, 6:22 p.m.

1011. 1. Following actions should be taken urgently to meet Laos crisis brought on by Communist attacks in Plaine des Jarres and south of Tha Thom:

a. We here see great advantage in Souvanna calling for paragraph 4 consultations/2/ at once, envisaging that these would take place in or from Vientiane, would cover local reps signatory countries, and might include on-the-spot looks by these reps to supplement ICC. Believe such diplomatic action would be useful prelude any further action we might take and would probably tend to cut down rather than increase any pressures for a Geneva Conference. Therefore, unless Vientiane feels otherwise, believe you should approach Souvanna urgently with this suggestion.

b. Vientiane ask Souvanna to issue request for small number of low-level reconnaissance missions by US jet aircraft over Paksane/Tha Thom road and over key areas of PDJ. Objects of this action, in addition obtaining essential target information and other intelligence, would be morale lift Kong Le forces and show of US concern and determination to PL/VM./3/ Alerting messages have been sent by military channels. Bangkok should seek RTG concurrence for overflights and/or staging of jets at Don Muong should this prove necessary. Saigon should seek GVN concurrence for overflights and/or reconnaissance flights from Vietnamese air bases.

c. We believe use US pilots in T-28's represents excessive risk at this time. [2 lines of source text not declassified] In view ineffectiveness Lao pilots, believe substantial operational advantages would be realized if Thai prepared to furnish pilots and Bangkok should approach RTG urgently with this suggestion. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] However, pending receipt such permission, Vientiane authorized to turn over aircraft at once to Lao for operations dispatched through Vientiane. USAF unit at Udorn being instructed accordingly.

d. Bangkok to seek immediate meeting of SEATO Perm Reps with MILAD Reps in attendance, for discussion of situation and exchange of information and plans, based on threat to area (dodging question whether Laos considered in SEATO area in light 1962 settlement). We do not know yet just how far we are going in such a session but believe it useful initial move in any case.

2. FYI: Following additional actions being taken or contemplated:

a. Secretary today calling in SEATO Ambassadors to express concern and need for maximum SEATO collaboration and participation in actions taken. Secretary also talking separately to UK, Soviet, Polish, and Canadian-Indian Ambassadors, or Charges, urging appropriate action in each.

b. If Souvanna agrees to approach Co-Chairmen on Para 4 consultations, we planning strong message to Co-Chairmen in support.

c. We urgently considering whether to propose to Thai immediate deployment of US forces to Thailand in approximately same strength as in 1962 (5,000-6,000 men including ground and air units). If we do so, we will seek restoration of UK, Australian, and New Zealand units to full 1962 strength plus units from Philippines. We considering whether this can be tied in some way to forces already being deployed for LIGTAS exercise due begin 30 May in Philippines.

d. Kitty Hawk task group has been directed take up positions off Vietnam soonest.

e. We do not at present plan make press statement but will let press know of our concern and of urgent consultations with interested countries which are going forward.

Rusk

Washington, May 19, 1964, 9:40 a.m.

Ball asked Bundy the general reaction to the idea of Americans in T-28s. Bundy said they just had a telecon with Lynn [Leon Unger] and he does not need them as of now./2/ He says if he is going to maintain the tempo he will need to use the civilians. Bundy said that the use of civilians in Laos is less desirable than in others because of the fact that the civilians have always been under propaganda attack. Bundy said he was going to check with CIA and see if they had some in Thailand who could do it. Ball said that when Bundy had a few minutes during the course of the day he would like to talk to him.

Bundy said he had just talked to Rusk and Harriman and they wanted to get out a message to Khrushchev. The other question is troops to Thailand and what we might do there.

[Here follows a paragraph unrelated to Laos.]

Washington, May 20, 1964, 8:55 a.m.

H: In Mike's [Forrestal] absence may I say to you what I would have been saying to Mike in last couple of days.

B: Yes.

H: I don't think we are hitting this thing hard enough. Morale very bad. I have recommended for some time that we put two battalions back in [to Thailand]. We have just got to do something to support morale.

B: The only objection I have seen to putting those troops in is the Thais are so strongly against it.

H: If they [Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese] move into the Mekong, we have got to do something to stop them. Have you seen the telegram in from Unger saying he has talked to Souvanna saying got to now head north./2/ I tried to get them to agree to put some low-flying reconnaissance in over Laos and supply road in North Vietnam. I thought it was agreed to but it was cut out after I left. We have got to send a message to North Vietnam. I had hoped we could do it from strength.

B: What do you mean, Averell?

H: If we send the low-flying reconnaissance in, it will be an indication that we have a very serious interest in where they are and what they are doing.

B: We have flown some low-flying reconnaissance.

H: Only in Laos. Not in North Vietnam. I thought it was agreed we would fly over supply routes in North Vietnam and that was cut out after I left the room. We've got to send a message which is thoroughly understandable. I think we should consider flying over Hanoi. It is all very serious; I have been very cautious about all this, as you know, but I think there comes a time when if you are overly cautious it is not good.

B: The whole problem about Moscow is they don't have much to say about it.

H: No, they're not interested. One of the staff of the Embassy keeps in touch with Bill Sullivan, knew him at the Laos Conference. He saw Bill and said that Pushkin had indicated they would agree to talk about it, but that I turned them down. That just isn't true. I think I have six times taken up with Pushkin about taking up with North Vietnam and getting them to call off the dogs. The major thing Khrushchev has in mind is row with Peking. It is a long shot but I think our being ready to be vigorous will have more influence on them than to sit back and try to get him to pull chestnuts out of the fire. They're not going to do that.

B: I agree with that.

H: As of the moment I would take two steps--have low level flights over North Vietnam. There are supply dump, airfield, and roads which we know about from high level reconnaissance. The other thing I would do is ask the Thais whether they can't agree to put these troops in; that we cannot decide what we do later but we have every intention of taking steps to protect the Mekong and having these troops in will help further steps. They have moved their own troops in, and I think we should have some witness to the world that we are doing something.

B: I agree with you Averell.

H: This may be a signal to them. Very hard to know what the facts are. Pathet Lao is hot-headed. They are commanded now by two Peking-trained people. North Vietnamese have a certain hot- headedness. I don't believe at this time that ChiComs want to take on United States. Of course, one can't do anything without thinking that this may be in their minds. But they are going after a show of peace to the world, sending people to Africa, etc. Trying to compete with Khrushchev in more vigorous way. This would reverse their policy in India. Well, this is what I would be saying to Mike if he were here, and I wanted to tell you what I think.

B: Mike came in on the private wire telling me he doesn't think low level reconnaissance means anything and would prove weakness, not strength./3/

H: You mean in Laos? Not North Vietnam. I am speaking of North Vietnam.

B: I know.

H: I was against going into Laos unless Souvanna approved. I don't mind what they did in the Plaines de Jars yesterday. Laos [is] not afraid of outside attack; North Vietnam is. I wish I could be more helpful.

B: It is very helpful, Averell. Thanks.

Washington, May 20, 1964.

SUBJECT
Daily White House Staff Meeting, 20 May 1964

1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting.

2. Southeast Asia. Bundy opened the meeting by saying that the next two or three days would be spent on Southeast Asia, and that other members of the staff who could run a continent without coming to him were encouraged to do so.

Nothing more was said on Southeast Asia during the meeting, but afterward Bundy asked Clif Alexander (the Southeast Asia expert in Forrestal's absence) and myself to stop by his office.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Laos.]

4. Discussion in Bundy's Office. In his office Bundy showed Alexander and myself the latest cables from Laos. Then, by way of direct conversation and through our overhearing his telephone conversations with McNaughton, Sullivan, and his brother, he let it be known that he was about to ask Presidential approval for intensified reconnaissance and for the use of some US civilian pilots in Laos. He also asked State and Defense to look into the matter of sending troops to Thailand. On this last point he asked me what the Chiefs thought of it, and I replied that, although I didn't know in this particular context, in general they were somewhat reluctant to do this and nothing else. Bundy then commented that it probably was that the Chiefs thought that we had gotten all the mileage out of troop movements that we could. I said I thought it would be something along those lines. The discussion on that point ended there.

Bundy asked Alexander to pull together the diplomatic temperature and the reactions to Rusk's conversations with various people. In particular, Bundy said Rusk may be taking a stronger line diplomatically than the government has yet reached decisions on. Bundy then asked me to help keep him posted on military planning.

WYS

Vientiane, May 20, 1964, 5 p.m.

1373. Ref: May 19 telecon; Embtel 1362./2/ T-28 pilots. Request Dept authorize US civilian pilots for T-28's not only for road cutting operation but in broader framework: 1) they are most immediately available; 2) their ability will be higher than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] other possible alternatives; and 3) they would be most responsive to guidance resulting from aerial recon once undertaken (septel/3/).

We are actively canvassing possibilities for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pilots and will continue to do so but requirement is urgent and as indicated Embtel 1369/4/ Souvanna now approves use of US civilian pilots. Would plan initially to assign only four or five to planes being transferred by COMUSMACV./5/

We hope RLG will agree to issue papers to these pilots and adjust personnel records to "terminate" employment with Air America or Bird so that pilots would have status of civilian technicians hired individually by RLG.

[2 lines of source text not declassified] Aircraft would, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operate out of Vientiane during day where combat loading and pilot briefing would take place. [4 lines of source text not declassified]/6/

/6/In telegram 1951 from Bangkok, May 18, Martin reported a 1-1/2 hour conversation with Thai Defense Minister Dawee and senior members of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the situation in Laos. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

Unger

Washington, May 21, 1964.

SUBJECT
A Program for Laos and South Vietnam

1. To meet the current Communist threat in Laos and Vietnam essentially two extreme courses of action are now being discussed: a) salvaging what we can by negotiations at Geneva; or b) carrying the war directly to Hanoi. Whatever the advantages of either course (we think they are limited) the risks (political in the case of Geneva and political as well as military in the case of Hanoi) are so high as to warrant a searching examination of yet another alternative. We call this, for want of a better name, "massive counterinsurgency." We recognize that this may be regarded as "more of the same" rather than as a genuine alternative to either of the two extreme courses. We believe, however, that what follows represents a difference in kind from the present US/GVN effort in implementation as well as conception.

2. The Program

In brief, what is proposed is that the defense and stabilization of the situation in South Vietnam (and Laos) be accomplished by a substantial change in the nature of the counterinsurgency program and certain substantial increases in its scale. This to be supplemented by intense psychological warfare pressures and selected military action (including, but not necessarily limited to bombing) against the Communists in South Vietnam and Laos as well as in North Vietnam. Such a program would necessarily require further inputs of personnel by CIA, a reorientation of US military and AID programs, some changes in the US organizational and command structure, and putting the GVN on a "war footing." These actions would probably involve additional requirements for US personnel directly involved in the counterinsurgency effort of as much as 5,000 men. Perhaps a corresponding economy could be achieved among US military and civilian personnel presently in South Vietnam.

3. The "oil spot" concept is the key to victory in South Vietnam, and its objective is the population, who must be given something to fight for and something to fight with. They must also be supported by the regular forces against the larger VC units now prevalent, and these regular forces must give this supporting, reinforcing, and protective mission priority over attempts to find and kill the VC.

4. In order to insure maximum attention to the development of this counterinsurgency approach CIA should develop such local political and paramilitary forces as feasible, among the Montagnards, the Cao Dai, the Hwa [Hoa] Hao, etc.). These would be supplementary to the CIDG, SDC, etc. In order to carry this out, CIA would establish officers in the local areas with direct lines of command to Saigon and direct logistical and financial support. This is not a reversal of Switchback; it is an extension of the CIA capability to conduct political and paramilitary actions in a flexible manner into new fields, leaving to the regular military and aid programs the development of the more organized and orthodox national forces.

5. Essential to the oil spot approach is a program of local self defense, which is where we believe the CIA can make an important contribution and we suggest that the Agency re-enter this field on a large scale. Thus, we propose:

a. There should be established in each province of South Vietnam an officer not necessarily CIA, in charge of counterinsurgency. He would have on his staff a USOM man and an officer of the US Special Forces or Marines. The latter, in turn, would have under his command up to 100 specially trained and indoctrinated US troops.

b. The Province counterinsurgency group would report, over its own communications, to a counter-insurgency command center in Saigon, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This command center would be directly under the Ambassador and would have the same status in Saigon as MACV, USOM, etc.

c. Consideration should be given to establishing regional counterinsurgency commands (the Delta, the Montagnard area, etc.).

d. US Special Forces Officers would function on a "counterpart" basis at the hamlet level and would be the action element in carrying out the elementary economic and social measures that are needed to provide the positive element to defend as well as to instruct the locals in their own self defense. The CIA, AID, and Special Forces officers would travel constantly through the Provinces to see that the programs are being implemented.

6. These proposals are designed to supplement rather than replace the regular AID and military programs in Vietnam. In essence, the regular, more orthodox programs should be designed to support the local counterinsurgency effort at least until the situation is stabilized.

7. We recognize that the proposals involving increased counterinsurgency activity with CIA participation, entail a number of adjustments in the chain of command structure: the relationship of the military and AID personnel on the counterinsurgency group to MACV and USOM, the relationship of the counterinsurgency command to the Commanding General, Vietnam. We believe, however, that if the concept of massive counterinsurgency is adopted, these command relationships could be easily worked out.

8. To supplement a vastly increased counterinsurgency effort within South Vietnam, the US/GVN should undertake a stepped-up program of psychological warfare against North Vietnam. This would include diplomatic, military, propaganda and economic pressures. This would also involve a program of bombing Communist targets, especially in Laos, but leading close to the North Vietnam frontier and into North Vietnam if necessary. This is relatively low-risk in Laos, and would encourage our friends and perhaps give pause to one enemy. (The pilots should be in the first instance Lao [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], phasing into the use of US pilots.) The initial military target inside Laos would be in the Plaine des Jarres area, along Routes 12A and 12B, Route 9, leading then along Route 7 towards the North Vietnamese frontier. These attacks would be more in the nature of a psychological pressure program than an all out military attack. They would have some slight military value in interfering with Communist supply routes, but their main objective would be to demonstrate an increasing determination on the US side to press the bombing into North Vietnam.

9. In Laos, it is recommended that all of the villages on our side be approached with the same philosophy as in South Vietnam, adapted as necessary to local conditions. Enterprising Lao have demonstrated in several instances that it can be done. In this way the areas on our side of the ill-defined informal partition could be secured by the villagers themselves. The FAR's mission would become a defensive one in support of calls for help from any village complex that comes under attack. Since the attack on a village if properly defended has to be fairly large scale, the political noise level to the Communists would rise and they would also be vulnerable to aerial attacks. This tactic should remove the scattered Pathet Lao bands on our side of the informal partition and provide the basis for long-term political development in Laos. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

10. We suggest that the idea of a civilian counterinsurgency command for Southeast Asia be explored. Such a command would have general authority over counterinsurgency programs with, of course, major emphasis on South Vietnam and Laos. This command would be directly responsible to Washington and have authority to guide, expedite, and inspect the counterinsurgency programs in various countries under its aegis. Its primary responsibility would be to augment and coordinate current counterinsurgency programs. The command will also have authority to recommend appropriate military and psychological meas- ures against the enemy to affect his will to press the current insurgency effort.

11. The functions of the command would be:

a. To guide, expedite, and inspect the work of all agencies and their concentration on the implementation of the approved strategy, i.e., the oil spot. The emphasis should be on the rapid exploitation of any opportunity, however valid, not overall or detailed planning or comprehensive reporting.

b. To organize a counterinsurgency center to train and indoctrinate Americans, Lao, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on an accelerated basis. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] subcenters for extension of the effort might be established in the countries involved.

WE Colby
Chief, FE/DDP

Chester L. Cooper
A/DDI/PS

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