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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXVIII Laos DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

56. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, May 22, 1964, 6 p.m.

1395. We may at this point in Laos be on watershed between (a) continued Communist military attacks driving at or very near to Vientiane and Paksane or (b) at the end of this dry season's pressure except for few consolidating and mopping-up operations. We are not disposed here to think that Communists this time do intend move to Mekong although their calculations in this regard may have been changed by some new elements in picture. These are (a) Souvanna's much more outspoken and consistent anti-Communist position which has finished any lingering Communist hope that he can be used to gain their ends and (b) our reconnaissance flights over Ho Chi Minh Trail which Communists may regard as prelude to serious assault on that corridor. Since corridor certainly represents major North Vietnamese interest in Laos, they might be driven to more extreme action if they become persuaded their continued use of it is threatened.

More likely hypothesis is that recent rash of fighting just about over, having resulted in body blow to neutralist forces, from which they may or may not recover, and having acquired for PL/VM prize geographical base for future harassment and advances in all directions northern Laos. If this is case, however much right wing and even Souvanna will protest about being devoured by Communists bite by bite, we (i.e. Western Powers) might accept new situation and try live with new state of affairs as we have lived with other unsatisfactory situations in Laos before. It would of course be a good deal harder to get acceptance of this course of action in Vientiane even than in past and would be much harder to live with our friends here in future, unless we considerably increased military help and showed ourselves much less restrained by Geneva Accords.

A fuller discussion of implications this course of action contained septel./2/ Under this we would seek to avoid involving ourselves in another conference and another set of accords, which could only be worse than last and where we might put ourselves in position of being obliged to beat an even more recalcitrant right wing (and perhaps Souvanna too) into negotiations and concessions to Pathet Lao which we full well know could only benefit latter. In other words should we not seriously consider drawing the line at this point and living with an even uneasier peace than before and something shakier than our accustomed instability rather than pretending that there is a possibility of peaceful co-existence with Communists in Laos? Of course, if an international conference could buy some worthwhile concessions it might have some value but otherwise I can't see why we should go into it and I would hope we could persuade enough of our friends of the rightness of this position that we could avoid finding ourselves so uncomfortably isolated as to feel obliged to give in.

With the French proposal and their current pressures on Souvanna, coupled with Communist line that is becoming daily clearer, we obviously will very soon have to adopt clear course or find ourselves swept along by force of events. It seems increasingly clear that it is Communist strategy to present Souvanna as prisoner or puppet of right wing and to present government in Vientiane as fictitious. In short order I expect them to say they cannot accept Souvanna Phouma as in position speak for Laos. They may go to point of even withdrawing diplomatic representation and, if there were a call for article 4 consultations from Souvanna, they would most probably not attend or, if they did, would not accept that he represents the Royal Laotian Government. At a Geneva type conference I would expect them to accord Souvanna role merely of representative of one of three tendencies and in no sense able to speak for Laos as a whole.

I believe this is line we must do our utmost to combat and frustrate and in conversation with U.K., France and Australian colleagues this morning I emphasized this point. Particularly for benefit of Millet whose government's officials (Paris to Dept 5565/3/) talk of Souvanna as "prisoner of right." Souvanna as we all well know has many times threatened to resign and once carried this threat out some years ago. He is certainly under no physical compulsion today and if he wished would not have slightest difficulty in leaving country. He apparently has been so thoroughly disillusioned and discouraged by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese behaviour that he no longer feels able work on his earlier cherished hopes of bringing about reconciliation. As for Souvanna not being free here, there of course comes immediately to mind contrast with Pathet Lao zone where he may not even enter without express permission. Colleagues here make much of Polish two-day incarceration, current plight of North Vietnamese Embassy, continued though moderated censorship, etc. all of which thoroughly stupid and highly counterproductive actions of extreme right wing; I urged them do as I have done, i.e. try bring about correction of these errors but don't dwell on them so as to play into Communist hands when grounds for condemnation of Pathet Lao and DRV are so much graver.

French are obviously obsessed with idea that tripartite balance must be restored and I am persuaded Millet using all effort with Souvanna to this end. If he manages play role in bringing about cease-fire (Deptel 1043)/4/ it will certainly be with intention break up present neutralist right wing cooperation. This would of course also be French objective in any conference. Continuation of uneasy status quo as discussed para 2 above would be entirely unacceptable to French in present frame of mind.

In light all this we come to immediate question of international conversations, in whatever form. As for Geneva type conference (either as Communists would have it or in slightly modified form proposed by French) if I understand correctly we have not burned our bridges entirely (for example Secretary's statement Depcir 2133/5/ which appeared leave door slightly open). Nevertheless I gather from Deptel 1039/6/ and various public expressions that we are definitely not prepared accept a conference now. It seems to me this is correct position since we know nothing can come out of conference that would in any way improve situation in Laos from our point of view. I believe our answer to pressure for conference should be two-fold:

(A) Article 4 consultations requested by PriMin should proceed in first instance to solidify PriMin's position and define issues and strategy of friends if there is to be a conference and

(B) Conference would be accepted only if it brought in advance clear gain, such as cease-fire coupled with withdrawal throughout Laos of PL forces to April or May 1963 positions (i.e. following Neut-PL break). (If, of course, current Pathet Lao/Viet Minh military attacks continue and cannot be contained and we are not willing intervene militarily to block them, we might have to buy cease-fire with conference.)

If Pathet Lao-Viet Minh pressure continues strong and we give consideration to military intervention, or if we come to conclusion that even with let up by Pathet Lao today we cannot expect to have viable free Laos with Plaine des Jarres severed from it, then another possible course of action outlined septel may have to be considered. This would entail a sharp and limited employment of U.S. forces to retake Plaine des Jarres.

Depcirtel 2169/7/ arrived following drafting foregoing. I see no conflict between that message and present tel and will await comments on cirtel, with which I am generally in accord.

Unger

Washington, May 23, 1964.

I.

In connection with your Sunday meeting of the Executive Committee on Southeast Asia,/2/ you may wish to note the following points relating to item 4 on your agenda/3/ entitled "Other immediate actions: State to report on efforts to forestall a Geneva Conference on Laos". Actions taken in this regard have been:

1. Immediate coordination between Unger and Souvanna to ensure Souvanna's support for Article 4 consultations in Vientiane, although being prepared to accept a conference on Laos in principle if certain key pre-conditions to be discussed on basis Article 4 are agreed to in advance by all concerned.

2. Coordination talks with the British over the past several days.

3. A circular telegram to all our posts in countries signatories of the Geneva Accords defining our position and asking for any urgent major comments they might have./4/ Discussions with host government not authorized. We have received only one reply--from Lodge--which was completely in accord with our position.

4. We wired Vientiane today (Saturday)/5/ instructing Unger to induce Souvanna to make a clarifying statement regarding Vientiane as the locus for Article 4 consultations, since Souvanna's position has not been entirely clear publicly on that point.

5. Following Souvanna's clarifying statement, action posts will consult with host governments on the basis of the various telegrams we have sent out reporting our position.

Comment: We are not rushing our consultations with other countries since there is advantage in dragging things out, but there is also a need to counteract the French who have been very active on the diplomatic front on this issue.

II.

I recommend that you flag the problem of possible moves to have the UN concern itself with Laos. L and some people in IO so favor./6/ I am not only opposed because of the "Hairy" Project you have up your sleeve,/7/ but also because:

1. A UN presence in Laos right now would help the Pathet Lao to consolidate their most recent gains.

2. The Communists would be far less inhibited and prevented from covert-type actions than we would be, were the UN to get itself in the act.

3. UN involvement has never been successful in this kind of situation, although it is a good way to waive our responsibilities in Laos and get out.

4. Because of the above, a UN involvement might well discourage the anti-Communists in Laos.

5. If the UN gets involved in Laos, the pressure will be on for its involvement in Viet-Nam as well.

6. To discuss Laos in the Security Council would almost inevitably require the presence of North Vietnamese representatives in New York.

7. To recommend UN action in Laos raises the question: why not a Geneva Conference, particularly in view of the fact that Peiping and Hanoi, interested parties, are not members of the UN?

Washington, May 23, 1964.

SUBJECT
CAS Vientiane Assessment of Situation in Plain of Jars and Immediate Requirements to Bolster Friendly Forces in Laos

1. Attached is the gist of a CAS Vientiane report/2/ received this morning as an assessment of the situation in the Plain of Jars. This report confirms the disordered and disorganized condition of General Kong Le's forces, and notes CAS support to the neutralists as well as to the Meo guerrilla forces. It concludes with CAS Vientiane's belief that it would be a mistake to relax even for a moment in preparations for countering further Communist pushes against friendly forces. Vientiane notes there will be, among other requirements, a need for additional air support.

2. I believe this report is of particular significance as a candid assessment of the confused situation in Laos, with some thoughts as to what we can do about it. There was not sufficient time for CAS to clear with the Ambassador and other members of the Country Team although the report is being passed to them for their information.

Richard Helms

Vientiane, May 24, 1964, 5 p.m.

1411. Want Dept be fully aware of degree to which we now becoming involved in measures in violation Geneva Accords but which are absolutely necessary if we are to meet urgent requirements in this ugly situation.

Souvanna called me on telephone this morning regarding threatening situation around Muong Kheung-Ban An-Muong Soui and asked for T-28 strikes in area. I told him [1 line of source text not declassified] to do anything quickly we would have to turn to U.S. pilots for combat missions. Souvanna hesitated at first but finally gave me green light proceed with U.S. pilots. Accordingly I am authorizing U.S. pilots (Air America civilians) to undertake T-28 flights tomorrow for two purposes: 1) help to hold PL advance on Ban An-Muong Soui area (Muong Kheung has reportedly now been evacuated); 2) cratering Rte 7 east of Ban Ban. Pilots will be briefed very carefully on known enemy dispositions and AA batteries. On a selective basis I am relaxing certain long-standing prohibitions: 1) Air America, particularly choppers, being permitted carry military personnel in hill areas and also war material; 2) Dept already aware presence here U.S. T-28 technicians; 3) closer ARMA and AIRA participation with FAR and RLAF in targeting for T-28 strikes and more direct USAID/RO participation in supply arrangements.

Unger

Washington, May 24, 1964.

SUBJECT
Laos and the Timing of Possible Actions Against North Viet-Nam/2/

Souvanna Phouma has stated that he would accept a "Geneva" conference on Laos subject to several preconditions, of which the most notable are withdrawal of Communist forces from areas previously occupied by the neutralists (principally the western part of the Plaine des Jarres) and reaffirmation of his own status and full power as head of the government. We are strongly supporting these preconditions, and are pressing the British and friendly signatories of the 1962 Accords to do likewise.

In addition, we propose, if a conference should ever meet, to press for full compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1962 as our objective. This would include total withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and an end to the corridor through Laos from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. Both of these Communist actions have persisted since 1962; we have protested against them frequently, but in practice have taken no stronger action.

Probable Communist Reaction to this Position (We assume that the Communists do not enlarge their present military actions to a further offensive. If they did so, we would have immediately to consider drastic action both within Laos and against North Viet-Nam.)

Unless further pressure is applied, the Communists are virtually certain not to withdraw their forces from the neutralist areas of the Plaine des Jarres. Moreover, they will undoubtedly fight any clear affirmation of Souvanna's power and legitimacy, and at least seek to argue at length that they were justified in boycotting the government, that Souvanna is a prisoner of the right-wing generals, etc. Thus, if we, and Souvanna, and the British, adhere to these preconditions--as we must seek to do--we shall be at an impasse with the Communist side. They may well cease any further military action, so that we would have virtually a de facto ceasefire. But they are unlikely to go further.

The US could take further military actions within Laos at any time. We have already introduced jet reconnaissance flights and have now authorized US civilians to fly T-28 prop fighter bombers against Communist positions. Our next actions in Laos could include the use of US aircraft in Thailand, South Viet-Nam or from carriers to bomb Communist positions in Laos.

This should be done only on the request of Souvanna and a major problem might be that, although he might well request some quantity of such action, he is basically concerned about destructions in Laos and might not wish us to push it far without himself pressing us to go at once against North Viet-Nam.

Our action could further include deployment of ground and especially air units to Thailand both to step up such air actions and to convey at least a threat of ground action by US forces within Laos. If we do deploy forces to Thailand, we could probably get the British, Australians, New Zealanders, and possibly the Philippines, to join with us, but it is less clear that any of these nations would join in actual attacks into Laos.

Once we started overt US military attacks into Laos, we would be forcing even more of a showdown and making it even more imperative that we not withdraw from our insistence on Communist withdrawal. By such attacks, we could inflict substantial damage on the Pathet Lao and could perhaps try to single out North Vietnamese troops for such attention. However, even in the face of such damage, the chances cannot be considered great that the Communists would withdraw, since to do so would represent the loss of the major morale and material gains they have made by their recent actions.

Thus, we could arrive at the point where we would virtually have to consider attacking North Viet-Nam in order to prevail in the contest of wills. Thus, in effect, the "Laos route" could lead us to the point of attacking North Viet-Nam, and could compress any timetable we might have for taking such action based on our wider view that it had become essential to hold South Viet-Nam and the whole area.

On the other hand, the timing of such a showdown is to some extent within our control. The various preconditions laid down by Souvanna, particularly in the political sphere, could be negotiated for a significant period of time before the withdrawal issue became the last remaining one. We must not seem to be dodging that issue, but we need not force it at once. For example, we could let the Article 4 consultations in Vientiane spin out a little on the issues of the ICC and Souvanna's own position, employing direct US military action only if the Communists did continue to move to any degree. We might during this period still move forces to Thailand to steady the situation and put ourselves in a position to move fast and hard once we did decide to act either within Laos or against North Viet-Nam.

In sum, the course of events in Laos could burn out the fuse on a decision to hit North Viet-Nam in a matter of 3 to 4 weeks, or it could conceivably be strung out longer. But, now that we are launched on insisting on the preconditions--which we could hardly have avoided--what we must recognize above all is that there is almost bound to be a showdown over these preconditions at some time in the next 1-3 months. If we back down from such a showdown--by abandoning the precondition of withdrawal--we will suffer a serious further loss of confidence among the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia.

Up to a point, the Laos issue can be useful to us in preparing the way for whatever action we want to take against North Viet-Nam. Our legal case in Laos is strong, with widespread recognition that the Communist attacks have been major violations and cannot be justified by the antics of the right wing or by past occasional right-wing violations. This helps us to bring the British and others along and gives a good legal basis for opening moves we might want to make in any case.

However, as we approach the point of actually hitting North Viet-Nam, justifying this on the basis of Laos would have little appeal to the American public and probably would not seem appealing even to the British and others. Thus, before we hit North Viet-Nam, we would wish to justify such action not merely on account of Laos but, perhaps far more, on the basis of the continued North Vietnamese aggression against South Viet-Nam. The "Laos route" must merge with the "Souvanna Phouma route" at this point and in fact become the smaller of the two.

On the lesser chance, that the Communists would accept withdrawal from neutralist positions in the Plaine des Jarres, we would then be virtually compelled to go on to a conference on Laos in Geneva or preferably somewhere else. Such a conference would probably be a prolonged "who struck John" exercise with endless argument about the political problem and with we and perhaps others pressing for total force withdrawal and the end of the corridor.

Such a conference, however, need not significantly affect either the timing or the carrying out of actions against North Viet-Nam. The issues are old ones and do not involve the loss of confidence that would be entailed by our backing down on the immediate withdrawal issue. Indeed, since we would have achieved our immediate objective of withdrawal, our psychological position at such a conference would be fairly good.

In sum, if this should happen, the Laos problem as such could be put to one side as a factor in our thinking whether to hit North Viet-Nam.

Washington, May 24, 1964.

SUBJECT
White House Meeting On Southeast Asia--24 May 1964

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Mr. Sullivan

Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster

Mr. Bell, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Smith, Mr. Cater

Mr. McCone, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Colby

1. Mr. McNamara opened the meeting by securing general approval of photo flights over the Plaine des Jarres on 25 May. He commented that he had been disappointed with the product from the low-level reconnaissance of the Tchepone area to date.

2. Secretary Rusk then opened the discussion of Vietnam. He stated, viewing Southeast Asia as a whole that it is clear that South Vietnam is the lynch-pin, although Laos and Cambodia also bear upon the matter. He emphasized that we have a good political position with respect to Laos in our demand for return to the 1962 Accords and that it is important to exploit this. [Here follows discussion on Vietnam.]

3. The problem of what to do about Laos was discussed in considerable depth, at the end of which Mr. William Bundy was requested to draft a detailed scenario of escalation of military action related to Laos. Mr. Rusk indicated concern that we may have an immediate problem on Laos and suggested that it might offer an alternate route to action against North Vietnam, on which our political base would be better founded. While the U.S. public is not much interested in Laos, Mr. Rusk thought that the Ho Chi Minh trail and the Viet Minh presence in Laos as related to South Vietnam could associate the problems of Laos with the U.S. public's more positive attitude toward Vietnam. Mr. Rusk thought that it important to maintain pressure on the pre-conditions for a Laos conference, such as restoring Kong Le's positions on the Plaine des Jarres by a Pathet Lao withdrawal, a cease fire throughout Laos, strengthening of the ICC and reaffirming Souvanna Phouma's full authority. At the conference itself there would be emphasis upon the Ho Chi Minh trail and the Viet Minh presence, but an effort would be made to restrict the conference to Laos rather than allowing it to spread into Vietnam. Mr. Rusk thought that the way to achieve the pre-conditions is to bring pressure on the Pathet Lao through other governments. Mr. McNamara felt that it would be necessary to use military action to bring about these pre-conditions, e.g. dispatching U.S. Forces to Thailand, bombing the Pathet Lao and possibly going ahead to bombing North Vietnamese routes of access into Laos. Once the failure to obtain the pre-conditions for a Lao conference is evident, particularly if this involved extension of military action into North Vietnam, it would be necessary to approach the Communists on the basis of Vietnam as well as Laos. Mr. McNamara felt that this would depend on the degree to which we force the pace. Mr. Rusk thought that the operation could be divided into two phases, a diplomatic effort to clarify our pre-conditions to a conference followed by the steps we might take if these were not achieved; Mr. McNamara felt that U.S. military action at least to some degree would be necessary in both phases. The DCI urged that we not divert our attention from the main Vietnamese problem just to obtain small diplomatic advantages based on Laos. Mr. Bundy felt that the U.S. position vis-a-vis Laos would have an effect on Vietnamese morale.

4. With respect to Vietnam Secretary Rusk reiterated his concern at adopting a course of action which might collapse because of poor performance or a collapse in South Vietnam. He insisted therefore that firm commitments be obtained from Khanh at an early rather than late stage on these matters. As an aside he said that he was investigating the potential for a UN Security Council sponsorship of a UN Commission to cover the Lao/Cambodia border.

[Here follows discussion related exclusively to Vietnam.]

11. [Here follows discussion on Vietnam.] Mr. McNamara reverted to Secretary Rusk's interest in Laos, commenting that we might be able to move into a North Vietnam program via the Laotian problem or we might even be forced into considering it by the situation in Laos. Mr. Sullivan brought out the point that Souvanna Phouma might cave in under too large a U.S. support of Laos.

12. The following actions were assigned:

a. JCS: Scenario of a stepped up covert program against NVN.

b. State: Proposals for the use of the United Nations.

c. Mr. W. Bundy: Scenario on Laos.

d. Mr. McNaughton: Revise the scenario on NVN.

e. Mr. Cooper: Review of number of additional personnel who would have to be brought into a formal USIB condition of the draft SNIE.

f. All Agencies: List of all personnel who are aware we are considering North Vietnam operations to be provided to Mr. Bromley Smith.

13. Mr. Bundy reiterated the necessity of secrecy in this whole operation.

William E. Colby/2/
Chief, Far East Division

Washington, May 24, 1964.

SUBJECT
Discussion at Dinner at the White House on Sunday night, May 24th

IN ATTENDANCE
The President, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy, George Mahon (there as a guest of the President) and McCone

1. The purpose of the meeting was to review the situation in Southeast Asia and for the President to receive the views developed at the Sunday morning meeting (memorandum of which is being prepared by Cooper and Colby/2/), and to decide on actions to be taken.

2. Secretary Rusk pursued his position at this morning's meeting; namely, that action taken against North Vietnam should be in response to violations of the 1962 Laotian Agreement. McNamara and McCone disagreed, stating that there would be little public support for a reaction because of any issue in Laos, as Laos is not in particular the popular or important issue with the people of the United States.

3. Rusk felt that it would be difficult to justify any actions in North Vietnam on the evidence of violations of the 1954 Agreement of South Vietnam. He was not clear as to why he differentiated between the two. I made the point that the South Vietnamese issue appeared of much greater importance in the minds of the American public and the Congress than the Laotian issue. McNamara seemed to support this position.

4. The President, throughout the evening, expressed impatience that we had not reached a conclusion as to the course of action to be followed. He said that he felt that there was little developed throughout the dinner discussion that had not been evident several days or several weeks earlier.

5. I stated that I felt we must be extremely careful about action in North Vietnam. I observed that the Chiefs (at least General LeMay) advocated a strike deep into North Vietnam. I pointed out that if this were done it might unleash forces which could readily overcome the friendly forces in both Laos and South Vietnam, with the result that we would "lose our base" in Southeast Asia. This view was supported by Bundy and recognized by the President.

6. Bundy pointed out that the most important paper before the President was the estimate prepared by the Board of National Estimates/3/ which in effect said a limited strike against North Vietnam might cause a hesitation on the part of the North Vietnamese in their direction to the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong, causing them to stand down their operations temporarily while events developed. On the other hand, the estimate pointed out that a large-scale attack might have just the opposite effect, i.e., intensification of action by the PL and VC and also intervention by the North Vietnamese and very possibly the Chinese Communists.

7. McNamara insisted, throughout the evening, that any action against North Vietnam must anticipate the commitment of at least seven Divisions in Southeast Asia. That while he did not intend to commit them, he felt that they should be pre-positioned and alerted. In fact, he said, they were already alerted. I took issue with this point, stating that in my opinion, (which was strictly non-professional and not supported by any studies) air attacks would be more decisive than this indicated and possibly conclusive. I furthermore said that if any action involved the commitment of troops to combat in South Vietnam, we had better forget it because the American people and the Congress would not support such action under any condition. I said that, in my opinion, the American public are fed up with adventures such as the Korean War and would not stand for another one.

8. Throughout the evening the President inquired as to whether all possible was being done in South Vietnam. The answer was affirmative and I did not take issue with this. There was some question concerning the JCS plan of additional training and also some questions about closer integration of the SVN government and MACV. However, the meeting did not deal with these issues to any particular extent.

9. The President then summarized the course of action he desired to follow about as follows:

a. We should do all possible in South Vietnam. We should review all that is being done in South Vietnam and see that any possible action on our part which might improve the situation is undertaken. A conference should be arranged in Honolulu or elsewhere with Lodge to be sure that he is "on board" on everything we wish to do and that no stone is left unturned in supporting Khanh, training men, developing plans, etc., which will assist with the effort in South Vietnam. In this connection we should point out that we are handicapped by a cut in foreign aid and foreign military assistance funds by the Congress.

b. We should go to Khrushchev and appeal to him to use his offices to relieve the situation threatening the peace. The United States should be in the position of promoting peace. On the other hand, we would not stand to see a country over-run and imposed upon by its neighbors.

c. We should go to the United Nations and make all possible noise advocating peace, telling the world through the United Nations forum of the aggression from North Vietnam. This should be done through the Security Council (not the General Assembly). If a veto is encountered, then we should;

d. Go to SEATO, solicit their aid, their assistance and their support.

e. If all of the above failed, then we should prepare for action against North Vietnam on carefully selected targets (this term was not defined and the discussion did not turn to exactly what was meant by the term, carefully selected targets). If this involved a positioning of troops and other actions, then we should be prepared to take such actions.

10. These were the guidelines laid down for me for my discussion with Eisenhower, with special emphasis on the cut in foreign aid.

11. It was agreed that low-level flights over Laos would be authorized to the extent required and requested by MACV and to the extent of 9 flights per day with a 36-hour lead time on actual authorization from Washington.

Washington, May 24, 1964, 9:47 p.m.

7706. Following message has been delivered to Prime Minister Home through White House channels:

Dear Prime Minister:

The situation in Laos has reached a critical point. Pathet Lao attacks against forces loyal to the Royal Government continue. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Souvanna, in a statement today, announced publicly he has called for consultations in Vientiane under Article Four of the Geneva Declaration, and I am glad to hear that you are having your Charge take the lead in organizing these promptly.

Souvanna also makes it clear that the Royal Government of Laos is prepared to attend a conference on Laos, which some signatories of the Geneva Agreements prefer, on condition that a cease-fire be established immediately throughout the country, that the Pathet Lao forces withdraw to the positions they held before the May 17 attacks, that his own powers be fortified and that the ICC operate effectively.

I believe we must give our unreserved support to Souvanna's position and seek through the Article Four consultations to develop as much further support as possible. Souvanna's conditions are truly minimal unless we are prepared to hold a conference to ratify another Communist grab. From Mr. Butler's message to Dean Rusk,/2/ I gather that your instructions to Denson call for achieving the objective of (1) an effective cease-fire supervised by the ICC, and (2) some real unity in the Government of Laos, but they apparently do not mention the important matter of Pathet Lao withdrawals.

If in fact there is this omission, then I do not believe these instructions go far enough. As Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma himself has put it, we cannot go to a conference faced with a fait accompli to the advantage of the aggressors, and where the latter could use their new territorial gains to argue that they control the whole country. Moreover, seizure of the entire Plain of Jars area by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese has been aimed at demoralizing and indeed eliminating the Neutralist forces in Laos. Unless a Neutralist position can be restored, Souvanna's right to speak for his country internationally will be put in question and the whole political basis for the Geneva Agreements undermined. In this connection, we are somewhat puzzled by Mr. Butler's allusion to a Zurich-type meeting. We do not, of course, wish to weaken in any way Souvanna's position as Prime Minister, any more than we can accept the takeover of the Plain of Jars. Souvanna must sit at the conference table as the representative of Laos just as he did at the concluding session of the 1962 conference. He could bring with him representatives of various factions if he wished.

To sum up, and to put the matter in more precise terms, I wish to say to you in all frankness that I do not see how the Government of the United States can consider attending a conference on Laos unless (a) there is an effective cease-fire supervised by the ICC; (b) there is a withdrawal of the Pathet Lao from the positions held by the Neutralists on the Plain of Jars before the recent Pathet Lao attacks; and (c) it is clearly understood that Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister would represent the Government of Laos at the conference. As Dean Rusk has put it in his letter of Friday to Mr. Butler,/3/ any other position would simply not be understood in this country and, "might very well be disastrous for our whole position in Southeast Asia, by finally convincing our friends that we really do not have the will and determination to resist a Communist take-over of the peninsula".

I fully realize that firm adherence to this position may result in sharp disagreement on the Communist side, at least initially. We would then have to consider various additional moves of a military nature. We would expect to consult closely with you on these.

I greatly value the close consultation our two governments have had and the parallel actions we have been taking. I hope that we can continue to see these matters eye-to-eye in approaching the Article Four consultations in Vientiane. Lyndon B. Johnson. End Text.

Rusk

Washington, May 26, 1964.

SUBJECT

Additional Measures to Stabilize the Situation in Laos

Vientiane's 1419 and 1430/2/ contain Unger's judgment that we could only get the Communist side to withdraw from the Plaine des Jarres by the application of very considerable military force in Laos, and the further fear that, if we and Souvanna should stand firm on the withdrawal conditions, the Communist side may also respond by maintaining attacks and gradually enlarging its area of control.

We have all felt that it was unwise or premature, or both, to get into substantial military actions in Laos at this point. Hence, the UN proposal/3/ to build up additional diplomatic pressure before we go further, with the "go further" contemplated to include measures against North Vietnam.

However, this may leave us a serious problem of deterring the kind of additional Communist attacks Unger fears. I believe that the only measure that would do so would be a prompt deployment of moderate-sized US and other SEATO ground and air forces to Thailand. We would not use these forces in Laos unless the Communists did actually continue to move on a significant scale, but their very presence would indicate that we were considering further measures and could well serve as a warning to the Communists that would hold the situation somewhat in place while we urge Souvanna to take the deadlock on withdrawal to the UN.

I therefore recommend that we consult immediately with the Thai in this sense,/4/ and concurrently with the British, Australians, New Zealanders, and Filipinos. This would involve our making clear that we were contemplating the UN request in order to build up international support and as a prelude to possible additional actions. I do not think, however, that we would need at this point to go through the whole range of possible actions in order to get the key nations to accept this course of action. It must be recognized that the Thai might so insist, but I think in the existing situation we would probably not have to spell it out.

The only other way I see to deter continued Communist action in Laos would be to bring the Lao complaint to the UN at once. However, this would somewhat rush our timing both in the sense of getting our materials together to handle that case effectively, and in the sense that the Lao action is itself part of the broader timetable on which we probably do not wish to act quite as rapidly as this. Therefore, the movement of forces to Thailand becomes a stopping action to enable us to take perhaps ten days or so before we move to the Lao complaint.

Washington, May 28, 1964.

SUBJECT
Implications of the Polish Proposal on Laos for US Interests/2/

Yesterday, the Polish Government, obviously with Soviet approval if not on Soviet instruction, suggested a meeting at a neutral site between representatives of the Geneva Co-chairmen, the ICC member nations, and the three Lao factions. The following are our initial views on the implications of such a meeting for US interests.

For this discussion, we assume US interests to be to retain as nearly as possible the Geneva solution--as opposed to some form of partition--with the minimum use of US military force.

Such a meeting, to be sure, could become merely a back door to a full Geneva conference. It could also lead the British and the Canadians, now apparently firmly behind Souvanna, and even Souvanna himself into making concessions to achieve at least the appearance of progress. However, these dangers are probably common to any purely political and diplomatic efforts directed toward resolving the problem of Laos. Although its prospects for achieving a successful settlement would be remote, we believe that such a meeting could have certain tactical advantages. These might make it to the interests of the United States to keep the proposal open, assuming it is acceptable to the Lao factions, as an alternative to Article 4 consultations should the latter break down or prove ineffective.

We see the tactical advantages of a meeting such as that proposed by the Poles as follows:

1) It would give the US another forum in which to work out a solution before going either to the UN or another 14 nation conference. The failure of such a meeting to produce agreement could bolster the argument of the futility of proceeding to Geneva.

2) Short of partition or of occupying Lao territory with United States forces, our best hope of keeping a non-communist government in being in Laos remains through some form of agreement, however fragile, among the Lao themselves. It should be remembered that the 1961-62 Geneva Conference could never have reached agreement if the Lao themselves had not agreed at Zurich to form a coalition government under Souvanna and at the Plaine des Jarres on the composition of the cabinet. Therefore, if there is any chance that the Lao might still reach agreement among themselves, we should encourage the chance. If there is no such chance we will at least have established once again that it is the Communist faction alone which refuses to cooperate with the other two, and will be on more solid ground to take further action.

3) The closer the United States comes to direct intervention the more disastrous it would be should Souvanna back down. If there is any chance that he will get off the train at some future stop, it should become apparent at such a meeting. If he should back down on his own conditions for a Geneva Conference it would be preferable for him to do it before we have committed United States troops and prestige to the support of these conditions. Such a meeting would test Souvanna's determination.

4) Such a meeting would provide a forum for negotiation in the absence of the French, the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese. Souvanna's conditions and our continued support for them would have a better chance of being justified and maintained at such a forum than at either a Geneva Conference or the UN.

5) Finally, the Polish proposal does not threaten to raise the question of Cambodia or South Vietnam as would a 14 nation conference or a UN debate.

In short, such a meeting would provide optimum conditions for Souvanna to establish his position with the very parties he must deal with sooner or later. In the absence of the French and the Asian Communists, Souvanna would be under less pressure to compromise. And no matter what the outcome, the United States need not be committed to anything Souvanna has not agreed to himself.

The main advantage of any Geneva-type conference, in Moscow's view, would be to forestall strong US countermeasures against the communists in Laos. The Russians may see the Polish-proposed meeting simply as a means of easing the West into a full-blown Geneva conference. However, they probably prefer the Polish plan which would get negotiations started in a forum excluding the two major Soviet adversaries, the United States and Communist China.

It is difficult to predict Soviet tactics with any precision in the absence of reaction from both the Asian communists and from the Lao principals themselves.

The Polish proposal suggests that a cease-fire might be an acceptable precondition, but Moscow would probably be unwilling and almost certainly unable to obtain compliance with Souvanna's demands for a Pathet Lao withdrawal from the Plaine des Jarres advances. The Polish statement also proposes that Laos be represented at the meeting by the three factions and does not refer to the Royal Lao Government or to Premier Souvanna Phouma. However, Moscow probably would try to work out a compromise formula to accommodate both Souvanna and the Pathet Lao. We believe that Moscow will seek to get the coalition government into operation again as a promising alternative to further polarization with the dangers of all-out war and US involvement. Therefore, the Soviets would support Pathet Lao demands that the neutralist-rightist merger be ended. Moscow probably would not agree to more effective ICC functioning; indeed it might seek to insure that no majority activities could be undertaken in the future.

Washington, May 29, 1964, 1:12 p.m.

CAP 64145. To Jack Valenti at LBJ Ranch, for the President from Mac Bundy and Forrestal.

1. Next following telegram is going from George Ball to Dean Rusk tonight and gives summary of current thinking on Laos./2/ This part of Southeast Asia crisis which could move quite soon into a new phase on its own steam, and for this reason you should know what is being considered even though no decision is called for today.

2. In essence, telegram to Rusk reports results of two long and comprehensive meetings here today in which Harriman, Stevenson, and Attorney General have been included with constructive results in all three cases.

3. Current proposal is that we should encourage Souvanna to accept a leading role in meeting proposed by Poles of representatives of the International Control Commission, Soviet and British Co-Chairmen, and three Laos factions. Virtue of this forum as against full Geneva conference is omission of French, Chinese Communists, and North Vietnamese. Also some slight tactical advantage to us in our own absence.

4. Key point in Souvanna acceptance would be statement that if no satisfactory restoration of situation in Laos emerges from Polish meeting, he would have to ask active foreign assistance and has assurance that U.S. at least would respond.

5. Form of our response would be international deployment to Thailand with probable company of British, Australians and Philippines, and readiness to execute air strikes, on Souvanna's request, against Communist supply lines in Laos (moving into North Vietnam only if total SEA picture made it desirable).

6. Thus, basic decision which may come to you is authorization of assurance to Souvanna that U.S. would act on this basis if situation in Laos remains unsatisfactory and Polish meeting should fail.

7. You will see at once that on this plan U.S. readiness to act in support of Souvanna is key element, both internationally and in terms of your own decision. Reason for thinking in terms of this decision now is that any international meeting with no show of U.S. will is bound to have gravely weakening effect not only in Laos but in South Vietnam, and so in other countries as well. This is unanimous judgment of both meetings today, including Stevenson and still more Harriman and the Attorney General.

8. Nevertheless, object of this scenario is to move actual use of force with respect to Laos further down the road and to limit it more tightly than any other alternative now apparent. Moreover, even if Polish meeting should fail, this scenario leaves open further appeal to UN at time of deployment and before any actual strike.

9. We repeat that no decision is required tonight or, in all probability, before your return. But because the problem of Laos has been somewhat in the background in your discussions of recent days, we believe it important for you to have this up-to-date report of current thinking here.

Washington, May 29, 1964, 8:24 p.m.

Tosec 36. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary./2/ Following represents general consensus of meetings today which included McNamara, Attorney General, Stevenson, General Taylor, General Carter, McGeorge Bundy, and Harriman on line of action re Laos./3/ Prior to formal presentation of recommendations to President, would appreciate your views after such discussion as you may desire to have with Martin and Unger./4/

There was general feeling that our objective should at minimum be seek prevent further deterioration in Laos and take action directed toward restoration status quo ante May 16th. Matter viewed not just from standpoint of Laos but also morale effects in SVN, Thailand and much of underdeveloped world. Also general consensus that no hope of achieving foregoing objectives by negotiation, whatever the forum, without some clear expression of US determination and will that US not willing write off Laos to Communists. While we initially would seek to treat Lao question separate from SVN-NVN problem, if satisfactory Lao solution not achieved basis should have been laid for possible subsequent actions that would permit our dealing more effectively with NVN with respect both SVN and Laos.

Against foregoing background, we felt initial step should be acceptance of appropriately modified or interpreted Polish proposal (full text being transmitted by septel)/5/ accompanied by firm assurance from us to Souvanna that we would be prepared to give him prompt and direct military support if the Polish conference was not successful.

We recognize that, before making such commitment to Souvanna, it would be necessary for us to obtain agreement of Thailand. However, we assume that, under circumstances outlined herein, this could be obtained.

Contrary to views set forth Circular 2209,/6/ which was not given seventh floor clearance, we now feel that Polish proposal probably offers best initial forum to seek to work out solution. It would:

1. Provide alternative to UN (where, in absence French support, we would probably be unable harness seven votes for useful proposition in Security Council) or another fourteen-nation conference. US support of such a meeting would be additional (and least damaging in terms SVN and Thai interests) demonstration our willingness seek peaceful settlement.

2. Short of partition or US occupation Lao territory, our best hope of keeping some non-Communist Government in being in Laos remains through some form of agreement, however fragile, among the Lao themselves. If Lao not able reach agreement, we will at least have established once again that Communist faction alone refuses to cooperate with other two and we will be on more solid ground take further action.

3. Such a meeting would provide forum for negotiation without French, Chinese Communists, or North Vietnamese. Souvanna's conditions and our continued support for them would have better chance of being justified and maintained in such a forum than at either the fourteen-nation Geneva conference or the UN.

4. Polish proposal does not threaten to raise question of Cambodia or South Viet-Nam as would fourteen-nation conference or UN debate, and should minimize problems in SVN of any conference on Laos.

5. Souvanna could go to such a conference without abandoning, and in fact he should not abandon, his preconditions for any fourteen-nation conference. Essential to acceptability of Polish proposal is recognition of Souvanna Phouma's position as Prime Minister of RLG. Polish formula appears leave room for negotiation on this point.

6. By providing a forum which includes Soviets but excludes ChiComs, such a conference keeps Soviets seized of Laos problem in context most useful to our interests.

To carry out foregoing, we would envision scenario along following lines:

1. Begin discussions with Souvanna, Thais, French, UK and USSR.

2. Assuming outcome of foregoing discussions favorable, Souvanna would undertake, with our support, discussions with Poles to obtain whatever reformulation or interpretation of their proposal may be required to obtain recognition Souvanna would be attending such a conference as PM of Government of National Union and sole spokesman for that Government. Representatives of other two factions would be attending solely as representatives of those factions.

3. Subject to satisfactory outcome foregoing, Souvanna would accept participation in Polish conference while maintaining his present preconditions for participation in any fourteen-nation conference.

4. In agreeing to attend conference, Souvanna would seek to improve bargaining position by making it clear, publicly or privately, in manner agreed with us and Thai Government, that, in event conference not successful, US would provide prompt and direct military support along lines described para 6 below. (Study being given here to question of Congressional consultation or approval of such future US force commitments, taking account of SEATO obligations.)

5. Souvanna would at same time request assistance of US (and possibly others) in reequipping his forces and we would immediately initiate such resupply through present channels.

6. If Polish conference not successful or in meanwhile Pathet Lao/Viet Minh significantly advance toward Mekong from present positions, we would, in response to Souvanna request, immediately deploy to Thailand an international force and initiate selective air strikes against Pathet Lao/Viet Minh supply lines and installations. (Note: We would not attempt at this time exactly to define what would be an acceptable degree of "success" but at minimum feel it would require reestablishment of some Kong Le presence in Plaine des Jarres. Whether such air strikes would at least initially be confined to Laos or include targets in North Viet-Nam would be determined at the time in the light of developments in the total Southeast Asia scenario.)

7. At the time of deployment to Thailand, accompanying Security Council action would be taken by Souvanna and/or ourselves in which our position would be that we were prepared to yield in favor of the UN if and when the UN reached agreement on appropriate measures to restore the situation. Decision would have to be made at the time with respect to exact time relationship between UN moves (by Souvanna as well as ourselves) and our military moves./7/

Bangkok, May 30, 1964, 3 p.m.

Secto 23. Had one hour talk with Kosygin at Soviet Embassy accompanied by Bowles. Soviet Ambassador and one Soviet FonOff official also present.

[Here follows a brief account of trade discussions.]

We then turned to Laos at my request. I went over background of Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement of June 1961 and Geneva Accords of 1962. I described two major Viet Minh violations throughout subsequent period, namely, continued presence Viet Minh military in Laos and use of Laos as corridor to attack South Viet Nam. I told him we and Soviet had agreed that everyone should leave Laos alone and that, if left alone, Laos would cause no problems for its neighbors. Neither side needed Laos as an ally. I said that, on the one side, the United States has no interest in military bases or a military presence in Southeast Asia and that if Hanoi and Peiping would leave their neighbors alone there could be peace in Southeast Asia. On other hand, I said that we could not stand aside and watch Southeast Asia be overrun by Hanoi and Peiping. I concluded by urging importance of close cooperation between Washington and Moscow to support full compliance with Geneva Accords of 1962.

Time began to run out because both of us had to attend and speak at Delhi memorial meeting for Nehru. Kosygin, however, said that he would report my observations to Mr. Khrushchev, declared that Soviet Union fully supports Geneva Accords, but stated that US was taking military steps which would provide no answer to situation. I told him that we are not seeking a military solution but that Pathet Lao with help of several Viet Minh battalions were resorting to military action contrary to the Accords. I told him growing danger of situation made it all the more important for our two governments to act together to preserve Geneva Accords.

Atmosphere of conversation was relaxed throughout except for two or three sentence exchange over our actions in South Viet Nam. No threats were used by either side. Since time was very short I do not believe this conversation substitutes for more systematic exchange of views with them on Laos at highest level.

Rusk

Honolulu, June 2, 1964, 8:30-11:50 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume I, pages 428-433.]

General Milton/2/ reported on "Military Action to Strengthen the Situation in Laos. Reequipping of Kong Le's forces; Farmgate in Laos; US/SEATO forces in Thailand." Annex H./3/ He said the objectives are (1) Hold the Mekong Valley. (2) Hold Sayorboury province. (3) Keep Souvanna in the saddle. (4) Get control of the external influences on the war in SVN while prosecuting the war in SVN. (5) Hold the confidence and support of Thailand.

He recommended (1), that we continue high and low-level recce in Laos, with armed escort with authority to return fire. The purpose is to get a better feel for the situation in Laos. (2) Continue to build up T-28 strike capability and use Lao and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Thai pilots. (3) Build up Thai "paru" operations in Laos. (4) Build up offensive guerrilla (Hardnose) operations. (5) Priority effort on GVN border patrols. (6) Cross-border operations from GVN into Laos (continued air recce, commence ground recce, raids and offensive guerrilla operations, psyops to get at least passive support of tribal groups and villages). (7) Hot pursuit into Laos. (8) Air lift and air resupply of ground recce./4/ (9) Plan with RVN for retaliatory air strikes on selected targets in NVN. (10) Naval presence off VN. (11) Low-level foto recce over NVN by Farmgate (USAF and USN). (12) Improve air defense of RVN and Thailand. (13) Retaliatory air strikes on selected targets in NVN and aerial mining of NVN ports. (14) Simultaneously, move ground units into Laos to secure (presumably at invitation of Souvanna) Thakhek, Vientiane, Paksane, and Savannakhet/Seno (2-3 brigades or 10,000 troops). Mission to hold those key points as "trip wires". If attacked, reenforced. (15) Start airborne and amphibious raids on NVN. (16) Start harassment of NVN maritime shipping. (17) Step up air strikes. (18) Selective quarantine of NVN. (19) Be prepared to defend SEA against Chicom/NVN reaction, which might be invasion./5/

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]

[?] asked if anything into Thailand. (No.) And if any SEATO contribution. Martin said keep them doing what they are: UK building a field near Savannakhet; Australia has aircraft at Ubon. Felt said that troops into Mekong towns will not all be US (but UK and Australia feel that their ground forces are tied up in Borneo; might provide air).

Martin said the Australians might provide token forces to help themselves psychologically at home.

Taylor said there must be more US forces in Thailand if put US into Lao towns. SecDef said it would require substantial deployments to Thailand. Further, any action against NVN would have to precede by substantial US deployments. Felt said it would be enough to be ready to send such US troops; the communists are "yellow" and will back down if the brigades are deployed to the Mekong towns. Taylor said this gets us to Hanoi by the Laotian route, which is not thought to be desirable.

General Clay/6/ discussed "Punitive air strikes in support of the Laotian situation." He said there are four fixed targets in the north, and 3 in the Panhandle (only good ones, Ban Ban and Khang Khay in the PDJ). CIA identified 17 bridges. Also 5 sod-type airfields, as potential targets if air resupply used. So very few attractive fixed targets. Armed reconnaissance, though, might provide something to attack (those who shoot at you).

SecDef pointed out that nothing mentioned so far will stop flow into SVN (e.g., 6 people a day, and equipment moving at night). It has psychological effect and is an escalating move but little physical impact. SecState said the same pertained to China targets during Korea, which led to conclusion that Chinese will would be affected only by striking Chinese cities! Felt distinguished the VN case, where no massive invasion. You can throttle down the flow of stuff (not stop it). Lodge said must distinguish supplies to Delta and to High Plateau. Taylor said that it would provide action for us, where we really can't retake the PDJ. Felt thinks a package of actions might cause Lao to be more active. SecDef asked whether we wouldn't have to increase US presence in Laos first (White Star teams, MAAG, etc.) to guard against PL moves. Bundy didn't think anything like that we did would make much difference on short term. Felt said PL are encadred by Viet Minh; we might encadre the FAR. Have done it to some extent with Thai. Lao don't like it. Chadbourn concurred, but said Lao might accept it.

SecDef said he would oppose putting US troops into Mekong without some US military stiffening of Lao (White Star and encadrement) and way of knowing what goes on.

Taylor asked about a Laos Farmgate. Milton said they had no enthusiasm for it.

Taylor asked re reequipping of Kong Le. Felt said it is being done. He objected, but Unger said it is needed, so did it. Don't need tanks replaced. Issue was trucks and 105s. They are "on the way".

SecState asked whether Souvanna would go to Paris if shooting began. Chadbourn said probably yes.

Taylor asked if Felt is happy with present recce. Felt said (1) want armed recce and (2) want to look at North Laos (near China).

SecState doubted value of recce. (They will hide and travel at night).

SecDef asked what if Souvanna left. Chadbourn said he might stick around. He has said he would not preside over a war. He has not asked for strikes in Laos, or even for US pilots. He thinks strikes against NVN are right and would put an end to the trouble. Souvanna, if he left, would probably be succeeded by Phoui Souvanikone.

SecDef said that if we moved into Mekong towns, Thais would be with us. SecState said that a VC-type operation from Laos into Thailand would be very difficult to handle. Felt said occupation of the towns would go with pressures elsewhere on NVN.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]

Washington, June 3, 1964.

SUBJECT
Intermediate Actions in Laos/2/

At the moment Article 4 consultations among five of the fourteen Geneva nations are taking place. These will not amount to a hill of beans. The next probable step will be something like the Polish proposal, modified so that this meeting will take place in Luang Prabang instead of Geneva and will include Souvanna Phouma, as well as representatives of the three factions. There will be two principal issues: restoration of the Government of National Union and PL withdrawal from the Plaine des Jarres. This meeting will fail to produce any agreement; but it will probably produce intense pressure for a fourteen-nation Geneva Conference.

We should take an intensely firm decision (probably by the President) not to attend the Geneva Conference. We should repeat this decision incessantly to our friends and enemies. Simultaneously, we should expand our air reconnaissance activities to include all those areas both in Laos and North Vietnam through which Hanoi's supply lines run into each of those countries. I understand (contrary to my previous expectations) that significant results are already being achieved. The purpose of the reconnaissance is not only to give a signal of our determination, but also to provide evidence for use before Congress and later the world.

Some of our planes will get shot at; some may even be lost. Hopefully, this will not start happening for some time, when we may be in a position to take advantage of this to begin moving down a more serious tack. This is very sketchy, but I think we must get a start on a combined military/political tack in Laos./3/

Mike

Washington, June 4, 1964.

SUBJECT
White House Meeting on Southeast Asia, 4 June 1964

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary McNamara, General Taylor,
Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster

Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Forrestal
Assistant Secretaries Bundy and Manning, Mr. Green, Mr. Sullivan
Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby

1. This meeting was in preparation for a session with the President on 5 June./2/ Assistant Secretary Manning will be developing a comprehensive public information program and Assistant Secretary Bundy took on the job of drafting a Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia. Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the following meeting discuss where we stand, develop the problems of Laos, cover the actions to be taken in Vietnam, mention the fact of the need for a public information program and go over a checklist of the range of military choices.

2. With respect to Laos, it was accepted that the value of the Lao situation is that we have a positive position, although we are not apt to regain any geography. Mr. William Bundy suggested that we stick to Souvanna Phouma's precondition of Pathet Lao withdrawal, and take certain steps to indicate strength. We should divide our potential actions into pre-impasse and post-impasse actions. Mr. McNamara noted that we do not wish to take military action soon but that we should do more than talk. He suggested that an impasse or a breakdown of the coalition government of Laos might occur any time and would call for stronger effort. Mr. William Bundy also indicated the importance of initiating some planning for actions on the Mekong with the Thai, at least on a hypothetical basis.

3. A discussion then took place of specific actions in the attached list with respect to Laos, with a selection among them as to various things to be done in a pre-impasse period. Few of these were selected as most were postponed for the impasse period. During the conversation the point was made that CIA hoped for somewhat looser restrictions on its covert operations to build strength within Laos; this was generally accepted. The measures to be recommended were to be summarized by Mr. Bundy in a separate paper the next day.

4. A discussion of the steps to be taken after an impasse brought up the problem of how we can keep from going to Geneva. Mr. Bundy opined that this depends largely on Souvanna Phouma, although the Thai and GVN will probably refuse to go. It was noted that the President wants a massive diplomatic effort to settle the problems in Indo China. Mr. Sullivan and others believed that it might be necessary to give some assurances to Souvanna Phouma of military action and to actually take some military steps in addition. The DCI commented on the difficulty of taking U.S. military action, and also whether it would be effective in holding back the Communists or keeping us from Geneva in the light of the pressures upon us to go there. It was also noted that Souvanna might be overthrown by the rightists if he started to go to Geneva. Various actions were then discussed for possible application after an impasse and these will be included in Mr. Bundy's memorandum above.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]

6. Arrangements were made for a meeting the following day with the President.

WE Colby
Chief, Far East Division

/3/Confidential.

ILLUSTRATIVE MILITARY MOVES DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE U.S. INTENTION TO PREVENT FURTHER COMMUNIST ADVANCES IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Continue high and low-level reconnaissance over Laos.

2. Continue high-level reconnaissance over DRV (20 flights per month).

3. Introduce GVN recon. teams into Laos (with or without U.S. advisors)--4 approx. 6/15; 16 by 8/15.

4. Authorize hot-pursuit into Cambodia.

5. Initiate selective low-level recon. into DRV along supply lines feeding the Laotian corridor.

6. Re-introduce a MAAG into Laos (shift from Thailand).

7. Re-introduce White Star teams into Laos--(15 teams in 20 days).

8. Introduce GVN harassing forces into Laotian corridor (with or without U.S. advisors)--60 days.

9. Send 500 additional military advisors to SVN to expand the counterinsurgency program (announce immediately; complete in 120 days).

10. Expand T-28 operations in Laos, their use of U.S. military pilots.

11. Accompany U.S. recon. flights over Laos with fighter escort.

12. Authorize VNAF air strikes against DRV activities in Laotian corridor.

13. U.S. Force movements:

a. 1 or 2 B-57 squadrons into SVN--24 hours.

b. 1 interceptor squadron into SVN--24 hours.

c. 1 or 2 fighter squadrons into Thailand--24 hours.

d. 1 Army Brigade (5150 men) into Thailand (5 to 12 days)

e. 1 Marine Brigade and Air Group (5700 men and 40 aircraft) into SVN on exercise or assignment (8 days).

f. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)

g. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days).

h. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks).

i. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days).

j. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days).

k. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days).

JCSM-479-64

Washington, June 5, 1964.

SUBJECT
Use of Thai Special Forces in Laos

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-24061/64, dated 8 May 1964,/2/ subject as above, which requested views on the possible use of Thai Special Forces in Laos, with particular attention to whether they could be employed fruitfully and taking into consideration other current operations in Laos.

2. Except for a modest overt military assistance program and the small-scale cross-border operations from South Vietnam into Laos which were recently authorized, the paramilitary operations in Laos are under the operational direction of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These programs are:

a. Operation Hardnose, which is a covert program primarily designed to develop intelligence of Viet Cong/Pathet Lao activity in Central and Southern Laos utilizing indigenous Lao and Kha tribesmen.

b. A covert program designed to support tribal elements engaged in village defense and guerrilla activities against the Pathet Lao. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. Certain of CINCPAC's operations plans provide for the utilization of Royal Thai Army (RTA) Special Forces along with other local national and Allied forces. In this event, such forces would be employed as part of a larger Allied military effort.

4. [2 lines of source text not declassified] the RTA Special Forces could be used as cadre and trainers for FAR and Neutralist regular Lao units. However, such use of Thai Special Forces at this time would probably create major problems in coordination and control. In addition, current training deficiencies of the Thai Special Forces make it unlikely that their use would be effective at this time. CINCPAC has the capability to provide the training necessary to improve their effectiveness for either overt or covert employment.

5. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that RTA Special Forces should not be employed at the present time in Laos. They recommend Foreign Minister Thanat be informed that the United States can provide training for RTA Special Forces. CINCPAC has been instructed to arrange for a mobile training team to conduct such training as soon as he is requested to do so by the Royal Thai Government through the Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Curtis E. LeMay/3/
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, June 5, 1964.

LAOS

The enemy has two choices in Laos, each with a number of shadings.

First, he can at any time initiate substantial military action on the ground aiming toward the Mekong Valley.

Second, he can try to keep what he has for the present and leave any military initiative to us. This is our major problem.

While we rate its likelihood very low (less than one in ten) we must obviously be prepared for this first case--substantial enemy pressure toward the Mekong. In this case we believe that it would be necessary to be prepared to move U.S. and other forces into Thailand at once and to be prepared, with the Thais, to occupy selected Laotian cities on the left bank of the Mekong. This of course would imply a still sharper de facto partition of Laos, but since it would by definition be a response to clear-cut Communist military aggression, we believe it would be internationally and nationally acceptable--and indeed almost inevitable.

Our recommendation is that contingency planning against this possibility should be undertaken at once with Thailand, and we believe that military discussions of this contingency will have a useful diplomatic effect in Thailand, Laos and North Vietnam.

The second enemy choice poses us a more complicated problem. In essence our objectives are three:

(1) not to let the situation develop so rapidly that we are faced with a choice of humiliation or major military action before we are ready to take decisions in the context of SEA and especially SVN.

(2) not to lose whatever prospect there is of maintaining a Souvanna government and at least a nominal maintenance of the political status quo in Laos.

(3) not to permit a diplomatic "victory" for neutralism and Communism which would reflect heavily against our position and that of our friends in SVN and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Our belief is that the following politico-military scenario is the best available for these purposes. By a minimum of force, and an absence of direct hostile action unless they shoot first, it aims to show

(1) Our determination

(2) Our readiness for peace

(3) More specifically, our continued dedication to the Geneva Accords and especially to the Souvanna government.

1. The Article IV consultations. These are proceeding in Vientiane now and we should do our best to string them out and to wring out of them a sharp picture of Pathet Lao aggression in the Plain of Jars. The Article IV consultations are limited to our friends and include neither French nor Communist representation. They have their value and it should not be we who bring them to an end. But already pressure is very high for the next step which is likely to be the Polish Proposal.

We recommend continuation of the consultations in Vientiane, exploitation of the evidence they produce, and readiness to move to the Polish proposals at the latest workable time.

At this stage our military pressure consists of fairly regular reconnaissance flights over the Plain of Jars and over Southern Laos, together with high-level U-2 reconnaissance over North Vietnam.

We recommend that these programs continue.

2. The Polish Meeting. We are in favor of the Polish proposal for discussion among the British and Soviet Co-Chairmen, the ICC Members (Canada, India and Poland), and representatives of the three parties in Laos.

It remains our position that the pre-conditions for any Geneva conference are as stated by Souvanna--cease-fire and withdrawal to previous positions, acceptance of Souvanna's position and powers, re-establishment of the Souvanna government of National Unity, and effective functioning of the International Control Commission. We must hold this stand strongly, less for the sake of our own prestige than for the protection of Souvanna's position vis-a-vis his Right Wing, and the position of the Khanh government in South Vietnam. We do not suppose that these conditions will be accepted in toto, but we do not at all exclude the possibility of real progress toward them if we follow the program set out below.

In one form or another the Polish discussions are likely to occur within the next week or two. Under proper conditions these meetings can be useful in gaining time. Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that these discussions will produce any substantial result, and when they reach an impasse, there will be stronger calls than ever for a new Geneva conference.

We therefore believe it important that the Polish meetings be accompanied by additional military signals on our side to underline our determination to insist on a certain degree of Communist pull-back before a Geneva meeting is held.

The best available military indicator for this purpose is the extension of present U.S. low-level reconnaissance over Laos into North Vietnam along supply lines feeding the Plain of Jars and the Laotian corridor toward South Vietnam.

We recommend the initiation of such low-level reconnaissance at about the time of a Polish meeting.

We recommend further that if such planes are downed either over Laos or North Vietnam, fighter escort should be provided with instructions to return ground fire and attack anti-aircraft installations.

3. Impasse in the Polish meetings. The actions recommended to this point are those which would occur before an impasse in the Polish discussions. When such an impasse has been reached, we expect to recommend selections from the following additional actions to strengthen our general position. No specific decisions are recommended at present, but such actions might include the following:

(1) The expansion of T-28 operations in Laos, including the use of third country pilots, but not Americans.

(2) The introduction of harassing action by South Vietnamese forces into the Laotian Corridor (with U.S. advisors).

(3) The authorization of South Vietnamese air strikes against North Vietnamese activities in the Laotian corridor.

(4) A number of movements of U.S. forces from our West Coast toward the West Pacific in ways that will increase our readiness posture and give a general warning signal. These movements might be selected from among the following:

a. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)

b. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)

c. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks)

d. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days)

e. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days)

f. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days)

4. Political steps after a Polish impasse.

Our present belief is that after an impasse is reached in the Polish discussions, the next step politically should probably be discussion in the UN. Such discussion need not necessarily be limited to Laos, and at this stage we might well wish a general discussion of the threats to peace in Southeast Asia in the UN forum.

We believe it important to have in reserve additional military deployments, warning of which might properly be given in the UN debate. It is possible that on further discussion some of the actions listed above might be withheld for this purpose, but our preliminary thinking has been that the most valuable item in this context would be the deployment of U.S. ground forces, of about 5,000 men to Thailand.

It is our current belief that this general politico-military scenario could be expected to last about a month to six weeks, and that at the end of that time further action should be closely related to our wider planning for South Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole.

One continuing danger, in all our Laotian efforts, is the Right Wing. Both the relatively skillful Phoumi and the quite unpredictable Siho are capable of acting to overthrow Souvanna and take power at Vientiane at any time. De facto, they have much power there now. Any Right Wing takeover would be most destructive to our whole position.

Recommendation 6

We recommend that Ambassador Unger continue to use all appropriate diplomatic pressures to prevent any such takeover, including the specific warning that the U.S. would not support those executing such a coup. At the same time, we must avoid as far as possible action which might trigger such a Right Wing reaction. This is one important reason for keeping the finger of accusation pointed at the Communists and avoiding a Geneva conference which tacitly accepts the status quo in the Plain of Jars.

Washington, June 5, 1964.

For your meeting with Secretary McNamara and McGeorge Bundy at 5:15,/2/ to be followed by the meeting with the President,/3/ there are two papers. I attach the paper related to Laos,/4/ and my comments appear below. Mr. Sullivan will give you the paper on Viet-Nam/3/ with his comments.

The Laos paper accurately describes the discussion in the Executive Committee yesterday./5/ You may wish to make the following additional points:

1. At the bottom of page 2,/6/ you might note that the failure of the British to consult Souvanna may give us an immediate problem in Laos with Souvanna and especially the right. (We are drafting a long cable to Unger so that he will do all he can to ease this.)

2. In the middle of page 3, as to military actions in the "pre-impasse" period, no mention is made of continuing and perhaps modestly extending T-28 operations and also reequipping Lao forces./7/ These are modest measures but they might at least be noted.

3. In the discussion of the "impasse" situation no mention is made of the possibility that Souvanna might himself make things extremely difficult for us at this point by yielding on the preconditions and accepting a Geneva conference. We can hope that our firmness and Unger's persuasiveness would keep him from doing this, but the President should perhaps be aware that the situation could slide off very rapidly at this point. In our Excom discussion, we all recognized this danger and the possibility that it might virtually de-fuse the whole Lao situation as an aspect of any wider action we might decide on over the summer.

4. The impasse situation might also produce a Communist declaration that they were forming their own government in Laos. This would indeed be a de facto partition, and we might then need to consider not only the various military steps discussed under paragraph 3 but also such steps within Laos, if Souvanna requested them, as reinstating the MAAG and putting substantial advisers into Lao units. The military effect of such steps would be modest but they would be a further sign that we were not prepared to stand for any Communist military action.

W.P.B./8/

Washington, June 5, 1964, 5:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
White House Meeting on Southeast Asia, 5 June 1964

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Mr. Sullivan
Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster
Attorney General
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Cater
Mr. Bell, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Wilson
Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby

1. Mr. McNamara suggested that plans be prepared for low level reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam to precede the convening of the Polish sponsored conference now possibly coming up on 23 June.

2. The meeting then discussed the attached agenda/2/ and its attached outlines of action./3/ With respect to the Lao section, Mr. Johnson noted that the scenario had omitted any assurance to Souvanna Phouma of U.S. forces. This was noted by the others but accepted due to the possible leakage in Vientiane (William Bundy), the fact that the U.S. forces do not seem to be needed in the absence of a further Pathet Lao push (Mr. McGeorge Bundy) and that no Congressional resolution is envisaged which would warrant such an assurance for the time being (Mr. McNamara). Mr. William Bundy pointed out that it might be desirable to send troops into Thailand on an exercise at least or to give such assurances if the pressure on Souvanna Phouma to go to Geneva grows, in which case at least air units might be sent to Thailand. Secretary Rusk indicated interest in how the scenario could be brought around to bring attention to the corridor to South Vietnam. Mr. McGeorge Bundy thought there was time for this as we are not apt to immobilize our efforts in the corridor area in any case by any settlement. The Attorney General commented that there seemed to be very little going on in the early stages of this effort, followed by a large jump as an impasse was reached. He suggested that it might be desirable to do more earlier. Both Mr. William and Mr. McGeorge Bundy replied that we are deliberately moving the whole operation quite slowly. Governor Harriman commented that Siho is a distinct weakness in our armor and would like to know what is being done about eliminating him from the scene. No definite answers were given in view of Siho's strong position in Vientiane. Governor Harriman also assumed that we would continue with our program of supply of equipment, etc; this was confirmed.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]

4. Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested particular attention to the Lao recommendations on low level reconnaissance and fighter escort over North Vietnam. There was no dissent from these. With respect to the idea of a Polish conference, Secretary Rusk expressed interest in the prospect that the USSR and Poles might use such a forum to indicate some support of the Geneva Agreements. The Attorney General suggested that a more vigorous U.S. posture might be useful to the USSR and Poles in order to hold back the somewhat more aggressive DRV.

5. The meeting then broke up as the President was understood not to be available. After some intervening discussion, however, he arrived and the Cabinet members remained with him.

WE Colby
Chief, Far East Division

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