The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXVIII Laos DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

76. Summary Record of the 533d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, June 6, 1964, 10:45 a.m.

LAOS

Secretary McNamara reported that an RF-8 jet reconnaissance plane from the USS Kitty Hawk had been shot down by antiaircraft fire approximately six miles from the town of Ban Ban in the Plaine des Jarres. The pilot was observed to have parachuted to the ground and was surrounded by Pathet Lao troops. Rescue attempts have been made but have not been successful.

Secretary McNamara reported his own recommendation and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that aerial reconnaissance be conducted tomorrow. A single flight plan was recommended, to be carried out by two reconnaissance aircraft, escorted by six to eight fighter bombers, with instructions to return any ground fire.

General LeMay and General Greene stated that they had personally recommended that the antiaircraft unit which had fired upon the downed aircraft be attacked but both concurred in the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of State [Defense]. Both were certain that future reconnaissance planes would be subject to ground fire.

General Wheeler said we should wait for further ground fire before hitting antiaircraft positions. All the military officers, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed that it was important militarily to continue reconnaissance.

Secretary Rusk agreed that reconnaissance should be continued with armed escorts who would return ground fire; but that such reconnaissance should be limited strictly to what is militarily required, and should be scheduled in accordance with real needs. The Secretary of State further wanted an opportunity to obtain, during the day, Souvanna Phouma's concurrence in the recommended action, to which the Secretary of Defense agreed./2/

The President inquired what had been the results of previous reconnaissance. Secretary McNamara replied that reconnaissance had shown the location of antiaircraft sites, troop dispositions and movements, supply routes and depots, and the movement of numbers of trucks down these routes. Night reconnaissance had also disclosed a significant increase of night movement on the supply routes from North Vietnam into Laos.

The Secretary of State agreed with the Secretary of Defense that reconnaissance had also had a political effect and may have prevented the complete breakdown of the Government of National Union.

The President specifically asked the Attorney General, Mr. McCone, Speaker McCormack and Mr. McGeorge Bundy whether they agreed with the recommendations of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs. All agreed and no one present made any further observation.

Michael Forrestal/3/

Washington, June 6, 1964, 10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the Executive Committee With the President, Saturday, 6 June, 10:45 a.m.

Note: Detailed memorandum on the conversation which took place being prepared by Mr. Colby./2/

1. Secretary McNamara reported on the shoot-down of a Navy reconnaissance plane, the fact that the pilot was observed parachuting and had sent out radio signals and he had landed in an area infected with Pathet Lao. Efforts to retrieve him had failed and had been ordered stopped because of darkness. McNamara then recommended that a reconnaissance mission of two planes be sent out tomorrow, that it be accompanied by 8 fighter bombers, with orders to return fire if the reconnaissance planes were attacked.

2. The President then asked the opinion of each of the Chiefs. All expressed agreement with LeMay and Greene, favoring fighter-bomber operations prior to the reconnaissance flight. Wheeler and MacDonald were studying the Secretary's recommendation. The differing views were reconciled along the lines of the McNamara recommendation.

3. Rusk then was asked his views. He said that he felt the reconnaissance flights had been a deterrent to PL operations, that they should be continued to the extent "necessary and essential in developing photographic reconnaissance required by the situation". He opposed excessive flights and he opposed "loitering" to gain visual observation of villages, encampments, etc. With this restriction, Rusk agreed to the reconnaissance flight tomorrow with fighter-bomber accompaniment and orders to return fire.

4. The President then said that he questioned whether we had thought through where we are going; specifically he said, "and what comes next?" This question--the most important question raised in the meeting--remained unanswered.

5. The President then asked my opinion. I stated that it was probably true that the reconnaissance flights had caused the Pathet Lao North Vietnamese to act with restraint. However I noted their limited time for military actions which involved going forward aggressively for a short period, pausing and then withdrawing was typical of PL operations and probably due more to logistic and support problems, ammunition shortages, etc., than to such considerations as our overflights. With respect to the McNamara recommendations, I supported them without hesitation or reservation.

6. The Attorney General likewise supported the recommendations.

7. The meeting adjourned.

I then met briefly with Forrestal and asked if he had researched the SEATO Agreement/3/ and the extent to which we could lean on it if we wished it to commit actual war. Forrestal agreed to review the Treaty and the obligations over the weekend.

I then met privately with Bundy and posed the same question to him. I said that the problems of securing a Joint Resolution were most serious as it would involve a debate on the Floor of the Senate which would probably be violent and corrosive to U.S. policy position. However in my opinion the commitment of ground troops to Laos would cause consternation throughout the country and the debate on the Hill infinitely more violent than the one that might arise over a Joint Resolution as outlined by the Attorney General. I said it would surprise me if several important Senators such as Russell and Saltonstall would not severely criticize the commitment of troops to Laos and that I felt a sampling of public opinion at this time would indicate that not one person in 50 favored such commitment. I pointed out that all of the "hardboiled spokesmen" such as Goldwater, Nixon, Rockefeller (to a lesser extent), and even Symington had advocated air strikes and envisaged our boys flying back to base in safety after having deposited their bombs on North Vietnam or elsewhere. I therefore viewed with great concern the consequences of the actions which we were "drifting into" and I wished Bundy to express this view to the President. Bundy agreed to give the President a brief memorandum./4/

[Here follows discussion of the DCI's and CIA's general responsibilities and the possibility of CIA returning to South Vietnam in an active rather than a support role.]

Washington, June 6, 1964, 6:09 p.m.

1144. Our exchanges with you today have of course related to PDJ missions. We have held off in authorizing any further Tchepone missions until we have decided on policy about escort.

Defense Dept. view is that Tchepone operations should not continue without escort. However, we recognize that such escort would involve possible firing on targets in eastern Laos in areas where Souvanna has never appealed for our reconnaissance and where Hanoi has made no complaint nor have we ourselves acknowledged them. International defense these flights can be made on grounds infiltration violates Geneva Accords, but case clearly more difficult in absence Souvanna request.

We can take more time on this decision than over questions of continuing and escorting PDJ flights. However, we need your judgment by Monday whether you believe Souvanna is in fact aware that we are conducting the Tchepone area flights and how he would feel about escort for them./2/ Experience to date is that these flights have encountered very little reaction and that only one out of nearly fifty has in fact been fired upon. We have impression Communists and perhaps Souvanna treating this area as almost a no-man's land where rules need not be quite so strict as elsewhere.

In accordance with your 1537 we have authorized escorted missions in PDJ for June 7./3/ Press release contained septel./4/ As you will see, we simply did not think we could plausibly claim RLAF doing protection. We hope our exact measures will not become known except to Communist side for at least a few days but of course cannot guarantee against leaks here. In any case we will review future frequency PDJ operations tomorrow having in mind all factors including allied reaction.

Rusk

Washington, June 7, 1964.

I have spoken with Mac Bundy on the telephone. He has the following thoughts about the Laos problem:

1. He feels we have not been figuring the odds of accidents over the Plain of Jars very carefully.

2. We should not feel rushed into counter-action by the strong desire to hit back. We should instead calculate very carefully and very professionally just when and how to make a strike that will really take out one of the offending anti-aircraft batteries. If that takes a day or two--O.K. We know we have the will to do it, so we don't have to prove our determination to ourselves. The enemy will be more impressed by an effective strike than by one that is not reasonably sure of success.

3. We ought not to push this into a faster escalation than we have planned at this stage. In other words we ought to confine our actions to the places where the incidents occurred.

4. Mac will be standing by to come down from Boston whenever you feel his presence here would help you. I plan to call him after the meeting this afternoon./2/

5. The name of the first missing pilot is:

Lt. C.F. Krusmann
of San Diego, California

Mike

Washington, June 7, 1964.

SUBJECT
Meeting with the President, June 7, 1964, Laos Reconnaissance

PRESENT AT THE MEETING
Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Harriman, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, Director McCone, Deputy Secretary Vance, Mr. Forrestal

The Secretary of Defense reviewed the circumstances surrounding the shooting down of an F8 aircraft flying an escort for the reconnaissance over the Plaine des Jarres early this morning./2/

The Secretary of Defense proposed that another flight of two reconnaissance planes, accompanied by between 6 and 8 escorts, follow a maximum safety route to the vicinity of Xieng Khouang Ville. The escort planes would strike a fortification in this area in which aircraft batteries have been identified by photographic reconnaissance. Immediately following the strike, the photo reconnaissance planes would follow, taking additional pictures, and would then exit from Laos by the safest route. The Secretary of Defense said he would prefer that this action take place tomorrow, but understood that the Department of State wished to delay it 24 hours.

Under Secretary Harriman and Assistant Secretary Bundy explained that they did not wish to increase the pace of escalation and particularly wanted to avoid interfering with discussions about the Polish proposal which were currently going on in London and Moscow. They asked, therefore, for a 24-hour delay. The Secretary of Defense agreed.

A proposed press statement prepared by the Department of Defense was also reviewed at the meeting.

The Secretary of Defense proposed that on June 10 a carrier task force from the First Fleet be transferred to the Seventh Fleet and that a public announcement of this fact be made.

The President approved the escorted reconnaissance flight described above to take place on June 9, unless cancelled in the meantime. The President also approved the press statement for release between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m. on Sunday, June 7./3/ The President further indicated that he was prepared to approve the proposed announcement of the fleet transfer on June 10./4/

Michael V. Forrestal/5/

Washington, June 7, 1964.

SUBJECT
Meeting on Sunday, June 7th, with the President, McNamara, Vance, Forrestal, Harriman, [U. Alexis] Johnson, William Bundy, Manning and McCone

After some discussion McNamara recommended:

1. Flying of a mission on June 8th involving 6 or 8 fighter bombers in advance of 2 reconnaissance planes to fly over an installation (Xieng Khouang Ville). Fighter bombers taking out the antiaircraft installation in advance. This would be a retaliatory action and it was agreed upon.

2. Press release concerning the shootdown of the F-8./2/

3. The positioning of a portion of the First Fleet to join the Seventh Fleet in the Far East.

Note: This was item 13 on the courses of action./3/

All attending the meeting approved. There was some discussion between State and Defense as to whether the above mission should be run June 8th or 9th. It was agreed to run on June 9th because of a meeting taking place in Vientiane on June 8th.

The President continually raised the question of what we see down the road. Harriman said we seek a government of national union and reestablishment of the terms of the 1962 accord. Johnson said our purpose was to demonstrate the U.S. determination to preserve Laos and the actions would assist the Soviets in supporting this position.

The President then said what if we do not take out the entire battery. Are we in danger, and secondly, are we violating the sovereignty of Laos.

Johnson stated, no we are not violating the sovereignty since Souvanna had requested reconnaissance flights and therefore we were responding to his request. (Johnson did not specifically refer to the fighter bomber action either in return of fire or in advance of fire as anticipated on the June 9th flight.) McNamara and the President then aired exchanges on the chances of the loss of another plane. McNamara stated that the Chiefs thought there was a very small chance and he placed the chance of losses for missions at 5%. We have run 138 missions with only 2 losses and this more or less verified his estimate. With respect to this particular operation, which was planned so the planes would go in on the safest route, take out the target and then exit by the safest possible route, he estimated the chances of a loss to be "only 1 in 500".

The President and Harriman then discussed the 1962 Accord and Harriman stated that we wished to reestablish Kong Le's position in the PDJ and to have the status quo established as prior to the PL offensive actions.

McCone stated we should want more than that. We should want the full terms of the 1962 Accord complied with. He noted that they had not been complied with, that Souvanna originally planned to go to every section of Laos and create political support for his government and the 1962 concept but in reality he had been able to go to Vientiane and Luang Prabang and had only travelled between the two cities by air, that the eastern part of Laos had been controlled by the Pathet Lao, it had been used as access to South Vietnam and if we agreed to merely the reestablishment of conditions prior to the PL advance, we were in effect turning over eastern Laos to the Communists for continued use in their effort against South Vietnam. I therefore strongly urged that we concentrate on the establishment of an adherence to all the conditions of the 1962 Accord. At this point Harriman said this was all very good, but he didn't think it could be brought about and then he said that neither he nor any one else expected that the terms of the 1962 Accord would be complied with, and when it was signed it was recognized that such things as full access to all of Laos was probably unattainable, even though the agreement provided it. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The President then asked where we were going, or was this a day-to-day affair. He seemed to be concerned that we were getting in a little deeper all the time and not really answering the problem. Harriman noted that Rusk was concerned over the practicality of our position as anti-aircraft and machine guns were scattered over the entire PDJ.

In answer to a question from the President, I stated that I felt there was grave danger of us "sliding down the slippery slope" on day-to-day decisions and that we did not have a full scenario of actions in view of the military effort that was now being made. Both McNamara and William Bundy challenged this, stating there was a scenario carefully worked out and that it was set forth in papers which had been approved and that the courses of action were designed to apply increasing pressure on Laos.

Note: I let the discussion drop at this point, but I wish to return to this issue as the papers referred to which were those considered on June 4th, specifically did not anticipate actual combat operations by U.S. air either in support of regular flights or in advance of regular flights. What is happening is that a scenario designed to bring pressure on Laos during the period of negotiations under Article 4, ICC discussion on Polish proposal, are now being considered as adequate under active military operation of a type which has taken place in the last 2 days and is anticipated for June 9th. Check with Cooper and Colby.

[Here follows a brief discussion unrelated to Laos.]

Vientiane, June 8, 1964, 7 p.m.

1559. For Secretary Rusk and Bundy. I am deeply distressed over events of past several days and am apprehensive that all our careful work of past two years may be largely vitiated. Problem as I see it is that air reconnaissance exercise, initiated (as far as I am concerned at least) primarily as political instrument to provide some encouragement here and serve as warning to Communists, risks becoming military exercise for its own sake, running rapidly out of control, seriously endangering our carefully managed position with regard to Geneva Accords, our good relations with PriMin and constructive relations with British, Canadians and others.

I now believe I made serious error in agreeing to approach PriMin Saturday night/2/ to seek his concurrence in sending armed escorts with recce planes. I yield to no one in my concern over fate pilot of plane downed June 6 but these are risks everyone must have known we were taking and, given political background of situation, we should have resisted putting on fighter escorts.

Escorts were put on but on clear understanding with Souvanna Phouma that this would remain secret. After June 7 shooting down question of press handling arose again and statement contained Deptel 1148/3/ went long way to meet requirements here as well as U.S. Government requirement of maintaining its position with regard Geneva Accords. Release did mention "F-8 aircraft from carrier Kitty Hawk" but this we thought we could live with by continuing stick to publicity line already laid down.

Now I learn (Deptel 1151)/4/ that Department and DOD have authorized background identification of downed aircraft as fighter escort. I am at a loss to understand why this was done. As long as our previous line was maintained we could pass off bombings and strafings in PL area as work of T-28s however much PL presented eye witness accounts of U.S. jet involvement. Now, however, we have virtually acknowledged that U.S. aircraft, not invited by RLG, have been bombing and strafing in Laos in direct violation of Geneva Accords.

I have no idea what is likely be PriMin's reaction when press queries him on these points.

Deptel 1151 proposes that I follow "same line" but am afraid I will require considerably more guidance than that both to reply to press, to PriMin's further questions, to ICC inquiries (and perhaps charges), and to British and Canadian reps who will be visiting Khang Khay Wednesday and will undoubtedly be jumped on this one.

I apologize for negative tone taken here and you may of course be assured I will do everything possible at this end to minimize damage to U.S. position. I hope U.S. military can be put under more stringent orders to restrain themselves to actions that fit strictly into our political requirements. I am every bit as frustrated as they but want to be sure that if we move into U.S. military action we have chosen right time and place. In this connection see penultimate para my tel 1551./5/ At this point it seems to me we would be wise to institute at once scaling down of recce flights as already recommended and withdraw fighter escort.

I may of course have entirely misinterpreted our actions, which were perhaps taken with full recognition of possible consequences mentioned above. Have we come to decision that after two years of Communist violation of Geneva Accords and aggression in Laos, we are also taking off wraps?

Unger

Washington, June 8, 1964, 3 p.m.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

OTHERS PRESENT
Acting Secretary Harriman, Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, Special Assistant Sullivan, General Carter, Mr. Chester Cooper, Mr. William Colby, Mr. Michael Forrestal, Mr. Bromley Smith

The meeting began by pre-arrangement without the President. Acting Secretary Harriman, Alexis Johnson, and William Bundy arrived a few minutes late. They had been delayed by discussing with Secretary Rusk in Newport, Rhode Island, the recommendation to conduct an air strike with U.S. planes on a specified target in Laos. Mr. Harriman said both Ambassador Unger's messages/2/ had been relayed to Secretary Rusk. After discussing the pros and cons, Secretary Rusk favored going ahead with the strike although he considered the decision to be an extremely close one. Mr. Harriman said that he, Mr. Johnson and Mr. William Bundy believed that the arguments for the strike were stronger than did Secretary Rusk. They were firmer in their belief that the President should authorize the strike today.

Mr. Harriman said the purpose of the strike would be to convey a message to Hanoi. Unless we take some action to convince Hanoi that we are serious, negotiations with Ho Chi Minh will not be productive. Secretary McNamara agreed.

Mr. Harriman said he did not think the strike would be as harmful to our relations with Souvanna as Ambassador Unger thought. If we attack a specific target we won't lose Souvanna by his giving up his position.

It was clear that Ambassador Unger had written his cable 1559 (copy attached) without knowing specifically what was planned in connection with the escorted aerial reconnaissance and the air attack.

Secretary McNamara said he disagreed with Ambassador Unger who had proposed that T-28s be used to take out the antiaircraft battery. He said that T-28s flown by Vietnamese would not be able to destroy the target. In his view, if another U.S. plane were knocked down, we would have to respond by some military action, not necessarily an air strike.

Secretary McNamara noted that he was not satisfied with the way the reconnaissance flights had been carried out by the Navy. He had asked the task force, for example, why the U.S. planes had expended only seven rockets. He referred to Ambassador Unger's comment about the military/3/ and asked the State Department to make clear to the Ambassador that the U.S. Government is working together and that Defense is not operating unilaterally. He noted that he had agreed that napalm should not be used because of the excessive political cost involved in its use.

In response to a question, Mr. Harriman opposed delaying the strike in order to allow time for Ambassador Unger to talk to Souvanna before the strike. Souvanna has to be against such an attack publicly, and, therefore, it would be better to tell him after it had taken place. Privately, he will not be as strongly opposed as he will have to be in public.

Mr. Forrestal asked what would be risked if the strike were delayed for 24 hours, as had been mentioned by Mr. McGeorge Bundy following a telephone conversation during which the current situation was summarized./4/ The general response was that nothing would be gained by delaying the attack because we would learn little during the next 24 hours that we do not already know. Secretary McNamara pointed out that the attack had already been delayed 24 hours.

General Carter recommended that the air strike be stood down on the grounds that it is a precipitous action based on the normal desire to retaliate against the shoot-down of two U.S. planes. He did not see it as part of a scenario which was aimed at seeking to improve the situation in Laos and South Vietnam. He stated this was Director McCone's view.

Secretary McNamara disagreed sharply, saying that Director McCone had told him flatly at 1:30 PM on Sunday/5/ that he was for an air strike in Laos. General Carter said he was not at the Sunday meeting but that he had been told that the Director disapproved of the attack because it was not part of a longer range plan to deal with the existing situation but rather an action taken out of sequence. Secretary McNamara crossquestioned General Carter as to Mr. McCone's view, saying that the Director may have changed his view, but as of Sunday, he had joined with all the others in recommending Presidential authorization of the specific air attack in Laos.

Secretary McNamara said: "Suppose we decide not to make the strike? What would we do if we cancelled it?" Mr. Sullivan pointed out that Canadian International Control Commission (ICC) representative Seaborn would be in Hanoi on June 15./6/ The message he is to convey would not be appropriate if we had not acted in some way in response to the shootdown of our reconnaissance planes. He, in effect, would be going to Hanoi with a broken stick.

There was discussion of low-level reconnaissance of North Vietnam as a possible alternative. The general view was that such reconnaissance would not be safe.

General Wheeler recommended strongly that the air attack be authorized. He opposed any delay and said that we had no other plan to respond to the shoot-down.

Secretary McNamara said we do not have to recommend the air attack but that no other action we can take to convey a message to Hanoi is comparable to an air attack. The possibility of some of our planes being shot down was a real one but the possibility that there would be a catastrophe was one chance in a million. The risk of not doing anything is greater than doing what is proposed. We must put additional pressure on Hanoi now.

In response to a suggestion that Laos and South Vietnam are separate issues, Alexis Johnson said the relationship between the problems in the two countries is exemplified by two chess boards, some plays being made on both boards.

Secretary McNamara said he and Deputy Secretary Vance had talked to several Senators during the day, including Senators Saltonstall and Russell. They had encountered less opposition than they had anticipated.

Secretary McNamara said a perfect attack would consist of hitting the antiaircraft battery and losing no U.S. planes. If the fighters miss the antiaircraft battery but no planes are lost, we can consider the attack successful. If the antiaircraft battery is hit and a plane is lost, we can consider the attack satisfactory. In the event of any of the above results, no further reconnaissance measures will be flown for the time being and no further retaliation would be undertaken. With respect to public information, we would announce only that a reconnaissance mission had taken place. If the Communists say our planes fired, we would say that the Communists fired on our planes and we merely returned the fire.

Following a discussion of whether the air attack fitted into the existing Laos scenario, Mr. William Bundy described the attack as providing only a bump in the upward curve of the military actions proposed in the scenario.

Secretary McNamara said we must make a reply to North Vietnamese military pressure by means of an attack or by some other means.

With respect to Ambassador Unger's views, it was pointed out that he was looking at the picture in a Laos framework. The air attack was visualized as a signal to Hanoi covering our total Southeast Asia policy.

With respect to whether the reconnaissance pictures we had obtained had been worthwhile, Secretary McNamara said they had been very useful, but that we could do without them, as we had during the past two years. He emphasized again we had one, not separate problems, in Vietnam and in Laos. Aerial photographs of the specific target and the surrounding area were circulated and examined by the group. It was pointed out that the antiaircraft battery to be attacked was 7/10 of a mile from a village.

Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Harriman said that we need to reconsider previously discussed courses of action in the light of the current situation.

Mr. William Bundy pointed out that the papers in the gray folder had not been discussed with the President. He had prepared a paper listing the diplomatic actions/7/ for the immediate future and it was his understanding that our current objective was to string out as long as practicable any diplomatic conference involving Laos.

At this point (3:45 PM) the President joined the meeting.

Mr. Harriman said the State Department, including Secretary Rusk, agreed that the air attack should be made although the decision was a close one. The risks involved in the attack were offset by the absolute requirement to send a firm signal to Hanoi.

The President asked that Ambassador Unger's cable be read to the group (No. 1559). Secretary McNamara said that before the message was read, he wanted to point out that when Ambassador Unger had sent the telegram he did not know of our plan to launch a single retaliatory attack.

The President, referring to a paragraph in Ambassador Unger's message, asked whether we had agreed to keep secret the fact that we were sending fighter escorts with the reconnaissance planes. The answer was that we had not said we would not send escort fighters, but we had probably not made clear to Souvanna what we would do following a shoot-down of an unarmed reconnaissance plane.

Mr. Forrestal then read 1559 and 1562 (copy attached).

Secretary McNamara noted that we had already reduced our reconnaissance flights from ten to one. In reference to Ambassador Unger's opposition to suppressive attacks on antiaircraft batteries, he said that we were not doing this except in the one specific case now being recommended. He repeated his flat statement that the antiaircraft battery could not be destroyed by Vietnamese pilots using T-28 airplanes, as Ambassador Unger believed. The T-28s would be lost to ground fire if they tried to attack an antiaircraft battery and the Vietnamese pilots had insufficient inability to deal with the targets.

The President repeated some of Ambassador Unger's comments to the effect that we were abandoning the Geneva Accords and violating them in a way which we had not done previously, despite Communist violations over the past two years. The President asked how we answered the accusation that an air attack would violate the Geneva Accords.

Mr. Harriman said the Communists had broken the Geneva agreements. We had sent in reconnaissance planes to obtain information which the ICC could not get. This information was very important to us because we needed to know how the Communists were violating the Accords and whether they were initiating a buildup with a view to capturing the Mekong River cities. We were invited to carry out reconnaissance missions by Souvanna who was not asked to agree to fighter escorts but did not oppose our sending in fighter escorts when we told him we were. We have to get a message to Hanoi to convince Ho Chi Minh that we are serious, that we haven't backed down, and that we are not scared off by attacks on our planes.

The President asked whether the gains in taking out the antiaircraft battery are sufficient to offset world criticism that we are violating the Geneva Accords. Secretary McNamara replied that he did not think the air attack violated the Accords. Others present agreed that Communist violations of the Accord had altered the situation. In addition, we had sent in reconnaissance planes on a peaceful mission. These planes had been shot at. Therefore, we were entitled to reply to the hostile action taken against our peaceful planes.

The President said Ambassador Unger felt that if we launched such an attack the Souvanna Government would fall. Others disagreed that Ambassador Unger had made this point. The telegram was re-read in an effort to clarify exactly what Ambassador Unger had said.

Secretary McNamara said the ICC had failed to carry out its duty of maintaining peace in the area. The Pathet Lao forces had advanced. Souvanna had agreed to aerial reconnaissance by U.S. planes and did not object when we told him that we were going to send in fighter escorts with our reconnaissance planes. He repeated his view that the legal situation consisted merely of the Communists firing on escort planes and our returning the fire.

The President asked whether anyone present was bothered by the charge that if we took out an antiaircraft battery we would be violating the Geneva Accords. He was bothered. Everyone acknowledged that the Communists had violated the Accords. If we go on further we will be throwing to the winds the Geneva Accords. In addition, we may lose Souvanna. The Communists are not expected to be responsible, but we are responsible people.

Mr. Harriman pointed out that if we decide not to make the air attack proposed, we would be criticized because we didn't respond to the hostile actions of the Communists.

The President asked: "What happens after the antiaircraft battery is attacked?" Mr. Harriman referred to a list of nineteen military actions from which we could choose./8/ One such action was the movement of an additional carrier to the seas off South Vietnam.

The President asked whether the air attack might not "blow" the meeting proposed by the Poles. Mr. Harriman responded that it might, but if we took no military action now, we would obtain no concession from the Communists at the Poles' meeting.

Secretary McNamara said he saw no possibility of obtaining any concessions from the Communists during the Poles' meeting. The question is how to prevent further deterioration of the situation in Laos but one thing he was sure we must not do is to show any weakness in the face of hostile Communist actions.

The President asked what we do if they knock down a bunch of planes. Secretary McNamara said we have to take some military action. He doubted that we could push the Pathet Lao back to where they were before their recent attack, but we must take some military action, such as the air strike, if we are to prevent further deterioration in our position in the area. Mr. Harriman said he did not write off completely the Polish talks which might help halt Communist aggression. He acknowledged that this was not very likely.

Secretary McNamara, noting that it was 4:30 PM, said that if the decision was to halt the mission, he must send a cable immediately because the planes were authorized to take off at dawn unless otherwise notified.

The President asked Mr. Harriman if he would recommend the air strike if it meant losing Souvanna. Mr. Harriman and the other State officers replied "no," they did not recommend the strike if it meant losing Souvanna, but they did not think we would lose Souvanna if the attack took place. They added that Ambassador Unger did not know our full plan when he talked to Souvanna, and, therefore, some arguments he could have used he did not use. A cable giving him the full picture would be sent immediately./9/

The President said that even if Ambassador Unger knows all about the plan, he very much doubts that the Ambassador would agree that it was a good thing to do.

The President asked what would happen if the strike were delayed for 24 hours. Mr. Harriman replied that damage would not be great but it would reveal a certain amount of indecision on our part. Secretary McNamara said the decision was a political one and not a military one. The air attack was one way of affecting any negotiations with Hanoi.

The President was brought a note and he left the room. In his absence, Secretary McNamara said we cannot go on as we now are. We can take an entirely different course but we cannot continue talking tough and acting weak as we are now doing. He said he was even ready to give up Southeast Asia but now we must back up the words we have already spoken about our firmness of purpose. He had been concerned ever since the President's Los Angeles speech/10/ which conveyed the thought that we were going to act firmly in Southeast Asia. We must be careful not to convey an impression of strong action when, in effect, we are not so acting. If we do not make the proposed air attack, we should change the very strong message which we have asked Seaborn to convey to Hanoi.

Mr. Harriman asked Secretary McNamara to repeat his statements to the President upon his return.

The President returned and Secretary McNamara re-stated his view. He was deeply concerned about the inconsistency between our words and our action. Ever since the Los Angeles speech, he has been concerned that we had no plan to back up the words contained in that speech. He said there has been much tough talk by Secretary Rusk and by himself. He referred to the Rusk interviews in New Delhi/11/ in which the Japanese were told of our firm intention to prevent the Southeast Asia situation from deteriorating further. It is most dangerous, especially with the Chinese, to have our adversaries conclude that we talk tough but act weakly. He does not oppose cancelling the air strike, but if we do, we must change our talk immediately. The President is not responsible for creating an impression of tough talk but his advisers are. We must change our talk and our present inconsistency.

Mr. Harriman said the air attack was the only way that we could signal Hanoi. If we don't send this signal, the situation will deteriorate in Southeast Asia. Souvanna may object publicly to our action but he will not be too unhappy in private. One day later we will know little more than we know now. There are fewer risks in going forward than in not acting.

The President said Secretary McNamara may have made a point in his remarks about what we have been saying in speeches. However, we are not now deciding what to put in a speech, but we are talking about something much more important, namely, an action involving an attack on an antiaircraft battery in Laos. We are here considering whether this action should be taken. Ambassador Unger's cable distressed him because he thought what we had been doing and were planning to do was done with the consent and knowledge of the Laos Government. He asked why the air attack was to be launched from Saigon rather than from an antiaircraft carrier. He wanted to know why an attack from Saigon would not be justification for the Communists to attack South Vietnam. What we do on the high seas is our business, but to attack in Laos would give the Communists a basis for launching an attack in South Vietnam.

General Wheeler said the North Vietnamese had no air force, and, therefore, whether we attack from the sea or from Saigon made no difference insofar as retaliation by the North Vietnamese was concerned. Any Communist aircraft which could attack South Vietnam would have to come from Communist China. Communist retaliation is very unlikely.

Secretary McNamara responded by saying that we were planning to attack from South Vietnam before we could use U.S. Air Force pilots who, in his opinion, are better prepared for the kind of attack proposed. He criticized the June 7 Navy operation from the aircraft carrier, saying that the reconnaissance planes were split into two groups, they came in over their target too high, and they apparently used Sidewinder air-to- air rockets when they should have used only air-to-ground missiles. General LeMay had said that he felt the Navy task force missions had not been as efficiently planned as the Air Force would have planned them.

In response to the President's question, General Carter said he had earlier recommended strongly against the air attack. He added, however, that this was his judgment and CIA did not have an agency view on the policy decision. He recommended that the air strike be delayed for 24-48 hours if for no other reason than to acquaint Ambassador Unger with the reasons why the attack was being launched. He said his personal view was that the air strike was motivated by a desire to retaliate against the loss of our planes and did not fit into a plan aimed at improving our situation in Southeast Asia. He repeated, however, that this was a question of judgment and acknowledged that he had no alternative proposal to suggest which would have the effect of letting Hanoi know that we were serious about our position in Southeast Asia.

The President said that we should go ahead with the mission but that he had doubts about the action.

Bromley Smith/12/

Washington, June 8, 1964, 9:40 p.m.

1158. Highest levels concluded mission June 9 should go forward. In view time factor we did not await your reply Deptel 1155/2/ but assumed it would generally follow lines your 1559 and 1562/3/ which as we saw it indicated Souvanna would certainly not publicly approve and might even disavow but that even another incident and loss plus firing would not be likely drive him seriously other actions. Incidentally, you may rest assured all decisions this subject being reached closest consultation Department and Defense with higher approval as necessary and in light most careful weighing we can make of political factors.

We all feel badly we did not cut you in full sequence events and particularly regret operations message did not reach you./4/ We are now clear that we will in any event take a few days after June 9 mission to assess next step and will hold off on further recce operations on any basis during this period. Hopefully you can catch up a little on sleep.

We also regret that in sending you text our statement on June 7 shootdown/5/ we did not make clear that we felt we would have to admit on background aircraft was escort although we did not admit and have not yet admitted that we have actually fired. Our basic problem here is to maintain credibility and we assumed, as it turned out rightly, that Communist radio would immediately charge us with firing and that we would be in impossible position unless we admitted that aircraft were being escorted. If as we expect Communists again respond by propaganda attack to firing by June 9 mission we will do maximum hold this line and to avoid conceding that ground positions were actually taken under fire.

For your further information we had informed British and Canadians our probable intention institute escort missions and they and others must now know that they took place and infer that we did actually fire. So far no reaction reported. We are perhaps more concerned about Indian reaction than any other and you should perhaps seek hold Indian Ambassador and ICC hand to maximum.

Naturally, Souvanna himself remains critical. You can best judge whether it useful discuss problem with him during day June 9 or whether it best you await results and act accordingly. Obviously you should not indicate in any way prior knowledge extent June 9 mission, but you might tell him you believe this escorted mission planned but to be followed by recess. You should certainly make clear to him and to all others our actions concerning recon mission do not indicate in any way we throwing away Geneva Accords but rather that we taking necessary action to carry on recon operations which fully justified within spirit Geneva Accords and in light RLG request and ICC inability to act to get facts about Communist military violations.

Above drafted before receiving your 1563./6/ We weighed alternative possibilities continuing recce missions without escort and attacking anti-aircraft sites with T-28's. We rejected former on grounds no safe flight path could be guaranteed and another shootdown without active US measures would above all give Hanoi and Peking another lift and would almost certainly be heavily criticized in US and possibly lose us crucial support for whole course of action we pursuing in Southeast Asia. We rejected latter on grounds military judgment here that it would be ineffective and almost certainly produce serious loss unless napalm used which we thought had other serious disadvantages particularly in international sphere.

We also rejected alternative another generalized escorted mission on grounds this might produce another loss with no offsetting advantage damage to other side and thus really force our hand for next move.

We understand fully your point about risks being daily incurred by your aircraft and those from Udorn and our hats are off to all concerned. Fact is that damage to our overt reconnaissance creates different pressures both in relation to Hanoi and Peking and in relation to US public.

Your 1564 now received./7/ You should certainly follow line with Souvanna that attacks in June 9 mission were in response hostile fire (which indeed probable once aircraft in area).

Secretary wants you to know that he feels our principal chance of turning the Southeast Asian situation around without large scale military action of one sort or another lies in our getting effective signals to Hanoi and Peiping that they must leave their neighbors alone before events go too far. In your discussion with Souvanna, if the strike of June 9th comes up in a different form, you are authorized to tell him that certain steps are underway, which you are not at liberty to disclose, to make very clear to Hanoi that they are embarked upon an exceedingly dangerous course of action in their gross and persistent violations of the Geneva Accords. The timing of our reaction as of June 9 is related to that signal to Hanoi.

Secretary also believes that you should not, even within your own staff, take the view that such actions on our part are themselves violations of the Geneva Accords. It is a well established principle of international law that where one side grossly violates particular provisions of an agreement such as those forbidding Viet Minh personnel in Laos or the use of Laos as a corridor to South Viet-Nam that those unilateral violations relieve other parties of relevant restrictions upon themselves. Our objective remains the fullest execution of and meticulous compliance with the Geneva Accords. We are ready to work with everyone and anyone to obtain full compliance on all sides. Central to our policy is full support for Souvanna Phouma despite repeated and contemptuous rejection of his role and authority by the Pathet Lao.

Deeply appreciate your thoughtful series this subject.

Rusk

Washington, June 9, 1964.

(Conv at time of bombing of Khang Khay, after bombing & reaction from Unger)

H--What's your reaction to this morning's take? The Secy made a good addition (tel to Unger)./2/ Bill (Bundy) is off the track. He is quite for going on with this thing (further bombing) regardless.

F--No one is in favor except him. McNamara is not in favor.

H--It is interesting, his thought that we should put some attack planes in if there is an attack. That is an entirely different proposition. They are worried about something coming from overhead. Then they have the sublime (faith) in the T-28's. I have never imagined they would do much damage.

F--Unger asked for a high-level letter (to SP) from LBJ. We are against it. Do you feel you could do a comforting letter?

H--I think it's the wrong thing to do, but I am perfectly willing to do it if it is the net balance. Seems to me this is a job Unger ought to do. It's certainly not a good thing for the President to do. If anybody should send it, I should. The idea of his thinking we could keep things quiet like the Soviet press, is fantastic. I have never seen anything which made me believe that we had taken a commitment not to say anything (to the press re fighter escort plane).

F--Prior to shooting down one of these planes it never occurred to Unger what we do if we get hit. They failed to think it thru.

H--I took up cutting out those two letters (on the plane). Bob McNamara said I can't handle it on the Hill. The announcement we would have made would have been exactly as Unger suggested if we took out those numbers. So I raised it. Bob said, "I can't live with it." You will get found out sooner or later so we accepted that. Unger has to understand. Trueheart has been getting something to the Secy to take to the President. It is interesting that SP suggested a certain operation if the other people did something. I think that would be a very, very dangerous thing to do.

F--That is way down the road.

F--The next step if we do anything at all is to change the fleet movement.

H--Bob thought that was probably the best. Do you think we are on the wrong track--that Unger is right about this? I don't see it myself.

F--No.

H--The trouble is that Bill (Bundy) didn't send enough background stuff. I just can't understand why they didn't do it. It's a one-man show, instead of getting a team play. When you're active yourself you feel as if you are achieving something, but it isn't done. I still believe it was a wise thing to do. I hope that the President thinks so. Incidentally to take the conceit out of some people who will be nameless. It is really preposterous. Not the ones we talk to. The ones in the background. This is two flops--yet they come forward next time with just as much assurance. It is a damn good thing because otherwise you couldn't win wars. But they shouldn't be allowed to sit in on policy discussions.

F--I tried to persuade Mac (Bundy) to let me and him pull over here to the White House some of the working people to try to begin to blow a new course. He says no. He wants to leave it to Bill to try.--To push State to taking the lead. I said if it will work.

H: The trouble is Bill is so (involved) in operational details.

F: I hope for a meeting tomorrow and then with the President the next day.

H--I think it is too early. I think if you try you are apt to rush decisions. This is what President Kennedy wanted, but not President Johnson who wants things thought through. I don't think we'll have things digested enough.

F--I don't have the feeling that everybody is thinking very much.

Washington, June 9, 1964.

What follows is in the context of my full support for whatever decisions you may have to take under the awesome responsibilities of your office. You alone have all the available facts and considerations. You alone can make the decisions. From the Senate, we can only give you, in the last analysis, our trust, our support and such independent thoughts as may occur to us from time to time in the hope that they may be constructive.

You know far better than I how delicate a manoeuvre was, first, the reconnaissance flights and, second, the bombing of the anti-aircraft sites in Laos. These two steps have opened up the immediate possibility of a far more direct U.S. military involvement in Laos than we now have in Viet Nam.

I presume that the reconnaissance flights were designed primarily as a show of U.S. determination and as an aid of some sort for the government of Laos. Nevertheless, they did lead to the shooting down of the U.S. planes and then to the U.S. bombing of anti-aircraft sites.

Clearly, this process of action and reaction can continue and grow deeper. It may be that circumstances require that the process continue and deepen. Only you are in a position to make that determination in the light of the whole of the interests of the nation.

But I gather from our telephone conversation/2/ that a deepening of the involvement is not what you believe desirable or necessary in terms of the nation's interest. You indicated to me that the bombing of the sites was not to be repeated. But you cannot count on the absence of the need for repetitions of the bombings so long as the reconnaissance flights continue over Laos. What happens if other U.S. reconnaissance planes are shot down? Having once taken out anti-aircraft sites by bombing are we not to repeat the operation? And if we cannot stop the attrition by air must we not do it by land force or suffer the ignominious consequences? I think it is most dangerous to assume that if the reconnaissance flights continue, additional U.S. planes will not be shot at and, if they fly low enough, that some will not be brought down.

The basic reality remains: if it is not in the national interest to become deeply involved in a military sense on the Laotian front, we will avoid those actions which can impel us, even against our inclination or expectation, to become more deeply involved. We will avoid further unilateral commitments and actions and take every possible initiative to bring about a peaceful settlement. But if our interests justify, in the last analysis, becoming fully involved on the Southeast Asian mainland then there is no issue. What must be done will be done.

My own views are well-known. On the basis of my limited knowledge I do not conclude that our national interests are served by a deep military involvement in Southeast Asia. But in this situation, what I or any other Senator may conclude is secondary. The responsibility rests with you and we can only give you our support in whatever decisions you may make.

If the decisions must be for a continuance of the course which is leading to deeper involvement, however, I would most respectfully suggest that the basis for these decisions must be made much clearer and more persuasive to the people of the nation than has heretofore been the case. In my judgment, public attitudes are far from understanding, much less accepting, even the limited degree of our present involvement in Southeast Asia.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. V. Top Secret. No drafter is indicated on the source text, but at the White House meeting (see Document 88) Forrestal summarized the paper and explained its rationale.

Washington, June 10, 1964.

DE-FUZING LAOS

The following are our objectives in Laos:

1. Preserve Souvanna Phouma as the Head of a Government of National Union, or at least as the Head of a government composed of the Neutralists and the Right Wing, leaving a door open to Communist participation.

2. Discourage further Pathet Lao grabs of territory.

3. Accomplish the above two objectives in such a way as to avoid dangerously demoralizing the South Vietnamese and the Thai.

Our most immediate problem is probably not further Pathet Lao military grabs, but rather the preservation of Souvanna Phouma. Today he announced that he had asked the U.S. to cease reconnaissance activities over the Plain of Jars. This will probably further expose him to the risk of an overthrow by the Right Wing forces of Siho and Kouprasith.

Unger should seek out Phoumi, Siho and Kouprasith immediately and leave them in no doubt that we still support Souvanna and would take the most drastic measures against the Right Wing in the event they attempted to overthrow him.

Souvanna's military and political position is probably now very weak and we therefore need to do what can be done, independently of any international negotiations, to shore it up.

We try to re-establish Kong Le in some other territorial base, perhaps Luang Prabang, using air if necessary as part of a refugee operation.

We increase our economic, as well as military, aid to him and his supporters and encourage as intense cooperation as possible between Kong Le and the Meo under the leadership of Vang Pao.

Before the beginning of the Polish conference, either we bring the Canadians and the British here, or we send briefing teams to London and Ottawa in order to explain to them and persuade them that our primary objective is to reduce tension in Laos. To do this we need to have the Polish discussions go on as long as possible. During these discussions we would not expect to secure a withdrawal of the PL from the Plain of Jars, although this would be an initial demand. We should concentrate on using the Polish forum as a way of pressuring the PL and the Right Wing into an agreement to preserve the Government of National Union. During this period Souvanna will become even more vulnerable to Right Wing attack; so we must devise every means of neutralizing Siho and Kouprasith, while at the same time bolstering Souvanna.

Explore the possibility of providing funds and goods directly to Souvanna and his allies in substantial quantities.

Reduce, if necessary, our support of the Right Wing in Vientiane, taking into account the risk of a violent reaction by Siho.

[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

It must be expected that the Polish discussions will fail to achieve any of these objectives and will result only in a call for a 14-nation Geneva conference. Souvanna might well be persuaded to attend, if the Right Wing did not assassinate him beforehand.

We would then have two choices: we might tell the Right Wing that unless they cooperated with us, we would be forced ourselves to attend the Geneva conference; but that if they did cooperate, we would refuse to attend and continue our support to them. We might also agree with the Thais and the South Vietnamese that we would not attend a Geneva conference.

If the conference should then take place, without our participation, our objective would be, with the help of our British and Canadian friends and of Souvanna, to drag it on as long as possible. At the same time, or perhaps prior to this, we would take (or would have taken) certain actions designed to discourage the Pathet Lao, at least temporarily, from further territorial encroachment. We should also consider high-level reconnaissance of the trail networks in Laos, both to keep track of PL-VM deployments and also for use by the British and Canadians at Geneva.

If the Geneva conference should fail to assemble because of our refusal to attend, we should consider resorting to some of the pre-Geneva 1962 measures, which we abandoned then. Among these would be heavily increased supply of money, weapons and goods to Souvanna and Kong Le; maintenance of our level of supplies to Phoumi's forces; possible re-introduction of some American advisory presence in the form of a small MAAG and/or White Star teams; U.S.-led GVN combat intelligence operations in the panhandle; and a beefing up of American operated air transport facilities within Laos.

The objective of the above would be to improve the bargaining position of Souvanna Phouma when and if the Geneva conference might occur. Ideally, we would at least go back to another Geneva conference in about the same position we were in May 1962. A second objective of these actions would be to reassure the Vietnamese and the Thai that we would not negotiate in Geneva from a position of complete impotence.

Another alternative would be to agree to attend a Geneva conference, but only after we made it clear that we intended to return to the status quo ante-May 1962 in Laos. The only difference between this alternative and the previous one is that we would go to a Geneva conference before we had completed the actions described above. If we took this route, it would probably be essential to take somewhat stronger action in the form of military deployments and cross border activities in order to convince the South Vietnamese and the Thai that we were not throwing in the towel.

If it is possible to keep the South Vietnamese, the Thai, and the Right Wing in Vientiane in hand, the actions described above might carry us through the early part of 1965, i.e. until the normal time for the Pathet Lao to attempt another bite.

If Souvanna Phouma gives up or is liquidated during the course of the above scenario, we should consider the formal partition of Laos. In any such partition all international restraints on our efforts to support the Right Wing would have to be eliminated. If Souvanna were lost during an international conference, we would press for formal recognition of a divided Laos, insisting, of course, on Right Wing control of the panhandle at least from Paksane south. The negotiation of any such solution would obviously be very long drawn out and involve many such thorny questions such as what to do about the Meo and the demarcation of the partition lines in the North.

Washington, June 10, 1964, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Southeast Asia

PRESENT

Secretary Rusk (later), Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, Under Secretary Harriman, Director McCone, Director Bell, Director Rowan, Mr. Rostow, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Special Assistant Sullivan, Mr. Chester Cooper, Mr. William Colby, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Douglass Cater, Mr. Bromley Smith

Three papers were considered. Copies of each are attached./2/

The attached agenda was followed./3/

The first question which arose was what statement should be made to the press about the reconnaissance missions over Laos.

Secretary McNamara said we should say that a U.S. reconnaissance mission was flown in Laos, that it was fired upon, and that the U.S. planes fired back.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said this statement was not true and strongly cautioned that nothing be said now which later could be used to prove that the U.S. Government had told a lie. He said the U.S. must not risk being exposed as making false statements.

Mr. William Bundy referred to Ambassador Unger's plea contained in his telegram 1586 (copy attached) that the U.S. not admit that the planes escorting the reconnaissance planes had used suppressive fire./4/ The Ambassador's cable was in response to a request for his views when it appeared here that it would almost be impossible to maintain our position of "no comment" in reply to questions concerning the firing of U.S. planes in Laos. Mr. William Bundy said that at an earlier meeting this morning/5/ all present had agreed with Ambassador Unger's reasoning and he asked that the present group agree to stand on "no comment." Mr. McGeorge Bundy agreed that refusing to comment on operations was a much better position than one which, in effect, was not true.

Secretary Rusk asked whether the press furor over the "no comment" position would blow over in a few days. Mr. McCone replied that he thought that press interest in the Laos operation would be very short-lived. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that Senator Morse would undoubtedly yell but we could live with his criticism.

Secretary Rusk, who had just returned from the Hill, said that he felt that there was little Congressional interest in the Laos situation. He noted that several Congressmen had reacted almost with boredom to a discussion of the reconnaissance flights in Laos. He wondered whether we and Ambassador Unger had built up the air strike out of all proportion.

In response to Secretary Rusk's question, Mr. Rowan said there had been some international interest in our air activity in Laos, but there had been no huge international outcry over press reports to date. Secretary Rusk said our long-range stake in keeping Souvanna in power in Laos was great. He thought that we should back our Ambassador in the field. Secretary McNamara agreed as to what we would say to the press. However, he thought that to Members of Congress and friendly governments we should say that U.S. reconnaissance missions over Laos had been fired on and we fired back. Mr. McGeorge Bundy repeated his statement that this would not be the truth. He strongly disagreed that we should make such a statement because he believed that it would not stick and the true facts would become public.

Mr. William Bundy said we would be making a general statement without reference to a specific mission./6/ We would simply say that reconnaissance missions were being flown in Laos and our planes were authorized to fire back when they were fired upon. We would not admit that we had carried out a suppressive mission. The British do not know that we carried out a specific air strike. The only explanation we would make to foreigners would be that there has been firing in Laos by U.S. planes because they had been fired upon.

Secretary McNamara urged that everyone in the room agree on one position to be taken by all so that all discussions of this subject would be identical.

Assistant Secretary Manning was asked to draft guidance for the use of everyone to include statements to the press, statements to Congressmen, and statements to foreign nations. It was agreed that we would continue to stand on "no comment" to the press but that Congressmen and foreign government officials would be told that our planes had been fired on and that they had fired back.

Mr. William Bundy said that the International Control Commission (ICC) inspectors were on the ground in the general area where firing had taken place. It is possible that they may see bomb craters caused by U.S. planes. There is doubt that Ho Chi Minh would allow the ICC to inspect Khang Khay because he would thereby reveal to outsiders the existence of antiaircraft batteries manned by Viet Minh crews. In addition, he would be creating a precedent of allowing the ICC inspectors to enter Communist-held territory.

The group then considered the paper entitled "Defuzing Laos."/7/ Mr. Forrestal summarized its content and said that its purpose was to reduce pressures in Laos.

Secretary Rusk said that if we accomplished the first objective stated in the paper, we would be in a hell of a shape. Our real objective in Laos is to get strict compliance with the 1962 Geneva Accords, which means getting the Pathet Lao out of Laos. We have taken this position recently with important foreign nations including the Soviet Union. We should push hard in any conference, such as that proposed by the Poles, for our prerequisites for a Geneva-type conference. It is in our interest to keep the Russians and the Poles in opposition to the Chinese Communists and Ho Chi Minh. We should not give up the effort to get the Pathet Lao out of the Plaine des Jarres by diplomatic means. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said he thought our objective was to keep Souvanna in power so that we could go ahead with our major objective which is to improve the situation in South Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara said we must not keep on restating unrealizeable objectives. He said we have no program which, in his view, will result in forcing the Pathet Lao out of the Plaine des Jarres.

Secretary Rusk suggested that a paper should be prepared which spells out the position which we have just taken with Khrushchev./8/

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that nothing now planned will get the Pathet Lao out of the Plaine des Jarres. Only General Taylor could do this by using U.S. military force and he would resign before agreeing to put U.S. troops into the Plaine des Jarres. The important problem is South Vietnam, not the presence of the Pathet Lao in the Plaine des Jarres.

Secretary Rusk said the defuzing paper surrenders our objective of seeking a pressure point against Hanoi and would result in giving Souvanna and the Thais a very leaden feeling. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said if it were true that the proposed policy would give Souvanna and the Thais a leaden feeling, this would be a valid reason to oppose it, but he did not think that its lack of effect on the Pathet Lao problem in the Plaine des Jarres was a valid objection.

Secretary McNamara said the President had been confused because there has always been a difference between our stated objectives and our courses of action. He expressed in several ways his view that the actions we have proposed to the President will not achieve our stated objectives.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said we have never told the President that the Communists had now gone too far and that we propose to throw them out. Secretary Rusk replied that our objective is certainly not to support Souvanna solely for the purpose of halting further Pathet Lao advances. Our objective is to force the Pathet Lao to retreat. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said he thought that our policy was aimed at trying to avoid bringing things to a military head over Laos.

Secretary Rusk said he visualized our Laos policy in three stages. The first preventive stage was to take those actions necessary to be ready militarily to do more than we are now doing if it appeared that the Pathet Lao was undertaking a campaign to seize the Mekong River towns. The second stage was to do all we could during the Polish-proposed conference to achieve our preconditions for a Geneva conference. We may not achieve this objective but we might. We simply don't know. The third stage would be a Geneva conference at which we would seek to obtain the removal of the Viet Minh from Laos and South Vietnam and close the North Vietnam corridor to the South Vietnamese.

Secretary McNamara asked whether we would go to a Geneva conference if we did not obtain the preconditions. Secretary Rusk replied that we would not. Secretary McNamara said that, therefore, there would be no conference. The defuzing paper is to look at the situation we would be in without a Geneva-type conference. The plan is based on not taking U.S. military action until we had obtained a Congressional resolution, which it did not appear would be obtainable very soon.

Secretary Rusk asked why we should not take as our objective the most probable contingency facing us.

Secretary McNamara suggested that, for the President, we prepare a paper which gave our stated objective being sought on the diplomatic track. The paper would acknowledge that we were unlikely to achieve our stated objective by diplomatic means and that, therefore, we propose to deviate from the diplomatic track and then state what we would do. He felt that we were leading the President down a track which would oblige him to resort to the use of military force in the next three months if the situation were to be saved. He expressed his fear that the conference route will run out in a few weeks and then there will be nothing left for us to do but use U.S. military force.

Director McCone expressed his concern that we would not be able to resist world public pressure for a conference by saying merely that we won't go to a conference unless the Pathet Lao holds back a few miles in the Plaine des Jarres. Secretary Rusk replied that the Pathet Lao pullback, which is a prerequisite for the conference, would not be difficult for the Communists to agree to do.

Mr. Rowan said he wanted to make certain that all were aware of the danger of having public objectives which differed from objectives known only to government officials. Mr. Forrestal said the objectives listed in his paper should accurately be described as interim objectives.

Mr. McCone wanted to know how we proposed to discourage further Pathet Lao territorial grabs as stated in objective number two. Mr. Forrestal said the actions he had in mind involved those listed under point thirteen of the McNamara report, including the movement to the area of U.S. forces.

Secretary Rusk asked that he be permitted to study the paper for another day or so. He was concerned that if we gave up the objective of moving the Pathet Lao back, we might forfeit the effort which we have been making in Moscow and indirectly in Peking.

Secretary McNamara said we do have military actions which could be used to prevent the Pathet Lao from grabbing further territory in Laos, but we do not have actions which he felt were adequate to force the Pathet Lao to get out of the Plaine des Jarres.

Secretary Rusk said he did not feel that a mountainous diplomatic effort would be necessary to get the Pathet Lao back to their previous lines. The Soviets have a stake in not ratting out on the agreement they have with us on Laos.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy, who had been out of the meeting for a few minutes, returned to say that he had told the President it would not be necessary for him to join the group today because another working session would be required before the group was ready to discuss recommendations with him.

[Here follows a record of the remainder of the meeting, which dealt mostly with Vietnam; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume I, pages 487-492.]

Washington, June 10, 1964.

SUBJECT
National Security Council Meeting on Southeast Asia--10 June

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Sullivan, Secretary Manning
Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster
The Attorney General
Secretary Dillon
Mr. Bell, Mr. Rowen
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Smith, Mr. Cater
Mr. McCone, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Colby

The U.S. position with respect to reconnaissance and escorts over Laos will be "no comment with respect to operations". Mr. Rusk will review a paper on our objectives in Laos and efforts to "defuze" the situation there,/2/ he believing that we must maintain our objectives as the withdrawal of the Viet Minh and returning to the 1962 Accords, Mr. McNamara and Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggesting that a more realistic approach is to consider our interim objective as merely to repel further Pathet Lao advances. With respect to South Vietnam it was agreed that the morale of the South Vietnamese must be actively considered in any step taken with regard to Laos or Southeast Asia as a whole. With respect to GVN ability to improve its counterinsurgency it was agreed that we should go ahead with a trial infusion of U.S. personnel. An operational checklist will be prepared for the senior officials to review the progress of South Vietnam. The DCI pointed out that the Watch Committee has been assigned the task of close attention to the possibility of a sudden VC thrust. It was indicated that a Congressional Resolution on Southeast Asia would probably not be desirable as the ground work could not be laid prior to July and the debate might raise more trouble than it would solve. If matters should indicate the real necessity for a resolution, Congress could be called into Special Session.

1. The meeting opened with a discussion of the position the U.S. will take with regard to overflights and escorts in Laos. After some discussion, between Secretary McNamara's position that we should say that our missions were essentially reconnaissance but authorized to return fire (with no specific reference to the June 9th mission) and Mr. McGeorge Bundy's concern that we be caught saying something that is not so, it was agreed that the line to the press internationally will be "no comment with respect to operations", in support of Ambassador Unger's strong plea. Mr. Manning was directed to present an agreed script to which all parties were instructed to adhere (attached)./3/

2. The attached paper by Mr. Forrestal on "DeFuzing Laos"/4/ was then reviewed. Mr. Rusk had trouble with this paper's expression of our "objectives" in Laos, believing that our real objectives are the complete withdrawal of the Viet Minh and that they not use the corridor to South Vietnam, i.e. adherence to the 1962 Accords. He feared that if our "objectives" were only the discouragement of the further Pathet Lao advances, there would be a bad feeling in the pit of the stomach of the people we expect to withstand Communist pressure in Southeast Asia, as this would be an abandonment of our previous objectives. Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. McNamara argued that the discouragement of further Pathet Lao grabs and the preservation of Souvanna Phouma were all we could practically hope for at this time and that our program of action certainly does not contain any steps to push the Pathet Lao back. Secretary McNamara thus made the point that our stated objectives and our courses of action would be inconsistent, if the former were the precondition of Pathet Lao withdrawal. Mr. Rusk emphasized that our real objectives must be to continue to press for the 1962 Accords and that our courses of action must envisage the necessity to act militarily if the Pathet Lao move to the Mekong, make a diplomatic effort to obtain the pre-conditions of Pathet Lao withdrawal prior to any Geneva meeting and endeavor at a conference to remove the Viet Minh from both Laos and the corridor. Mr. McNamara brought out that this rapidly brings up the problem of how much military pressure we are prepared to use to obtain these. Mr. McCone pointed out that there are extensive international pressures pushing us towards Geneva even though the pre-conditions may not be met. Secretary Dillon suggested that there might be two stages, interim objectives and ultimate objectives. Mr. Rusk then asked that he have an opportunity to revise the paper and resubmit it.

3. In the course of this discussion it was agreed that there is little evidence that the 9 June action had any impact on the Pathet Lao assessment of what it is faced with. Mr. William Bundy felt it would have little effect. Mr. McNamara questioned whether the Pathet Lao could be brought to move back from the Plaine des Jarres. Mr. Rusk believed that it might be possible to obtain movement of this nature, in part by pressure on and by the Soviet Union, which has an interest in defuzing the situation in Laos also.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]

WE Colby

Washington, June 11, 1964.

SUBJECT
Reflections on Yesterday/2/

1. The question, from one end of the world to the other, is quite clear: Is the United States prepared to apply force to bring about Hanoi's compliance with the Accords of 1954/3/ and 1962 in both Laos and Viet Nam? Behind this is the related question: Are we prepared to face any level of escalation Hanoi and Peiping might mount in response to our actions? Virtually no one doubts that we would react with force if there was an attack on the Mekong Valley or across the seventeenth parallel, initiated by the Communists. Virtually no one doubts that we are prepared to stick it out in Viet Nam and Laos along present lines. What is seen clearly, from Paris through Moscow east to Peiping, Hanoi, Bangkok, etc. is:

a. Communist techniques of erosion in Southeast Asia, based on violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords, are working well and rendering progressively less viable our present policy; and

b. We have evidently not made up our minds to apply force to bring about Hanoi's compliance with the Accords of 1954 and 1962.

2. I can understand, of course, that a policy might be built around avoiding or postponing that decision; but if the object of the exercise is to maintain until November such confused anxiety in the Communist camp as to keep Hanoi from launching a big offensive and sufficient hope in Vientiane and Saigon as to avoid a total political collapse then: (a) we should assess and the President should understand fully the risks involved; (b) everyone around the table should be working consciously to the same time-buying conception of the task; and (c) we should be straining within the limits of that conception to do what we can within our operational limitations, and without surrendering our ultimate objectives.

3. What struck me hard yesterday was that there was no common assessment of either our ultimate or our operational objectives. The Forrestal approach/4/ assumed that we were unprepared to apply virtually any force in Southeast Asia; and, in the end, it confronted us with a formal split of Laos, involving an explicit extension of Communist power and implicitly a legalization of the Viet Minh presence in Laos which, given the character of any Lao border in a split, I would regard as a disaster. Secretary Rusk, on the other hand, evidently felt (and I would agree) that the U.S. does have certain diplomatic leverage and, if this is progressively backed at critical stages by a demonstration of our willingness to use force, it might yield some forward movement, while maintaining our ultimate objectives. Secretary McNamara, on the other hand, was asking for greater clarification about how much force we were prepared to use before we started and committed ourselves to our objectives; but he saw little hope that much force would be applied in the coming months. With commendable candor, he insisted that our statement of objectives be geared to our modest prospects, under the circumstances he assumed as realistic.

4. The critical need, as I see it, is to assure ourselves that we are working within a framework which is actually the one which the President desires. This means that he must understand from us: (a) what the risks are of political collapse in Vientiane and/or Saigon; (b) what the consequences are of maintaining a declaratory policy in support of the 1954 and 1962 Accords, without in fact answering the central question. This ambiguity has already cost us a good deal. It will certainly cost us more; but under certain circumstances that cost might be more acceptable to the President at the present time than the risks of a confrontation with Hanoi.

5. The President should also be confronted not merely with our assessment of the possible costs of a time-buying policy but also with a scenario as fully worked out as we can of the type which Secretary Rusk apparently has in mind; that is, one of holding firmly in diplomacy to the 1954 and 1962 Accords while using all the elements of power we have available short of a direct confrontation. I sensed yesterday some tendency to take the view that unless we were prepared to go for a McNamara Option Three (or Rostow) policy, that we should operate pretty passively with minimal defensive objectives with respect to both Vientiane and Saigon. If we strain imaginatively along the lines, say, of Bill Sullivan's memorandum of yesterday, there may emerge uses of force as a counterpoint to diplomacy which would improve our position somewhat without committing the President to a final confrontation. It is in this area that I think we have to get consensus, assuming that the President is not now ready for the direct confrontation.

6. I say all this while still believing that, as nearly as I can perceive the situation, we are in fact taking risks in not having the confrontation now, which outweigh the risks of the confrontation itself. Moreover, I disagree with the view that a Congressional resolution would be difficult to get if the President made up his mind that he needed it. The Democrats would certainly back him, except for a few mavericks; the Republicans would not oppose him, although they would be prepared to exploit the consequences of failure as in any case they will exploit the Southeast Asian situation during the campaign; and, until we publish the Jorden Report,/5/ we will be conducting diplomacy with at least one hand tied behind our backs. But only the President can make that judgment.

7. In short, I believe we are caught in a vicious circle. Diplomacy can only be truly effective once the President is committed to a confrontation. What I fear now is that the ambiguity of our signals will lead to a situation of desperation--based on the assessment that we are not prepared for a confrontation--and that then (with Goldwater on our flank) we shall be forced to act convulsively and with vastly more bloodshed than if we had acted sooner.

8. As one who has been merely reading newspapers and cables on Southeast Asia in recent weeks, I can only say that we have been conducting propaganda as defined by F.M. Cornford: "that branch of the art of lying which consists in very nearly deceiving your friends without quite deceiving your enemies."

Return to 1964-1968, Volume XXVIII index
Return to the U.S. Department of State Home Page

This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.