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Table of Contents: Read the Volume Online
Foreword
SummaryForeword
(This is not an official statement of policy by the Department of State; it is intended only as a guide to the contents of this volume.)
Since 1861, the Department of State's documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States has constituted the official record of the foreign policy and diplomacy of the United States. Historians in the Office of the Historian collect, arrange, and annotate the principal documents comprising the record of American foreign policy. The standards for the preparation of the series and the general deadlines for its publication are established by the Foreign Relations of the United States statute of October 28, 1991 (22 USC 4351, et seq.). Volumes in the Foreign Relations series are published when all the necessary editing, declassification, and printing steps have been completed.
The documents in this volume are drawn from the centralized indexed files of the Department of State and the decentralized Bureau, Office, and other lot files of the relevant Departmental units. In addition, the volume relies heavily upon Presidential and other papers at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas. Because U.S. policy in Laos had such a strong military component, the editor made extensive use of the records of the Secretary of Defense and his principal assistants at the Department of Defense, the official files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Westmoreland and Abrams papers, both at the Center of Military History in Washington, D.C., as well as the Taylor Papers at the National Defense University, also in Washington. Laos also had a large intelligence component. For these topics the files of the Central Intelligence Agency and the records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State were most useful. The volume was completed before the Office of the Historian had access to Johnson's taped telephone conversations, but there are only a few tapes of conversations exclusively on Laos. Johnson usually discussed Laos in conjunction with Vietnam. Important tapes on the Vietnam war are included in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966 (released in 1998) and the President's taped conversations on the war including Laos are scheduled for publication in subsequent volumes on Vietnam and in volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia: Regional Affairs.
This volume complements the intensive documentary coverage of the Vietnam war published or scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968,Volume I, Vietnam, 1964 (released in 1992), Volume II, January-June, 1965 and Volume III, June-December 1965 (both released 1996), and Volume IV, Vietnam 1966 (released on March 23, 1998). Volume V, Vietnam, 1967 and Volumes VI and VIII, Vietnam, 1968 are scheduled for later publication.
Almost all of the documents printed here were originally classified. The Information Response Branch of the Office of IRM Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, in concert with the appropriate offices in other agencies or governments, carried out the declassification of the selected documents.
The following is a summary of the most important of the issues covered. Parenthetical citations are to numbered documents in the text.
Summary
When he was Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson played no role in the Kennedy administration's attempt to neutralize Laos and insulate it from the fighting in South Vietnam. Under Kennedy, Johnson was not active in foreign affairs and therefore was uninvolved in the negotiations at the Geneva Conference of 1962 that resulted in restoration of tripartite government in Laos under neutralist leader Souvanna Phouma. By November 1963, Kennedy's policy had clearly failed to stop the fighting in Laos and bring about real neutrality for Laos. North Vietnam flouted the Geneva provisions by retaining approximately 6,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos to defend and maintain the Ho Chi Minh trail in the southern Laos panhandle, their vital supply line to South Vietnam. North Vietnam supported the Pathet Lao with military assistance and troops. Together the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese controlled most of the northern and central highlands. Although officially part of the same government, the military forces of the Pathet Lao and the Souvanna government engaged in low level warfare for territory and strategic advantage. President Johnson was forced to deal with a simmering crisis in Laos.
In February 1964, the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese began an offensive in central Laos on the strategic Plain of Jars, the gateway to the Mekong Valley where most of the Lao population lived. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman recommended the introduction of U.S. forces into Thailand (as had been done in 1962 during an earlier Laos crisis) and a broad program of political, military, and covert actions to provide additional support to the Souvanna government. (3, 6) U.S. Defense officials failed to see how sending U.S. troops to Thailand would blunt the Communist offensive in central Laos, and recommended only low-level reconnaissance and the deployment of additional jets for Thailand. (4, 7) President Johnson's principal advisers concluded that Hilsman's program was premature. (8) Ambassador to Laos Leonard Unger also opposed Hilsman's advice, stating that, if implemented, it would shred what remained of the Geneva settlement and undermine Souvanna's precarious neutralist position. (11)
The Johnson administration examined instead a series of incremental steps to combat the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese offensive, including support of the fledgling Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), composed entirely of T-28 propeller driven aircraft, (13) and encouragement of potential joint South Vietnamese-Lao military cooperation in the panhandle. (15, 16) The Pentagon and General William Westmoreland, Commander in Vietnam, pressed for U.S.-South Vietnamese cross border operations, but the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, successfully opposed them for fear of potential hostile publicity and complicating already planned covert operations against North Vietnam. (18) The Communist offensive in Laos stopped after the North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao consolidated their newly won positions in the highlands. They did not threaten the Mekong Valley towns of Laos, the traditional strongholds of the Lao non-Communist forces.
U.S. attention shifted to the administrative capital of Vientiane where relations between the three Lao factions were fast deteriorating. (19) On April 19, 1964, two of the leading conservative politician-generals, General Kouprasith and Security Chief Siho, attempted to overthrow Souvanna's government. The coup forces arrested Souvanna and his ministers, but in response to pressure from Ambassador Unger and Washington, they rescinded the arrests. President Johnson and his advisers decided to take no further action until more information was available. Johnson was adamant that word be passed to Hanoi that the Pathet Lao should not take advantage of the coup in Vientiane. Johnson also hoped that the Souvanna government could be restored. (22, 23, 24, 25, 27)
Johnson took advantage of Assistant Secretary William Bundy's visit to Saigon to send him on a fact finding mission to Vientiane. Bundy's tentative conclusion was to allow Souvanna to reconstruct his government. (29) As McGeorge Bundy told the President, the political crisis in Vientiane would not be resolved soon since "the clocks in Laos run on their own time." (30) Upon his return to Washington, William Bundy reported to President Johnson and the National Security Council (NSC) that Souvanna would most likely survive and that the short-term priority was to keep the "right-wing hot heads" from preventing it. (35) William Bundy cabled Unger that the United States was prepared reluctantly to apply sanctions against the coup forces, particularly suspension of U.S. military supplies. (36, 37) Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara strongly supported Souvanna and recommended pressing the coup leaders to accept Pathet Lao membership in a new coalition government. (38) Vientiane returned to approximate normality; Souvanna was again in power, but the coup leaders still had great influence behind the scenes.
While the Johnson administration waited for the Lao factions to form a government, the NSC examined the problem of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops down the Ho Chi Minh trail through the Laos panhandle into South Vietnam. William Bundy hoped that the President would authorize small-scale intelligence gathering by South Vietnamese teams and U.S. photo reconnaissance to determine the nature of the problem. (42) Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay and Admiral David McDonald wanted to extend the war into the panhandle by conventional bombing. (44)
At a NSC meeting on May 5, the administration agreed to authorize cross border intelligence gathering operations, but delayed photo reconnaissance for a week in deference to Unger's reservations about potential damage to Souvanna. (45, 46) Unger stated in mid-May that the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese had renewed their offensive, at least in part, in reaction to right-wing influence on the Souvanna government. U.S. reconnaissance of Laos could be used by Souvanna's enemies to justify the claim that he was no longer a neutral. (47) While the general assessment in Washington held that the renewed Communist offensive of May was aimed at eliminating neutralist forces from the Plain of Jars, U.S. intelligence did not consider that the Mekong towns were in danger. (49) Nevertheless, Unger now asked for authority to give the tiny Lao air force 500-lb. bombs and supplement its minuscule pilot pool and air force with a small number of aircraft with Air America pilots under U.S. Government contract who would fly U.S. T-28 aircraft with Lao markings. The Department of State authorized the use of the bombs, but denied the use of U.S. civilian contractors flying combat missions for Laos. (48) Instead, it authorized sending four T-28 to the Lao and provided low-level U.S. jet reconnaissance of the battlefield. (50) Eventually, Unger convinced Washington that Air America pilots were needed in the battle. (51-53)
As Unger noted, the United States was now deeply in violation of the Geneva agreements, but he believed that the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese success and the disarray of the pro-Souvanna neutralist forces on the Plain of Jars made such measures necessary. (59) Johnson administration policymakers met on May 24, to deliberate on possible policy initiatives, but the lack of consensus at the meetings demonstrated how divided the administration was about Laos. The President himself remarked pointedly on this failure of the decision process. All that resulted was a substantial increase in U.S. reconnaissance of Laos. (60-62)
Washington's inaction owed much to a recent proposal by the Polish Government for a negotiated settlement in Laos in which the three Lao factions, the International Control Commission, and the Geneva Co-Chairmen (Soviet Union and Great Britain) would meet at a neutral site and resolve their differences. (63, 65) As long as there was a hope of a negotiated settlement that isolated Laos from the rest of Southeast Asia, the administration was unprepared to take further decisive action. (66, 67) Johnson's principal advisers met to prepare recommendations for the President on what to do should military action be required when and if it became clear that negotiations had reached an impasse. (71-74)
A new development changed the situation. Pathet Lao anti-aircraft batteries shot down a RF-8 reconnaissance jet from the USS Kitty Hawk. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a second armed reconnaissance mission for the next day with authorization to return fire if fired upon. Johnson polled his advisers and none disagreed with this plan. (76, 77) On the next day, June 7, McNamara proposed attacking the battery responsible for the downing of the U.S. reconnaissance jet. The President agreed, but wondered aloud a number of times where policy in Laos was heading. (80, 81) In Vientiane, Unger had no doubts, believing that armed reconnaissance and the attack on the Pathet Lao battery were now at risk of becoming "a military exercise for its own sake, running rapidly out of control" and endangering diplomatic negotiations over Laos. (82) Johnson and his advisers seriously considered Unger's objections, but they believed that a one-shot retaliatory strike would have to be carried through as a signal to Hanoi. Johnson reluctantly approved. (83) The attack was only a qualified success; half of the planes hit the wrong target. (93)
Johnson's foreign policy advisers met on June 10 to discuss policy objectives in Laos. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the principal champion of attempts to persuade Soviet officials to press North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva agreements, emphasized the need to obtain withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops as promised in the 1962 agreement. McNamara suggested such a goal was probably unrealistic; repelling militarily further Pathet Lao advances was a more practical interim objective. (88, 89) On June 15, the President's advisers again met to discuss Southeast Asia. William Bundy thought it was now time to draw back and make longer-range contingency plans to meet small-scale Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attacks. (95) The Johnson administration attempted to define--without much success--its long term goals in Laos. (96-98, 100)
The next decision point came far sooner than Johnson's planners had anticipated. In late June 1964, Souvanna's military commanders submitted a plan, code-named Operation Triangle, to retake territory lost to the Pathet Lao on the Plain of Jars near the junction of routes 7 and 13, a strategic point between the administrative capital of Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang. The Lao generals requested that the United States provide six Air America piloted transport planes, fifteen T-28 aircraft piloted by Air America civilians to provide ground support, and U.S. air reconnaissance. The request was modest, but it was an important departure for the United States because it involved Americans fighting in Laos. (103-105) When Johnson was told that the plan had a better than 50-50 chance of success and that the Joint Chiefs favored it unanimously, he approved U.S support. (106, 107)
In a retrospective analysis, July 1, 1964, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research presented a number of conclusions to Secretary Rusk, perhaps the most important of which was that both the United States and North Vietnam had become much more involved in the conflict in Laos. (108) This is the overriding theme of the rest of the volume: a U.S.-North Vietnamese ground and air war fought on two fronts. The first front was the war in northern Laos where the United States supported a Hmong (Meo) guerrilla force on the ground that eventually numbered 40,000 troops. The Hmong usually operated behind Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese lines and were supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency and supported from the air by Air America. The second front was the panhandle or corridor of southern Laos where the United States embarked on a major air war of interdiction to try to prevent men, arms, and supplies from reaching the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam.
The immediate concern in Washington was the slow implementation and advance of Operation Triangle. (110-114) With Operation Triangle making finally making modest progress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed for a more active policy in the Laos panhandle, suggesting that the South Vietnamese Air Force be allowed to mount a bombing campaign and the South Vietnamese army be permitted to dispatch up to battalion-sized ground forces (led by U.S. Special Forces advisers) to disrupt and harass traffic on the Ho Chi Minh trail in the corridor. When the issue was raised at an NSC meeting in late July 1964, the JCS's courses of action were rejected because of Souvanna's unyielding opposition to South Vietnamese military operations in Laos. (117)
There was now a rough equilibrium between the non-Communist and Communist military forces in northern Laos. Enhanced by additional T-28 aircraft and Thai support, the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) were capable of retaking much of the Plain of Jars, but the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese were fully capable of defending the Ho Chi Minh trail and, if they chose, mounting a counteroffensive which could halt Operation Triangle in its tracks. While there was a balance of power in Laos, Johnson policymakers realized it depended upon North Vietnamese forbearance. (119, 120)
Such a tenuous equilibrium had little attraction to Westmoreland in Saigon, who considered that the tiny Lao Air Force could hardly be expected to blunt infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh trail. As a matter of "self-defense in the face of a desperate threat," Westmoreland called for U.S. and South Vietnamese air power to attack the panhandle. (128) At a meeting in Washington, President Johnson approved limited South Vietnamese air and ground operations along the Laos-South Vietnamese border so long as Souvanna agreed. In addition, the Royal Lao Government was encouraged to use more of its limited air power against the infiltration corridor. (130) Unger responded that given the small-scale nature of these operations, Souvanna need not be informed. (131) The President reiterated this decision in early October when he again approved a program of U.S. bombing in the Lao corridor. McNamara pointed out that such approval also implied the use of U.S. aircraft for suppressive fire, but that he was not then asking the President to approve this decision. (136, 138)
As the United States moved slowly toward a full-scale air war in Laos, the Department of State, and especially Rusk, continued to talk with Soviet officials about a possible new Geneva conference on Laos. At the same time, the Department encouraged Souvanna to insist on tough preconditions for such talks that would reestablish the essence of the 1962 agreement. High-level U.S.-Soviet discussions on Laos fell into a familiar pattern of charges and countercharges that the respective Southeast Asia allies were not living up to the Geneva agreement. (118, 121, 143, 147) Finally an exasperated Rusk tried a non-diplomatic approach by asking Gromyko when Hanoi was going to leave Laos alone, and stated that if it was not going to, then the United States and the Soviet Union had a serious problem. Gromyko countered angrily that it was the United States that was expanding the war in Laos. (149)
The JCS recommended an expanded U.S. role in the bombing of the panhandle. (140, 142) On December 7, 1964, Johnson approved JCS recommendations for an air campaign to be known as Operation Barrel Roll. (148) When the new ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, informed Souvanna of the U.S. decision, Souvanna's response was hawkish. The Lao Prime Minister encouraged the U.S Air Force to attack anything that moved on the infiltration routes by day or night, but he insisted that the bombing program not be publicized or acknowledged. (150, 152, 153)
Representatives of the Embassies in Saigon, Bangkok, and Vientiane, and MACV officials met to refine and improve Barrel Roll. (155) The Departments of State and Defense approved new guidelines which made the bombing campaign more flexible and better coordinated. (157) The Department and Embassy in Laos discussed ways to allow the bombing to make a greater impression on the North Vietnamese. (171, 173) In March 1965, the Johnson administration approved an intensified program of U.S. bombardment against the Laos panhandle, called Steel Tiger, and separated it from Barrel Roll, which would concentrate on the rest of Laos. (174, 176)
In late January and early February 1965, right-wing military forces attempted another coup against Souvanna. Sullivan's timely intervention--he convinced an Australian technician to disable the national radio network--and his open support for Souvanna helped to quash the half-hearted and poorly organized putsch. (162-164) This failed coup eliminated once and for all the two most important conservative figures on the Lao political scene, Generals Phoumi Nosavan and Siho Lamphouhakoul. Henceforth, they were no longer factors in Lao politics. (166, 167)
During 1965, differences of opinion about implementation of policy arose, especially over the question of cross border operations from South Vietnam into Laos. Westmoreland and MACV wanted to harass the North Vietnamese forces in Laos, using local hill people led by U.S. Special Forces. Sullivan's reaction was totally negative: "it is, in my view far fetched to think of storming the Ho Chi Minh trail with a bare bottom bunch of these boys." Sullivan believed that MACV should attempt intelligence scouting, a little sabotage, a little interception, but if Westmoreland wanted "to break up the real marrow of the Ho Chi Minh trail," he "had better start thinking in terms of regiments and divisions, not tribal assets." (179)
After returning to Washington for consultation in the summer of 1965, Sullivan combined his thinking on cross border operations into a single cable. Looking first at interdiction, Sullivan stated that the U.S. did not have adequate resources to deny the North Vietnamese the Ho Chi Minh trail, especially by air power alone. True interdiction would require troops--two U.S. divisions at least--but such an overt violation of Laos sovereignty and the Geneva Accords of 1962 would either bring Souvanna down should he agree to it, or require the United States to underwrite Lao control of the Mekong Valley. Sullivan considered neither alternative as practical. The best that the United States could accomplish was harassment of the North Vietnamese in the Laos corridor. While this effort was becoming more efficient and productive, successful harassment usually disrupted intelligence gathering. Once harassment teams attacked, the North Vietnamese swept the area driving off the passive intelligence assets. Sullivan's point was that operations in the Laos corridor should be judged on whether the objective was worth the price. (194)
In the second half of 1965, the United States gave serious consideration to a plan favored by President Johnson to shoot down a North Vietnamese supply plane delivering military goods to the Pathet Lao. This action would send a clear message to Hanoi that there was a price to pay for supporting the Pathet Lao. (188, 197, 198) Codenamed Duck Soup, this plan proved impossible to implement, mainly because the enemy aircraft had to be caught in the act of parachuting or dropping by air supplies to ground forces and there was always a danger that a Soviet aircraft might be attacked by mistake. The same implementation difficulties befell the idea of creating a cordon sanitaire across the corridor of Laos into Thailand, thus sealing off the Ho Chi Minh trail, and the scheme to use napalm in Laos bombing campaigns. The cordon plan required substantial U.S. troops; napalm would arouse unacceptable international condemnation. (205, 206, 208, 211)
In early 1966, tensions between Sullivan and Westmoreland over cross border operation increased. Sullivan charged that Westmoreland's covert forces, the Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG), which comprised of ARVN foot soldiers led by Green Berets, was "an Eagle Scout Program," and that their intelligence forays into Laos, code-named Shining Brass, were often ineffective, dangerous, and of limited intelligence producing value. Westmoreland could not understand Sullivan's opposition to harassing the enemy before he entered South Vietnam. (216, 218)
Nevertheless, the covert U.S. military effort in Laos expanded in small incremental steps. In March 1966, Sullivan authorized the use of napalm in two specific cases, and then the Department allowed its general use as a tactical weapon. (223, 227) The Department of Defense successfully established the principle of "hot pursuit" into Laos from South Vietnam (230, 231, 234), increased the size of Shining Brass teams from 11 men to platoon size, and expanded their area of operation within Laos. (237)
At mid-year of 1966, there were signs of optimism, especially in the CIA-directed war in northern Laos. Sullivan reported that despite increased North Vietnamese troop commitments, the war in the north was going well. He noted with pride that success came against North Vietnamese regulars, not the Pathet Lao. (244) The 303 Committee received an optimistic report of CIA's counterinsurgency operations in Laos and considered it an "exemplary success story" worthy of continuation and expansion. (248) CIA's Far Eastern Chief William Colby was "exhilarated" not only by the success in the north, but by CIA's intelligence operations in the panhandle. He reported that in the north "the marriage of excellent intelligence furnished by CAS and the superb performance by the 7th AF has enabled outnumbered friendly units [Vang Pao's Hmong] to not only contain the enemy offensive, but to mount a counteroffensive which has regained 90% of the area lost." (246)
The Johnson administration was also proud of the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), which it had helped to build virtually from scratch. The head of this small air service was General Thao Ma, a combat pilot who poured his heart into T-28 operations, often leading missions. As one U.S. official observed, "Ma and he alone makes the RLAF go." Critics accused Ma of being "fixed" on T-28 operations and less honest Lao resented his unwillingness to use the RLAF transport squadron for smuggling. (232) Lao politics were at their essence family politics, and Ma was without important family contacts. Souvanna temporarily eased him out of the job of Chief of Staff of the RLAF and gave him a desk job in Vientiane. Ma rebelled in October 1966, put his planes at Savannakhet into the air, and took off to bomb Vientiane. It was an act of defiance by a desperate man, but apart from some minor bombing damage and a few regrettable deaths, Ma's defiance failed. He flew to exile in Thailand with a good part of the RLAF, which was later retrieved. (262-264) The task for the United States was to rebuild the Lao Air Force, but by this time U.S. aircraft were carrying much more of the air operations over Laos.
Another theme of U.S. policy in late 1966 was Secretary of Defense McNamara's growing interest in a technological barrier--composed of sensors, short-lived mines, visual surveillance by aircraft, and quick reaction air strikes--running across South Vietnam south of the 17th parallel and traversing Laos so as to cut off infiltration. Sullivan was convinced that such reliance on "gadgetry" would be a disaster, but McNamara pushed the idea forward. (261, 265) McNamara's penchant for technology as an alternative means of fighting the Vietnam war was equally evident in 1967. The Department of Defense experimented with weather modification to increase the rainy season in the panhandle and slow infiltration and with a compound that would make mud stickier and impede truck traffic. Sullivan approved the idea with his usual wit: "Make mud, not war." (274, 289)
Neither of these schemes passed much beyond the experimental stage. Perhaps the most important technological issue in Laos was the need to place a navigational guidance system in northern Laos to direct the bombing of North Vietnam. (278) Souvanna wanted no tangible proof that operations against North Vietnam were being carried on from Lao soil. He reluctantly agreed to the establishment of the facility, but insisted that if it were exposed the United States would say that it was done without his knowledge. The U.S. resident technicians would have to have civilian cover and the unit would have self-demolition capacity for emergency use. (290)
Also in 1967, tensions between Sullivan and Westmoreland over the nature of the covert ground war in Laos emerged even more starkly. Westmoreland and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral Sharp, successfully pressed for a reduction of restrictions on operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail. (276, 277) Sullivan worried about the steady and gradual expansion of the U.S.-directed effort, believing that MACSOG already had more targets than it could handle. Expanded operations proposed by Westmoreland could not be kept secret. Once exposed they would be a glaring exception to Souvanna's opposition to foreign troops in Laos and would help justify North Vietnamese presence. (283) The intelligence community studied the problem and concluded that Souvanna would disapprove and probably resign in the face of large U.S.-South Vietnamese operations in Laos launched over his objections, but would tolerate small scale actions of which he was not officially informed. (287)
Sullivan became increasingly exasperated at MACV efforts to enlarge its operations in the panhandle. (301, 302) He informed Westmoreland that the 20-kilometer zone of operations in Laos along the border with Vietnam in which MACSOG operated a stepped up version of Shining Brass, renamed Prairie Fire, was "not a piece of territory which has been detached from my responsibilities in Laos and given over to your Command." (306) For his part, Westmoreland believed that Sullivan was not allowing for enough flexibility for MACSOG operations. (307)
In contrast to MACV-Embassy Vientiane tensions, relations between the Embassy and the CIA in Laos proceeded relatively smoothly. CIA roadwatch teams operated in the panhandle on a large scale. The "quiet war" in northern Laos, as William Colby called it, was a substantial covert undertaking in which 36,183 local defense forces (mostly Hmong) were paid and directed by CIA. The cost was under half of what the U.S spent on the 55,000 strong Royal Lao Army, one of the least aggressive and effective armies in the world. The CIA-supported Hmong were doing most of the serious fighting in Laos. (304)
In the fall of 1967, Souvanna made his third visit to Washington during President Johnson's term. Before Souvanna's arrival, Johnson asked his advisers for "new ideas" on fighting the war in Vietnam, and some responded with new initiatives for U.S and South Vietnamese operations in Laos. (310) In discussing issues with Souvanna, the Embassy and White House officials warned Johnson that Souvanna was either ignorant of or not officially aware of much of U.S.-South Vietnamese operations in Laos. The President was advised to be discreet about those topics. (311) Most of Souvanna's conversations with President Johnson and Rusk at meetings on October 20 and 21 revolved around North Vietnam. If anything, Souvanna was more hawkish than Johnson, recommending bombing North Vietnam intensively for November and December and then proclaiming a halt. If the North Vietnamese did not respond, Souvanna recommended resuming the bombing with a vengeance. As for Laos, Souvanna told Rusk there was no going back to the Geneva Accords of 1962 unless there was peace in South Vietnam. (312-314)
In late 1967, there was general optimism about the effectiveness of the U.S. bombing campaign, including the use of B-52's, against trucks using the Lao portion of the Ho Chi Minh trail. (317, 319, 321) The President approved daytime B-52 bombing over Sullivan's objections that Souvanna was opposed to all but night missions. The Pentagon convinced Johnson that no one could recognize a B-52 from 20,000 to 30,000 feet. (315, 320) The year ended with McNamara's systems analysts in the Pentagon questioning the cost effectiveness of jet fighter aircraft as opposed to propeller driven aircraft (much slower and cheaper) in attacking North Vietnamese targets on the trail. In the controversy over whether jets or props were more efficient in the air war over Laos, neither the systems analysts nor the traditional military gave ground. Finally, the JCS satisfied both sides by agreeing to expand both the number of jet and propeller aircraft for use in Southeast Asia. (323, 326, 337)
By 1968, the U.S. commitment to the air war over Laos had grown enormously since the early days of "armed reconnaissance" in 1964. Nevertheless, in the face of a successful North Vietnamese offensive, Sullivan required more air power and asked that a U.S. air commando wing be "dedicated" to Laos. (332) Sullivan was the leading proponent of what one official called the "Sopwith Camel" approach, using prop planes to hit North Vietnamese troops at the border of Laos and North Vietnam along so-called "choke points" before they disappeared under the jungle canopy of the Ho Chi Minh trail. (334) The 7th Air Force was unprepared to dedicate planes to Laos, stating that South Vietnam was their first priority, but they promised to respond to Sullivan's requests as fully as possible. (335, 371)
In early 1968, there were ominous signs that special navigational site 85, established in north Laos at Phou Pha Thi, had come to North Vietnam's attention. On January 12, the North Vietnamese sent two single engine biplanes to bomb the site. One plane was shot down by ground fire, the other with a rifle fired by a U.S. technician from an Air America helicopter. (336) The North Vietnamese next dispatched six battalions with artillery and rocket support, closed the ring on site 85, destroyed it, inflicted heavy casualties on its Hmong defenders, and killed 11 American technicians. This secret battle deep in north Laos was the blackest day to date for U.S. fortunes in Laos. (340-343, 351)
The conflict between Sullivan and Westmoreland over the level of U.S.-South Vietnamese operations in the panhandle continued in 1968. Sullivan complained of MACV's "encroachment" and still regarded MACSOG "as [a] dubious organization of marginal value." (347) Sullivan's opposition helped to kill the plan to employ 3000 Kha tribesmen as guerrillas in Laos. (352) The defense of Khe Sanh, so near the Laos border, convinced President Johnson that Westmoreland should be allowed to employ battalion sized Prairie Fire forces in Laos in conjunction with operations in South Vietnam's Ashau Valley. (355, 356, 358, 360) The operation was eventually canceled (364), but the decision to use these extensive combat forces in Laos was an important departure for U.S. policy.
In the spring of 1968, the Department of Defense initiated a reassessment of U.S. policy in Laos. The JCS believed that the United States was too passive in Laos, responding only to North Vietnamese moves. The Tet offensive had been supported from the Laos panhandle, I, II, and III Corps in South Vietnam were in trouble in part because of support from Laos, and pacification in South Vietnam was floundering. It was time to rethink policy in Laos. (350, 354) Sullivan stated that if the United States wanted to alter its basic commitment to fighting the North Vietnamese by covert and limited methods, it had better be prepared to support Laos with U.S. troops. (359) Nicholas Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State, stressed to Paul Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense, that it was important to consider what the North Vietnamese had not done in Laos: they had not set up a rival Pathet Lao government, not engaged in terrorism, not exposed publicly U.S. ground operations in the panhandle, nor had they pushed to the Mekong. (366) There existed a unspoken mutual restraint between Hanoi and Washington in Laos; but if the United States increased its efforts, North Vietnam could also do so just as effectively.
As 1968 drew to a close, U.S. experts on Laos admitted that it had been a good year for the North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao and a bad one for Souvanna. (373, 376, 380, 383, 384) The U.S. presidential election of 1968 and the Paris Peace talks took the steam out of the reassessment of U.S. policy in Laos desired by the Department of Defense. The general feeling was that there would be no North Vietnamese drive to the Mekong so long as there was a chance for peace, but no one was convinced that the enemy did not have the capability to do so. (386, 388, 390, 392). With the bombing pause over North Vietnam, the United States committed additional air power to Laos in the hopes of righting the balance. (391, 393, 398) At year's end, there were new concerns that North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao forces might move across what had become a de facto line and threaten the Mekong towns. (397, 399) The battle for Laos was not over. In 1964, Laos was a secondary front of the war in Vietnam. In 1968, Laos was a full-fledged battlefield of the war in Southeast Asia.
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