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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
110. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-825-65
Washington, November 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 381 China, Rep of. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a December 20 letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alvin Friedman to Fearey.
SUBJECT
GRC Proposal for Landings on Mainland China1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-26555/65, dated 13 October 1965, subject as above, which requested the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to a proposed concept for Government of the Republic of China (GRC) landings on mainland China which was submitted to the Secretary of Defense by GRC Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo on 22 September 1965./2/
/2/Chiang's proposal and the ISA memorandum are cited in footnote 2, Document 104.
2. The proposed concept depends for its success on massive US naval, air, and logistic support and large-scale popular uprisings and defections once a landing has been accomplished. The use of US air and naval forces, as proposed, in a cover role only, without air and naval strikes on mainland targets, is unrealistic. The GRC has only a limited capability to strike airfields in south China. A concept which commits US forces to protecting the invasion force against Chinese Communist air and naval attacks without being permitted to strike the supporting bases is militarily unsound. Further, available intelligence provides no evidence that the mainland population would support a GRC invasion. Therefore, there appears to be no possibility of successfully executing the concept as proposed.
3. The timing and the circumstances of the proposal by the GRC Minister of Defense and the fact that it was submitted as a matter for discussion and not as an operational proposal mark it as a vehicle for increasing the scope and volume of US-GRC consultations. However, US involvement in a comprehensive bilateral study of a GRC offensive concept requiring US logistic, air, and naval support would imply a degree of US interest and encouragement to the project greater than warranted by the facts.
4. On the other hand, there are features of the concept which lead to discussion and consultation without implying US commitment. These include:
a. Concepts and strategies for dealing with the Communist threat in Southeast Asia.
b. Intelligence assessments of the mainland China situation, with particular reference to the prospects for popular uprisings and defections.
c. Critique of GRC unilateral plans, with emphasis upon factors required for success which lie outside GRC resources and control.
5. Although various aspects of the proposed concept can profitably be discussed with the GRC, existing restrictions against joint planning should be maintained. Joint planning conceivably could be considered under conditions of expanded hostilities in Asia. However, the circumstances presently pertaining in Asia and those which attend consideration of the concept at hand do not now justify joint planning for operations against the mainland.
6. Consultations concerning the proposed concept and related matters should do much to satisfy President Chiang Kai-shek that his views and experience are being given due consideration by the United States. Such consultations should serve to maintain the GRC as a fully cooperating partner rather than as a course of potential disruption to our policies and objectives in Asia. If discussions were limited to those aspects of the concept indicated above, the existing US-GRC "Blue Lion" Committee would appear to be the most appropriate forum for carrying on these consultations, as well as conducting critiques of GRC unilateral plans.
7. In summary, it is the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that:
a. There is no apparent possibility of successfully executing the concept as proposed.
b. The United States should not engage in a comprehensive bilateral study of the proposed concept for GRC landings on the mainland of China.
c. The United States should, by means of the "Blue Lion" Committee:
(1) Examine with the GRC the concepts and strategies for dealing with the Communist threat in Southeast Asia.
(2) Endeavor to arrive at agreed intelligence assessments of the mainland China situation, with particular reference to the prospects for popular uprisings and defections.
(3) Conduct critiques of GRC unilateral plans, with emphasis upon factors required for success which lie outside GRC resources and control.
d. These consultations should be conducted without committing the United States to involvement in planning for, encouragement of, or support for the proposed GRC landing on the mainland.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A.H. Manhart
Major General, USA
Vice Director, Joint Staff
111. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Berger) to the Consul General in Hong Kong (Rice)/1/
Washington, November 24, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Blue Lion Consultations. Secret; Eyes Only.
Dear Ed:
At the time of Chiang Ching-kuo's visit to Washington last September we discussed with him means of tuning up our machinery for mutual consultations. We on our side felt this was necessary because of unmistakable indications that Chiang Kai-shek felt excluded from U.S. thinking on Viet-Nam and other Far Eastern policy problems. We found our thoughts on this confirmed by Chiang Ching-kuo's repeated mention while in Washington of the need for closer U.S.-GRC consultations on policy matters.
We told Chiang Ching-kuo that we would be ready to resume the Ambassadorial level consultations of the "Blue Lion" committee, of which I think you are aware from the time you were in Washington, when our new Ambassador arrives in Taipei. At the same time we made no suggestion that the frame of reference for "Blue Lion" be relaxed and we intend to adhere strictly to "Blue Lion" ground rules in future consultations. These ground rules are:
(a) that the Chinese planners should develop detailed plans for landing on the China coast on the assumption that uprisings had occurred on the mainland;
(b) that planning is to be based upon the GRC's current capabilities, without any additional materiel support or participation by U.S. forces;
(c) that completed plans would be reviewed by the U.S. side, which would make appropriate criticisms and suggestions to the GRC.
In general the purpose of these restrictions has been to obviate any participation by us in joint military planning with the GRC in connection with operations against the mainland.
One other proposal that we made to Chiang Ching-kuo was an exchange of intelligence appraisals of conditions on the mainland. We hoped in this way to stimulate more realistic thinking by the Chinese on the possibility that widespread dissidence on the mainland would permit a successful GRC counterattack against the Communists. As by-products we might also gain additional intelligence on the Communists and further insight into GRC thinking. There has been a continuing exchange of intelligence on the Communists [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the GRC on a piece-by-piece basis; however, there has not been the more searching and comprehensive type of intelligence exchange which we have in mind.
The plan is that CIA will produce a study which, after a review in the Department and in Defense, will be submitted to the Chinese; the Chinese will produce a similar study for our review. There might then be a meeting in which we and the Chinese would discuss our studies and compare notes as to conclusions. We think it would be helpful if someone from Hong Kong's political section could participate in such discussions and we have made this suggestion to Embassy Taipei for comment.
I would very much appreciate your own thoughts on this./2/ We will in any case see that you receive copies of all materials on mainland China which are generated as a result of this exchange.
/2/Rice replied in a December 13 letter to Berger that he had "some qualms" about this. Predicting that the Chinese Communists would hear of it, perhaps in a distorted form, he commented, "Some may argue it would be useful to make the ChiComs believe we are working with the GRC on plans for attacking the mainland, but I would consider this a highly dubious and danger-fraught exercise."
With all best wishes,
Sincerely,
Samuel D. Berger/3//3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
112. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
Washington, December 4, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential. Drafted by Dean.
SUBJECT
Proposed New Policy Initiatives for December 15 Warsaw Meeting1. At the December 15 Warsaw meeting we propose to give the Chinese Communists clear warning of our intention to intensify our efforts in Vietnam with full realization of the possible consequences. To balance this strong warning we propose to say that it is incumbent upon both sides to take some steps away from a direct confrontation in the direction of a peaceful settlement. We propose to tell the Chinese that we are taking certain unilateral steps in this direction.
2. We suggest that present U.S. policy be modified to allow for the following new initiatives:
a. We would state our readiness to admit Chinese journalists to the United States without reciprocity. Our present policy is to issue validated passports to American newsmen and to press for either a formal or informal agreement on the exchange of newsmen. We have asked the Chinese Communists for such an exchange since 1959. Our efforts to secure an exchange are well known as is the Chinese refusal to agree. The offer to allow Chinese Communist journalists to come to the United States would almost certainly be rejected by the Communists, but when it became known we believe that this step would be welcomed by the American press community and the public as evidence of our desire to bring about an eventual exchange. In the unlikely event that the Chinese did accept such an acceptance would signal a major change in Peking's attitude towards the United States. We would not plan to publicize this offer until some time after the meeting.
b. Provided our travel package on doctors and scientists in the fields of public health and medicine is cleared in time for the talks, we propose telling the Chinese of the new travel regulations/2/ and informing them of our willingness to allow Chinese doctors and scientists in the same fields to come to the United States as a reciprocal aspect of such a move. While we do not plan to publicize this reciprocal aspect, we envisage at some point it will have to be made clear that we would have no objection to reciprocal visits on the part of the Chinese. We are virtually certain that the Chinese under their present policy will reject visits of Americans and will refuse to allow Chinese to come to the United States.
/2/On December 29 the Department of State announced the relaxation of travel controls to permit doctors and scientists in the fields of public health and medicine to travel to countries under travel restrictions for purposes directly related to their professional responsibilities. For the text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, January 17, 1966, p. 90.
c. We propose suggesting to the Chinese that we jointly examine their charges of air and sea violations of their territory and attacks on Chinese vessels on the high seas. If the Chinese were to accept, which is possible but unlikely, we would plan to examine with them in Warsaw each new charge. We would not plan to publicize this suggestion. It is unlikely the Chinese would reveal it to the press. If they did, it would enhance our own image of reason and responsibility.
3. I believe that these moves are important to indicate to the Chinese that we still seek to avoid a major confrontation. The moves suggested will not be interpreted as a sign of weakness since our power position in the Far East is steadily growing. But if the Chinese eventually decide to look for a way out, this approach may ease the way.
4. In the event we wish to make public the record of this talk, it would prove that we warned the Chinese of the dangers of a major confrontation and that we took several unilateral steps to hold out the possibility of an alternate solution.
5. Additionally, I believe that we should maintain a policy of firmness but transfer to Peking the opprobrium of being intransigent and hostile. Chinese rejection of the U.S. moves proposed above would serve to isolate them still further from world opinion.
6. Clearances for these three proposals have been obtained in draft from P, L, SCA, CU and SCI and are shown on the attached telegram.
7. The telegram containing instructions for the Warsaw talks is attached (Tab B) for your approval./3/ It may be advisable to send the instructions for attached translation purposes before a decision is reached on the policy decisions listed above. In the telegram, you will note that it is recommended:
/3/The draft telegram, not attached, was sent to Warsaw as telegram 863, December 10. It stated that it was an uncleared preliminary draft and that final approval would be sent subsequently. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US) Telegram 873 to Warsaw, December 11, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, approved the instructions in telegram 863 with some revisions. (Ibid.)
1. That you approve a modification in present policy to permit Ambassador Gronouski to say that we will allow Chinese Communist journalists to visit the United States without an exchange agreement.
2. That you authorize Ambassador Gronouski to affirm our willingness to allow Chinese doctors and scientists in the fields of public health and medicine to come to the United States as a reciprocal aspect of our move to permit similar professional men to travel to mainland China.
3. That you authorize Ambassador Gronouski to suggest to the Chinese Communists that we jointly investigate their charges of air and sea violations of their territories and attacks on Chinese vessels on the high seas./4/
/4/The source text bears no indication of approval or disapproval.
113. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)/1/
Washington, December 6, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret. Sent to Bundy with a January 11, 1966, covering note from Cline.
SUBJECT
Chinese Nationalist Military Forces vis-a-vis Vietnam1. One element in the balance of military forces in Southeast Asia is seldom mentioned, for reasons I find difficult to understand. This element is the half-million or so Chinese Nationalist ground forces supported by qualitatively good though small air forces and naval forces. The Chinese Nationalists are reasonably well trained and equipped and are highly motivated against the Chinese Communists and in favor of US objectives in Southeast Asia. They have argued strongly for an assault on the South China coast on a scale that would threaten logistic lines to Vietnam and probably would supply a considerable number of ground forces for employment in South Vietnam if requested to do so by the US.
2. Reluctance to use this Free World military asset stems from fears of provoking or at least providing a public excuse for Chinese Communist intervention in Vietnam. Now that some Chinese Communist troops (albeit probably logistic ones) are already in Vietnam, this nicety on our part may be somewhat anachronistic. In any case, I think we should do some serious thinking about when, if ever, and how we might employ Chinese Nationalist forces.
3. My own recommendations would be:
a. do some contingency planning jointly with the GRC for landing Chinese Nationalist forces in South China, since this will undoubtedly leak and frighten the Chinese Communists as it did in 1962; this is probably the greatest deterrent (short of US nuclear attack) we can bring to bear to keep Communist China from intervening directly and massively in Vietnam.
b. add realism to this contingency planning exercise by accepting a 10,000 man Special Forces unit from Taiwan to engage in search-and-destroy operations in the highlands area of South Vietnam.
c. in fact decide and work out realistic plans for a Chinese Nationalist landing on the South China coast (supported by US Navy and US Air Force elements) when and if Chinese Communist military commitments of troops to North Vietnam pass the 50,000 mark or result in Chinese Communist combat troop contacts with US forces in South Vietnam or friendly forces in Laos or Thailand.
4. Somehow or other the admittedly delicate politics of using Chinese Nationalist forces always suppresses serious inquiry into this subject. My own feeling is that the kind of Communist threat we face in Vietnam makes this particular political delicacy a luxury the US can ill afford. If the Chinese Communists are forcing us into a war of attrition on the ground in Southeast Asia, we should feel free to use Chinese Nationalist troops against them.
Ray S. Cline
114. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, December 16, 1965, 1527Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong. A copy of the telegram, omitting paragraph 11, was sent to the President. (Johnson Library , National Security File, Country File, Poland, Gronouski-Wang Talks)
1003. Gronouski-Wang talks. Deptels 863 and 873; Embtel 998./2/
/2/Regarding telegrams 863 and 873 to Warsaw, see footnote 3, Document 112. Telegram 998 from Warsaw, December 15, reported briefly on the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
1. 128th meeting. Prior to meeting I was introduced to Ambassador Wang and his staff. Wang regretted that he had been unable to accept my earlier invitation to have an informal conversation and tea after the meeting. He said he really had another diplomatic engagement so he could not have tea but suggested that we might get together at another time. Wang took this opportunity to mention that there had been a lot of "rumors" about the Warsaw talks lately. I assured him that neither I nor my staff would divulge contents of talks. It possible that Wang made this observation because of press commentary about my visit to Paris prior to talks or because he thought we might have used his acceptance of my invitation as basis for more "rumors".
2. Wang started meeting with some polite phrases of welcome. In brief review of talks he said Chinese government has always stood for peaceful settlement of Sino-US dispute through negotiations and that his side would continue to take positive and reasonable attitude towards peaceful settlement. He soon marred this auspicious start by expressing hope that I would persuade USG to change its wrong position and give up its aggression against China.
3. Wang's attitude throughout the meeting apparently was milder than his previous behavior. He read 20-minute long list of alleged US provocations in quiet restrained voice. He did not raise his voice when registering his government's strong protest and serious warning concerning these incidents.
4. Wang listened attentively to my statement. His interest was obviously aroused by our offer to jointly investigate Chinese claims of Chinese fishing boat incidents on high seas, but he later rejected this initiative. He also finessed our offer concerning Chinese journalists and our statement concerning validated passports for doctors and scientists in the fields of public health and medicine by labeling my statements about doctors and journalists as old problems that could not be solved until problem of Taiwan was solved.
5. Wang only became heated when, during his rebuttal, he asked what threat Chinese fishing vessels which had been attacked on the high seas offered to the US. He asked, "what right have your planes to dive and strafe. . . . We have right to fish on high seas. What threat can such small fishing boats pose? How can they prevent you from your rescue work? What right have you to kill these fishermen?"
6. Wang was careful not to make any new commitments concerning Viet-Nam. However, he repeatedly stressed Peking's firm intention to maintain its support for Hanoi. He emphasized China's defensive rather than aggressive intent and said they would fight to defend themselves. Unlike last session, Wang did not dwell at any length on opposition of American public to administration policy in Viet-Nam.
7. I believe our position at this meeting demonstrated our concern about Viet-Nam and our desire to move towards a peaceful settlement. We also indicated reasonable flexibility in our efforts to obtain some meaningful contact with the Chinese. In both my opening statement and in my rebuttal I asked Wang if his side doubted our sincerity about unconditional negotiations why didn't they put us to the test?
8. I was impressed by inflexibility of Chinese position and their refusal to give any indication of willingness to resolve the Viet-Nam crisis or anything else on any terms other than their own. I believe that others who listened to the talks will also get same impression. In this context our SY officer has tape recorded this session of talks which were broadcast by Polish transmitter concealed in or near the meeting room. (I understand our British colleagues were also aware of the transmitter in the meeting room. We may find that others also listened in.) PZPR Central Committee Plenum, now in session, may have received prompt report of our talks. If so, I suspect they also must have been impressed by our attempts reach some agreement and by Chinese inflexibility.
9. I was also impressed by Wang's evident belief that US really was hostile and had aggressive intentions towards China. He was particularly eloquent on these points during his rebuttal when he was free wheeling and not reading from his text. He appeared genuinely to believe US harbors aggressive intentions towards Communist China and inter alia twice cited US assistance to Chiang "gang" in slaughtering millions of Chinese as proof of US hostility.
10. Wang seemed to be trying to drag out length of meeting by reading long statement on ChiCom position on disarmament (largely a repeat of previous stand). At end of meeting I suggested that because of critical situation Viet-Nam, we meet next January 19. After some discussion I agreed to March 16 date. Possible that delay until March 16 may be further evidence Chinese desire to extend interval between talks but we subsequently learned Ambassador Wang and interpreter Chien will leave before Christmas for 2 months home leave plus 20 days travel time.
11. I note that Dept instructions sent only to Warsaw. Dept may wish to repeat them to interested posts together with this telegram and Embtel 998. In briefing GRC both in Dept and at Taipei suggest use of paras 5 through 17 of Deptel 863 with changes in Deptel 873, plus Wang's statements our 998, omitting Wang's comments about joint investigation para 5 and doctors and journalists para 10./3/
/3/Paragraph 5 of telegram 998 stated that Wang rejected the offer of joint investigations of Chinese fishing boat incidents. Paragraph 10 reported that Wang said concerning doctors and journalists, "We have repeatedly made clear our position--no problems can be settled until major problem (Taiwan) settled."
Gronouski
115. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Taipei, December 29, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol V. Secret. Wheeler sent the memorandum of conversation to the President under a January 11 covering letter. (Ibid.)
PARTICIPANTS
President Chiang Kai-shek
General Earle G. Wheeler, CJCS1. I called on President Chiang Kai-shek on the afternoon of 29 December 1965. The conversation lasted from 1705 hours until 1855 hours. The conversations were continued both before and after a dinner which the President gave for me that evening; however, nothing of substance arose additional to the areas covered during the afternoon call. Chinese present were: President Chiang Kai-shek; Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-Kuo; Admiral Ni Yue-si, Chief of the General Staff; and General Yu Pak-Chuan, Vice Chief of the General Staff; Mr. James Shen, Interpreter. On the U.S. side, in addition to General Wheeler, were Charge d'Affaires and Ambassador Ad Interim A. W. Hummel, Jr.; Vice Admiral William E. Gentner, Commander, Taiwan Defense Command; and Major General D. B. Johnson, Chief, Military Assistance Aid Group, Republic of China.
2. This long conversation was conducted in a friendly atmosphere and the President was calm and courteous although frank and direct (I understand from Mr. Hummel unusually so). Moreover, the President repeated several times that he desired that I convey his views to President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.
3. After the usual amenities and serving of tea, the President questioned me closely regarding our strategy in Vietnam. I responded by quoting President Johnson as to the limited nature of our political objectives (no territorial ambitions; no bases; want predator nations of SE Asia to permit their neighbors to seek their own destinies unhindered by outside forces) and our consonant military strategy in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. The President stated that not to go into North Vietnam did not make military sense; however, he understood the political reasons behind this American decision. The fact is that the Americans do not recognize the North Vietnamese as merely puppets of the Chinese Communists; the ChiComs are your enemy and must not be left untouched if there is to be a lasting settlement in Vietnam. You are already fighting Communist China by proxy; indeed, you are fighting forces trained and supported by the ChiComs. There are Chinese troops now in North Vietnam. It is time for a basic plan to be formulated to deal with the ChiComs; such a plan is entirely lacking. Some time ago MOD Chiang Ching-kuo gave the U.S. Government a plan for seizing and holding the five southwest provinces of China, thereby severing the lines of communication by which the Communists supply the North Vietnamese. To date, I have received no reaction to this proposal.
4. I replied that we knew there are Chinese railroad engineer units in North Vietnam and, probably, some anti-aircraft units. The MOD had told me that electronic intercepts revealed four infantry regiments had been deployed there also. [less than 1 line of text not declassified] As to the plan for invading mainland China, General Yu had briefed me earlier that afternoon on the concept. The requirements for such an operation were very large, as I had pointed out to the MOD the needed naval and air effort would be great. The President then made the following points:
a. I am convinced you cannot achieve any lasting conclusion of the Vietnam problem until you have settled the problem of Communist China;
b. In reaching this settlement you should use local troops to a much greater extent. You should not send U.S. troops into North Vietnam or Thailand. You should think of ways to use GRC forces, and the best way to use GRC forces is the plan I have proposed to seize and hold the five southwest provinces of China. This plan would require no U.S. ground forces; GRC ground forces could do the job and effectively sever ChiCom support to the trouble spots in Southeast Asia.
c. We know that the people of the mainland would welcome our forces. If you were to use one-half the power you are using in South Vietnam and help put GRC troops on the mainland, you could solve your Southeast Asian problems. The ChiComs are in no degree as strong as the Germans were in Europe; you would not need to involve yourselves on anything like the scale of Normandy.
d. We should make greater efforts to arrive at common understandings and common plans for action. In dealing with Asian problems, you should consult with Asians more than you do. In dealing with the Chinese Communists, you should listen more to the GRC; we have knowledge and experience which could help you.
e. I am speaking very frankly and honestly as to my convictions. I am speaking as a long-time friend of the United States, not exaggerating here and holding back a little there.
f. Please inform President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara of my views.
5. To the foregoing statements, which were not delivered in that order or in one declaration, I replied substantially as follows:
a. The planning by the GRC for invasion of mainland China should, as already discussed, be continued. I would hope that we would continue to be informed.
b. The reason I was in Taiwan was to consult with GRC officials, to attempt to see Asia through Asian eyes. I pointed out that the forthcoming visit of Vice President Humphrey would give the President the opportunity to present his views directly to the second-ranking elected official of the United States.
c. I had no doubt but that he was speaking from the heart; no one who heard him could think otherwise.
d. I would, of course, convey his views to President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara as he requested.
6. Comment: An interesting sidelight on my conversations with President Chiang Kai-shek is provided by the context of my earlier meeting that day with Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo and certain senior officers of the Chinese General Staff. This meeting lasted one hour and twenty minutes. The greater portion of that time was devoted to a general discussion of the situation in Vietnam, deficiencies in GRC forces and a discussion of Chinese proposals for additional military assistance in critical areas such as modern radars, submarines, and an accelerated F-5 program. Only about ten minutes was consumed by a briefing by General Yu, Vice Chief of the General Staff, on the plan for the invasion of mainland China to seize the five southwestern provinces and sever ChiCom lines of communications into North Vietnam. General Yu made the remarkable statement that "99 per cent of the population of the five southwestern provinces" would adhere to Chiang Kai-shek's cause. Other than that, I gained the distinct impression that the presentation was pro forma and that the military had a far better appreciation of the difficulties of transportation and air support required for such a considerable operation. At any rate, when I pointed out the logistic and other problems involved, very little rebuttal was attempted by the Chinese officers except for the implication that I overestimated the difficulties and underestimated the degree to which the Chinese people would welcome Chiang Kai-shek's return to the mainland of China. On the other hand, President Chiang Kai-shek made two demands for action in straight forward language. These were: (a) An explicit request for the United States to put GRC forces ashore to reconquer the five southwestern provinces; and (b) a complaint that the U.S. Government fails to consult him with sufficient frequency or to heed his advice when it is offered.
7. Recommendations: If one considers the age and background of President Chiang Kai-shek, his remarks are perfectly understandable. He probably recognizes that the Vietnamese War provides him with his last opportunity to return to mainland China with any hope of establishing and maintaining himself there. Moreover, he probably believes that if he were consulted more frequently he would gain influence in U.S. Government Councils which, over time, would lead to the adoption of the plan for the invasion which he advocates. In view of the fact that his military staff continues unilateral planning for the invasion, keeping our Embassy and our military personnel in Taiwan informed, we can adopt one of two tactics in dealing with him. First, we can tell him frankly that an invasion supported by United States forces is out of the question at this time; or, second, we can continue our present posture of being interested but uncommitted onlookers. I, myself, advocate the first course of action, although it would have to be done tactfully and perhaps sweetened by some addition of military assistance to assuage his pride. As to additional consultation, I believe it would be in the best interests of continued amity and cooperation for the U.S. Government to consult with President Chiang Kai-shek frequently on many aspects of Asian problems. After all, we would not be committed to accept his views anymore than the views of other Asian leaders whom we do consult on a regular basis.
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
116. Telegram From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, January 2, 1966, 1745Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International File, Vice President Trip, Far East, 12/27/65. Top Secret; Exdis. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw it.
CAP 66018. For the President from the Vice President. Report on conversation with President Chiang Kai-shek/2/ and Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won of Republic of China; Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon and President Park of Korea.
/2/Vice President Humphrey met with Chiang Kai-shek on January 1. A record of the meeting by Special Assistant to the President Jack Valenti is ibid., President's Office File, Valenti, Jack, Memoranda of Conversations, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, December 1965-January 1966. Another, sent in telegram 722 from Taipei, January 3, is ibid., National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. V. A January 5 memorandum from Humphrey to Johnson pertaining to his visit to Taipei is ibid., NSC Files, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 37.
1. The meeting with Chiang Kai-shek went about as predicted, in that he stressed the need for the United States to recognize that the real enemy in Southeast Asia was not the Viet Cong or North Vietnam, but was Communist China. He stressed as he has before that we could not expect to match Communist manpower in Asia, and that it would be a mistake to think that sophisticated weapons could replace manpower, the objective should be to utilize Asian manpower with American logistics support. He again stressed that the Soviet Union would not intervene in a situation in which a civil war would be created by a Chinese "return to the mainland," on the grounds that the USSR commitment was in the event of a U.S. attack. He would not go into detail as to the plans for returning to the mainland, or for further cooperation with the United States in combatting Communism in Asia, but said that if we can come to a consensus on the question of who is the real enemy, we can work out such details.
Rather surprisingly Chiang commented that your peace offensive was a wise and effective effort. He also commented that the Russian moves were especially significant, and should be watched very closely.
As all Asian leaders have stated, there has been a measure of concern about the U.S. intentions in South Vietnam stirred by the peace program. But I reassured him strongly that we had no intention of seeking a peace that left our friends unprotected. I parried his question as to what you would do if the peace effort failed, by saying only that this was a matter for the highest policy level, and would of course be up to you to decide. But we would undoubtedly take all measures necessary to defeat the aggression.
Chiang looks rather old, but very healthy, with ruddy complexion and obviously in full command of himself. There are no signs of senility that I could detect. He, of course, asked particularly after your health and asked me to extend to you his best wishes. The conversation was extremely friendly and cordial, and there was no effort to press for decisions, nor any hint of chagrin that he has not been consulted lately. I gave him your warm personal greetings, as I did to the Chinese people both on arrival and departure at the airport.
[Here follows a report of the Vice President's conversations in Korea.]
117. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, January 12, 1966, 1020Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong and to CINCPAC for POLAD.
761. Ref: Deptel 707./2/
/2/Telegram 707 to Taipei, January 11, reported that the Department had received reports of a GRC Navy attack on January 10 on a suspected Chinese Communist submarine in the Taiwan Strait and a January 10 UPI report that President Chiang, angered by the Communist downing of a plane carrying defectors, had ordered a full military alert and ordered ships and planes in the Strait to shoot on sight. It requested Embassy's views. (Ibid.)
1. Embassy has been kept informed by military [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
2. We know of no order such as that reported UPI story.
3. Jan 10 depth charge attack by GRC Navy on alleged sonar contact in straits is evaluated by US naval authorities as unlikely to be against real target but is rated as "possible". Sonar contact reportedly made at depth of 33 fathoms (198 feet) which is beyond depth ChiCom subs likely to be maneuvering. ComustDC advises no US or known friendly subs in vicinity.
4. There is no question that the GRC has lost prestige in this and other incidents. President Chiang is reportedly provoked and has directed Minister Chiang and Admiral Ni to conduct an investigation into the HU-16 incident.
5. On day after shooting down of amphibian, Air Force C in C Gen Hsu approached C in C Pacaf General Harris (who was visiting Taiwan) and ATF-13 Commander, General Wilson. Hsu indicated continued ChiCom provocations such as the destruction of the amphibian and recent ship sinking would require a "change in GRC policy". This was later developed as meaning GRC would have to take reprisal actions. Hsu cited knocking out a radar site and harassment of ships, as possible examples of limited actions intended. Both US officers declined to consider proposal and said this sort of action must be taken up at govt to govt level.
6. Embassy reasonably confident that GRC does not plan unilateral military action at this time. Chiang Ching-kuo had direct request for prior consultation from Asst Secretary Bundy in Washington in September, and indirectly from me in November./3/ He has clearly stated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that military actions (as opposed to intelligence raids) will be consulted upon before execution in accordance US-GRC Defense Treaty. We also have independent confirmation that Ching-kuo is saying same thing to MND officers. General Hsu demarche, as well as GRC Chief of General Staff Ni demarche to comustdc Admiral Gentner Dec 17 (reported separately) are also indications GRC intention to consult.
/3/A briefing paper of June 22, 1966, prepared for Rusk's July visit to Taipei, states that on November 27, 1965, after intelligence reports indicated impending GRC military actions against the mainland, Hummel, acting on instruction, emphasized to Vice Foreign Minister Sampson Shen the U.S. expectation of consultation before any such operations were undertaken. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 59) Further documentation on this episode is ibid., INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, China, 1965.
Hummel
118. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 13-5-66
Washington, January 13, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Raborn and prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S Intelligence Board concurred on January 28 except the AEC and FBI representatives, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
The Problem
This estimate focuses on the two factors which dominate the economic scene in Communist China: a huge and rapidly growing population living close to the margin of bare subsistence, and the regime's determination to invest in costly weapons programs.
Note
We noted in NIE 13-64, "Economic Prospects for Communist China" (28 January 1964), that the information available for an appraisal of the Chinese Communist economy is fragmentary, uneven in coverage, and uncertain as to reliability. There has been no significant improvement; although open-source information is currently supplying somewhat more data on production trends, these data are still spotty and consist mainly of percentage increases over an unknown base. A major intelligence collection effort is focused on this target, and continuing efforts are made to increase its effectiveness.
Conclusions
A. Communist China has managed in the past five years to pull the economy back from the brink of catastrophe and has made progress in its programs to acquire modern weapons.
B. The Vietnam conflict has not yet added serious strains to the Chinese economy. However, a sustained increase in the level of fighting in Vietnam, if accompanied by a comparable rise in Chinese assistance as well as significant defensive measures within China itself, would add greatly to China's economic problems.
C. In any event, the Chinese economy faces slow growth, at best, over the next few years. The primary causes will be lagging agricultural production and a burgeoning population, but these problems will be complicated by the ambitious military program and by the inefficiencies brought on by Peking's ideology. In agriculture, despite somewhat greater support in the last few years, the regime is still not doing enough to achieve the yields necessary for sustained economic growth. Since Peking's birth control program will have little early effect, population pressure on the food supply will increase over the next decade. This narrow food margin makes the economy highly vulnerable to bad crop conditions. Moreover, growing competition for resources in China's sluggish and nonresilient economy seems likely gradually to undermine economic stability.
D. In the face of even a critical food emergency, the present regime would probably make only grudging and piecemeal cuts in its military programs. Although China will continue to be a dangerous and growing military threat, we believe that some future Chinese leadership will be forced to a fundamental concentration on China's economic problems.
[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
119. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, January 25, 1966, 1040Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House.
797. Ref: A. Deptel 728;/2/ B. Depcirtel 1387, 1390, Deptel 741./3/
/2/Telegram 728 to Taipei, January 19, transmitted U.S. comments on the proposal that Chiang Ching-kuo gave to McNamara on September 22 and instructed Hummel to convey them to Chiang Ching-kuo. (Ibid.)
/3/Circular telegrams 1387 and 1390, January 22 and 23, and telegram 741 to Taipei, January 23; not printed. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
1. Yesterday evening Jan 24 I delivered messages contained reftels to Chiang Ching-kuo. Meeting lasted over one hour. I took along comustdc VAdmiral Gentner.
2. Would not have been advisable follow instructions Ref B which stated I should try to convey substance Pres. Chiang, because to do so would have invited reiteration of Great Torch Five (GT-5) as solution for Vietnam. I considered it important, therefore, to deliver message Ref A first, and decided to deliver Ref B to Chiang Ching-kuo at same time, making clear that two instructions not directly related.
3. CCK showed considerable disappointment and irritation. Stated that GRC had tried to make helpful suggestion in honest belief that US has no way to solve Vietnam without solving ChiCom problem. Said it is not good that US refuses to discuss GT-5 and stops the planning; it will have bad effect on GRC morale and won't help USG. Said US is making mistake, and that someday such a plan might be used, even if not now, and that planning now for the eventual contingency would be useful.
4. Gentner and I several times pointed out that we wish to broaden Blue Lion consultations to include discussion of concepts and strategies, even though we do not wish to discuss "plans". CCK replied that he understood US position very well. Said that if USG unwilling even consider this kind of operation, in light USG view of weakness number one (Ref A, para 4-A)/4/ there was little point in continuing discussion.
/4/The statement in paragraph 4 of the two fundamental weaknesses of the plan is similar to the statement in paragraph 3 of telegram 762, Document 120.
5. I pointed out that exchange of intelligence appraisals should continue since it had bearing on weakness number two (para 4-B), but CCK said he saw little point in this. When I asked if he did not wish to continue plans for exchange of appraisals, he seemed to reconsider. Said that everyone should know that there could be no significant rebellions on mainland without outside pressures and without a place to defect to. Said when time came and GRC forces landed with US backing there would be defections. I agreed that we would not expect actual rebellion or defections at present time, but that intelligence appraisals might show some indications which could be used in estimating likelihood of defections. CCK doubted there could be such indications, but insisted that defections would occur when mainland attacked. Cited recent IL-28 and LCM defections as evidence and pointed out that both had occurred even in absence of battle conditions. Stated that in wartime many more defections inevitable. Said that ChiComs obviously fear their own people and that GRC is best judge of state of mind of people on mainland.
6. On para 5, CCK brushed aside as useless any further discussions of unilateral GRC plans in Blue Lion framework. Said that without US help no plan could succeed. Said that while GRC does not want or need US ground forces would obviously need other help. Therefore unilateral planning is pointless.
7. He repeated at some length arguments we have heard before. Said that ChiComs only fear strength, and that US show of weakness only encourages aggressive acts. Said that ChiComs have stated that US forces total only 2 million, which must be divided into half million for US itself, half million for eventual use Vietnam, half million for other areas, leaving only half million for use on mainland China, which would not be nearly enough and which ChiComs do not fear.
8. CCK asked if US answer to Great Torch Five was related to present Vietnam peace offensive. I repeated my earlier statement that two instructions coincidental, and pointed out that answer on GT-5 was result of Washington examination over several months. GT-5 and peace offensive related only in general sense that they both involve Vietnam, and that US is not at war with ChiComs and therefore cannot consider the air strikes against mainland that would be necessary under GT-5.
9. CCK said he would convey request for views on Vietnam (Ref B) to his govt, but said GRC had already given its views on recommending GT-5 as only long-term solution to Vietnam problem.
10. CCK calm and controlled throughout, but obviously disappointed and irritated that proposal which GRC had hoped would open door to joint consideration of future contingencies had been turned down flatly. He came close to saying that exchange of intelligence appraisals useless, and he did say he saw no point in further Blue Lion plans. He brushed aside suggestion for broadening scope of Blue Lion to include discussion of concepts and strategies. How much of this was quick reaction that will be reconsidered later, we will have to wait and see.
11. At lunch today Jan 25 which CCK hosted in honor of Senator Miller and Congressman Dorn CCK got me aside and said he had not yet reported to Pres. Chiang. Said that when he did he wanted to be sure he was conveying accurate summary of USG reaction, and asked if I could furnish informal written summary. He said next day would be soon enough, and went on to say he thought we should continue discussions these topics. I replied I would try to furnish written document, perhaps morning of Jan 26, and that I thought it very important for us to continue discussions.
12. Believe that CCK may now be worried about Gimo reaction, and hoping for some softening of language Reftel A which would minimize reaction. Also probably wants to be sure he is accurately conveying US intentions, although his aide and interpreter Col. Pat Wen took notes, and there should be no confusion.
13. Recommend that Dept send me soonest text of summary of Ref A which could be passed as informal document, unheaded, undated and unsigned. If possible summary should contain insertion of words "at this time" in appropriate spots, and should amplify para 7 to indicate what is meant by broadening of Blue Lion concept.
14. We are still faced with strong advisability, if not necessity, of having some future contingencies in mind which we can talk to GRC about. So far our responses, when viewed from GRC perspective, have been entirely negative except for assurances of future discussions of general strategy, and exchange of intelligence on mainland. CCK's reaction shows that the day is past when we can give GRC sensation of being consulted and having its plans seriously considered without some demonstration of "give" in US views. Blue Lion framework served very useful purpose in previous years, but is inadequate now.
15. Believe Dept not willing to consider discussions of specific contingencies under which GRC forces might be used, and I also believe this is wise. However would be very helpful if we can say something along following lines: "Vietnam situation still contains several unused US options for further US pressure and suasion. Until we have explored these we are unwilling to consider any significant action against ChiComs, even through agency of GRC. At some later time, after more US options have been exercised and if there is still no hope for a settlement in Vietnam, we would re-examine our premises. In meantime we are still anxious to exchange views on present situation, and to discuss basic concepts and strategies."
16. This telegram not repeated info CINCPAC because of exdis Pinta slug on some references. Dept please repeat appropriate portions.
Hummel
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