The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

11. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, January 29, 1964, midnight.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Limdis.

680. At two and one half hour meeting with President this evening, Ambassador, visitor, FinMin, Ching-kuo and interpreter Shen. After generalities President asked how we viewed the future. We replied three steps: first, prevent French-Communist [China] consummation of their proposed establishment relationships, second, urge other nations not to follow, third, support GRC, and fourth, strengthen and develop backing for GRC in United Nations.

Asked President if he had any proposals. President answered, under US policy of open door and accommodation very little to suggest. If commie regime not overthrown or destroyed PM [PRC?] will swallow up GRC and all others opposed.

After discussion President said first step to study French objectives. Three years ago de Gaulle sent emissary to President who suggested GRC abandon exclusive reliance on USA and make France third partner. Quid pro quo would be exchange of Ambassadors. This first unmistakable indication French motives to expel US and UK, restore French influence all Southeast Asia and to pursue alliance with Chicoms for this purpose. Latest attitudes towards Laos and Cambodia neutralization, and Chicom recognition all verify.

President said US failed to realize the effect on morale of GRC people and forces caused by deteriorating situation in East. State of mind frail and brittle. Danger Chicom will seize and capitalize on this and overcome his country by infiltration and subversion.

President said he must have some way of reassuring his people that he will never agree to two-Chinas situation. So long as there is no two-Chinas there will be hope for return to mainland and high morale in his people and forces. If we had taken steps to recover mainland three years ago, French recognition would not have happened. If we move against the mainland French recognition of us would be of no importance. Once we take this action it will have reassuring effect on morale of people and forces. He said if GRC had been left alone they would have taken such action to restore the mainland three years ago. However, he is well aware of US attitude and has no intention to act at present time.

If we fail to take some action which will have a similar effect on maintenance of morale we will open the gates to infiltration and subversion in which the people and forces would be demoralized and the Chicoms could take over without the use of force and by their well-known tactics of "peaceful liberation", in which the Seventh Fleet would be helpless.

Knowing US policy well, could not the GRC ask the United States come forth some formula to maintain morale of people and armed forces?

The President said he had some views on this subject. There are three interrelated war zones: South Vietnam, Korea, GRC. Collapse of one will affect the other two. French recognition creates a new situation in South Vietnam where commies will use French influence to sabotage US actions with view to forcing US to pull out. Effect of pull out would be such that US prestige would suffer so much that no reassurances would prevent demoralization in Korea and the GRC.

The President said he would submit three proposals: Plan one. US take the lead to establish a four-nation alliance of US, Korea, South Vietnam and GRC, such that armed forces of one would be at disposal of others for movement to troubled areas.

Plan two. A three-nation alliance of Korea, South Vietnam and GRC with US to give only its blessing, air cover and naval support.

Plan three. The GRC make separate bi-lateral agreements with South Vietnam and Korea with same US support which would permit exchange of forces for mutual support.

Note that in plans two and three US could officially stand aside providing only support. He said plans two or three were a minimum requirement for the maintenance of stability and morale in the area. Frankly he does not see how US can maintain position in South Vietnam without some such alliance which would permit use of GRC troops. There followed detailed discussion three plans including effect on Laos, Burma and Thailand.

Asked about Japan. President said Japan was out. Her constitution would not permit it. Communism and infiltration have gone too far and her country is now divided in two, one under Ikeda and one under communists. US should not overestimate role of Japan in the East.

President said at his last meeting with General Marshall that if US persists in its policy mainland will fall to communists. Same applies today to all Southeast Asia and GRC.

Discussion concluded with assurances of careful US consideration and generalities.

Foregoing is a brief of long discussion much along previously reported lines.

Comments:

1. President appears to think French-Chicom relations an eventual fact.

2. President seems deeply concerned over morale of nations in area and particularly people and military forces of GRC.

Wright

 

12. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, February 10, 1964, 9:17 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-FR. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received at 9:04 a.m. Repeated to Paris, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and USUN. Passed to the White House, OSD, Army, Air Force, Navy, and CIA.

736. Embtel 735./2/ At a twenty minute meeting with the President at 1800 today he confirmed the arrival of the French communication delivered orally to the Foreign Minister by French Charge Pierre Salade this morning. He considered this as an official communication from the French Government.

/2/Telegram 735 from Taipei, February 10, reported a conversation with Shen, who stated that the French Chargé had made an oral statement to him that day that France would exchange diplomatic representatives with Peking soon and that once the Chargé from Peking arrived in Paris, the French would consider him as the representative of China; consequently, the Republic of China diplomatic mission would lose its raison d'etre. (Ibid., POL 1 CHICOM-FR)

President said he had cooperated with the United States in his handling of the January 27 announcement and the January 31 press conference but he considered that the French message delivered by the French Charge had ended the period of manuever. He said that at a meeting of his government after arrival of the message he had decided that the relations of the GRC and the Government of France had been terminated by the French communication. I said that in speaking for the United States all our efforts had been bent on forcing the French to take the initiative and I hoped that in handling this matter the GRC would assure by all means available that the responsibility for this action in the eyes of the world rested squarely on the French. The President replied that there was no doubt in his mind that the French Government with the delivery of the French Charge message had in fact taken the initiative.

The President then asked that I convey to the Secretary of State and President Johnson that relations between the GRC and the Government of France had by French action ceased to exist.

There will be an emergency Cabinet meeting at 2100 to decide on the form in which the French action will be announced. The Premier stated there would be an announcement to the press tonight.

I have urged the Premier and Foreign Minister to get the French message in writing to facilitate a clear public understanding but both have stated that they considered that the meaning of the French message was clear and unmistakable and therefore a written statement would not be requested. I repeated to Premier and Foreign Minister the need for wording of their announcement so as to make it clear that the initiative for breaking relations had been taken by the French.

Wright

 

13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, February 12, 1964, 7:46 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHINAT-FR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Popple, cleared by Bacon and in the Bureau of Public Affairs, and approved by Green. Repeated to Hong Kong, Paris, Tokyo, and USUN.

727. Taipei's 753 Dept; rptd Paris 55, Tokyo 223, Hong Kong 272, USUN 23./2/ Dept. shares your disappointment with manner GRC handled severance relations with France, and agrees that maximum advantage of tactical maneuver was lost through GRC failure put onus for break clearly on French.

/2/Telegram 753 from Taipei, February 12, recommended that Wright be authorized to express to President Chiang the U.S. disappointment that the GRC announcement of February 10 failed to place the onus on the French for the break in diplomatic relations. (Ibid.)

On other hand, press here has learned of French action which led to GRC announcement of break. As result, over past two days editorials and news analyses have presented facts fairly accurately.

Under circumstances, Dept. feels that little to be gained by raising issue directly with President Chiang at this time. However, you might consider bringing to GRC's attention informally and at lower level our concern over lack of adequate consultation as described reftel and consequent adverse effect on ability U.S. provide maximum support in maintenance GRC international position.

Rusk

 

14. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, February 26, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, China (CPR), Nuclear Explosion/Capability. Secret.

Mac--

I've been sitting on attached Chicom nuclear paper,/2/ on assumption you'd hardly find it urgent business.

/2/Reference is to a draft policy statement of October 15, 1963, prepared in the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State. (Ibid.) For information concerning it, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXII, p. 399, footnote 1. For the summary portion, see the Supplement to that volume.

Walt's first hope is that LBJ will look at the conclusions (at my suggestion he summarized them in letters to McNamara, McCone, etc.)./3/ LBJ really should be told about these, because they reduce the problem to proper perspective, i.e. not much of a military threat but of some political "scare" potential. If you agree I'll do a one-pager for weekend reading./4/

/3/A January 24 letter from Rostow to Bundy enclosed a copy of his January 21 letter to McNamara. (Both Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, China (CPR))

/4/A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting next to this sentence reads, "Yes." The word "weekend" was crossed out and the word "night" added in Bundy's handwriting.

Walt also wants a NSAM. This seems quite unnecessary at this point, and you'll agree when you see horrendous draft attached./5/ Paper is mostly of educational value, and has already largely served its purpose. If a high level ad hoc group is really needed for follow-up action (I'm of two minds),/6/ why couldn't this be discussed in SG and then set up by Rusk (with WWR as chairman).

/5/A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting next to this sentence reads, "Not needed yet." The draft NSAM, with a drafting date of January 24, is in Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, China (CPR).

/6/A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting connected to the words "ad hoc group" reads, "Not now, in my view. Ad hoc groups are over employed on more urgent stuff."

JCS have done some comments, which further complicate picture./7/

/7/The JCS comments on the October 15 draft statement have not been found. A JCS memorandum to McNamara (JCSM-986-63), December 14, 1963, responded to a memorandum of July 31 from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William Bundy to the JCS Chairman requesting a contingency plan for an attack with conventional weapons on Chinese Communist nuclear weapons production facilities designed to cause severest impact on and delay in the Chinese nuclear program. The JCS memorandum of December 14 indicated that such an operation was feasible but recommended consideration of the use of nuclear weapons for such an attack. Both memoranda are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, 471.61 China Reds.

WWR is also poking around in pre-emptive action field. Do we want this?/8/

/8/A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting connected to this sentence reads, "I'm for this."

RWK

 

15. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency's Deputy Director for Intelligence (Cline) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/

Washington, March 2, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Top Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum of March 2 from McCone to Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and Harriman suggesting that a warm communication be sent to Chiang Kai-shek promptly "in the interests of rekindling confidence."

SUBJECT
U.S. Relations with Republic of China (Taiwan)

1. My trip to Taipei last month succeeded in getting the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) to postpone breaking relations with France for two weeks, thus forcing both Peiping and Paris to make clear that France was obliged to drop its diplomatic support of the GRC in Taiwan as the price of establishing relations with Peiping. This was a gain for the U.S. since many nations would recognize Peiping if they thought they could maintain diplomatic relations with "Two Chinas." Few nations have followed the French lead because it became clear that any nation recognizing Peiping had to go all the way and recognize its right to take over Taiwan and its twelve million non-Communist people.

2. President Chiang Kai-shek agreed to this delay out of respect for President Johnson's direct request to do so, but pointed out (correctly) that the French had sold out to Peiping and would force a break between Paris and Taipei. He also said this would be a shattering blow to morale in Taiwan, particularly among the Mainland Chinese element in his Armed Forces and Government.

3. President Chiang requested that his views be conveyed to Washington, along with his recommendations for actions to restore morale in Taiwan and build up U.S. prestige in Southeast Asia. I summarized these views in the form of an oral message for President Johnson and provided it to Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman and McGeorge Bundy about three weeks ago. A copy is attached./2/

/2/Not attached to the source text. A copy is filed with a covering memorandum of February 8 from Cline to Harriman, which states that he had left the original with Bundy for the President. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Subject Files, Cline, Ray S.)

4. This memorandum is intended to call to your attention some information on which I orally briefed Governor Harriman and McGeorge Bundy. It is that (a) I found the morale of GRC officials exceptionally and dismally low; (b) a senior Chinese General had attempted on 21 January 1964 to lead the crack 1st Armored Division against Taipei to overthrow the Government (of course, he failed); (c) President Chiang told me personally in highly emotional tones that a continuation of present U.S. policy in Asia, which he feels will end in Chinese Communist control or domination of all East and Southeast Asia, will create a situation in which the GRC cannot survive; (d) many officials in addition to President Chiang felt that present trends would bring a military coup in Taipei against the present Government within two years because of frustration with inability to return to the Mainland and a feeling that U.S. military, economic and political support was weak and waning.

5. In view of the seriousness with which these views were impressed upon me, I feel that they should be seriously considered by the U.S. Government. My own feeling is that a strong U.S. initiative in Vietnam would buck up morale in Taipei, but I think it would be dangerous to assume that we can always take stability and friendly cooperation on the part of the GRC for granted.

Ray S. Cline

 

16. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 3, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, China, Vol. I. Secret.

Here is a proposed telegraphic reply to Chiang Kai-shek's letter of 1 February (Tab B)./2/ He also sent an informal message via Ray Cline (Tab C)./3/ The Gimo is of course very worried by what he sees as the eroding of the GRC's position because of French recognition of Peiping and our troubles in Vietnam.

/2/Attached but not printed; the letter was transmitted in telegram 700 from Taipei, February 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM)

/3/Not attached, but see footnote 2, Document 15.

The Gimo seizes the occasion to urge some of his favorite ideas, such as a new GRC-ROK-South Vietnam security pact, stepped up GRC action against the mainland, and perhaps sending GRC troops to help out in Vietnam. Chiang also feels strongly that serious US setbacks in the Far East would bring a military coup on Taiwan within two years.

US reactions to Chiang's fears vary widely. Cline takes them quite seriously. On the other hand, a senior State official who visited Taiwan about the same time reports that GRC officials below the very top level are quite pleased with their undoubted success in making a going concern of Taiwan./4/ We doubt in any case that a GRC-SVN alliance or an overt GRC troop commitment would help enough to counteract the real risk of justifying Chicom counteraction.

/4/A memorandum entitled "Recent Observations in Taipei," with name and date removed, was sent from Harriman to Michael V. Forrestal of the NSC Staff on March 4 and from Forrestal to Bundy on March 5. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. I) A copy of the memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Economic Affairs Robert W. Barnett to Harriman, March 3, is in Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, R.C. 1964, POL 2. Barnett visited Taiwan February 5-8. The Embassy's report on his visit was transmitted with airgram A-738, March 6. (Ibid., Central Files, ORG 7 FE)

So the best bet seems to be a friendly response showing Chiang that we take his concerns seriously and are studying them, but not committing us in any way as yet. Such a message is at Tab A./5/ Rusk, Harriman, and Cline concur, and I've edited it for suitable warmth./6/

/5/Not attached to the source text, but see Document 17.

/6/A notation on the source text in Komer's handwriting states, "Approved by Pres 6 Mar. in my presence. RWK."

R.W. Komer

 

17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, March 6, 1964, 3:53 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON. Secret; Limdis. The telegram indicates that it was drafted by Popple on March 3, cleared by Harriman and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Green, but an attached note of March 6 from Bundy to Read states that it was approved by the President. See also footnote 6, Document 16. The original draft, attached to the source text, indicates that it was cleared by Cline, Green, and Harriman, and approved by Rusk.

820. Please deliver following letter to President Chiang from President Johnson:

"March 2, 1964. Dear Mr. President: I greatly appreciate your letter of 1 February, which I have most carefully studied. I should also like to thank you for the cordial reception given Mr. Ray Cline. He has reported fully on your strategic concerns and recommendations with respect to the situation in Asia.

Your views on world problems are always much valued here. We too are actively concerned over possible trends in the Far East, though I can assure you that we intend to meet our responsibilities squarely and are confident that the forces of freedom will not be found wanting.

I am also confident that through continual close consultation and coordination our two governments will find mutually acceptable solutions to the problems which particularly concern us. As to steps which might be taken to offset the adverse effects of France's deplorable recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, some of the suggestions which you and your officials have made are already being carried out and others are under intensive study. I am asking Ambassador Wright to discuss them with you in detail, and to keep in closest touch with your represent-atives so as to ensure full coordination.

As a matter of primary urgency, I believe it essential to mount an intensified diplomatic effort to strengthen your country's international position, especially within the United Nations. We want to cooperate fully with you in this effort, but you must take the laboring oar.

We further intend to take steps to cope more effectively with Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, which, as you emphasize, poses grave risks to all free world countries whether or not they acknowledge it. In this connection we have again reviewed our bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements in Asia, along the lines you have suggested. Our tentative conclusion is that these arrangements are basically sound and can effectively deter Communist encroachment in the area. We do intend, however, to take steps to improve their practical effectiveness.

We recognize that your Government is already making a significant contribution to assist the valiant people of South Vietnam, and we believe that there may be additional areas for cooperation between your Government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to reiterate the view endorsed by President Kennedy in March, 1962, that the United States would regard with great satisfaction developments on mainland China in which freedom might be restored to the Chinese people. I hope that through further close consultation and planning our Governments can agree on actions which will demonstrate to people everywhere the inevitable defeat of Communist aggression. Secretary Rusk will discuss these matters with you when he visits Taipei in April.

I recall my visit to Taiwan with great pleasure. I hope that your health continues to be excellent and that Madame Chiang has recovered safely from her recent illness.

Warmest personal regards,
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson"

Rusk

 

18. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, March 12, 1964, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon, Seoul, and Paris.

852. Deptel 812 and 820./2/ I delivered Pres Johnson's letter of Mar 2 to Pres Chiang on Mar 10. Others present were FonMin Shen, Chiang Ching-kuo, James Shen (interpreter) and DCM. He had already seen translation made from advance copy we delivered to Foreign Ministry. He asked whether I had any comments to make on the letter.

/2/Telegram 812 to Taipei, March 4, transmitted guidance for Wright's discussions with Chiang Kai-shek and other GRC officials on the U.S. reaction to recent GRC proposals. (Ibid., POL 16 CHICOM) For telegram 820, see Document 17.

I said I had no comments to make on President Johnson's letter, but I had received instructions from the Department concerning proposals he had made in conversation with Ray Cline and me on January 29 and certain other proposals subsequently made by Foreign Minister.

I then gave him US reaction to his three alternative proposals as instructed paras A, B, and C, Deptel 812./3/ I wanted to avoid implying that, by suggesting he explore feasibility bilateral arrangement with Seoul, US was prepared to support such arrangement in terms his original suggestion. Consequently, I added that I was not authorized to state that US would be prepared to provide air, naval, or logistic support to any bilateral arrangement that might be reached.

/3/The reference paragraphs provided responses to Chiang's plans one, two, and three, which he proposed during his meeting with Cline and Wright on January 29; see Document 11. The responses were negative, except for the suggestion that Chiang might consider exploring the feasibility of a bilateral arrangement with South Korea.

I then outlined support US giving to GRC international position citing EEC, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Senegal, Congo, (Brazzaville) and FRG.

President then asked what was meant by statement in President Johnson's letter that "there may be additional areas for cooperation" between GRC and GVN.

I responded with substance of para G, Deptel 812 on subject of financial assistance and land reform, saying I believed this probably represented part of what President Johnson had in mind, although I had been given no interpretation.

The President asked whether he was correct in inferring US was not in favor GRC sending a representative to Viet-Nam at present to discuss possibility of alliance as we had suggested he do with respect Seoul.

I repeated our view that situation in Viet-Nam is too sensitive at present for such action and we hoped he would defer undertaking any such initiative.

I told President that I had reported to Washington what Foreign Minister Shen had told me March 8 concerning difficult situation faced by GRC in Brazzaville. We hoped GRC would find it possible to keep mission there until situation clarified. If withdrawal should be considered advisable, we hoped onus could be placed on Brazzaville and that GRC would closely consult with us on steps considered necessary. I then read to him Dept's 833./4/

/4/Dated March 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHINAT-CONGO)

President said he had nothing particular to say at this time. He believed he understood the meaning of what I had told him and asked whether the Secretary was definitely coming on April 16.

I replied that I had reported that the President would be glad to see him on April 16 and I believed that he was now definitely planning to come.

President said that matter we had discussed could be gone into fully with the Secretary.

Wright

 

19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 16, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. I. Secret. A notation on the source text reads: "President read. 3/19."

Relations with the Chinats. Your reply to Chiang's messages and our other actions appear to have calmed Taipei for the moment.

The Gimo will naturally keep talking up his pet ideas for a stronger anti-Chicom posture: (1) a US-backed alliance of Vietnam, S. Korea, and the GRC; (2) a Chinat landing on Hainan; and (3) sending GRC and ROK troops to help in Vietnam. However, we should be able to fob off these ideas, all of which have serious drawbacks on present reading. Rusk's mid-April stopover in Taipei after Manila SEATO meeting will be a further safety valve.

Meanwhile we're doing our best to prevent further erosion on the Chirep issue. Fortunately, the French Africans have not all followed DeGaulle. The GRC itself is also playing a cannier game, which is encouraging.

Chiang keeps talking of the risk of military coup on Taiwan if the GRC's international position collapses. But our new NIE on GRC prospects (43-64)/2/ is more reassuring. Its chief conclusion is that:

/2/NIE 43-64, March 11, is entitled "Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China." (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110)

"A. French recognition of Communist China, together with fears about the strength of the US position in the Far East and the firmness of US Far Eastern policy have further damaged the morale and confidence of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC). However, we believe that, unless the GRC leadership becomes convinced that the US is abandoning Taiwan and the anti-Communist cause in the Far East, the GRC will live through this setback relatively intact and that it is also likely to survive subsequent blows arising from recognition of Peiping by other important powers and from a bitter struggle over the UN China seat. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that a crisis might precipitate a radical change in the makeup or policies of the GRC."

R.W. Komer

 

20. Letter From the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Wright) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Taipei, March 30, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 CHINAT. Secret. The source text is stamped, "Mr. Bundy has seen."

Dear Bill: I am sure you are familiar with the "Blue Lion" Committee organized for the purpose of examining Chinese capability plans for operations against the mainland under conditions of a mainland uprising. The Committee was specifically excluded from examining plans for employment of U.S. forces in support except for Taiwan defense.

The Blue Lion Committee work has been largely responsible for getting across to the President and the GRC a factual and realistic evaluation of their chances of success in such operations. This realization has resulted in the relatively quiescent period of propaganda and effort by the GRC in "mainland recovery" plans and for this reason has done a splendid job.

Recently the GRC, entirely on their own initiative, has expanded their planning to operations against Hainan Island. This goes beyond the Blue Lion terms of reference inasmuch as their plans assume:

1) A U.S. requirement for the operation,

2) The employment of U.S. air, naval and logistic support forces.

To clarify the situation I called a meeting of the Blue Lion Committee and have attached hereto the minutes of the meeting./2/

/2/The meeting is recorded in an enclosed March 27 memorandum of conversation. Wright stated at the meeting that the U.S. representatives were not authorized to study and comment on any plans that presupposed the use of U.S. forces except in the defense of Taiwan.

If you or Defense have any views that we should proceed with requirements planning, please advise and we will act accordingly.

Sincerely,
Jerauld Wright

[Continue with Document 21]

Return to 1964-1968, Volume XXX index
Return to the U.S. Department of State Home Page

This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.