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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

130. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Poland/1/

Washington, March 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Dean. Cleared by Jacobson, Berger, Stoessel, and Colonel Cowherd in FE for Defense.

Dear John:
I have inquired about Bob McNamara's reply to your inquiry which you mentioned in your letter of February 12./2/ I understand that a close check has been made of the Chinese charges of incidents on the high seas and that Bob will be writing to you shortly.

/2/In Gronouski's February 12 letter (ibid.) he referred to a December 17 letter to McNamara, in which he observed that Wang had referred repeatedly, and with emotion, to incidents of strafing of Chinese fishing boats on the high seas by U.S. planes and asked whether steps could be taken to avoid or at least minimize such incidents. (Filed with McNamara's interim reply of December 30; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 381 Communist China)

In view of your recommendation/3/ we have decided to drop the idea of shifting the talks with the Chinese to each other's Embassy in Warsaw. The Chinese are undoubtedly aware of the Polish microphones and may be talking to the Poles and the Russians as well as to us. Nevertheless, until we detect any sign of change in the Chinese attitude we may as well continue with the present venue.

/3/Gronouski commented in his February 12 letter that he thought it was "useful" that the Poles and the Russians had first-hand knowledge of the substance and tone of the talks and that the United States should as much as possible gear its presentations to the Poles and Russians.

The instructions for the next meeting are being prepared and they will get to you in sufficient time to allow you to make any comment or suggestion you may desire. I hope the next meeting goes off well. While I don't expect any basic change in the Chinese position, it will be interesting to see if Wang brings back any new attitudes from his recent meetings in Peking.

With best regards,
Sincerely,
Dean/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

 

131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, March 9, 1966, 6:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-CHINAT. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Colonel Berry in DOD/ISA/FER and by George L. Warren in G/PM; cleared by Fearey, Director for Operations in G/PM Howard Meyers, and in draft by Adam Yarmolinsky in DOD/ISA; and approved by Berger. Also sent to CHMAAG CHINA and COMUSTDC and repeated to CINCPAC and CINCPAC for POLAD.

884. Ref: Taipei's 837./2/ Joint State/Defense message.

/2/Telegram 837 from Taipei, February 4, urged reconsideration of proposed reductions in the military assistance program for the GRC. (Ibid.)

1. Country Team's concern expressed in reftel fully understood and appreciated here. We recognize some lessening of overall GRC capabilities is implicit in the revised MAP dollar guidelines. It has been judged here however that this is consistent with established US objectives and security.

2. The revised MAP guidelines are based on the Secretary of Defense draft Memorandum for the President on MAP FY 67-71, elements of which will be reflected in forthcoming revision to Military Assistance Manual. Following planning guidance derived from draft Memo to President has State Department concurrence and is expected to be published in revision of Part I, MAM:

"a. The size and nature of the forces which the US would support through MAP can be properly determined only after comprehensive analysis of (1) the US ability to augment local forces against the threat, and (2) the types of forces that can be more effectively produced and maintained by the recipient country than by the US.

b. Our major MAP programs should take larger account of the growing mobility and combat power of US general purpose forces, while realistically reflecting the degree of commitment of those forces. This should, of course, be done in the context of other US objectives, particularly those of a political nature.

c. US military assistance will not be designed to support the GRC objective of returning to the mainland.

d. Estimates regarding the type and size of GRC forces required to defend Taiwan and the Penghus against serious attack should be based on the firm premise of major participation, from the opening day of hostilities, by US naval and air forces.

e. While the US is firmly committed to the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, US policy leaves to Presidential discretion whether to treat an attack on the offshore islands as an attack on Taiwan. The US is not committed to the defense of the offshore islands.

f. It would be in the US interest to maintain a continually modernized GRC air force of roughly the current size, and a navy similar to the one now in existence but with a reduced amphibious capability. Such forces are necessary both to supplement US capability and, in the event of a limited ChiCom challenge or probe, to provide the GRC with a capability to engage alone, permitting the US time to assess the situation and determine whether to commit its own forces or reserve them for a more serious challenge.

g. Planning will be based on reducing the GRC force level from the present 612,000 to 458,000 at the end of FY 1971. The major change from the present will be a reduction in the Army of 146,000 men. Particular emphasis should be put on modernization of the GRC Air Force and the pattern of expenditures for the services should work toward the proposed force goal of 458,000 men. Such a force can be sustained and kept reasonably modern, particularly as to its Air Force, with MAP aid in the range of $90-100 million for the early years of the planning period. Thereafter a total grant military assistance of $70 million will be sufficient, particularly if combined with a relatively modest sales program. During this entire period, efforts will be made to integrate grant military assistance with the sales program.

h. We should make clear to the GRC our view that their forces are too large in relation to the threat, and that the US is not prepared to underwrite modern GRC forces at their present level, in part owing to the stringency of military assistance funds. It is recognized that the GRC will probably attempt to maintain a larger force structure than we deem desirable, and may well increase their defense spending in order to purchase additional military equipment. We should, as appropriate, argue the merits of a smaller GRC force.

i. The GRC will be encouraged to assume some of the operating costs presently borne by grant military assistance so that a higher proportion of grant military assistance can be applied to force investment."

3. The dollar guidelines are based on the assumptions that: (1) MAP investment, starting with FY 67, will be limited to that required in support of end-FY 71 objective levels of forces, (2) adequacy of current inventories of equipment will be judged against end-FY 71 force objectives, and (3) MAP operating cost support will be phased down on straight line basis from actual MAP-support levels of FY 66 to end-period objective levels in FY 71.

4. In context of above guidance, dollar guidelines are deemed sufficient to (1) provide MAP support for operating costs of the reduced numbers of supported forces on same basis as contemplated for forces in current MAP plan, (2) provide complete replacement of F-86F and C-46 aircraft, (3) provide average of about six million per year FY 67-71 for investment in Army/Navy/Marine forces. This, plus modest sales program, would seem to provide adequate support for GRC forces.

5. Also of significance is the outlook presented by delivery figures as contrasted to program figures used in reftel. Total deliveries FY 64-67 estimated $390 million for four-year shortfall of $110 million from NPP objective, rather than $152 million shortfall between NPP and program figures shown in reftel. Looking to future, deliveries expected to average about $95 million through FY 70 with shortfall of deliveries against NPP averaging $30 million per year FY 63-70.

6. Impact on GRC militarily, politically, and economically of a reduced MAP is likely to be gradual since the reduction itself is spaced over a number of years and MAP level for FYs 66-69 would still be higher than FYs 63-65. Consequently, we do not expect GRC reaction to take extreme or dramatic form.

7. We agree that as reduced MAP gradually becomes apparent, GRC would probably seek offset by increase in its own military expenditures. We also agree that economic effect this added expenditure would be increased by MAP shift and disappearance of military budget support. Yet, leaving aside the question of desirability of supplying under US military sales program military hardware which we were unwilling supply under MAP, the question remains whether extent of additional GRC military spending would actually cause serious economic setback or extensively undermine economic development achievements. We believe that regime is sufficiently aware of importance of economic viability to security of state that it would seek to avoid this. In final analysis of course, there is little US could do to prevent GRC from allocating whatever funds it believed necessary to maintain its military establishment but this is a choice the GRC itself must continually make and not a choice which we force upon it.

8. We do not believe gradual reduction MAP will cause GRC reluctance to support Viet-Nam related proposals. GRC leadership has consistently identified Viet-Nam conflict as matter of vital GRC national interest. Stationing of US aircraft and visits to Taiwan of R&R personnel provide substantial economic windfall. Improvement of US facilities and additional US deployments all contribute to GRC security.

9. We do not believe that reduction of GRC MAP combined with increasing commitment US military forces in area to Viet-Nam conflict would necessarily lead to increased ChiCom aggressiveness in the Taiwan Straits as long as military assistance to GRC continues at a level adequate to insure defense in combination with available US forces. In view of general US military buildup in Pacific area we believe US military strength will remain sufficient to insure ability of US to continue to meet obligations under Mutual Defense Treaty.

10. We recognize that cost estimates which form basis for dollar guidelines have not had benefit of comprehensive analysis by country team and CINCPAC and we look forward to such analysis in planning cycle now underway. While policy remains firm that MAP dollar levels must be minimum required to serve US security interests, your comprehensive evaluation will be given full consideration in our continuing reviews. Many questions and details remain to be resolved such as what strength in armor is to be MAP supported, to what extent will MAP support the modernization of GP vehicle fleet, etc. In meantime, MAP planning should proceed in such way as to enable all concerned to identify easily those forces and programs which are and those which are not MAP supported. For example, we consider it essential to base computations on adequate support for specific divisions and none for others, rather than to plan inadequate and indefinable level of support for all divisions.

11. We appreciate your comprehensive analysis set forth in reftel and assure you that your opinions will be given continuing consideration as US objectives and total strategy are constantly under review.

12. It would be useful for Country Team to explore with Bundy question level credit sales program. Taiwan may well be one of the candidates for early application of President's policy (1 Feb 66 Foreign Aid Message) to shift gradually from grant to sales basis in military assistance program when this can be done without jeopardizing security interests or progress of economic development. GRC has substantially increased foreign exchange reserves in recent years. According to DOD, GRC has under current consideration significant purchases of items from Germany, including materiel to support objective of returning to mainland. Would therefore seem appropriate that US should seek to influence GRC to direct foreign exchange materiel procurement toward high-priority items included in grant MAP short-fall list.

Rusk

 

132. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, March 12, 1966, 0707Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

964. For Berger from Bundy./2/

/2/Assistant Secretary Bundy visited Taiwan March 10-12 and transmitted a brief summary of his talks in telegram 965 from Taipei, March 12. (Ibid., POL CHINAT-US) Detailed reports of his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek on March 11 and with Chiang Ching-kuo on March 11 and 12 are in telegrams 972, 973, and 974, all dated March 14. (Ibid., POL 7 US/BUNDY) Briefing material for his visit is filed ibid., ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Bundy Visit to ROC, March 10-12, 1966.

1. Central theme of talks with Gimo and CCK has been alleged threat of ChiCom action against Taiwan in near future. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will report intelligence aspects, which so far as we can see do not add up to any clear likelihood or imminence as of now./3/

/3/[text not declassified] telegram [text not declassified] to the Department of State, March 12, stated that the GRC had a report that the Communists were considering a surprise airborne attack against Taiwan as a preemptive measure to prevent the use of Nationalist troops in Vietnam. (Ibid., Central Files, POL CHICOM-CHINAT)

2. I have of course assured both that in event of such action our treaty commitment would come into play and there could be no doubt of our action. I also said that I was sure ChiComs knew as much. Nonetheless, after long discussion during my talk with Gimo yesterday, CCK came in briefly this morning to say new evidence just received [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and to urge that we include in next Warsaw conversation clear reminder to this effect.

3. I told him I thought this would present no problem to us, but that I would refer to Department and Embassy could let him know. We must have covered topic many times, and I urge we do so again, probably in low key and without indicating we have any special indication such action likely. Please advise Embassy of action taken./4/

/4/Telegram 899 to Taipei, March 12, reported that a U.S. statement at the next session of the Warsaw talks would include a specific reference to the continuation of U.S. defense commitments to allies in the Far East, including the GRC on Taiwan. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-US)

Hummel

 

133. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, March 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 3-2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Rusk.

SUBJECT
From Lee Kuan Yew to Chiang Kai-shek: Far East--March 1966

Around our Chiefs of Mission Conference, I paid visits to Japan (briefly), Viet-Nam, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Republic of China. This memorandum gives the highlights of my observations, drawing briefly on some of the broader policy points already covered in the "highlights" summary of our Baguio meeting, but primarily on my own observations.

[Here follows discussion of the area in general and of specific countries.]

7. Republic of China.

a. Fear of Basic Change in US Policy. Although the travel regulation on scholars/2/ was calmly received while I was there, the current US discussion is doubtless stirring some fears.

/2/On March 10 the Department of State announced that it would consider on an individual basis applications from scholars for travel to restricted areas. For text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, pp. 491-492.

b. Chinese Representation. This is the real touchstone. I delivered our message of "deep concern" and laid out the negative factors fully. They got the message, and it was certainly wise not to take it further at this stage. I suspect we will be hearing from them, and that the argument must be raging in high quarters as to whether they should pull out if the worse comes to the worst and some formula is presented that offers the possibility of membership to Peiping. If they are to come to the right answer, they must deeply believe that we are doing everything possible to help them (e.g., in Vanguard below) and that, at least for the present, we are doing our utmost to prevent unwise initiatives (e.g., as has already been done with Canada).

c. The Gimo. The Gimo is currently in a state of mild jitters, reflected in excessive dwelling on the ChiCom threat to Taiwan but more conspicuously in the most unwise proposals for drastic emergency powers that we know (from highly sensitive sources) that he has been putting forward. I believe we can cushion his fear of ChiCom action--if indeed it is real--and his reaction to our continued negative attitude on the Mainland planning seemed resigned. The internal reorganization could be more serious, although the final proposal--apparently much modified by C.K. Yen and others--will not be too hard to present to the world, especially in view of its pairing of reorganization with possible elections within Taiwan. The underlying problem apparently is the Gimo's fear that his death could produce a chaotic succession situation. Although the succession has now become much more uncertain than we had supposed--with Chiang Ching-kuo's stock down and health uncertain, and C.K. Yen's elevation--it is hard to see why it should be so chaotic as the Gimo appears to believe. Ching-kuo and Yen are personally close and both strike me as being at heart "realists" who do not really accept the Mainland mystique. As to the reorganization, all will depend on what is actually done under it, and we need to do some talking in the right places when the plan is surfaced.

d. MAP and Military Facilities. I encountered moderate pressure on MAP, but I think this can be met if we maintain roughly the planned levels. They fully expect to spend more money of their own, including $5-10 million of military sales from us. They know we want them to reduce their forces, but unless the economic pinch gets much worse it seems wholly out of the cards that they will do so. There must be a latent argument within the GRC on military spending, and this could indeed break into the open if the Gimo departed. For now, his voice is decisive on the military side of the argument, and my judgment is that--having made our basic view quite clear--we would be wasting credit to no good purpose to hammer any harder. The whole MAP argument now has additional coloration from the fact that the GRC is giving us significant air and naval facilities, to the point where our air transport squadrons will shortly be taking over the Chinese areas of their major air base. So far, my visit gave no indication that they would use this leverage overtly, but the time may come.

e. Economic Planning and Vanguard. This is our most important action decision. I was tremendously impressed both by their internal agricultural policy and by their expanded plans for Africa. They have now appealed specifically for our support of the latter through the use of PL-480 wheat to generate local currency. We ourselves would get a proportion of the currency, and, since our local currency supply runs out in the fall, this would substitute for gold flow. But, more basically, the "exchange of resources" (K.T. Li's phrase) involved in our assisting a significant technical assistance program for food in Africa seems to me a good buy in its own right, with the major additional factor of its relation to the UN problem. While it can be argued that the Chinese have the money themselves, their external accounts are now slightly adverse. In short, I would recommend favorable consideration of the PL-480 proposal.

f. New Ambassador. Hummel's excellent performance and their satisfaction with our nominee have somewhat muted the official concern over the delay, although one must assume that recent newspaper attacks have been to some extent inspired. The situation is deeply unsatisfactory on balance, and particularly so with the kind of talking that we may soon have to do on the UN and other issues.

 

134. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 14, 1966, 7:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy. Confidential. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw it.

Staying Loose on China Policy. I'm convinced that China is fast becoming a major foreign and domestic issue again, and needs careful watching. Though I gather that the VP's "hint" of flexibility was strictly his own (and rather premature, to say the least), why not let it serve as a sort of trial balloon?

To withdraw from what was rather grossly overplayed by the press would only start another debate with our VN critics, and also force us to eat crow later if, as Secretary Rusk has twice indicated, we may yet be forced to make a virtue of necessity and accept an adverse Chirep vote in the UNGA.

On the other hand, to start shifting our China policy now--before we've carefully assessed all the implications, would be risky. We still lack any firm feel for where the electorate stands, or for how our Vietnam enterprise might be affected.

Yet there may be a way to have our cake and eat it too. It is to move gradually to the same stance toward Peiping as we now have toward Hanoi--i.e., if these people will only stop their subversion and aggression and live peacefully with their neighbors, we are prepared to re-examine co-existing peacefully with them. It is not we who are isolating Red China, but Red China which is isolating itself. If we're going to be forced to adjust our China policy sooner or later anyway, there is virtue in doing so in a way which puts the monkey on Peiping's back.

I don't want to overdo this prickly issue, only to urge the case for staying loose till we can sort it out better. Signs of US flexibility would offend Korea, the GVN, and above all Taiwan, but be quite a plus with most other friends. More important is whether such signs would tend to undermine our Vietnam stance or serve rather as a diversion protecting our Vietnam flank.

R.W. Komer

 

136. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Moyers)/1/

Washington, March 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Moyers Memos. Confidential. A typed notation on the source text reads "Revised Version." A handwritten notation on the source text reads "Bill--note p. 2." Subparagraph 4(b) begins the second page.

SUBJECT
The China Hearings and the Vice President's TV Remarks

At the suggestion of Hayes Redmon, here are some thoughts on how to handle both the Fulbright China hearings and Humphrey's remarks on China as highlighted in today's newspapers:

1. The Administration is in luck, so far, on both China and Vietnam during the present phase of the Fulbright hearings. Two of the country's top Asian specialists, Fairbank and Barnett, have supported us on Vietnam and have offered constructive suggestions rather than sharp criticism on China.

2. The Fairbank/Barnett central thesis on China policy is "containment--yes, isolation--no". This is a useful and memorable shorthand for describing a rational policy.

3. As of this morning's papers, the Administration, through the Vice President, appears to have adopted both (a) a friendly and positive approach to the China hearings, and (b) the Fairbank/Barnett thesis itself, i.e., "containment--yes, isolation--no".

4. Recommendation:

I would urge that we now make the VP's line the official Administration position. It gives us just the room for maneuver that we will need in the months ahead. It should also help to avoid an unhealthy polarization on China policy. Furthermore, it need not be billed as a new policy.

In talking to the press, our stress should be that:

(a) Of course we welcome such hearings on the problem of China, a matter of continuing concern to all the nations of the world, and one on which dispassionate discussion and public education can only be useful; and

(b) We do indeed pursue a policy of containment but not isolation--in fact, we have attempted to pursue such a policy for a number of years now, and as the situation permits, we will attempt to find new ways to reduce China's isolation, despite the fact that China has been responsible in large degree for isolating itself from us.

On this latter point, it should be noted that:

(a) We have sought an exchange of journalists with China since 1959--over 80 American newsmen now have valid passports, but the Chinese won't let them in (only Edgar Snow, admitted as a "writer", not a journalist);

(b) We have authorized various categories of Americans to travel to Communist China--most recently specialists in medicine and public health last December and scholars as of last week--but again the Chinese won't let them in (case of Dr. Samuel Rosen, ear surgeon, in 1964);

(c) We have expressed our willingness to see China participate in international disarmament talks;

(d) We have left the door open since 1962 to the commercial sales of grain to Communist China, if application should be made (despite Peking's denunciation of any trade relations with the U.S.);

(e) We have privately made clear our willingness to admit to this country Chinese journalists and other specialists (scientists), but none have applied; and, of course,

(f) We talk to the Chinese regularly at Warsaw--the latest meeting is this Wednesday./2/

/2/March 16.

In other words, the Vice President's statement does not indicate a "new policy"; it is rather a description of our continuing and expanding efforts to find ways to lessen the belligerence of the Chinese Communist regime and to bring the people of the mainland into a more peaceful relationship with the world community.

Jim

 

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, March 16, 1966, 2050Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong and passed to the White House.

1536. Ref: Embtel 1535./2/ Prior to opening of meeting I asked about Wang's home leave and welcomed him back. He seemed reasonably relaxed and courteous. In course of conversation I mentioned he had missed Governor Harriman's visit when he was on home leave. Wang laughed and said perhaps it was just as well. An army of photographers which had been lurking at the door was admitted by mutual agreement. They left ten minutes later and I opened with an expression of my personal sympathy for the victims of the recent earthquake in Hopei. I used Department's guidance in Deptel 1331 [1303]./3/ Wang listened with considerable attention, despite length of statement, and took extensive notes.

/2/Telegram 1535 from Warsaw, March 16, reported briefly on the 129th meeting of the Ambassadorial talks that day. (Ibid.) Gronouski reported in detail in airgram A-697, March 21. (Ibid., POL 1 CHINAT-US)

/3/Telegram 1303 to Warsaw, March 10, conveyed guidance for the meeting. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-US)

Wang's response seemed short and almost perfunctory. He read it with a calm and almost detached air quite different from his more emotional charges of the December meeting. Part of his problem may have been the lack of substance in his charges of US military provocations against China. He could only muster up serious warnings 397 and 398 (without details), a GRC plane and two US robot planes shot down and March 2 attack on Chinese fishing vessel which caused no damage. Wang threw in Taipei Sofa agreement, Kung Kuan Airbase, and US Air Force activities and lodged what he termed a strong protest and serious warning through me to the USG. He said he wanted to tell us in all seriousness that the Chiang clique had been long repudiated by the Chinese people. "Taiwan will certainly be liberated by Chinese people and US will never succeed in perpetuating its occupation of Taiwan."

Wang then charged that US since last meeting had taken grave steps to expand its war of aggression in Viet-Nam. He listed resumption air raids, Honolulu Conference, increase US troops in South Viet-Nam, allied assistance, building bases round the clock in SVN, and Thailand, to accommodate more troops "to slaughter SVN people." Said US mopping up operations in SVN burned, killed and destroyed. Claimed US used poison gas and toxic chemicals. Said US was using more barbarous means than those of Hitler and was not only expanding effort in Viet-Nam, but was trying to spread war flames to Laos and Cambodia in attempt save self from defeat in SVN. Said if US dared spread war flames to all of Indochina, its efforts will only meet with more disaster, defeat and nothing else.

Wang then lodged protest about bombing Chinese Consulate Phong Saly, saying it was deliberate act of provocation and that he was instructed once again to lodge strong protest to USG. Wang said US actions proved US, not China, is aggressor. He repeated claim China does not have single soldier stationed in foreign land. Said US can solve no problem by attacking China and continued with comments reftel on Chinese determination to fight to end.

Wang mentioned US peace talks plot and said test of US sincerity is whether or not US honors Geneva Agreements with withdrawal all troops, US must accept DRV's four points, Front's five points, and recognize Viet Cong as sole legal representative of SVN people.

Wang then dredged up and dusted off April 1964 draft-agreed announcement on Taiwan Straits. Repeated it and said US acceptance was only way to effect improvement in Sino-US relations. "If USG really has sincere desire for better relations it should accept the draft-agreed announcement."

Wang ended his initial presentation with this parting thrust. I responded by reiterating that we had no hostile or aggressive intent towards his country. Said we had treaty obligations protect Taiwan against attack and said we hoped for peaceful solution this and other problems in Far East. If we could agree to renunciation of force in Taiwan Straits this would be major stride towards peace. I also dwelt at some length on US sincere desire for peace in Viet-Nam. I told Wang that I would request a further investigation by DOD on Phong Saly charge and would let him know if there were any results of further investigation at next meeting.

Wang responded by repeating charge focus US strategy has shifted to Far East. He said "aggression against our fraternal neighbor is also a threat to our country so we can by no means sit idly by. . . . These are facts and you cannot deceive others by lies . . . so long as you refuse to change your policy it is impossible to improve relations." Wang said US has no right to say that there should be renunciation of force in Taiwan Straits. "As everyone knows, it is an internal affair and US has no right to interfere. . . . The only means to improve relations is for US to withdraw forces from Taiwan and Taiwan Straits."

Wang said that his side not fundamentally opposed to talks but in problems like Viet-Nam it impossible have talks because US aggression in Viet-Nam absolutely unjust and violation Geneva Agreements. He said as long as US refuses to change its policy our talks about a relaxation of tensions is false. Also said it impossible for his side take part in disarmament discussions because US not sincere. In mentioning prisoners, Wang said his government's policy was to give time off for good behavior. But said this a matter for Chinese Government to decide. Made no mention of Captain Smith./4/

/4/Reference is to Captain Philip E. Smith, USAF. The New China News Agency reported on September 20, 1965, that a U.S. F-104 plane had been shot down by PRC aircraft over Hainan that day and that Smith had been captured. Telegram 406 to Warsaw, September 21, instructed Cabot to send a letter to Wang Kuo-ch'uan stating that the plane's navigational equipment had malfunctioned, expressing regret for any intrusion it might have made inadvertently into Chinese airspace, and requesting that Wang's government facilitate Smith's release and return. (Ibid., POL 31-1 CHICOM-US) Cabot reported in telegram 445, September 22, that he had done so. (Ibid.)

I made brief reply to Wang's statement. Wang then ended by complaining about leaks of the talks by USG officials. He cited three instantly (including that reported in Embtel 1535). I think it is advisable when mentioning the talks in the future to avoid any reference to substantive content. Wang proposed next meeting for June 22. I told him I extremely busy in mid-June with Poznan Fair and other travel, and suggested mid or late May. Wang suggested May 25 and I agreed. Meeting lasted three hours. After meeting I gave Wang copy of testimony on China before Zablocki committee and then asked him, in interest of becoming better acquainted, to dinner at my home with his staff during week of April 3. He did not reject invitation, but received it courteously. After deliberating he said he would let me know.

As reported Embtel 1534/5/ our security officer has again taped broadcast of meeting. During meeting strange whirring noises occurred occasionally in nearby closet attracting attention of Chinese as well as ourselves.

/5/Not found.

After the meeting I gave brief, very general press statement. NBC and CBS then taped a television interview in my office.

Gronouski

 

138. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, April 6, 1966, 0813Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHICOM-US. Secret; Exdis.

1086. For Bundy.

1. In last week or so Embassy has encountered serious concern in GRC about eventual drift of US policy toward greater accommodation with Communist China. This is result of estimate of long-range effect of domestic US policy debate, not conviction that administration has decided or intends to decide to change its attitude. However, those GRC officials with long memories, and this includes all the senior people, seem to suspect that US fear of war with ChiComs, coupled with what they believe is manipulation of US debates by subversive elements, will result during coming months in relaxation of US determination to prevent UN admission of ChiComs. In short, they seem to think that we may reenact some events of 1945-50 when, in their view, Communist and leftist elements cleverly and successfully manipulated US policy. This is nonsense of course, but there are, it seems to me, some compensations in this belief, since it may be better for US officials to be considered dupes than thought to be knaves.

2. My own recent exposure to this has come April 2 in conversation with Premier, April 4 in meeting with group of Legislative Yuan members (both memcons pouched),/2/ and yesterday when accompanying Ray Cline in call on President Chiang. Other Embassy officers report similar concerns, and newspaper comment and speculation has also reached high level. Phrase "containment without isolation" has been center of much of this discussion, with newspapers using Chinese word for "containment" that means something close to "isolation" and then complaining about faulty US logic.

/2/Enclosed with airgram A-807 from Taipei, April 6. (Ibid., POL 1 CHINAT-US)

3. Cline's conversations being summarized separately,/3/ but mention should be made here of unusual tenor of Pres Chiang conversation yesterday. This was only meeting Cline had with Gimo. Chiang seemed glum and discouraged; he made little effort to be communicative, which struck us as strange in light his long friendship with Cline and energetic and forthcoming atmosphere of previous talks. Cline's talks with CCK were much more relaxed and friendly. They showed little CCK concern over ChiRep.

/3/Not found, but see Document 142.

4. Chiang accepted gracefully our assertions that US policy is firm, but clearly believed some change will occur whether USG now intends it or not. Said he believed elements in US were doing to US Govt what had been done to GRC on mainland by ChiCom subversives. Appeared much concerned by recent alleged Japan Gaimusho spokesman statement that US problem this year would be to keep GRC in after ChiComs voted in. Said "if that occurs, how can we stay in the UN?"

5. Chiang declined to give his views on Southeast Asia when asked by Cline, saying only "I have nothing to say; I said it all in my letter to President Johnson after his election/4/ and I've said it on many other occasions."

/4/See Document 69.

6. I realize problems of trying to give unequivocal assurances to GRC in light of probable UN situation this fall, and of other factors involving US domestic scene and Peiping reaction. However I strongly recommend we attempt some reassurance. This could be done in two ways: (a) through continued high level public denials of change in US attitude toward ChiComs entering UN, and (b) personal and private message, preferably from President Johnson to Chiang Kai-shek. Latter message should if possible refer to recent public discussions among Americans who are not in administration, and express resolve not to allow true USG position be misunderstood in third countries.

7. Also desirable would be beginning, if it has not started already, of intensive consultations on UN estimates with GRC officials in Wash and N.Y. Conclusions about US domestic pressures now being drawn by GRC are detrimental to our objective of convincing GRC that any change in US tactics in UN will be result not of USG desire for change but of our hard estimate of UN situation.

8. Ray Cline and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have seen this cable.

Hummel

 

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, April 14, 1966, 5:41 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bennett, cleared by Dean and FE Public Affairs Adviser Richard L. Sneider, and approved by Fearey. Also sent Priority to Tokyo, Seoul, Wellington, and Canberra.

1048. 1. Assistant Secretary Bundy April 14 called in Chinese, Korean and Japanese ambassadors to explain that Marvin Kalb CBS broadcast morning of April 14 citing statement by Secretary before Zablocki committee as evidence that US-China policy changing is completely without foundation./2/

/2/The texts of Kalb's broadcast and Rusk's March 16 statement before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs are attached to a memorandum of April 16 from Read to Walt Rostow. The memorandum stated that Rusk had made revisions in the statement before giving it to the Subcommittee for publication; Kalb had seen the original version and had drawn inferences from a revision concerning the Chinese representation issue. (Ibid., POL 1 CHICOM-US)

2. Bundy said it had been our plan give text Secretary's statement to ambassadors prior publication originally planned for next week. Since press leak had occurred we making it available to the ambassadors' governments at once and will send copies to embassies later in day. (Text of statement being transmitted addressee posts by septel.)/3/

/3/The text was transmitted in circular telegram 2012, April 14. (Ibid.)

3. Bundy flatly denied there any change in US-China policy, as he said would be clear on reading text of Secretary's statement. Said there no implication whatever in Secretary's statement that US, as claimed in Kalb broadcast, moving toward two Chinas. Referring to Kalb mention of Secretary's reference to invitations to Chinese Communist scholars to travel to the US, Bundy said no policy change involved as reciprocal travel always considered implicit in categories authorized by Dept travel to restricted areas, namely newsmen, doctors, and scholars.

4. Australian and New Zealand embassies also informed.

5. Embassy requested convey ASAP to Foreign Ministries full text Secretary's statement, making foregoing points.

Rusk

[Continue with Document 140]

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