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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
150. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 17, 1966, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Moyers and to Special Assistant to the President Robert E. Kintner.
Mr. President:
This recommendation from Secretary Rusk/2/ is something of a landmark since it recommends to you that we begin to shift off our present policy toward Communist China in the UN, starting with talks in Taipei.
/2/Rusk's May 14 memorandum (Document 149) was attached.
I have the following thoughts, aside from underlining the need for the highest degree of security:
1. On the domestic scene it would be helpful if General Eisenhower could be brought aboard at some appropriate stage. I believe he warned President Kennedy that this was the only issue in foreign policy where he might take out after him. If the facts were laid before him by Secretary Rusk, and you put the issue to him, it seems to me possible that--as in the case of birth control--he might shift his position.
2. We are putting a heavy burden on a new ambassador to ask McConaughy to take up this question with the Chinese on Formosa immediately after his arrival. In traditional oriental style, a shadow may lie across his term as ambassador, as a bringer of bad news. It may be wise to let Averell start the conversation. At least the question ought to be put to Secretary Rusk.
3. It may be wise to caution the Canadians hard against a leak, since we plan to tell them of our Taipei probe.
4. Before approving finally the Taipei probe, you may wish to have a final session walking around the problem.
Walt
Set up a meeting/3/
Let it go/3/This option is checked on the source text.
151. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, May 17, 1966, 1929Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis.
4920. For the Secretary and the President from Goldberg. US-Canadian talks re ChiRep.
1. Goldberg, accompanied by Butterworth, Sisco, and Pedersen called on PriMin Pearson. FonMin Martin and Under-Secy Ritchie also present on Canadian side. One hour's conversation devoted almost exclusively to China reflected Pearson's and Martin's strong feeling there is need for movement on ChiRep issue at UN. Both stressed that they under strong pressure domestic opinion to make some change. Both feel Red China should be subjected to world opinion at UN. In responding to their views Goldberg adhered to line contained Goldberg-Rusk memo to Pres./2/ Our impression is that over coming weeks Canadians will develop and refine their ideas on "two Chinas" tactics for discussion with us. Pearson and Martin gave categoric assurances, however, that no move would be made by Canadians without further consultations with us. Pearson seemed firm on need to protect GRC's position at UN, saying that Canada would be "hard put not to vote in favor of a two-China res"; at same time it would be "hard put not to be against res which would expel GRC".
/2/Document 149.
2. Goldberg reviewed ChiRep experience in last GA, indicated no change had been made in our policy but matter had been reviewed by Secy and himself in recent days and was under active consideration. Our assessment, based on 47-47 vote, that past traditional tactic unlikely to hold, particularly since Africans, who will be pressing at UN on Rhodesia and SWA, cannot be relied upon in such circumstances to maintain line on ChiRep.
3. Alluding to Pearson speech, Goldberg indicated interest on our part in any new thoughts Canadians had developed, stressing at same time that no new move be launched before we had opportunity for full consultation with Taipei as well as other key Asian friends such as Japan, Australia, Thailand, and Philippines. Said we would talk to Canadians again after we had talked to Chinese to try to induce more realistic understanding of situation by them. In meantime stressed US talking only to Canada and not even to UK in this sense. Asked Canadians to respect our confidence.
4. Pearson said if asked whether his speech indicated change in Canadian view he would reply to effect that, yes it represented sense of need to bring Communist China into contact with world but also that Communist Chinese views and behavior and their conditions on UN membership made it difficult to see how change could come. Said we could be guaranteed of Canadian confidence and that they would give us their views on how to proceed.
5. Goldberg stressed as he had earlier with Martin that he thought neither US nor Canada had yet examined carefully enough what effect of change in ChiRep policy might be on USSR. Sovs might think we were doing it only to embarrass them in relation to Chinese. We had important objectives with Sovs, such as nuclear treaty and non-proliferation, and would not want to jeopardize Sov movement toward West. Pearson said Sovs difficult to talk to at best and ChiRep would be subject almost impossible to discuss with them. Agreed to importance of factor and said they would give it consideration.
6. Pearson said he very conscious of difficult situation ChiComs would create in UN. Thought this period we would have to ride through. Noted Molotov and Vyshinsky had been about as difficult and nasty as possible but that exposure to UN over years had ultimately moderated their behavior. Suggested exposure to counter-debate might similarly make it difficult for ChiComs to maintain outside China some of more outrageous positions they took at home.
Goldberg
152. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 20, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Exdis.
SUBJECT
Draft Warsaw Instructions1. The instructions for the next meeting between Amb Gronouski and the Chicoms on May 25 present many issues. The President has expressed his personal interest and desire to clear the instructions himself.
2. The attached draft (Tab A)/2/ has been cleared in Defense and throughout the Department, except for the ACDA reservation noted in sub-paragraph e below. The following are the key points:
/2/Not attached to the source text, but see Document 153.
a. The discussion in paragraph 5 of the May 12 incident, particularly the last sentence.
b. The general language of assurance in paragraph 8. This substantially repeats prior language, but obviously takes on special importance at the present time.
c. The discussion of South Vietnam in paragraph 9. This too repeats themes previously used, but emphasizes them specifically in order to cover in detail two points raised by the President with Ambassador Gronouski: that we would cease bombing in Vietnam if there were an appropriate response, and the underscoring that our objective in Vietnam is a peaceful settlement.
d. The discussion in paragraphs 11-14 of our peaceful intentions toward Communist China. This too repeats earlier themes, but the tone is important.
e. The discussion in paragraph 16 of the Chicom proposal concerning non-first use. In this paragraph, ACDA has a reservation concerning the first three full sentences at the top of page 7 ("Mr. Ambassador . . . convenience.") These sentences have been cleared with Defense, but ACDA points out that they imply our willingness to accept a non-first use agreement, which as you know we have consistently rejected in Europe and which, in Asian terms, would be inconsistent with our actual military plans for the defense of Korea and Taiwan. The question is whether we wish to be this responsive when we know that in fact we could not accept a non-first use agreement which did not cover other types of forces and weapons. Defense reports that Secretary McNamara believes that this degree of forthcoming response is warranted, without significant risk. Ambassador Gronouski strongly favors it. Our own inclination is that this would not be a serious risk, but we must weigh the possibility of leak and serious concern in Seoul and Taipei.
f. The extensive discussion in paragraph 16 of our willingness to engage in disarmament discussions, and the specific communication stated in paragraph 17. The President has told Ambassador Gronouski that he wishes the message to emphasize our interest in disarmament and our wish for serious discussions. Mr. Sisco has prepared the message in paragraph 17 specifically in order to smoke out the Chicoms on the WDC exploratory group. There is general agreement that these elements of the instructions are wise, but I flag them for your attention.
3. In preparing these instructions, we have re-evaluated the proposal discussed with you last week that we give the Chicoms a message suggesting a meeting at Foreign Minister level. Such a message might be furnished in writing, and could be done at any time without regard to the specific date of the talks. In the last two days, Messrs. Ball, Johnson, and Thompson have concurred in the judgment that in the existing political circumstances in South Vietnam such a message at the present time would only be construed as a sign of weakness by Peiping, and would not have the positive effect we had envisaged a week ago. Thus, it would be our recommendation that we put this on ice for the present, while arming Ambassador Gronouski with a draft message which could be readily reviewed and authorized if the circumstances changed at any time. Ambassador Goldberg's views are discussed in the note from Joe Sisco attached at Tab B./3/
/3/The attached memorandum from Sisco to Rusk, May 20, stated that he had had a further talk with Goldberg "with a view to getting him to go along with" the draft message to Gronouski without the proposal for a meeting at the Foreign Minister level and that Goldberg was "now agreeable" to this provided that Gronouski was given a draft message with the proposal which could be reviewed and authorized "as soon as circumstances changed."
4. In view of the President's desire to review this finally, and Ambassador Gronouski's departure Sunday, there would be advantage if you could complete your review not later than Saturday./4/ For this purpose I am asking S/S to make a simultaneous immediate distribution of this memorandum, with the draft instructions, to Mr. Ball, Ambassador Thompson, Ambassador Johnson and Mr. Sisco. Ambassador Gronouski has already seen it and concurs.
/4/May 21.
5. If you approve these instructions, subject to any amendments you may make, I will prepare a Read-Rostow memorandum for submission to the President. You might wish to indicate by checks (in the margin of paragraph 2, above) which points in this memorandum you would specifically wish me to include in the memo to Rostow.
Recommendations:/5/
/5/Rusk initialed his approval of recommendation A. Next to the line "With regard to Presidential clearance," the following notation appears in his handwriting: "Show him full text. DR."
A. With regard to instructions at Tab A:
B. With regard to Presidential clearance:
1 Approve preparation of Read-Rostow memorandum incorporating points indicated in Paragraph 2 above.
2 No need for memo to Rostow
3 Prefer
153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
Washington, May 23, 1966, 11:19 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Dean; cleared by Jacobson, George B. Roberts, Jr., of FE/VN, Barber of Defense, Jacob D. Beam of ACDA, Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs George H. Aldrich, Sisco, Bundy, and Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, and Saigon.
1752. Guidance for 130th Meeting, May 25, 1966.
1. Wang is scheduled to open. We anticipate that he will make bitter attack on U.S. for May 12 plane incident. Chicoms have charged that shooting down of Chinese plane over Yunnan was deliberate, planned war provocation. Wang's statement will probably echo May 13 Liberation Army Daily editorial which stated "While flagrantly extending the war of aggression in Vietnam, US imperialism has openly declared that China is its chief enemy and clamored that 'there exists the danger of war with China.' It was at this very moment that US air pirates intruded into China's airspace and made a surprise attack on Chinese aircraft. This was by no means an isolated or accidental case but a well planned act of the Johnson Administration--in attempt to extend further war of aggression against Vietnam to China. . . . Nefarious US imperialism is the biggest scoundrel of our times and an arch-enemy of the Chinese people."
2. Wang probably will also list U.S. acts of "aggression" against mainland China including: occupation of Taiwan, "several hundred" intrusions into China's territorial airspace and waters, and strafing attacks on Chinese fishing boats. He may repeat ChiCom allegations that U.S. intensifying war in Vietnam and bent on spreading flames of war to China. It is likely Wang will refer to recent 4 points Chou En-lai gave in interview with Dawn (China will not provoke war, China means what it says, China is prepared, a war will have no boundaries). See FBIS 90, May 10./2/
/2/The May 10 Foreign Broadcast Information Service report included the text of a May 9 New China News Agency release quoting Chou's four-point statement, which he had reportedly made to a Pakistani correspondent on April 10. McNaughton sent a copy to McNamara with a May 19 memorandum calling it to his attention. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 092 China Reds) The full text of Chou's four-point statement is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 666.
3. Wang may raise air attacks on ChiCom Economic and Cultural Delegation quarters in Khang Kay on March 24. He may attempt justify ChiCom shoot-down of US A3B near Luichow Peninsula on April 12 and claim A3B's flight as additional evidence U.S. hostile intent. Considering recent nuclear test, also possible Wang may raise ChiCom's 1964 draft agreed announcement on meeting heads of states to discuss complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. (See record 123rd meeting.)/3/ Similar proposal repeated in Sino-Albanian communiqué of May 14.
/3/See Document 69.
4. FYI: Following response has been cleared with Ambassador Gronouski. Suggest Harding prepare translation based on this text. You will be informed of any changes. End FYI.
5. Mr. Ambassador, in response to your charges concerning an intrusion of your border on May 12 by U.S. aircraft and the subsequent shooting down of one of your aircraft there appears to be considerable confusion about what actually did occur. We did have aircraft in the NW sector of NVN on that date. Our pilots claim, however, that they at all times remained south of the Red River. They state they were attacked by an unidentified aircraft and returned its fire. They saw it explode but saw no parachute. We have checked carefully with our pilots and with the careful navigational equipment that was available on the American aircraft involved; these accounts concur that the U.S. aircraft were at all times over DRV territory. We repeat that American pilots have explicit instructions to avoid flying into your air space. If the evidence available to us should have been in error, we would of course have regretted this intrusion into your territory.
6. Reverting to the case of Captain Smith's flight in the Hainan area, we repeat that this was a case of mischance and navigational error.
7. As to the A3B aircraft on April 12, it too was far off course because of navigational errors when it was attacked by your pilots. Nonetheless, we understand that this plane was not over Chinese territorial waters when it was shot down. We would like to know if there were any survivors.
8. I am deeply disturbed by these incidents on both sides because misinterpretation of the motives behind these incidents by either side could lead to a further increase in tensions. I should like to repeat what I said in our last meeting. We have no hostile intent towards your government or your people. President Johnson has said that we seek the end of no regime and our Secretary of State has recently said we do not intend to provoke war. We have acted with restraint and care in the past and we are doing so today. FYI: Ambassador Gronouski is fully briefed on details May 12 air incident. End FYI.
9. Mr. Ambassador, by this time it should be clear that we intend to live up to our commitments to the Government of SVN. We are prepared to continue our present action as long as it is required to convince Hanoi and the Viet Cong that their efforts to take over SVN by force, terror and infiltration will not succeed. At the same time we are equally and sincerely prepared to seek a peaceful solution. We have stated time and again that our objective in South Vietnam is a condition of peace in which the South Vietnamese people can be free to choose their own future without outside coercion or force. We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination nor military alliance in Vietnam. There are many roads towards a peaceful solution. We are willing at any time to engage in discussions or negotiations leading towards peace, without conditions. Alternately we are willing to undertake a reciprocal dampening down of the war. We will respond if others are prepared to reduce their use of force. Specifically, we are willing to suspend or even cease our air attacks on North Vietnam if Hanoi gives clear evidence that it is prepared to take reciprocal action, for example with respect to its infiltration of military personnel and equipment into South Vietnam and its military activity and terrorism in South Vietnam. Such evidence and suspension of the bombing could be determined by mutually acceptable observers.
10. It seems clear to me that Hanoi will eventually realize that a military victory is not possible. The DRV may hope to wait until the military position is reversed, but this will not occur. As Hanoi continues to send more reinforcements south we will be compelled to reinforce the GVN. Over a period of time the VC and DRV forces will face further losses and defeats. The DRV, eventually, will realize that it could avoid all this bloodshed and destruction by evidencing willingness to engage in negotiations leading to a peaceful solution.
11. Mr. Ambassador, I have noted that NCNA has commented on Secretary Rusk's statement of March 16 before the House Subcommittee on the Far East. NCNA said that "all talks about 'improving relations' and 'avoidance' of a state of hostility are a sham." The People's Daily of April 6 said that the hints of "goodwill dropped by the U.S. are obviously part of its counter-revolutionary dual policy, an attempt to undermine the Chinese people's fighting determination and reduce their combat-readiness . . . The evidence is increasingly clear that the U.S. imperialists are preparing to impose war on the Chinese people." Similarly observer in the March 29 People's Daily said that "these blasts of good will set off by Washington at a time when U.S. imperialism is working more energetically than ever to concentrate its aggression on China, are indeed absurd and ridiculous . . . . All such expressions as a flexible policy, 'without isolation,' and 'more contact' are only pretenses for intensifying the U.S. containment of China."
12. Mr. Ambassador, I regret that your government seems to reject all our proposals for easing tensions. Judging from what your side says it appears that you choose to believe that U.S. does not seek a better mutual understanding. Despite our statements to contrary you say that U.S. only wants war with China. As I have tried to indicate, such a conclusion is not warranted by the facts.
13. There may be other reasons, both internal and external, why you wish to avoid a better relationship. Mr. Ambassador, we are willing to try to reach some mutual agreement on peaceful solutions of such critical problems as Vietnam but your side has rejected all such moves. We would like to work towards a reduction of tensions and a better understanding but your side rejects our efforts, We have explained our intentions towards your country but your side rejects our statements because you claim we are not sincere. You say we must prove our sincerity by actual deeds, by accepting, in fact, your own solutions. Mr. Ambassador, your side has its own convictions. So do we. In the interests of peace we are willing to search for a just solution. Are you willing to do the same? Mr. Ambassador, I intend to continue my efforts to convince you that my government seeks a just and lasting peace. We stand ready to fulfill the commitments we have made concerning travel contacts and visits, joint investigations, and discussions concerning peaceful solutions of the problems confronting us in the Far East.
14. I would like to draw your attention to the remarks I made at our 128th meeting on December 15, 1965./4/ At that time I said that "peace and stability in the Far East is as much in your interest as it is in ours . . . It would permit the withdrawal of U.S. forces. If we could be assured of peace throughout the Far East and the whole Pacific, our fleets and our bases would no longer be necessary."
/4/See Document 114.
15. There are a few additional matters I should like to raise. At our last meeting, I told you that I would ask for a further report on your charges that the Chinese Consulate in Phong Saly was attacked. I am informed that we have no additional information concerning this incident.
16. Mr. Ambassador, I have noted with considerable interest Premier Chou En-lai's statement of May 10 in which he said that China must conduct nuclear tests to develop nuclear weapons, because, although China had proposed a non-first use agreement to the United States, we had rejected the proposal. Mr. Ambassador, does this statement indicate that your government would consider an agreement to ban nuclear tests if it were linked to a non-first use agreement? This is an important point and I would like to ask you to seek clarification from your government. Perhaps you could let me know about this matter at your earliest convenience. While we believe that any disarmament agreement must be a rounded one which covers all types of forces and weapons, we are interested in any serious proposal that would contribute to disarmament. We are willing to explore disarmament issues with your government either here at Warsaw or elsewhere. In this connection, I would like to comment on Premier Chou En-lai's statements about the World Disarmament Conference in his April 10 interview with a Pakistani reporter for Dawn. He said that "a world disarmament conference in the present circumstances will yield no useful, practical results and will only provide U.S. imperialism with a smoke-screen of peace under which it will freely expand its war of aggression against Vietnam." You may recall my earlier comments about the proposed World Disarmament Conference. Last December I told you that we had our doubts about the effectiveness of a World Disarmament Conference because we believe it to be an unwieldy body that could make little positive contribution to disarmament. Nevertheless, I indicated to you that we were prepared to discuss the prospects for such a conference with you in a small exploratory group. We hope that Premier Chou's statement does not imply that your government believes that such an exploratory group for a World Disarmament Congress would not be able to make progress towards meaningful disarmament.
17. FYI. Request you send following letter to Ambassador Wang after 130th meeting:
"The Government of the United States has expressed its willingness to participate in an exploratory group to prepare a possible World Disarmament Conference. We note that your government has also called for a meeting of all heads of state to discuss disarmament. The Government of the United States would like to learn the views of the Government of the People's Republic of China with regard to its possible participation in an exploratory group to examine questions relating to convening a World Disarmament Conference or disarmament talks on some other basis." Ambassador Gronouski will sign letter. End FYI.
18. Mr. Ambassador, I have been requested by some of the families of the American prisoners in China to raise their cases with you once more. At our last meeting you informed me that it was your country's practice to grant time off for good behavior. I hope this regulation can be applied to our prisoners and I would appreciate any information you can give me concerning their cases.
19. Lately I have been receiving an increasing number of letters addressed to me from serious-minded Americans who have a great interest in establishing communication with individuals or organizations in China. They do not know the appropriate addresses or what ministry or organization they should write. Would it be possible for me to send these letters to you for the requested information?
20. It is our turn to propose date of next meeting. Suggest August 17.
Rusk
154. Editorial Note
On May 24, 1966, the President met with Acting Secretary Ball, Ambassador Goldberg, Assistant Secretary Bundy, and Walt Rostow for a discussion of China policy from 12:25 to 1:20 p.m. Prior to the meeting, he met with Goldberg from 11:37 a.m. until 12:25 p.m. The subject of that discussion is not indicated. (Johnson Library, President's Appointment Diary) No record of the meeting has been found.
According to a memorandum of a May 24 telephone conversation between Ball and U. Alexis Johnson, Ball stated that at the meeting they had "only gone over the ChiRep business" and that no decision had been made. Johnson asked "if we were going ahead with Taipei," and Ball replied that "there was no final decision even on that; the thought was that Walt would do some softening up and we would then leave it until the Secretary goes out." (Ibid., Papers of George Ball, China (Peking))
A June 14 briefing memorandum from Sisco to Rusk states that as a result of the meeting with the President, they were asked to prepare for Presidential approval an instruction for Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy, whose appointment as Ambassador to the Republic of China had been announced early in May but had not been confirmed by the Senate, on the assumption that he would raise the question when he arrived in Taipei. The memorandum states that McConaughy's approach "was essentially conceived as softening up exercise" to be followed by Rusk's conversations in Taipei in July. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM)
155. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, May 25, 1966, 1955Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, and USUN. Passed to the White House and USIA.
2066. Gronouski-Wang talks./2/
/2/Gronouski sent a detailed record of the meeting in airgram A-877, May 30. (Ibid.)
1. Wang opened 130th meeting with prepared statement containing no surprises. He started with claim that May 12 plane shoot down over Yunnan was deliberate, systematic act of war provocation and repeated ChiCom Defense spokesman statement of May 12. Wang then handed over photographs of US fuel tanks and rocket parts and claimed these were iron-clad evidence of incident. Wang said incident definitely not accidental. He then read list of other "war provocations" against China including serious warning 399 through 402, the April 12 A3B intrusion, April 7 air attack on Chinese fishing boats. Wang claimed facts show US war provocations have been growing in frequency and intensity. He said he was authorized to lodge serious warning and protest most strongly to USG. Wang added, "You should think over carefully what grave consequences you will have to face if you go on like this."
2. Wang then commented on US China policy. Said top US officials recently have said US has changed its posture towards China from containment plus isolation to containment without isolation. He said these statements by bigwigs of USG indicate worn-out policy of containment plus isolation has gone bankrupt. Also said policy of containment without isolation is out and out fraud. "How can you succeed in containing China? China can never be isolated. USG says it wants to enlarge unofficial contacts with China and discuss questions of disarmament and non- proliferation of nuclear weapons with Peking and does not intend to attack China . . . US tries to cover its aggressive designs with flimsy veil, but it can never succeed."
3. Wang said US has occupied China's territory of Taiwan by force, built strings of military bases around China, incessantly sent warships and military aircraft to intrude in China's territorial air and sea space in its "unbridled military provocations." He also claimed US opposes restoration to China of its legimate seat in UN; "US has imposed trade embargo on China; openly declared China its principal enemy; shifted its global strategy to Asia; and is feverishly planning carry its war of aggression from Viet-Nam to China."
4. Wang read complete text Chou En-lai four points (China will take no initiative to provoke war with US, they mean what they say, China is prepared, if war breaks out it will have no boundaries, see FBIS 90, May 10). He said whatever policies of hostility US may adopt, China will never make slightest change in its solemn position.
5. Wang switched to Viet-Nam, claimed US had further intensified its war of aggression, increased troops, stepped up air raids, used B-52s against North Viet-Nam, used poison gas, US bent on extending flames of war of aggression to whole of Indo-China, US instigating attacks by its Thai and SVN puppets on Cambodia and Laos, US planes bombed Chinese economic cultural mission in Khang on March 24. Wang claimed Mansfield's call for peace talks was swindle. Claimed defeat of US in Viet-Nam a foregone conclusion, said US had already changed 13 horses in SVN and having difficulty finding 14th horse. "Like ants in frying pan, US in very difficult position in Viet-Nam." Wang said only way out was for US to accept DRV's four points and Front's five points, withdraw all troops and recognize Front as sole representative of SVN prople.
6. Using Department's instructions I responded by telling Wang that American pilots have explicit instructions avoid flying into ChiCom airspace. I said that if evidence concerning May 12 plane incident available to US should have been in error, we would of course have regretted incident. Said I was deeply disturbed by incidents on both sides because misinterpretation of motives by either side could lead to further increase in tensions. I repeated President's statement that we seek end of no regime. Followed up with Department's guidance on Viet-Nam, US relations with Communist China, American prisoners, and disarmament. I added that by not taking up our proposals for exchange newsmen, doctors, educators, his side was making it difficult to prevent its own isolation. I defined our concept of containment--defense of non-Communist countries who are threatened by outside-directed force of subversion, and told Wang that as long as Peking seeks spread its views through force and revolution we will continue defend ourselves and allies. I said our objective was to live in peace with his and all other countries, and that I hoped in time his government will adopt same objective. Said we hopefully looking forward to day when on cultural, philosophical and other grounds there could be maximum of intercourse between all nations. I denied use of poison gas in Viet-Nam.
7. Wang, his advisor, and interpreter took special note of my question whether Chou En-lai's May 10 statement linked banning of nuclear testing to a non-first use agreement. They consulted amongst themselves for several minutes. Later Wang made no mention of this statement nor did he refer again to subject of disarmament. This is unusual since Wang almost always responds to each subject I bring up.
8. Wang responded to my statement with long commentary on US policy of containment. Said US only purpose was to carry out policy of hostility to China. "US says one thing and does another." He said, "If US does not change and completely abandon old policy of aggression against China, and refuses to withdraw all forces from Taiwan Straits and Taiwan, then China cannot believe so-called sincere desire of US to improve relations."
9. Wang denied China aggressive. Said China would strive shoulder to shoulder and hand in hand with all oppressed people for liberation, but that China has not committed aggression against any country nor engaged in terrorist action or subversion against any foreign country.
10. Wang returned to subject of Viet-Nam but offered nothing new. Wang also referred again to May 12 incident and said US explanation completely untrue. "Since US calls itself strong power why shouldn't you have courage to admit this crime?" Referred again to US air attack on Chinese Consulate at Phong Saly.
11. Wang said he had already made clear his answer concerning Captain Smith. Smith is criminal who intruded into Chinese airspace and will be dealt with according to Chinese law. As regards Walsh, he was spy and must be dealt with in accordance with Chinese law. Wang said he had nothing further to say on this matter.
12. I replied with rebuttal touching on May 12 plane incident, fishing boats, and Viet-Nam. I repeated that if we in error concerning May 12 plane shoot-down and incident occurred over Chinese territory, I would extend sincere regrets for this accidental encounter. Also said I was concerned about his claim US planes attacked Chinese fishing boats and would like to investigate them further to make sure that if incidents did take place, they do not reoccur. Told Wang I disappointed by his earlier rejection my suggestion we jointly investigate these incidents. I also told Wang again that US not hostile to his government or people. Said US forces are in Asia in direct response to situations not of our own making. His leaders preach war and revolution and should not be surprised if other countries, particularly those in Far East, are fearful of this threat to their own peace and security. Consequently, many have asked for our assistance. I said Wang's side ought to test our willingness to negotiate to prove if we have sincere desire reach peaceful solution.
13. Wang's reply contained nothing new. I suggested next meeting convene on August 17. Wang replied he busy in August. He suggested September 7 for next meeting. Meeting lasted two hours fifty minutes.
14. At conclusion meeting I asked Wang and his staff to farewell drink for Dean on May 26. Wang regretted and said he would not have time.
15. Atmosphere of meeting was relatively mild. The Chinese did not make an emotional issue of the May 12 plane incident, attacks on fishermen, or other US "war provocations." When Wang read from his instructions his voice was low and deliberate. In some of his rebuttals, particularly when discussing US hostility to China, he abandoned his papers, raised his voice and became more excited, gesturing and sometimes groping for words. He played same line over and over, particularly on containment. He made no new points or new commitments. His statement on Viet-Nam was routine as was his statement on US relations with China. He rejected all prospect of relaxing tensions through increased contacts.
16. Department may wish to inform Captain Smith's wife and brother about Wang's comments concerning Smith since both are aware we intended raise subject this meeting.
17. Suggest delay in briefing GRC in Washington and Taipei until we submit more detailed telegram for GRC briefing. Delay could be explained by referring to fact previous briefings based only on partial, incomplete reports.
18. Dean and Harding will deliver letter on World Disarmament Conference (para 17 reftel) at 10:30 am May 26./3/
/3/Telegram 2071 from Warsaw, May 26, reported that they had delivered the letter (see Document 153) that day, and that the Chinese had asked about the meaning of Gronouski's query about Chou's May 10 statement on nuclear testing. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
Gronouski
156. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the President's Special Assistant (Moyers)/1/
Washington, June 3, 1966.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, L.B. Johnson, Jan.-July 1966. Secret; Personal.
Attached is the memorandum I wrote to the President November 19, 1964./2/ Much of it is now outdated, except the fundamental truth that the image of the President abroad is the single most important factor in molding world opinion towards the United States.
/2/Attached but not printed.
It seems to me that today much can be made of the fact that the President has achieved an extraordinary victory in the Dominican election in proving his faith in the ability of people to decide their own future if given the opportunity without interference. This ties in with his objectives in Vietnam.
We discussed the profound impression which the President's speech made on the African Ambassadors. This I believe could and should be gotten across in some way to the African peoples.
It is difficult to carry the worldwide unpopularity and misunderstanding of Vietnam along with an unpopular China policy inherited primarily from Dulles. I feel the President could well gain in most parts of the world by a spectacular change in attitude towards Red China. It would then, I believe, be easier to gain better understanding of Vietnam.
Without being specific, I would suggest the President's acceptance of "containment, but not isolation" through adoption perhaps of a two-China policy. The Department has been studying this matter for five years to my knowledge. But the subject requires considerable study to bring it up to date, although a part of this has already been done. I understand there is a notion being considered to let some other nation propose this in the UN without our opposition. The US would cover up its past by abstaining. To me, this would miss a real opportunity for the President to take leadership.
I fully recognize the problem of giving full support to the war in Vietnam, while at the same time making a gesture towards Red China. But on balance I see an enormous "plus" in this move towards obtaining greater credibility and more understanding of our Vietnam policy in world opinion.
Incidentally, there might be an opportunity for a public rapprochement with Bill Fulbright as the instigator of the China hearings, without embracing Fulbright's softness on Vietnam.
I can only assure you of one thing, that a suggestion of the above would be opposed by the State Department for a dozen reasons, including unhappiness in Taipei.
Bob McNamara had an unusually good public reaction to his Montreal speech./3/ I am speaking of the body of his speech, not his final proposal for the two-year service. I refer particularly to his readiness to have a new look at our relations with Red China, as well as his emphasis on other policies, rather than military power, to achieve security. Of course, the latter got attention because of Bob's position. He really said nothing new, but it confirmed the newsworthiness of "man bites dog." It seems to me, however, that since Bob's speech went over well it might be worth while for the President to take some occasion to indicate his support of Bob's ideas (omitting two-year service proposal).
/3/Reference is to an address given by McNamara on May 18 before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal. The text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 14-21.
I mentioned to you the possibility of the President's taking leadership in advocating action by NATO to break down East/West European barriers, possibly at the conclusion of the Brussels Foreign Ministers conference. An opportunity exists prior to DeGaulle's visit to Moscow.
You asked me for suggestions. The above is all I can come up with this afternoon. I thoroughly enjoyed lunch and look forward to talking with you next week.
Averell/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Harriman signed the original.
157. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, June 15, 1966, 1005Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Top Secret; Exdis.
1448. 1. Following observations and suggestions offered for Dept's consideration in connection with visit to Taipei of Secy Rusk.
2. Top GRC officials have carefully followed recent statements by US administration officials, Congressional leaders and private citizens on subject of US policy toward mainland China. While official reactions from MOFA have been restrained, and unofficial reactions (from Chiang Ching-kuo and other GRC officials) carefully refrain from raising alarm, believe GRC fully aware of implications of implied US denial of GRC national goal of return to mainland.
3. Therefore believe we have opportunity, because ground has been prepared, for somewhat franker discussion than has been customary. There are risks in being too explicit about US disbelief in GRC ever under any circumstances returning to mainland, but believe Secy can and should be forthright in acknowledging that USG envisages possibility (perhaps remote in probability and in timing) of changes in mainland regime which could cause USG to modify present policies.
4. Believe any less forthright statement would be mistake because new Ambassador will need to begin discussions with GRC of long-term implications for Taiwan--discussions which have heretofore usually been taboo in very high level conversations. Need to open this topic is also a function of possibility US ChiRep tactics may have to be changed and USG may have to try to persuade Gimo not to walk out of UNGA if some kind of resolution with "two Chinas" implications is passed.
5. Discussions with Gimo and FonMin could include following statements volunteered by Secretary:
a. Observations on SEATO and ANZUS conferences and on situation in Vietnam.
b. Importance to the US of close relations with the GRC and the importance to the US and the free world of a strong democratic Taiwan.
c. Appreciation for economic and social progress.
d. Appreciation for GRC efforts through Vanguard program to raise food production in underdeveloped countries and extend their ties with free world. Also could indicate US desire to work out appropriate ways to assist Vanguard.
e. Thanks for allowing USG use of GRC military facilities.
f. Reaffirmation of US commitments to GRC, summarizing in succinct form: Defense Treaty, opposition to ChiCom entry into UN, US use of veto in Security Council "if it would be effective", assurances that USG will not bargain away at Warsaw any of these commitments, and any other appropriate assurances.
g. Reminder of GRC commitment to obtain joint agreement before using force against mainland.
h. Expression of concern at very high level of GRC military budget which could if further expanded hamper economic development.
6. Secretary should be prepared to deal with:
a. Request for "unequivocal" reaffirmation of US support for GRC as sole Govt of China (this is context in which US attitudes toward changes on mainland could be brought forward by Secretary).
b. Request for US public statement that if ChiComs enter UN the US will withdraw (this would be place for explanation of US concern about GA voting, hopefully including US assurance that if voting lineup continues to seem favorable then US contemplates no change in strategy).
c. Possible but improbable ultimatum by Gimo that if UN votes any kind of entry to ChiComs then GRC must withdraw from UN or at least from UNGA.
d. Ominous and cryptic GRC statements sometimes heard by EmbOffs that if goal of return to mainland disappears then stability on Taiwan will be threatened, presumably either by GRC military hotheads, or by Taiwanese demands for greater political power.
e. Request for US support of an Asian anti-Communist military alliance.
7. It is possible that in spite of GRC understanding of recent US statements Gimo will again request US logistic support for massive assault on mainland "as only means of dealing with root of Vietnam problem." Without trying to outline detailed scenario, suggest Secretary should say frankly that American traditions and present day opinions will not support such an action, and that US is committed instead to containment of aggression while strengthening chances for peaceful solutions.
8. Believe we have passed the point where offers to study "concepts" for assault on mainland will be either useful or credible to GRC.
Hummel
158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Hong Kong/1/
Washington, June 16, 1966, 10:23 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 CHICOM. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Dean, cleared by Robert W. Drexler in INR/RFE, and approved by Jacobson. Repeated to Saigon and London.
1632. 1. UK HK Chargé Hopson's report on his conversation with Ch'en Yi prior to departure from Peiping for Hong Kong for Chiefs of Missions Conference follows:
2. After referring to full exposition on Vietnam which he gave me last year, Ch'en Yi said there has been talk abroad of peaceful negotiations, the convening of the Geneva Conference, etc., to discuss an end to the war. But the Vietnamese (both DRV and SVNLF), the people most concerned were against negotiations. Conditions were not ripe; reason was that U.S. had no intention of withdrawing from Vietnam. The Chinese Government supported this stand. The U.S. had never expressed the intention of withdrawing; on the contrary the Americans were expanding the war and in the final stage would escalate it to China. Some people thought that events would not develop in this way but China had to be prepared. Judging from their dealings with the U.S. since 1945, the Chinese could not assume that U.S. adventurous policy had "no" limit. Nothing was unlimited, but the fact was that U.S. would not withdraw from Vietnam and last stage would be U.S. escalation of war to China. He hoped this estimate would be proved wrong. The facts, however, were more likely to prove it correct. The U.S. was meeting difficulties in Vietnam and they would meet even greater difficulties in China if they attacked.
3. There were many conditions for ending the war but the following were the two principal preconditions:
(a) The U.S. must immediately withdraw from Vietnam; and
(b) They must recognize the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front as the sole representative of the Vietnamese people.
4. If these two conditions (the minimum proposed by the people on the ground) were accepted, all other problems could be solved. Stopping of American bombing of North Vietnam and reunification would present no problems if basic conditions were met. It would also be easy to implement the Geneva Agreements which stipulated that Vietnam should not take part in military alliances. The SVNLF could discuss this matter with the North Vietnamese without outside interference.
5. The British Government could help by stressing these two Vietnamese preconditions. The Chinese and the North Vietnamese would regard any proposals divorced from these conditions as being pro-American.
6. Naturally Ch'en Yi wanted to see China's rightful seat in the United Nations restored. But more important was the question of relations between China and the U.S.: If Sino-American relations were improved, then the question of the UN would be solved. The question now was that the Americans were not willing to stop their aggression in Vietnam and no matter what "His Excellency Rusk" said, they were preparing to escalate that war. There were of course other outstanding Sino-American issues but if there were no withdrawal from Vietnam there was no question of talking about the improvement in Sino-American relations. Some people said that China was not interested in acquiring her seat at the UN. The Chinese would definitely not make any concessions in a matter of inherent rights. But the main question was Vietnam and the danger of escalation of the war to China.
7. When the Americans had withdrawn from Vietnam leaving the South and the North Vietnamese to settle their problems themselves, there would be hope of improving Sino-US relations.
8. Ch'en Yi referred to the four points made by Chou En-lai on 10 April/2/ (my tel No. 358) and asked that these should be conveyed to the Americans as well as to the Conference of British Heads of Mission. Chou En-lai's four points ("China will never start a war with U.S.; what China says counts; China is prepared for escalation; if Americans extend war to China there will be no boundaries to that war") all revolved around the question of Vietnam and Sino-American relations.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 153.
9. Referring to Ch'en Yi's "two preconditions," I reminded him of the English saying that "politics is the art of the possible." I said that the Americans had entered into obligations with the South Vietnamese Government which made it impossible for them to withdraw from Vietnam immediately without further ado. For those obligations to be fulfilled, the right conditions had to be created. Moreover what was the basis for calling the SVNLF the only legal representative of the Vietnamese people? The SVNLF might represent a faction--perhaps an important faction but there was nothing legal about their status. I had no doubt that if a conference were convened, ways could be found of ensuring their participation or representing their point of view. But there was no legal basis whatsoever for claiming that they were the only legal representatives. If therefore Ch'en Yi's two preconditions were rigidly applied no solution was possible.
10. Ch'en Yi said that he knew that the Americans could not accept them, but he also knew that the Vietnamese would not accept any departure from them either. The only course therefore was to be prepared for the worst.
11. Vietnam and Sino-American relations also figured to some extent in the exchanges on Sino-British relations for a summary of which please see my immediately following telegram.
Rusk
159. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Defense Minister of the Republic of China Chiang Ching-kuo/1/
Washington, June 16, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, China Nats 373.24. Secret. Drafted by T.L. Ridge of OASD/ISA/FER.
Dear Mr. Minister:
Thank you for your letter forwarded to me by Ambassador Chow on 25 April./2/
/2/Dated April 15; the letter is attached but not printed.
Your comments on Communist aggression in the Far East were of great interest. In this respect, I particularly appreciated your assurance of continued cooperation in countering such aggression.
Following his discussions with you in March, Assistant Secretary Bundy informed me of the problems which you raised.
You commented in your letter on Communist Chinese plans to attack Taiwan in the immediate future by air. Our review of this threat has revealed no evidence of such plans nor any significant movement of units into base areas within range of Taiwan which would indicate that the Communist Chinese had such an attack in mind. I know you are appreciative, however, of Admiral Sharp's recent temporary deployments of F-100 and F-4 aircraft to Taiwan. These deployments again demonstrate US capability to respond promptly with effective force should the need arise.
I consider very important your reference to conferences with Vice Admiral Gentner and Major General Johnson on ways and means to improve your air defense capabilities. This type of high-level review is required periodically to assure a thorough understanding of the many problems of air defense and to achieve maximum capabilities with available units and equipment. In this regard, I have been informed that a Systems Training Program is now being instituted in Taiwan which will realistically simulate air defense situations for intensified training of air defense personnel. I hope that this program will provide you with a new and more effective means of evaluating and improving your air defense system.
With respect to your comments on deficiencies of your F-86F aircraft, I have learned the two crashes within the past year were attributed to structural failure, with the possibility that two other crashes may have been due to similar causes. We are expediting production and delivery of modification kits which, when installed, will insure the structural integrity of these aircraft. I know that Major General Johnson and his staff will render every possible assistance in dealing with this problem. In the meantime, we will continue to implement our plans to replace the F-86F's with F-5 aircraft commensurate with the availability of funds and our worldwide commitments for F-5's.
You also referred to the Military Assistance Program. The degree of US concern for the security of the Republic of China and our other allies facing the Communist threat is indicated by our past and current Military Assistance Programs. As you are aware, your cumulative program for the period FY 1951 through FY 1966 amounts to more than $2.4 billion, making the Republic of China the second largest current recipient in our total worldwide program. In the proposed FY 1967 program now before the Congress, we have once again allocated approximately three-fourths of the total program, which includes over fifty countries, to the ten countries adjacent to the borders of Soviet Russia and Communist China, where our forward strategy draws the front lines of free world defense. The proposed FY 1967 program for the Republic of China is again one of the largest.
Even within this very large current program, however, certain of the items which you mentioned in the Memorandum you left with me last September,/3/ and which you again discussed with Assistant Secretary Bundy, cannot be programmed. Because of this and because of our continuing mutual concern that your armed forces have adequate modern equipment, we believe that the quality rather than the size of the force should be emphasized.
/3/Dated September 16, 1965, the memorandum is attached but not printed; for Chiang's September 22 conversation with McNamara, see Document 104.
I was pleased to note your reaffirmation of our understanding of military sales. As you know we have just sent a team to Taiwan to investigate the possibilities of co-production of military vehicles. This and other possible projects will represent a significant investment and should be carefully evaluated in terms of effects on your overall economy.
As you have no doubt been informed, the US Congress recently authorized the loan of a destroyer and destroyer escort to the Republic of China. These will be included within your Military Assistance Program as funds permit. We have also agreed to the sale of another APD to replace the one which was recently lost while under tow. When these ships and the recently acquired APD's have been reconditioned, and the latter type converted, to assure their maximum combat effectiveness, the naval capabilities of the Republic of China should be significantly improved.
I hope you will continue to consult freely with Vice Admiral Gent-ner and Major General Johnson on matters of military concern to you. I can assure you that they and Admiral Sharp are able spokesmen on programs that are of mutual interest to our countries.
Please convey to President Chiang my personal regards and sincere best wishes for every success during his new term of office.
Sincerely,
Robert S. McNamara/4//4/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.
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