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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada/1/

Washington, July 25, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 ChiCom. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy on July 23, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for IO William B. Buffum, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Geneva for Goldberg and repeated to Taipei, USUN, Tokyo, and London.

14522. Subject: Secretary's conversation with Paul Martin, July 22/2/--Chinese representation.

/2/The conversation took place over lunch at the Department of State. A memorandum of the portion of the conversation concerning Chinese representation is ibid.

1. Martin opened discussion by asking about the Secretary's visit to Taipei and our view of the voting situation.

2. The Secretary responded that Taipei was now well aware that we felt there was a serious tactical problem whether the important question/substitution approach could succeed in the next General Assembly. He noted that his trip had revealed how strongly several key Asian countries feel about the issue, and particularly reported that Prime Minister Sato had urged privately that we do all possible to round up the votes on the present approach. The Secretary said it would be a disaster if the ChiComs displaced the GRC in the GA, and that we needed the most careful possible review of the votes to see if there was a major tactical problem in preventing this result.

3. The Secretary went on to say that it was important to distinguish between the General Assembly and the Security Council. The GRC was named in the Charter as a Security Council member, and the CPR was simply not the same government. (The Secretary conceded that the British and perhaps others did not share this legal view.) The Secretary also referred to the question whether the Asian nations would really want Communist China to occupy a permanent "Asian" seat on the Security Council, and whether it might not be necessary to consider a Charter amendment to designate some other Asian country or to provide for a method of selection for the permanent seat.

4. Martin agreed on the necessity of a careful review of the votes. He thought that the ICJ decision on Southwest Africa and the Rhodesian issue--on which he saw the British not being able to come up with any answer satisfactory to African opinion--could have a serious effect on African voting patterns. On the other hand, he noted that U Thant, in a conversation held within the past 10 days, had expressed the view that there would be little change from past voting patterns.

5. On the basic Canadian attitude, Martin said that the GOC had always approached the issue with full recognition of its relationship to the US and of all that the issue meant to the USG. Nonetheless, the GRC had to recognize that there was "overwhelming sentiment" developing in Canada, as shown by the 65% in a recent Gallup Poll in favor of ChiCom admission. He noted in passing that there appeared to be a similar trend in the US. He said that Canada would have taken a different line before now but for its concern for the USG position. He then went on to say that the ChiComs might not come in if offered admission, but that "there may be a lot" in GOC acting to make admission possible. However, the GOC would never act to expel GRC, although it might take or join in steps that "would have the effect of ushering them out."

6. The Secretary rejoined vigorously that the issue was not one that affected the vital interests of Canada; "You have a free ride on it." On the other hand, the Asian countries who face the militancy of Communist China would feel great pain if she were admitted. The Secretary strongly questioned whether this should be done merely to please sentiment in Canada and European countries.

7. Martin responded that the state of public opinion in Canada and elsewhere was a fact that statesmen must take into account, and the Secretary rejoined that the French particularly simply had no further stake in Asia. Martin responded that ChiCom admission was "bound to happen" eventually.

8. The Secretary said that it seemed to him the best thing would be for us to compare notes on the voting and to stay in close touch. Although making a mild complaint that GOC had not been informed on Secretary's discussions in Taipei (FYI: We had in fact given general description to Embassy officer, and Embassy had not otherwise approached us), Martin did not seem to differ from this conclusion. He did refer again to recent SYG opinion and returned to his argument about the African vote, contending that African attitudes on such issues as Rhodesia and the ICJ decision did in fact wash over into the Communist Chinese issue.

9. Comment: In the light of the indications in Ambassador Goldberg's conversations in Ottawa in May, it seemed noteworthy that Martin did not indicate that GOC planned to take some "two Chinas" initiative in the near future. We have other information, received on an unauthorized basis from Canadian Embassy officers here, that Martin directed the Canadian Delegation in New York to submit alternative "two Chinas" resolutions, but did not find any of these acceptable. While his general remarks continue to suggest that the Canadians cannot be relied on in a pinch, and might join in an initiative from some other quarter, it appears to Department less likely that they will take any lead, at least for the present. Ottawa may wish to comment, but our general posture should be to lie low as far as direct discussions with Canadians are concerned except on voting prospects. We expect they will ask for fuller report on Taipei discussions next week, and we will give them straightforward account.

Rusk

 

171. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 25, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VI. Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum of July 25 from Rostow to the President.

The underlying memorandum/2/ summarizes the current situation in Communist China following the eight months of turmoil and confusion. The major conclusions are:

/2/The memorandum from the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director of Central Intelligence, July 15, on the subject "The Crisis in China," is attached but not printed.

1. Mao is now in effective control of the Chinese Communist Party and of the policies of the Peking regime.

2. The long standing stability of the Chinese leadership has been shaken.

3. The chance of a peaceful and orderly succession to the aging Mao appears greatly lessened.

4. Support for the regime will weaken further as Peking tries to substitute exhortation for material incentives.

5. Effective political leadership or economic management will be difficult in the present atmosphere of confusion and apprehension.

6. Most observers agree that the radical turn taken in internal affairs will not spread to foreign policy.

7. The internal crisis serves to reduce the chance of Chinese intervention in Vietnam.

8. It highly unlikely that Peking will soften its anti-Soviet line.

Walt

 

172. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 28, 1966, 11:10 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VI. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw the memorandum. Another handwritten notation reads: "Rec'd 11:45 a.m."

Mr. President:

It may be that, looking back, the crisis inside Communist China will be viewed by historians as the most significant event now taking place on the world scene. Obviously it is extremely hard to follow in detail.

The attached intelligence cable presents the crisis as a final stand of Mao and the Old Guard seeking to suppress forces for change inside the Communist party. It implies that these forces will, in time, assert themselves.

Something like this analysis would be accepted by most of those who have followed the evolution of mainland China since 1949. What no one knows--and experts argue over--is how long it will take for this strong, pragmatic opposition to assert itself and what will happen in the meantime.

The latter is what matters most to us from day to day. Nevertheless, I thought you might like to read this interesting assessment.

Walt

Attachment

TEXT OF CIA INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE
(TDCS 314/09256-66)/2/

/2/The source text is the retyped text of the CIA cable, dated July 25.

SUBJECT
Mao's Opposition

SOURCE
Staff officers of this Organization

This is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation. It is not an official judgment by this Agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of staff officers and is based on information available to them at the time of its preparation. Prepared for internal use as a guide to the operational environment, this commentary is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to other agencies in assessing the situation for their own purposes.

Summary: Mao's opposition is widespread and continuing. It is characterized by the Party as "more insidious and cunning" than any previous anti-party clique. The opposition is found in artists of all types, Politburo members, Party senior propagandists, military personnel and university presidents. However, functional non-political offices, such as Party Economic and Foreign Affairs Departments seem to be outside the purge. As Mao again attempts to force his Party and his people to accept the discipline of Maoism, the effort may be too much for both and the Chinese may quietly walk away from his leadership.

As the purge widens throughout China there is need to examine just who has been caught opposing today's Roi Soleil. It is certainly a mixed bag--historians, playwrights, movie directors, Politburo members, virtually all of the Party's senior propagandists, military personalities and university presidents. Mao and Lin have recognized the universality of the opposition, indeed, have perhaps created it in part. So many are involved that one wonders at first just who remains loyal and who is pressing the attack against the bourgeois royalists, the revisionists, and all the members of the black gang of the three-family village and the four-family store.

Certain vital Communist Party entities have as yet been above reproach: the public security apparatus, the Communist Party staff offices of Agriculture and Forestry, Finance and Trade, Industry and Communications, as well as Foreign Affairs--all appear to have escaped open criticism. It almost seems that the functional non-political offices are outside the purge and that those under censure are the offices which are involved in the ideology of Communism and the extension of Communist Party control.

The party now characterizes its opposition as "more insidious and cunning than the two previous anti-party cliques which have been crushed." These are the men who "reached out to grab at power in the party, the Army, and the government to usurp the leadership so as to restore capitalism." These charges are extremely serious; the problem lies in whether they are genuine or false. In the past the Communists have been pretty literal and we would guess that these charges should be taken seriously as a clear reflection of the intentions of the opposition.

Assuming these charges are in earnest we must answer another question: To whom do they specifically apply?

There has been an opposition faction in China since the Communist assumption of power in 1949. After Mao embarked on the communes and the Great Leap Forward and these two efforts failed badly, criticism grew to a high point in 1962. From 1959 to 1962, by Mao's own admission, the "heavy national calamities and the sabotage of the Soviet revision-ists" so weakened China that a major purge to contain this criticism was not possible. Actually this is partly an excuse, since Mao forced the démarche with the Soviets leading to the removal of the technicians; still, there can be no doubt that the Soviet departure hurt China. The intellectuals now under heavy attack did use this period of party weakness to advance ideas which, when read, literally refuted Maoism. This is why Wu Han and Teng T'o were able to print their satires and why the party did not act against them.

In late 1962 Mao felt strong enough to begin the rectification he knew was necessary--the socialist education campaign. This developed throughout 1963 and led to the direct attack on Yang Hsien Chen, the leading theoretician of the higher party school, whose dialectic arguments directly opposed those of Mao and were applied by the opposition to buttress agreements for private plots, free markets, and increase in small enterprises. All of this was anathema to Mao, but not necessarily to a number of party leaders who were beginning to move away from Mao's leadership and his theories. As senior party members defied Mao, many lesser individuals used this shelter to produce anti-Maoist novels, essays and motion pictures.

By 1965 the rectification movement was faltering badly. The socialist education movement was by then being carried forward in the nationwide four clearances effort. Probably no disciplinary movement of the party was so thoroughly honored in the breach as the four clearances. By the fall of 1965 the party was no longer in direct control of the people. The opposition within the party had continued to mature and Mao found it necessary to begin a broad attack on his critics in November 1965. The first battle of the socialist cultural revolution took place in Shanghai when the municipal committee denounced the historian Wu Han and the fight with the Peking Municipal Committee began.

Therefore, we can answer our question. The opposition lay in the leadership of the Peking Municipal Committee, P'eng Chen and his subordinates, the propaganda department of the party, which allowed the development of the intellectual opposition, and the many party members who felt that the relaxation of Maoist Doctrine presaged a more adaptable Communism. This opposition is not dead despite the three months socialist cultural revolution purge. Mao is attempting a cleansing of the entire country of such anti-Maoist thought. He has not abandoned his intent to lead world Communism, but he realizes he must fully re-establish Maoism in China and regain control of the drifting party apparatus.

It is doubtful that a dynasty built on the sand of Maoist philosophy will take a century to fall; once begun, a decade would seem too long. The great socialist cultural revolution now unmasks "freaks and monsters" each week. As the list of purges grows, it is a reasonable speculation that there will be more. Mao is worried about his revolution for it is clearly failing. If there is, medically, a disease definable as political paranoia it has settled on the sometimes resident of the small but now unlovely quarters overlooking Nan Hai, Peking's most exquisite lake. "Who knows whither the golden crane went, leaving but a shrine for pilgrims?" If there is any answer for the old man, it is also found in Chinese poetry--"A cup of wine under the trees; I drink alone for no friend is near."

 

173. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, August 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VII. Secret; Eyes Only. Filed with a covering note of August 4 from Thomson to Rostow that indicates that William J. Jorden of the NSC staff had read Thomson's memorandum and concurred.

SUBJECT
Relaxation of U.S. Embargo on Trade with Communist China

I want you to know of a China initiative which has been under preparation for some months and will soon be on its way to the Secretary of State for decision. I attach an advance (and thoroughly unofficial) draft of the relevant State document./2/ (This comes to me because I am quoted in the annexes, as a discussion participant.)

/2/A draft memorandum from Bundy and Solomon to Rusk is attached but not printed.

In brief, this memorandum recommends that Rusk authorize the Department to being certain small modifications of our total embargo on trade and transactions with Communist China which has been in effect since 1950. Specifically, Rusk is asked to approve (a) general licensing of relevant transactions for those categories of U.S. citizens now entitled to travel to Communist China, (b) an end to the special bunkering controls that have been in effect for 16 years, and (c) preparation for unilateral relaxation of trade controls (subject to the President's approval) with initial focus on two-way trade in foodstuffs, non-war related pharmaceuticals, and art objects.

This recommendation to the Secretary results from the first inter-agency review of the complete China trade picture since the outbreak of the Korean War. To the casual observer, it may seem that the mountain has labored and brought forth a mouse. Yet I anticipate resistance at the top of the Department even to these minimal steps.

The rationale for modification of our trade embargo is familiar to you: In the short run, despite anticipated Chinese Communist denunciation of such moves, we alter a substantive element of our previously rigid and defensive posture toward China, and we demonstrate to our critical friends and allies a welcome degree of confidence and flexibility. In so doing, we give substance and meaning to the Administration's new rhetoric--"firmness and flexibility," "containment without isolation," "reconciliation," etc. Equally important, for the longer run, we communicate a new and supportive message to elements within mainland China that are pushing for policies of pragmatism and accommodation with the outside world.

I bring this matter to your attention for obvious reasons. In his July 12th speech on Asia, the President went far in words toward changing our China posture at the highest level. The response has been extraordinarily good, both in terms of the approval his words have won, at home and abroad, and in terms of the absence of strong criticism (even from Taiwan). If we are to keep up the momentum of the past six months, we must begin to match out words with action. There is no better place to start than the subject of trade regulations which have outlived their original rationale and usefulness.

As you know, however, there is certain built-in resistance to any such adjustments on the 7th floor at State. We therefore face a situation in which the President's declared hopes--"the free flow of ideas, people, and goods"--may well be obstructed, despite hearty support for those hopes within the working bureaucracy--unless the White House can deftly intervene.

I realize that there are a large number of complex political ramifications to this issue--among them, the Vietnam War, the elections, the idiotic furor over the German rolling mill, etc. But I would argue that as long as we are standing firm in Vietnam, the President has far more benefit than risk to reap in maintaining momentum on China actions as well as China rhetoric. I would add that such actions could not take place at a more important moment in Chinese political history: the more we can do to support the mainland pragmatists by our actions and to cause confusion to the theologians in Peking, the better for our national interests and the achievement of stability and peace in Asia.

Jim

 

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State/1/

Tokyo, August 11, 1966, 1030Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the President with an August 16 covering memorandum from Komer supporting Reischauer's arguments. A note in Johnson's handwriting on Komer's memorandum reads, "Ask Rostow to contact Rusk & comment. L." An attached note in an unknown hand reads, "Call Bill Moyers before you do anything about attached." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VI)

1126. 1. The problem of China looms large in the future of that half of the world's population which lives in East and South Asia, and it casts a shadow over the rest of the world as well. Before leaving Tokyo, I should like to address myself to this problem as it appears from Japan, the only important industrialized and modernized nation in Asia and our one great Pacific partner on whom the future of our own posture in East Asia is heavily dependent.

2. During the five years I have been here, I have seen bilateral American-Japanese problems decrease markedly in number and intensity. Short of a major depression in either country, our economic relations raise no great difficulties, though some specific irritants, such as salmon fisheries, remain. The determination of much of the Japanese left to break the security relationship with the U.S. in 1970 has all along posed the greatest threat to our bilateral relations, but the growing realism about world problems on the part of the Japanese and their increasing defense mindedness make it now seem improbable that this problem will of itself cause serious difficulties in 1970 or thereafter. One specific aspect of the defense relationship, however, does bear careful watching and a readiness for rapid and flexible action on our part. This is the growing confrontation in the Ryukyu Islands between Japanese nationalistic pride and U.S. and Japanese defense needs. The deep emotional reaction of the Japanese in 1965 to U.S. actions in the Vietnamese war also shows that so long as this war continues it will have dangerously explosive possibilities for U.S.-Japanese relations. But the Ryukyu and Vietnamese situations are themselves in part reflections of the China problem. It seems safe to conclude that the continuing danger areas in U.S.-Japanese relations lie not so much in our bilateral relations as in our respective approaches to regional Asian problems. Among the latter the deep Japanese uneasiness over the China problem, and over American policies toward China presents the greatest threat.

3. The fundamental reasons for Japanese uneasiness over our China policy have often been reported from this Embassy. While attitudes vary greatly among age and occupational groups, the Japanese for the most part have a strong sense of closeness to the Chinese, which they express in the term "same race and same culture." They look with respect and affection to China as the country from which their own civilization in early days was in large part derived. They feel that their geographic proximity to the Chinese giant makes the maintenance of friendly relations all the more imperative from them. Despite their recent great economic success, they still feel uncertainties about their economic future, and, continuing to think along channels well established over the past forty years, they look upon close economic relations with China as necessary for their own economic well being. In all these respects--racial, cultural, historical, geographic and economic--they feel that the United States stands in a very different position with regard to China and that, therefore, US policy is likely to diverge sharply from Japan's interests. They thus picture in their mind's eye a relatively small Japan which has strong reasons to be friendly to both the U.S. and China but is tragically caught between the mutual antagonisms between these two great giants. While more realistic Japanese would feel that the Chinese are more responsible than Americans for this situation, they tend to excuse the Chinese as driven by understandable psychological compulsions and in any case not open to reason. On the other hand, they tend to feel that the United States, as the stronger and more reasonable of the two nations, should make the adjustments to ease the Sino-American tensions that Japanese find so disturbing.

4. Despite these pervasive Japanese attitudes, the GOJ, particularly under Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina, has given us strong support on our China policy. The men now in charge of the Japanese Government represent those Japanese who are most fully in sympathy with the US position. A large part of their own party, however, is restive about Japan's close identification with our China policy, and the public at large is decidedly unhappy about it. Except for the extreme left, there is general sympathy for Taiwan's "independence" of continental China and its continued membership in the U.N. There is also an increasing awareness of the threat inherent in Peking's dogmatism and of the need to discourage its open aggressiveness. At the same time, the Japanese by and large believe that it is only sensible to admit that two Chinas (or one China and one Taiwan) do exist. They are not satisfied with a policy which ostensibly maintains that the GRC is the one and only representative of the great historical entity known as China. They feel that Communist China is here to stay for the foreseeable future and that the best outcome that can be realistically hoped for is that it will in time become a less cantankerous member of world society and will be satisfied to accept peaceful coexistence, at least to the extent that this term is understood by the Soviet Union. To hasten this process, they feel that it is important to increase trade and cultural contacts with Peking and to allow Peking or even encourage it to enter the U.N. (on the U.N.'s terms, of course, and not Peking's). The Japanese are fearful that as things are now going an overly inflexible U.S. will drift into conflict with a blindly intransigent China, and Japan will be caught in the resultant catastrophe. While they welcome recent efforts on our part to foster the movement of newspapermen, scholars and the like between the U.S. and China, they wonder why we cannot go further than this. They are unhappy about a ChiRep strategy that is clearly aimed at keeping Peking out of the U.N. rather than facilitating its ultimate entrance. Many of them realize that for the time being Peking no doubt will refuse to enter the U.N. if Taipei is also there, but they see no reason why the responsibility for Peking's absence from the U.N. should not fall on Peking itself rather than on a joint U.S. and Japanese blackball operation.

5. Japanese unease at being linked to a China policy which they consider is basically unrealistic and not in Japan's long-range interests is, in my judgment, the most serious problem that now exists in U.S.-Japanese relations. It places a heavy burden on our relations, which may become heavier rather than lighter the longer it lasts. Growing Japanese realism about the ChiCom menace is likely to be more than offset by mounting fears of a U.S.-ChiCom military confrontation and a rapidly rising sense of national pride, which makes Japanese increasingly desirous of asserting a position on ChiRep and other China policies more in line with basic Japanese feelings and less open to the charge of subservience to the U.S.

6. The heavy price we pay in U.S.-Japanese relations for our current stand on ChiRep policy is, of course, only one of many factors that must be taken into consideration in deciding on that policy. I am aware of the arguments for maintaining the present position or something as close to it as possible. It should be remembered, however, that Japan is not the only country in which we pay a price for our present stand. The cost may be higher here than elsewhere, but I believe that we pay something of a price in practically every other of our major industrialized allies and in many other countries throughout the world. It is also my considered opinion that, wholly aside from the price we pay in Japan and other countries, it is to U.S. interests to modify our stand on the ChiRep issue and our whole attitude toward Peking.

7. No sensible person would deny the great threat to world peace posed by the blind dogmatism of the Peking leaders and their tragic ignorance of the outside world. I personally am less optimistic than some observers about the rapidity with which these dangerous attitudes may change, because I feel that they are not just the product of Communist dogmatism and the very special and restricted experience of the Peking leaders. They are perhaps more fundamentally an expression of frustration on the part of the Chinese people, whose traditional pride and sense of superiority to all other nations have been gravely injured by a century of continuing humiliations. I, therefore, see no alternative to our present policies of firm containment. It would be folly on our part and a betrayal of our own basic ideals if we did not continue to give full support to the right of the people who live on Taiwan to self-determination. I have throughout given complete support to our policy of strong but measured military containment in Vietnam and neighboring areas. I believe that we just be prepared to continue to contribute to the security and stability of the Asian countries that surround China, though I would hope that in the future we could find ways to be not so much the primary actor in such defense as one of a group of outside powers that gives the necessary support to local forces of nationalism and regional efforts to maintain stability.

8. I am thus strongly in sympathy with what we are doing with regard to the containment of the threat of Communist China, but I feel that the public definition of our attitude towards this threat and our future relation with Communist China does not contribute to the efficacy of these actions and, in fact, tends to undermine them. As I see the situation, we make a pretense of believing that the twelve million people on Taiwan, and not the seven hundred million in continental China, represent the great historical political entity known as China and that the Chinese Communist regime is not here to stay, but may be swept away almost any time by the GRC on Taiwan. We of course do not really believe either proposition, and I feel that it is highly damaging to ourselves and our policies that we make the pretense of doing so. It is confusing to the American people, it distresses almost all our major allies, including the Japanese, and it angers many of the less-developed nations, who sometimes interpret our seeming scorn for Peking as a broader scorn for all less developed nations. Some people may argue that these pretenses are necessary to bolster up our small Asian allies in the Far East and maintain morale in Taiwan. I would not deny that we would face a difficult problem, particularly in Taiwan, in persuading the leaders to accommodate themselves to a recognition of reality, but in the long run this will be necessary in any case. In the meantime, the maintenance of our pretense permits the continuation of serious economic and political distortions of what would otherwise be a most encouraging situation in Taiwan itself; it sometimes encourages dangerous tendencies among our more committed allies, such as the Koreans; it is damaging to the development of regional solidarity in Southeast Asia; and most of all it stands in the way of the development in Japan, in Europe and throughout the world of the sort of broad international concern for peace and stability in Asia that is needed to replace the one-man policement role we are performing today.

9. I believe that most people would agree that the best we can reasonably hope for from Communist China in the foreseeable future is that it may gradually relax its present drive for immediate world revolution and that in time it will accept peaceful coexistence, at least as a temporary stratagem, and will thus wish to rejoin the world on the world's terms. Most people would also agree that, in order to work toward this one and only realistic objective, we should not only continue to frustrate ChiCom expansionist drives but should also help to develop greater communication and contact between Peking and the outside world. Our willingness to exchange newspapermen, scholars, and the like is a helpful step in this direction. The opening of trade in non-strategic goods would also be useful. Since all our major allies trade with the ChiComs, our present trade embargo is all but meaningless economically, while being psychologically disadvantageous to us. More important than these concrete steps, however, would be the redefinition of our attitude toward Peking. China presents us with what is fundamentally a psychological problem. The leaders are of course tragically misled by their own dogmatic beliefs, but even more basic is Chinese pride, made all the more fierce and unbending because of the past century of humiliation and the present frustrations growing out of China's obvious weakness and backwardness. Nothing stands more firmly in the way of a Chinese readiness to seek a rapprochement with the world than their resentment of what they regard to be the callous pretense on the part of the world's greatest power that China does not really exists or that, if it does exist, it is so depraved or so unstable or so inconsequential that it should be barred from world society. I would not claim that a more realistic and more tolerant and appreciative attitude on our part would bring any quick change in Chinese attitudes. I am sure that it would not. But at least it would remove the greatest single barrier on our side that now stands in the way of China moving in the direction we would hope to see it go, and at the same time it would remove a serious barrier to the development of a broader international approach to the problem of containing Chinese Communist expansionism.

10. It might be argued that until China shows itself more conciliatory toward the U.S., particularly at this time when we are engaged in the war in Vietnam, we might lose face or might weaken our containment policy if we were to redefine our attitude toward Peking in this way. I would disagree strongly. I do not see how face would be involved. As by far the world's greatest nation, we lose face by pretending to believe things that most people in the world, including ourselves, realize are not true. We lose face by letting our basic policies seem to be determined by the peculiar sensitivities of a small country like Taiwan. The only sound course is for us to stand frankly on our own ideals and on our own judgments, and these do not include the concepts that the GRC will reconquer the continent or that we must approve of Communist China to admit that it exists. As to a redefinition of our attitude weakening the containment policy, I believe that the reverse is the case. The very fact that we are militarily so committed in Vietnam would prevent any serious misinterpretation of our actions. On the contrary, our clarified stand would be more understandable to our own people as well as to outsiders; we could count on increased sympathy and possibly more actual aid from the rest of the world; we would have laid the ground work for a broader international approach to the continuing ChiCom menace; and most important, by showing respect for Chinese nationalism we would help to strengthen all Asian nationalism and the possibilities for increased regional solidarity, which in the long run are the only real answers to the threat of Communist subversion.

11. In conclusion, let me outline specifically what it is that I advocate. It is merely the further clarification of the current semi-official phrase "containment with [without] isolation" and the sections of the President's July 12 speech/2/ which call for a "peace of conciliation" and "the full participation by all nations in an international community under law." In other words, we should make clear that, however strongly we insist on the right of Taiwan to retain its membership in the United Nations, we recognize that Peking represents a great country which, according to the basic concepts of the U.N. and our own ideals of international society, should also be represented in the U.N. and other international bodies, so long as it is willing to join these on the same terms that are expected of every other nation. We should also make clear that we are ready to live peacefully with Peking and develop such friendly cooperation as it is willing to accept; that we believe that the form of government which exists in continental China is a matter for the people who live there to decide; and that we have no intention of interfering in any way in the domestic affairs of continental China. In addition, we should find ways to express our admiration for the great historic entity of China as not only the largest nation in the world today in terms of population but as one of the truly great national units throughout human history.

/2/See Document 168.

12. We have for some time been hinting at the sort of attitude I advocate, but I believe that we should move to a clear and unequivocal definition of this attitude as soon as possible. I realize that the delicacy of the political situation on Taiwan would require carefully coordinated steps over a certain period of time before the new positions could be reached. But we should not allow the peculiarities of one small country to continue to determine the position of the world's greatest power year after year. In view of the dangers of an adverse outcome on the ChiRep vote, in the U.N. this autumn, we need to move with considerable speed. World opinion and votes in the U.N. are likely in any case to push us step by step towards the type of redefinition of our attitude I have outlined above. If we move in this direction only out of pressing necessity and with obvious reluctance, we shall probably end up with most of the disadvantages of our present stance and few of the possible benefits of the new. I am convinced that it is overwhelmingly in our interests to move quickly and on our initiative to the new stance, which is both in keeping with the realities and with our own fundamental ideals.

Reischauer

 

175. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Chamcook, New Brunswick, August 21, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Smith; approved at the White House on August 30. The source text is labeled "Part 5 of 9."

SUBJECT
Communist China and Admission to UN

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth
Rufus Z. Smith, Director for Relations with Canada

Canada
Prime Minister Pearson
Ambassador A. E. Ritchie
H. Basil Robinson, Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs

(The President met with Prime Minister Pearson on the occasion of his participation in a cornerstone laying ceremony at the Roosevelt Campobello International Park on Campobello Island, New Brunswick. He was the luncheon guest of the Prime Minister at Rossmount Inn in the little town on Chamcook, N.B. The lunch was preceded by approximately an hour and a half of serious conversation in a parlor of the Inn set aside for the purpose.)

The Prime Minister commented that there appeared to be some real problems inside Communist China. The Chinese seemed to have settled the leadership question, but it appeared that the structure of the leadership is no longer quite so monolithic.

The Prime Minister asked whether the President saw any big issue coming up at the UN General Assembly other than the Chinese representation question. He went on to say that he would like to see the Chinese Communists in the United Nations where they would have to defend their position before the world, but he did not want to sell out the Chinese Nationalists. He concluded by asking whether public opinion on the question is changing in the US.

The President responded that he thought American public opinion had moderated somewhat as a result of the Fulbright hearings and the speeches of a number of professors. He thought, however, that opinion could quickly swing back, although he was not sure that would be good if one believes the UN should include those who disagree with one's position. For that matter, he said, the Chinese Communists probably don't want to come in, although that may be a sham argument, and he admitted there was a good deal of reason to what the Prime Minister said.

The President concluded the remarks about China by saying we are still examining the situation. He thought that the two governments should keep in close touch on the issue and that with the relationship what it is between our two countries we could always work out any differences between us.

 

176. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 30, 1966, 1:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VII. No classification marking. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that it was seen by the President.

Mr. President.

This Hong Kong analysis of the ChiCom political scene is a bit long-winded, but worth reading given the importance of the subject./2/

/2/A typed copy of telegram 1392 from Hong Kong, August 30, is attached but not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 CHICOM)

In brief:

1. Mao has chosen Lin Piao as his successor.

2. Together they are determined to set up a power structure, via the Army, which will override the moderate opposition in the Party and the bureaucracy, as well as in intellectual life.

3. It is not certain that Lin Piao will be able to consolidate his position as Mao's successor.

4. If he does consolidate his position, he's bad news.

Walt

 

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/

Washington, August 31, 1966, 5:23 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg on August 19; cleared in draft by Vietnam Working Group Director Robert H. Miller, Aldrich, UNP Deputy Director William Gleysteen, and J. Stapleton Roy of SOV, and by SCA Deputy Administrator Barbara M. Watson, Dr. Creech of USDA, Anderson of DOD/ISA, Bundy, Harriman, and William Jorden; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Moscow, Saigon, Taipei, and Hong Kong.

38572. Gronouski-Wang talks: Guidance for 131st meeting, September 7, 1966.

1. We are scheduled to start this session. Suggest you open along following lines:

2. Mr. Ambassador, in three meetings in this series in which I have personally participated, I have endeavored to communicate desire of my Government to see improvement in relations between our two countries. I have reiterated that we have no hostile intent toward your country or your people. I have conveyed wish of my Government to enlarge areas of contact and communication between our two peoples so that through increased knowledge may come greater understanding and possibility of gradual reduction in tensions and conflicts that presently exist between us. I have expressed my Government's interest in discussing problems of disarmament and in pursuing specific views of your side on this subject. We are under no illusion that this process would be easy or rapid one. We are all too aware of great ideological and political differences between our two countries. I deeply regret our inability in these meetings, in part because of these differences, to pursue to a fruitful conclusion any of these potential areas of agreement.

3. But we are deeply convinced that violence and war are not adequate or acceptable means for settling differences between states today. President Johnson stated in speech July 12 that "reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies" was one of essentials for peace in Asia. He emphasized that any "isolation" of your country in world comes not from actions by US or other countries, but by your own choice. FYI: Peking has not so far commented on the President's speech. End FYI. It is not US which blocks path toward peaceful cooperation and exchange between scientists, scholars, doctors, artists, and athletes of our two countries. We know there is active correspondence on professional matters between many of your scientists and those of US. We know of large purchases of American books and other publications made by your Government in US. You are obviously interested in exchange of knowledge and we understand this, because so are we. What we do not understand is why you are afraid of permitting such exchanges by direct, face-to-face contact? Why not openly acknowledge that such direct exchanges would be of mutual benefit. Mr. Chou En-lai was reported by New China News Agency on July 31 to have told gathering of scientists in Peking that: "We are willing to learn modestly strong points and experiences of people of other countries." This is point of view we share and is reason we have indicated our willingness to see such exchanges of knowledge between citizens of our two countries. FYI: If ChiComs reject or do not reply to invitation to attend High Energy Physics Conference in Palo Alto, you should regret such action. End FYI.

4. Even though your Government has so far not agreed to such exchanges as we have proposed, Mr. Ambassador, I would like at this point to note potential mutual benefit which would be derived from exchange of plant and horticultural samples between interested institutions of our two countries. As you may know, exchanges of plant samples provide opportunities for cross-breeding and strengthening of plant strains and thereby provide basis for improving and increasing agricultural production.

5. Mr. Ambassador, we have noted with dismay view expressed in People's Daily of July 24 that "the Chinese people have always held that a conference table can never bring the oppressed nations a new world of independence and freedom, nor can an international agreement guarantee the oppressed nations a life of liberation and happiness." Overwhelming evidence of world history in last 20 years repudiates view that peaceful negotiations offers no prospect for social and political change. This position is false reflection on people and governments of dozens of countries in Africa and Asia: Burma, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, Kenya, and I could go on and name many more. It is only when your Government realizes impossibility of imposing its will and its ideology upon others through force and is prepared to discuss and negotiate differences at conference table that progress can be made toward goal of peace that is, I am convinced, desire of Chinese people along with those of rest of world. We do not consider valid political and economic premises of your Government in ruling your people. But we have no intention of interfering with your internal affairs. It is not for you or for us to lay down rules and principles by which other governments and peoples should govern themselves.

6. Mr. Ambassador, we have repeatedly stressed that people of South Vietnam should be able to decide their own future and choose their own form of political, economic, and social organization, free from all outside interference. Our entire position in Vietnam can be summed up as an effort to assist the people of South Vietnam to achieve this goal. We do not want to maintain bases in Southeast Asia and we have repeatedly pledged to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam when its security and freedom of choice are assured. We do not oppose the reunification of Vietnam. We support the right of self-determination through the free choice of the Vietnamese people. Likewise, the US does not oppose the neutrality or non- alignment of all the countries of Southeast Asia if that is their desire. It is in its opposition to any resolution in Vietnam which is not achieved by violence and war that your Government has found itself isolated from overwhelming majority of people and governments in world. I am sure you are aware, Mr. Ambassador, from your own reading as well as from what I and my predecessor have said in these meetings, that US is absolutely resolved to continue its support of the Government of SVN in resisting communist aggression from north with its goal of imposing by force the political system of North Vietnam on people of South Vietnam. I urge you not to doubt this and not to encourage others to doubt our determination. Military success by communist side in Vietnam is impossible. But we are prepared to seek honorable peace, one with honor for all sides. I have indicated before to you my Government's willingness to discuss means of achieving such an honorable peace with representatives of your or any other government directly involved. I reiterate that offer to you now. At our last meeting I suggested that one means by which movement toward an end to conflict could be found was through mutual dampening down of hostilities. My Government would be interested in any constructive proposals your side might wish to put forward. We are willing to consider all propositions but we will not accept ultimata. We do not attempt to intimidate others and we cannot ourselves be intimidated. I assure you, Mr. Ambassador, that you have only to test our sincerity by accepting our offer to discuss peaceful settlement in Vietnam. Our willingness to halt destruction and slaughter of war is clear and unequivocal.

7. Your Government, Mr. Ambassador, appears to consider that Geneva Agreements no longer exist. People's Daily commentary I quoted earlier alleges that Geneva Agreements have been "reduced to ashes". It scoffs at willingness of US to work toward settling conflict in Vietnam on basis of Geneva Agreements and at efforts of numerous distinguished and sincere international figures to achieve this end, one which authorities in Hanoi claim they also seek. Mr. T'ao Chu in a speech on July 22 said that "whoever still attempts to use the Geneva Agreements to tie the hands of the Vietnamese people, the Chinese people, and the revolutionary people of the world will never succeed . . . . The Geneva Agreements are already non-existent". This is position which authorities in North Vietnam have not advanced.

8. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to note that apparent position of your Government on peaceful resolution of disputes (including your rejection, as stated in the People's Daily of June 20, 1966 of any disarmament negotiations at the present time) and statements by your Government's officials setting forth extraordinary "conditions" under which your Government would even consider joining UN raise strong doubt that your Government has any interest whatsoever in participating in peaceful international organizations. The very foundation of UN is conviction that resolution of disputes and conflicts by peaceful means is not only possible but necessary. On this issue every member of UN is in agreement.

9. Mr. Ambassador, I regret to call your attention to unprovoked firing by vessel Nan Hai 155 belonging to your country on US military aircraft on July 30 at 20 degrees 37' N, 107 degrees 32' E. A second US military aircraft was fired upon by armed vessels of your country's flag on August 2 at 34 degrees 35' N, 123 degrees 05' E. Both incidents took place on open seas and in clearly international waters. US aircraft on neither occasion returned fire directed at them but only this restraint and forebearance in face of blatant provocation averted what could have been grave incident. I strongly urge that you request your Government to take appropriate measures to avoid recurrence of such incidents which could lead to consequences I believe neither of us would wish.

10. Mr. Ambassador, at our 118th meeting on November 13, 1963 and again at 127th meeting on September 20, 1965 we requested that your side provide us with names on American dogtags (identification tags) reportedly on exhibit in War Museum in Peking. I am sure you will understand strong desire on part of parents of American soldiers missing-in-action in Korea for any information that might pertain to their sons. I hope that on humanitarian grounds you will find it possible to meet this request.

11. We anticipate that in his presentation Wang may protest press leak of last meeting. We would not plan to respond other than to reiterate regret already conveyed. (Deptel 1837)/2/ Wang will probably respond to our query on non-first use agreement and WDC Preparatory Meeting along lines of People's Daily Commentary June 20 (FBIS June 20). Commentary rejects any connection between test ban and "non-first use." It implicitly replies to letter handed Wang at last meeting on WDC with flat rejection of ChiCom participation in WDC in any disarmament negotiations. Wang may also raise question of alleged US attack on ChiCom fishing boats in Tonkin Gulf May 28 and SEATO naval exercise Sea Imp and may revert to shoot-down of ChiCom plane May 12 which was discussed last meeting. He may also protest Syrian defector case or Dutch case involving attempted ChiCom defection. Kreisberg will provide you with detailed rebuttals on these and other points Wang may raise.

/2/Telegram 1837 to Warsaw, June 3, transmitted the text of a brief letter of apology for the leak of the talks reflected in a New York Times article of June 3; telegram 1853, June 4, authorized delivery of the letter. (Ibid.) The article stated that the United States had raised the possibility of making an agreement with China that neither would be the first to use nuclear weapons if the Chinese would agree to stop nuclear testing. Information about the leak was sent to Rusk in Tosec 38 to Oslo, June 3. (Ibid.)

12. It is Wang's turn to suggest timing of next meeting. You may agree to any date within next three months--we prefer November 30 or December 7.

13. FYI: In general, we anticipate that tension on mainland and indications of continuing international CCP dispute will result in Wang's taking particularly hard line in this meeting and we do not exclude possibility of last minute postponement at their initiative. End FYI.

Rusk

 

178. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, September 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VII. Confidential.

SUBJECT
DOD Interest in ChiRep

Mort Halperin told me at lunch today that a DOD memorandum on ChiRep/2/ advocating abandonment of the old formula and pointing toward a "two China" policy had been approved all the way through McNamara, without any discernible opposition in Defense.

/2/The memorandum has not been found.

According to Mort, McNamara commissioned his staff to find some way of getting DOD into ChiRep policy deliberations. The reasoning was that our present stand damages our relations with friends, and that particularly in the case of Japan such damage has defense implications.

Mort said he was talking out of school, of course, and would appreciate our treating this accordingly.

As you have observed, the issue is not appropriate for NSC deliberation but I wonder whether it would be an appropriate Tuesday luncheon topic.

Al
WJJ/3/

/3/Jorden initialed below Jenkins' signature.

 

179. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, September 6, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a September 6 memorandum from Harold K. Saunders of the NSC staff to Rostow, which transmitted NSC staff views on the main issues to be discussed at Rusk's UNGA strategy meeting. Concerning the Jenkins memorandum, Saunders commented, "I have deliberately stayed an outsider on this one, but I am wondering whether we shouldn't soon give the President a rundown on where we stand. Time is getting very short. The ticklish aspect of this problem is that the Secretary is somewhat alone in resisting change."

SUBJECT
ChiRep Item at Secretary's Meeting on UN Problems

Background

1. Prior to Red Guard excesses and Lin Piao's redeclaration of global "People's War," majority U.S. opinion--public, academic, congressional and bureaucratic--seemed to hold that effort should be made to bring Communist China into the world community. The clear trend in international opinion was similar.

2. The effects of recent Peking extravagances on sentiment for a UN invitation is not yet known, and could go either way. (My Chirep memo of Aug. 31, para 6.)/2/

/2/The memorandum reported the status of the issue. (Ibid., Name File, Jenkins Memos)

3. Our ability to defeat an Albanian-type resolution (ejecting the GRC and seating the PRC) is at present questionable. A recent field round-up of voting predictions produced too many "uncertains" to be very meaningful, and did not take account of (a) most recent Peking belligerence, or perhaps more importantly, (b) the following lament in U Thant's resignation statement:

"I must confess to a sense of dissatisfaction with the fact that the organization has not yet achieved universality of membership."

Alternatives

4. Of a whole spectrum of possible approaches to the problem, the following two appear to be the only ones which at this late date warrant U.S. consideration:

a. Attempt to have a friendly member introduce a resolution along the lines of the draft at Tab A,/3/ which reaffirms GRC status and also invites the PRC to occupy seats in the General Assembly.

/3/The tabs are attached but not printed.

b. Attempt to defeat the Albanian-type resolution, without having any other one introduced.

The two alternative drafts at Tab B/4/ may be discussed at the meeting, but have not elicited much interest so far. Either of them would probably be widely viewed as a too-patent gimmick, or overly moralistic.

/4/Both affirmed that the Republic of China was a founding and continuing UN member. The first requested the President of the General Assembly to inquire of the PRC whether it was prepared to accept the obligations of the UN Charter; the second expressed willingness to consider General Assembly membership for the PRC on being informed that it had accepted the Charter and its obligations.

Considerations

5. Alternative a) would be responsive to the President's desire that we get off the defensive.

It would surely keep the PRC out of the UN, for it would be interpreted by the Chicoms as an insult. It would provoke a blast and an indignant rejection from Peking.

It would nevertheless be interpreted by many who have considered our policies as too rigid, as welcome evidence of movement in those policies.

6. However, evidence is we would have difficulty in finding a suitable sponsor, partly because of the lateness of the shift in our tactics, and partly because many on both sides of the China issue could not support this resolution. Even we presumably would have to abstain on the second part of this two-part resolution, and hence on the later vote on the resolution as a whole--if only because the prerequisite and exceedingly difficult ground work with the GRC has not been laid (Secretary's visit to Taipei).

Furthermore, a number of our friends who have been uneasy with the "puppet" tag from their support of us in the past, have asked that we give them fair warning if we ever depart from our position, so that they may at least precede us in that shift. It is very late to give such warning now.

7. With alternative b), we would remain on the defensive, with a policy the effectiveness of which is of doubtful longevity. Although there is some indication that the voting could even be slightly more favorable than last year, the crucial uncertain vote (especially African) is more unpredictable than ever, and we could end up with the PRC in and the GRC completely out of the UN.

8. There are many other considerations, but these are the more salient. There is no course which is attractive and safe.

Recommendation

9. All things considered, I recommend that you take the following position:

Since requisite groundwork for a clear change in policy or tactics has not been laid, we should

a. State more unequivocally than in our last message to the field our continued opposition to an Albanian-type resolution and our expectation as of now that this is the only resolution which will be presented.

b. Keep constant tabs on likely voting on such a resolution. If the chance of losing becomes too great, consult immediately for sponsorship and support of a para 4, a) type resolution. (A last minute shift in extremis would be more acceptable to our friends--including the GRC--than a planned shift before that, at this late date.)

c. If that alternative, too, should go awry (e.g. no appropriate sponsor, too much friendly opposition, or amendment putting PRC in Security Council) attempt to shift immediately to a resolution establishing a study group to consider this complex question, and report back to the Assembly. This alternative is a poor third, since we could not predict or perhaps greatly influence the outcome. It is a stop-gap if something deemed worse should loom. Timing and mechanics are complex, but we could probably gain support for the desired priority sequence in voting, where more than one resolution is tabled.

10. Finally, we should bear in mind that the mood on the mainland is ugly, not yet fully understood, and probably not yet settled into a definitive course. U Thant was not far wrong when he said China was having a nervous breakdown--a malady requiring on the part of others patience and firmness, understanding and wariness, flexibility, and at times forceful opposition. We cannot yet predict the dominant conclusions which the UN membership will draw from China's present madness. We should therefore keep an open mind concerning resolutions which may be introduced by others than the Albanian group. Especially if we are otherwise in trouble, it is possible that such initiative might bring some of the advantages sought in a "non-defensive" approach, without the costs which would be associated with our having initiated it.

Meanwhile, as the situation permits, we can continue our quiet, carefully measured program of attempted reconciliation. It will not be reciprocated, but as a minimum it helps throw Mao and company off balance, and hopefully builds for the non-Mao future.

Alfred Jenkins/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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