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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
190. Memorandum by the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency/1/
ONE Special Memorandum No. 14-66
Washington, September 23, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VII. Secret.
SUBJECT
The China Tangle/2//2/This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Directorate of Intelligence Research Staff. [Footnote in the source text.]
1. The situation in China today is one of confusion, contradiction and rapid change. The more spectacular events have been widely reported: Mao has chosen a new successor, Lin Piao, re-juggled the top leadership, and most important, launched an extensive purge of the party. With the removal of Peng Chen and the demotion of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, the men who have run the party for Mao have been forced to give way to a new group. Military men, notably the old Marshals of the PLA, are prominent in the revised Politburo. Moreover, elements of the old party machine are now also under attack by the Red Guard, which has been formed primarily for this purpose by Lin and Mao, and to some degree is overseen by the PLA.
2. It seems to us that the party cannot have been subjected to such a radical upheaval merely because it had been sluggish or unresponsive to Mao's orders. More likely Mao was confronted with actual open opposition in party forums, leading him to conclude--possibly with good reason--that he could no longer trust the party as it had been constituted and led to execute his basic policies. To be sure, Mao may be simply suffering from the pathological suspiciousness of a senile autocrat, yet we still do not believe he would have wrapped himself in the mantle of the PLA and unleashed the Red Guards unless he had good reason to think there was some real and potent threat to his authority.
3. There may have been specific policy issues which brought on the crisis--such as the Vietnam war, military questions, the Sino-Soviet conflict or economic problems. This cannot be demonstrated from the available evidence. It is reasonable to believe, however, that the manner and style of Mao's approach would generate opposition among those who had to run the country's affairs, and would, by its nature, have to be opposed by a more moderate line.
4. Lin Piao is still a shadowy figure. We do not know how far he is loyal to Mao or how far he is pursuing an ambitious plan of his own. We are inclined to believe that Mao deliberately turned to Lin as he lost confidence in the party, but that the proximity of power is acting as a strong stimulant in Lin. If Mao and Lin successfully purge the party and replace Liu's and Teng's men with their own, then Lin will obviously have gone a long way to consolidating his role of heir apparent. However, even with the power and prestige of Mao behind him, and perhaps allied with the wily and astute Chou En-lai, Lin's task remains difficult and dangerous. The leaders of the old party machine are not without assets. They are presumably working now to turn the tide against the Red Guard. The forces arrayed against them are formidable--Mao, Lin, the PLA--but even in defeat the former party leaders could throw the nation into great confusion.
5. Thus a basic instability could continue for some time, possibly until Mao leaves the scene and a successor regime finally consolidates its control. In any case, we expect protracted and complicated maneuvers. Some further turmoil at the top is likely, and sharp reversals of policies cannot be ruled out.
6. There are indeed some few signs that reason and sanity have not totally departed the Chinese scene. Despite the flood tide of harsh criticism against moderates and pragmatists, the regime has not yet abandoned the relatively realistic and restrained approach to economic policy of recent years. As spokesman for this policy, Chou En-lai has called on the Red Guards to leave the farms and factories alone; Lin Piao, however, has not touched on this aspect but has called for heavier blows against those within the party "who have taken the capitalist road." In attempting to curb unnecessary disruptions to the economy, Peking has shown particular apprehension over potential threats to the fall harvest. In view of the disappointing early harvest, there is valid cause for concern. But while Mao and Lin appear to have conceded Chou the need to maintain some stability in the economy, we cannot be sure that Mao will not again veer in an extremist direction and launch a campaign against the ideological impurities now being tacitly ignored. Action against the peasants private plots would be a key indicator that such an extremist campaign was underway.
7. Caution is also being shown in foreign affairs, specifically on Vietnam. Concentration on the enemies within has resulted in a drop in press attention to Vietnam and to foreign affairs generally. China has not abandoned or even eased its stand on Vietnam, but it has pushed the matter to the back burner for at least the time being. Aside from some heavily qualified hyperbole about the Red Guards being ready to "fight a war at any time," the current upheaval has concentrated on domestic issues. We estimated recently that it was unlikely that the Chinese would intervene with their own forces in the Vietnam war. And we continue to believe this is the best judgment of Chinese policy. But the questions of who is in charge in China and what he or they are seeking to accomplish certainly bear on the matter. It would only be prudent to allow for some chance that turmoil in China will produce a radical break with the caution that has so far characterized Chinese policy in Vietnam.
8. There is one further aspect of the Chinese crisis that is of great interest for the US. This is the effect on Hanoi. Thus far, the North Vietnamese have appeared to act as if nothing has happened in China. But they must be concerned over the disruptions and uncertainties. At the very least, China is increasingly exposed as a rather uncertain and unstable ally, and the net result may be a loss of influence in Hanoi. If so, this might improve the chances for other interested parties, particularly the USSR if it was so minded, to encourage Hanoi to consider a political settlement.
9. As for the longer term, the present crisis cannot help but have a profound effect on China. It is already apparent that Mao's permanent revolution is meeting resistance. The recurrent trauma of government by exhortation as a substitute for effective policies to deal with real problems, is clearly taking its toll among the Chinese people. Despite a widespread support for Mao's objectives of building a strong and independent China, there must be growing disenchantment with his methods for reaching this goal. Attempts to modernize China by following doctrines coined in Mao's guerrilla days must appear increasingly ridiculous. Some intellectuals and even some party leaders were aware of this earlier but it has by now probably reached broader sectors of opinion.
10. No amount of glorification of the omniscient leader will dissolve the tightening constraints of the economy. Most Chinese will judge any government on its ability to help them meet their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. The present regime has yet to come up with a reasonable plan for feeding its over 750 million people and at the same time financing an economic development program. As the growing population pushes against the limited resources of the stagnant economy, the risk of a major economic crisis will grow.
11. In the face of these problems, only a pragmatic leadership seems likely to make any progress at all in dealing with China's immense problems. Such a leadership would also be forced to make an important reassessment of the premises of Mao's foreign policy, including, probably, relations with the USSR. If we are correct in these assumptions, the long range trends are moving inexorably against Mao's brand of socialism, and his desperate effort to reverse the tide may actually hurry his ultimate defeat. In short, his fears of "revisionism" in China are probably well grounded.
For the Board of National Estimates:
Abbot Smith
Acting Chairman
191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/
Washington, September 29, 1966, 6:57 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Bennett; cleared in draft by Roy, Admiral Lemos of DOD/ISA, Richard H. Donald of ACA, and [text not declassified] of CIA; and approved by Berger. Repeated to Hong Kong.
56941. Consultations with GRC. Refs: A--Taipei's 901; B--Taipei's A-250;/2/ C--Hong Kong's 2095;/3/ D--Hong Kong's 2072./4/
/2/See Document 186 and footnote 2 thereto.
/3/Telegram 2095 from Hong Kong, September 21, warned that Ch'en Yi's recent comments to a Japanese delegation indicated that Chinese Communist policy was dominated by an extremist Mao-Lin leadership preoccupied with the possibility of war with the United States. It warned of the risk of giving the Chinese Communists the wrong signal at that time and urged rejection of any Nationalist proposals for operations against the mainland. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
/4/Telegram 2072 from Hong Kong, September 20, commented on Ch'en's comments to the Japanese delegation and urged extra precautions against any steps that might risk Chinese involvement or force greater North Vietnamese dependence on China. (Ibid., POL CHICOM)
1. From your conversation with Chiang Ching-kuo reported refs A and B, it apparent GRC now desires resume consultation with respect to mainland and continues hope win some form US approval, even if only on contingency basis, for military action against mainland. In present situation on mainland and in Viet-Nam it crucial we and GRC avoid actions which might give wrong signal to ChiComs. As you noted to CCK, our position against initiation use of force against mainland has not changed. In circumstances now foreseen, we could not assist GRC landings on mainland and could not agree to any unilateral GRC military action against mainland. We feel GRC tacitly accepts our position in assuring us, as both President Chiang and CCK have done, that GRC gives priority to solution Viet-Nam problem over return to mainland.
2. We believe we should welcome interest of President Chiang and CCK in exchanging views with us on Far East problems and we hope through maintenance this dialogue avoid GRC feeling isolated from US policy. This consideration especially important in view seven-nation meeting on Viet-Nam.
3. Regarding ref C para 3, assume Embassy will continue monitoring GRC activities and report immediately any GRC plans for unilateral actions which could convey wrong signal to ChiComs.
4. We see no objection to Blue Lion consultations continuing on same basis as in past and with lowest possible level visibility. Regarding briefings mentioned para 9 ref A, we believe it must be made clear to GRC that original Blue Lion ground rules remain in force. We cannot become involved in contingency military planning re mainland jointly with GRC, though joint planning for defense Taiwan and Pescadores under our treaty should of course continue.
5. CCK's separate proposal re intelligence operations, while entirely too sweeping in total, may offer way of permitting minor concession to reduce appearance of flat rejection of GRC desires and detrimental GRC reaction. We will discuss specifics with you through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] channels./5/
/5/A copy of a message agreed upon at a September 30 meeting between Berger and Colby is filed with an October 4 memorandum from William McAfee of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to Hughes, recording the meeting. (Ibid., INR Files, 1966 FE Weekly Staff Meetings)
6. Regarding ref A para 8, you may inform CCK there have been no US-Soviet discussions on Communist China including recent Rusk-Gromyko conversations in New York. Within recent weeks low level Soviet officials have become somewhat freer in remarking on Chinese developments in conversations with US counterparts but only to extent of repeating Soviet press commentary. We will of course keep GRC informed of any significant developments in this respect.
Rusk
192. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, October 4, 1966, 0151Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow and the White House.
1214. For Secretary and Sisco. Goldberg conversation with Gromyko.
1. I called on Gromyko Oct 3 at Sov Mission in accordance arrangements in reftel./2/ Gromyko opened discussion by stating he had been told of my desire call on him and said he interested to exchange views but asked me to begin. I replied that I had been informed of his interest in conversation with me.
/2/Not identified.
[Here follows discussion concerning a possible treaty on outer space, Vietnam, and nonproliferation.]
5. I then brought up question of Chinese representation stating that in recent review US policy on this matter, I had been interested to note that impact of any possible shift in US posture on US-USSR relations had received little stress. I said that perhaps, in light of recent events in China and extraordinary phenomenon of Red Guards, this consideration perhaps should figure more importantly in our assessment adding that, in a personal way, I had explored this question with friends and brought it to attention of Prime Minister Pearson of Canada in recent conversation with him. Gromyko appeared taken aback by my launching of ChiRep question, and said that he could only repeat long-held Sov view that rightful occupant Chinese seat in UN was PRC. He inquired immediately whether stress on US-Sov aspect of ChiRep study was personal one on my part and I confirmed that it was. He also expressed some surprise at my frank statement that domestic public opinion which recent Gallup Poll had shown 59 percent in favor "two Chinas" policy no longer important consideration in US assessment of ChiRep matter. I added, of course, that this only one consideration anyway and decision had to be taken in context world events. He then expressed in what appeared to be somewhat confused manner Sov puzzlement over recent events in Communist China stating that they not fully informed about them or sure of their meaning. Admitted that their result was lack of satisfactory relations with PRC but observed that this should be seen against background of common basic ideology and not assessed in same way as unsatisfactory relations between states of differing ideologies. (This statement made in uncharacteristically halting and uncertain manner.)
[Here follows discussion of a possible treaty on outer space.]
Goldberg
193. Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, October 25, 1966, 0500Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong and to Manila for Bundy.
1227. Ref: State 70990 (Limdis);/2/ Taipei 1106 (Limdis);/3/ Hong Kong 2905 (Limdis)./4/
/2/Telegram 70990 to Taipei, October 21, requested Embassy comment concerning an October 15 naval clash near Matsu, reported in the press on October 18, and an Embassy recommendation as to whether the matter should be taken up with Chiang Ching-kuo or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to avoid repetition of such provocative actions at a time when the mainland situation was unsettled and Chinese Communist decisions on possible intervention in Vietnam might hang in the balance. It also asked whether any U.S.-supplied equipment had been used in the operation. (Ibid.)
/3/Dated October 12. (Ibid., POL CHINAT-US)
/4/Not found.
1. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has reported all available data concerning October 15 naval incident [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Major outlines are that incident took place in area between Matsu and mainland; five small GRC boats attacked ChiCom vessels; four of GRC small craft lost together with ten of the fifteen personnel who participated in operation; ChiCom losses apparently one small boat; incident was apparently not mounted for intelligence collecting, but to attack ChiCom ships as part of new GRC response to mainland turmoil and hopefully to stage symbolic victory for psychological and morale reasons at time of President Chiang's birthday.
2. No MAP or other US supplied equipment was used in this operation. Raid was conducted by Intelligence Bureau of Ministry of National Defense (IBMND), same group which has run most small GRC incursions. The IBMND built the boats used, the two largest of which (M 5's) were 25-foot assault boats.
3. I have given serious thought to advisability of making approach of some kind to GRC concerning Matsu incident, and believe that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] information concerning GRC intent in this case warrants our raising issue with GRC. I appreciate fact that such incidents, even though not wholly new, may arouse ChiCom suspicion or cause reaction particularly at time when leadership in Peking may be seriously split on policy issues including Viet-Nam. Before any decision is taken concerning form of representation to GRC, believe following factors should be considered:
A. We know from new, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reporting (being disseminated today) that this incident reflects a GRC decision to have IBMND resume such maritime operations after two-year lull. We know [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of some 22 small maritime incursions of various kinds conducted in 1964, most of them by IBMND. These GRC incursions continued on small scale, apparently five in 1965 and four in 1966 prior to October 15 case. Latest incident is of larger scale than 1965-66 operational level (with exception of course of 6 August 1965 GRC naval sortie), and calls to mind some six Matsu area small operations conducted in 1964, one of which (October) was very similar to subject case. In view of previous USG acceptance of such GRC incursions, GRC would wonder why we have chosen this particular time to make approach, particularly if ChiComs have made no specific response.
B. We know [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that Matsu incident has been mounted in direct response to Gimo's demands that his forces undertake some positive action against ChiComs. Protest to GRC on activities it has been carrying out in response to President Chiang's orders, however, unlikely to be productive.
C. As I observed in Taipei's 1106, we stand to gain a good deal from continuing our useful relations with the GRC [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and we should if possible avoid diminishing their utility.
D. If we raise Matsu affair with CCK or MOFA, Chinese may believe that we are trying to establish new ground rules to further limit their actions concerning mainland. While new limitation may be desirable or even necessary at some later stage, to try to implement them now would arouse GRC suspicions and make officials here less cooperative at very time (before ChiRep vote) we need to have most influence.
E. Past ground rules, as understood both by GRC and by US officials here, have allowed GRC clear latitude to conduct unilateral "intelligence gathering operations," but not "military raids." October 15 operation must be considered as one kind of "military raid," although we have not protested to GRC in past borderline cases of this kind. It is useful to note that these ground rules allow short duration, small scale landing operations on mainland where objective is to abduct ChiCom personnel and acquire documents for intelligence purposes. October 15 engagement, while probably outside present ground rules, was conducted entirely at sea between small boats, and may be considered by ChiComs as less dangerous, and easier to handle than "intelligence collection operation" conducted against mainland itself.
4. On balance I believe we should take this up with GRC and I wish to discuss both substance and tactics with Bundy during his visit here next week.
5. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
McConaughy
194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/
Washington, October 28, 1966, 9:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Gleysteen, cleared by Berger, cleared in draft by Acting Secretary Katzenbach, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN for Goldberg.
75499. Tosec 143. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. Subject: ChiRep.
1. We have received three separate approaches which signify not surprising build-up of pressure from our allies over ChiRep issue.
2. First approach was from Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel yesterday to Ambassador Knight stating that Belgian Government would begin conversations with Canadian and Italian representatives at UN to introduce proposal for study committee on ChiRep leading toward tabling report at next UNGA. Harmel's vague discussion indicated he thinking of wide terms of reference for committee (including ChiCom seat in SC) and tempted by idea of abstaining on Albanian resolution if Belgian study committee proposal not adopted. After discussion with Knight, Harmel seemed inclined to vote against Albanian resolution but thought this would be easier for Belgium if study committee resolution also tabled.
3. Second approach was from Italian Ambassador to Sisco in which Ambassador said he instructed to bring to our attention statement made by Fanfani yesterday in Parliament which hinted need for establishment of UNGA study group to make recommendation on ChiRep question. Ambassador added he had impression no immediate move being contemplated by Italian Government. Sisco promised to report approach to me, emphasized that our policy remained unchanged, and requested Italian Government take no further initiative without first consulting US. Sisco gave numerous reasons why we would have reservation about timing of any move which might be interpreted by Peking as concession to its hard-line policy. Report of his conversation being repeated separately./2/
/2/Transmitted in telegram 7516 to USUN (sent to Bangkok as Tosec 139), October 28. (Ibid.)
4. Third approach was from Canadian Ambassador who handed me letter from Paul Martin to you/3/ (which I am repeating by separate telegram), stating that Canadian Cabinet had decided it would "appear most appropriate" for Canada to go on record in GA to effect that Canada considers most equitable interim solution to be representation of both ChiComs and GRC in UN, adding that this separate initiative would still enable Canada to adhere to previous position against Albanian resolution. Martin letter notes he will be leaving Ottawa for Eastern Europe and Italy beginning November 4 and does not see possibility discussion with you prior his return November 16. I stressed our desire for further discussion before Canadian position frozen and I emphasized particular importance of timing of Canadian action mentioning possibility that Canadians might better postpone such move until next session of UNGA.
/3/Ambassador Ritchie's letter to Katzenbach, October 28, conveying Martin's message of October 27 to Rusk, is ibid.
5. Comment. On basis our latest nose count, we feel our prospect for obtaining simple majority against Albanian resolution is precarious. We particularly bothered by persistence of Chile's and Iran's willingness to part ways with us on substantive resolution despite our high-level representations. We have now analyzed carefully UNESCO voting on ChiRep, and while we sustained our position by expected margin, several countries voted contrary to firm promises.
6. In this situation, I recommend we make additional interim rejoinders to the Belgian, Italian and Canadian representatives before you return, telling them not take any step pending further consultation. We, in concert with Goldberg, will have further recommendations for you upon your return. ChiRep debate does not begin until Nov. 21 and we therefore have time.
Katzenbach
195. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 2, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Jenkins Memos. Secret. Copies were sent to William J. Jorden and Donald Ropa of the NSC staff.
SUBJECT
ChiRepThe latest tally on probable voting is about where it was when you left town. It is possible that we could have a slightly higher margin on our side than last year for the important question vote. On the substantive vote, the best guess is that we will have perhaps two votes margin in our favor but events in Africa, mainland China, or elsewhere, could still affect this considerably. Furthermore, since the vote will not come until about December 1 (debate begins Nov. 21), mainland events could take a somewhat clearer turn with unpredictable results on the voting. The fact that the tally is close to last year's vote does not indicate stability. Several nations have shifted from each side of the question to the other side.
After the IRG meeting today, Sam Berger called me into his office to say that he wanted me to know of a memo being prepared as the result of a meeting held this morning with Joe Sisco, but that it was being very closely held within the Department./2/ He said that he had become finally convinced that it was too late under any circumstances for us to shift to a two-China approach at this session, even in extremis. After considerable discussion it was agreed that as a contingency position we would not oppose efforts on the part of friendly nations, such as Canada, Italy or Belgium, to turn to a study group. We would recommend to the Secretary, however, that we be a member of such a study group. (I am very glad to see this change in our position.)
/2/A November 3 memorandum from Sisco to Rusk sets forth three alternatives: continuing the same tactics, supporting dual representation, and supporting a Study Committee. It dismissed the first alternative as ineffective and the second as unacceptable because of the reaction of Taipei and other governments that were publicly committed to support the U.S. position and because Congress and the public were not prepared for such a sudden reversal. The memorandum stated that adoption of a passive role concerning a Study Committee proposal had been considered but that direct U.S. involvement would provide the best assurance of getting acceptable results. A copy is attached to a November 4 memorandum from Sisco to Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM)
I think this makes sense. It may make some sort of contribution on the right side of the present mainland struggle without incurring just at this unpredictable time some of the risks of a more definitive change in U.S. policy. I hope the Secretary will buy this policy. It is obviously essential that our contingency position, if it becomes that, be closely held, lest it affect disastrously our initial and only overt position.
Al Jenkins
196. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, November 3, 1966, 1040Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/BUNDY. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received at 6:27 a.m.
1308. For Secretary and Berger from Bundy./2/
/2/Assistant Secretary Bundy visited Taiwan November 2-3 after accompanying President Johnson on a trip to Asia and the Pacific, October 17-November 2, including the Manila Summit Conference October 24-25.
1. Outstanding feature of my visit here was subtly cool, though correct, reception by Gimo himself. Every single detail of the meeting was in this direction, including transfer from residence to formal setting of office, last-minute back and forth on time resulting in delay after arrival, last-minute exclusion of Hummel so that Ambassador had to take notes, and above all fact that conversation lasted only forty minutes and was terminated politely but with unusual firmness and even abruptness by Gimo. It was certainly in total contrast in warmth and length with any previous conversation I have had here with Gimo over many years.
2. As to substance, while Gimo heard me out politely on Manila summary, and found communiqué satisfactory, he was notably curt on declaration, saying only that he "had to objection" to it. Even more significant, the main message that the Gimo wished to get across was that the ChiCom nuclear-missile test/3/ meant they would be in a position within six months either to employ or to threaten use of these weapons specifically in Vietnam. I of course responded that any such use would be a madness far beyond any irrationality now discernible on the mainland, since they must be aware of massive power that we could use in this event.
/3/The Government of the People's Republic of China announced on October 27 that China had successfully tested a guided missile with a nuclear warhead. The text of the announcement as printed in the Peking Review, October 28, 1966, p. iii, is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 676-677.
3. In marked contrast, Chiang Ching-kuo and C.K. Yen have been if anything more friendly and outgoing than in the past. CCK in particular talked most responsibly and interestingly about whole ChiCom picture and Soviet relationship. He made no attempt to tie the nuclear-missile test to Vietnam, and the only pitch I encountered on any of the other conversations was a fairly mild plea by the Foreign Minister for stepped-up mainland operations of a "commando" character.
4. Trying to put these pieces of the puzzle together, I am inclined to think that Gimo is personally more upset by our repeated references to reconciliation themes, during the trip and specifically in the Manila declaration, than others here may be. But I would be inclined to go further and to suppose that Gimo's coolness reflects to some degree sense of personal affront over our omission of Taipei from schedule, fairly perfunctory tone of President's birthday message to him,/4/ and general feeling of personal neglect over long period of time.
/4/Dated October 17. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, China, 3/1/66-12/31/66)
5. To the extent that Gimo's reaction rests on substance, it is unavoidable. However, his personal state of feeling could become important if we should confront in the next month any necessity for a change of position in UN. For what it may be worth, this subject has not even been mentioned at any level in 24 hours of conversation here. They obviously do not want to get into any suggestion of change by me, although of course I shall have to indicate if asked tonight that we must and will keep situation under close review, with possibility of tactical change still present.
6. In any event, I think we must consider some personal touch that involves our President directly. A letter reporting on Manila and the whole trip, with some reference to my visit, could at least help to ease the feelings, which are not wholly incomprehensible, of a crotchety old man who still has the power to make decisions that can affect our interests seriously.
7. Ambassador concurs.
McConaughy
197. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 3, 1966, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in U on November 7. The meeting was held in Under Secretary Katzenbach's office.
SUBJECT
Chinese RepresentationPARTICIPANTS
Canada
A.E. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador
Peter M. Roberts, Counselor, Canadian EmbassyUS
The Under Secretary
Rufus Z. Smith, Director, Officer of Canadian Affairs, EUR
Donald Morris, Special Assistant to the Under SecretaryAmbassador Ritchie opened the conversation by saying it seemed desirable to impose on the Under Secretary's time once more in order, first, to provide the Department with the draft text on which the Canadian Government has been working as a possible early initiative on the question of Chinese representation in the UN and, secondly, to point out again that Canadian Foreign Minister Martin was scheduled to depart for Europe the following evening. His intent was to convey the Canadian thinking on this subject to the Department in as concrete a form as possible prior to Mr. Martin's departure so that if the Secretary wished to consult personally with Mr. Martin he would have a more tangible basis on which to do it.
The Under Secretary responded that he had not yet had a chance to talk with the Secretary on this subject and it was difficult for him to say just when he would be able to. He pointed out that with the President leaving the next day for Texas it would be difficult to go into the question in depth with the Secretary prior to Mr. Martin's departure. He therefore wanted to reiterate his hope that the Canadian Government would give us time to consider the matter further and an opportunity to discuss both the substance of the problem and questions of timing. He noted in this regard that the Secretary would also probably want to discuss the matter with the President.
When the Ambassador mentioned specifically that Mr. Martin would be leaving Ottawa the next day and would return on November 16, the Under Secretary remarked that he assumed of course that Mr. Martin would be totally out of touch even during the period of his journey. The Ambassador responded that one of the difficult points was that the Canadian Government would obviously want to talk before November 16 with other governments. He hoped therefore it would not be necessary from the United States point of view that his Government refrain from talking with at least some other counties. He said he was not speaking of widespread consultation at this point but had in mind a few key countries. (He mentioned specifically only the UK.) He said he was not thinking of active lobbying by Canadian representatives but certainly they would want to show the text of their draft resolution to some others.
The Under Secretary asked that the GOC at least give him a chance to talk to the Secretary before approaches were made to any other government. He would try to do it that evening or perhaps the following morning.
The Ambassador then turned to the substance of the Canadian proposal. He said there were two purposes which his Government had in mind. The first was to make it possible for the GOC and other governments which felt the same way to express a point of view on the subject of Chinese representation which, by their so doing, would accomplish the second purpose, namely to be able still to oppose an Albanian-type resolution. The Canadian Government had been working for some time on a draft of a resolution which would accomplish these two purposes and has come up with a proposal which would call upon the President of the General Assembly to carry out an investigation of the possible basis for an interim solution. (The Ambassador then handed the Under Secretary the text which is attached to this memorandum.)/2/ He said the word "interim" had been chosen deliberately since it was recognized that the draft dealt with the de facto situation of two Chinas and did not attempt to present a long-range definitive de jure solution.
/2/The text of the proposal is not attached. A copy is attached to the November 4 memorandum from Sisco to Rusk cited in footnote 2, Document 195. The proposal included a preamble suggesting an interim arrangement in which both Chinese Governments would be seated in the General Assembly and the People's Republic of China would have China's seat in the Security Council, and it requested the President of the General Assembly to explore the possibilities outlined in the preamble as the basis for an interim solution.
After an initial glance at the text, the Under Secretary noted particularly the provision for Chinese Communist representation on the Security Council. He said he was of course speaking off the cuff but it certainly seemed to him that this provision was hardly necessary in order to express the point of view Canada was trying to get across. The Ambassador responded that his Government has considered the point put did not see how the resolution would be acceptable to many other governments unless such a provision were made. The document, in his view, would otherwise not be a credible document.
The Under Secretary asked what the Canadians had in mind with regard to tactics. Would their resolution be pressed to a vote and if so, when? after consideration of the "important matter" question? after a vote on the Albanian-type resolution?
The Ambassador responded that certainly they had in mind that such a resolution would be put to a vote but as to timing he could not say at this point. The Under Secretary stressed that tactics and substance quickly become intertwined.
The Ambassador remarked that the GOC did not expect that the Chinese Communists would welcome the Canadian resolution all that warmly, but at the same time he thought the Chinese Communists would not be able to maintain that the Canadian proposal was entirely unreasonable. He argued that the real problem for Canada and for certain other governments was how to continue to oppose an Albanian-type resolution. The alternative to something like the Canadian proposal would be to abstain on the Albanian resolution.
The Ambassador reaffirmed that the Canadian proposal had been drawn up only after Cabinet-level consideration, although he could not be certain that the Cabinet had considered the detailed wording of the draft. He asserted that his Government regarded the proposal as a positive approach and as the best means of preserving the real interest of Taiwan. Throughout their consideration there had been a continuing effort to meet what they knew were the real concerns of the United States, and he wanted to reiterate that he would be available to discuss the matter at any time.
The Under Secretary reiterated that he would take the matter up as soon as possible with the Secretary. He nevertheless wanted to say now it seemed to him there were many ways of skinning a cat and that the Canadian draft was not the only way of meeting the problem. There were many other courses which ought to be considered. The Ambassador wryly remarked that there were indeed many ways to skin a cat but a cat, after all, had only nine lives.
In parting, the Ambassador stressed again the urgency of the matter and indicated his Government felt a need to begin consultation with other governments very shortly. He understood the plan was to approach the British the following Monday (November 7).
198. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 13-8-66
Washington, November 3, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Helms and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on November 3. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of the estimate. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred, except the FBI Representative, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
A November 1 memorandum from INR/RFE Director Fred Greene to Hughes states that the SNIE was intended to be a summary of portions of NIE 13-2-66 of the same title, sanitized for distribution to persons not cleared for access to NIE 13-2-66, but that the draft SNIE had been revised to incorporate information about the fourth Chinese nuclear test explosion. (Ibid.) NIE 13-2-66, "Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program," dated July 1, is not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIE Files)
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAM
The Problem
To make a preliminary evaluation of recent information bearing on Communist China's advanced weapons program.
The Estimate
1. On 27 October 1966, the Chinese announced that they had successfully launched a guided missile which carried a nuclear warhead. We have confirmed that there was a nuclear explosion, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] detonated in the lower atmosphere about 100 miles east of the Lop Nor nuclear test site. As nearly as we can ascertain, the device was delivered by a ballistic missile, as the Chinese claim. Such a missile, in or near the MRBM class, may have been fired from the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu missile test range over a distance of about 400 nautical miles. At this point we are not able to judge with confidence what this event implies for China's advanced weapons capability. The Chinese may have conducted this test for propaganda and political purposes, using equipment that would not be satisfactory for a weapon system. We think it somewhat more likely that they have tested a missile-warhead combination which, while considerably below US or Soviet standards, could be used as a weapon in the short or perhaps medium range. If this is the case, the Chinese could have a few such weapons ready for deployment in 1967 or 1968.
2. We have recently received information indicating that the Chinese also have under development a much larger and more complex missile system. We believe that this is an ICBM, although a space role cannot be discounted. We believe a launch facility will be completed early in 1967. No major component of an ICBM has been detected but there are indications that the Chinese might be able to begin flight testing by the latter part of 1967. If so, and if they are able to produce the missiles and other equipment necessary to sustain an active and successful test program, a few ICBMs, with fission nuclear warheads, could be operational by the early 1970's. The first generation of such missiles would probably be large, costly, and, again by US or Soviet standards, deficient in reliability and accuracy. Nevertheless, the Chinese would probably wish to have a few operational at least for political and psychological effect. The development of an ICBM booster would also give the Chinese the capacity to put a fairly large payload into orbit early in the ICBM test program.
3. An ICBM could not be fired to full range within the borders of China, and we cannot establish at this time how the Chinese would carry out full range ICBM tests. Preliminary flight testing of system components, however, could be accomplished within the borders of China.
4. At the same time, the Chinese will be working toward a high yield thermonuclear warhead. The third Chinese test device, which contained some thermonuclear material, performed quite inefficiently and apparently was heavy and bulky, indicating that the Chinese have much to learn about thermonuclear technology. It did, however, constitute an initial step toward the attainment of a thermonuclear capability. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Chinese will be able to develop a thermonuclear warhead by the early 1970's.
199. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 4, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VII. Secret. Copies were sent to Jorden and Ropa.
SUBJECT
Lifting Remaining Travel Restrictions on ChinaAt the last EA (formerly FE) /IRG meeting, the Acting Chairman Sam Berger raised the only voice in dissent to the China Working Group's proposal that the few remaining restrictions on travel to China be removed (Tab A)./2/ One other member, the CIA representative, had some reservations but did not oppose. It was strongly supported by Defense and AID representatives and by ACA. Sam simply feels that this is a curious time to lift the ban in view of unsettled political conditions on the mainland. He thinks we could get adverse domestic reaction for that reason.
/2/Tab A, a copy of the report of the China Working Group to the Far East Interdepartmental Regional Group proposing the removal of restrictions on travel to Communist China by U.S. citizens, undated, is attached but not printed. Another copy of the report is filed with the minutes of the November 2 meeting of the Far East Interdepartmental Regional Group in Department of State, FE/IRG Files: Lot 70 D 56. The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs became the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs on November 1, and the Far East Interdepartmental Regional Group changed its name accordingly.
So far, reaction to each of the several stages of liberalization of travel has met with very good public reception and most of us at the meeting felt that this would be true of this proposed final step. There is a new requirement that justification for restrictions be printed in the Federal Register (Tab B)./3/ I think we would be more likely to incur unfavorable domestic reaction by failing to lift the negligible remaining restrictions, since I don't believe we can make a convincing case that "travel would seriously impair the conduct of United States foreign affairs." Short of that, I think the average citizen would (and should) interpret the continuation of such restrictions as overly paternalistic management of mature Americans. The academic community particularly is very vocally critical of our present remaining restrictions--on both political and "citizens' rights" considerations.
/3/Not attached to the source text.
I don't think this is one the White House really needs to fight for but if the issue should come up at the weekly luncheon or otherwise, I recommend that you take a quietly favorable attitude toward the Working Group's unanimous recommendation to the IRG. Berger is doing a memo to the Secretary./4/
/4/Not found.
Al Jenkins
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