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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
200. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 5, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow. Secret. The source text does not indicate the drafter, but Sisco's November 4 memorandum cited in footnote 2, Document 195, which forwarded the draft memorandum to Rusk, indicates that it was drafted by Sisco and Buffum and cleared by Berger and Meeker. Sisco's memorandum states that the proposal reflected a consensus of views reached at a meeting with Katzenbach, Berger, and Meeker and that Goldberg concurred. The source text was sent to the President with a November 5 memorandum from Rostow noting that NSC staff member Nathaniel Davis thought the proposal was probably the "best we can do" to avoid being in a minority.
SUBJECT
Chinese RepresentationRecommendation/2/
/2/The source text indicates the recommendation was approved.
That you authorize me to try to persuade the Canadians to alter their present "one China-one Taiwan" proposal to one more acceptable to us, involving a UN General Assembly Study Committee./3/
/3/In a telephone conversation on November 6, Rusk told the President that he would not object to setting up a study committee if it would mean defeat of the Albanian resolution. A study committee would "complicate" the issue for a year or two. Without that, the United States risked not being able to defeat the Albanian resolution. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Rusk, November 6, 7:10 p.m., tape F66.30, side B, PNO 1)
Discussion
The Canadian Cabinet has decided to consult with friendly governments immediately on the introduction of a United Nations General Assembly resolution which would ask the President of the Assembly to explore possibilities of a solution based on a seat for both the Republic of China and Red China in the Assembly, with the Security Council seat going to Peking. The Canadians say that without this opportunity, they would be obliged this year to abstain on the Albanian resolution, which provides for replacing the Republic of China by Red China in all UN organs. The Belgians and the Italians have also informed us of their intention to make a similar new move.
The Canadian shift makes a critical difference. If we lose the support of these friends, it is probable that the Albanian resolution will obtain a simple majority for the first time. We could probably still prevent its adoption by relying on the procedural device of requiring that such a resolution receive a 2/3 majority for adoption, but we will have suffered an important defeat.
I have urged Paul Martin not to do anything further about this until I have had a chance to raise the matter with you. He is proceeding with consultations with a few governments (UK, Italy, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) at once, but has agreed to defer submission of his proposal formally to the General Assembly for a short time pending consultations with us.
We could stand on our present tactics and oppose Canada's new move; we do not believe they can be dissuaded. Canada and the Belgians have told us that unless they are able to pursue a new course, they no longer will oppose the Albanian resolution; others such as Italy, whose Government is under strong Socialist pressure, are likely to take the same position. In these circumstances, the necessary majority to prevent Red China replacing the GRC would be seriously undermined.
A second option would be for us to stand aside; let the Canadians and others go ahead as they see fit on the assumption the Canadian proposal probably would not get the required 2/3 vote in the face of Peking's opposition. This has great risks since there are elements in the Canadian proposal, e.g. giving the Security Council seat to Red China, which we would not want the Assembly to endorse even by a simple majority.
We conclude, therefore, we must engage the Canadians next week with the safest countermeasure we can offer, i.e. establishment of a Study Committee to examine all facets of the Chinese representation issue and report back to the next General Assembly. There are admitted risks in pursuing this suggestion since we can not be sure of the composition of the Committee and more importantly, we can not guarantee what its recommendations will be. At a minimum, I would expect that this Committee would recommend some form of "two Chinas" solution, and that we would have to take a stand on this during the Committee's work and subsequently at next year's General Assembly.
We feel strongly that the present Canadian text prejudges the ultimate decision of the Assembly. I would like to make a major effort with the Canadians to move them from their present course to another which we could support. This would be the best protection for the GRC. The Canadians seem to have the bit in their teeth, and I am not certain how far we can get with them.
A shift to a Study Committee would be a less radical departure from past tactics than Canada's "one China-one Taiwan" proposal, it would be more palatable to our close Asian allies, and while the GRC would oppose a Study Committee, it is less offensive because the ultimate solution would not be prejudged. It offers some flexibility on how rapidly subsequent Assemblies move towards a definite substantive decision.
I would also consult quickly with the GRC to assure they understand the reasons for our efforts with the Canadians and others.
Ambassador Goldberg concurs in the recommendation.
Dean Rusk
201. Editorial Note
Representative to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg met with President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch on November 7, 1966. A November 9 memorandum from Nathaniel Davis of the NSC staff to Special Assistant Walt Rostow reports that Chinese representation was among the subjects Goldberg discussed with the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5) A statement by Goldberg, released to the press by the White House Press Secretary's office in San Antonio, Texas, on November 7, included the statement that the United States did not wish to increase the isolation of mainland China from the rest of the world but that it would not consent to "the demands of Peking that the Republic of China on Taiwan be excluded and the UN itself transformed, in order to pave the way for Peking's admission." For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 5, 1966, pages 851-855.
202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada/1/
Washington, November 9, 1966, 1:06 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Sisco and Rufus Z. Smith, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN for Goldberg and to London, Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, Rome, Brussels, and Taipei.
81612. For Ambassador from Secretary.
1. Please convey following message from me to Pearson/2/ urgently:
/2/Ambassador Butterworth reported in telegram 784 from Ottawa, November 8, that he had delivered the message to Prime Minister Pearson, who was in a meeting and therefore unable to discuss its contents at that time. (Ibid.)
[Begin] Text.
Dear Mike:
Under Secretary Katzenbach has explained to Ambassador Ritchie the serious problems we have with the Canadian draft resolution on Chinese representation. I hope that you will be able to give this problem your personal and urgent attention.
From my conversations with Paul Martin over a period of time, and from discussions with Ambassador Ritchie, I gather that your government may be moved in part by the feeling that an offer of membership in the UN would have a constructive effect on Chinese Communist behavior, including the outcome of the present internal convulsion, and also by a related feeling that such an offer might have some favorable effect on the prospects for peace in Vietnam.
I must confess that, as of this particular time at least, both of these arguments seem to me to have little substance. None of us can tell where the present convulsion on the mainland is headed, but surely the dominant fact is that Mao and Lin Piao appear to be at least tenuously on top, and appear clearly to stand for a harsh line in all aspects of policy. Our own China experts are in total agreement that this is a time for watchful waiting, and not for injecting any new special factor if it can be avoided. (I may say that this applies equally to any military action that could be construed as a direct or indirect threat to Communist China, and I can assure you of our continued prudence in this regard.) As things now stand, I find it hard to avoid the conclusion that at this moment what must appear to be a naked offer of membership will if anything encourage the hard-liners and work against the possible emergence of different policies out of the present turmoil in China.
The same point applies to the prospects for peace in Vietnam. We have tried our utmost to have the UN play a useful role to this end, and the outcome to date suggests many factors other than the absence of Peking from New York. But surely, in any event, Peking will come only if the Republic of China withdraws, and in these conditions the encouragement to hard-line policies, not merely immediately, but for a long period to come, would only be compounded.
Moreover, there is the further imponderable of Sino-Soviet relations. Any major change in the pattern of presentation of the Chinese representation issue can only confront the Soviet Union with serious problems. In terms of the really serious interest the USSR and its Eastern European friends now appear to be taking toward peace in Vietnam, I doubt very much if they would feel that a new controversy on this issue would be helpful.
All in all, our own conclusion would have been that it was better for this year to put the issue to one side, and to deal with it on previous lines. And our soundings in New York, as well as widely in Europe and elsewhere, had indicated sufficient support to maintain this view, even among nations most desirous of some early change in the situation.
So much for our view of the merits of the case. Having followed closely the thrust of our policy over the past year, from the bombing pause in January to our handling of Communist China and the theme of reconciliation stressed by the President on his recent trip, I know that you recognize that our motives and objectives yield to none in our concern for peace in Vietnam and an eventual wider peace in Asia.
This brings me to the other main point that Paul Martin has stressed in the past, and Ambassador Ritchie most recently. This is that your government feels under strong political pressure to show some forward movement on the issue during this session, and to make clear and explicit the Canadian view that a new answer must be found along "two Chinas" lines. It would be presumptuous of me to contest this argument, which apparently leads you to the conclusion that you must put forward and support a new proposal of some sort.
But from a purely practical standpoint, I must then point out that your present proposal is almost bound to create maximum mischief for minimum result.
First, it is an incompatible hybrid between an action and a study resolution. While ostensibly directing the GA President to explore the issue, the preamble states the exact solution to be explored. Which is it meant to be, for only the most naive could conclude that you have not pre-judged the outcome of any exploration?
Second, your resolution states the answer for the Security Council as well as the General Assembly. Of course, this issue will have to be faced in due course if Peking should ever accept membership in the General Assembly. But surely we must all recognize that a Peking seat in the Security Council raises far more serious issues even than General Assembly membership; for the short run, any serious student would have to conclude that Peking on the Security Council would spell total ineffectiveness by the Council for a long period to come on any issue such as the recent disputes about Cyprus and Kashmir and a whole host of past examples in which Canada has often played a great part. Must we charge across that bridge in any fashion now? May we not wish to examine it at some point against the possibility of some Charter amendment providing, perhaps, for rotation of a permanent Asian seat on the Security Council among India, Japan, and China?
I mention this point because it seems very clear that most Asian nations do not welcome the thought that Peking would sit as an Asian permanent member with a veto in the Security Council. Surely those who live at great distance from the present scene in Asia should give great weight to the views of nations most directly and deeply concerned about the irrational militancy of the present Peking regime.
Moreover, inclusion of the Security Council as a specific element can only have the gravest effects on the reaction of the Republic of China. I have always taken at face value Paul Martin's assurance that your government does not wish to see that government out of the UN, and I need not repeat to you the depth of our convictions on this subject, convictions I believe to be shared by the great majority of the UN membership. Yet your proposal as it stands, by including the Security Council, is bound to arouse the strongest emotions--and wholly understandable ones--in the Nationalist Chinese government, including the moderates who represent its hopeful future voice. If you are trying to force the Republic of China right out of the UN, you could not choose a better course. But that can hardly be your purpose.
Thirdly, as to the choice of a party to explore the issue, the President of the General Assembly seems to us to have grave disadvantages. His mandate is limited in time, and he is a single individual not necessarily representative of the spectrum of views and interests of the membership on a complex issue.
All of the above are serious defects of substance. They lead us to the clear conclusion that we would in any event have to oppose your Resolution in its present form, if it were introduced, and indeed would have to exert every ounce of our influence to defeat it by the heaviest possible margin. I need not underscore the seriousness of such a split between our two nations.
But the difficulty is even more grave than this. Again from a purely practical standpoint, the introduction of your Resolution could only create a state of total confusion in the General Assembly as it considers the Important Question issue and the Albanian Resolution. I cannot say what votes you would be able to obtain for your Resolution, but at the very least it would throw a last-minute and unforeseen element into the situation, so that the resulting vote patterns would become the result of almost unpredictable and emotional currents in New York. I cannot believe that this is the constructive way to go about resolving the problem.
Let me now turn to our own affirmative proposal for a substitute resolution. Although we would have preferred to let the whole issue lie for this session, we have always known that the issue would have to be faced at some point, and we approach the matter in a constructive spirit. The idea of a study committee has a long history in the thinking of other members and in our own contingency planning. Under present circumstances, it seems to us to avoid virtually all the grave disadvantages of your proposal, while at the same time representing clear forward movement on the issue along the line that your government feels under political pressure to obtain.
This is most definitely not a delaying tactic on our part. Rather it faces the whole issue head-on and will require a full report on all aspects of the problem by the study committee for the next General Assembly. In the nature of things, this can hardly fail to include a serious examination of the complex issue of the Security Council, as well as an examination of the conditions under which Peiping might be offered a General Assembly seat--a matter, incidentally, on which your proposal is totally silent. In short, from a substantive standpoint, it does everything you could ask and at the same time provides the period of detailed examination that we believe is required both in terms of the complexity of the issue and in light of the present uncertainties of Communist Chinese behavior.
I might add that we would wholly support membership by Canada on the study committee.
Therefore, it is our earnest suggestion that your government not submit its Resolution and take the lead with others (such as the Italians) in sponsoring a proposal such as contained in the draft Resolution that we have given Ambassador Ritchie./3/ If you wish to make your own view of the desirable outcome clear, you will surely have ample opportunity during the debate, as will all the other nations involved.
/3/The text of the U.S. alternative draft resolution was transmitted in telegram 81492, November 8. It provided that the General Assembly, noting that "the GRC is a founding member of the United Nations," that "the PRC has attached conditions to its representation," and that "the complexities involved in this question require the most searching consideration," decided to establish a committee to study all facets of the situation and make recommendations to the 22d General Assembly for an equitable and practicable solution. (Ibid.) Katzenbach gave the draft to Ritchie on November 8; their discussion is summarized in telegram 81500, November 8. (Ibid.)
We ourselves, while not sponsoring such a substitute proposal, would be prepared to join in its support, while we would expect--in accordance with our understanding of your position--that if such a proposal were put forward and were supported by us, you in turn would continue to support the Important Question and to vote against the Albanian Resolution. With the study committee resolution before the General Assembly, the latter would of course become in clear contradiction to it, while I hope that your government continues to appreciate the grave consequences for the whole work of the United Nations that would flow from any defeat on the Important Question.
We are already consulting with key interested nations in this sense, including the circle with which you have shared your proposed resolution.
Finally, let me make clear that the President, who is of course now resting in Texas in preparation for his operation Friday, has gone over this whole matter with the greatest care and has personally approved the position I have stated. We hope that your government will reconsider its position and be prepared to act as I have suggested. Please let me know just as soon as you possibly can.
With warm regards,
Sincerely
Dean Rusk/4//4/In a reply transmitted in telegram 801 from Ottawa, November 11, Pearson wrote that he was giving serious and urgent consideration to Rusk's letter but added that the Canadians were convinced that some forward movement on the issue was desirable and that their initiative represented a realistic and balanced approach. (Ibid.)
End Text.
2. For Info Addressees (other than USUN): We also sending you State 81502/5/ showing line we are taking with GRC. We are talking here today with British, Australians, New Zealanders, Belgians, and second round with Japanese, who were seen last night in Tokyo. Italians were seen last night particularly with view to their interest in study committee idea. All of our conversations here will be reported to interested posts during the day. You should take no action on basis this cable unless otherwise instructed, but should carefully study lines we have taken with Canadians and GRC, being prepared to adapt these to your local situation in any discussion that may arise with host government.
/5/Telegram 81502, November 8, summarized a conversation that day between Katzenbach and Ambassador Chow, in which Katzenbach stated the U.S. view that the only feasible way to deal with the Canadian resolution was to try to persuade the Canadians to alter it and to give them a substitute proposal. (Ibid.)
Rusk
203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, November 10, 1966, 9:21 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret, Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Gleysteen, cleared by Bundy and Judd, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Ottawa, and Taipei.
82445. Subj: Canadian Initiative on ChiRep.
1. Assistant Secretaries Sisco and Bundy called in British Minister Stewart to talk about Canadian proposal on ChiRep (see septel). Sisco explained our very strong objections to Canadian draft resolution, especially its prejudgment of issue with drastic proposal which amounts to "one China, one Taiwan" arrangement with Peking in SC. He thought it would be hard to devise proposal better calculated to provoke GRC into walking out of UN. Apart from unacceptability Canadian scheme, we felt this no time for move which might encourage hardline tendencies in Peking, adversely affect peace prospects in Viet Nam and create problems for many allies in Asia. Our problems compounded by shortness of time to consult friendly governments, Congress and public. In addition there was effect on UN itself; if Communist China were seated in SC UN peacekeeping actions in Cyprus and Kashmir would have been inconceivable.
2. Sisco went on to say that since Canadians were under domestic pressure to give sense of movement we were prepared, on assumption of continued Canadian opposition to Albanian resolution and support for important question procedure to go along with alternative arrangement of study committee to study all facets of Chirep in both GA and SC and make recommendations to next regular session of GA. Study committee would permit us to pursue question in evolutionary and reasonable way with examination of all alternatives. It would moreover provide Canadians and other governments with ample opportunity to express views on substance of question.
3. After handing Stewart copy of illustrative resolution we could support, Sisco noted that we had made our views clear to Canadians yesterday telling them that we flatly opposed to their resolution and suggesting this alternative. We did not yet know ultimate Canadian reaction. We had also talked with Chinese, Italians and would today be seeing Japanese, Australians, New Zealanders and Belgians who we hoped would sympathize with our reaction.
4. FYI Only. Stewart (asking that it not be reported to other governments) said UK had already been consulted by Canadians in London and had told them UK did not like Canadian resolution and did not intend any policy change this year, i.e., British would continue support important question procedure, would support para one of Albanian resolution and would make explanation of vote on para two expelling GRC. British considered Canadian resolution a stall which would in any event fail. Stewart added quite frankly that if UK were to support such resolution they would expect to be thrown out of Peking. End FYI.
5. Stewart remarked that while British had refused support Canadian resolution they had agreed not to lobby against it and he assumed we wished British support for our alternative. Sisco confirmed this and said Amb Goldberg would want to discuss precise tactics after consultations with various governments over next few days. Officer accompanying Stewart thought it necessary to remind us that when the British reviewed idea of study committee in April this year they frowned on idea because it would appear too much a procedural device designed to avoid coming to grips with substance of issue. Stewart, however, preferred not to prejudge his Government's reaction.
Rusk
204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Gleysteen and cleared by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Rome, Brussels, Tokyo, Wellington, Canberra, and London.
Washington, November 10, 1966, 11:56 p.m.
83437. Subj: GRC Reaction to Canadian Chirep Initiative. Following uncleared record of conversation is FYI Noforn and subject to revision on review:
1. Secretary together with Asst Secretaries Sisco and Bundy saw GRC Ambassador Chou this evening at latter's request. Chou covered many of same points made in Taipei to Ambassador McConaughy/2/ but at no point claimed study committee proposal would be "even worse than a two-Chinas resolution." Nor did he imply threat that GRC would consider walking out of UN if study committee established.
/2/Telegram 1382 from Taipei, November 10, reported discussions between McConaughy and Foreign Minister Wei, in which Wei argued that the United States should exert maximum pressure on the Canadians to abandon their proposal or any substitute, such as a study committee. He declared that in the GRC view, a study committee resolution would be "even worse than two-Chinas resolution" and that if such a resolution were adopted, the GRC would have to consider taking the step intimated by Chiang Kai-shek in his June 30 conversation with McConaughy (see Document 162), that is, withdrawal from the United Nations. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM)
2. Chou told Secretary GRC profoundly distressed by Canadian move and did not understand how Canadians could contemplate such disservice to free world at this time except perhaps in terms of Paul Martin's special preoccupation with issue. GRC had found that its reaction was shared by many countries, especially Japan and Australia, and it hoped US would use this additional support to stop Canadian initiative and hold to previous tactics. GRC has been humiliated for 17 years in UN over Chirep issue and could not face additional humiliation of being held in suspense while study committee deliberated recommendations.
3) Secretary emphasized that we fully agree with GRC's strong objections to Canadian proposal which we found bad, ill-timed and mischievous. Having spilled "a lot of blood" over this issue with Paul Martin in many rough encounters over past two years, Secretary stressed that he wanted it reported very clearly to Taipei that there has never been any collusion between Canada and US. Secretary had tried to persuade Martin that Canadians should defer on this matter to countries with real responsibilities in Asia, but Martin has persisted on grounds of domestic pressures in Canada which he claimed necessitated Canadian initiative this year. Perhaps wheat sales and other factors played role but in any case GRC should understand that we have been doing battle for them including very strong letter which Secy has sent Pearson yesterday after talking to President.
4. Secretary noted that Canadian move could not have come at worse time because it threw confusion into situation which could not stand confusion--i.e., number of countries such as Italy, Belgium, Chile which had been on verge of shifting position before Canadian initiative could no longer afford to resist domestic pressures and carry on with traditional approach. We had great trouble with Italians last year and could hardly expect Fanfani to drop study committee concept this year in face of Ottawa's action. Facts were that Canadians had not consulted us and we had not been able to dissuade them from initiative, including possibility they would still go ahead and table highly objectionable res.
5. Situation we now face, according to Secretary, remains essentially same as one month ago in that we must still sustain important question procedure and defeat Albanian resolution, but in view Canadian decision we now had to use counter measure to retain our support for these same purposes. Actual result of study committee, which designed to avoid pre-judgment of issue, would be to put off decision on Chirep just as we have done since 1950. Secretary urged that GRC not draw conclusion about Chirep before UN does thereby give open field to Communist China. Despite annual debate GRC remained in both GA and SC.
6. During remainder conversation Ambassador Chou engaged in repetitive but insistent request that US marshal other governments in all-out effort to deter any Canadian initiative, refrain from supporting study committee proposal, and hold to past tactics on Chirep even if this course risked defeat. Chou argued Canadian move was largely bluff which could be called by firm US response and he claimed we would have adequate votes (53-48) to hold line against Albanian res despite Canadians. Ambassador emphasized that if on contrary US were to continue support for study committee while GRC made all out efforts against, result would be deplorable division between allies.
7. In response Secretary explained that we did not expect GRC support for study committee but simply asked that GRC not prejudge situation by making prior assumption about outcome of such tactic. Study committee might not materialize and if it did group would not necessarily recommend ChiCom membership in UN. Quite possible that over next few months some move would be made to inquire about Peking's attitude and if Peking refused various schemes advanced in UN, Communist China would not be admitted. Secretary asked why, if GRC could go along with study committee in 1950, it could not do so today. Our problem was votes. Without some move which would assure support from number of particular countries we thought it very likely that Albanian resolution would achieve simple majority this year and there was also serious question whether we could hold support for important question procedure. This was unacceptable risk for US and it was for this reason that we were prepared to support study committee.
8) Although Ambassador Chou argued GRC vote count against Albanian resolution was adequate despite impact of Canadian move, he asserted we should in any case risk be willing defeat because any change would be first crack in crumbling dike. Question involved national honor and if situation in UN had in fact deteriorated to point where study committee-type tactics necessary it would be better to face defeat now rather than be humiliated over course of next year.
9) Both Secretary and Sisco used specific examples to illustrate how Canadian initiative would erode our support against Albanian resolution unless many countries were offered some other alternative. They also disputed Chou's insistence in assuming inevitably bad consequences of study committee by showing that GRC had in past agreed to shifts in tactics without disastrous consequences. Ambassador's response was to repeat that GRC had its back to wall on this issue and preferred defeat to going along with change which would be interpreted domestically and internationally as advance acknowledgment of failure, making ultimate humiliation that much greater. Chou also pointed out that GRC considered any switch particularly regrettable because likely impact within Communist China would be to encourage militancy.
10) Secretary interjected that Ambassador was fully aware of our special concern about dangers of ChiCom militancy since we had to bear military consequences in Viet-Nam. It was our judgment, however, that defeat on Albanian resolution this year would be far more damaging in this sense than our agreement to study committee as alternative to Canadian resolution.
11) Secretary repeated that we do not expect GRC to support study committee idea and said we think it most useful for GRC to put its views strongly to Canadians. We also hoped Canadians would be made sharply aware of Australian, Japanese and other negative reactions. Even so we had to consider our tactics in light of newly confused situation in GA, and we hoped the GRC would not retreat before battle by making premature judgment about outcome of study committee.
12) In summing up Ambassador Chou stated that GRC was opposed to any change as beginning of uncontrollable process and asserted GRC had to consider matter in terms of its national honor and dignity since its leaders were answerable to history. Secretary said he could not complain about this view but could not accept it. We did not agree with Ambassador's estimate of current situation in GA and we strongly disagreed with his judgment about effects of Canadian resolution. We would, of course, continue to take account GRC's views and Secretary suggested that strategy group in New York resolve conflicting estimates of likely votes on various resolutions.
13) Secretary concluded by stating that we were in agreement with GRC on importance of reaffirming important question procedure, we were in agreement on opposition to Albanian res and we were in agreement in our common opposition to Canadian res. Insofar as study committee was concerned, however, Secretary declared that we were prepared to support this measure because we had too much at stake to accept defeat on the Albanian res in GA this year.
Rusk
205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, November 11, 1966, 5:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared in substance by Bundy, and approved by Sisco.
83599. For Goldberg.
1. We commend you for skillful manner in which you are pursuing delicate conversations on complex and difficult Chinese representation question.
2. We fully endorse your statement to Chileans that: (1) Important Question Resolution must be upheld; (2) Albanian Resolution must be rejected; and (3) we should try isolate and deflect Canadian proposal by achieving common agreement on Study Committee approach.
3. We know you appreciate fully how essential it is to get the Important Question Resolution introduced promptly as maximum protection and are glad you plan wait no later than tomorrow. Scenario along above lines might help ease concern of Japan, Australia, Philippines and GRC regarding Study Committee idea as alternate to Canadian proposal and as way to bulwark support for reaffirmation Important Question Resolution and defeat Albanian Resolution.
4. You will have noted telegram from McConaughy in which he makes some concerned suggestions regarding special efforts which may help us with GRC./2/ We confident you fully agree with these suggestions since in fact you have been proceeding along these lines. We think similar special efforts are also desirable and necessary with Japanese who are showing extreme nervousness. In particular, we would draw your attention to paragraph (c) of Taipei's 1386/3/ and Secretary's comment to Chou yesterday regarding need to put together as promptly as possible current vote counts on propositions likely to be before General Assembly.
/2/In telegram 1386 from Taipei, November 11, McConaughy urged the importance of convincing the GRC that it was being fully consulted and informed on the Chinese representation issue in order to prevent further deterioration of the atmosphere in Taipei. He suggested daily briefings and consultations with GRC officials in New York, Washington, and Taipei, inclusion of a GRC representative in group meetings in New York whenever possible, and a letter from Rusk to Wei. (Ibid.)
/3/Paragraph (c) suggested giving the GRC an assessment of the effect the Canadian resolution or the U.S. study committee proposal would have on the voting on the important question or Albanian resolutions.
5. Regarding Study Committee, we realize that whether it will require a 2/3 vote for adoption or simple majority will be considerably influenced by what substantive material is included in the preamble. As you know, we do not want ultimate solution prejudged as Canadian preamble would do.
6. If Study Committee Resolution is devoid of substance as present Italian text,/4/ we assume only simple majority vote required. We have stated our intention to support the Study Committee idea if the countries interested in pressing it are thereby willing to continue to support Important Question Resolution, oppose Albanian Resolution, and abandon unacceptable Canadian Resolution. However, given great difficulties GRC is having re Study Committee, we believe it undesirable for us to get out in front on this proposal and to lobby for it. We particularly welcome therefore the reluctant dragon posture you have adopted re Study Committee; it has struck just right balance.
/4/Telegram 2210 from USUN, November 10, transmitted the text of a draft resolution that the Italian Representative gave to Goldberg on November 9. It stated that the General Assembly, conscious of the importance of the principle of universality of the United Nations to its effectiveness, bearing in mind that China was a founding member of the United Nations, and noting that the People's Republic of China had attached conditions to its participation in the United Nations, decided to establish a committee of member states to study the situation and make recommendations to the 22d General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM)
7. Indeed, simplest outcome would be for Important Question Resolution to be reaffirmed and Albanian Resolution defeated in the first instance and Study Committee proposal fall by the board for lack of required majority. We would appreciate your views on this.
8. We find interesting your suggestion that perhaps this Committee might be made up of prominent statesmen rather than member government representatives. Group of past GA Presidents would be highly attractive to us. However, we doubt such proposal would prove feasible since obviously list of past Presidents loaded completely on our side. As to member government composition Study Committee, our strong preference would be to stick as close to Credentials Committee ratio of 5-3-1 as possible, though realize composition will be at least as tough a job as your finding on SW African Committee.
Rusk
206. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 14, 1966, 6:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Chinese Representation in the UNWe introduced the Important Question Resolution at the UN this afternoon with the Belgians and others as co-sponsors.
Efforts to enlist the Italians and Canadians as co-sponsors were unsuccessful. The Italians wanted iron-clad assurances--we did not feel we could give them--that we would not drop the study committee idea if we win the votes on the Important Question and the Albanian resolutions. We are trying to make sure that the order of voting in New York is: first, the Important Question (to require a two-thirds vote for any change in Chinese representation); second, the Albanian Resolution (to substitute Red China for the Republic of China in the UN); and third, the modified Canadian or Italian Resolution (looking toward a study committee). The introduction of our Resolution today makes it likely that it will be the first to be voted on. If the study committee proposal comes up, we might have to go through a second Important Question vote.
Canadian Foreign Minister Martin and Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani met today in Rome to discuss their respective tactics on Chinese representation. Preliminary reports indicate that they did not reach any agreement. The Foreign Minister of the Republic of China is expected to arrive in Washington tomorrow.
Secretary Rusk will address himself to this issue at tomorrow's luncheon-meeting./2/
/2/According to Johnson's Daily Diary, he had lunch on November 15 from 2:05 to 3:40 with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and Moyers. Chinese representation was one of several issues discussed. (Ibid.) No record of the discussion has been found.
Walt
207. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 15, 1966, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Sneider and approved in S on November 29. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. The source text is "Part II of III."
SUBJECT
Communist ChinaPARTICIPANTS
Zentaro Kosaka, Former Japanese Foreign Minister
Kazuo Chiba, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan
The Secretary
Richard L. Sneider, Country Director for JapanAt the invitation of the Secretary Mr. Kosaka reviewed the impressions gained from his trip to Communist China. Mr. Kosaka first explained that his trip to Communist China was an effort to wrest contacts with Communist China from Japanese leftwing control. Kosaka said that he had told Chen Yi he was pro-American and gained more respect from Chen Yi. He also told Chinese leaders that the US had no intention of bombing Communist China to which Chen Yi agreed. He felt that the Chinese Communist top leadership wanted its views transmitted to the US and therefore he has made his trip to Washington. Basically his objective is, as a representative of the Free World, to try to make Communist China open its door to the Free World.
Mr. Kosaka then reviewed his major observations on Communist China, as follows:
(1) The "cultural revolution" has excluded rational thinking, eliminated able men, and reflects the senility of Mao.
(2) The young generation is being force-fed Mao's thoughts and there is no feedback of the popular views to the highest level. Mao's objective is to divide his friends from his enemies, i.e. those accused of being pro-American, bourgeois elements and pro-Soviet revisionists.
(3) The success of Mao's effort depends on an increase of agricultural production to meet rising population. Mao is seeking to spread his cult to agricultural areas through the Red Guard movement which is pushing for the abolition of private plots and reinstitution of communes. However, the farmers are apathetic and Kosaka felt that the abolition of private plots is not possible. He found that there are only about 120 million hectares of arable land, approximately one hectare per farm family. Farm income is low with a family of 5 to 6 earning from $208 to $416 annually. In comparison industrial workers earn $300 per worker annually. At the same time costs of bicycles, $50, and TV sets, $200, are out of the range of farm families. Clothing is available but coarse. The Chinese leadership to meet agricultural discontent compares farm living stand-ards today with those of 17 years ago rather than with those of other comparable areas in the Free World at the present time.
(4) Generally, Chinese people have enough to eat, more schooling and free medical care which is an improvement over the pre-Communist period.
(5) Chinese leadership claims that agricultural production will increase this year and has offered to export cotton and rice to Japan. Kosaka mentioned that there is a discrepancy between Hong Kong estimates of Chinese Communist agricultural production of 175 million tons and Communist China's estimates of 200 million tons. Kosaka expressed doubts about production increases because the extensive movement of the Red Guard on Chinese railroads has disrupted transportation. After the crop comes in he expects this will be the basis for criticism of the Mao leadership.
(6) The Chinese recognize that they are now underdeveloped and talk in of terms [of] needing 20-30 years to become a developed economy.
(7) Chinese higher education is now undergoing significant changes. The universities and higher schools are closed until next February and there are plans to shorten the school year and eliminate entrance exams. In the future only students with clear-cut revolutionary background will be admitted to the top universities, with the result of eliminating some of the best students and a general lowering of academic standards.
Kosaka concluded by saying that the key problem of Communist China is when will the current contradictions come into the open. The Chinese leadership says that they will not but Kosaka anticipates that the farmers will be disillusioned after the harvest and maybe cause a basic showdown. He felt that it was important to let the Chinese see the progress occurring outside Communist China and open Chinese eyes. He asked whether there was anything the Secretary wished him to convey to Chinese leadership since Liao Ch'eng-chih, head of the Chinese Communist trade office, offered to convey any message in the utmost secrecy.
The Secretary then questioned Kosaka on other aspects of Chinese Communist developments. Kosaka mentioned that he had contact with the Red Guards at the Peking secondary school. He found them young and very articulate but they all talked the same language. When he asked them why the Red Guards had been formed and the Young Communist League not utilized, they replied that the YCL was "old people" while the Red Guard was more militant and class conscious. In response to the Secretary's inquiry about Kosaka's impressions on the internal leadership struggle, Kosaka said that as long as Mao is alive the opposition forces in the Communist Party will be suppressed but they are strong and the struggle will continue. He mentioned that he had tried to see Lin Piao but was advised that Lin as a military man saw no foreigners.
Kosaka mentioned that Chou had stressed Chinese Communist peaceful intentions to the U.S. but there were two differences between the countries: (1) the U.S. refused to recognize the five principles; and (2) the U.S. refused to withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. The Secretary said that at Warsaw the Chinese Communists had continually maintained the position that there was nothing to discuss until we surrendered Formosa which the U.S. was not prepared to do.
On Sino-Japanese relations, Kosaka said that the Chinese Communists accepted the present relationship with non-governmental trade and cultural ties and no diplomatic relations. They expressed opposition to Sato but praise for Ikeda and they are evidently trying to split the Liberal Democratic Party. In response to a question by the Secretary, Kosaka said that there were no Japanese government officials in Peking but there is a Liao-Takasaki trade office there and one official who had resigned from the government. He mentioned in passing that the Liao-Takasaki trade negotiations on the renewal of the Liao-Takasaki trade agreement had broken down recently due to the Chinese insistence that the Japanese buy more rice.
208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Paul H. Kreisberg of EA/ACA; cleared by William W. Thomas of EA/ROC, Louise McNutt of EA/RA, and Jacobson; and approved by Berger.
Washington, November 15, 1966, 1:16 p.m.
84624. (A) Warsaw's 1165;/2/ (B) Bucharest's 626./3/
/2/Telegram 1165 from Warsaw, November 9, referred to a report from Geneva that the Romanian Charge had told Consul General Roger W. Tubby the Chinese Communists might be interested in moving the Ambassadorial talks to Rangoon because they thought Gronouski had given the Poles information about the talks. Gronouski noted that the Soviets or the Poles might have discussed information from their tapes of the talks with the Chinese or that the Chinese might suspect the taping and want an excuse to move the talks from Warsaw. He suggested a U.S. proposal to the Chinese to hold all subsequent talks alternating in each other's Embassies. (Ibid.) The Geneva report was in telegram 1466 from Geneva, November 4. (Ibid., POL 17 ROM-POL)
/3/Telegram 626 from Bucharest, November 11, reported that Ambassador Richard H. Davis had asked Acting Foreign Minister Macovescu the source of statements by Romanian representatives in Rangoon, Moscow, and Geneva to the effect that the Warsaw talks were to be shifted to Rangoon. Macovescu had replied that the reports had come from diplomatic sources in Rangoon and not from the Chinese. (Ibid.)
1. Department has carefully considered your suggestion in Ref A that we take initiative in suggesting to ChiComs change of venue of Warsaw talks from present neutral Polish ground to alternating between US and ChiCom Embassies. Without prejudice to possibility of taking such initiative somewhat later, we have concluded it undesirable raise this issue with ChiComs at present time.
2. Primary factor this conclusion is current complexity and sensitivity of discussions and considerations affecting ChiRep. US initiative to shift venue of talks, if leaked by accident either here or intentionally by ChiComs, would lend itself so easily to misinterpretation that it could have significant and serious effect on course of ChiRep debate.
3. Furthermore, degree of uncertainty and vagueness as to actual ChiCom intentions on talks (ref B) suggests desirability of caution on our part in moving at current time. We believe it may be preferable for us to sit tight and wait to see whether ChiComs make move on change in venue rather than attempt preempt them.
4. Depending on developments in next month, however, we do not rule out suggesting possible shift in venue to ChiComs along lines your suggestions at January meeting. Our present thinking, however, is any such feeler to ChiComs should be in lowest possible key, preferably by informal, private approach after meeting rather than by raising issue in formal letter or in open session. We will, in any event, be prepared deal with this issue if ChiComs raise it at January meeting.
Rusk
209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Bennett and cleared by Bundy and Sisco. Repeated to USUN and Tokyo.
Washington, November 15, 1966, 9:58 p.m.
85359. ChiRep. Ref: State's 83437./2/ Following uncleared record of conversation, is FYI Noforn, and subject to revision on review:
/2/Document 204.
1. GRC Foreign Minister Wei accompanied by Vice Minister Yang, Ambassador Liu, and Ambassador Chow called on Secretary November 15 to discuss Chinese representation. Bundy and Sisco also present. Principal impressions gained from conversation were (a) moderation of GRC presentation and muting of threat to withdraw and (b) distinct willingness expressed by GRC reps to go along with simple study committee resolution without prejudicial language in preamble.
2. Wei opened by saying that it was his purpose to convey to Secretary GRC position on recent developments in UN which have been cause for some emotion and much deliberation. GRC basic policy, Wei said, is to overthrow ChiComs and recover mainland and therefore GRC is opposed to any form of two Chinas. While GRC attaches importance to its UN seat, it attaches even more to this basic position. If anything along line of two Chinas should happen, this would seriously upset GRC basic position, GRC's raison d'etre, and GRC's role in Asia. GRC would rather keep its basic position than its UN seat. A UN seat on the other hand would be meaningless if its basic position were undermined.
3. The Secretary said he thought the GRC's international standing was also important to its basic position. (He also later reminded Wei that it was our position that GRC's position regarding the mainland cannot be settled by force.) As he had told Ambassador Chow November 10 (reftel), he said we attach the greatest importance to passage of IQ resolution and defeat of Albanian resolution. The Canadian move had been a great surprise and it was most harmful. We have tried for many years to keep the Canadians in line on the ChiRep question, but Canada is not a US puppet and the USG does not have decisive influence in the Canadian Government. Nonetheless we think we can defeat Canadian resolution.
4. Mr. Sisco described present tactical situation in the GA and what we know of discussions in progress between Martin and Fanfani. So far as we know, the Canadian-Italian consultations were still inconclusive. Sisco said there are two possibilities in the present situation: On one hand, a study committee resolution which contains sufficient substance in the preamble which would likely necessitate a 2/3 vote for adoption. From Chinese point of view advantage of this proposal would be that it unlikely to achieve a 2/3 vote. However, such preamble likely to have a two China formula in it. Other possibility is a study committee resolution which did not prejudge ultimate solution and probably would only necessitate a simple majority to adopt. Such resolution would have advantage of not prejudicing GRC position, although better chance for its adoption since only simple majority required.
5. Secretary said Communists would vote against any resolution with reference to two Chinas for the same reason as GRC. Other countries such as the UK would also be opposed and for this reason Canadian resolution might not pass. The Secretary added that, while we could probably defeat the Canadian resolution, a simple resolution for a study committee without substantive language in the preamble would be more difficult.
6. Ambassador Liu said that he had told Ambassador Goldberg that of all the texts of resolutions he had seen, he preferred the text of the US study committee resolution. He said however that it would be best to delete from it any reference to the People's Republic of China and suggested that paragraphs two and three of the preamble be dropped. He also observed that the Italian resolution is not as harmless as it looks, noting that "China" is referred to without specifying which one. He hoped that the US would intervene with the Italians to bring about a non-prejudicial text.
7. The Secretary noted that he had already personally approached Fanfani on the IQ./3/ He mentioned the difficult tactical decisions we face and said that frankly and on most confidential basis we would be content to see the Important Question passed, the Albanian resolution defeated, and no other resolution passed.
/3/Telegram 83743, November 12, transmitted a message from Rusk to Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani urging him to instruct the Italian Delegation in New York to co-sponsor the important question resolution and to agree that the proposals should be voted on in the following order: important question resolution, Albanian resolution, study committee resolution. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM) On November 14, 15 countries, including the United States and Italy, submitted a draft resolution reaffirming the General Assembly's 1961 resolution that any proposal to change China's representation was an important question. (U.N. Document A/L.494)
8. Vice Minister Yang pointed out that to introduce any resolution might confuse the GA delegates and undermine our position on the Important Question and the Albanian resolution and the Secretary agreed. The question was raised whether introduction of a third resolution should wait until after voting on the Albanian resolution. Mr. Sisco noted that if the Canadian resolution came after the other two, a substantial number of countries might favor it because of its two Chinas content, but we still do not think it would get a 2/3 vote. The Communists would be strongly opposed and he referred to the incident last year when Peking turned down an attempt to water down the standard Albanian formula.
9. The Secretary said present events on the mainland make this a particularly bad time for the international community to appear to encourage Chinese Communist militancy. However, some countries view Chinese representation as an important domestic political issue. The Government in Italy takes this view, as does Belgium. The nature of the political pressure in Canada is not so clear. The Secretary said that we would not lobby for Italian study committee proposal and we would strongly oppose the Canadian resolution. He suggested that the GRC should make its strong opposition to the Canadian resolution vigorously known in New York. Our support of study committee proposal had been made to protect 4 or 5 critical votes on the Albanian resolution. Canada, Belgium, Italy, and Chile had made it clear that they could vote against Albanian resolution only if some third proposal is put forward in the GA. Sisco added that Italians had told us that Fanfani study committee proposal made in Parliament under pressure of Socialists and that there was risk fall of Italian Government if it not put forward.
10. Ambassador Liu said that what concerns the GRC most is that if there is an untoward development, it might seriously affect the GRC's basic position. If it "met reverse" GRC might have no choice but to leave UN. Secretary said he hoped GRC did not consider passage of a study committee resolution as cause for leaving UN. He noted that with the GRC having diplomatic relations with some 60 countries, as opposed to some 46 for the PRC, study committee formed on this basis would be long way from defeat. Secretary noted that we were not married to any precise language. We want to be in touch with the GRC on which type of resolution they would prefer. Ambassador Liu said the GRC was moving toward the US line of thinking, a simple study committee resolution.
11. There was some discussion of the concept of a study committee consisting of "wise men," about which Ambassador Liu expressed doubt. Secretary suggested that some of GA past presidents might be good possibilities. It was agreed however that the more recent past presidents of the General Assembly would prove troublesome. Liu said Chinese strongly prefer committee of member states.
12. Vice Minister Yang asked whether, if the US draft resolution were tabled, we could pick up support from other countries on the Albanian resolution. Sisco replied that some countries, such as Denmark, might shift to abstention and he hoped we could get good vote on Albanian resolution as result. Yang observed stronger vote on Albanian resolution would have helpful influence on finding of study committee.
13. Before the meeting closed, the Secretary said he wished to make two points:
a. He reminded Minister that he had told Zablocki Subcommittee last March it is US policy to support position of GRC in UN and oppose membership of Chinese Communists.
b. He urged GRC to avoid rash moves which might leave it with only its basic position but without international understanding and support.
14. Following departure of Secretary and after lunch there was further brief discussion during which Ambassador Liu said he had been instructed by Taipei to tell Goldberg he authorized to cooperate with US. Since according to GRC information Canadians and Italians have been approaching other delegations, Liu urged that US approach them too, to avoid their becoming confused.
15. Sisco cautioned the Chinese that what the Secretary had said about our being content to see no third resolution passed was for their ears only. We were telling others that we prepared to support non-prejudicial study committee resolution and relations with other close friends and allies thus involved.
Rusk
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