NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
310. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, May 14, 1968, 0757Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to Hong Kong and CINCPAC for POLAD.
3071. Subj: Country Team Assessment of GRC Intentions. Ref: State 135828;/2/ Taipei 2420./3/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 242.
/3/Telegram 2420 from Taipei, March 12, stated that the previous 2 months had yielded no indications of GRC plans for unilateral actions against the mainland. (Ibid.)
1. There have been no recent indications that the GRC intends to mount any major unilateral military operations against the mainland in the near future, though small-scale para-military or air operations could be launched without prior U.S. knowledge. Desultory planning for mainland recovery continues, but recent emphasis appears to have been rather on exploitation of propaganda windfall inherent in latest Maoist attacks on opposition figures as "KMT reactionaries".
2. GRC actions in the Taiwan Strait have continued to be defensive. As promised by Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo at the time of the Pueblo incident,/4/ the GRC has taken no action that could be construed as provocative, and CAF patrols have only recently resumed previous practice of flying within the ChiCom-claimed twelve-mile territorial limit, with no unusual ChiCom reaction. In late February and early March GRC shore batteries on the Offshore Islands on several occasions fired on a number of small high-speed targets, with no hits reported. In view of the fact that none of these "targets" was visually sighted, it is likely that they were radar "ghosts" or clutter. The MND later admitted that they (MND) considered them to be products of "seasonal meteorological anomalies", since much the same type of activity occurred during the same period in 1967. The GRC has shown some concern over, but so far has not reacted to, apparent ChiCom augmentation of naval forces in the Fuchou-Matsu area, which could in time pose a threat to GRC resupply of Matsu.
/4/Telegram 2015 from Taipei, January 29, reported the promise made by Chiang that afternoon. (Ibid.)
3. After more than a year of quiescence, the problem of the KMT irregulars in the tri-border area has taken a new tack. Recent offers by the Thais and Burmese to the irregulars to serve against Communist insurgents have spurred the GRC into action. We know privately that GRC planning is underway to unify the various irregular groups to form an effective anti-Communist force in Burma under GRC control. Initially, only money and equipment would be supplied by the GRC, but the planners envisage a time when men would be sent to help the irregulars, at least during some operations. GRC officials feel that this plan would offer least political difficulty for the present and would be flexible enough for future contingency use of the irregulars. Actual GRC implementation of these plans would represent a marked shift from assurances previously given the USG on the KMT irregular question, but such implementation would in any event prove difficult, in our opinion, in view of the resistance irregular leaders have shown previous efforts to increase GRC control over them.
4. Contingency military plans for unilateral mainland recovery efforts are now continuing, but we know privately that top GRC leadership acknowledges the general unfeasibility of existing plans and is aware of GRC inability to take much major unilateral military initiative against the mainland.
5. We know that the drastic MAP cut is causing unease among the leaders of the GRC, but Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo and his subordinates have thus far outwardly taken the news calmly and have apparently moved to absorb cuts through reductions and careful budgeting. The GRC is taking measures to earn foreign exchange for procurement of military equipment through repair of battle-damaged U.S. equipment. Privately, we know that there are GRC plans to siphon off for military spending at least part of a $30 million amount supposedly allotted for scientific development.
6. The GRC has seized on recent Maoist attacks against opposition figures as being Kuomintang agents and supporters to try to breathe new life into the GRC's mainland recovery theme. This propaganda windfall has received heavy coverage in the local press, where Maoist denunciation of alleged association with the KMT has been played as proof of the vitality of KMT clandestine organizations on the mainland and as support for a GRC prognosis that Mao will be toppled by anti-Communists (stimulated by KMT agents), first linking up with anti-Maoists in the Chinese Communist Party, and finally with GRC forces from Taiwan. GRC press coverage has been drawn almost entirely from ChiCom prop-aganda output, however, with few claims of specific GRC agent activities. We have no reliable evidence supporting any significant increase of the GRC's modest clandestine activities on the China mainland.
McConaughy
311. Editorial Note
On May 18, 1968, the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw invited an officer from the U.S. Embassy to the Chinese Embassy and handed him a letter from Charge Ch'en Tung to Ambassador Gronouski stating that since Ambassador Wang would not be able to return to Warsaw by May 29, the scheduled time of the next meeting, and "as there is nothing to discuss at present," the Chinese Government suggested that the 135th meeting be postponed until mid or late November. (Telegram 3219 from Warsaw, May 18; Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US) Telegram 167426 to Warsaw, May 20, transmitted the text of a letter to be conveyed to Ch'en in reply. The letter stated that the U.S. side continued to feel the talks were of value, that it was prepared to meet again with Ch'en on May 29 as an interim measure until Ambassador Wang was able to return, and that there were "several pressing matters we would wish to take up on this occasion." It urged adhering to the originally scheduled date. Telegram 3241 from Warsaw, May 21, reported that the letter had been delivered that morning. (Ibid.)
On May 24, at another meeting at the Chinese Embassy, Chinese Attaché Lo returned the U.S. letter of May 21. He read a prepared statement declaring that it could not be accepted because it addressed Ch'en Tung as the Charge d'Affaires of the Office of the Chinese Representative to the U.S.-Chinese Ambassadorial Talks rather than as the Charge d'Af-faires of the Chinese People's Republic in Poland. Gronouski, who had been absent at the time the May 21 letter was sent, suggested to the Department that the letter should be addressed to Ch'en Tung, Chargé d'Affaires, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Warsaw, the form of address used in a letter of March 6. (Telegram 3293 from Warsaw, May 24; ibid.) Telegram 170093 to Warsaw, May 24, concurred, and telegram 3309 from Warsaw of the same date reported that the letter had been handed to Lo that day, along with another stating that Gronouski would soon be leaving Warsaw, leaving Deputy Chief of Mission Walter E. Jenkins, Jr., as Charge d'Affaires. (Ibid.)
On May 28, at the Chinese Embassy, Lo conveyed a letter from Ch'en Tung to Jenkins stating that U.S. arguments for holding the meeting as scheduled were "untenable." It stated that the U.S. Government had recently "stepped up its military provocations and war threats against the Chinese people" while making "various gestures of sham relaxation to hoodwink the people of the world" and that under the circumstances, there was no point in holding the meeting. (Telegram 3335 from Warsaw, May 28; ibid.) Telegram 171995 to Warsaw, May 28, 1968, instructed the Embassy to express orally strong regret at the tone of the Chinese letter and to reject as baseless the allegations made in it, emphasizing that the meetings were not a "gesture" nor were they designed to "produce a good effect" but to deal privately with problems between the two countries. In addition, the Embassy was to convey a written response proposing a meeting on June 26 or July 10. (Ibid.) Jenkins reported in telegram 3364 from Warsaw, May 28, that the Embassy had done so. (Ibid.)
On June 27, at the Chinese Embassy, Lo transmitted a letter from Ch'en to Jenkins insisting that the meeting be postponed until mid or late November. (Telegram 3745 from Warsaw, June 28; ibid.)
312. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 13-9-68
Washington, May 23, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A note on the cover sheet states that it was submitted by Helms and prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on May 23 except the AEC and FBI representatives, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A May 22 memorandum from INR/REA Director Fred Greene to Hughes, filed with the source text, states that the estimate was the product of very lengthy discussions reflecting a long-standing disagreement within the Intelligence Community over the nature of the relationships among the top Chinese leaders. The key question, according to Greene, was whether Mao Tse-tung remained the architect of basic Chinese Communist policy and the prime mover in the regime or whether the underlying political dynamic was a factional struggle with Mao playing a relatively restricted role.
THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The Problem
To estimate the main trends and outlook in China over the next year or so.
Conclusions
A. The situation inside Communist China is still highly fluid and the outlook uncertain. Disorder, confusion, and unrest continue but have been reduced since the high water mark last summer. Nevertheless, the ranks of those alienated by the Greater Proletarian Cultural Revolution have grown; the costs in political control, social discipline, and economic progress have far outweighed the gains. Though Mao was successful in breaking high-level opposition in the old party apparatus, in its broader aspects his Cultural Revolution has been a failure and we believe it will be gradually phased out.
B. Mao still appears to be the central figure and source of basic policy. Mao and the regime are officially committed to the reconstruction of a new framework for administrative and political control. On balance, we believe that the trend will be toward regaining some stability, in part because of the increased influence of the moderate elements in Peking. But there still will be sharp twists and turns, occasional crises, and disorder and turmoil at various levels which will reflect strong differences among factions and leaders over policies and tactics.
C. The military will remain Peking's most reliable instrument over the coming year. As the only cohesive force with a nationwide system of command and control, the military will have to serve a variety of administrative and control functions. The scope of the rebuilding effort--political, economic, and social--may require the heavy support of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for some years to come. Military dominance in political life may become institutionalized, particularly if political reconstruction bogs down in violence and disarray requiring the repressive force of the PLA. The corollary to this increased political role is the diversion of the PLA from normal military routine and a consequent reduction in its military readiness.
D. The damage to the economy as a direct result of the Cultural Revolution includes depressed industrial production, a delay in modernization and economic growth, aggravated labor problems, setbacks in the training of technical specialists, and a general hiatus in the formulation of new economic policies and plans. The cumulative damage to the economy of prolonged political turmoil will not be easily or quickly repaired. Whatever the political course for 1968, agricultural output is not likely to repeat last year's very good harvests, which benefited from exceptionally good weather. At best, China can hope only to restore stability and balance to the economy in 1968, foregoing any prospect of expansion. Indeed, there is a possibility that a reduction in food output, combined with problems of collection and distribution, could cause a serious food shortage by 1969, which in turn could have serious political repercussions.
E. "Red Guard diplomacy" cost Peking last year in relations with Communist as well as non-Communist regimes. Since last summer, however, the regime has taken steps to reduce the violent and provocative influence of internal affairs on foreign relations. In the main, the Cultural Revolution has not altered the general line of Chinese policy abroad; it still remains revolutionary in tone but cautious and prudent in deeds. Preoccupation with internal affairs is likely to relegate foreign concerns to a secondary role.
F. A major uncertainty in any estimate of China's future is the problem of Mao's passing. The events of the past two years have made it more likely that Mao's departure will usher in a stormy and possibly protracted period in which policy differences and power aspirations will continue to fuel a leadership struggle. Mao's legacy is likely to be an enfeebled party, a confused bureaucracy, and a divided and harried leadership. In our view the ultimate result will be to accelerate the rejection of Mao's doctrines and policies.
[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
313. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, June 7, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XII. Confidential.
SUBJECT
China Items of Interest1. I have learned confidentially and informally that the proposal for the recognition of Mongolia/2/ has been signed off by Ambassador Bohlen and the Under Secretary and is now on the Secretary's desk. You may be hearing from him on it. I should think he will want the President's views on it, and it may be a fit subject for a Tuesday luncheon meeting. The attached Tokyo telegram (Tab A)/3/ reports recent conversations by UPI correspondent Axelbank with Tsedenbal and the Mongol-ian People's Republic Deputy Foreign Minister in Ulan Bator, in which both indicated that the MPR would welcome recognition by the United States.
/2/Document 347.
/3/Telegram 8714 from Tokyo, May 28. None of the tabs is printed.
2. A trade package, concerning which I have talked at length with Bob Barnett for many months, is in abeyance largely because of reaction of peripheral friendly countries to the President's March 31 statement and the Paris talks (i.e., fears that we are becoming soft on communism). As you know, I believe there are a few limited steps in the trade field which we could and should take any time now--especially with the Paris developments. If there should come a Vietnam settlement and either one of the two likely outcomes of the Cultural Revolution, I think we might want to attempt a bit more. Doing so must assume prior groundwork. Dana Robinson (correspondence at Tab B) has been doing some useful work with the academic community, the business community and to some extent the Hill with respect to China trade, largely in the post-Vietnam context. I think he has used very good judgment and has been working in our long-term interest. He has kept me well informed. I am sorry to hear that he has met with such negative response that he is giving up his efforts. We are effectively denying the Chinese Communists almost nothing because of our trade restrictions. Of course we should continue to make it hard for them to get certain things, but Western Europe and Japan as well as European communist countries are in general all too ready to fill the breach. I am convinced that Japan especially will increase its lenient ways.
There have been several signs that the Chinese Communists are regularizing their international relations and attempting to repair the damage of Red Guard diplomacy. It is too soon to speak in terms of a revival of the "Bandung spirit" in Chinese Communist politics, but something of the sort could well come and make it very hard for us to deal with others' lessened restrictions on China whether it be concerning trade or ChiRep. Meanwhile, it is difficult in most people's view, I believe, to square the extreme restrictions in our trade policy with our desire for more contact and a freer flow of people, ideas and goods. We would, of course, get no response from Peking as yet, but I do believe that the limited steps proposed in Barnett's package might well hasten the day when we would be able to take bigger steps in safety and with profit.
3. At Tab C is Peking's shameless exploitation of the Kennedy assassination.
Al
314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada/1/
Washington, June 10, 1968, 1538Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAN-CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Donald on June 7, cleared by Straus in EUR/CAN, and Thayer in EA/ROC, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to 12 posts, CINCPAC, US NATO (Brussels), USUN, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
179549. Subj: Approach to Canadian Ambassador Regarding Canadian Policy Initiatives Toward Communist China.
1. Assistant Secretary Bundy called in Amb. Ritchie June 7 to discuss with him US concern over implications of possible Canadian initiatives toward Communist China.
2. Mr. Bundy said that the Secretary had asked him in low-key way to run through points of concern to the United States and proposed therefore to mention the various problems we see as Canada moves to possible recognition Communist China, as suggested by Prime Minister's policy statement on Canadian foreign policy and other remarks by Prime Minister and Mr. Sharp. We have noted, of course, Mr. Sharp's references to taking into account the Government of Taiwan in pursuing recognition of Peking.
3. Mr. Bundy said that the first problem that we see is the pattern exemplified in French experience with recognition of Peking. At that time Peking made it totally clear to Paris that a continued relationship with Taipei was out of the question. Taipei, primarily for reasons of face, actually broke relations with France but did this only after being informed by French that with the arrival of Chinese Communist Mission their Embassy in Paris would lose its "raison d'etre." Mr. Bundy gave the Ambassador copy of a chronology encompassing US understanding of what transpired in course of French recognition of Peking.
4. Primary concern to US is the status of Taipei. It is doing a very good job, Mr. Bundy said, and juridically, morally, and in regional terms it is a going concern and important to Free World position.
5. Mr. Bundy said that it might be of interest to Canadian Government that we have been confidentially informed by French that in view of recent anti-French statements by Communist China, they are seriously considering not returning their Ambassador to Peking. He mentioned this, Mr. Bundy said, to indicate roller coaster nature of relationship with Chinese Communists.
6. A secondary but important point involved the timing of possible Canadian initiatives. This was involved with the Viet-Nam situation and Paris talks. Such an initiative by the Canadians would give encouragement to hard liners, both within Communist China itself and in Hanoi, and this might well rub off on North Vietnamese position in the Paris talks. The degree of damage to be anticipated here obviously depended on the terms on which the Canadians dealt with the ChiComs.
7. Bundy said that another important factor which again depended on these terms was the blow which Taipei would suffer and which might be increased if other countries were tempted to follow the Canadian example. There would be concern, particularly in East Asia, both over the blow to Taipei and over the increased prestige which Peking would gain from Canadian action.
8. In conclusion, Mr. Bundy said he wanted to indicate to Canadian Government our sense of concern, a concern based in large part on what happened when the French began a similar initiative. Mr. Bundy referred to Mr. Sharp's conversation with the Secretary and reiterated our hope that the Canadians would talk to us before they took any action vis-#-vis Communist China.
9. In response, Ambassador Ritchie said that he would report points made by Mr. Bundy and the concern which he expressed. He would like to say, however, that he did not believe that the parallel with France was necessarily applicable to Canada. In a very real sense, he believed that Mr. Sharp felt that Canada could only find out what the ChiComs would have in mind by trying. He questioned the effect such an initiative would have on the Paris talks, but agreed that extent this influence would be governed by terms of Canadian initiative. He concluded by stating it goes without saying that Canadian Government would talk to us before taking any action.
Rusk
315. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, June 26, 1968, 1110Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
3513. Subject: Conversation with Gimo on U.S. attitudes toward China issues.
1. At President Chiang's request I called on him at his Yangmingshan residence June 25. Gimo's purpose was to convey his deep concern about implications June 22 New York Times editorial on China policy, and developing trend as he saw it of U.S. thinking on China issues. In particular he was disturbed about editorial's assertion that USG considering urging President Chiang to withdraw GRC forces from Offshore Islands. Gimo said this type of statement, together with Anderson article, could encourage Chinese Communists to attack Offshores. He urged USG to issue statement repudiating editorial's insinuation that USG is considering urging a withdrawal of GRC from Quemoy and Matsu.
2. In conversation which lasted nearly two hours Gimo dwelt on what he interpreted as alarming trends U.S. policy and public attitudes towards China. He cited editorial's mention of Leonard Marks speech in early May and Katzenbach May 22 speech/2/ and referred to Jack Anderson articles of last February on alleged high level USG discussions of China policy matters. He said he was particularly incensed by last para NY Times editorial which advocated withdrawal U.S. opposition to ChiCom entry to UN and initiation of steps to recognize Peking as seat of government for mainland China. Editorial stated: "This does not mean abandoning Taiwan, but does involve recognizing Taipei for what it is--and what it is not." Gimo said editorial is insulting and has aroused strongest resentment among Chinese people. He reasoned some of contents NY Times editorial also reflected views some influential USG officials. He said editorials such as this make Chinese have serious doubts about U.S. policy towards China and Chinese cannot help but resent what U.S. is doing. He bluntly asked what was more in interests of USG--encouragement of ChiCom regime or friendly relations with GRC?
/2/Reference is to a speech on China by Under Secretary Katzenbach before the National Press Club on May 21. For text, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1968, pp. 737-740.
3. President stressed repeatedly that Quemoy and Matsu were integral part of China and could not be separated from territory of China. He said retention of Quemoy and Matsu were absolutely imperative for defense of Taiwan and Pescadores and GRC would fight to last man to defend Offshores. If Quemoy and Matsu were lost, he thought it was questionable whether Taiwan and Pescadores could be successfully defended even with U.S. air and naval power. Gimo said if U.S. should adopt views attributed to U.S. officials in Anderson article and give up defense of the Offshores, this would have extremely bad effect on morale, would incite ChiCom attack on Offshores, would give ChiComs momentum required for successful attack on Taiwan, and would have lasting effects even more serious than Vietnam war. In addition, hardliners in NVN would be encouraged to stiffen position at Paris Peace Talks and to intensify war.
4. President Chiang urged U.S. to clarify once and for all its basic position towards status of Offshores. Gimo repeatedly returned to this theme and urged that USG for its own interests and for interests security in Asia should openly state that NY Times editorial has no foundation in fact and is completely groundless. He stated "for the sake of China and the U.S. and our mutual interests the insinuations contained in the NY Times editorial must be denied by USG. Only by doing this can damage already caused by editorial and Anderson articles be minimized." Gimo added that not only had NY Times editorial caused considerable concern here but many leading members of U.S. Congress had made appeasing statements concerning Communist China. This was why he thought it important for USG to make concise, resolute statement clarifying U.S. position toward Offshores along lines that Offshores are integral part of territory of Republic of China and U.S. Government has no right to determine their disposition. He referred with warm approbation to Secretary Rusk's statement concerning Taiwan/3/ which was along similar lines and said there was even more reason for U.S. to make such a statement about Offshores since they were undisputed Chinese territory long before Taiwan was retroceded at end of World War II.
/3/Reference is to Secretary Rusk's remarks at a press conference on June 21; for text, see ibid., July 8, 1968, pp. 33-38.
5. President warned that if USG did not come out with such a statement he seriously estimated that Communist China would be likely to launch an attack on the Offshore Islands between now and inauguration new U.S. President. He felt Peking would misinterpret NY Times editorial, Anderson articles, and other official statements. Partly for internal reasons--to draw dissident factions together, and partly because apparent weakness or at least uncertainty U.S. posture--ChiComs would think they had golden opportunity to attach Offshores. Gimo then added that speaking as a friend, present U.S. attitude towards Viet Cong, NVN, and Communist China appeared to Asian people as reminiscent of the attitude Chamberlain had adopted toward Nazi Germany prior WW II. He dwelt on this point at some length. He then said he believed if U.S. continues with present irresolute attitudes it would lead to World War Three, since Communist China will be encouraged to pursue more aggressive designs.
6. I told the President I appreciated his willingness to give frank expression to his views and I respected the depth of his convictions. I then said that I felt he was giving too much weight to both the NY Times editorial and the Anderson articles, that neither had any standing as far as U.S. Government is concerned. Repeated that NY Times editorials, like all other expressions of our free press, represented private views of newspaper and not official USG policy or positions. I said that I felt editorial was regrettable but it was nothing new for him and many others to read unpalatable views in NY Times or indeed in other papers. I told Pres that as he knew there were various shades of opinion in U.S. concerning China but, the administration supported by the Congress, was steadfast on basic policy as it now stands.
7. I then mentioned that Gimo knew we had not approached his government to suggest evacuation Quemoy or Matsu. I told him that there were officials at lower levels in the U.S. Government who constantly write background papers and think pieces embodying a great variety of views on various contingency situations, but these papers do not constitute policy. I said that there should be no concern because at the policy making levels of the government our policy towards China was well established. The expressions of editorial opinion published in our leading newspapers may have some influence but they do not necessarily represent any majority opinion. I told the President that in his own experience through the years he has been able to put up with a great deal of press commentary of this type. I expressed hope that President could continue to live with expressed views that were contrary to ROC's policy. I said that Washington was inclined to believe it was not useful in general for USG to refute or even take cognizance of questionable editorials on foreign policy issues. It would be a confusing and unprofitable business and would draw added attention to these editorials. I said I doubted if it would be possible to have a rebuttal statement issued such as the President desired, but I would transmit his request to Washington without delay.
8. I referred to his remarks on appeasement and stated that it pained me very much, with our very high casualty rate in Vietnam and with our heavy additional defense burdens in Korea, in Western Europe and elsewhere in the world, to hear the President intimate that the United States is pursuing a Chamberlain type appeasement policy. I told the President that when we are making such heavy sacrifices in the cause of freedom and standing firm on all the cardinal principles of freedom we are defending, any characterization of "appeasement" was inappropriate and could not be justified.
9. I then referred to various speeches that have been made by top-level U.S. officials holding out the possibility of additional contacts with mainland China. I told the President that those who were advocating seeking limited contacts are not thinking in terms of formal diplomatic relations or enhancement of the international position of Communist China. Rather they were thinking in terms of establishing a better understanding with the Chinese people on the mainland, his people. I said there is a fairly widespread desire in the U.S. for cultural, intellectual, medical and press contacts with the people of the mainland. This however was not equivalent to the advocacy of formal recognition of the ChiCom Government nor the acceptance or condoning of the Chinese Communist regime or its policies. I suggested that over the long run such people-to-people contacts, if they could be brought about, might provide some means of offsetting the dangerous spread of poisonous anti-U.S. feeling and misunderstanding fomented by the Communists in a whole new generation on the mainland.
10. Memcon will be forwarded by airgram./4/ Insights and recommendations about Gimo's position and request will be subject of septel./5/
/4/The memorandum of conversation was enclosed with airgram A-742 from Taipei, July 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-US) Airgram A-807 from Taipei, July 26, forwarded a summary record of the conversation prepared by the Foreign Ministry. (Ibid., POL CHINAT-US)
/5/McConaughy sent a message to Rusk and Bundy in telegram 3554 from Taipei, June 28, calling their attention to Chiang's request. He commented further in telegram 3594, July 2. (Both ibid.)
McConaughy
316. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, July 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret. A copy was sent to Jorden. Rostow sent the memorandum, along with some intelligence reports, to the President with a covering memorandum of the same date, noting that the disarray in China might help explain "the Soviet willingness to proceed with arms control measures with the U.S. and to interject itself so deeply in the Vietnam affair." (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
China Mainland SituationSince the Wuhan episode of last summer, the conservatives in general have had their way more--often with Army collusion or acquiescence. This has concerned the Maoists, and Mao on June 2 issued one of his infrequent delphic "instructions" to the effect that the masses were to be given their rein at all costs. This has resulted, not unexpectedly, in a rise in fighting throughout June. The level has not yet reached that of last summer, but it is well on the way, and we have again a situation which could deteriorate fairly rapidly.
Perhaps the chief difference between last summer and now is that Cultural Revolution dislocations have begun to bring suffering to larger and larger numbers of citizens. Illegal immigrants into Hong Kong give most frequently as reasons for fleeing, unemployment and food shortages. Lack of raw materials, labor troubles and not infrequently sabotage have reduced production in many enterprises to the point where salaries cannot be met. We have reports of both grave robberies (especially in rur-al areas, valuables are still often buried with the dead) and the sale of children--both typical phenomena in times of crisis in China. (One woman spoke of being offered the equivalent of about $45.00 for her son, but she was holding out for more.) Vehicles, even public buses, are being stolen for use in factional fighting, and bicycles are at such a premium in some places where public transportation has ceased to function, that they are being wrested out from under the riders.
Serious floods are reported from six provinces in Southeast China. The early rice crop in Kwangtung may be off as much as 10-15%, and planting of late rice will be delayed.
All three North-South rail lines have had interruptions for considerable periods in June from floods, landslides and fighting around the stations. (We are not sure whether military-manned priority trains are getting through, where "acts of God" are not the cause of the interruptions.) Many letters mention that the writer is stranded away from home or work because of lack of transportation.
No one knows what all this will ultimately mean, of course. However, one is now tempted to alter the British witticism of last fall to the effect "the situation is excellent, but not hopeless." Things must be beginning to look pretty hopeless to the average Chinese. If the regime could bring itself to give the conservatives their way, things could quiet down, but there are no signs that the regime will do that. Almost anything could happen in coming months, but the best bet still is that a portion of the military will get fed up and take matters into their own hands. If the Maoists' opposition should begin to jell, we should see radio stations taken over. So far, this has happened in only a couple of places very temporarily some months ago. It was premature.
AJ
317. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, July 9, 1968, 1046Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC.
3656. Subject: Rising GRC concern over Offshore Islands. Ref: Taipei 3641./2/
/2/Telegram 3641 from Taipei, July 8, reported a conversation between MAAG Chief Major General R.G. Ciccolella and Chiang Ching-kuo. (Ibid.)
1. Heightened concern was expressed by Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) July 8 in conversation with Major General R.G. Ciccolella about possible ChiCom attack on Offshore Islands (reftel). There have been similar recent expressions of concern about Offshores by President Chiang to retiring CINCPAC, Admiral Sharp, on June 20 (Taipei 3467/3/ and 3612/4/) and to me on June 25 (Taipei 3513 and 3554)./5/ In addition, FonMin's conversation with me on July 2 (Taipei 3592)/6/ and July 8 conversation of Defense Minister with Vice Admiral John L. Chew, Commander United States-Taiwan Defense Command, focused on aspects of the same subject. CCK's conversation with Admiral Chew, expressing Defense Minister's anxiety about possible new ChiCom aggressive moves, included suggestion that revision of Plan Rochester should have an annex to cover contingency of possible combined defense of Offshore Islands, in event U.S. should find such defense related to defense of Taiwan and Penghu.
/3/Dated June 22. (Ibid.)
/4/Not found.
/5/Document 315 and footnote 5 thereto.
/6/Dated July 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)
2. This high level worry about possible ChiCom attack on Offshores is by GRC's own admission not based on any hard evidence of ChiCom plans or preparations but only on GRC leadership's understanding of Chinese Communist leadership's tactics, motivations and psychology, as applied to current international situation. This anxiety has thus far been evidenced only by private statements of President Chiang, CCK and ForMin to top U.S. officials. There has been no evidence of general concern on this topic at lower levels in the GRC.
3. President Chiang has probably himself initiated a great deal of this concern by his reaction to the Jack Anderson series of articles last February-March, and by the New York Times editorial of June 22. His analysis is that the Communists may be emboldened to strike by absence of any U.S. refutation of NY Times editorial or Anderson stories, combined with what he interprets as other signs of U.S. reluctance to take a firm stand vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists.
4. There can be no question but that President Chiang would like very much to take this opportunity to solicit from the U.S. some type of public statement of acceptance or recognition of the GRC presence on the Offshore Islands. Subsequent follow-up consultations sought by Defense Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs are designed to continue the pressure in this direction.
5. I continue to regard it as desirable from standpoint most effective conduct of our relations here that low-key statement be made by the Department's spokesman that would help to assuage GRC fears about the Anderson articles and the NY Times editorial statement about Offshores. Such a statement could easily avoid any confusion of our clear position as to exclusion of Offshores from treaty area. To be effective for these purposes, I believe a statement would need to be public. It could take the form of a simple response to an arranged question that those islands are Chinese territory and their fate is not ours to dictate.
McConaughy
318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/
Washington, July 12, 1968, 2114Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Shoesmith; cleared by Brown and Walt Rostow, and in draft by Donald, Kreisberg, Armstrong, Walt Rostow, Steadman, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Robert J. McCloskey; and approved and initialed by Rusk.
201378. Ref: A. Taipei 3513./2/ B. Taipei 3554./3/ C. Taipei 3592 and 3594./4/
/2/Document 315.
/3/See footnote 5, Document 315.
/4/See footnote 6, Document 317 and footnote 5, Document 315.
1. We have considered carefully your suggestion Ref B for some statement which would be responsive to President Chiang's request as outlined Ref A. As you made clear to Chiang, we continue to believe it would not be useful for Department to take issue with such speculative articles as Anderson series or editorials taking various positions on China policy. At time Anderson articles appeared, Department spokesman set forth our position as clearly as possible (State 133316 and 135413)./5/ We believe it would be unwise and misleading to amplify that position in any way which suggests we regard GRC position on offshores in same light as its position on Taiwan. Further, to raise such issue at this time or to go beyond Secretary's June 21 statement with respect to our overtures toward Communist China would risk making Offshore Islands and China policy issues subject of partisan controversy with consequences that might be even more disturbing to GRC than events which have prompted Chiang's current concern.
/5/Telegrams 133316 and 135413 to Taipei, March 20 and 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)
2. We concur with general thrust your response to Chiang and particularly appreciate your entirely appropriate rebuttal of Chiang's unwarranted remarks concerning our posture toward North Vietnam and Communist China. Although we unable comply with Chiang's request, we wish encourage him to engage in frank discussions with you, since it may provide opportunity to exercise some leavening influence on his views and reactions to current developments bearing on US-GRC relations. For that purpose, you requested convey orally following message from Secretary to President Chiang.
3. Begin message. Ambassador McConaughy has reported in detail the observations which you were good enough to make to him on June 25. I appreciate, as always, a frank exposition of your views and I have given them the most careful thought and attention. I hope that you will continue to meet with our Ambassador from time to time for such frank discussions on matters of mutual interest and concern.
4. I have noted your anxiety concerning certain speculative articles and editorials concerning U.S. policy and wish to share with you my own thoughts on the questions you raised about their significance and impact. The Department of State has for many years indicated that the position of the United States Government concerning the offshore islands is that expressed specifically and solely in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and the Joint Congressional Resolution of 1955. That remains our position. With respect to the limited conversations which we have had with the authorities of Mainland China, we have repeatedly made clear that such conversations in no way imply any change in our commitments to or any diminution of our concern for the Republic of China and Taiwan.
5. The speculative articles and editorials which you brought to the Ambassador's attention in no way qualify the position of the United States Government. They attracted no significant attention in the United States and I have seen no public discussion here arising from them. I do not believe, therefore, that any useful purpose would be served by taking public issue with such press comments, beyond that which has already occurred. Quite frankly, it would not be in the interest of either of our countries to contribute to a controversial discussion on a matter which is not being actively debated at the present time.
6. I also have noted your concern that such speculation may encourage Chinese Communists to launch an attack on offshores and your estimate that such an attack may be imminent. We are of course alert to possibility that Chinese Communists may attempt to renew tensions in Taiwan Strait, and we are especially appreciative of GRC care to avoid provoking such action. We have no indications from other sources, however, that Chinese Communists intend provoke incident in Strait or are planning such moves. We will continue to keep this matter under closest scrutiny and would appreciate any intelligence information GRC may develop.
7. Since we are very anxious that you always feel free to be frank with us, I hope that you will understand frankness on our part as well. I found it difficult to understand your assessment of the reaction of people in Asia to U.S. policies in Vietnam and toward Communist China. The American people have accepted almost 300,000 casualties since the end of World War II in trying to assist our friends in maintaining their independence against aggression. In this very year of 1968, more than 9,000 of our young men have been killed and more than 60,000 have been wounded. If these sacrifices cannot assure our friends and allies as to both our attitude and our determination, I do not see how the achievement of a sense of assurance is possible. Certainly between such close allies as the United States and the Republic of China there should be no doubt on this score. The expression of such doubts, in the face of the extraordinary sacrifices we are being called upon to make, would not be received well by the American people and would give a powerful stimulation to those voices among us who are urging isolation and withdrawal from our responsibilities in other parts of the world. End message.
8. Please express to the President the Secretary's highest esteem and personal regards.
9. If you think desirable, you may leave the above text with President Chiang as an oral memorandum.
Rusk
319. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, July 17, 1968, 1030Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
3761. Subject: MAP aspects of Gimos's July 15 conversation with Ambassador. Ref: A) State 201378;/2/ B) Taipei 3730./3/
/2/Document 318.
/3/McConaughy reported in telegram 3730 from Taipei, July 15, that he had delivered Rusk's message to Chiang, who had accepted the decision but urged that some of the reassurance reflected in the message be incorporated in some forthcoming high-level official speech. Chiang expressed continuing concern about a possible attack on the Offshore Islands and stated that the people of Asia did not doubt U.S. policy in Vietnam but were "haunted" by the memory of the 1946 Marshall mission to China. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)
1. During latter part of conversation reported Ref B, President Chiang turned to discussion of U.S. military assistance to GRC generally. After referring to the imminent ChiCom threat he considered to be posed to the Offshores, the Gimo observed that the defense capability of the GRC was "far from adequate" and needed to be expeditiously improved.
2. Stating that he was not making any formal request for increased military aid from the United States, he added that he hoped that all defense items, the supply of which had already been agreed upon by the two governments, could be delivered as soon as possible. He thought it urgent that Nike-Hercules and Hawk ground-to-air missiles be expeditiously supplied in increased numbers in order to help face the ChiCom threat.
3. Speaking of the MAP program in general, the President observed that U.S. military aid to the Republic of China during the next fiscal year was expected to fall below the U.S. fifty million dollar level. This, he said, was "too little". Even with the favorable U.S. policy on credit sales, the total available would be "not adequate". He expressed his hope that I would pass on these statements as "a casual remark".
4. I promised to do so, but took the opportunity to review briefly the recent Congressional mood on military aid generally and to mention the other programs of the U.S. Government--such as expediting credit sales, aiding the GRC in its own military production capabilities, and transferring some used equipment from Vietnam and elsewhere--all of which should help to meet GRC needs.
5. When discussing the danger of imminent ChiCom attack on the Offshore Islands, President Chiang emphasized at several points the urgent need to revise Plan Rochester. I noted that TDC and MAAG, and CINCPAC were presently working with the Ministry of National Defense and other interested GRC agencies on the first draft of a prospective revision.
6. Mentioning the growing Chinese Communist Air Force capability, the President expressed his hope that by next year the GRC would have at least one squadron of the latest model high capability fighter planes--such as recently supplied Korea. (Later discussion revealed that the plane in question was the F4C Phantom.) I remarked that the F5 planes now in use and programmed in larger numbers, appear to be very appropriate, efficient and relatively economical for the GRC's requirements. The Gimo responded that the F5 was good, and he appreciated our current efforts to make it available to the GRC but he wished to reiterate that he still felt that one squadron of the higher capacity fighters to lead the Chinese Air Force would greatly help the morale in his armed forces and the ability of the CAF to repel a Communist attack. He suggested that perhaps there should be some reallocation of resources, if necessary, to make this possible.
7. The President noted that while the GRC had not contributed troops to Vietnam, it was shouldering a major responsibility by tying down Communist troops on the South China coast. The level of military aid, he hoped, would be determined with this consideration in mind.
8. Comment: President Chiang's remarks at this meeting were among the most direct that the GRC has thus far made about recent MAP cuts. For the first time, the GRC at a high level has officially labeled our anticipated Military Assistance Program as "not adequate". By inference, the Gimo was apparently drawing a comparison between the level of U.S. military assistance to his own government and that being provided to Korea. The Gimo apparently was seeking by this means to underscore the significance he felt the U.S. should give GRC efforts in the Far East, including in particular its contribution in reducing pressures or potential pressures on the U.S. position in Vietnam by immobilizing large numbers of ChiCom troops opposite Taiwan Strait.
McConaughy
Return to 1964-1968, Volume XXX index
Return
to the U.S. Department of State Home Page
This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.
