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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
Mongolia 344. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, June 3, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 MONG. Secret. Sent through Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson. Drafted by Lindsey Grant, Arthur R. Dornheim of ACA, David Dean, and Bennett, and concurred in by Deputy Assistant Secretary for EUR Richard H. Davis, SOV Deputy Director David H. Henry, MacArthur, and Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs Carl F. Salans. The source text bears the handwritten notation "S saw."
SUBJECT
Diplomatic Recognition of the Mongolian People's RepublicDiscussion:
This memorandum concerning the recognition of Outer Mongolia is submitted at the request of S/S. We continue to receive indications that the Mongols are still interested in exchanging missions (Tab A)./2/ Ambassador Kohler favors recognition (Tabs B and C)/3/ as does Ambassador Bohlen (Tab D)./4/
/2/Airgram A-1490 from Moscow, May 17, and a March 1 letter from Ambassador Kohler to EUR Assistant Secretary Tyler. None of the tabs is printed.
/3/Telegram 2683 from Moscow, March 13; letter of June 12 from Kohler to Tyler; and telegram 3594 from Moscow, May 29.
/4/Telegram 4993 from Paris, March 4.
Ambassador Kohler suggests that, once a policy decision is taken, he be authorized to take quiet soundings with the Outer Mongolian Ambassador in Moscow to avoid any possibility of a rebuff to a public approach on the pretext of popular revulsion because of our behavior in Viet-Nam (Tab C).
We continue to believe that our 1961 negotiations should be resumed. (Tab E summarizes the pros and cons.)/5/ If the Outer Mongolians should prove unresponsive to an approach by Ambassador Kohler, we would inform them privately that we are prepared to consider recognition again whenever they are ready. Aside from Soviet and Outer Mongolian attitudes, the problem of the GRC reaction remains, as always, the principal deterrent. In our most recent conversation with the GRC Embassy concerning Outer Mongolia we repeated to Minister Shen on May 19 that, while we were not actively contemplating recognition at that time, any U.S. commitment made with respect to the non-recognition of Outer Mongolia was not an unending one (Tab F)./6/ A precis of US-GRC exchanges on the Mongolian recognition issue is also included in Tab F./7/ Steps we might take to mitigate the expected adverse GRC reaction to our decision are discussed at Tab G./8/
/5/Unsigned and undated paper entitled "Advantages and Disadvantages of Resuming Recognition Negotiations With the Mongols."
/6/No record of the conversation with Shen is attached to the source text.
/7/Unsigned and undated paper entitled "Precis of U.S.-GRC Exchanges on Mongolian Recognition Issue."
/8/The remainder of the tabs, consisting of unsigned and undated papers as described in the memorandum, are attached but not printed.
As to timing, it is extremely important that the step be taken as soon as possible (preferably before the end of June) to avoid an adverse effect on the Chinese representation position in the UN and in any disarmament conference that may be called. Recent soundings by Marshall Green at our Embassy in Taipei and current conversations here with Taipei's DCM Ralph Clough indicate that now is probably the best time, as far as our relations with the GRC are concerned, to recognize Outer Mongolia. Our firm policy in Viet-Nam should allay any GRC fears that U.S. policy is softening, and the intelligence requirements dramatized by Communist China's second nuclear explosion are self-evident.
The Russians may be less inclined right now to be forthcoming about transit rights, but the virulence of the Chinese Communist attack upon them should stiffen their back and perhaps cause them fairly shortly to be seeking some indirect means to riposte. If our assumptions are correct, the Mongols will be urging the Russians to cooperate, and the USSR perhaps is not presently in the best position to deny favors to the Mongols. In November 1964 the British established a mission in Ulan Bator, and the French have recently recognized Outer Mongolia, so we are not breaking new ground.
Our generalized interest in self-determination argues that we recognize Outer Mongolia. To this may be added certain specific arguments. If negotiations lead to recognition, we shall have:
1) encouraged the Mongols' sense of national identity, both in Mongolia and the bordering areas of China, and promoted the further fractioning of the Communist world,
2) contributed to a deepening of Sino-Soviet hostilities,
3) increased our intelligence capabilities in an important area,
4) afforded better protection for the growing number of American tourists in Mongolia, and
5) deflected charges of racialism by recognizing for the first time a non-white Communist regime. (This small point may be useful in our efforts to counter the Chinese Communists' drive to polarize feelings between the white and non-white worlds.)
Even if they did not lead to recognition, negotiations with the Mongols would yield us certain advantages. We would gain a better reading of Russian/Mongol/Chinese relations at this juncture, we would have established communication with the Mongols, and we would have encouraged their sense of nationalism and perhaps their irritation at the Russians. On the other hand, we also would have complicated our relations with the GRC.
A proposed scenario is at Tab H and answers to anticipated domestic criticism at Tab I, in the event you decide that this matter should be further explored. Ambassador MacArthur concurs in the recommendations but wishes to underline the importance of consultation with congressional leaders as spelled out in paragraph 2 of Tab H. As you are aware the Zablocki sub-committee has recommended that consideration should be given to recognition of Outer Mongolia.
Recommendation:
That you approve further exploration of the idea of resuming recognition negotiations with the Mongols in accordance with the scenario at Tab H./9/
/9/The source text bears no indication of Rusk's approval or disapproval. A July 6 memorandum from Bundy to Thompson and Rusk transmitted additional material. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 MONG) A July 28 memorandum from Thompson to Bundy and EUR Assistant Secretary Leddy stated that Rusk did not wish to act on the matter at that time. (Ibid., ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Bundy Visit to ROC, March 10-12, 1966) An August 2 memorandum by Dornheim states that Thompson told Berger that Rusk did not want to take action at that time because it "would only invite hostility from President Chiang Kai-shek and we had enough governments critical of us at the moment." Rusk did, however, suggest that soundings be taken of Chiang's views when Chiang Ching-kuo visited Washington in September. (Ibid.)
345. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 9, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 MONG. Secret. Drafted by Franklin O. McCord of ACA. Concurred in by Jacobson, Bennett, Country Director for Soviet Affairs Malcolm Toon, Sisco, Country Director for Japan Richard L. Sneider, MacAr-thur, and Kohler. The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs became the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs on November 1, 1966.
SUBJECT
Diplomatic Recognition of the Mongolian People's RepublicDiscussion
1. In an action memorandum dated May 6, 1966 (Tab H),/2/ the SIG forwarded a recommendation that we initiate steps to recognize Mongolia. No action was taken at that time, largely because the timing was considered unpropitious. The SIG recommendation stated that there were then more international advantages than disadvantages in recognizing Mongolia. (Tab F gives the arguments pro and con as presented to the SIG.)/3/
/2/The memorandum from Under Secretary Ball to the Secretary, undated but with a drafting date of May 6, 1966, stated that at the Senior Interdepartmental Group meeting on May 3, it had been agreed that Ball should inform Rusk of the SIG views: that there were more international advantages than disadvantages in recognizing Mongolia, that such a decision would require consulting some members of Congress and Japan and informing the GRC, and that the question of timing was important with respect to the GRC reaction.
/3/The remainder of the tabs, except Tab G, consisting of unsigned and undated papers as described in the memorandum, are attached but not printed.
2. There have been significant changes in the situation, leading us to reexamine the problem. We believe the time is now propitious to undertake steps which would lead to recognition of Mongolia. Factors supporting this view include the following:
a) Chinese representation in the United Nations has been resolved for another year and will not come up again for several months;
b) The Republic of China is pleased with the results of the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations which has strongly reaffirmed its international status, and this fact strengthens our position in countering expected GRC opposition to our recognition of Mongolia.
c) We have demonstrated our opposition to Communist aggression in Vietnam, and recognition of Mongolia now would demonstrate our desire to work with and establish contacts with peaceful Asian Communist states;
d) We have had a few recent indications from Mongolian officials through private channels that they continue to wish to establish relations with the U.S. [3 lines of source text not declassified] (INR has completed a study of probable reactions by Mongolia and certain other countries to a U.S. approach--Tab G.)/4/
/4/Tab G is not attached to the source text.
3. We do not expect the Soviet Union to oppose establishment of a U.S. presence in Ulan Bator, although Soviet interests will undoubtedly be reflected in Mongol efforts to control the size and activities of our mission. At the present time, also, the prospect of Chinese Communist criticism will carry less weight with both the Mongols and their Soviet allies. We believe that the current situation in Communist China will have no effect on reactions to our approach to the Mongols.
4. One factor again urging speed is the prospective visit this May of the Vice President of the Republic of China. We should if possible pro-gress to the point that we can make our approach to the Mongols a matter of public knowledge prior to his departure for the United States.
5. If the decision is taken to recognize Mongolia, certain members of Congress should be consulted and the GRC and Japan should be informed beforehand. Japan is also seriously considering early recognition of Mongolia after the January 29 elections and will wish to consult with us on the timing of our respective actions. We should also inform the Soviet Union shortly after approaching the Mongols. We may also wish to notify our NATO allies at an appropriate stage.
6. A recommended action schedule has been prepared by EA and EUR and is attached at Tab B. The talking points at Tab C and D, and draft telegram at Tab E, would be utilized in implementing this schedule following approval of the recommendation contained in the Memorandum for the President at Tab A.
7. We expect the GRC to protest, but we have already told the GRC that we had the step under review. We also believe we should be able to reassure the GRC that these actions do not in any way affect our continuing support for it and that we will play our move in low key. Our suggested action schedule allows the GRC time (two weeks) to make their views known.
8. Although we believe that the Mongols will respond favorably to our initiative, it is always possible that for some reason they will reject it. We believe that the risk on this score is minimal and that in any event the disadvantages that a negative Mongol response would entail do not outweigh the advantages of moving at this time.
Recommendation
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab A./5/
/5/The source text is filed with a February 7 note from Under Secretary Katzenbach's Special Assistant Donald R. Morris stating that Katzenbach had discussed this memorandum with Rusk, who did not sign the memorandum to the President, and that it should be returned to EA on the basis of Katzenbach's conversation with Bundy. A memorandum from Bundy and Leddy to Rusk, undated but with a drafting date of July 5, states that in response to their January 9 memorandum, Katzenbach had suggested seeking to moderate the Republic of China's opposition to recognition of Mongolia by discussing with it some of the anticipated intelligence benefits. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 MONG)
346. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, March 30, 1967, 1040Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 MONG. Top Secret; Exdis.
2993. Eyes only Bundy. Ref: Taipei 2975./2/
/2/Telegram 2975 from Taipei, March 28, stated that McConaughy had a tentative appointment with President Chiang on March 31 to discuss Outer Mongolia. He planned to follow the instructions in telegram 142238, February 23, which instructed him to "take soundings with the Gimo" concerning the possibility of U.S. representation in Ulan Bator and possible intelligence advantages. (Both ibid.)
1. I had meeting March 29 with FonMin Wei at his request, which turned out to be on subject of Outer Mongolia.
2. FonMin said that President Chiang, who is very busy, had suggested that requested meeting with him to discuss Outer Mongolia could be handled by FonMin instead of President. FonMin said he could outline GRC position and that President Chiang would not give any different reaction from that he (FonMin) would give.
3. FonMin said that GRC viewed question of recognition of Outer Mongolia as matter of China's territorial integrity, and that recognition by US would be an act undermining GRC's basic position. He said that closeness of US-GRC relations meant that any US recognition would have a more serious impact on GRC than recognition by Australia, for instance. Australia is a "new friend" but US is a close ally who should not undermine GRC basic policy.
4. I emphasized that USG had not reached any decision on recognition, and that we wished at this stage only to place before President Chiang, and seek his reaction to, some of the possible advantages we think might accrue to US if we should open an Embassy in Ulan Bator. I said that my instructions were to seek the Gimo's views, and that I still wished if possible to have opportunity to do so, but that of course it would be up to Gimo whether he wished to receive me on this subject. I noted that in view of known high importance GRC attaches to entire subject of Outer Mongolia, it would seem appropriate for GRC reaction to be conveyed to US at highest level. I said there was no great urgency about appointment, and that USG was not on the brink of any quick decision, so that I could afford to wait until Gimo might have time to see me.
5. FonMin spoke at some length about impossibility, in GRC view, of getting any advantage from Embassy in Ulan Bator. He said Sovs would not permit US to set up any installations in Outer Mongolia capable of monitoring ChiCom nuclear or missile tests. I confined myself to saying that FonMin perhaps not aware of technological advances which might in fact enable us to obtain valuable technical information.
6. [10 lines of source text not declassified]
7. I reiterated request to discuss matter with Gimo at his conven-ience, and said I would stand by to see if Gimo would find it possible to give appointment. FonMin repeated that Gimo's views would be no different from what FonMin had already conveyed, but agreed to convey my renewed request to Gimo.
8. Today (March 30) in course of unrelated meeting with DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) to exchange views on mainland situation, CCK brought up Outer Mongolia. He recalled that USG has expressed an interest in considering recognition, saying that this had been mentioned to him in September 1965 during his Washington visit. He said that while the matter was outside of his sphere of authority he would like to know of US view of relations between Outer Mongolia and ChiComs.
9. I said we had little independent information, but that Outer Mongolia seemed to be following anti-ChiCom stance similar to Soviets. Soviet influence was apparently strong, but Mongolia should not necessarily be considered merely their puppet. I recalled that Mongolians had recently reviewed alleged 1921 Chinese interference in Outer Mongolia, and I said we had information that Soviet SAMs installed near Ulan Bator. I said USG had reached no decision on recognition, was keeping an open mind, but that I had instructions see Gimo to get his views directly, as well as to convey to him our thoughts on certain advantages possibly to be derived from having an Embassy there. I said FonMin had conveyed to me that Gimo is very busy, but I had renewed my request for an appointment with Gimo because of USG desire to give full consideration to GRC views, and because I knew that Gimo's own views expressed by him would get close high level consideration in Washington. I said I knew Gimo to be very busy, but that I felt it important for our joint interests for me to have appointment.
10. CCK said "I understand."
11. In obviously prepared reminiscences, he spoke of origin of Sino Sov Treaty of 1945, which was result, he said, of agreements at Yalta which GRC had not been party to. He said that during negotiations on that treaty he himself had spoken to Stalin, who said that an Outer Mongolia under influence other than Soviet would be threat to security of USSR. Stalin had also promised that there would be 30 years of peace in the area if Soviet proposals accepted by GRC, and that Soviets would not support ChiComs against ChiNats. (His intention was to say that Soviets not to be trusted.) He then referred to his third trip to Moscow in fall of 1945 to talk about an economic agreement privileges in Manchuria, not to be accorded to any other country. CCK had discussed this provision with Gimo, who had refused to sign, noting that treaty would have excluded US from economic opportunities in Manchuria. (His intention here was to say that GRC had protected US interests at that time.) He recalled that shortly afterwards in November Lin Piao's troops had begun attacking Mukden and Changchun, in violation of agreements.
12. Comment: We have recently had indications from middle level MOFA officers and others that GRC opposition to US or Japanese recognition of Outer Mongolia would be on "moral" grounds rather than on legal grounds, since MOFA officers recognize that GRC abrogation of Sino-Soviet Treaty after it was in force for eight years cannot from international law standpoint undo previous recognition of independence of Outer Mongolia. FonMin did place some emphasis on "territorial integrity" of Outer Mongolia, but major emphasis seemed to be on requesting USG not to undermine position of close ally. CCK has implied that past GRC actions in support of US interests deserve some recompense.
13. I am not sure whether my rather strong representations for appointment with Gimo will produce results, but believe next step should be to await reply from FonMin. If appointment again rejected, I would take it to mean that Gimo feels he already has received substance of this approach from Ambassador Goldberg on March 1 (Embtel 2623)/3/ and does not wish to involve his prestige further at this preliminary stage. It would be quite an adverse indication./4/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 245.
/4/McConaughy reported in telegram 3359, April 28, that he had discussed the possibility of U.S. recognition of Mongolia with Foreign Minister Wei the previous day and that Wei had reiterated GRC opposition. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 MONG)
McConaughy
347. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MONG-US. Secret; Exdis. Sent through Under Secretary of State Katzenbach. Drafted by J. Stapleton Roy of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, and Kreisberg on May 14; and cleared by Bohlen, Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations William B. Macomber, Jr., Jacobson, Shoesmith, Sneider, and Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs George H. Aldrich.
SUBJECT
Recognition of Mongolian People's RepublicDiscussion:
1. In response to our query of May 7, Ambassador Thompson has expressed the opinion that there is now a better-than-even chance that a direct approach to the Mongols on the subject of establishing diplomatic relations would elicit a favorable response (Tab A)./2/ He continues to favor establishing relations with the MPR and does not believe the Soviets would oppose. Last August the Ambassador considered it inadvisable to approach the Mongolian Government on this issue because of indications that the Mongolian position on Vietnam ruled out ties with the United States at that time./3/
/2/Telegram 159927 to Moscow, May 7, and telegram 3782 from Moscow, May 8; neither printed.
/3/Telegram 264 from Moscow, July 20, 1967, reported that the Austrian Ambassador to the Soviet Union had told Thompson this. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 MONG) This is apparently the telegram referred to in a July 20 note from Rusk's Special Assistant Harry W. Shlaudeman to Bundy file with the memorandum from Bundy and Leddy to Rusk cited in footnote 5, Document 345. In the memorandum, Bundy and Leddy renewed their recommendation for recognition of Mongolia. Shlaudeman's note states that Rusk wanted the memorandum returned to Bundy with a cable "which apparently disposes of the problem."
2. We continue to believe that it is in our national interest to establish a diplomatic presence in Mongolia as soon as possible. It would improve our intelligence collection capabilities in that area. It would demonstrate in a timely fashion that the United States is willing to have normal relations with an Asian Communist state which leaves its neighbors in peace. It would not at this time have a significant effect on the attitudes of the USSR or Communist China.
3. In terms of timing, there are advantages in moving now while Vietnam negotiations are in an early stage. Progress towards peace talks has already served to ease existing political restraints, as demonstrated by Soviet ratification of the Consular Convention. In addition, the President and the White House staff have in recent weeks requested your suggestions on possible policy initiatives for the balance of the Administration. Recognition of Mongolia can usefully be considered in this context also.
4. We cannot expect to secure GRC concurrence in this move, and Nationalist Chinese opposition will continue to be vigorous. In March 1967 Ambassador Goldberg mentioned directly to President Chiang the intelligence aspect of our interest in recognition, and Ambassador McConaughy subsequently discussed the potential intelligence benefits in greater detail with GRC Foreign Minister Wei and other GRC officials reiterated their Government's strong opposition to recognition of Mongolia by the US. Ambassador McConaughy this month has reassessed the GRC attitude (Taipei 3177 at Tab C)./4/ Although he recommends, from the standpoint of "best nourishment of our interests and relations" in Taiwan, that we postpone indefinitely any move toward recognition, he believes that GRC reaction now would be substantially that which he anticipated a year ago. We therefore conclude that recognition of Mongolia will create strains in our relations but that these strains will be largely temporary in nature and manageable in degree. Our actions over the past few years have probably conditioned Taipei to accept the inevitability of eventual US recognition of Mongolia, and the record shows we have given every consideration to GRC views. Moreover, unlike 1961, the GRC will not need to take any positive action suggesting acquiescence in our move.
/4/Telegram 3177 from Taipei, May 22; not printed.
5. The Japanese Government has made clear on several occasions its hope that the US would keep the GOJ informed of any US decision to move toward recognition of Mongolia. Embassy Tokyo's assessment (Tab D)/5/ emphasizes that the GOJ would probably welcome such a move. We have indicated we would stay in close touch with the GOJ. The GOJ has informed the Mongolian Government of its willingness to enter diplomatic relations with Mongolia if the MPR would agree to waive the right to raise the question of war reparations, a condition the Mongols have thus far refused to meet. GRC opposition is also a factor in Tokyo's moves, as is the GOJ's desire to establish diplomatic relations with the MPR in advance of the US. In view of the sensitivity of the GRC and the GOJ on this issue, we intend to inform both governments in advance of any US decision to approach the Mongols on the question of recognition. Embassy Seoul (Tab E)/6/ favors recognition providing the timing does not come on the heels of some unsettling development.
/5/Tab D, listed as telegram 8623 from Tokyo, is not attached to the source text. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 MONG)
/6/Tab E, listed as telegram 7443 from Seoul, is not attached to the source text. (Ibid.)
6. Congressional support for this initiative will be essential. Our first move would be to take renewed soundings with key and discreet Congressional leaders. We have noted that key members of Congress, including the Chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have favored recognition of Mongolia.
Recommendations:
1. That we in collaboration with H be authorized to sound out key Congressional opinion on recognizing Mongolia, drawing on information in Tab B./7/
/7/Tab B, listed as talking points for use with members of Congress, is not attached to the source text.
2. That we then inform both the GRC and the GOJ that we intend to approach the Mongols to ascertain their position on exchanging diplomatic representation with the US.
3. That we then sound out the Mongols in Moscow concerning their attitude toward establishing diplomatic relations with the US, and if their reaction is positive, that we then open formal discussions with the Mongols looking toward recognition and exchange of diplomatic representatives./8/
/8/The source text bears no indication of Rusk's approval or disapproval. Another copy is filed with a copy of a memorandum from Meeker to Rusk, undated but with a drafting date of June 20, stating that Read had asked the Legal Adviser's Office to review the 1961 exchanges with the Republic of China on the question of recognition of Mongolia to ascertain the nature and duration of any U.S. commitments. Meeker's memorandum concluded that there was no commitment binding on the United States in 1968 to refrain from recognizing Mongolia. An attached handwritten note of July 29 by Meeker states that Rusk "saw this after his return from Honolulu. He has in mind to let the Japanese act first, and is doubtful of our moving very soon." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 MONG)
[end of document]
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