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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
35. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, July 15, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Cabot-Wang Talks. Secret. A note in Komer's handwriting on the source text reads as follows: "Jim Thomson and Rice make sense on this one! We may want to use Warsaw channel for real signals, so better not to clog it with a lot of useless noise. RWK."
SUBJECT
Warsaw Talk with the Chicoms, July 29The attached cable from Ed Rice in Hong Kong/2/ offers a persuasive U.S. line for the re-opened Warsaw talks with Peiping's new Ambassador July 29.
/2/Telegrams 48 and 52 from Hong Kong, July 13 and 14 respectively, are attached but not printed. Both are in Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US.
Rice argues that:
(1) We have here a good opportunity to clarify our various signals to the Chicoms on Southeast Asia.
(2) We should do this in strictly non-polemical fashion--and thereby attempt to alter the tone of the Warsaw meetings for future discussions with the new man.
(3) We should re-invoke the "Bandung principles".
(4) We should avoid squeezing debater's points from the literature of Sino-Soviet polemics.
It seems to me that such an approach might help to raise the tone and usefulness of the Warsaw channel. This presentation would be impressive as well to Warsaw's keyhole listeners, the Poles and the Russians.
May I urge my pals at State to follow this approach in their instructions to Cabot?/3/
/3/A note in Bundy's handwriting next to this sentence on the source text reads as follows: "Yes, indeed."
James C. Thomson, Jr./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
36. Memorandum From William E. Colby, Chief, Far East Division, Plans Directorate of the Central Intelligence Agency to That Agency's Deputy Director for Plans (Helms)
Washington, July 15, 1964.
[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Central Intelligence Agency, Volume I. Top Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]
37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
Washington, July 23, 1964, 6:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dean and Grant. Cleared in substance by William Bundy, and in draft by Carl Salans of L/FE, Allen Whiting of INR/RFE, William C. Trueheart of SEA, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Vietnamese Affairs Michael Forrestal, and Thomson. Approved by Grant. Repeated to London, Stockholm, Taipei, and Hong Kong.
160. Cabot-Wang Talks: 121 Meeting Guidance. Following guidance is provisional and not fully cleared. It is provided to permit you to begin to organize your presentation. Changes or confirmation will follow.
FYI: ChiComs in June held major party meeting and apparently consulted with North Vietnamese and other friends. Result has been deeper ChiCom commitment to come to assistance North Viet-Nam if attacked. (See July 9 People's Daily Editorial.) While ChiComs thus more committed to meet major US attack, they have avoided committing selves to explicit action in response US actions at lower level. We presume they will reiterate threats contained July 9 editorial. We are particularly interested to see whether their private statements to us differ in any way from the public utterances. We are also interested in determining whether they press strongly for reconvened Geneva Conference, and on what terms. Intensity of pressure in this direction probably would reflect degree of ChiCom concern at likelihood escalation in Southeast Asia. We do not have indications that ChiComs presently anticipate US attack on North Viet-Nam. First session with new ChiCom representative affords good opportunity both to clarify US signals on SEA and to indicate our desire to keep open Warsaw channel. End FYI.
1. Suggest you open meeting by greeting Ambassador Wang Kuo-chuan and introducing staff. Then proceed on following lines:
2. "While we cannot boast of many successes or much agreement reached in these talks, hope you agree that they have served useful purpose in permitting contact and providing channel in case of need. We believe it is to advantage both our sides to have clear understanding of each other's intentions, particularly in situations where there is serious threat of a major confrontation.
"In Southeast Asia we presently face just such a serious situation. We have read your statements as to obligation which you feel to support Communization of other nations. We see a confrontation between your ambitions and our resolve to prevent non-Communist governments of Southeast Asia from being overturned by infiltration and subversion supported and led from outside their borders.
"If in fact we stand perilously [close] to a confrontation, it is no pleasure to us. We have too much affection and respect for Chinese people to enjoy possibility of becoming involved in hostilities involving them. Nevertheless, if we correctly read your intentions, the possibility exists. If we have misread your intentions, we should be informed."
3. Make following points, paraphrased from Depcirtel 49:/2/
/2/Circular telegram 49, July 7; not printed. (Ibid., POL 1 ASIA SE-US)
a. US has vital interest and commitments in Asia as well as Europe, and does not intend to treat our Asian commitments more lightly than European ones.
b. Our specific commitment to the Republic of Viet-Nam goes back a decade. Systematic violation of 1954 Geneva Accords by Communists has forced us to respond.
c. Our consistent policy has been to assist South Viet-Nam in its efforts to maintain freedom and independence in the face of covert Communist aggression directed from outside SVN, and in violation of Geneva Accords. We intend to maintain that policy.
d. This battle is being fought by Vietnamese, with aid sent by US and other free nations, at request of Republic of Viet-Nam. So long as Viet Cong, supported and directed by DRV and encouraged by your side, continues its attacks on GVN, US will find it necessary to lend GVN such help as it needs to restore peace.
e. Secretary Rusk said on July 1 "peace ought to be possible in Southeast Asia without any extension of the fighting . . . . First objective of our policy and our desire in SEA is to exploit that possibility."/3/ We are well aware of serious consequences that could flow from an expansion of war beyond the borders of SVN. We do not desire it and will seek to avoid it, but we shall not abandon our objectives or commitments out of fear of it.
/3/For the transcript of the July 1 press conference at which Rusk made this statement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1964, pp. 82-88.
f. As to negotiation, neutralization, or a political settlement to bring peace to Southeast Asia: we would like nothing better than an end to terror and killing. Negotiated settlements have been spelled out in Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962, and we believe present need to be for Communist observance of those accords, rather than negotiation of new arrangements.
4. In Laos a similar situation obtains. We shall continue our support for RLG. We support Geneva Agreement of 1962 and Government of National Union headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. PL and DRV have endeavored to undermine arrangements. North Vietnamese troops have never left Laos as provided in Geneva Agreement and they continue use Laotian territory as route of infiltration to South Viet-Nam, in violation 1962 Agreements. With assistance of DRV, PL has taken over Plaine des Jarres, traditional base of neutralist forces under Kong Le. It has done so on fiction that neutralist forces in possession that area had suddenly become no longer "true neutralists," apparently because PL decided they were not amenable to Communist control. So long as these Communist efforts destroy Tripartite Government continue, we shall continue to respond to requests for assistance by the legitimate government of Laos recognized by all participants in Geneva settlement.
We read in People's Daily of July 6 that "US and Laotian right wing ousted Prince Souvanna from power by force, put him under house arrest, announced his removal from Premiership, etc." You have fabricated your own version of events by ignoring explicit US condemnation of April 19 coup and continued US support for Souvanna, and by attempting to create a US announcement which does not exist. A policy based on unreality constitutes a peril for all involved. It is unfortunate enough for you to make such misstatements. We hope that you do not believe them. Similarly, we hope that you understand correctly the firmness of our resolve to support the RLG, and that you are not acting on basis of a willful underestimate of our seriousness and ability to assist RLG to defend its independence and neutrality.
5. Lest there be any misunderstanding of our policy in Far East, we wish to repeat what President Kennedy said on June 27, 1962: "purposes of the US in this area are peaceful and defensive."/4/ We believe your side is aware that our presence in SEA is intended to help free nations there protect themselves against externally-directed subversion, and is not aimed at your destruction or at destruction of authorities in North Viet-Nam. We have no interest in maintenance of US presence in SEA beyond defense of those free governments. If US military presence is onerous to your side, simplest means of achieving its withdrawal would be for you and North Vietnamese to terminate pressures upon those governments.
/4/For the transcript of the press conference on June 27, 1962, at which Kennedy made this statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 509-517.
6. Wang Kuo-chuan will probably start with lengthy series of complaints about US "aggressive acts" in FE. This will include People's Daily editorial on 300th serious warning (FBIS 128) and editorial on U-2 (FBIS 139). Wang may then reiterate ChiCom serious warnings concerning attacks on North Viet-Nam (see July 9 People's Daily editorial, FBIS 133, and ChiCom Government statement July 19, FBIS 141). He may repeat that "Chinese people cannot be expected to look on with folded arms in face of aggression in North Viet-Nam" and that a US attack on North Viet-Nam would pose threat to China's peace and security.
7. Suggest you respond to warning re ChiCom actions in event US attack on NVN by referring to your statements para 4 d&e and para 6 above, and observing that his side's peace and security not at stake, but rather his side's ambitions.
8. Wang may press strongly for Geneva meeting on Laos. You should respond that such meetings seem desired by Communists to legitimize military conquest. Note Souvanna's statement that meeting dependent upon restoration of neutralist position in Plaine des Jarres and an effective ceasefire. We favor negotiation among Lao leaders, or with other participants as proposed by Poland. If Wang presses this point or makes an official request for such a meeting tell him that you will refer request to Department.
9. Suggest you ignore routine "serious warnings." If pressed, state that in past complaints have been without foundation but volunteer to submit specific complaints to Department. On U-2s, ignore unless Wang charges that we broke word in supplying further U-2s to GRC after first two were lost. In latter case, observe that US never made such commitment. US spokesman on September 9, 1962 said GRC had contracted purchase two U-2s./5/ On September 13, 1962 President Kennedy said we had no plans to sell any further ones./6/ We have subsequently had ample reason to change decision.
/5/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXII, p. 318, footnote 2.
/6/For the transcript of the press conference on September 13, 1962, at which Kennedy made this statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 674-681.
10. Wang may ask for US view on draft joint statement presented 120th meeting requesting US adhere Bandung principles and withdraw from Taiwan. Suggest you tell Wang US favors these principles, but we have observed that his side seems to have no scruples of conscience in pronouncing such principles, and then announcing support of Communist insurrection in free world. We believe in non-interference, and wished that his side really shared the belief. As for "withdrawal" from Taiwan US has treaty obligation with Republic of China. We will not abandon this obligation. There are a few thousand US military advisors on Taiwan. It requires a remarkable imagination to say that these men seized Taiwan by force of arms and are controlling the Republic of China and its army of several hundred thousand.
11. It is just possible that ChiComs may raise substance Mao July 11 interview with Japanese Socialist Party delegation concerning Taiwan. (See Hong Kong 57 to Department being repeated you.)/7/ Mao reportedly said if US would agree to withdraw forces from Taiwan China would guarantee not to install its own forces on island. You should respond that you presume this means ChiComs prepared renounce use of force against Taiwan provided US withdraws its military advisors. If response affirmative say you will report to Department. In any case, draw Wang out as to specifics of proposal.
/7/Dated July 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 JAPAN)
12. If Wang raises question of transferring site of talks, tell him you will refer suggestion to Department.
13. When Wang suggests date for next meeting you should, if necessary, suggest that interval until next meeting not exceed two months.
14. In view sensitivity of topics, you are particularly urged to make detailed telegraphic report covering this meeting.
Rusk
38. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, July 24, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: JOB 80-B01285A, DCI Mtgs with the Pres, May-Oct 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.
SUBJECT
Meeting with the President--11:15 a.m., 24 July 1964.[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
3. With respect to the Chinese atomic program, I said we could not foretell when the Chinese would explode a device. However, we had observed five installations associated with the Chinese Atomic Energy Program in various stages of assembly and operation and hence I concluded they had overcome some, if not all, of their problems associated with the Soviet's withdrawal of technical assistance and were now making progress./2/
/2/An attached paper dated July 22, entitled "Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Capabilities," is apparently the briefing paper that McCone used to brief the President on this subject. It states that the evidence was "still insufficient to permit confident conclusions as to the likelihood of Chinese Communist nuclear detonation in the next few months."
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
Washington, July 25, 1964, 9:42 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Grant, cleared by William Bundy and in substance by Harriman and Thomson, approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to London, Stockholm, Taipei, and Hong Kong.
169. Cabot-Wang Talks: 121st Meeting Guidance. Deptel 160/2/ rptd London 569, Stockholm 66, Taipei 74, Hong Kong 98.
/2/Document 37.
Guidance in reftel is confirmed, with following amendments:
Section 2. Introduce presentation with brief review of purposes of talks and their successes and failures. Revise first two paragraphs section 2 as necessary to accommodate your general introduction. Eliminate third para section 2. Close section with statement that a clear statement of our position seems desirable to avoid possibility of misunderstanding.
Section 3 para d. Expand closing phrase to read "to lend SVN such help as it desires and needs to restore peace."
Section 5. Expand conclusion of your presentation along following lines: We have presented our position in SEAsia in some detail as means insofar as possible of avoiding danger of conflict based upon misunderstanding. Given our understanding that your ultimate intention is Communization SEAsia by any means, we are not confident that confrontation between us is avoidable. However, we welcome an expression from you of your side's intentions concerning area.
Rusk
40. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, July 29, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Geneva, Moscow, and Stockholm.
223. Department telegram 160. Cabot-Wang talks./2/
/2/Telegram 160 is Document 37. Cabot commented in telegram 227 from Warsaw, July 30, "I think it fair to say there appeared to be something of a 'collision course' atmosphere." He reported the meeting in further detail in airgram A-112, August 3. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
(1) Wang asked say a few words first in which he affirmed in pursuance directive his government he wished to continue maximum efforts through talks to achieve peaceful solution Sino-American problems and work toward change in stagnant state of them. I reciprocated hope talks may prove fruitful. Then made lengthy opening statement based closely on first five sections reference telegram with changes desired Department telegram 169.
(2) After Wang's rejection my "absurd distortion facts and groundless charges" against his government he mentioned draft agreed announcement of last meeting, saying it would open way to find settlement Sino-American disputes and conforms to common desire improve relations. Agreement would carry immense significance. Wang then reviewed totals serious warnings with break-down recent ones saying provocations not confined to coastal regions but extended deep into hinterland. Mentioned "incessant instigation and support of 'Chiang gang raids' and spy aircraft." Since November of last year until June of this, nine groups of Chiang agents captured in raids on mainland and two more spy planes shot down since last meeting. U-2 nominally Chiang's but "control US". Said recently Admiral Felt in Taiwan clamored for risking war with Communist China and President Johnson openly declared US must be prepared risk war. All these facts point to utter unwillingness seek peaceful settlement disputes or practice peaceful coexistence. Said at last meeting I had tried justify US seizing Taiwan and our rejection agreed announcement by revoking treaty with Chiang government. This completely untenable since Chiang long ago overthrown by Chinese people and did not represent anyone. Treaty illegal, null and void. Said we had concocted treaty of December 2, 1954 more than four years after our seizure Taiwan.
(3) Wang continued we had slandered his side in accusing it of violation principles peaceful coexistence. Said "we are Communists. It goes without saying we shall propagate revolutionary doctrine but unlike you we do not have single soldier in any foreign territory anywhere in world. We have never advocated export of revolutions in propagating our revolutionary doctrine. We only publicize objective truth." Continued our armed intervention many areas of world was aggression. Said we and not they unscrupulously meddled in affairs other countries. Seizure Taiwan and interference Chinese internal affairs gave rise Sino-American dispute. These facts can in no way be bypassed and account must be settled at some time.
(4) Wang continued tension Indo-China caused by our planning new military adventures there which aroused concern people of China, Asia and rest of world. Said after assassination Foreign Minister Laos we had again instigated rightists to stage coup and our intervention had known no bounds. Geneva accords in danger being completely scrapped. On June 11 our fighter bombers bombed Khang Khay. Our brutal atrocity caused heavy losses among Lao and killed one, wounded five in Chinese Economic and Cultural Commission. Chinese Government and people expressed great indignation at this and Wang instructed lodge serious protest to US through me. Chinese Government reserves all rights pursue responsibility in this case (sic). Said we had long since thrown overboard Geneva agreements South Vietnam and even clamoring spread war to North Vietnam. Present situation Indo-China exceedingly grave. There is danger flames of war will spread even to whole of SEA. China is signatory to both Geneva agreements and these matters have direct bearing on Chinese security. China cannot look on with apathy in face grave situation we have created in Indo-China. Chen Yi has made clear Chinese people absolutely will not sit idly by while Geneva agreements torn up and flames of war spread. Chinese people cannot be expected look on with folded arms in face any aggression against DRV. Said he hoped these statements had received our full attention. China had advocated conference fourteen signatory nations seek peaceful settlement Laos question basis Geneva accords. Many among fourteen endorsed proposal but we obstructing holding conference, putting blind faith in force of arms, believing we can act with impunity. Said we must understand revolutionary people cannot be cowed into submission through force of arms. This policy would ultimately bring ignominious fiasco.
(5) I responded I was astonished and dismayed at Wang's statements and must state categorically many of them inaccurate. For instance we had nothing do with bombing Khang Khay. Re Taiwan I made clear US has no intention abandoning treaty obligations. Followed with substance latter half section 10 reference telegram then first half re draft statement. I then spoke of peaceful coexistence and exportation revolutions, quoting from ChiCom Central Committee letter to Soviets June 14 last year re general line including concept "to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed peoples and nations." Said this policy has caused ChiComs give support contrary Geneva agreements to wars being waged by PL in Laos and Viet Cong in both Laos and South Vietnam. Asked how in face this quote issued by highest authority and in face ChiCom deeds Laos and Vietnam they could expect us let SEA fall through ChiCom use of force against wishes people of area. Said we agreed most unfortunate for everyone if war expanded such as to North Vietnam but on other hand surely ChiComs must realize if their gross interference Laos and South Vietnam continues there is danger war might spread and it is that we wish avoid. If we are agreed on necessity upholding Geneva agreements that is great step forward. Unfortunately complete discrepancy between ChiCom words spoken here and deeds SEA.
(6) I continued saying re 14-power conference we had encouraged consultation Vientiane and we prepared accept Polish proposals but all this refused by Wang's side.
(7) Wang returned to Taiwan theme in familiar well worn terms saying we tried use pretext GRC was sovereign state to cover up our serious crime of seizing Chinese territory. We would not succeed in this scheme.
(8) Wang continued I had made clear US determined continue intervention Indo-China and even made threat extending war to North Vietnam. Said this was making mockery of Sino-American ambassadorial level talks. Said he wanted tell me bluntly 650 million Chinese people cannot be bullied easily. Indomitable Chinese nation cannot ever be cowed into submission. We would do well ponder matter carefully as to serious consequences for ourselves which will arise as result our irresponsible behavior. Said despite our lawlessness Indo-China his government had consistently exercised self-restraint. Should we make miscalculation and take this attitude as sign weakness and think we can act as we please with impunity, going on with present course, we would find ourselves "licked by the fire with which you have been playing." Said Indo-China is next door to China and DRV and other IC states related to China "like lips and teeth" and fraternal feelings exist. Chinese people by no means would sit idly by while US expanded war. Whatever Chinese Government and people say will count and we would do well bear this in mind. Evident US should be held fully responsible for daily worsening situation Indo-China. We were trying to play trick of thief crying "stop thief" and make wild allegation Chinese support DRV in aggression. Said it was known to whole world DRV firmly abided by all provisions Geneva agreements. There was no single foreign military base or single foreign soldier on territory DRV. Said our call for them abstain from exerting pressure on neighbor was putting foot in wrong shoe. Tension IC created solely by US. US instead of China should do some intensive soul-searching rectifying our misdeeds and rein up horse before precipice. Said could not see indications we willing for relaxation tension IC. On contrary every sign we plotting fresh military adventures.
(9) Wang then put following questions:
What are you up to in sending Chairman JCS to South Vietnam? What is your purpose in giving $125 million aid to bogus South Vietnam Government? What is your purpose in reinforcing forces South Vietnam with several hundred more so-called military advisers? What are you up to in despatching several hundred Sky Raider aircraft and other types to South Vietnam? What are your intentions in sending flagship Oklahoma City to Saigon? Said if we were really sincere we would immediately call off aggression and intervention.
(10) I replied remarks re seizure Taiwan so wide of mark I need not review again. Fact is a government exists there recognized by more governments than recognize Chinese Communists and important armed forces are there. Have been no hostile military operation by US there. As for Wang's series of questions my opening statement really answered them. I said I had no desire issue threats but wished make our intentions clear and could scarcely consider some of Wang's comments anything but a threat. I then followed guidance section 7 reference telegram, adding could not help but note Wang gave no explanation for extraordinary and revealing statement Chinese Communist Central Committee which I quoted and said we had ample proof war South Vietnam and Laos both backed by North Vietnam with Chinese Communist help.
(11) After another Taiwan tirade Wang said leaders USG had publicly admitted aggression and intervention Vietnam affairs. US has grossly violated sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity IC states. Said we would be fostering reactionary forces Laos and instigated them in repeatedly overthrowing legal governments Laos thus undermining national unity. We could not shift responsibility recent bombing there.
(12) I said we seemed to have reached a point where further discussion almost useless. I profoundly disagreed with practically everything he said. Important thing was ask Wang transmit to his regime what we had said here today and hoped his regime would study it carefully.
(13) Wang mentioned their unacceptable earlier proposal re newsmen saying in view our extremely hostile attitude toward China our proposal re newsmen made them suspicious of ulterior motive. Said prior meetings had made clear Chinese position re American "criminal offenders" and he would not go into that. Said Central Committee article was correct but this sort of thing not chief subject we called on to settle in these meetings and did not propose go into that. Complained of my discourtesy in calling the government of the great PRC a "regime."
Next meeting September 23.
Cabot
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